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Ar
LA
DUE PROCESS qf LAW
and
THE EQUAL PROTECTION
qfthe LAWS
A Treatise Based, in the Main, on the Cases in Which
the Supreme Court of the United States Has
Granted or Denied Relief upon the
One Ground or the Other
By HANNIS TAY|»OR
Hon. LL. D. of the Dnivenitiet of £Jihi>ur^lKLnd Dublin and of eight
American Dnivenitiet
Author of The JurisdictUn and Procedure of thi Supremi Court of the
United States**; *' International Public Law**; "The Science of
Jurisprudence** (Presented to the Institute of France, March 13,
1909); ''The Origin and Growth of the English Constitution**; ''The
Origin and Growth of the American Constitution**; "Cicero, a
Sketch of His Life and Works. 'A Commentary on the Roman Con--
stitution and Roman Public Life.** Sometime Minister Plenipo-
tentiary of the United States to Spain.
CHICAGO
CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY
191 7
GOPTBIGHT 1917
BT
CALLAGHAN & COMPANY
242'; 66
■ •^ • •
• ^»
"v
tKitt antfior \tAitatti tfittf book
to W slon
HANNIS JOSEPH TAYLOR
Tecentlj admitted to the bar, and through him to
the new generation of American lawyers who wiU
be called upon to defend the ancient constitutional
guaranties imbedded in ''the law of the land"
against the persistent effort now in progress to sub-
stitute for them a bureaucratic system based on the
deadly assumption that this is no longer "a thorough
government of law as contradistinguished to a gov-
ernment of functionaries."
Qniunquam te, Marce fill, . . . Cari sunt pa-
rentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed omnes
omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua
qnis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit pro-
raturuaf Cicero, De Offldis, I, i, xvii.
PREFACE
The principles embodied in the constitntional formu-
lafi — due process of law and the equal protection of the
\awa — are the ultimate outcome of the progressive history
of the English and American peoples considered as one
unbroken development. The basic conception^ whether it
be called **due process of law*' or *Hhe law of the land,'*
is purely an English creation which has no prototype in
the constitutional history of any other country. As
lieber has expressed it, ''The guaranty of the suprem-
acy of the law [due process] leads to a principle which,
so far as I know, it has never been attempted to trans-
plant from the soil inhabited by Anglican people, and
which, nevertheless, has been, in our system of liberty, the
natural production of a thorough government of law as
contradistinguished to a government of functionaries.''
CivU Liberty and Self -Government, 91.
As thus defined, due process of law stands as the anti-
pole of what the French jurists call droit administratif ,
which rests upon the assumption that in France the gov-
ermnent and each of its servants possess a body of
special rights and privileges as against private citizens
to be fixed on principles different from those defining the
legal rights and duties of one citizen towards another.
Under that theory, speaking generally, the ordinary
tribunals have no concern with administrative law (droit
administratif) as applied by administrative courts {tri-
bunaux administratif s) ^ at the head of which stands the
Council of State. Dalloz, Jurisprudence Generale, 1883,
ii, p. 212; iii, p. 94; 1884, i, p. 220; Aucoc, Droit Admin-
vi PEEPACE
istratif , ss, 24, 269-272 ; Vivien, Etudes Administratives,
i, pp. 129, 140 ; M. P. BoBuf, Droit Administratif (4~ ed.),
p. 11 ; Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, pp. 50, 252, 306-
332; Taylor, The Science of Jurisprudence, pp. 88-9.
For example if a body of policemen in France, who have
broken into a monastery, seized its property and expelled
its inmates under an administrative order, are charged
with what English lawyers would call trespass and
assault, they would plead as an exemption the govern-
ment 's mandate in the execution of its decrees dissolving
certain religious societies. If the right to plead that
exemption is questioned before an ordinary civil tribunal,
a ** conflict*' arises which can not be settled by an ordi-
nary judge under what we would call the law of the land.
In that illustration we have a sharply defined distinction
between **a thorough government of law as contradis-
tinguished to a government of functionaries.**
Mr. Dicey has said that **The words * administrative
law, * which are its most natural rendering, are unknown
to English judges and counsel, and are in themselves
hardly intelligible without further explanation. This
absence from our language of any satisfactory equiva-
lent for the expression droit administrcUif is significant ;
the want of a name arises at bottom from our non-recog-
nition of the thing itself. In England, and in countries
which, like the United States, derive their civilization
from English sources, the system of administrative law
and the very principles on which it rests are in truth
unknown. This absence from the institutions of the
Union of anything answering to droit administratif
arrested the observation of Tocqueville from the first
moment when he began his investigations into the char-
acter of American democracy. In 1831 he writes to an
experienced judge {magistrat)j Monsieur De Blosseville,
to ask both for an explanation of the contrast in this mat-
ter between French and American institutions, and also
for an authoritative explanation of the general ideas
(notions generates) governing the droit administratif of
PREFACE vu
his country. ' ' The Law of the Constitntion, p. 307, citmg
Tooqueville, CEuvres Completes, vii, p. 66.
The first and only attempt ever made to induce the
Supreme Court of the Utaited States to recognize the
existence in this country of a droit administratif occurred
in the famous case of the United States v. Lee, 106 U. S.
196, involving the title to the Arlington estate, sold dur-
ing the Civil war to the United States for taxes, the cer-
tificate of sale being impeached because of the refusal of
the commissioners to permit the owner to pay the tax,
with interest and costs, before the day of sale, by an
agent, or in any other way than by payment in person.
After the case, an action of ejectment, had been removed
to the United States Circuit Court, the Attorney General
challenged its jurisdiction, and denied its right to pro-
ceed because **the property in controversy in this suit
has been for more than ten years and now is held, occu-
pied and possessed by the United States, through its offi-
cers and agents, charged in behalf of the Government of
the United States with the control of the property, and
who are in the actual possession thereof, as public prop-
erty of the United States, for public uses, in the exercise
of their sovereign and constitutional powers as a mili-
tary station and as a national cemetery established for
the burial of deceased soldiers and sailors, and known
and designed as the 'Arlington Cemetery.' '' Against
that plea of droit administratif thus set up by the agents
of the Government of the United States stood the conten-
tion of the plaintiff that the property in question was his
private property, and that it had been taken from him in
violation of the constitutional provisions which guaranty
due process of law, and that private property can not
be taken for public use without just compensation. The
issue so made up between the droit administratif and
'*the law of the land'* was thus stated by the court itself:
''The counsel for plaintiffs in error and in behalf of the
United States assert the proposition, that though it has
been ascertained by the verdict of the jury, in which no
viu PREFACE
error is f ound| that the plaintiff has the title to the land
in controversy, and that what is set up in behalf of the
United States is no title at all, the court can render no
judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants
in the action, because the latter hold the property as
officers and agents of the United Staies amd it is appro-
priated to lawful public uses/^ To this, perhaps the
piost vital question ever submitted to it, the Court
answered, in the majestic words of Mr. Justice Miller,
that ''No man in this country is so high that he is above
the law. No officer of the law may set that law at
defiance, with impunity. All the officers of the Govern-
ment, from the highest to the lowest, are creations of
the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who,
by accepting office, participates in its functions, is only
the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy,
and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon
the exercise of the authority which it gives. Courts of
justice are established not only to decide upon the con-
troverted rights of the citizens as against each other,
but also upon rights in controversy between them and
the Government, and the docket of this court is crowded
with controversies of the latter class.'* No more notable
triumph was ever won by **the law of the land.*'
The germs of existing English and American ideas of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws first
appeared during the reign of Henry II, who undertook
not only to establish the reign of law, but to reduce all
orders of men to a state of equality before the same
system of law. The most formidable obstacles that stood
in the way of the complete execution of that august
design were the baronage on the one hand, with their
private jurisdictions, and the clergy on the other, with
their far-reaching claims of exemption from ordinary
process of the temporal tribunals. As Bishop Stubbs
has expressed it: ''The former must be compelled to
agree to the restriction of their hereditary jurisdictions
PREFACE is
within the smallest compass, and the latter to allow
themselves to be, in all matters not purely spiritual, sub-
ject to the ordinary process of law J* Select Charters,
p. 21. The foundations thus laid were soon widened and
strengthened by those provisions of the Great Charter
that embody a series of practical rules, both general and
special, for the government of all courts in the admin-
istration of justice, first among which stand chapters 39
and 40, providing: ''and we will not set forth against
him, nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgment
of his peers and by the law of the land. To no one will
we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or
justice.'*
During the period that intervened between the Nor-
man conquest and the end of the fourteenth century the
feudal council that gathered around the Norman and
Angevin kings, with authority too vague and shadowy
for precise definition, was gradually transformed into
an assembly of estates that won not only the right to
participate in taxation and legislation, but to supervise
and control the entire system of national administration.
At the beginning of the period all of the great powers
of government are centralized in the person of the king,
acting through his continual council composed of the
officers of state and of the household, from which ema-
nated all the more important acts of government, whether
administrative, legislative, judicial, fiscal, or political.
At the end of the period we find the sum of govern-
mental power, originally vested in the king in coimcil,
vastly reduced by a process of subtraction through which
the greater part of the judicial work of the continual
council, which soon came to be known as the curia regis,
was permanently transferred to its offspring, the courts
of king's bench, common pleas, and exchequer, each
devoted to the hearing of a definite class of causes. And
when at a later day out of the residuum of judicial power
retained by the council was developed the equitable juris-
diction of the chancellor, the judicial functions of the
z PREFACE
crown were confined within a still narrower circle. Tay-
lor, The Origin and Growth of English Constitntion,
iiiy pp. 248-250, 302. By the transfer thus brought about
of the greater part of the judicial business originally
despatched by the king in council to the great courts of
law and equity, the central administration, in its judicial
aspect, was transformed into a government of law as
distinguished from a government of functionaries. In
that way the principle became settled that judicial con-
troversies should no longer be determined by the mere
force of royal authority, but by due process of law, —
that is, by law administered in fixed tribunals by trained
judges governed by principles and precedent drawn from
the Old English code of customary law as modified by
Norman innovation.
The most important part of that Norman innovation
was represented by the writ process, a creation of royal
law that brought the central administration of justice
into close contact with the popular or customary law as
administered in the local popular assemblies known as
the courts of the hundred and the shire. In that way
the Norman system of central or royal law and the Old
English system of local or popular law (see as to the
distinction, Budolph Sohm, North American Review for
July, 1874, p. 222) were drawn together and finally amal-
gamated in one composite whole that retains to this day
the strongest elements of both. The visible outcome of
the imion between the Norman curia and the Old English
shiremoot is the typical English law court of modem
times, in which witnesses depose to facts, upon which
the jury pass under the guidance and direction of a judge
learned in the law. Under the infiuence of the Norman
writ process the community-witnesses of the Old English
customary law were finally relieved altogether of their
character of witnesses, and endowed with the right to
act as judges of evidence detailed by others. From the
account given of juries by Fprtescue in his treatise (De
Laudibus Legum Angliae, c. xxvi, 89, Clermont ed.),
PREFACE zi
written between 1460 and 1470, it is quite clear that the
final stage of the development of the jury, as a jury of
judgment in civil cases, was not reached before the mid-
dle of the fifteenth century. First employed in suits in
which rights to land were in question, the jury was grad-
ually extended by the judges to the trial of other civil
cases in which rights to land were not involved. The
decree of the Later an Council which led to the abolition
of trial by ordeal paved the way for the introduction
of the trial jury into criminal procedure. After ordeals
were abolished in England, no way remained of
traversing the presumption of guilt which arose out of
the accusation made by the jury of presentment. To
remedy that evil by giving the accused his constitutional
right to traverse in some form the presumption of guilt
raised against him, trial by petit jury was gradually
introduced in criminal cases. Not until that point was
reached, not until trial by jury, in both civil and crim-
inal cases, became an established institution, did due
process of law become, in the full sense of the term, an
integral and recognized element in the English judicial
system.
As the trial jury did not exist either in civil or criminal
cases at the time of the winning of the Great Charter
of 1215, it is folly to contend that it was referred to as
such in the famous chapter 39, which declares : * * and we
will not set forth against him, nor send against him,
unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the
law of the land.'' It was settled long ago that the guar-
anty of trial by jury was not contained in the phrase,
**the lawful judgment of his peers," and that **by the
law of the land" was guarantied at most judgment by
some of the contemporary methods of trial — the duel,
ordeal, or compurgation in criminal cases ; the duel, wit-
nesses, charters, or recognition in property cases. Thus
it appears that the chapter in question, ^^a sacred text,
the nearest approach to a ^fundamental statute' that
English has ever had," contained only the germs out
xii PREFACE
of which the modem conception of due process of law has
been slowly evolved. Pollock and Maitland, Hist, of
Eng. Law, 2d, i, 173. In each age chapter 39 has been
interpreted as a living guaranty of fundamental rights
according to the needs of that age. In that way, after
being lost for a long time in the midnight of the Tudor
despotism, it was resurrected and given a broad con-
struction by the jurists and statesmen of the seventeenth
century during the constitutional struggle with the
Stuarts; and that broad construction, as eventually
defined in the commentaries of Blackstone, passed into
the original constitutions of the thirteen states as an
integral part of the text of chapter 39, which was repro-
duced, in substance, in all of them. Thus the immortal
part of the Great Charter, embodied in its judicial
clauses, out of which has grown what English and Ameri-
can lawyers call due process of law, has been appealed
to by each succeeding generation as a living guaranty
of the rights to which it aspired. It has been interpreted
in each succeeding age according to its peculiar needs
and aspirations. A famous commentator on Goethe's
P^'aust (Dr. Julius Goebel, p. vi) has said: **Like all the
really great productions of literature, this world-poem
possesses the magic power of appealing in a different
way to every new generation; and like the fathomless
crystal lake of the high Sierras, it reflects only the pic-
ture of the beholder.*' And so the English nation has
been looking from age to age into the judicial clauses of
the Great Charter, which have mirrored for each genera-
tion the image of its own peculiar conception of civil
liberty under law.
When the Fifth Amendment was adopted, the essence
of chapter 39 of the Great Charter passed into the Con-
stitution of the United States as a limitation on the
powers of the Federal Government, in this form : * * No
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." In construing
that clause, the Supreme Court has said: **The words
J
PREFACE xui
*dne process of law' were undoubtedly intended to convey
the same meaniiig as the words 'by the law of the land'
in Magna Carta. Lord Coke, in his commentaries on these
words (2 Inst. 50), says they mean due process of law.
The constitutions which have been adopted in the several
states before the formation of the Federal Constitution,
following the language of the Great Charter more closely,
generally contained the words, *but by the judgment of
Ma peers, or the law of the land. ' ' * Mr. Justice Curtis in
Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 18 How. 222. There
has never been any serious dispute as to the general scope
and meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which, prior to
1878, had * * rarely been invoked in the judicial forum, or
the more enlarged theater of public discussion.*' Mr.
Justice MiDer in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 IT. S. 97.
Senator Howard, in introducing in the Senate the Four-
teenth Amendment, in behalf of the Reconstruction Com-
mittee, of which he was a member, said: **They (the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment) do not operate in
the slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon
state legislation. States are not affected by them, and
it has been repeatedly held that the restriction contained
in the Constitution against the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation is not a restric-
tion upon state legislation, but applies only to the legis-
lation of Congress. There is no power given in the
Constitution to enforce and to carry out any of these
guaranties. '^ Cong. Globe, 39 Congress 1st sess., part
3, pp. 2764, 65, 66.
The path-breaking idea that distinguishes the second
and existing Constitution of the United States from all
preceding federal fabrics, including the Articles of Con-
federation, is embodied in the principle that it operates
directly on the citizen, and not upon the states as cor-
' poratiouis. If that principle had been carried at the
oxxioei to its logical conclusion, it would have been th^n
settled that the individuals upon whom the new govern-
ment, partly federal and partly national, was to act were
xiT PBEFACE
primarily its own citizens. Because the sense of nation-
ality had not sufficiently advanced to permit the expres-
sion of that idea, the new fabric was permitted to rest
upon the solecism that while it was the first federal gov-
ernment that had ever operated directly on citizens, it
had, in its own right, no citizens. To remove that sole-
cism, to fill that vacuum, was adopted the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, without making
any direct reference to the question of race at all, con-
tains the first positive definition ever given of citizenship
of the United States as a primary and substantive thing,
independent of state citizenship. It provides that, ^^AU
persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws. ' ' Thus was reached the ultimate and
inevitable conclusion that every citizen of the Union is
primarily a citizen of the United States, and not merely
of one of the states composing them.
In commenting upon the Act of Settlement, Hallam
(Const. Hist, iii, 196) characterized it as ^Hhe seal of
our constitutional laws, the complement of the Revolu-
tion itself and the Bill of Bights. '^ In the same sense
in which the Act of Settlement is the capstone of the
English Constitution, the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the capstone of the American Constitu-
tion, completing its logical symmetry by the creation of
a primary and independent national citizenship whose
privileges and immunities were wisely limited to those
only ** which owe their existence to the Federal Govern-
ment, its national character, its constitution, or its laws.^*
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., p. 79. It is not going
too far to say that a revolution was wrought by the
PBEPACB XV
creation of the new national citizenship which ^^nation-
alized the whole sphere of civil liberty. . . . The
rights of the individual to life, liberty, and property had
to be secured by the Federal Constitution itself, as,
indeed, they should have been when it waa originally
framed. The amendment, therefore, placed the essential
rights of life, liberty, and property in the several states
of the Union under the ultimate protection of the national
Government Guthrie, The Fourteenth Amendment,
p. 2, citing Hare 's Am. Const. Law, i, 747. The natural
result was a vast and sudden increase in the business
of the Supreme Court, to whose guardianship the new
citizenship was committed. Speaking upon that subject,
as early as 1878, the Court said: ** While it (the Four-
teenth Amendment) has been a part of the Constitution,
as a restraint upon the power of the states, only a few
years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in
which we are asked to hold that state courts and state
legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law.*' David-
son V. New Orleans, 96 IT. S. 97. During the thirty-eight
years that have passed by since that utterance was made,
the tide has steadily risen until the overshadowing ques-
tions presented by the great cases that now engage the
attention of the Supreme Court involve either due proc-
ess of law, or the equal protection of the laws.
Just as due process of law is a purely English cre-
ation, so the closely related principle now embodied in
the formula, *Hhe equal protection of the laws," is purely
an American creation. It is the natural and inevitable
expression of that sense of equality which is the under-
tone of our national life. In the words of Mr. Justice
Brewer : "Equality in right, in protection and in burden
is the thought which has run through the life of this
nation and its constitutional enactments from the Decla-
ration of Independence to the present hour." Gulf, C. &
S. F. B. Co. V. ElUs, 165 U. S. 150. That equality never
adequately secured before, either by constitutional guar-
xvi PREFACE
anties or by the common law, was put for the first time
upon a firm foundation by the addition at the end of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the clause
declaring that no state shall * * deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws/' Such
is the final outcome of the struggle instituted in the reign
of Henry II, who undertook not only to establish the
reign of law but to reduce all orders of men to a state
of legal equality before the same system of law. That
kind of legal equality, which neither the constitutional
nor common law of the mother country was ever able to
establish, has appeared for the first time upon the soil
of the New World, As it is here enforceable through
the judgments and decrees of federal courts, it is an
entirely different thing from the nebulous egalite of the
dreamers of the French Revolution, who never compre-
hended the fact that all guaranties in favor either of
liberty or equality are worthless unless enforceable by
an independent judicial power.
How to ascertain the full scope and meaning of the
new Magna Carta embraced in Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which has wrought a revolution by
placing the essential rights of life, liberty, or property
in the several states under the protection of the Federal
Government, is the question of questions now absorbing
the American lawyer. When we go to the final arbiter
for a definition, we are given instead a discreet and
fruitful working rule best described in its own language :
*'But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give
any definition which would be at once perspicuous, com-
prehensive, and satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think,
in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such
an important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the
gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as
the cases presented for decision shall require, with the
reasoning on which such decisions may be founded.''
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97. In a word, the
rule is that when a citizen of the United States, as such.
PBEPACE xvii
oomplains that a fundamental right guarantied by the
clauses in question has been taken away, the court will
say in that particular case whether the right is an inci-
dent of national citizenship and, as such, within its pro-
tection, or an incident of state citizenship and, as such,
within the protection of the state. In that way a swelling
stream of decided cases is rapidly expanding into a
vitally important body of judge-made law, which must
be systematized and reduced to compendia, because the
subjects of it have become of more practical importance
than all others to the American bench and bar. Any one
who undertakes to perform that task should accept the
fact that the subject must be dealt with by two distinct
methods — ^the historical and the analytical. No mind can
grasp this intricate subject as a whole simply by the
study of the decided cases as isolated units. By the aid
of the historical method, a review must first be made of
the entire evolution through which Henry II 's effort to
establish not only the reign of law, but the reduction of
all orders of men to a state of legal equality before the
same system of law, has culminated, after seven cen-
turies of struggle, in the firm establishment upon Ameri-
can soil not only of due process of law, but of the equal
protectioji of the laws. In the light of many years of
special study of English and American constitutional
law, the author has attempted to outline the history of
that evolution in the Introduction, entitled The Origin and
Growth of Due Process. He has then applied the ana-
lytical method to the mass of decided cases upon the '
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in such a way as to
extract from them the working rules required by the
practicing lawyer in dealing with the various divisions
and subdivisions of the subject. That difl5cult task has
been made easier by his effort heretofore made to define
in a treatise the ** Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Su-
preme Court of the United States,'* and by his long
experience in the argument of cases at its bar.
In the preparation of Part III, entitled **The Equal
zviii PREFACE
Protection of the Laws as a Limitation on State Power/'
the author has been assisted by Mr. Frederick C. Bryan,
an able, experienced and distinguished member of the bar
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Washington, D. 0. Hakxhs Tatlob.
August, 1917.
CONTENTS
INTBODnCTZON
TBS OBIQIN AND CKOWTH OF DUX FB0GI88
Pact
i 1. Henry II and the reign of law 1
i 2. Bichard I and John 2
i 3. The Great Charter of 1215 a treaty between the crown and the
estates 3
i 4. Chapter 39 of the Oreat Charter 4
i 5. Later versions of the Great Charter 6
i G. Bebirth of the Great Charter in 1628 7
i 7. Cohe a misleading expounder of the Great Charter 8
i 8. The Bevolntions of 1640 and 1688 9
f 9. Blaekstone, not Coke, the true guide 11
i 10. The true rule reeognised in Hurtardo 12
i 11. Chapter 39 as reproduced in our first state constitutions 13
f 12. The wider scope of chapter 39 in American law 15
f 13. First eight articles of Amendment to the Federal Constitution. ... 19
f 14. Due process of law as embodied in the Fifth Amendment 21
1 15. Absence of national citisenship emphasised by the Dred Bcott Case. 25
116. The new national eitisenship created by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 29
f 17. Our new Magna Ctota protects only the national citizenship 35
1 18. Due process of law as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. ... 41
1 19. Equal protection of the laws as embodied in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 45
1 20. The rule of inclusion and exclusion 49
PART I
DUE PROCESS AS A LIMITATION ON
FEDERAL POWER
CHAPTEB I
FDTH AMSNBKINT AND ITS CONSTBtJOTION (1790-1866)
1 21. The text of the Fifth Amendment 55
i 22. Earlier cases eonstming Fifth Amendment 50
zix
CONTENTS
Paob
f 23. Webster's famous definitioii of due process in 1819 58
f 24. Baron y. Baltimore, 1833, Idmitationa on the states 60
i 25. Fox y. Ohio — ^Involving a state law as to counterfeiting 61
1 26. Murray v. Hoboken Land Co. — ^Due process defined 62
f 27. Withers v. Buckley — Conflict of state law with state ccmstitution. . 64
1 28. Ex parte BCilligan and the triumph of legality 65
1 29. Ex parte McCardle — ^Military ccHnmission, habeas corpus 69
CHAPTEB n
riVTH AlCENDMENT AND ITS CONSTRUCTION (1866-1896)
1 30. The legal tender cases 71
1 31. Miller ▼. U. 8.— Bight of confiscation 73
1 32. Pumpelly v. Canal Co. — ^Bight of eminent domain 74
1 33. Ex parte Wilson — ^Indictment for infamous crime 76
{ 34. Boyd v. U. S.—Einship of Fourth and Fifth Amendments 79
{ 35. Spies ▼. Illinois — Jurisdiction to review judgment of highest court
of a state in a criminal case 81
{36. Counselman v. Hitchcock — ^Broad construction of Fifth Amend-
ment in favor of refusal to testify 84
I 37. Simmons v. U. 8. — ^Bight of judge to discharge jury during trial
and to express opinion on facts 85
{ 38. Tesler v. Harbor Line Commissioners — ^Locating harbor lines. ... 86
{ 39. Shoemaker v. U. S. — ^Bight of eminent domain in the District of
Columbia 87
f 40. Thorington v. Montgomery — Fifth Amendment does not embrace
questions of state procedure 89
{ 41. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S. — ^Eminent domain and full equiva-
lent under Fifth Amendment 90
{42. Fong Tue Ting v. U. S. — ^Bights of the sovereign to deport for-
eigners already domiciled 92
f 43. Johnson v. Sayre — ^Persons subject to military law 95
{44. Brown v. Walker — ^Immunity for witnesses under Act of 1893
applies to state as well as federal courts 96
{ 45. Case of Wong Wing, sequel of the case of Fong Tue Ting 97
{46. Talton v. Mayes — ^Fifth Amendment has no application to courts
of Cherokee Nation 99
CHAPTEB ni
VlfTH AMINDMXNT AND ITS CONSTBTTCTION (1896-1917)
( 47. Hovey v. Elliott — ^Fifth Amendment limits the judicial as well as
legislative power of the Federal Government 101
{ 48. Scranton v. Wheeler — ^Biparian owner deprived of access to navi-
gable stream 103
t^ 49. Wight V. Davidson — ^Meaning of due process in the District of
Columbia 104
{ 50. Hanover National Bank v. Moyse»— Bankruptcy Act of July 1,
1898 107
CONTENTS
Paob
51. Breyer ▼. IDiiioifl — ^Former jeopmrdy, TJ. 8. v. Pem reviewed. . . .109
52. Lone Wolf ▼. Hitehoock — ^Fifth Amendment does not limit the
power of GongreBB when ezereieing eontroL over Indian tribes. .111
53. XJ. S. ▼• Lynch — ^Liability nnder Fifth Amendment for land taken
to improve navigation. 113
54. The Japanese Immigrant Cue — ^Application of the due prooess
daose in a case of deportation after entry 114
55. Hawaii v. Mankiehi — ^How colonists must win right to partiei-
pate in constitution of the parent state 116
5d. Bassmussen v. IT. 8.— Incorporation of Alaska vrith the United
8tates and the right of trial by jury of twelve men 123
57. A group of eases involving the extension of due process to the
Philippine Islands 125
58. Bedford v. TJ. 8. — ^Distinguished from the Lynch Osse 127
59. Buttfield v. 8tranahan — ^How far the iK>wer to regulate foreign
commerce is limited by due process 128
60. Adams v. New York — Due process and the admissi<m of evidence
illegally obtained 131
61. Beavers v. Henkel — ^Indictment as evidence of probable cause. . . 133
62. Public Clearing House v. Ck>yne — Due process as a limitation on
power to regulate the mails 134
63. U. 8. ex reL Turner v. Williams — ^Due process as a limitation on
power to exclude alien anarchists 136
64. 8hepard ▼. Barron — ^When estoppel to contest constitutionality
may be set up against promoters of public improvement 138
65. Fayerweather v. Bich — ^Relation of due process to res judicata. .139
66. McCray v. XT. 8. — ^Due process and constitutionality of oleomar-
garine tax 140
67. XT. 8. y. Ju Toy — ^Due process of law in Chinese exclusion cases —
Conclusiveness of decision of executive officer 142
68. South Carolina v. 17. 8. — ^Due process as a limitation on federal
power to tax dispensing agents of a state 143
69. Hale v. Henkel — ^Effect of statutory immunity upon constitutional
protection against self-incrimination 144
70. In re Moras — Claim that prisoner wsS convicted without indict-
ment and compelled to testify against himself 145
71. Union Bridge Co. v. TJ. 8.— Due process invoked as a restraint on
power of Secretary of War to order alterations in a bridge over
a waterway 147
72. TJ. 8. V. Heinszen — ^Due process and the rights of importers under
Philippine Act of June 30, 1906 149
73. Adair v. U. 8. — ^Due process as a limitation upon power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce — ^Belative rights of em-
ployer and employee 150
74. Twining v. New Jersey — ^Exemption from self-incrimination not a
fundamental right of national citizenship 153
CONTENTS
Page
f 75. XT. 8. ex rel. ▼. Delaware ft H. Go. — ^Due prooess and the eommo-
dities clause of the Hepburn Aet of June 29, 1906 155
f 76. Oceanic Steam Nav. Go. v. Stranahan — ^Due proeeee and the Act
of March 3, 1903, making it unlawful to bring into the TJ. S.
any aUen affected with a loathsome or contagious disease 156
f 77. Brantley v. Georgia — ^Fifth Amendment inyoked upon plea of
former jeopardy 158
§ 78. Holt V. U. 8. — ^Protection against self-incriminati(A invoked in
trial for a crime committed within a military reservation 159
f 79. Atlantic G. L. B. Go. v. Biverside Mills — ^Due process not denied
by Garmack amendment of June 29, 1906 160
I 80. Briscoe v. Budolph — ^Due process as involved in a special assess-
ment for benefits in Washington Gity 161
§ 81. Wilson V. U. 8. — ^Privilege against self-incrimination when in-
voked by an officer of a corporation 162
§ 82. Breese v. U. 8. — ^Presentment of an indictment by ^and jury in
k body not required by Fifth Amendment 164
f 83. Ensign v. Pennsylvaniar— States not compelled to accord the pro-
tection against self-incrimination guaranteed by Fifth Amend-
ment 165
§ 84. Heike v. U. 8. — Self-incrimination and claim of immunity based
on a proviso to Act of February 25, 1903 166
I 85. Zakonaite v. Wolf — ^Due process invoked by an alien found to be
practicing prostitution within three years after her entry 167
I 86. Ochoa v. Hermandez — ^Due process denied by order of military
governor of Porto Bico taking property from lawful owner
without notice or hearing 168
I 87. Delaware, L. and W. B. Go. v. U. 8. — ^Prohibition in Hepburn
Act of transportation from market to mine does not deny due
process 170
I 88. Billings v. XT. 8. — ^Imposition of an excise tax based on gross
tonnage upon the use of foreign-built pleasure yachts does not
deny due process ; 171
§ 89. Herbert v. Bicknell — ^Due process not denied when judgment by
default is rendered against absent defendant on summons left
at last and usual place of abode 173
I 90. U. 8. V. Atchison, T. & 8. F. B. Go.— Act of February 4, 1887,
I 4, as amended by Act of June 18, 1910, f 8, not repugnant to
Fifth Amendment 174
§ 91. Pennsylvania Go. v. XT. 8 176
^ 92. Greenleaf Lumber Go. v. Garrison 177
§ 93. Louisville Sb Nashville B. B. v. U. 8 179
§ 94. Ghicago & Alton B. B. v. Tranbarger 180
f 95. Anderson v. Forty-two Broadway Go 180
§ 96. Williams v. Johnson 181
f 97. Seven Gases v. U. 8 181
S 98. Brushaber v. Union Pacific B. B. Go 181
S 99. Dodge v. Osbom 182
CONTENTS xxiii
Paox
1 99a. Wilflon, XT. 8. Attorney v. New and Tenia, Beceiyers— Eight-
Houz-Law Case 182
i 100. Beiview — ^Peraistent and harmful infinence of Murray v. Hoboken
Land and Improyement Go 186
CHAPTBB rV
VEDERAL POWSB OF XUINXNT DOMAIN AND DUS PBOdSB
1 101. Power of eminent domain vested in all states, federal as well as
single 207
1102. The eminent domain vested in Federal Oovemment paramount. .208
§ 103. Paramount right of eminent domain limited by due process 209
§ 104. The taking must be for a public use 211
1 105. Bight of legislature to determine public use 212
§ 106. What constitutes a taking 213
§ 107. Neeesaitj that justifies the taking 215
f 108. Necessity for compensation 217
f 109. What kind of property may be taken 218
§ 110. As the question of compensation is a judicial one, a competent
tribunal necessary 219
S 111. Bight of Congress to legislate against laches 221
PART II
DUE PROCESS AS A LIMITATION ON STATE
POWER
CHAPTEB V
THX NIW NATIONAL CITI2SNBHIP
f 112. Interstate citizenship created by Articles of Confederation 225
f 113. Developed by our second Federal Constitution of 1789 225
i 114. The grand inquest in the Dred Scott Case 227
1 115. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and its scope 228
S 116. The new citizenship as defined in the Slaughter House Cases 228
1 117. Question of birth as settled in TJ. S. v. Wong Kim Ark 231
f 118. Aliens, resident and nonresident 233
1 119. Bight to due process in unincorporated territory 237
§ 120. Bight to due process in incorporated territory 239
1 121. A corporation a person within the meaning of Section 1 240
S 122. Two bulwarks against the unlawful or unequal exercise of state
power 241
1 123. Due process clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should
receive identical construction 243
1 124. Only national citizenship as such protected against state action by
the due process clause of Section 1 244
CONTENTS
CHAPTEB VI
gxneeal boopx or the guabantt ot dus pr00ks8
Pagx
1 125. The guaranty in English law 249
f 126. The guaranty in American law 251
1 127. Supreme Court of the United States as a supervising and annul-
ling tribunal 257
§ 128. Congress as a protecting and enforcing body 266
§ 129. Due process the common heritage of all the states 270
f 130. Notable attempts to define due process 274
1 131. Difficulties in the way of a complete and authoritative definitiQiL
— The rule of inclusion and exclusion 284
f 132. Fundamental requisites of due process — ^Notice 286
1 133. Fundamental requisites of due process — ^Hearing 292
1 134. Fundamental requisites of due process — Generality and equality
of laws 297
S 135. Fundamental requisites of due process — Jurisdiction 307
CHAPTEB VII
DUS PBOCBSS AND jxtbisdiohon
f 136. A competent tribunal and notice .312
f 137. Necessity of service to validity of judgment 314
1 138. Curing lack of notice or service by appearance 316
1 139. Jurisdiction over nonresident persons 318
f 140. Jurisdiction over nonresident corporations 319
1 141. Proceedings in tem 321
1 142. Divorce proceedings, strictly speaking, neither in rem nor in
personam 323
f 143. When judgments are subject to collateral attack 332
CHAPTEB Vm
BTATX POWER OT TAXATION AND DUB PROCESS
S 144. Taxing power of the Imperial Parliament 336
f 145. Extension of parliamentary control over the colonies 337
f 146. Colonies transformed into sovereign states 337
1 147. Constitutional limitations an American invention 338
1 148. Nature and extent of limitations on state taxing power — ^Exemp-
tion of governmental agencies 339
f 149. Federal power to regulate interstate commerce not to be hampered
by state taxation 340
f 150. State can only tax property within its jurisdiction 341
1 151. Taxation of corporate property situated in several states 342
S 151a. Due process not denied by state statute imposing annual fran-
chise tax on a consolidated railway corporation 343
f 152. Taxation of tangible personal property 344
{ 153. Taxation of intangible personaJ property 347
CONTENTS
Pact
f 154. ExemptioiiB fr«an taxation fltrictlj eonstnied 349
1 155. Taxation must be for a public use 352
§156. Legialatore may act direetlj or delegate functions to local an-
thoritieB 356
S157. Due process requires compensation to owner when property is
taken, by state for public use 358
1 158. Collection of taxes by summary proceedings 361
i 150. Notice and hearing in tax proceedings 364
f 160. Besidunm of taxing power remaining in the state 371
CHAPTEB IX
STATE POiWKB OF UONSNT DOMAIN AND DUB PROCXSS — ^TIDiaAL EIGHT OF
SUPBBVIBION
161. Beview heretofore made of federal power of eminent domain. . .377
162. Power of eminent domain inherent in states 378
163. Duty of state to guarantee protection to life, liberty and prop-
erty through due process 379
164. l^ht to review state action established by Fourteenth Amend-
ment 380
165. Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. ▼. Chicago— Begard must be had to
substance, not to form 380
166. Fallbrook Irrigation District ▼. Bradley — ^Heed to be given to de-
cisions of state courts construing state statutes and constitu-
tions 382
167. Henderson Bridge Co. ▼. Henderson — ^It must clearly appear that
state taxation is really spoliation 384
168. Hooker ▼. Los Angeles — Case must be clearly stated in trial
court 385
169. dark ▼. Kash — ^Bespect to be given to state definitions of a
public use 385
170. ICanigault v. Springs — ^When flooding does not constitute a tak-
ing 386
171. Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. v. Illinois— When there is no taking of
private property for public use 387
172. Noble State Bank v. Haskell — ^Use really public when judged by
the ultimate end and not by the proximate effect 389
173. Ettor ▼. Tacoma — ^When a vested right is protected against
destruction by a repeal of the remedy 390
174. McGovem v. New York — ^There must be something more than an
honest mistake of law 391
175. New York v. Sage — ^The rule by which the value of property
should be measured 391
176. Union Lime Co. v. Chicago ft N. W. B. Co.— rNo unlawful taking
even when the extension of a spur track is for the benefit of a
single industry 392
177. Brand v. Union Elevated B. Co. — ^What should be excluded in a
proceeding to recover for a decline in market value 393
xxvi CONTENTS
CHAPTEB X
state pougx powxs and dus pb0cx8s
Paob
f 178. English origin of state poliee power 395
f 179. The typical English state in America 396
f 180. The police power as defined by American jurists and text writers. 397
i 181. Delegation of police power to municipalities 400
5 182. Beasonableness as a limitation on the police power 401
5 183. Vested rights as a limitation on police poiwer 403
S 184. The right of forfeiture 404
i 185. Limitations on the enjoyment of property 405
S 186. Property or business clothed with a public interest 407
i 187. Interstate Commerce Act and the common law 410
i 188. Beasonableness of rates and the delegation of legislative power. .411
1 189. Elements involved in the reasonableness of rates 413
S 190. Becent cases on the subject of rates and due process 416
S 191. Police power to promote publio convenience 419
S 192. Police power and the exclusion of suicide as a defense on policies
of insurance 420
S 193. Due process not infringed by limitation on hours of labor of
women 421
S 194. Due process not denied by the prevention of the diversion of
waters 421
S 195. Due process and the prohibition of exportation of Philippine coin. 422
$ 196. Forbidding burial within city limits 423
S 197. Due process not denied by Michigan Bales-in-Bulk Act 424
i 198. Creation of depositors' guaranty fund valid exercise of police
power 425
i 199. Due process not denied by ordinance prohibiting the use of ad-
vertising trucks or vans 426
S 200. Due process not denied by ordinance prohibiting billiard or pool
rooms 427
§ 201. Unconstitutional exercise of police power in establishing a build-
ing line 427
i 202. Due process not denied by prohibition of local sales of malt
liquors, whether intoxicants or not 428
S 203. Due process not denied by ordinance regulating size of loaves of
bread 429
§204. Due process not denied by ordinance requiring installation of
water-closets under certain conditions 430
§ 205. Due process not denied by ordinance concerning milk not subjected
to tuberculin j;est 431
§ 205a. Due process not denied by statutes prohibiting the sale as "ice
cream " of a product containing less than a fixed percental of
butter fat 431
S 206. Due process not denied by state law regulating barrier pillars
between adjoining coal properties 432
CONTENTS
Pact
f 207. CcHistitnUonal ezerdfle of the poliee power in reference to deposi-
tora ' guaranty fund i33
1 208. Due process denied by Khtiwbw Act inflictung paialtiee on employer
for impoeing certain conditione on employee 435
1209. Dae proeeae not denied by the so-called Ohio <<nm-of-mine'' or
<< anti-screen'' law ; 436
i 210. Doe process not denied by ordinance prohibiting brick yards in
certain portions of a city 437
S 211. Due process not denied by police statute requiring hotel keepers
to give notice to guests in case of fire 437
i211a. Due process not denied by ordinance subjecting business of
private detectiTe to polio^ superyision 438
1212. Due process not denied by legislation declaring the emission of
dense smoke in cities a nuisance 438
S 213. Due process not denied by statute requiring full switching crews
on railroads exceeding one hundred miles iu length 439
1 214. Due process not denied by statute imposing taxes on the privilege
of using profit sharing coupons and trading stamps 440
i 215. Due process not denied by the fixing of certain absolute liabilities. 440
CHAPTEB XI
VWOFMBTY U0BT8 AS PBOVIOTKD BY DUX FBOCISfl — 'YX8TID BIGHTS AKD THUB
1 216. Chapter 39 of Magna Carta and its amendments 443
i 217. Growth in England of the idea of vested rights 443
1218. Development of the idea of "vested rights" advanced by con-
stitutional limitations on legislative power 445
1 219. Formula in Declaration of Independence 448
S 220. No state shall make any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 449
i 221. Contract clause limited to vested rights that arise out of it 450
1 222. The Fifth Amendment 451
S 223. The great vacuum to be filled 452
S 224. The Fourteenth Amendment 452
S 225. What constitutes a vested right 453
i 226. Bights below the standard of vested rights 456
S 227. Curative legislation 457
1 227a. No vested right in any genersl rule of law or poli^ of legisla-
tion 458
S 228. Bight of a state to regulate its procedure 458
f 229. An laws impairing vested rights within the scope of due process. 459
i 230. Application of the rule of inclusion and exclusion 461
S 231. Legitimate modification of rights of abutting owner 462
S232. How the outstanding shares of an owner of stock may be con-
demned without denial of due process 463
{233. Power of a state to reorganize a co-operative association with-
out consent of its members 464
{234. Power of a state to make discriminating property classifications. 464
"CONTENTS
Pagx
S 282. Preedom of eontraet not infringed hj state law forbidding the
issue of irredeemable orders in payment of labor 509
{283. Freedom of contract not limited by a Missouri statute against
combinations 510
1284. Freedom of contract denied by application of nonforfeiture
provisions of statute of one state so as to invalidate policy
loan agreement made in another 511
i 285. Freedom of contract denied by state law making it a crime for
an employer to impose a certain condition on employee 512
f 286. Employment at the will of the parties does not make it employ-
ment at the will of others 514
S287. Freedom of contract not infringed by the so-called Ohio
"run-of-mine" or '* anti-screen" law 516
S 288. Freedom of contract not infringed by certain statutes regulating
the employment of women 516
§ 289. Freedom of contract not infringed by Florida statute imposing
special license taxes on merchants using profit sharing coupons
and trading stamps 517
CHAPTBE XTTT
PROPIRTT aiOHTB AS PBOTEOTED BY DUE PBOOXSS — ^LIMITATIONS AND BEMXDIX8
I 290. Statutes of limitation regarded as rules of procedure 519
i 291. The constitutional limitation of reasonableness 520
S 292. When statutes of limitation may be retroactive 521
I 293. When exemption from suit by the ending of complete statutory
period becomes a vested right 523
i 294. Montoyo v. Gk)nzales 525
i 295. Bight of the legislature to change remedies 526
S 296. Qualifications of the forgoing rule 527
CHAPTBB XIV
LIVB AND LIBXBTY AS PROTECTED BY DUE PROCESS — ^PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL
CASES IN FEDERAL C0X7RTS
1 297. No change in proceedure, either under federal or state law, must
work a denial of fundamental rights 532
S 298. Due process clause of Fifth Amendment as re-enforced by
Amendments Six and Seven 533
i 299. Federal right to indictment by grand jury in criminal cases —
Informations 534
S 300. Federal right to trial by petit jury 535
f 301. Bight to plead guaranteed by Fifth Amendment 536
f 302. A person accused of felony necessarily present during entire
trial-— Privilege can not be waived 538
S 302a. Summary of rights of persons and property guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution 539
CSONTBNTS
GHAPTEB XV
urs ain> ubbrtt as pbotbotxd by dub pb0cbs8 — proobbubb in obiminal
gabbs in btatb c0x7bts
Pagb
1 303. How far the statee may modifj existing flTstems of proeedore in
criminal eases 541
f 304. The straggle to leave the states untrammeledy as far as possible,
in the making of codes of criminal procedure 543
i 305. Bight of a state to abolish grand juries 544
i 300. ^ght of the highest court of a state to dismiss a writ of error
in a criminal case 546
i 307. Bight of a state to provide for a trial bj a struck jury 547
1 308. Bight of a state to authorize a trial by a petit jury of eight 548
1309. Exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in state courts
not a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 550
i 310. Befusal to set aside a verdict, after the rendition of which, one of
the jurors became insane 558
§311. Due process not denied because no arrangement or plea was had
upon a second information 554
1 312. Bight of the accused to be present in a state court at every stage
of his trial 556
1 313. Duty of an accused person to exhaust all of his remedies in the
state courts 562
1 314. When habeas corpus is the proper remedy to test the validity of
a detention under state law 564
1 315. The notable case of Prank v. Mangum 567
i 316. Dissenting opinion of Justices Holmes and Hughes 569
1 317. Are there at present any enforceable restraints upon the powers
of a state to regulate its procedure in criminal cases 573
GHAPTEB XVI
LIFB AND LIBBETT AS PEOTECTBD BY DUB PB00B8S — ^PBOOBBDINGS rOB
CONTEMPT— DISBABUBNT Or ATTOBNBTS
i 318. Power to punish for contempt inherent in all courts 578
1 319. Proceeding in its nature criminal 579
1320. What constitutes a direct contempt committed in the presence
of court 580
i 321. As the power to punish is inherent, trial by jury is not required .
by due process of law 580
1 322. What constitutes an indirect or civil contempt 582
1 323. Bight to notice and hearing in indirect or civil contempts 585
i 324. Cronsequence of a lack of jurisdiction 588
1 325. Power to disbar attorneys inherent in all courts 589
1326. An attorney can not be denied due process 590
CONTENTS
PART III
THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AS A
LIMITATION ON STATE POWER
CHAPTEB XVII
first intbprxtation of thb olausb
Pagb
t327. The equal protection of the law clause a purely American
invention 595
S 328. Denial to colored persons of the right to act as jurors 596
i 329. Equal protection of laws to colored race — ^Bight to mixed juries. .597
f 330. Exclusion of juror on account of color 600
I 331. Law excluding jurors on account of race or color 602
i 332. Punishment of offense 602
1 333. Setting aside panel of jurors — ^Discriminating against citizens of
African descent 603
§334. State statute requiring separate acconmiodations for white and
colored persons in railway coaches 604
f 335. Discrimination against colored children 605
§ 336. Negroes as grand jurors 606
S 337. Negroes as jurors 607
I 338. Bight of women to practise law in state courts 608
I 339. The Civil Bights Cases 608
CHAPTEB XVIII
POWER OF TAXATION
S 340. Constitutionality of state tax laws 611
S 341. Tax on corporate securities 612
§ 342. Tax on business of an express company 613
f 343. Legacy and inheritance taxes 614
f 344. State taxation of express companies ' property 615
1 345. Penalty for nonpayment of taxes 617
S 346. State tax law as to banks constitutional 618
I 347. Taxation of mortgagee 's interest in land 618
S 348. Forfeiting lands for nonpayment of taxes 619
1349. Discrimination in taxes as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws 620
1 350. License tax on emigrant agents 622
f 351. Tax on corporations 623
§ 352. Succession taxes 624
1 353. Inheritance tax 624
S 354. Income tax on mining companies 625
I 355. Tax on cigarette selling 625
§ 356. Taxation of corporate franchise 626
1 357. Taxation of street railways 627
1 358. Tax on special franchises 628
CONTENTS xxxiii
Pagb
1 359. Validity of state inheritance tax 629
f 360. State taxation of meat-paddng houaee ^ 630
f 361. Diacri m i n ation in taxing Hqnor seUera 632
f 362. State inlieritanee tax 632
i 363. Validity of stock transfer tax 633
1 364. Taxation, of spirits in bond 634
i 365. Inlieritanee tax 635
f 366. Taxing wholesale dealers in oils 635
1 367. Ocenpation tax 636
1 368. Forfeiture for nonpayment of taxes 637
f 369. Gla88ification«TaKes-Sales for future deliverj 638
1 370. Bxeiae tax on corporations 639
i 371. Tax on transfers inter vivos .640
S 372. Discrimination in license tax 641
f 373. Oradincf municipal license fees for theaters 641
f 374. Taxation of deposits in national banks 642
i 375. Taxation of mineral rights 643
S 376. Taxation of savings banks 644
S377. State taxation of memberships in an incorporated chamber of
commerce 644
S 378. Discrimination against oleomargarine in license tax 645
§ 379. Excise tax imposed on gross earnings of railway companies. . . .645
1 380. Discrimination in license tax 646
1 381. Assessment for public improvements 646
§382. Trading stamps and pranium coupons, discriminations against
not in violation of equal protection clause 647
1 382a. State taxation of consolidated railway company 648
CHAPTEB XIX
CONTBOL OF BAILBOADS
1 383. Legislative control over railroad fare and rates 650
1 384. City ordinance as to railroad 651
S 385. Valuation and taxation of railroad property 652
1 386. Liability to employee for negligence of fellow servant under
Iowa statute 653
f 387. Liabilities of railroad companies to employees 654
1 388. Liability of railroad company for omission to fence its road 655
S 389. Beasonableness of railroad rates 656
i 390. Assessing railroads to meet expenses of state railroad commission. 657
S 391. Taxation of railroads — ^Law of Georgia 658
S 392. Requiring railroad companies to bear entire expense of abolishing
grade crossings 660
S 393. Remedy for property injured by construction of a railroad 661
i 394. Unjust and unreasonable railroad rates 662
1 395. Eimsas law as to liability of railroads for personal injuries 663
1 396. Statuta requiring heating of railroad cars by stoves 664
f 397. Damages for running rulroad across street • • • •665
CONTENTS
Pagx
398. State law establialiing railroad ratea — ^When Toid 665
399. State aet as to railroad eompanys' paying their emplojees 667
400. Pirea aet bj railroad loeomotiyea 668
401. Statute changing fellow servant rule in eaae of railroad
employees .669
402. Exceptions to ordinance regulating speed of trains l^ city 670
403. Assessment of railroad property for omitted taxes 670
404. Charging more for shorter than for longer haul 672
405. Validity of order requiring safety appliances at grade crossings. 673
406. Discriminating against railway companies 674
407. Legislative abrogation of fellow servant rule 675
408. Imposing expense on railvraty company for draining private lands. 676
409. Classifying railway mail clerks with railway employees 677
410. Excessive penalties for violation of the provisions of a statute. .678
411. Classification of railway employees 680
412. Statute creating presumption of negligence 680
413. Requiring full train crew 681
414. Requiring full switching crew — ^Excessive penalties 683
415. Classification of railway employees — ^Railway relief 683
416. Abolishing fellow servant rule 684
417. Federal employer's liability act 685
418. Comparative negligence in injuries to railway employees 686
419. Modifying fellow servant rule 686
420. Classification of railroads for rate regulation 687
421. Judicial review of rate regulation 688
422. Requiring carrier to accept reshipments in cars of other carrier. 689
423. Requiring electric headlights on locomotives 689
424. Exessive penalties 689
425. Taxation of foreign railway company 691
426. Requiring railroads to provide drainage for water contrary to
common law rule 692
427. Discrimination between carrier and shipper as to attorneys' fees
in demurrage cases makes law invalid 693
427a. Requiring railway company to remove noxious weeds 694
CHAPTER XX
CONTROL OF D0MX8TIG AND FCAKIGN GOBPOBATIONB
§ 428. State control of corporations 696
S 429. Statute applicable to fire insurance only 697
§430. Statute as to effect of false answers by applicant for life
insurance 698
1 431. State regulation of fordgn corporations 698
S 432. State anti-trust laws 699
f 433. Discrimination against dealers in articles manufactured from
produce of another state 700
S 434. YaUdity of Texas anti-trust law 701
§ 435. Appointing state auditor to accept service <m corporation 702
CONTENTS
Pagb
1436. Unequal wweiMiment of franehues and other property of certain
corporations 702
1 437. Bequlring eorporatioiis alone to produce books and paper 703
1 438. State regulation of telegraph companies 704
S439. Local aaBeeemente on state tide lands 704
1 440. Exempting Farmers' mutual insuranee companies from statute
regulating fire iosurance rates 705
1441. Forfeiture of charter of corporation for failure to file afildavit
of innocence not required of individuals 706
§ 442. License tax on foreign corporation 707
S 443. State restrictions on foreign corporations 708
S 444. Tax on capital of a corporation ^ 708
S 445. Corporation, when not within jurisdiction of state 709
§ 446. Bight to attach nonresident's property 711
S447. l>iscrimination against nonresident creditors of foreign corpo-
rations 712
S 448. Taxation of nonresident stockholders 713
f 449. Taxation of stock of foreign railroads 714
S 450. State taxation of local managers of foreign packing houses. . . .716
S 451. Excluding foreign corporation 716
i 452. Notice to nonresidents — ^Validity of tax sales 717
i 453. Discrimination between residents and nonresidents 718
1 454. Taxing shares of foreign corporations 720
i 455. Excise tax on foreign corporations 720
i 456. Franchise tax on foreign corporation 721
1 457. Excluding foreign insurance company .722
GHAPTEB XXI
THB PdVXa OP OLABSmCATION
f 458. Discrimination between agricultural and other lands in statute
of annexation to city ^ 725
1 459. Begistration law discriminating between dtisens 726
1 460. Glaasification of elevators and warehouses 727
S 461. Classifieation of merchants 728
S 462. Discrimination against nonproducing venders of milk 729
1 463. Bequiring labels on mixed paints to show ingredients 730
S 464. Classification of coal mines by number of men employed 731
S465. Classification between corporations and individuals--<7ompulsory
production of testimony 732
1 466. Discrimination in building regulations 734
1 467. Begistration of physicians 735
1 468. Exempting banks and trust companies and bona fide mortgages
from state usury law 736
1 469. Creating bank depositors' guaranty fund 737
1 470. .Licensing private bankers 737
1471. Penalizing insuranee company connected with tariff association. 738
S 472. Prohibiting waste of mineral waters 739
CONTENTS
Pact
§ 473. Advertismg wagons on city streets 740
1 474. Unelaimed sayings bank deposits 741
S 475. Begolating assignments of future earnings 742
S 476. Municipal liability for damage by mob 742
§ 477. Begulating canceUation of land contracts 743
i 478. Discrimination in fee for auction Ueense 744
S 479. Prohibiting unfair competition 744
f 480. Municipal license tax based on classification 745
§ 481. Municipal waterworks competition 746
1 482. Forbidding sale of food preservatives containing boric acid. ...747
S 483. Classification of telephone companies for taxation 747
S 484. State anti-trust laws 748
i 485. Bedemption of store orders in money 749
f 486. Abolishing Greek letter fraternities in state universities 750
1 487. Requiring washhouses for coal miners 751
S488. Discrimination between county and city in disposition of tax
penalties 752
f 489. Discrimination against aliens 753
1 490. Discrimination against foreign labor on public works 755
1 491. Begulating innkeeper's duty in case of fire 756
f 492. Forbidding brickmaking in designated area 756
1 493. Workmen 's compensation act 757
1 494. Abating smoke nuisance 757
i 495. Begulating net weight of packages of lard 758
1 496. Classification denying equal protection of the laws, because
arbitrary and creating presumption of guilt 758
CHAPTER XXII
THS POLIGX POWIB
1 497. Police power of state — ^Public laundries and washhouses 760
1 498. City ordinances as to public laundries, when valid 762
S 499. Drainage law of New Jersey not unconstitutional 763
( 500. Begulation of laundry business 764
§ 501. Oleomargarine law 765
f 502. When servitude attaches to lands 766
f 503. Utah statute as to damages by cattle 767
i 504. Bequiring five towns to maintain a bridge and highway 768
i 505. Ordinance as to license for sale of cigarettes 769
1 506. Validity of state statute restricting sale and manufacture of
oleomargarine 770
S 507. Validity of mining insi)ection law 771
§ 508. Live-stock quarantine 772
S 509. Sale of stocks on margin 773
§ 510. Eight-hour law 774
f 511. Compulsory vaccination ^ . . . 775
1512. Municipal ordinance against visiting barricaded gambling rooms. 776
i 513. Municipal regulation of milk business , . . .777
CONTENTS
Pack
i 514. Laws to prevent dealing in fatures 777
f 515. Bestrietioiis on aheep grssang 778
1 516. Begnlating admiflaion to places of pnblie amusement 779
1 517. State proteetion of the national flag 780
I51&. Imposing responsibility on mine owners for defaults of certain
employees 781^
1 519. State regulation of the sale of patented articles 782
1 520. Prohibiting diverting water b^ond state 784
1 521. Begolating sales in bulk 785
1 522. Prohibiting drumming on carriers' premises 786
i 523. Begulating sale of explosives 786
i 524. Prohibiting billiard or pool rooms 787
S 525. Begolation of junk dealers 787
1 526. Beqniring connection vrith sewer system 788
1 527. Milk ordinance requiring tuberculin test for dairy cattle 789
S528. Guarding open shafts 790
f 529. Begulating entries in coal mines 791
f 530. Municipal water supply 791
1 531. Employment of minors in hazardous occupations 792
i 532. Prohibiting possession of firearms by alien 792
f 533. Prohibiting sales by itinerant vendors 793
i 534. Prescription 794
i 535. Begulation of livery stables 794
f 536. Workmen's compensation law 795
f 537. £ight-hour law for women employed in hotels 796
i 538. Classification of women employees — Hours of labor 798
i 539. Control of liquor traffic 799
f 540. Imposing attorneys' fees and penalties 803
1541. Certain penalties imposed on common carriers for failure to
settle claims 888
1 542. Attorneys' fees to successful plaintiff in mandamus proceedings. .809
1 543. Excessive penalties 812
f 544. Statute regulating charges 812
S 545. Statute limiting charges of stockyards companies 814
§ 546. Municipal regulation of telephone rates 816
1 546a. Emulating private detectives 817
f 546b. Begulating percentage of butter fat in ice cream 818
1 546e. State regulation of motor vehicles 819
CHAPTEB XXni
PBOOXDUSX IN STATS COUBTS
1 547. Different courts in the same state 820
i 548. Tax tities 821
1 549, Number of peremptory challenges in criminal cases 822
1 550. Laws operating on all alike 823
S 551. Error in charge to jury 824
i 552. Befnsal to amend record in criminal case 824
xxxviii CX)NTENTS
Pagx
I 553. Power of state to make elaasificatioiis 825
f 554. Sufficiencj of indictment 826
S 555. Severer punishment for subsequent offenses 826
i 556. Denial of right of review — ^Alien juror 827
S 557. Adjudging a prosecutor to be liable for costs 828
§ 558. Payment before possession in condemnation proceedings 828
1 559. When equal protection of the laws not denied 829
i 560. Abridging the right of trial by jurj 829
I 561. Constitutionalitj of struck jurj law 830
S 562. Additional punishment on third conviction 831
fi 563. Criminal law—Appeal by state 831
§ 564. Difference in term of sentence for imprisonment 831
f 565. Presumption of guilt from possession of gambling paraphernalia —
Effect of exception in favor of public oflcers 832
I 566. Change of venue for local prejudice 832
§ 567. Local regulations for the selection of jurors 833
S 568. Error of trial court in discharging a juror 834
S 569. Indeterminate sentence act 834
fi 570. Discrimination in matter of grand jury 835
$ 571. Difference of procedure against corporations 836
f 572. Appeal by government in criminal case 837
I 573. Classification of prisoners committing assaults 837
§ 574. Quo warranto 838
§ 575. Punishing habitual criminals 839
S 576. Attachment of property of non-resident 840
1 577. Right to preliminary examination in criminal prosecutions in
Manila 840
f 578. Baising federal question on second trial 841
I . 'I
• -
Dl]E PROCESS OF LAW
AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
INTRODUCTION
THE OBIGIN AND OBOWTH OF DUE FBOCESS
§ 1. Henry n and the reign of law. The distinctive
feature of the Norman period, so far as English constitu-
tional history is concerned, is the development of the
new system of central administration with the source of
its strength in the royal authority. That new system of
central administration was superimposed as a Norman
creation upon the Old English system of local self -gov-
erning communities represented by the township, the
hundred and the shire. Out of the fusion between the two
has grovm the modem constitution. During the Norman
period, embracing the reigns of the four Norman kings,
the great mass of foreign elements and influences were
infused into the blood, the language, the laws, the
]>olitical institutions of the English nation; during the
Angevin period, embracing the reigns of Henry II and
his sons, the foreign elements were worked together into
a new combination that retained the strongest elements
of both. The most striking single fact revealed by an
analysis of the result is, that in the new combination the
superstructure is ^orman, the substructure Old English.
Under the pressure of common calamities and through
the agency of frequent intermarriage the work of fusion
1
Doe
•••
V... • DUE PROCESS OP LAW §1
• •, •••
• • •
m
adyatfoe'd so rapidly that by the time of Henry II it was
iijippssible, without a careful examination of pedigree,
. •JEpikscertain who was Norman and who was English. So
•//jabon as that condition of things was reached, in which it
was difficult to distinguish an Englishman from a
Norman, all legal distinctions of one race as against the
other passed out of view. Thus was paved the way for
the epoch-making policy that contemplated not only the
establishment of the reign of law, but the reduction of all
orders of men to a state of legal equality before the same
system of law, inaugurated by Henry II, ** whose states-
manlike activity, whose power of combining and adapting
that which was useful in the old system of government
with that which was desirable and necessary under the
new, gives to the policy which he initiated in England
almost the character of a new creation. ' * Stubbs, Const.
Hist., i, 336. See also the author's Origin and Growth
of the English Constitution, i, 284-333.
§ 2. Richard I and John— The struggle for the charters.
Henry II was succeeded by his son Richard I, a spend-
thrift knight errant, who strained to the utmost the new
system of taxation his thrifty father had devised in order
to provide vast sums of money to be expended in crusades.
By the steady and persistent pressure of taxation upon
every class during Eichard's reign, the clergy, the
baronage, and the commons were each in turn aroused
to more or less positive resistance. With the wanton and
irritating pressure of the royal authority upon every
class in the reign of Richard I, the struggle for the
charters really begins. That struggle was intensified
after the accession of John by the shameless pressure of
taxation, by acts of wanton despotism in individual cases,
and by constant demands upon the baronage for military
service in fruitless expeditions which were never carried
out. The royal authority reached the limit of its growth
when both Richard and John, accepting the imperialist
theories of Glanville, held that the will of the prince was
53 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 3
the law of the land. The reckless attempts made by John
to enforce tliat theory finally brought about the armed
conflict belrween the king and the nation, divided now
into clergy, baronage and commons as a part of a general
movement known as the estate system whose growth
constitutes an important epoch in the! constitutional his-
tory of E^nrope. The nation thus marshaled in the ranks
of the three estates claimed that the law of the land was
not the will of the prince, but the immemorial laws of the
English Kingdom, with such modifications and amend-
ments as those laws had suffered through the results of
the Norman conquest. It is therefore plain that when the
barons seized upon the charter of Henry I as the basis
of national action and demanded of the king that he
should enter into a treaty with the nation upon the lines
it defined, it simply amounted to a demand upon their
part that the legal and constitutional relations between
the king and the nation should henceforth be regulated by
the Old English code of customary law, subject to such
changes in that code as the results of the conquest had
brought about. The effort was to fix the limits of inno-
vation, to define the extent to which the centralizing and
feudaUzing processes to which the conquest gave birth
should be permitted to abridge the immemorial freedom
in the time to come. In that vital question each estate
was interested as a corporate entity, and the nation as
a whole was also interested as a corporate entity.
§3. The Great Charter of 1215 a treaty between the
crown and the estates. An analysis of the Great Charter,
when made in the light of the circumstances attending
its execution, clearly reveals the fact that, although
issued in the form of a royal grant, it was in substance
a treaty or compact entered into between the royal
authority on the one hand and the nation marshaled in
the ranks of the three estates on the other. As the clergy,
the baronage, and the general commonalty of freemen
all participated in the movement that brought about the
4 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 8
making of the conventioiiy and as all three orders par-
ticipated equally in its fruits, the great act at Bunnymede
was in the fullest sense of the term a national act, and
not the mere act of the baronage in behalf of their own
special privileges. The winning of the charter was in
fact the final consummation of the work of union. In the
words of a master: ^^It is the first great act of the
English nation after the descendants of Norman con-
querors and Norman settlers had fully become English-
men, after all thought of any distinction between the
king's men, French and English, had passed away from
the thoughts of men.*' Freeman, Norm. Conq., Vol. V.,
p. 475. Each estate enters into a covenant with the kiag
as to its own special rights and privileges, while the
nation in its corporate person covenants as to those gen-
eral rights and immunities which are to be secured to the
whole body of freemen, irrespective of their division into
estates or orders.
§4. Chapter 39 of the Oreat Oharten Foremost among
the guaranties given by the charter to the nation as a
whole were those embracing reforms in the judicial sys-
tem. In addition to the provisions touching the character
and appointment of judicial officers, the f ramers of the
charter were careful to announce a series of practical
rules, both general and special, for the government of all
courts in the administration of justice. First among
those general rules stands the famous chapter 39, which
provides that, **No freeman shall be arrested, or detained
in prison, or deprived of his freehold, or outlawed, or
banished, or in any way molested; and we will not set
forth against him, nor send against him, unless by the
lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.*'
A recent and able commentator, in speaking of the ^^main
object'* of that chapter, has said: ''It has been usual to
read it as containing a guaranty of trial by jury to all
Englishmen ; as absolutely prohibiting arbitrary commit-
ment ; and as xmdertaking solemnly to dispense to all and
Si ORIGIN AND GROWTH 5
snndry an equal justice, fuU, free, and speedy. (See, e. g,,
Coke, Second Institute, 55.) The traditional interpreta-
tion has thus made it, in the widest terms, a promise of
law and liberty, and good government to every one.
(Thus Blackstone, Commentaries, iv, 424.) A careful
analysis of the words of the clause, read in connection
with its historical genesis, suggests the need for modifi-
cations of this view. It was in accord with the practical
genius of this great document that it should direct its
energies, not to the enunciation of vague platitudes and
well-sounding* generalities, but to the reform of a specific
and clearly defined group of abuses. Its main object was
to prohibit John from resorting to what is sometimes
whimsically known in Scotland as *Jeddart justice.' It
forbade him for the future to place execution before judg-
ment/^ McEIechnie, Magna Carta, p. 439. John often
proceeded, or threatened to proceed (under the theory
that the will of the prince is the law of the land) by force
of arms against those assumed to be guilty, without wait-
ing for legal procedure. * * The practice of granting writs
of execution ^^thout trial in the courts appears to have
been common. ' * Bigelow, History of Procedure, p. 155.
The primary purpose of chapter 39 was to demand not
only legal procedure, prior to execution, but an ascertain-
ment of guilt or liability **by the lawful judgment of his
peers and by the law of the land.'* Mr. Webster had that
basic idea clearly in mind when, in defining * * due process
of law*' and **the law of the land,'* in the Dartmouth Col-
lege Case, he said: ''By the law of the land is most
clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before
it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment onlj/ after trial.**
Nothing can be clearer, in the light of our present
knowledge, than the fact that *^nisi per legale judicium
parium stMrutn vel per legem terrae** meant nothing
more than the right to make ''proof according to one
of the then existing modes of legal procedure. In the
words of a great historical jurist : "The expression 'per
6 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 4
legem terrae* simply required judicial proceedings^
according to the nature of the case ; the duel, ordeal, or
compurgation in criminal cases, the duel, witnesses, char-
ters, or recognition in property cases.** Bigelow, Pro-
cedure, 155, n. That trial by jury was not in contempla-
tion is absolutely certain, for the simple and conclusive
reason that it did not exist in 1215 ; the jury of proof was
not transformed into the jury of judgment, the trial jury
of our day, until a century or more after that time. The
Great Charter did not guarantee ** trial by jury*' to any
one. How in the process of time that new method of
trial — ^the joint product of the Norman writ process and
the community-witnesses of the customary law — ^gradu-
ally absorbed or superseded all other methods of trial
that had prevailed in the popular courts is a question full
of interest, but one that belongs to the history of legal
procedure. SuflSce it here to say that such was the final
result of the development of the jury in England, where,
rather by the silent force of its own intrinsic excellence
than by the artificial stimulus of legislation, it gradually
overshadowed and exterminated all other methods of trial
ever employed for the settlement of issues in which dis-
puted facts were in question. By the force of the law
of natural selection it outlived them all — as the fittest it
survived.
§ 5. Later versions of the Oreat Charter. The charter
was reissued in 1216, and again in 1217, and that text,
though often republished and confirmed, was never after-
wards materially altered. The later versions, beginning
with that of 1217, were made to declare that *'No free-
man shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived
of his freehold, free tenements^ franchises^ and free cus-
toms, or outlawed, or banished, '^ etc, by the addition of
the words ^'de libera tenemento sua vel libertatibus, vel
liberis consuetudinibus suis/^ That italicized addition
appears in the reissues of 1217 (2 Hen. m, 1217) and of
1225 (9 Hen. lEI, 1225). **(a) Liberuni tenementum.
i 6 OBIGIN AND GROWTH 7
'Free* tenements were freeholds as opposed to the holding
of villeins. . . . (b) 'Libertates' covered feudal rights
and incidents of too intangible nature to be appropriately
described as 'holdings.* . . . (c) Consuetudines had
two meanings, a broad general one and a narrower finan-
cial one. * ' McKechnie, p. 445.
§ 6. Rebirth of the Great Charter in 1628. During the
despotic days of the Tudor monarchy, whose system of
government by councils was continued by the Stuarts
down to 1640, the ancient liberties of England guar-
anteed by the charters were obscured as a wheat field is
obscured beneath a fertilizing mantle of snow. The roots
of these ancient liberties were thus strengthened for a
sudden and vigorous growth in the time to come. That
larger conception of civil liberty, bom of the Renaissance
and the Reformation, which culminated in the Puritan
Revolution of 1640, expressed itself in no uncertain terms
in Charles * third parliament of 1628, in which the popu-
lar cause was championed by Eliot, Phelips and Sir
Thomas Wentworth. The Petition of Right, then adopted,
drew its substance from Wentworth and its form from
Coke. After referring to the Great Charter, wherein
it was declared *'that no freeman may be taken or
imprisoned or be disseised of his freehold or liberties,
or his free customes, or be outlawed or exiled, or in any
manner destroyed, but by the lawfuU judgment of his
peeres, or by the law of the land ; ' * to the statute of 28
Edw. m, c. 3, wherein it was declared **that no man,
of what state or condicion that he be, shall be put out
of his land or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor
disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought to
answere by due process of lawe, ' * and then, after reciting
the fact that in violation of such statutes, **and other
good lawes and statutes of your realme to that end pro-
vided, divers of your subjects have of late been impris-
oned without any cause shewed; and when for their
deliverance they were brought before your justices by
8 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 6
your Majestie's writts of habeas corpus, there to under-
goe and receive as the court should order, and their
keepers commanded to certifie the causes of their de-
tayner, no cause was certified, but that they were deteined
by your Majestic 's special conmiand, signified by the
lords of your Privie Councell, and yet were returned
backe to severall prisons, without being charged with
anything to which they might make answere according
to the lawe,** the petition prayed **that no freeman, in
any such manner as is before mencioned, be imprisoned
or detained. ^ *
§ 7. Coke a misleading expounder of the Great Charter.
Such was the general nature of the document, reviving
the immortal part of the Great Charter, which drew its
form from Coke, a dogmatic lawyer whose aspirations
in favor of liberty were deeply colored by his associa-
tions with a despotic past. Cokeys First Institute, begun
in 1621, was completed in 1628, while his Second Insti-
tute— a commentary on Magna Carta and other statutes,
so frequently appealed to by our courts as the best expo-
sition of them — was not published until 1632. In esti-
mating the value of Coke as an expounder of the Great
Charter it is impossible to ignore the fact that, after
having sat in the Star Chamber, he died September 3,
1634, when the entire code of Star Chamber law and High
Commission law was in full force. It is not, therefore,
strange that we are unable to draw from his commentary
the wider meaning, the more advanced interpretation
given to the Great Charter by the leaders of the revolu-
tions of 1640 and 1688. Another difficulty arises from
the fact that * ' The great lawyer reads into Magna Carta
the entire body of the common law of the seventeenth
century, of which he was admittedly a master. He seems
almost unconscious of the great changes accomplished by
the experience and vicissitudes of the four eventful cen-
turies which had elapsed since the charter had been orig-
inally granted. The various clauses of Magna Carta are
§ 8 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 9
thus merely occasions for exponnding the law as it stood
not at the beginning of the thirteenth century, but in
his own day. In the skilful hands of Sir Edward, the
Great Charter is made to attack the abuses of James or
Charles, rather than those of John or Henry, which its
framers had in view. . . . Yet Coke, following his
vicious method of assuming the existence, in some part
of Magna Carta, of a warrant for every legal principle
established in his own day, has utterly misled several
generations of commentators. ' * McKechnie, p. 208, 447.
It is all-important to emphasize the fact that Coke 's com-
mentary on the charter is neither a correct description of
the legal conditions existing at the time it was granted,
nor a reliable forec€ist of the broad meaning put upon it
during the half century or more that followed his death.
In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, the Supreme
Court of the United States said: **The prohibition
against depriving the citizen or subject of his life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law, is not new in the
constitutional history of the English race. It is not new
in the constitutional history of this country, and it is not
new in the Constitution of the United States when it
became a part of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the year
1866. The equivalent of the phrase *due process of law,'
according to Lord Coke, is found in the words 'law of the
land ' in the Great Charter, in connection with the writ of
habeas corpus, the trial by jury and other guaranties
of the rights of the subject against the oppression of the
crown. ' ' In that case, as in the preceding case of Murray
V. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272,
the court fell into a manifest historical error when it
assumed that the due process of law clause, as it appears
in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, should be con-
strued as it was understood in England in 1632, when
Coke's Second Institute was published.
§ 8. The revolutions of 1640 and 1688. During the one
hundred and forty-two years that intervened between
10 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 8
Coke's death and the severance of the English colonies
in America from the mother country, what may he called
the ancient Constitution of England, first clearly defined
in Magna Carta, was transformed into the modem con-
stitution through the revolutions of 1640 and 1688. The
reformed and invigorated constitutional system that
stands out after those revolutions was a vastly wider
and more complete fabric of liberty under law than that
existing in Coke 's time. Those revolutions brought into
being many new constitutional principles of which Coke
never heard, most of which passed into American law.
As a practical illustration, reference may be made to
the notable discussion that occurred in Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U, S. 78, in which the court had occasion to
consider the origin of the constitutional right to an
exemption from compulsory self-incrimination, Down
to Coke 's death that compulsory principle was a part of
the Star Chamber code. Not until after the revolution
of 1688, and as a consequence of it, was that Star Cham-
ber process extinguished. The exemption from com-
pulsory self-incrimination, to which the revolution of
1688 gave birth, had become so clearly defined in English
constitutional law prior to the separation of the Ameri-
can colonies from the mother country, that the bills of .
rights of our first state constitutions bristle with defini-
tions of it. That exemption was first stated in a dog-
matic form in the bills of rights of the state constitutions
of 1776. We have the court's word for it that **the
exemption from testimonial compulsion, that is, from
disclosure as a witness of evidence against one's self,
forced by any form of legal process, is universal in Amer-
ican law, though there may be differences as to its scope
and limits." That exemption only became ** universal in
American law" because it had become firmly fixed in
English law between 1688 and 1776. The new constitu-
tional principle, forbidding compulsory self-incrimina-
tion, that passed into all or nearly all of our original
state constitutions, is highly typical of the fact that the
i 9 OBIGIN AND GROWTH 11
bills of rig^hts of those first state constitutions are but
epitomes^ and the very besi epitomes, of the English con-
stitutional system as it stood forth after the revolutions
of 1640 and 1688. The draftsmen of those constitutions
would have recoiled with horror at the thought that they
were founding American constitutional law upon the
ancient Snglish Constitution as it existed in 1632 — ^with
the Star Chamber and High Commission intact — and not
upon the reformed English Constitution as it stood after
the glorious revolutions of 1640 and 1688.
§9. Blackstone, not Coke, the true guide. Blackstone's
famous * * Commentaries * * were put in their present form
in 1758; and Burke, in his conciliation speech made in
the House of Commons in 1775, said : * * I hear that they
(English booksellers) have sold nearly as many of Black-
stone's Commentaries in America as in England. Gen-
eral Ga^e marks out this disposition very particularly
m a letter on your table. * ' Those * * Commentaries * ' were
taught at TVilliam and Mary College, before the revolu-
tion of 1776, by Chancellor Wythe, who numbered Mar-
shall, Jefferson^ and Monroe among his students. Amer-
ican lawyers of that day, as of this, knew Coke through
Blackstone, ^th his doctrines amended and expanded
by the changes the revolutions of 1640 and 1668 had
wrought in the ancient constitution of 1632. Thus trained
and influenced, the founders of this republic epitomized
m our first state constitutions the modem English Con-
stitution as Blackstone had defined it. If anything in
the history of this country is certain, it is the fact that
the essence of the English constitutional system as
reformed hy the revolutions of 1640 and 1688, and as
defined by Blackstone in 1758, passed into our first state
oonfltitutions, which were the fitter beds through which
the essence of the reformed English system passed into
the existing Constitution of the United States. There-
fore, in construing the due process of law clause, as it
appears in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, noth-
12 DDE PROCESS OF LAW § 9
ing but confusion and inaccuracy can result from the
acceptance of the false standard contained in a mislead-
ing andchronisuL We should have nothing to do with
Coke's sketch of the ancient English Constitution as it
existed in 1632 — ^we should turn instead to the true foun-
tain opened for us by Blackstone in 1758.
§ 10. The true rule recognized in Hurtado v.
In Hurtado v. California, 110 U, S. 516, Mr. Justice
Matthews was the first to perceive that the rule of con-
struction, based on English constitutional theory as it
existed in Coke's time, is at once unsound and imprac-
tical. In rejecting that idea, accepted without due consid-
eration by Justices Curtis and Miller in cases heretofore
referred to, he said: **It would be 'to stamp upon our
jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the
laws of the Modes and Persians. This would be all the
more singular and surprising, in this quick and active
age, when we consider that, owing to the progressive
development of legal ideas and institutions in England,
the words of Magna Carta stood for very different things
at the time of the separation of the American colonies
from what they represented originally. ... In this
country written constitutions were deemed essential to
protect the rights and liberties of the people against the
encroachments of power delegated to their governments,
and the provisions of Magna Carta were incorporated
into bills of rights ;'' that is, into bills of rights of the
first state constitutions, because there were no other bills
of rights. In these golden sentences, Mr. Justice
Matthews solved the problem by announcing that the
court, when construing the due process of law clause as
it appears in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments,
should take that formula with the meaning annexed to
it in English constitutional law, ''af the time of the sep-
aration of the America/n colonies/' as contra-distin-
guished from the meaning annexed to it in 1632, when
Coke ^s Second Institute was published. That conclusion
§11 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 13
was greatly strengthened by the statement that **the
provisioiiB of Magna Carta were incorporated into bills
of rights, * * that is, into the bills of rights of our first
state Gonstltxitions. Thus a new and unassailable his-
torical test v^BB laid down as a guide whenever a particu-
lar law or procedure is drawn in question on the ground
that it is i^iranting in due process of law, and that new
test received emphatic confirmation when the court,
8X)eaking through Mr. Justice Gray in Lowe v. Kansas,
163 U. S. 81, said: ** Whether the mode of proceeding
prescribed by this statute, and followed in this case, was
due process of law depends upon the question whether
it w(is in substantial accord with the law and usage of
England before the Declaration of Independence, and in
this country since it became a nation, in similar cases. ' '
That emphatic refusal to recognize as a correct historical
test the condition of English constitutional law as it
existed in 1632 was repeated in no uncertain terms in
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, when the court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Moody, said: ^^ Second.
It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in
English law at the time of the emigration, and brought
to this country by our ancestors, is an essential element
in due process of law. // that were so, the procedure of
the first half of the seventeenth century would be fastened
upon American jurisprudence like a straight-jacket, only
to be loosed by constitutional amendment/^
§ 11. Oliapter 39 as reproduced in our first state consti-
tutions. An attempt has now been made to state within
narrow limits the history of the famous formula that
underlies the English conception of due process of law,
from its advent in the Great Charter of 1215 down to
its embodiment in the American state constitutions
adopted in 1776 or shortly thereafter. Emphasis has
been given, first, to the fact that during the five hundred
and sixty-one years intervening between those dates the
meaning of the formula varied from age to age, each
14 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 11
generation perceiving in it its own peculiar conception
of civil liberty and law; second, to the fact that our
American states adopted it with the meaning attached
to it in England in 1776. Chapter 39 appears in the fol-
lowing forms in the state constitutions of 1776. In the
act of that year, continuing the charter of Coimecticut
of 1662 as the organic law of the state, it is provided
' ^ that no man 's life shall be taken away : no man 's honor
or good name shall be stained : no man 's person shall be
arrested, restrained, banished, dismembered, nor any
ways punished : no man shall be deprived of his wife or
children: no man's goods or estate shall be t£Cken away
from him, nor any ways indamaged under the color of
law, or countenance of authority: unless clearly war-
ranted by the laws of the state. ' * In Maryland *s consti-
tution of the same year it is provided *Hhat every free-
man, for any injury done him in his person or property,
ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the
land, and ought to have justice and right freely without
sale, freely without denial, and speedily without delay,
according to the law of the land." In North Carolina's
constitution of the same year it is provided **that no
freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of
his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.'* In
Pennsylvania's constitution of the same year it is pro-
vided, *'nor can any man be justly deprived of his liberty
except by the laws of the land, or the judgment of his
peers.'' In Virginia's constitution of the same year it
is provided *Hhat no man be deprived of his liberty,
except by the law of the land or by the judgment of his
peers." In Vermont's constitution, drafted in 1777 and
affirmed in 1779, it is provided, **nor can any man be
justly deprived of his liberty, except by the laws of the
land or the judgment of his peers." Li South Carolina's
constitution of 1778 it is provided **that no freeman of
this State be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his
§ 12 OBIGIN AND GROWTH 15
freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, exiled, or
in any manner disseized or deprived of his life, liberty,
or property, but by the judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land. ' ' In Massachusetts ' constitution of 1780
it is provided that **no subject shall be arrested, impris-
oned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, inmiunitieSy
or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled,
or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judg-
ment of his peers, or the law of the land. ' ' In the New
Hampshire constitution of 1784 the same provision is
rex)eated, word for word. The student of American con-
stitutional law should never for a moment forget that
the best epitomes of the reformed English Constitution
ever written are to be found in the bills of rights of our
first state constitutions, drafted by men who knew per*
fectly what rights were fundamental in English law at
that time. Those bills of rights were the filter beds
through which the due process principle passed prior to
its incorporation into the Constitution of the United
States.
§ 12. The wider scope of chapter 39 in American law.
In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, the Court said :
**It is easy to see that when the great barons of England
wrung from King John, at the point of the sword, the
concessions that neither their property should be dis-
posed of by the crown, except as provided by the law of
the land, they meant by * law of the land ' the ancient and
customary laws of the English people, or laws enacted
by the parliament of which those barons were a con-
trolling element. It was not in their minds, therefore,
to protect themselves against the enactment of laws by
the Parliament of England.^' In Hurtado v. California,
110 TJ. S. 516, that statement was amplified by the dec-
laration that **The concessions of Magna Carta were
wrung from the king as guaranties against the oppres-
sions and usurpations of his prerogative. It did not
enter into the minds of the barons to provide security
16 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 12
against their own body or in favor of the commons by
limiting the power of parliament : so that bills of attain-
der, ex post facto laws, laws declaring forfeitures of
estates, and other arbitrary acts of legislation, which
occur so frequently in English history, were never
regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land, for
notwithstanding what was attributed to Lord Coke in
Bonham's Case (8 Coke 114), the omnipotence of parlia-
ment over the common law was absolute, even against
common right and reason. The actual and practical
security for English liberty against legislative tyranny
was the power of a free public opinion represented by
the commons/' In Bonham's Case, Coke's words are
these : * * And it appears in our books, that in many cases,
the common law will control acts of Parliament and some-
times adjudge them to be utterly void ; for when an act
of Parliament is against common right and reason, or
repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common
law will control it and adjudge such act to be void."
8 Coke 118a. And yet, when properly understood, what
Coke said was only inteujded as an announcement of a rule
of construction whereby acts of parliament were to be
interpreted according to common law and natural right,
even, when necessary, to the extent of giving a forced con-
struction. As Mr. Dicey has expressed it: ** English
judges do not claim or exercise any power to repeal a
statute, whilst acts of Parliament may override and con-
stantly do override the law of the judges. Judicial legis-
lation is, in short, subordinate legislation, carried on with
the assent and subject to the supervision of Parliament. ' '
Law of the Const., p. 58. See also Thayer, 1 Cas. Const.
Law, 48, note.
Thus it appears that the English guarantee of private
rights embodied in the formula *'by lawful judgment
of his peers and by the law of the land" was intended
as a limitation upon the crown, or upon those exercising
authority by it« direction, as by letters patent. In Lon-
don's case, 8 Coke 125a, in which Henry VI granted to the
§ 12 OMGIN AND GROWTH 17
oorpbration of dyers in London power to search, and if
fliey found any doth dyed with logwood, such cloth
should be forfeited, it was adjudged that this charter con-
cerning the forfeiture was against the law of the land,
because no forfeiture can grow by letters patent. Upon
the same principle it was held that the law of the land
afforded protection against unjust and arbitrary conduct
upon the part of municipal corporations, because, in the
words of Coke, they ** derive their authority from the
king." Upon that basis it was held in Bagg's case, 11
Coke 99a, that no freeman of a borough or city can be
disfranchised from the corporation provided it has no
authority so to act either by the express terms of the char-
ter or prescription. In the absence of such authority the
freeman should, under the provisions of the Great Char-
ter, be convicted by due process of law before removal.
In the same way, a custom in a city was adjudged void
because ^^ against the law of the land." 2 Inst. 46 Cf.
McGehee, p. 24, sq. In the English system the guarantee
in question was intended to restrain executive action flow-
ing directly or indirectly from the crown; it was not
intended to restrain legislative action upon the part of
the omnipotent parliament.
It has ever been an elementary principle of American
constitutional law that every state legislature is endowed
by its very nature with the omnipotence of the English
parliament, save so far as that omnipotence is restrained
by the express terms of constitutional limitations — an
American invention that rests on the doctrine of the sov-
ereignty of the people as distinguished from the sover-
eignty of parliament. Such limitations, of which the
European world knew nothing, grew naturally out of the
process through which American legislatures came into
existence. From the very beginning the powers of the
colonial assemblies were more or less limited through the
terms of the charters by which such assemblies were either
created or recognized. In colonial times, if statutes were
passed in excess of the powers conferred by the charter,
Due
18 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 12
the question was tested, in the first instance, in the colo-
nial courts, or, if the matter was taken to England, by the
privy council. After the severance from the mother
country, that power to annul an unconstitutional law was
simply assumed, without any express grant from the
people, by the state courts. Paper constitutions, defining
in a dogmatic form the circle of individual rights sur-
rounding the citizen into which state power must not
intrude, was a French invention ; the right of the judicial
power to strike down as void any such unlawful intru-
sion was an American invention, the first and only real
one to which our state system has so far given birth.
And here it is interesting to note that the very first cases
in which the right of an American court to declare an
act of a state legislature unconstitutional and void was
asserted arose out of attempts upon the part of such
legislatures to destroy or impair the right of trial by
jury as a part of the law of the land. In Trevett v.
Weeden, decided in Rhode Island in 1786, an act was
declared void because it impaired the right of trial by
jury guaranteed by the colonial charter granted in 1660,
which Rhode Island continued as her organic law until
1842 ; in Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N. C. 42, decided by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1787, an act passed
in 1785, authorizing summary proceedings in suits con-
cerning confiscated property, was declared void because
destructive of the right of trial by jury. Those who
claim the honor of the first case on the subject for New
Jersey contend that at some uncertain date, prior to
1785, Chief Justice Brearley, in Holmes v. Walton, held
an act void which provided for trials by jury consisting
of six men. Those who claim the honor for Virginia rely
upon the case of Com. v. Caton, 4 Call 5, which came
before the court of appeals of that state in November,
1782. In Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held in 1792 that an act passed
by the colonial legislature of 1712 was ipso facto void
because in contravention of Magna Carta. See the
S 13 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 19
antlior's Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Supreme
Court, pp. 2-5.
So it appears that just as the guaranty contained in
chapter 39 of Magna Carta existed in England as a
limitation upon executive power, as embodied in the
crown and its agents, so in America it existed as a
limitation upon legislative power, as embodied in the
state legislatures. From that starting point the circle
has widened until in our system it has been made to
embrace all state power, executive, legislative and judi-
ciaL In the words of the Supreme Court: **In this
country written constitutions were deemed essential to
protect the rights and liberties of the people against the
encroachments of power delegated to their governments,
and the provisions of Magna Carta were incorporated
into bDls of rights. They were limitations upon all the
powers of government, legislative as well as executive
and judicial. It necessarily happened, therefore, that
as these broad and general maxims of liberty and justice
held in our system a different place and perform a dif-
ferent function from their position and office in English
constitutional history and law, they would receive and
justify a corresponding and more comprehensive inter-
pretation. Applied in England only as guards against
executive usurpation and tyranny, here they have become
bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation. ' ' Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516. See also Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U. S. 97.
§ 13. First eight articles of Amendment to the Federal
Constitation. The position of those who opposed the
adoption of the Constitution of 1787 because it was not
prefaced by a bill of rights was neither factious nor
unreasonable. When the new state constitutions came
into existence, the tendency was general to preface them
with bills of rights epitomizing, as explained already, all
of the seminal principles of the English Constitution
for the protection of the citizen against the crown, as
20 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 13
those principles had been redefined in the revolutions of
1640 and 1688. At the base of that body of protective
constitutional law was that part of Magna Carta (chap-
ter 39) out of which grew the modem conception of due
process of law. With the broad construction put upon
that chapter by the statesman and lawyers of the seven-
teenth century, as restated by Blackstone, it became at
the close of the American Revolution the cornerstone of
American constitutional law. Upon chapter 39 as a base
were superimposed the more modem principles defined
during the revolutions of 1640 and 1688, as embodied in
the acts of the Long Parliament (1640-41), the Petition of
Right (1628), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), the Bill of
Rights (1689), and the Act of Settlement (1700-1701),
which Hallam has characterized as ' ' the seal of our con-
stitutional laws, the complement of the Revolution itself
and the Bill of Rights, and the last great statute which
restrains the power of the crown. ^' Out of those funda-
mental statutes were fabricated the bills of rights by
which the first state constitutions were prefaced, and out
of those bills of rights were coined the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States. After the
Federal Convention of 1787 had refused to limit its unique
creation by a bill of rights, and after Congress had acted
adversely on Lee's suggestion in the same direction, the
question passed to the conventions of the states which
followed the lead of Massachusetts, whose convention
agreed unconditionally, in the words of Hancock, * * to the
Constitution, in full confidence that the amendments pro-
posed will soon become a part of the system.'* In order
to carry out that understanding Madison, the leader of
the House in the first Congress, offered on June 8, 1789,
the desired guarantees in the form of twelve amendments,
ten of which, after long discussion, were ratified by the
states. In the words of Rives, **The amendments pro-
posed by Mr. Madison were, therefore, mainly in the
nature .of a Declaration of Rights, placing the freedom
of speech, the freedom of the press, freedom of religion,
§ 14 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 21
the security of property, personal liberty, trial by jury,
and in general every right and power of the people not
delegated or surrendered, under the aegis of the Con-
stitution, and by express interdiction, beyond the reach
of the Government Life and Times of James Madison,
ii, 38-46. The terms of the first eight out of the ten
amendments thus adopted demonstrate, as nothing else
can, the oneness of English and American constitutional
law. And yet the demonstration is not complete if
we exclude the notable declaration made by Chief
Justice Marshall in Burr*s Case, 4 Cranch App'x 470,
when he was called upon to define the term '^levying war**
as it appears in Art. HE, § 3, which provided that
"treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort. * * In giving the definition
the great path-breaker said: **But the term is not for
the first time applied to treason by the Constitution of
the United States. It is a technical term. It is used in a
very old statute of that country whose language is our
language, and whose laws form ihe substratum of our
laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not
employed by the f ramers of our Constitution in the sense
which had been affixed to it by those from whom we bor-
rowed it So far as the meaning of any terms particu-
larly terms of art, is completely ascertained, those by
whom they are employed must be considered as employ-
ing them in that ascertained meaning, unless the con-
trary be proved by the context. It is therefore reaspn-
able to suppose, unless it be incompatible with other
expressions in the Constitution, that the term 'levying
war' is used in that instrument in the same sense in which
it was understood in England, and in this country to have
been used in the statute of twenty-fifth of Edward III,
from which it was borrowed.''
§14. Due process of law as embodied in the TUth
Amendment. It is impossible to grasp the full meaning
22 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 14
of the Fifth Amendment when considered in isolation,
interwoven as it is with the entire fabric contained in the
first eight articles of amendment which, when taken as
a whole, embody the essence of the new scheme of civil
liberty in England as it emerged from the revolutions of
1640 and 1688. It was that entire and connected scheme
that the first eight articles of amendment imposed as
limitations upon the powers of the Federal Government
of the United States. The amendment in question pro-
vides that: **No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre-
sentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when
in actual service in time of war or public danger, nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation. ' ' Into Arti-
cles V, VI, and VII are condensed the guarantees of due
process of law, springing from chapter 39 of the Great
Charter and from the English jury system, grand and
petit, as that system existed at the time of the severance
of the colonies from the mother country. Nothing more
can be attempted than a statement of the essence of the
judicial literature that has grown up around each article
since its adoption. The purpose of the first clause of
Article V was to perpetuate the grand jury as an instru-
ment for the prosecution of serious crimes in the courts
of the United States. It has been held that it was not the
purpose of the due process of law clause of Article XIV
to perpetuate that institution in the states. In Hurtado
V. California, 110 U. S. 516, it was said: **We are to
construe this phrase in the Fourteenth Amendment by
the usus loquendi of the Constitution itself. The same
words are contained in the Fifth Amendment. That
article makes specific and express provision for perpetu-
§ 14 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 23
ating the institution of the grand jury so far as it relates
to prosecutions for the more aggravated crimes, under
the laws of the United States. According to a recog-
nized canon of interpretation, especially applicable to
formal and solemn instruments of constitutional law, we
are forbidden to assume, without clear reason to the con-
trary, that any part of this most important amendment is
superfluous. The natural and obvious inference is, that
in the sense of the Constitution *due process of law' was
not meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the insti-
tution and procedure of a grand jury in any case. The
conclusion is equally irresistible that when the same
phrase was employed in the Fourteenth Amendment to
restrain the action of the states, it was in the same sense
and with no greater extent ; and that if in the adoption
of that amendment it had been part of its purpose to per-
petuate the institution of the grand jury in the states, it
would have embodied as did the Fifth, express declara-
tions to that effect.*' For a reexamination of the ques-
tion at a later day, see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581.
Thus it appears that the Fifth Article is a limitation
upon the powers of the National Government, while the
Fourteenth is a limitation upon the powers of the states.
Under the Fifth it is necessary that the accused plead,
or be ordered to plead, or, in a proper case, that a plea
of not guilty be filed for him, before his trial can right-
fully proceed; and the record of his conviction should
show distinctly, and not by inference merely that every
step involved in due process of law, an essential to a
valid trial, was taken in the trial court; otherwise the
judgment will be erroneous. It is also the right of the
accused to be present during the whole trial, a right of
which he can not be deprived even with his consent. The
clause that provides that "no person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself*' has been recently con-
sidered in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, in which
it was held that exemption from self incrimination,
though secured as against federal action by Article V is
24 DUE PEOCESS OF LAW § 14
not one of the fundamental rights of national citizenship,
so as to be included among the privileges and immnnities
of citizens of the United States which the slates are for-
bidden by Article XIV to abridge. Not until after the
Revolution of 1688, and as a consequence of it, was the
principle of compulsory self-incrimination abolished. As
Stephen has expressed it: **Soon after the Revolution
of 1688, the practice of questioning the prisoner died
out,'* it was not abolished by statute or ordinance. See
History of the Criminal Law, vol. i, p. 440. And so it
came to pass that the exemption from that cruel provision
of the Star Chamber code was first defined as a principle
of constitutional law in the American bills of rights of
1776.
The all important clause that **no person shall be . . .
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law'* was first expounded in Murray v. Hoboken Land
and Improvement Co., in 18 How. 272, in which the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, said : * * The words
*due process of law' were undoubtedly intended to con-
vey the same meaning as the words *by the law of the
land, ' in Magna Carta. Lord Coke in his commentary on
those words (2 Inst. 50) says they mean due process
of law.'* Following in the path thus marked out,
Mr. Justice Miller, in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S.
&7, said : * * The equivalent of the phrase * due process of
law,' according to Lord Coke, is found in the words the
*law of the land' in the Great Charter, in connection with
the writ' of habeas corpus, the trial by jury, and other
guaranties of the rights of the subject against the oppres-
sion of the Crown." An effort has been made therefore
to demonstrate that these eminent justices fell into a
grave historical mistake when they assumed that the
meaning of **due process of law" should be accepted by
American courts in the limited sense in which it was
understood by Coke in 1632, prior to the Eevolutions of
1640 and 1688 by which it was given a vastly wider sig-
nificance. It was then said that the draftsmen of our first
§ 15 OEIGIN AND GROWTH 25
conartitntions ^wonld have recoiled with horror at the
thought that they were founding American constitutional
law upon the ancient English Constitution as it existed
in 1632 — ^with the Star Chamber. and High Commissions
mtact — ^and not upon the reformed English Constitution,
as Blackstone described it in the first book of his * * Com-
mentaries,' ' arranged in their present form in 1758. The
matter was first put upon a proper foundation by
Mr. Justice Matthews in Hurtado v. California, 110 XJ. S.
516, as heretofore stated.
After declaring in Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, that
the final clause, * * nor shall private property be taken for
public nse, without just compensation,^* is intended
"solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the
Government of the United States, * * Marshall, C. J., said :
"But it is universally understood, it is the history of the
day, that the great revolution which established the Con-
stitution of the United States was not effected without
immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively
entertained that those powers which the patriot states-
men who then watched over the interests of our country
deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those
invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be
exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost
every convention by which the Constitution was adopted,
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were
recommended. These amendments demanded security
against the apprehended encroachments of the Gen-
eral Government — ^not against those of the local
governments.''
§ 15. Absence of national citizenship emphasized by
the Dred Scott Case. With the ratification of the Twelfth
Amendment on September the 25, 1804, the constructive
work of the ** patriot statemen'* who founded the Eepub-
lic drew to a close. By that time Washington, Pelatiah
Webster, Franklin, Hamilton, John Rutledge, James
Wilson, George Mason, Roger Sherman, John Blair, and
26 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 15
Robert Yates had passed away; while Jefferson, John
Adams, Madison, Marshall, Charles Pinckney, Oliver
Ellsworth, Elbridge Gerry, Eufus King, Edmund Ran-
dolph, Robert Morris, Qonverneur Morris, John Lang-
don, George Wythe, and Richard Dobbs Spaight still
remained. Not one of that number, however, survived
the sixty-one years destined to pass by before the adop-
tion of the new or civil war series of articles headed by
the Thirteenth Amendment, ratified on December 18,
1865. During that interval the Union was for a time dis-
solved by civil war, the product of the deadly original sin
of this Republic, African slavery, which had crept into
the colonies prior to the Revolution. Finally in 1789 the
North and the South covenanted together in what are
known as the ** compromises of the constitution ' ' to per-
petuate it by law forever. After that fateful compact had
been signed a great moral revolt took place in the con-
science of the world that ultimately destroyed the insti-
tution in this country at the end of a civil war which, for
a time, disrupted the Union, in fact if not in law. The
driving force of that great moral revolt manifested itself
in no uncertain terms in England when Lord Mansfield,
in Somersett*s Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 79, held that a
person forcibly detained in England as a slave, is enti-
tled to be discharged on habeas corpus. The failure, in
the celebrated case of Dred Scott, 19 How. 393, — ^wherein
a person, having the status of a slave in a state where
slavery was legal, was taken by his master into a free
state of the Union in which slavery was prohibited by
law, — of the attempt in this country to enforce the prin-
ciple thus announced by Lord Mansfield, precipitated the
Civil war. The vital facts of the case, decided by the
Supreme Court, March 6, 1857, were these: In 1834,
Doctor Emerson took his negro slave, Dred Scott, from
Missouri first to Illinois, where slavery was prohibited
by statute, then to Wisconsin, a part of the Louisiana
purchase, where slavery was prohibited by the Missouri
Compromise. In 1838, Doctor Emerson returned with his
§ 15 OBIGIN AND GROWTH 27
slave to Missouri. Then it was that Scott, or some one
for him, conceived the idea that hy touching the free soils
of Illinois and Wisconsin during his absence he had been
set free. In other words, the direct purpose of the case
was to ascertain whether or not the doctrine laid down
by Lord Mansfield in Somersett^s case — ^wherein it was
held that a slave, taken to England from one of the Amer-
ican colonies where slavery was legal, was set free by
touching the soil of England, where slavery was not
recognized by positive law,— could be applied under our
Constitution, whose compromises expressly recognized
the existence of slavery as a matter of positive and
supreme law. On the theory that he was a free man after
his return to Missouri, Dred Scott contended that a whip-
ping there given him by his master in 1848, was an assault
and battery for which he brought suit in a state court at
St. Louis and obtained judgment. While that case was
pending in the State Supreme Court, Doctor Emerson
sold his slave to one Sandford of the city of New York.
Upon the theory that Scott and Sandford thus became
'^citizens of different states/' the former brought suit
against IJie latter for assault in the Federal Circuit Court
for Missouri, where Sandford pleaded that the plaintiff
was not as alleged a citizen of Missouri but "a negro of
African descent, his ancestors were of pure African
blood, and were brought into this country and sold as
negro slaves/' Scott in demurring to that plea claimed
that he was a citizen on defendants* own showing, and
his demurrer was sustained, Sandford then pleaded to
the merits that plaintiff was his negro slave and that as
such he had ** gently laid hands on him*' as he was author-
ized by law to do. After the court had declared the law
to be with the defendant, plaintiff presented exceptions
upon which the case passed to the Supreme Court, where
the primary question, was one of jurisdiction. Was
Scott a ** citizen of Missouri** within the meaning of the
Constitution? If he was not, the Federal Circuit Court
had no jurisdiction of his case ; and he certainly was not
28 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 15
a citizen but a slave, unless his residence in Illinois^
where slavery was prohibited by statute, and in Wiscon-
sin where slavery was prohibited by the Missouri Com-
promise had set him free. The constitutionality of the
Compromise was thus the essence of the issue, because
upon its validity depended the fact whether Scott *s status
as a slave was affected by his presence on the soil of
Wisconsin. It is not likely that any jurist familiar with
the practice of the Supreme Court would have seriously
contended, in times free from political excitement, that
the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, involv-
ing the entire status of slavery in the territories, was not
squarely before that court on the pleadings in the Dred
Scott Case, 19 How. 393. However that may be, the
court so held, and that decision was conclusive upon all
persons bound to respect its authority. One of the harsh-
est critics of the judgment in question frankly admits that
**the action had been brought by Scott in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Missouri
to establish the freedom of himself, his wife, and their
two children/^ Carson, History of the Supreme Court,
p. 367. With that question squarely before it the court
held that under the Constitution as it then stood,' no state
had the right to raise a man of African descent to the
rank of a citizen so as to make him a citizen of a state or
of the United States. After the end of the Civil war that
judgment was affirmed by the nation as a whole when it
resolved that Scott's appeal could only be granted
through an amendment of the Constitution itself.
The vital importance of the case in question to the
subject before us is emphasized by the fact that a grand
inquest was then held, upon the eve of the Civil war, with
all the machinery of learning, and with all the accessories
of prolonged and exhaustive argument, in order to ascer-
tain whether or not such a thing existed as a citizenship
of the United States, defined as such by its Constitution
and laws, independently of state citizenship. The most
earnest seeker for such a citizenship was Mr. Justice
S 16 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 29
Cartas, who was in the highest degree qualified to ascer-
tain it, if it existed at all. His return was non est inven-
tus. He ascertained that there was no such thing at that
time, as a citizenship of the United States, as a sub-
stantiye thing independent state citizenship. He said:
**I can find nothing in the Constitution, which, propria
vigore, deprives of their citizenship any class of persons
who were citizens of the United States at the time of its
adoption, or who should be native born citizens of any
state after its adoption; nor any power enabling Con-
gress to disfranchise persons bom on the soil of any
state, and entitled to citizenship of such state by its con-
stitution and laws. And my opinion is that, under the
Constitution of the United States, every free person bom
on the soil of a state, who is a citizen of that state
by force of its constitution or laws, is also a citizen
of the United States. . . . That the Constitution itself
h(i$ defined citizenship of the United States by declaring
what persons f horn within the several states, shall or not
he citizens of the United States, wUl not he pretended. It
contains no such declaration/^ Dissenting opinion in
Dred Scott Case, 18 How. 393. When we place in juxta-
position with those weighty words the language of Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment — ** All persons bom
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States ' ^ —
whereby the new national citizen was created, we perceive
at once how prophetic they were of the definition soon to
come.
§ 16. The new national dtiMnship created by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Curtis persuaded him-
self that Sandford's plea to the jurisdiction was bad, and
that Scott had the right to sue because * * every such citi-
zen, residing in any state^ has the right to sue, and is
liable to be sued in the federal courts, as a citizen of that
state in which he resides.*' Even if we concede all the
Justice claimed, it appears that such citizenship of the
30 DUB PEOCESS OF LAW § 16
United States as Scott was supposed to possess was noth-
ing more than a secondary and dependent relation result-
ing from his state citizenship. Such was the solecism
imbedded in the Constitution at the time of its adoption.
While it created the first Federal Government that ever
operated directly on citizens, the fact remained that it
had no citizens in its own right. The solenm judidal
ascertainment in the Dred Scott Case, 19 How. 393, that
such a vacuum existed in the Constitution did more than
any one thing to precipitate the Civil war ; and after its
close the vacuum was filled by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment which, without making any direct reference
to the question of race at all, contains the first positive
definition ever given of citizenship of the United States
as a primary and substantive thing, independent of state
citizenship. It changed both its origin and character by
providing that **A11 persons bom or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States ; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. ^ *
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of a constitu-
tional revolution which, through the creation of this new
national citizenship, shifted the center of gravity of the
composite structure from the states to the nation, thus
nationalizing the entire sphere of civil liberty. It is not
therefore strange that we should desire to know some-
thing of the authorship of a document which has been
called not inaptly, a new Magna Carta. Unfortunately,
and strangely enough, the inner history of the personal
authorship of the various parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment is shrouded in almost as much mystery as
that which surrounds the personal authorship of the old
Magna Carta from which its vital part was drawn. We
! 16 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 31
know little beyond the fact that, taken as a whole, it was
drafted by tbe Joint Reconstruction Committee, consist-
ing of nine members from the House and six from the
Senate, the majority of whom joined in a report made on
June 8, 1866, which burns not unnaturally with the pas-
sions of the Civil wax. **Your committee does not deem
it either necessary or proper to discuss the question
whether the late Confederate States are still States of
this Union, or can ever be otherwise. Granting this
profitless abstraction, about which so many words have
been wasted, it by no means follows that the people of
those States may not place themselves in a condition to
abrogate the powers and privileges incident to a State of
Union, and deprive themselves of all pretense of right
to exercise those powers and enjoy those privileges. A
State within the Union has obligations to discharge as
a member of the Union. It must submit to federal laws
and uphold federal authority. It must have a govern-
ment republican in form, under and by which it is con-
nected with the General Government, and through which
it can discharge its obligations. It is more than idle, it
is a xnockery, to contend that a people who have thrown
off their allegiance, destroyed the local government which
bound their States to the Union as members thereof,
defined its authority, refused to execute its laws, and
abrogated every provision which gave them political
rights within the Union, still retain, through all, the
perfect and entire right to resume, at their own will and
pleasure, all their privileges within the Union, and espe-
cially to participate in its government, and to control the
conduct of its affairs.'' Eesolution proposing amend-
ment was dated June 16, 1866. With the report of the
Joint Beconstruction Committee, reviewing the condi-
tions that controlled it in the drafting of the amendment
in question before him, Mr. Justice Miller did not hesi-
tate to say in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
decided in 1872, that **The first observation we have to
make on this clause is that it puts at rest both the ques-
32 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 16
tions which we stated to have been the subject of differ-
ences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens
of the United States without regard to their citizenship
of a particular state, and it overturns the Dred Scott
decision by making all persons bom within the United
States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the
United States. That its main purpose was to establish
the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt.
. . . We doubt very much whether any action of a
state not directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever
be held to come within the purview of this provision. It
is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency,
that a strong case would be necessary for its application
to any other. ' '
Ten years later, when the jurists and statesmen of the
country had perceived the necessity for widening the new
citizenship beyond the drcumstances out of which it grew,
Mr. Boscoe Conkling, a leading member of the Recon-
struction Committee that framed the amendment, during
the argument of the San Mateo County Case in the
Supreme Court, December 19, 1882, 116 U. S. 138, pro-
duced for the first time the journal of the committee, never
before published. In his argument, after explaining how
the various provisions came to be inserted, he affirmed
that the committee did not intend to confine their opera-
tion to the African race. He said : ** At the time the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified, as the records of the two
Houses will show, individuals and joint stock companies
were appealing for congressional and administrative
protection against invidious and discriminating state and
local taxes. One instance was that of an express com-
pany, whose stock was owned largely by citizens of the
State of New York, who came with petitions and bills
seeking acts of Congress to aid in resisting what they
deemed oppressive taxation in two states, and oppres-
sive and ruinous rules of damages applied under state
§ 16 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 33
laws. That complaints of oppression in respect of prop-
erty and other rights, made by citizens of Northern
States who took up residence in the South, were rife, in
and out of Congress, none of us can forget; that com-
plaints of oppression in various forms, of white men in
the South, — of 'Union men' — ^were heard on every side,
I need not remind the court. The war and its results,
the condition of the f reedmen, and the manifest duty owed
to them, no douht brought on the occasion for constitu-
tional amendment, but when the occasion came, and men
set themselves to the task, the accumulated evils falling
within the purview of the work were the surrounding cir-
cumstances, in the light of which they strove to increase
and strengthen the safeguards of the Constitution and
the laws." Fortunately the negro was not mentioned by
name in the amendment even if he was the primary cause
of it. Mr. Justice Bradley in his dissenting opinion in
the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, said: **It is
futile to argue that none but persons of the African race
are intended to be benefited by this amendment They
may have been the primary cause of the amendment, but
its language is general embracing all citizens, and I think
it was purposely so expressed. ^ ' Mr. Justice Swayne in
his dissenting opinion in the same case said : ^ ' The lan-
guage employed is unqualified in its scope. There is no
exception in its terms, and there can be properly none in
their application. By the language * citizens of the United
States' was meant all such citizens; and by *any person'
was meant all persons within the jurisdiction of the State.
No distinction is intimated on account of race or color.
This court has no authority to interpolate a limitation
that is neither expressed nor implied.** By that broad
view thus expressed by Justices Bradley and Swayne,
and concurred in by Chief Justice Chase and Justice
Field, the amendment in question was severed from its
history and made to rest alone upon a construction of the
terms that appeared upon the face of it. In order to give
Due Process — 3
34 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 16
support to that idea Mr. Justice Gray said, in United
States V. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S, 649: *' doubtless the
intention of the Congress which framed and of the states
which adopted this Amendment of the Constitution must
be sought in the words of the amendment ; and the debates
in Congress are not admissible as evidence to control the
meaning of those words/' To that eminently wise and
patriotic method of construction Mr. Conkling gave
strong support by his presentation of the unpublished
journal of the Committee in the San Mateo County Case.
And so it has been settled for the good of the whole nation
that the new national citizenship was not created for the
exclusive benefit of the colored race, nor limited to their
protection; it was made a part of the fundamental law
for the benefit of ''AH persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. '*
All such are declared to be ''citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. ' ^ Py the force of
those provisions the primary citizenship in this country
is in the United States ; and the secondary is in the state
of the citizen 's residence. The two citizenships are sepa-
rate and distinct from each other. In the words of the
Supreme Court : " It is quite clear, then, that there is a
citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of the
state, which are distinct from each other and which
depend upon different characteristics or circumstances
in the individual.^' Only the privileges and immunities
that belong to a citizen of the U^ted States as such are
placed by the amendment under the protection of the
Constitution; "those belonging to the citizen of the state
as such . • . must rest for their security and protec-
tion where they have heretofore rested ; for they are not
embraced by this paragraph of the amendment." The
privileges and immunities of the new and primary na-
tional citizenship were thus wisely limited to those only
"which owe their existence to the Federal government, its
national character, its constitution or its laws. ^ ^ Slaugh-
ter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.
§ 17 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 35
§ 17. Our new Magna Oarta protects only the national
dtizenship. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
embraces two separate and distinct subject matters. The
first creates the new national citizenship by the declara-
tion that * * All persons bom or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside;** the second protects the new citizenship thus
created by the declaration that * * No State shall make or
enforce any law which shaU abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ' '
Only to the protective portion of Section 1, devised to
shield the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
power by state authority, executive, legislative, or judi-
cial, can the phrase, **new Magna Carta,'' be applied.
And that protective portion divides itself into two dis-
tinct parts: first, the provision, **nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law/' a reproduction of the ancient
formula derived from the English Constitution ; second,
the provision, ' * nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws, ' ' a purely Amer-
ican invention which has no connection whatever with
English law.
To protect the new national citizenship against the
encroachments of state power was the primary purpose,
of its creators. Prior to the adoption of the amendment
the citizens of a state could rely for due process of law
on the institutions of the state alone ; and when such pro-
tection was denied the Federal government had no right
whatever to interfere. Li the words of the Supreme
Court the amendment **legitimality operates to extend
to citizens and residents ( [Hibben v. Smith] 191 U. S.
310, 326) of the states the same protection against arbi-
trary state legislation affecting life, liberty and property
36 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 17
as if offered by the Fifth Amendment against similar
legislation by Congress/' Thus it came to pass that if
the state fails to guarantee due process of law and the
equal protection of the laws to citizens of the United
States, as such, the Federal judiciary can supervise the
performance of that duty in such a way as to vest the
ultimate decision of every question, involving due process
of law and the equal protection of the laws, in the Federal
courts. But in the particular case the Federal court can
only determine whether the state has failed in that duty ;
and, in that event, it can only declare the proceedings
void. The vital question therefore in every case is this :
Has the individual complaining been deprived by official
state action of some right or immunity guaranteed to him
by virtue of his national citizenship, considered as a thing
separate and apart from his state citizenship, because it
was settled at the outset '*that there is a citizenship of
the United States and a citizenship of the state, which
are distinct from each other and which depend upon dif-
ferent characteristics or circumstances in the individ-
ual. ' ' Only the privileges and immunities that belong to
a citizen of the United States as such are placed by the
amendment under the protection of the Constitution;
those belonging to the citizens of the state as such '^must
rest for their security and protection where they have
heretofore rested; for they are not embraced by this
paragraph of the amendment. ' ' A definition of the privi-
leges and immunities of state citizenship was drawn in
the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, from the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell,
Fed. Cas. No. 3230, in the following form : *'the inquiry,''
he says, *'is, what are the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several States? We feel no hesitation in
confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are fundamental; which belong of
right to the citizens of all free governments, and which
have at all times been employed by citizens of the several
States which compose this Union, from the time of their
17 OEIGIN AND GROWTH 37
becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these
fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be com-
prehended nnder the following general heads : protection
by the government, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain hap-
piness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints
as the government may prescribe for the general good of
the whole.*' Mr. Justice Field, who dissented in the
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, with the concur-
rence of the Chief Justice, and Justices Bradley and
Swayne, contended that the fundamental rights of citi-
zenship, which, by the opinion of the court, were held to
be rights of state citizenship, protected only by the state
government, became, as the result of the Fourteenth
Amendment, rights of national citizenship, protected by
the Federal Constitution. That view was based on
the contention that the safeguards of personal rights
enumerated in the first eight articles of Amendment to
the Federal Constitution, sometimes called the Federal
Bill of Bights, though they were by those amendments
originally secured only against national action, are
among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, which Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects against state action. The majority of the
court took, however, a much narrower view of the scope
of the amendment by declaring that the states might still
abridge some of the personal rights enumerated in the
first eight amendments, whenever it appeared that such
X)ersonal rights were not within the meaning of the clause
"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States. '* With the way thus cleared it was held in
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, that the right to trial by
jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the Seventh Amend-
ment ; in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, that the right
to bear arms, guaranteed by the Second Amendment ; in
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, that the security
against prosecution, except by indictment of a grand
38 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 17
jury, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment; in West v.
Louisiana, 194 U, S. 258, the right to be confronted by
witnesses, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment were not
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, as such, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Then came the notable case of Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 TJ. S. 78, which may be said to have closed the
controversy on this subject by the declaration, after a
careful review of all the preceding cases, that the exemp-
tion from self-incrimination secured, as against the action
of the Federal government by the Fifth Amendment, is not
one of the fundamental rights of national citizenship
included among the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States which the states are forbidden to
abridge by the Fourteenth Amendment. After describ-
ing, in general terms, the character of state citizenship
the court, in the case in question, thus states the essence
of its conclusion: ** Privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States, on the other hand, are only
such as arise out of the nature and essential character of
the national government, or are specifically granted or
secured to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of
the United States, Slaughter House Oases, supra, p. 79 ;
Be Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448 ; Duncan v. Missouri, 152
U. S. 377. Thus among the rights and privileges of
national citizenship recognized by this court are the right
to pass from state to state (Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall.
35) ; the right to petition Congress for a redress of griev-
ances (United States v. Cruikshank, supra) ; the right to
vote for national officers (Ex-parte Yarbrought, 110 U. S.
651 ; Wily v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58) ; the right to enter the
public lands (United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76) ; the
right to be protected against violence while in the lawful
custody of a United States marshal (Logan v. United
States, 144 U. S. 263) ; and the right ^o inform the United
States authorities of violation of its laws (Re Quarles,
158U. S.532)..''
The majority of the court who determined in the
§ 17 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 39
Slaughter House Gases, 16 Wall. 36, to confine the opera-
tion of the amendment within the narrowest possible
limits were largely controlled no doubt by a practical
consideration which has prevailed down to the present
time. It was considered wise so to limit the constitn-
tional revolution wrought by the amendment as to pre-
vent a radical diange of the whole theory of the relations
of the state and federal governments to each other, and
of both governments to Ihe people. It was thereof said
in the United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, that
"The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from
depriving any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law ; but this adds nothing to the rights of
one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an
additional guaranty against any encroachment by the
states upon the fundamental rights which belong to
every citizen as a member of society ; ' ' and In Be Kemm-
ler, supra, that **The Fourteenth Amendment did not
radically change the whole theory of the relations of the
state and federal governments to each other, and of both
governments to the people. The same person may be at
the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen
of the state. Protection to life, liberty and property
rests, primarily, with the States, and the amendment
furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroach-
ment upon those fundamental rights which belong to citi-
zenship, and which the state governments were created
to secure. Undoubtedly the amendment forbids any arbi-
trary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and secures
equal protection to all under Uke circumstances in the
enjoyment of their rights ; and, in the administration of
criminal justice, requires that no different or higher pun-
ishment shall be imposed upon one than is imposed upon
all for like offenses. But it was not designed to interfere
with the power of the State to protect the lives, liberties
and property of its citizens, and to promote their health,
peace, morals, education and good order. Barbier v. Con-
noUy, 113 U. S. 27, 31. '' Thus it was considered all
40 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 17
important to leave the internal sovereignty of the states
so unimpaired that they could still exercise the sovereign
rights of taxation, eminent domain, the police power, the
administration of justice, in civil and criminal cases, with
no restraint whatever so long as the guarantees in favor
of the new national citizenship were not violated. In the
second place, it was considered necessary so to limit the
scope of the amendment as to prevent, the Federal courts
from being submerged under a mass of new Ktigation
involving practically a review of every transaction
between the state and its citizens. Its framers had no
idea of converting the Supreme Court of the United
States into a general court of appeal with jurisdiction
so wide and plenary as to enable it to review all cases
involving the taking away of life, liberty and property
when only questions of equitable consideration or broad
ideas of justice are involved. That tribunal remains as
before a court not of general but special appeal with
power to supervise under the amendment in question only
when the official action of the state has violated either its
provisions or those of some act of Congress passed in
pursuance of it. The denial of due process becomes a
question when the decision of the highest court of a state
is against the vaUdity of a right set up under the Federal
Constitution of its laws.
Here the fact should be emphasized that the prohibi-
tions of the amendment have reference to state action
exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.
Such actions constitute merely private wrongs, or crimes
of the individual. There can be no remedy under the
amendment unless the denial of the constitutional right
in question rests for its justification upon state law or
authority. Despite the fact that the Federal Constitu-
tion guarantees a republican form of government the ulti-
mate power to determine all questions of local govern-
ment and policy still resides, and must ever reside in the
states, so long as the fundamental rights of the individual
as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are not
§ 18 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 41
abridged or denied. The Federal courts have nothing
whatever to do with the expediency or policy of state
laws, nor is the hardship or injustice of such laws neces-
sarily an objection against their constitutional validity.
**The rule, briefly stated, is that whenever an act of the
legislature is challenged in court the inquiry is limited
to the question of power, and does not extend to the mat-
ter of expediency, the motives of the legislators, or the
reasons which were spread before them to induce the pas-
sage of the act.'' Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, etc., Eail-
way, 151 U. S. 1. The amendment does not attempt to
deprive the states of their police powers nor does it '* pro-
fess to secure to all persons in the United States the
benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great
diversities in these respects may exist in two states sepa-
rated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line
there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other
side no such right. Each state prescribes its own modes
of judicial proceeding. ' ' Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22.
In speaking of due process as applied to legal proceedings
the Supreme Court has said that it means **a course of
legal proceedings according to those rules and principles
which have been established in our system of jurispru-
dence for the protection and enforcement of private
rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must
be a tribunal competent by its Constitution — ^that is by
the law of its creation — ^to pass upon the subject mat-
ter of the suit, and, if that involves merely a determina-
tion of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be
brought within its jurisdiction by service of process
within the State, or his voluntary appearance. ' ' Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, quoted in Scott v. McNeal,
154 U. S. 46.
§ 18. Dae process of law as embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The leading case just quoted emphasizes
with a clearness and force that can not be surpassed, the
all important fact that what the amendment does guar-
42 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 18
antee, primarily and in terms that can not be misunder-
stood, is that kind of legal proceedings contemplated by-
chapter 39 of the Great Charter, as the same was under-
stood in England at the time of the separation from the
mother country. Unfortunately in applying that seminal
principle of the English Constitution as a limitation upon
the powers of the states the Supreme Court, speaking
through a great judge, fell into the error, as heretofore
explained, of appealing to Coke 's commentary on Magna
Carta, published in 1632, as the true key to its meaning
instead of the ** Commentaries^' of Blackstone, put in
their present form in 1758, after the meaning of due proc-
ess had been vastly widened by the results of the Revolu-
tions of 1640 and 1688. In Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U. S. 97 (1877), the court, speaking through Mr. Jus-
tice Miller, said: **The equivalent of the phrase *due
process of law, ' according to Lord Coke, is found in the
words * law of the land, ' in the Great Charter, in connec-
tion with the writ of habeas corpus, the trial by jury, and
other guaranties of the rights of the subject against the
oppression of the Crown. In the series of amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, proposed imme-
diately after the organization of the Government, which
were dictated by the jealousy of the states as further
limitations upon the power of the Federal Government,
it is found in the Fifth, in connection with other guaranties
of personal rights of the same character. Among those
are protection against prosecutions for crimes unless sanc-
tioned by a grand jury ; against being twice tried for the
same offense ; against the accused being compelled in a
criminal case, to testify against himself; and against
taking private property for public use without just com-
pensation . . . when, in the year of grace 1868, there
is placed in the Constitution of the United States a decla-
ration that *No State shall deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law, ^ can a State
make anything due process of law which, by its own legis-
lation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm this is
§ 18 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 43
to hold that the prohibition to the States is of no avail,
or has no application where the invasion of private rights
is affected nnder the forms of state legislation.'' The
Court added that **A most exhaustive judicial inquiry
into the meaning of the words Mue process of law,' as
found in the Fifth Amendment, resulted in the unani-
mous decision of this court, that they do not necessarily
imply a regular proceeding in a court of justice, or after
the manner of such courts. Murray v, Hoboken Land
Co., 18 How. 272 (1855)." In that case the Court, falling
into the same historical error, said: **The words *due
process of law, ' were undoubtedly intended to convey the
same meaning as the words 'by the law of the land,' in
Magna Carta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those
words (2 Inst., 50), says, they mean due process of law.
The Constitution which had been adopted by the several
States before the formation of the Federal Constitution,
following the language of the Great Charter more closely,
generally contained the words *but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land.' "
As time went on the Court perceived that the draft-
men of the State Constitutions, to which Mr. Justice
Curtis referred in the case last cited, never dreamed of
founding American constitutional law upon the ancient
English constitution as it existed in 1632 — ^with the Star
Chamber and High Commission intact — and not upon the
reformed English constitution, as Blackstone described
it in the first book of his famous ** Commentaries," put
in their present form in 1758. The departure from the
old and mischievous misconception dates from 1884 when
in Hutardo v. California, 110 U. S. 516, Mr. Justice
Matthews was the first to perceive that the old rule of
construction, based on English Constitutional theory as
it existed in Coke's time, was at once unsound and imprac-
ticaL In rejecting the old rule, he said : * ' It would be to
stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness
attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians. This
would be all the more singular and surprising, in this
44 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 18
quick and ax^tive age, when we consider that^ owing to the
progressive development of legal ideas and institutions
in England, the words of Magna Carta stood for very
different things at the time of the separation of the Amer-
ican colonies from what they represented originaUy/^
The good work thus begun was materially advanced in
1896 when in Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81, Mr. Justice
Gray said : ** Whether the mode of proceeding prescribed
by this statute, and followed in this case was due process
of law, depends upon the question whether it was in sub-
stantial accord with the law and usage of England before
the Declaration of Independence, and in this country
since it became a nation, in similar cases. ' ' But the end
was not reached until 1908 when in Twining v. New Jer-
sey, 211 U. S. 78, Mr. Justice Moody, a jurist of rare
promise, said: **It does not follow, however, that a pro-
cedure settled in English law at the time of the emigra-
tion, and brought to this country and practiced by our
ancestors, is an essential element of due process of law.
// that were so, the procedure of the first half of the
seventeenth century would be fastened upon American
jurisprudence like a straight jacket only to be loosed by
constitutional amendment/^
The foregoing definitions of the due process of law
guaranteed by the amendment in question, as formulated
by Justices Matthews, Gray and Moody, are happy
expressions of the fundamental principle of the Histori-
cal School of Jurisprudence which has established the
momentous conclusion that law, in its final analysis, is
neither the command of an outside sovereign, nor a collec-
tion of abstract principles in force by the nature of
things for all ages. Law is a living and growing organ-
ism which changes as the relations of society change.
As Mr. Justice Holmes has expressed it: **The law is
always approaching, and never reaching consistency. It
is forever adopting new principles from life at one end,
and it always retains old ones from history at the other,
which have not been absorbed or sloughed off. It will
§ 19 OBIQIN AND GROWTH 45
become entirely consistent only when it ceaaes to grow. ' '
The Common Law, p. 36, Only so long as a constitution
continues to be a living and growing organism, which
changes as the relations of society change, can it continue
to adapt itself to the ever increasing wants of a progres-
sive society. Mr, Justice Moody grasped the fact that the
problem of problems for those who create judge made law
is to find a way through which the '* straight- jacket ^^ put
on a progressive state, in the form of a written constitu-
tion or code, can be made sufBciently elastic to adapt itself
to all the changing conditions of the aftergrowth. That
problem has been engaging EngUsh jurists ever since
chapter 39 of the Great Charter was formulated in 121 5.
They have interpreted the due process principle it em-
bodies in each succeeding age according to its needs and
aspirations ; and in that way it has been made to mirror
for each age its own peculiar conception of civil liberty.
After it had been broadened and adapted to modem condi-
tions by the Revolutions of 1640 and 1688 it passed into
the Constitution of the United States as a limitation on
the powers of the Federal Government after the adoption
of the Fifth Amendment in 1790 ; and as a limitation on the
powers of the state government after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
§ 19. Equal protection of the laws as embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment. The draftsmen of the amend-
ment in question were prompted to add the final clause
of Section 1 — ^'^nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws'' — ^by the peculiar
political conditions by which they were surrounded. Mil-
lions of slaves of African descent had been suddenly
lifted to the condition of f reedmen, and there was a grave
apprehension expressed upon the part of their liberators
that the legislatures of the Southern States, if not
restrained by a constitutional limitation, would enact dis-
criminating statutes designed to remand these freedmen
to a condition of virtual slavery. It was said, and right-
46 DUE PEOCESS OP LAW § 19
fully, that against such statutes the due process clause
would afford no protection because the principle of * * the
equal protection of the laws ' ^ had no place in it, — such a
principle had never been recognized in the EngUsh con-
stitutional system. It was also realized that Section 4 of
Article IV of the Constitution which declares that * * The
United States shall guarantee to every State of this
Union a republican form of government^' was too vague
and indefinite to give adequate protection. Prompted by
such conditions American jurists made an invention, cre-
ating equality before the law and securing equal laws, a
guarantee that never existed prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In that way the due process
clause was supplemented by a new creation of a broader
scope and deeper significance. Referring to provisions
of the Constitution existing prior to the adoption of the
new amendments, and particularly to the Fifth Amend-
ment, Senator Howard, who introduced the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Senate on behalf of the Beconstrue-
tion Committee, said: ''Section one is a restriction upon
the States, and does not, of itself, confer any power, upon
Congress. I look upon the first section, taken in connec-
tion with the fifth, as very important. It will, if adopted
by the States, forever disable everyone of them from
passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights
and privileges which pertain to citizens of the United
States, and to all persons who may happen to be within
their jurisdiction. It establishes equality before the law,
and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most
despised of the race the same rights and the same pro-
tection before the law as it gives to the most powerful,
the most wealthy, or the most haughty.'* In explaining
the provision for equal protection of the laws Senator
Poland said of equality: ''It is the very spirit and
inspiration of our system of government, the absolute
foundation upon which it was established. It is essen-
tially declared in the Declaration of Independence and
in all the provisions of the Constitution. Notwithstand-
§ 19 ORIGIN AND GEOWTH 47
ing this, we know that state laws exist, and some of them
of very recent enactment, in direct violation of these prin-
ciples. It certainly seems desirable that no doubt should
be left existing as to the power of Congress to enforce
principles lying at the very foundation of all republican
government if they be denied or violated by the States,
and I can not doubt but that every senator will rejoice in
idding to remove all doubt upon this power of Congress. ' '
The moment the amendment passed from the political
arena to the Supreme Court the manifest historical fact
was promptly recognized that the protection of the
negro race was the primary and immediate cause of its
adoption. In the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
Mr. Justice Miller said : * * * Nor shall any State deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.' In the light of the history of these amend-
ments, and the prevailing purpose of them, which we have
already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to
this clause. The existence of the laws of the States
where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which dis-
criminated with gross injustice and hardship against
them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause,
and by it such laws are forbidden.*' Mr. Justice Field,
in his dissenting opinion, said: *' After referring to sev-
eral statutes passed in some of the Southern States, dis-
criminating between the f reedmen and white citizens, and
after citing the definition of civil liberty given by Black-
stone the Senator (Trumbull) said: *I take it that any
statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any
citizen of civil rights, which are secured to other citizens,
is an unjust encroachment upon liberty ; and it is in fact
a badge of servitude which by the Constitution is pro-
hibited: Cong. Globe, 1st Sess., 39 Cong., part I, p. 474.**
Nevertheless the wise and patriotic jurists, who thus
frankly stated the true facts as to the history of the
amendment, at once resolved to sever it from its history,
in order to give it a broad national significance according
to i(^ terms which, fortunately, did not refer to the exist-
48 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 19
ence of race distinctions in any form whatsoever. In the
weighty words of Mr. Justice Bradley: '*It is futile to
argue that none but persons of the African race are
intended to be benefited by this amendment. They may
have been the primary cause of the amendment, but its
language is general, embracing all citizens, and I think it
was purposely so expressed. The mischief to be reme-
died was not merely slavery and its incidents and conse-
quences. The amendment was an attempt to give voice
to the strong national yearning for that time and condi-
tion of things, in which American citizenship should be a
sure guaranty of safety, and in which every citizen of
the United States might stand erect in every portion of
its soil, in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege
belonging to a freeman without fear of violence or moles-
tation.'' And in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
Mr. Justice Matthews said: ** These provisions (of Sec-
tion 1) are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws. ' ^ The ripe fruit of that wise rule of con-
struction was embodied in the Railroad Tax Cases
8 Sawy. 238, by Mr. Justice Field who said : ' * Oppres-
sion of the person and spoliation of property by any state
were thus forbidden, and equality before the law was
secured to all. With the adoption of the amendment
the power of the states to oppress any one under any
pretense or in any form was forever ended ; and thence-
forth all persons within their jurisdiction could claim
equal protection under the laws. No state — ^such is the
sovereign command of the whole people of the United
States — ^no state shall touch the life, the liberty, or the
property of any person, however humble his lot or
exalted his station, without due process of law; and no
state, even with due process of law, shall deny to any one
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.**
§ 20 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 49
§ 20. The rule of inclusion and exdnsion. Despite the
fact that the meaning of the two formulas contained in
Section 1 of the amendment, as limitations upon the
powers of the states, has been definitely ascertained, it is
gravely difficult in a particular case to determine when
the act of a state, executive, legislative, or judicial, takes
away from a citizen of the United States, as such, a right
so fundamental that its loss may be said to * * deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law,'* or **deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. * ' Foreseeing that diffi-
culty at the outset the Supreme Court determined to meet
it in each case by a discreet and cautious working rule
best described in its own language: **But, apart from
the imminent risk of a failure to give any definition
which would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive, and
satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think, in the ascertain-
ing of the intent and application of such an important
phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented
for decision shall require with the reasoning on which
such decisions may be founded.*' Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 IT. S. 97. In a word, the rule is that when
a citizen of the United States, as such, complains
that a fundamental right guaranteed by the clauses in
question has been taken away, the court will ascertain
in that particular case whether the right is an incident of
national citizenship, and as such within its protection, or
an incident of state citizenship, whose protection belongs
to the state alone. If it appears that the right claimed is
an incident of national citizenship, then the ultimate
question arising is, whether or no that right as protected
by the amendment has been actually taken away by state
action, executive, legislative or judicial. The natural and
inevitable tendency always impelling the court to narrow
rather than extend its jurisdiction arises out of the prin-
ciple of self-preservation. After stating that so long as
the due process of law clause was only a part of the Fifth
Doe
50 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 20
Amendment it **has rarely been invoked in the judicial
fornm, or the more enlarged theatre of public discus-
sion," attention was called to the fact^ as early as 1878,
that ^' while it has been a part of the Constitution, as a
restraint upon the power of the staies, only a few years,
the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which
we are asked to hold that state courts and state legis-
latures have deprived their citizens of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.^* Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97. For the last thirty-six
years the court has been applying its rule of inclusion
and exclusion to the ever rising tide of cases before
it, and the result is a body of unique and pro-
foundly important judicial literature which the author is
now striving to condense and arrange in a more complete
and systematic form than it has ever assumed before.
This body of literature is unique because it embodies the
result of an effort upon the part of the only court in the
world's li^story ever endowed with such a power to annul
national and state laws whenever they attempt to violate
the rights of the national citizen as guaranteed by the
national constitution. When the framers of the French
Constitution of 1795 defined legal equality by declaring :
**L'egalite consiste en ce que la loi est la meme pour
tons, soit qu'elle protege, soit qu'elle punisse,''' they did
not conceive of a supreme tribunal armed with the power
to enforce such equality in every case in which it might be
denied. The judicial power as the ultimate supreme
power in the state is purely an American creation. Here
it is supposed to express the last word of the people
when their political agents have transcended the bounds
set by their written constitutions. Thus we have
realized, in our own way, the dream of Savigny, who gave
expression to a path-breaking idea, unfamiliar before his
time, when in his Beruf unserer Zeit, which appeared in
1814, he said that law is a part and parcel of the life of
a nation, * * not a garment merely which has been made to
please the fancy and can be taken off at pleasure and
J 20 OMGIN AND GROWTH 61
exclianged for another.'^ Instead of considering law as
the creation of the will of individuals, he regarded it as
the natural outcome of the consciousness of the people,
hke their social habits or their language. To use his
own words : Das Gesetz ist das Organ de$ Volksrechts
(the people is always the true legislator). In nearly
all of the -weighty judgihents rendered by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the leading cases that
have arisen under the Fourteenth Amendment, it has
strengthened its hold upon the confidence of the nation
by giving faithful and accurate expression to the national
consciousness as embodied in contemporary public
opinion.
PART I
DUE PROCESS AS A LIMITATION ON
FEDERAL POWER
PART I
DUE PROCESS AS A LIMITATION ON
FEDERAL POWER
56 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 21
Criminal Law, i, p. 416. The Star Chamber system of
trials exercised a strong influence over trial by jury,
and its effect may be traced in all the criminal proceed-
ings that took place under the Tudors, James I and
Charies L And despite the fact that the civil wars
broke down that" system and gave to trial by jury an
undoubted supremacy, the fact remains that during the
reigns of Charies n and James II juries were so manipu-
lated that they proved in practice quite as unjust and
tyrannical as the Star Chamber. All the safeguards pro-
vided against that condition of things passed into the
first state constitutions, and then into the foregoing
clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The second provision,
declaring that no person shall be ** deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law,'' simply
embodies the essence of chapter 39 of the Great Charter
as it was understood in England in Blackstone's time,
while the third and last, *'nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation," is an
assertion, in its American form, of the restraint imposed
upon a right inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied
to the state by its fundamental law, and known since the
time of Grotius as the right of eminent domain. De Jure
Belli et Pacis, lib. iii, c. 20, § 7 ; Thayer Cas. Const. Law,
945, 947 ; Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
§22. Earlier cases construing Fifth Amendment. Dur-
ing the seventy-six years that intervened between the rati-
fication of the amendment in question, in 1790, and the
case of Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, decided in 1866,
only ten cases involving its construction were passed
upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. IPnited
States V. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (1824) ; Barron v. Balti-
more, 7 Pet. 243 (1833) ; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (1847) ;
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507 (1848);
Mitchell V. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851) ; Moore v.
Illinois, 14 How. 13 (1852) ; Murray v. Hoboken Land
and Im. Co., 18 How. 272 (1855) ; Dynes v. Hoover, 20
§22 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1790-1866) 57
How. 65 (1857) ; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84 (1857) ;
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866). In the first case,
of United States v. Perez, the court, speaking through
Justice Story, simply declared in a few words that the
discharge of the jury from giving a verdict in a capital
case, without the consent of the prisoner, the jury being
unable to agree, is not a bar to a subsequent trial for the
same offense. With that case of double jeopardy may
be classed Moore v. Hlinois. In West Kiver Bridge
Co. V. Dix, the court refused to disturb the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Vermont upholding the right of
eminent domain asserted by that state in the extinguish-
ment of a franchise, Justice McLean saying: **The
power of appropriation by a state has never been held
by any judicial tribunal as impairing the obligation of
a contract in the sense of the Constitution. And this
power has been frequently exercised by all the states
since the adoption of the Constitution. In the fifth
article of the amendments to the Constitution it is
declared : * Nor shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without juSt compensation. ' ' * The first case in
which relief was ever granted under the amendment in
question is that of Mitchell v. Harmony, in which the
court, after admitting that private property may be taken
by a military commander to prevent it from falling into
the hands of the enemy, or for the purpose of converting
it to the use of the public when the danger is immediate
and impending, or the necessity urgent for the public
service, such as will not admit of delay, denied that in
that particular case there was any such urgent necessity
or impending danger. A few years later it was held, in
Dynes v. Hoover, that the provisions of the amendment
in question limits in no way the power of Congress ' * to
provide for the trial and punishment of military and
naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by
civilized nations. ^ ' The more notable cases that remain
will be considered separately.
58 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 23
§23. Webster's famous definition of due process in
1819. It is important to note that five years before the
Supreme Court of the United States was called upon to
consider the first case involving the construction of the
Fifth Amendment, Daniel Webster had presented to that
court his famous definition of due process, or *'the law
of the land,*' in the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518,
in which he emphasized the fact that the acts of the New
Hampshire legislature, taking away the rights and fran-
chises of the college acquired under prior charter, were in
conflict with that provision of that state's constitution,
which declared that no one shall be deprived of * * property,
privileges or immunities but by the judgment of his peers
or the law of the land. ' ' He said : * ' It is not too much
to assert that the legislature of New Hampshire would
not have been competent to pass the acts in question,
and make them binding on the plaintiffs without their
assent, even if there had been, in the constitution of
New Hampshire, or of the United States, no special
restriction on their power, because these acts are not
the exercise of a power properly legislative. Their object
and effect is to take away from one rights, property and
franchises, and to grant them to another. This is not
the exercise of a legislative power. To justify the taking
away of vested rights there must be a forfeiture; to
adjudge upon and declare which is the proper province
of the judiciary. Attainder and confiscation are acts of
sovereign power, not acts of legislation. . . . By these
acts, the legislature assumes to exercise a judicial power.
It declares a forfeiture and resumes franchises, once
granted, without trial or hearing. If the constitution be
not altogether waste paper, it has restrained the power of
the legislature in these particulars. . • • Lord Coke is
equally decisive and emphatic. Citing and commenting
on the celebrated 39 chap, of Magna Carta^ he says : * No
man shall be disseized, etc., unless it be by the lawful
judgment, that is, verdict of equals, or by the law of the
land, that is (to speak it once for all), by the due course
§23 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1790-1866) 59
and process of law. ' Have the plaintiffs lost their fran-
chises by *dne course and process of law'! On the con-
trary, are not these acts ^particular acts of the legisla-
ture, which have no relation to the community in general,
and which are rather sentences than laws*! By the law
of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a
law which hears before it condenms ; which proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgmentorily after trial. The
meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, lib-
erty, property and inmaunities, under the protection of
the general rules which govern society. Everything
which may pass under the form of an enactment is not,
therefore, to be considered the law of the land. If this
were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties,
acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts
directly transferring one man's estate to another, legis-
lative judgments, decrees and forfeitures, in all possible
forms, would be the law of the land. Such a strange
construction would render constitutional provisions of
the highest importance completely inoperative and void.
It would tend directly to establish the union of all powers
in the legislature. There would be no general perma-
nent law for courts to administer, or for men to live
under. *' The fact that this epoch-making case was
decided upon the ground that the charter granted to
the trustees of the college by the crown in 1769 was a
contract within the meaning of that clause of the Con-
stitution (art. I, § 10) which declares that no state
shall make any law impairing the obligation of contracts,
and that the charter of the college, as a private corpora-
tion, was not dissolved by the Revolution, does not dimin-
ish in any way the inestimable value of Webster *s
demonstration *Hhat the legislature of New Hampshire
would not have been competent to pass the acts in ques-
tion, and to make them binding on the plaintiffs without
their assent, even if there had been, in the constitution
of New Hampshire, or of the United States, no special
restriction on their power; because these acts are not
60 DUE PROCESS OP LAW. § 23
the exercise of a power properly legifllative. ' * By that
demonstration, Webster blazed the way for those who,
in the time to come, were to impose constitutional limi-
tations upon state power through Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
§ 24. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. 8.) 8 L. Ed. 672,
1833 — ^Limitationa on the states. Not until fourteen years
after the decision of the Dartmouth College Case did the
court, speaking again through Chief Justice Marshall, un-
dertake to declare that the first eight articles of amend-
ment were intended solely as limitations on the exercise of
power by the Government of the United States, and not as
limitations upon the powers of the states. In the case in
question the Court said : ' ' The Constitution was ordained
and established by the people of the United States for
themselves, for their own government, and not for the
government of the individual states. Each state estab-
lished a constitution for itself, and in that constitution pro-
vided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of
its particular government as its judgment dictated. The
people of the United States framed such a government
for the United States as they supposed best adapted to
their situation, and best calculated to promote their inter-
ests. The powers they conferred on this government
were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on
power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and,
we think, necessarily, applicable to the government cre-
ated by the instrument. They are limitations of power
granted in the instrument itself; not of distinct govern-
ments framed by different persons and for different
purposes. If these propositions be correct, the Fifth
Amendment must be understood as restraining the power
of the general Government, and not as applicable to
states. These amendments demanded security against
the apprehended encroachments of the general Govern-
ment, not against those of the local governments. In com-
pliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to
§25 FIFTH AMENDMENT— (X)NTINUED (1790-1866) 61
quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments
were proposed by the required majority in Congress, and
adopted by the states. These amendments contain no
expression indicating an intention to apply them to the
state governments. This court can not so apply them. ' '
7 Pet. 243. See also Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 76 ;
Pervear v. Mass., 5 Wall. 480; Twitchell v. Penn, 7 Wall.
325; Edwards v. EUiott, 21 Wall. 557; U. S. v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U. S. 552 ; Spies v. Dlinois, 123 U. S. 166 ; O 'Neil
V. Vermont, 144 U. S. 360; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.
606 ; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 174 ; Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78.
§ 25. Fox y. Ohio— Involving a state law as to counter-
feiting. In the case in question it was held that a state
law punishing the offense of passing counterfeit coin was
not unconstitutional, because of the difference between
the offense of counterfeiting the coin, a crime directly
against the Federal Government, and the offense of pass-
ing counterfeit money, a private, wrong, by which that
Government may be injured only indirectly, if at all.
The Court said: **We think it manifest that the lan-
guage of the Constitution, by its proper signification, is
limited to the facts, or to the faculty in Congress of
coining and of stamping the standard of value upon what
the Government creates or shall adopt, and of punishing
the offense of producing a false representation of what
may have been so created or adopted. The imposture
of passing a false coin creates, produces, or alters noth-
ing; it leaves the legal coin as it was — affects its intrinsic
value in nowise whatever. The particular offense
described in the statute of Ohio, and charged in the indict-
ment against the plaintiff in error, is deemed by this
court to be clearly within the rightful power and juris-
diction of the state. So far, then, neither the statute in
question, nor the conviction and sentence founded upon
it, can be held as violating either the Constitution or any
law of the United States made in pursuance thereof. ' *
62 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 25
5 How. 410. See also U. S. v. Marigold, 9 How. 560;
Smith V. Maryland, 18 How. 76; Ex parte Wilson, 114
U. S. 423. Justice McLean dissented, however, npon the
ground * Hhat the power to punish for passing counterfeit
coin is clearly in the Federal Government. Can this same
power be exercised by a state ! I think it can not. ^ ^ He
therefore concluded that a person might be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, despite the amendment in
question, because **the punishment under the state law
would be no bar to a prosecution under the law of
Congress. '»
§26. Murray v. Hoboken Land Oo. — ^Due process de-
fined. Not until 1855 did the due process clause of the
amendment come before the Supreme Court in the case
in question, in which it was held that a distress warrant,
issued under the act of May 15, 1820, by the solicitor of
the treasury, against a delinquent collector of customs
for a balance found to be due his accounts, was **due
process of law. ' ' In the words of the Court : * * It must
be admitted that, if the auditing of this account, and the
ascertaining of its balance, and the issuing of this proc-
ess, was an exercise of the judicial power of the United
States, the proceeding was void ; for the officers who per-
formed these acts could exercise no part of that judicial
power. They neither constituted a court of the United
States, nor were they, or either of them, so connected
with any such court as to perform even any of the min-
isterial duties which arise out of judicial proceedings.
The question whether these acts were an exercise of the
judicial power of the United States can best be consid-
ered under another inquiry, raised by the further objec-
tion of the plaintiff, that the effect of the proceedings
authorized by the act in question is to deprive the party
against whom the warrant issues of his liberty and prop-
erty * without due process of law,' and therefore is in
conflict with the fifth article of the amendment of the
Constitution. To what principles, then, are we to resort
§26 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1790-1866) 63
to ascertain whether this process, enacted by Congress,
is due process t To this the answer must be twofold.
We must examine the constitution itself, to see whether
this process can be in conflict with any of its provisions.
If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages
and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statute law of England before the emigration of our
ancestors, and which are shown to have been imsuited
to their civil and political condition, by having been acted
on by them after the settlement of this country. We
apprehended there has been no period since the establish-
ment of the English monarchy when there has not been,
by the law of the land, a summary method for the recov-
ery of debts due to the crown, and especially those due
from receivers of the revenues. It is diflScult at this
day to trace with precision all the proceedings had for
these purposes in the earliest ages of the common law.
That they were summary and severe, and had been used
for purposes of oppression, is inferable from the fact
that one chapter of Magna Carta treats of their restraint.
It is certain that this diversity in the law of the land
between pubUc defaulters and ordinary debtors was
understood in this country and entered into the legisla-
tion of the colonies and provinces, and more especially
of the states, after the Declaration of Independence and
before the formation of the Constitution of the United
States. Tested by the conunon and statute law of Eng-
land prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by
the laws of many of the states at the time of the adop-
tion of this amendment, the proceedings authorized by
the act of 1820 can not be denied to be due process of
law, when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of
balances due to the Government from a Collector of Cus-
toms, unless there exists in the Constitution some other
provision which restrains Congress from authorizing
such proceedings. For, though * due process of law ' gen-
erally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according
84 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 26
to some settled course of jndicial proceedings (2 Inst.
47, 50; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. N. C. 15; Taylor v.
Porter, 4 Hill 146 ; Van Zandt v. Waddel, 2 Yerg. 260,
599; State Bank v. Cooper, Ibid. 599; Jones' Heirs v.
Perry, 10 Yerg. 59; Green v. Briggs, 1 Curtis), yet, this
is not universally true. There may be, and we have seen
that there are, cases under the law of England after
Magna Carta, and as it was brought to this country and
acted on here, in which process, in its nature final, issues
against the body, lands and goods of certain public
debtors without any such trial.''
Such was the process of reasoning by which the court
convinced itself that the case of Swartwout, who was
found to be indebted to the Government in the sum of
$1,374,119.65, by mere administrative officers armed with
no kind of judicial power, was an exception to the gen-
eral rule of due process, including ^^actqr, reus, judex,
regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial
according to some settled course of judicial proceed-
ings," because of a ** diversity in *the law of the land'
between public defaulters and ordinary debtors." 18
How. 272. In other words, when mere auditing officers
ascertain the fact that a collector of the public revenue is
a defaulter, and issue final process for the collection of the
balance so ascertained against him, he is ipso facto de-
prived of the due process which the law of the land would
otherwise guarantee him in any other case. An exhaustive
examination of that entirely unfounded assumption will
be made hereafter.
§ 27. Withers v. Buckley— Conflict of state law with
state constitution. In this case the court held that it had
no jurisdiction either to declare a state law void, as in
conflict with the state constitution; nor to review the
judgments or decrees of state courts as to the construc-
tion of state laws, — the state legislation involved not
being repugnant to the provisions of the Fifth Amend-
ment, which is not applicable to or restrictive of state
5 28 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1790-1866) 65
laws. The Court said that it ^' never has and does not
assume the right to pronounce authoritatively npon the
wisdom or justice of the legislation of the states, when
operating upon their own citizens and upon subjects
of property clearly within their own territory and appro-
priate cognizance, except so far as the Constitution of
the United States expressly or by inevitable implication,
may have made it the duty of tiiiis court to control the
action of the state governments. Nor has it been deemed
the province of this court to abrogate or overrule the
interpretation put upon their own respective statutes by
the courts of the several states, whether such interpreta-
tion had reference to the ordinary rights of person or
property, or to the nature and extent of the legislative
powers vested by the constitutions of the several states,
and their coincidence with acts of legislation performed
imder the delegation of those powers. These are the
fmictions wisely and necessarily left by this court
tmtouched in the state tribunals, the assumption of which
by the federal judiciary, as it would embrace every mat-
ter npon which the government of the states could operate,
would, in effect, amount to the annihilation of those gov-
ermnents. ' ' 20 How, 84. It was also held that as the state
of Mississippi possessed as a sovereign the inherent right
to improve her navigable rivers, her act designed for
that purpose was not in conflict with the act of Congress,
admitting the state into the Union, which guaranteed the
free navigation of the Mississippi river.
§28. Ex-parte MUligan and the triumph of legality.
What may be called the first epoch in the history of the
Fifth Amendment ended in 1866, with a notable triumph
for "the law of the land'' in Ex-parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2,
a case in which the material facts, as stated by the Court,
were as follows: *'0n the 10th day of May, 1865, Lamb-
din P. Milligan presented a petition to the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Indiana, to be
discharged from an alleged unlawful imprisonment. The
Due
66 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 28
case made by the petition is this : Milligan is a citizen
of the United States ; has lived for twenty years in Indi-
ana ; and at the time of the grievances complained of was
not, and never had been, in the military service of the
United States. On the 5th day of October, 1864, while
at home, he was arrested by order of General Alvin P.
Hovey, commanding the military district of Indiana ; and
has ever since been kept in close confinement. On the
21st day of October, 1864, he was brought before a
military commission, convened in Indianapolis, by order
of General Hovey, tried on certain charges and specifi-
cations; found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged, and
the sentence ordered to be executed on Friday, the 19th
day of May, 1865. On the 2d day of January, 1865, after
the proceedings of the military commission were at an
end, the Circuit Court of the United States for Indiana
met at Indianapolis and impaneled a grand jury, who
were charged to inquire whether the laws of the United
States had been violated; and if so, to make present-
ments. The court adjourned on the 27th day of January,
having, prior thereto, discharged from further service
the grand jury, who did not find any bill of indictment
or make any presentment against Milligan for any offense
whatever; and, in fact, since his imprisonment, no bill
of indictment has been found or presentment made
against him by any grand jury of the United States.
Milligan insists that such military conunission had no
jurisdiction to try him upon the charges preferred, or
upon any charge whatever; because he was a citizen of
the United States and of the state of Indiana, and had
not been, since the commencement of the late Eebellion,
a resident of any of the states whose citizens were arrayed
against the Government, and that the right to trial by
jury was guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the
United States. The prayer of the petition was, that under
the act of Congress approved March 3d, 1863 (12 Stat.
755), entitled *An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and
Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases,' he
§ 28 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1790-1866) 67
may be brought before the court, and either turned over
to the proper civil tribunal to be proceeded against
according to the law of the land, or discharged from cus-
tody altogether. ' '
Upon that state of facts the Supreme Court held that
the act of Congress approved March 3, 1863, ** relating to
habeas corptis/^ conferred jurisdiction on the Circuit
Court of Indiana to hear such a case ; that a proceeding
by habeas corpus is a cause, as that term is used in sec-
tion 25 of the Judiciary act ; that the said Circuit Court
had authority to certify questions in a proceeding for a
writ of habeas corpus to inquire into a sentence of a mili-
tary commission; and that it had jurisdiction to hear
and determine thenoL
Thus in possession of the merits of the case, upon
questions properly certified, the Supreme Court said:
' * No graver question was every considered by this court,
nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the
whole people, for it is the birthright of every American
citizen, when charged with crime, to be tried and pun-
ished according to law. These precedents inform us of
the extent of the struggle to preserve liberty and to
relieve those in civil life from military trials. The found-
ers of our Government were familiar with the history of
that struggle; and secured in a written constitution
every right which the people had wrested from power
daring the contest of ages. By that Constitution and the
laws authorized by it, this question must be determined.
The provisions of that instnmient on the administration
of criminal justice are too plain and direct to leave room
for misconstruction or doubt of their true meaning.
Those applicable to this case are found in that clause
of the original Constitution which says, *That the trial
of all crimes, except in case of impeachment, shall be
by jury : * and in the fourth, fifth and sixth articles of the
amendments. The fourth proclaims the right to be secure
in person and effects against unreasonable search and
seizure; and directs that a judicial warrant shall not
68 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 28
issue ^without proof of probable canse supported by oath
or affirmation.' The fifth declares Hhat no person shall
be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime unless on presentment by a grand jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia
when in actual service in time of war or public danger,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law/ And the sixth guarantees the right of
trial by jury, in such manner and with such regulations
that with upright judges, impartial juries, and an able
bar, the innocent will be saved and the guilty punished.
It is in these words: ^In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjby the right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. ' These
securities for personal liberty thus embodied, were such
as wisdom and experience had demonstrated to be neces-
sary for the protection of those accused of crime. And
so strong was the sense of the country of their impor-
tance, and so jealous were the people, that these rights,
highly prized, might be denied them by implication, that
when the original Constitution was proposed for adop-
tion it encountered severe opposition; but for the belief
that it would be so amended as to embrace them, it would
never have been ratified. ' ' In order to enforce those con-
stitutional guarantees in Milligan's favor, the court held
that Congress could not grant the power, and no usage
of war could sanction a military trial for any offense
whatever, of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected
with the military service, in a state where federal author-
ity was always unopposed, and its courts always open to
hear criminal accusations and redress grievances; that
to every one accused of crime, who is not attached to the
§ 29 FIFTH AMENDiMENT— CONTINUED (1790-1866) 69
anny, or navy, or militia in actnal service, the right of
trial by jury is preserved ; that martial law can not arise
from a threatened invasion; that the necessity must be
actual, the invasion real, such as actually closes the courts
and overthrows the civil administration ; that martial law
can never exist where the courts are open and in the
unobstracted exercise of their jurisdiction; that a mili-
tary commission has no jurisdiction to try and sentence
one not a resident of one of the states in rebellion, nor
a prisoner of war ; that Milligan could not be treated as
a prisoner of war, when, at the time of his arrest, he had
been living in Indiana for twenty years, he never hav-
ing been in the military or naval service, but living at his
home when arrested by the military power of the United
States, imprisoned, and on certain criminal charges pre-'
ferred against him, tried, convicted, and sentenced to
be hanged by a military commission organized under the
military conunander of the military district of Indiana;
that if such military trial of Milligan was contrary to
law, he was entitled, on the facts presented by this peti-
tion, to be discharged from custody under the terms of
the act of Congress of March 3, 1863, and it was so certi-
fied to the said Circuit Court. Thus the right to trial
by jury was preserved to every one accused of crime, who
is not attached to the army, navy, or militia in actual
service. Martial law can not arise from a threatened
invasion ; the necessity must be actual and present ; the
invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and
deposes the civil administration.
§29. Ex-parte McCardle— Military commission, habeas
corpus. Reference should here be made to the closely
related case of McCardle, who was arrested and held in
custody in the state of Mississippi by a military com-
mission organized under the Reconstruction acts, upon
charges of disturbing the public peace, and inciting to
insurrection. As the case involved the validity of the
Reconstruction acts, it excited universal interest and was
70 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 29
argued by counsel of the greatest distinction. In Ex-
parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318, it was held that an appeal
lies to the Supreme Court, from the judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court in cases of habeas corpus; and that every
question of substance which the Circuit Court could
decide upon the return of the habeas corpus, including
the question of its own jurisdiction, may be reviewed on
appeal from its final judgment. From the statement
of the case it appears that* *4n obedience to the writ,
Major General Gillem, on the 21st day of November,
made a return to the cause of imprisonment, from which
it appeared that McCardle had been arrested and held
in custody for trial by a military commission under the
alleged authority of the Reconstruction acts.*' In Ex-
parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, it was held that, as the act
of March, 1868, took away the jurisdiction defined by the
act of February, 1867, of the Supreme Court, in habeas
corpus cases, no judgment could be rendered in a suit,
after the repeal of the act under which it was brought and
prosecuted. In the opinion in which the validity of the
repealing act was sustained, the court, speaking through
Chief Justice Chase, said: **It is quite clear that this
court can not pronounce judgment in this case, as it has
no longer jurisdiction of the appeal, and judicial duty is
not less fitly performed by declining jurisdiction than in
exercising formally that which the Constitution and laws
confer/'
CHAPTER n
FIPTH AMENDMENT AND ITS CONSTBUCTION (1866-1896)
§30. The legal tender cases. When we cross the
threshold of what may be called the second epoch in the
historjr of the construction of the Fifth Amendment, we
enconnter the cases in question in which the guaranties
given by that amendment entered into the controversy
as a vital element By acts of Congress of February 25
and July 11, 1862, and March 3, 1863, it was declared
that notes issued thereunder should be ** lawful money
and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and
private, vnthin the United States, except duties on im-
ports,** etc. The question whether Congress really pos-
sessed the power to make anything but gold or silver coin
a legal tender was first raised in Bronson v. Bodes, 7 Wall.
229 (1868), in which it appeared that the contract sued
on stipulated for the payment of gold and silver coin,
lawful money of the United States, with interest also in
com. Upon that record the conclusion was reached that
express contracts to pay coin dollars could only be sat-
isfied by payment of the same ; that such contracts were
not such *' debts as could be satisfied by the tender of
United States notes. ^* Not until the later case of Hep-
bum V. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869), involving the ques-
tion whether the provision as to legal tenders applied to
debts contracted before, as well as after, the enactment,
was the constitutionality of the acts in question presented
for consideration. In stating the constitutional objec-
tions, the Court said: ** Another provision found in the
Fifth Amendment, must be considered in this connection.
We refer to that which ordains that private property
shall not be taken for public use without compensation.
71
72 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 30
This provision is kindred in spirit to that which forbids
legislation impairing the obligation of contracts; but,
unlike that, it is addressed directly and solely to the
National Government. It does not, in terms, prohibit
legislation which appropriates the private property of
one class of citizens to the use of another class; but if
such property can not be taken for the benefit of all,
without compensation, it is difficult to understand how
it can be taken for the benefit of a part without violating
the spirit of the prohibition. But there is another pro-
vision in the same amendment, which, in our judgment,
can not have its full and intended effect unless construed
as a direct prohibition of the legislation which we have
been considering. It is that which declares that ^no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law/ It is not doubted that all
the provisions of this amendment operate directly in
limitation and restraint of the legislative powers con-
ferred by the Constitution. The only question is, whether
an act which compels all those who hold contracts for
the payment of gold and silver money to accept in pay-
ment a currency of inferior value deprives such persons
of property without due process of law. * ^ After affirm-
ing the doctrine announced in Bronson v. Bodes, 7 Wall.
229, the legal tender acts were held to be unconstitutional
so far as they applied to debts contracted before their
passage, in an opinion in which the Court said : ' ^ It has
not been maintained in argument, nor, indeed, would any
one, however slightly conversant with constitutional law,
think of maintaining, that there is in the Constitution
any express grant of legislative power to make any
description of credit currency a legal tender in payment
of debts. We must inquire, then, whether this can be
done in the exercise of an implied power. '* The result
of a searching inquiry in that direction was the conclu-
sion that the recognition of the existence of such an
implied power would carry that doctrine beyond any
limits heretofore given to it.
§31 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 73
After the court had been reorganized, the entire legal
tender question was reopened and exhaustively reargued
in Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1870). The result
was a judgment which, in overruling Hepburn v. Gris-
wold, 8 WalL 603, held that the legal tender acts were
valid, as to contracts made before as well as to those
made since their passage. In the opinion delivered by
Justice Story the comment was made that Hepburn v.
Griswold **was decided by a divided court, and by a
court having a less number of judges than the law then
in existence provided this court shall have. These cases
have been heard before a full court, and they have
received our most careful consideration.'*
§ 31. Miller v. XT. S.^— Right of confiscation. The real
questioi^ at issue was the constitutionality of the Confis-
cation Act of July 17, 1862, which **made it the duty of
the President to cause the seizure of all the estates,
property, money, stocks, credits and effects of the per-
sons described, and in order to secure the condemnation
and sale of such property, after its seizure, directed
judicial proceedings, in rem^ to be instituted. It con-
templated that every kind of property mentioned should
be seized effectually in some mode. It had in view not
only tangible property, but that which is in action. It
named stock and credits; but it gave no directions
respecting the mode of seizure. It is, therefore, a fair
conclusion that the mode was intended to be such as is
adapted to the nature of the property directed to be
seized, and in use in courts of revenue and admiralty.
. . . As described, it was *An Act to Suppress Insur-
rection, to Punish Treason and Eebellion, to Seize and
Confiscate the Property of the Rebels, and for Other
Purposes.' '* Those who assailed the constitutionality
of the act relied upon those parts of the Fifth and Sixth
amendments as restrictions upon legislative power which
provide that no person shall be held to answer for a cap-
1—11 Wall 208.
74 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 31
ital or otherwise infamous offense, save on indictment or
presentment by a grand jury ; that no person shall be de-
prived of his property, without due process of law ; that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury in the state
or district in which the offense was committed. The
court held that in confiscation cases, as in revenue and
admiralty cases, a default may be entered establishing
facts averred in the libel or information, warranting a
decree of condemnation, when such libel or information
contains the necessary averment; that after default
entered, under such circumstances, a trial by jury is
unnecessary; that the Confiscation Act in question was
constitutional, because a legitimate exercise of the war
power ; that the right to confiscate enemy property exists
in full, no matter whether the war is domestic or civil ;
that if the war be civil, all are to be treated as enemies,
who, though citizens of the lawful government, are resi-
dents of the territory under the dominion of the power
resisting that government.
§ 32. Pumpelly v. Canal Co.— Right of eminent domain.
In such a case the primary inquiry always is whether
the use is public or not. If it is public, private property
can not be taken, no matter how large the professed
compensation may be. A state statute was held to be
unconstitutional which, as construed by the highest court
of the state, compelled a railroad company to permit a
private party to erect an elevator upon its right of way,
the result being the taking of private property for a
private use. In the Pumpelly Case, 13 Wall. 166,
the court determined that it is not necessary that the
property should be absolutely taken, in the narrowest
sense of the word, in order to bring the case within the
protection of the Fifth Amendment. In its opinion the
Court says: **But there are numerous authorities to
sustain the doctrine that a serious interruption to the
common and necessary use of property may be, in the
§32 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 75
langaage of Mr. Angell^ in his work on water-courses,
equivalent to the taking of it, and that under the consti-
tutional provisions it is not necessary that the land
should be absolutely taken. Ang. Wat., § 465, 2 ; Hooker
V. N. Haven and Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146 ; Rowe v.
Granite Bridge Co., 21 Pick. 344; Canal Appraisers v.
People, 17 Wend. 604; Lackland v. North Mo. R. R. Co.,
31 Mo. 180 ; Stevens v. Prop, of Middlesex Can., 12 Mass.
466. And perhaps no state court has given more fre-
quent utterance to the doctrine that overflowing land by
backing water on it from dams built below is within the
constitutional provision, than Wisconsin. In numerous
cases of this kind under the Mill and Mill-dam Act of
that State this question has arisen, and the right of the
mill-owner to flow hack the water has been repeatedly
placed on the ground that it was a taking of private
property for public use. ' '
Private property may be appropriated to the uses of
government. Federal or State; or to the uses of such
local governments as counties or municipalities. Under
that general authority condemnations are made for navy
yards, forts, armories, light houses, custom houses, court
houses, post-offices, public schools, alms-houses, and the
like. In Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, the Court
said: '^But, if the right of eminent domain exists in
the Federal Government, it is a right which may be
exercised within the States, so far as is necessary to
the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution. In Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 523, Chief
Justice Taney described in plain langaage the complex
nature of our government, and the existence of two dis-
tinct and separate sovereignties within the same terri-
torial space, each of them restricted in its powers, and
each, within its sphere of action prescribed by the Con-
stitution of the United States, independent of the other.
Neither is under the necessity of applying to the other
for permission to exercise its lawful powers. Within
its own sphere it may employ all the agencies for exert-
76 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 32
ing them which are appropriate or necessary and which
are not forbidden by the law of its being. When the
power to establish post-offices are to create courts within
the States was conferred npon the Federal Government,
included in it was authority to obtain sites for such
offices and for court-houses, and to obtain them by such
means as were known and appropriate. The right of
eminent domain was one of those means well known when
the constitution was adopted, and employed to obtain
land for public uses. Its existence, therefore, in the
grantee of that power, ought not to be questioned. The
Constitution itself contains an implied recognition of it
beyond what may justly be implied from the express
grant. The Fifth Amendment contains a provision that
private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. What is that but an implied assertion
that, on making just compensation, it may be taken f ' ' In
the case in question, involving the condemnation of land
for a custom house, it was held that the circuit court
had jurisdiction of the proceeding, under the general
grant of jurisdiction made by the Act of 1789, and that
such court was not required to allow a separate trial
to each owner of an estate or interest in each parcel.
§ 33. Ex-parte Wilson— Indictment for infamous crime.
In the case in question it was held that under the pro-
visions of the Fifth Amendment a person sentenced to
imprisonment for an infamous crime, without having
been presented by a grand jury, is entitled to be dis-
charged on habeas corpus. In the course of its opinion
the Court says: **The leading word * capital' describing
the crime by its punishment, only the associated words
*or other infamous crime' must, by an elementary rule
of construction, include crimes subject to any infamous
punishment, even if they should be held to include also
crimes infamous in their nature independently of the
punishment affixed to them. A reference to the history
of the proposal and adoption of this provision of the
§33 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 77
Constitution confirms this conclusion. It had its origin
in one of the Amendments in the nature of a Bill of
Bights, recommended by the Convention, by which the
State of Massachusetts in 1788 ratified the original Con-
stitution, and as so recommended was in this form : ^ No
person shall be tried for any crime, by which he may
incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life, until he
be first indicted by a grand jury, except in such cases
as may arise in the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces. ' Journal Massachusetts Conven-
tion, 1788 (ed. 1856) 80, 84, 87; 2 Elliott's Debates, 177.
As introduced by Mr. Madison in 1789 at the first ses-
sion of the House of Bepresentatives of the United
States, it stood thus : ^ In all crimes punishable with loss
of life or member, presentment or indictment by a grand
jury shall be an essential preliminary.' Being referred
to a committee, of which Mr. Madison was a member, it
was reported back in substantially the same form, in
which it was afterwards approved by Congress and rati-
fied by the States. Annals of Congress, 435, 760. Mr.
Dane, one of the most learned lawyers of his time, and
who as a member of the Continental Congress took a
principal part in framing the Ordinance of 1787 for the
government of the Northwest Territory, assumes it as
unquestionable that by virtue of the Amendment of the
Constitution, informations 'can not be used where either
capital or infamous punishment is inflicted.' 7 Dane
Abr. 280. Judge Cooley has expressed a similar opinion.
Cooley Constitutional Law, 291. Within the last fifteen
years, prosecutions by information have greatly in-
creased, and the general current of opinion in the Circuit
and District Courts has been towards sustaining them
for any crime a conviction of which would not at common
law have disqualified the convict to be a witness. U. S.
V. Shepard, 1 Abb. U. S. 431 ; U. S. v. Maxwell, 3 Dill.
275; U. S. V. Block, 4 Sawy. 211 ; U. S. v. Miller, 3 Hughes
553; U. S. V. Baugh, 4 Hughes 501; U. S. v. Yates, 6 Fed.
Sep. 861; U. S. v. Field, 21 Blatchf. 330; Ee Wilson, 18
78 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 33
Fed. 33. But, for the reasons above stated^ having
regard to the object and the terms of the first provision
of the Fifth Amendment, as well as to the history of
its proposal and adoption, and to the early understand-
ing and practice under it, this court is of opinion that
the competency of the defendant, if convicted, to be a
witness in another case, is not the true test; and that
no person can be held to answer, without presentment
or indictment by a grand jury, for any crime for which
an infamous punishment may be imposed by the court.
This case was distinguished in Bannon v. United
States, 156 U. S. 464, in which the court held that the
affixing of an infamous punishment did not raise the
crime to the grade of a felony. ** Neither does it neces-
sarily follow that, because the punishment affixed to an
offense is infamous, the offense is thereby raised to the
grade of felony. The word * felony' was used at com-
mon law to denote offenses which occasioned a forfeiture
of the lands or goods of the offender to which capital
or other punishment might be superadded according to
the degree of guilt. 4 Black. Com. 94, 95; 1 Eussell,
Crimes, 42. Certainly there is no intimation to the con-
trary in Mackin's Case [117 U. S. 348], which was put
wholly upon the ground that, at the present day, impris-
onment in a state prison or penitentiary, with or without
hard labor, is considered an infamous punishment. If
such imprisonment were made the sole test of felonies,
it would necessarily follow that a great many offenses
of minor importance, such as selling distilled liquors
without payment of the special tax, and other analogous
offenses under the internal and customs revenue laws,
would be treated as felonies, and the persons guilty of
such offenses stigmatized as felons. The cases of Ex-
parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, and Mackin v. United States,
117 XT. S. 348, prescribe no new definition of the word
felony, but secured persons accused of offenses pun-
ishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary against
§ 34 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 79
prosecution by information, and without a preliminary
investigation of their cases by a grand jury. ' '
§34. Boyd v. U. S.''— Kinship of Fourth and Fifth
amendments. In the case in, question the court, after
declaring that it does not require actual entry upon the
premises and search for and seizure of papers to consti-
tute an unreasonable search and seizure as defined by
the Fourth Amendment, held that a proceeding to for-
feit a man 's goods for an offense against the laws, though
civil in form, no matter whether in rem or in personam^
is a criminal case within the scope of that part of the
Fifth Amendment declaring that no person ** shall be
compeUed, in any criminal case, to be a witness against
himself/' In speaking of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court said: **The case, however, which will always be
celebrated as being the occasion of Lord Camden's mem-
orable discussion of the subject, was that on Entick v.
Carrington, reported at length in 19 How. St. Tr. 1029.
The action was trespass for entering the plaintiff's
dwelling house in November, 1762, and breaking open
his desks, boxes, etc., and searching and examining his
papers. The jury rendered a special verdict, and the
case was twice solemnly argued at the bar. Lord Cam-
den pronounced the judgment of the Court in Michael-
mas Term, 1765, and the law as expounded by him has
been regarded as settled from that time to this, and his
great judgment on that occasion is considered as one of
the landmarks of English liberty. It was welcomed and
applauded by the lovers of liberty in the Colonies as
well as in the mother country. It is regarded as one
of the permanent monuments of the British Constitution,
and is quoted as such by the English authorities on that
subject down to the present time. As every American
statesman, during our revolutionary and formative
period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this
monument of English freedom, and considered it as the
2-116 V, 8. 616.
80 DUE PROCESS OF LAW S 3*
true and intimate expression of constitutional law, it
may be confidently asserted that its propositions were
in the mind of those who framed the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently
explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches
and seizures. . . . We have already noticed the intimate
relation between the two Amendments. They throw
great light on each other. For the * unreasonable searches
and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a
man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal
cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and com-
pelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself,' which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment,
throws light on the question as to what is an ^unrea-
sonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to per-
ceive that the seizure of a man's private books and
papers to be used in evidence against him is substan-
tially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself. We think it is within the clear intent
and meaning of those terms. We are also clearly of the
opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of
declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason
of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil
in form, are in their nature criminal. . . . Though the
proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggra-
vating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as
before said, it contains their substance and essence, and
effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is
the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form ; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely: by silent ap-
proaches and slight deviations from legal modes of pro-
cedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the
rule that constitutional provisions for the security of the
person and property should be liberally construed."
The foregoing case was cited and relied upon by the
S35 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 81
dissenting Justices in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591,
in which the majority held that immunity granted to a
witness before the Interstate Commerce Commission
deprives him of the right to refuse to answer. The bare
possibility that by a disclosure such a witness may be
subjected to the criminal laws of some other sovereignty,
and that he may be subjected to the expense and annoy-
ance of pleading his immunity by way of confession and
avoidance, notwithstanding the law has given him immu-
nity from prosecution therefor, is not sufficient to justify
his refusal to answer after immunity has been granted
hint
•
§ 35. Spies V. IllmoiB ^ — Jurisdiction to review judg-
ment of highest court of a state in a criminal case. Peti-
tion for writ of error in this case, after citing section
709 of Eevised Statutes, averred that the following fed-
eral questions were involved and presented by it:
"First, Petitioners challenged the validity of the statute
of Illinois, under and pursuant to which the trial jury
was selected and impaneled, on the ground of repug-
nancy to the Constitution of the United States, and the
state court sustained the validity of the statute. Second,
Petitioners asserted and claimed, under the Constitu-
tion of the United States, the right, privilege and inmiu-
nity of trial by an impartial jury and the decision of
the state court was against the right, privilege and
immunity so asserted and claimed. Third. The State of
Illinois made, and the state court enforced against peti-
tioners, a law (the aforesaid statute) whereby the priv-
ileges and immunities of petitioners as citizens of the
United States were abridged, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Fourth. Upon
their trial for a capital offense, petitioners were com-
pelled by the state court to be witnesses against them-
selves, contrary to the provisions of the constitution of
the United States, which declare that 'No person shall
a— 123 V. 8. 131.
BneProeeBS — 6
82 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 35
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself,' and that 'no person shall be deprived of life
or liberty without due process of law.' Fifth. That by
the action of the state court in said trial, petitioners
were denied the equal protection of the laws, contrary
to the guaranty of the said Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution." In dismissing the petition
the court held that the first ten amendments were intended
solely as limitations upon the Federal government and
not upon those of the states; that ''when, as in this case,
application is made to us on the suggestion of one of
our number, to whom a similar application had been
previously addressed, for the allowance of a writ of error
to the highest court of a state under Section 709 of the
Eevised Statutes, it is our duty to ascertain not only
whether any question reviewable here was made and
decided in the proper court below, but whether it is of
a character to justify us in bringing the judgment here
for re-examination. In our opinion, the writ ought not
to be allowed by the court, if it appears upon the face
of the record that the decision of the federal question
which is complained of was so plainly right as not to
require argument, and especially if it is in accordance
with our well considered judgments in similar cases;"
that when the application is based on the ground
that a statute of a state as construed by the state court
deprived petitioners of a trial by an impartial jury, this
court will consider only the rulings on the challenges to
the jurors who actually sat at the trial; disallowance
of challenge does not prejudice defendants who have per-
emptory challenges remaining; a right to challenge is
right to reject, not to select jurors ; that where the chal-
lenge is on the ground that the juror had formed an
opinion, it must appear clearly that upon the evidence,
the trial court should have found that he had formed
such an opinion that he could not be considered in law
impartial ; that a statute is constitutional which provides
that a juror shall not be disqualified simply by reading
§35 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 83
newspaper articles ; that it could not be said that the state
had unlawfully denied a trial by an impartial jury to
one accused of crime, when it appeared upon the trial
that a part of the jurors had formed . opinions based
npon newspaper articles concerning the truth of which
they had expressed no opinion after they had stated on
oath that they could try the case upon the evidence pre-
sented, regardless of such opinion; that the plea that
the defendants, who were foreign bom, were denied by
the trial court rights guaranteed by treaty can not be
heard for the first time in this court; that the extent
and character of the cross examination to which the
accused subjects himself when he appears as a witness
m his own behalf, is purely a question of state law ; that
the objection that the defendants were not actually pres-
ent in the state court when sentence was pronounced can
not be made for the first time in this court, when the
record attests the fact that they were present; that an
objection, not made in the court below, to the use in
evidence of a letter on the ground that it was obtained
by an unlawful search and seizure, can not be heard for
the first time in this court, that to give this court juris-
diction by reason of the denial by a state court of any
right or immunity set up under the Federal Constitution,
it must appear from the record that such pght or
inmmnity was set up in such court, at the time and in the
manner which the law directs.
In this case the contention was made that the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States embrace
the rights protected by the first eight amendments.
While the court did not deem it necessary to pass upon
that contention it referred to in this way: **It was con-
tended, however, in argument that ' though originally the
first ten amendments were adopted as limitations on fed-
eral power, yet in so far as they secure and recognize
fnndamental rights — common-law rights — of the man,
they make them privileges and immunities of the man as
a citizen of the United States, and can not now be
84 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 35
abridged by a state under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In other words, while the ten amendments as limitations
on power only apply to the Federal Government, and not
to the States, yet in so far as they declare or recognize
rights of persons, these rights are theirs, as citizens of the
United States, and the Fourteenth Amendment as to such
rights limits state power, as the ten amendments had lim-
ited federal power.' It is also contended that the pro-
vision of the Fourteenth Amendment which declares that
no State shall deprive *any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, ' implies that every
person charged with crime in a State shall be entitled to
a trial by an impartial jury and shall not be compelled to
testify against himself. '*
§36. Counselman v. Hitchcock ^— Broad coiiBtruction
of Fifth Amendment in favor of refusal to testify. In
the case in question it was held that the privilege of the
Fifth Amendment extends to any criminal proceeding
before a grand jury, that the privilege given to every one
by the Constitution, that he shall not be compelled to be
a witness against himself in any criminal case, is not
taken away by section 860 of the Revised Statutes, which
provides that the evidence of a person shall not be used
against him in any proceeding for a crime, or penalty,
or forfeiture. The court said: **It is broadly con-
tended on the part of the appellee that a witness is not
entitled to plead the privilege of silence, except in a
criminal case against himself; but such is not the lan-
guage of the Constitution. Its provision is that no per-
son shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. This provision must have a broad con-
struction in favor of the right which it was intended to
secure. The matter under investigation by the grand
jury in this case was a criminal matter, to inquire whether
there had been a criminal violation of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. If Counselman had been guilty of the matters
4—142 U. S. 647.
§37 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 85
inquired of in the questions which he refused to answer,
he himself was liable to criminal prosecution under the
Act The case before the grand jury was, therefore, a
criminal case. The reason given by Counselman for his
refusal to answer the questions was that his answer might
tend to criminate him, and showed that his apprehension
was that, if he answered the questions truly and fully (as
he was bound to do if he should answer them at all), the
answers might show that he had committed a crime
agaiQst the Literstate Commerce Act, for which he might
be prosecuted. His answers, therefore, would be testi-
mony against himself, and he would be compelled to give
them in a criminal case. It is impossible that the mean-
ings of the constitutional provision can only be, that a
person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It
would doubtless cover such cases; but it is not limited
•
to them. The object was to insure that a person should
not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investi-
gation, to give testimony which might tend to show that
he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is lim-
ited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief
against which it seeks to guard. ' '
§ 37. Simmons v. U. S.' — ^Right of judge to discharge
jtny during trial and to express opinion on facts. In the
case in question it was held that the court may discharge
the jury during trial when it appears that by reason of
facts, existing when the jurors were sworn but not then
known to the court, or by reason of influences to which the
jurors were subjected during the trial, they or any of them
were imbued with such prejudices as to render them in-
capable of impartiality between the government and the
acensed ; that when a jury in a criminal case is discharged
under such circumstances, the defendant may be put on
trial before another jury, without being subject to the
double jeopardy forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. In
5-142 U. 8. 148.
86 DUB PBOCESS OP LAW R S7
the words of the court : * ' The only other exception argue* i
is to the statement made by the judge to the second jury,
in denying their request to be discharged without having
agreed upon a verdict, that he regarded the testimony as
convincing. But at the outset of his charge he had told
them, in so many words, that the facts were to be decided
by the jury, and not by the court. And it is so well
settled, by a long series of decisions of this court, that
the judge presiding at a trial, civil or criminal, in any
court of the United States, is authorized, whenever he
thinks it will assist the jury in arriving at a just conclu-
sion, to express to them his opinion upon the questions
of fact which he submits to their determination, that it is
only necessary to refer to two or three recent cases in
which the judge *s opinion on matters of fact was quite
as plainly and strongly expressed to the jury as in the
case at bar. Vickburg and M. B. Co. v. Putnam, 118
U. S. 545 ; United States v. Philadelphia and E. E. Co.,
123 U. S. 113; Lovejoy v. United States, 128 U. S. 171/'
§ 38. Tesler v. Harbor Line Oommissionen ^ — ^Locating
harbor lines. The basic question involved the taking of
private property for public use without just compensa-
tion, forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, was blended, and
perhaps confused with the claim of a denial of the due
process provided by the Fourteenth. The court said:
**By the 16th section of article I of the constitution of
Washington no private property can be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation. The similar
Umitation upon the power of the general government,
expressed in the Fifth Amendment, is to be read with
the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting the states from
depriving any person of property without due process
of law, and from denying to any person within their juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. The amendment
undoubtedly forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life,
liberty, or property, and secures equal protection to all
e— 146 U. 8. 646.
§39 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 87
under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights.
Assuming onr jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a
state tribunal upholding a law authorizing the taking of
private property without compensation to be unques-
tionable (Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay and
M. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254, 269), we can not accede to the
position that the action of the Harbor Line Commission-
ers, in locating the harbor line and filing the plat, would
take any of relator 's property, or so injuriously affect it
as to come within the constitutional inhibition. The filing
of maps of definite location in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain furnishes no analogy. The design of
the state law is to prohibit the encroachment by private
individuals and cooperations on navigable waters, and to
secure a uniform water front; and it does not appear
from relator's application that the defendants have
threatened in any manner to disturb him in his posses-
sion, nor that which is proposed to be done tends to pro-
duce that effect. The consequences which he deprecates
were too remote to form the basis of decision.*'
§ 39. Shoemaker v. U. S. — ^Right of eminent domain in
the District of Columbia. In this case, 147 IT. S. 282, as in
all others arising in the District of Columbia, the constitu-
tional aspects of the question of eminent domain are gov-
erned by the Fifth Amendment. Under such conditions it
was held that the courts must determine the question of
the public use, the legislature the amount of the property
to be taken. * ' We are not called apon, ' ' say the court, * ' by
the duties of this investigation, to consider whether the
alleged restriction on the power of eminent domain in the
general government, when exercised within the territory
of a state, does really exist, or the extent of such restric-
tion, for we are here dealing with an exercise of the
power within the District of Columbia over whose terri-
tory the United States possess, not merely the political
authority that belongs to them as respects the states of
the Union, but likewise the power Ho exercise exclusive
88 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 39
legislation m ail cases whatsoever over such district/
U. S. Const. Art. I, 58. d. 17.*^ In the later case of
Bauman v. Eoss, 167 U. S. 548, it was said: "By the
Constitution of the United States, the estimate of the just
compensation for property taken for the pnblic nse,
under the right of eminent domain, is not required to
be made by a jury ; but may be intrusted by Congress to
commissioners appointed by a court or by the executive,
or to an inquest consisting of more or fewer men than an
ordinary jury. Curtiss v. Georgetown and A. Tump. P.
Co., 6 Cranch, 233 ; Secombe v. Milwaukee & S. P. B. Co.,
23 Wall. 108, 117, 118 ; United States v. Jones, 109 U. S.
513, 519 ; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 300,
301; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166
U. S. 685.'^ And in Parsons v. District of Columbia,
170 U. S. 45, it was held *'that it was competent for Con-
gress to create a general system to store water and fur-
nish it to the inhabitants of the District and to prescribe
the amount of the assessment and the method of its col-
lection ; and that the plaintiff in error can hot be heard
to complain that he was not notified of the creation of
such a system or consulted as to the probable cost thereof.
He is presumed to have notice of these general laws
regulating such matters. ' ' Thus the Supreme Court has
settled the fact that when Congress acts directly, it may
determine the district benefited by a public improvement,
and apportion absolutely the expense among the parcels
of land included in it. As such an act concluded both the
question of the necessity of the work, and the benefits aw
against the abutting property, such questions are not
open to review by the Courts upon the petition of any
property holder. In Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U. S. 611,
** while the general power to legislate exclusively for the
District of Columbia is not disputed, nor the competency
of Congress, in the exercise of that power, to establish a
public park, it is contended that under the limitation upon
that power contained in the Fifth Amendment, protecting
the citizen from being deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
140 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 89
erty without due process of law, Congress, when erecting
a work which is expressly declared to be perpetually
dedicated to the use and enjoyment of the people of the
United States, should defray the cost thereof out of the
funds of the entire nation. It is further contended in the
brief of the appellees that a tax for raising a fund for
snch a purpose to be valid ought to be levied and appor-
tioned as a direct tax among the several states, according
to their respective numbers. ' ' It was held however, in the
face of that contention, that special assessments for a
public park in the District for the benefit of all the people
of the United States are not unconstitutional as a depri-
vation of property under the Amendment in question,
upon the theory that the cost should be defrayed * * out of
the funds of the entire nation. ' '
It was held in Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141,
that while Congress has express power to exercise exclu-
sive legislation over the District of Columbia, it can not,
in creating such District a body corporate for municipal
purposes, delegate its exclusive power to legislate for
sneh District. It can authorize such subordinate body to
exercise municipal powers only.
§40. Thorington v. Montgomery— Fifth Amendment
does not embrace questions of state procedure. After
saying in this case, 147 U. S. 490: *'We can not find that
any Federal question was raised in the proceedings in the
chancery court. The only error assigned in the Supreme
court was that 'the court below erred in rendering the final
decree made by it dismissing appellant's bill and in over-
rulmg objections to testimony. ' It is stated in the writ of
error that in the cause * between Sallie G. Thorington, ap-
pellant, and the city council of Montgomery, appellee,
wherein was drawn in question appellants right under
Article V of the amended constitution of the United
States to have the testimony of her, the said Sallie G.,
which had been taken under a duly issued commission in
that behalf, read in her behalf on the trial of the said
90 DUE, PROCESS OP LAW § 40
cause, and the decision was against her right and claim
to be so heard, a manifest error hath happened, etcf —
the Court held that a decision by the state court upon a
matter of state practice did not draw in question any
right plaintiff had under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States ; that no Federal ques-
tion was raised by the refusal of the State court to set
aside the submission of a suit in equity in order to give
plaintiff time to get the deposition of witnesses, where
there had been ample time to have done so before the
submission. In Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, it
was said: *'The state has full control over the pro-
cedure of its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, sub-
ject only to the qualification that such procedure must
not work a denial of fundamental rights, or conflict with
specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Consti-
tution. Ex parte Eeggel, 114 U. S. 642 ; Iowa C. E. Co. v.
Iowa, 160 U. S. 389; Chicago, B. and Q. E. Co. v. Chicago,
166U. S. 226."
§ 41. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S.^ — ^Eminent domain
and full equivalent under Fifth Amendment. In this
case it was held that apart from the benefit derived in
common with the public, the Amendment in question
guarantees to the owner a full and perfect equivalent for
the property taken ; that as the measure of compensation
is a judicial question the court may disregard a direction
of Congress as to the method by which such compensation
shall be ascertained; that the right of the Federal gov-
ernment, under the power to regulate commerce, to con-
demn and appropriate a lock on the Monongahela river, is
subject to the provision of the Fifth Amendment which
provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation ; that such compen-
sation includes not only the value of the tangible prop-
erty, but also the value of the franchise to take tolls. The
Court said: *'The language used in the Fifth Amend-
7—148 u. a 312.
§41 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 91
ment in respect to this matter is happily chosen. The
entire Amendment is a series of negations, denials of
right or power in the government, the last, the one in
point here, being *Nor shall private property be taken
for public nse without just compensation.' The noun
'compensation,' standing by itself, carries the idea of
an equivalent. Thus we speak of damages by way of
compensation, or compensatory damages, as distin-
guished from punitative damages, the former, being the
equivalent of the injury done, and the latter imposed by
way of punishment. So that if the adjective *just' had
been omitted, and the provision was simply that prop-
erty should not be taken without compensation, the natu-
ral import of the language would be that the compensa-
tion should be the equivalent of the property. And this
is made emphatic by the adjective *just.' There can, in
view of the combination of those two words, be no doubt
that the compensation must be a full and perfect equiva-
lent for the property taken. And this just compensation,
it will be noticed is for the property and not to the owner.
Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment is personal.
'No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime,' etc. Instead of continuing that
form of statement, and saying that no person shall be
deprived of his property without * just compensation,' the
personal element is left out, and the * just compensation,'
is to be a full equivalent for the property taken. This
excludes the taking into account as an element in the com-
pensation any supposed benefit that the owner may
receive in common with all from the public uses to which
his private property is appropriated, and leaves it to
stand as a declaration that no private property shall be
appropriated to public uses unless a full and exact equiva-
lent for it be returned to the owner. We do not in this
refer to the case where only a portion of a tract is taken,
or express any opinion on the vexed question as to the
extent to which the benefit or injuries to the portion taken
may be brought into consideration. *'
92 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 42
§ 42. Fong Tne Ting v. U. S.^— Right of the sovereign
to deport foreigners already domiciled. Justice Brewer
in his dissenting opinion said: *'I rest my dissent on
three propositions : Firsts that the persons against whom
the penalties of Section 6 of the Act of 1892 are directed
are persons lawfully residing within the United States;
secondly, that as such they are within the protection of
the Constitution, and secured its guaranties against
oppression and wrong; and third, that section 6 deprives
them of liberty and imposes punishment without due
process of law, and in disregard of constitutional guar-
anties, especially those found in the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th
articles of the Amendments, ' ' Justice Field, in his dis-
senting opinion, said : ' * The citation from the opinion in
the recent case of Ekiu v. United States (the Japanese
case) 142 U. S. 651 ; the citation from the opinion in Chae
Chan Ping v. United States (the Chinese exclusion case)
130 U. S. 603, 604, 606; the citation in the case before
the judiciary committee of the Privy Council — all have
reference to the exclusion of Foreigners from entering the
country. They do not touch upon the question of deport-
ing them from the country after they have been domi-
ciled vnthin it by the consent of its government, which
is the real question in this case.** Chief Justice Fuller,
in his dissenting opinion, said: '^I entertain no doubt
that the provisions of 5th and 14th amendments, which
forbid that any person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, are in the lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Matthews already quoted by my
brother Brewer, * universal in their application to all per-
sons within the territorial jurisdiction without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality, ' and
although in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 366, only the
validity of a municipal ordinance was involved the rule
laid down as much applies to Congress under the Fifth
Amendment as to the States under the Fourteenth. * ' The
precise question at issue, therefore, was this: Had the
8—149 U. S. 698.
1 42 FIFTH AMEND>IENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 93
Congress of the United States, tinder the limitation of
due process imposed upon it by the Fifth Amendment,
the constitutional right to authorize the exclusion of for-
eigners already domiciled here under the provisions of
section 6 of the Act of May 5, 1892. Justice Brewer, in
his dissenting opinion, supported the negative in this
way; "Section 6 deprives of *life, liberty, and property
witiiout due process of law.' It imposes punishment
without trial, and punishment cruel and severe. It places
the liberty of one individual subject to the unrestrained
control of another. Notice its provisions : It first com-
mands all to register. He who does not register violates
that law, and may be punished ; and so the section goes
on to say that one who has not complied with its require-
ments, and has no certificate of residence, ^ shall be
deemed and adjudged to be. unlawfully within the United
States,' and then it imposes as a penalty his deportation
from the country. Deportation is punishment. It
involves first an arrest, a deprival of liberty ; and, second
a removal from home, from family, from business, from
property. In Bapalje and Lawrence's Law Dictionary,
p. 109, ^Banishment' is thus defined: ^A punishment by
forced exile, either for years or for life ; inflicted princi-
pally upon political offenders, * transportation' being the
word used to express a similar punishment of ordinary
criminals. ' In 4 Blackstone, 377, it is said. ^ Some pun-
ishments consist in exile or banishment of the realm, or
transportation*' In Vattel we find that 'banishment is
only applied to condenmation in due course of law. ' Vat-
tel's Law of Nations, 288, note."
Despite such objections the majority of the Court,
speaking through Justice Gray held that the United
States as an independent sovereign is vested by interna-
tional law with full power to exclude or expel aliens;
that such power is vested in the political department of
the government, subject to regulation by act of Congress
or by treaty ; that such power is to be carried into effect
by the executive, subject to the right of the judiciary to
94 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 42
intervene when required to do so by the provisions of the
Constitution, a statute or treaty ; that such a power when
asserted through a constitutional Act of Congress must
be made to override an earlier treaty; that Chinese
laborers resident in this country continue to be aliens,
and as such remain subject to the authority of Congress
to expel them or to order them to be deported, whenever
in its judgment such removal is expedient or necessary
for the public interest As to the right of Congress to
prescribe the evidence admissible upon this subject in the
Federal courts, and to determine the effect of that evi-
dence, the Court said : * * The effect of the provisions of
section 6 of the Act of 1892 is that, if, a Chinese laborer,
after the opportunity afforded him to obtain a certificate
of residence within a year, at a convenient place, and
without cost, is found without such a certificate, he shall
be so far presumed to be not entitled to remain within
the United States that an officer of the customs, or a col-
lector of internal revenue, or a marshal, or a deputy of
either, may arrest him, not with a view to imprisonment,
or punishment, or to his inamediate deportation without
further inquiry but in order to take him before a judge.
The provision which puts the burden of proof upon him
of rebutting the presumption arising from his having no
certificate, as well as the requirement of proof, *by at
least one credible white witness, that he was a resident
of the United States at the time of the passage of this
Act,' is within the acknowledged power of every legis-
lature to prescribe the evidence which shall be received,
and the effect of that evidence, in the courts of its own
government. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 262,
349 ; Pellow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472, 476 ; 125 Baskets of
Champagne v. United States, 3 Wall. 114, 143 ; Ex parte
Fiske, 113 U. S. 713, 721 ; Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass 505,
516-519. The competency of all witnesses, without regard
to their color, to testify in the courts of the United States,
rests on acts of Congress, which Congress may at its dis-
cretion modify or repeal.*'
§43 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 95
§ 43. Jobnson v. Sayre ^—Persons subject to military
law. This was an appeal from an order of a United
States Circuit Court discharging, upon habeas corpus, a
paymaster's clerk in the Navy, from custody under a
sentence of a Naval Court Martial, upon a plea by Sayre
that he * * was unlawfully restrained of his liberty, because
detained under a sentence to an infamous punishment,
not in time of war or public danger, without indictment
or trial by jury, in violation of the Constitution of the
United States/' In holding that all persons in the naval
or military service are subject to the military law, and
that the words ' * when in actual service in time of war or
public danger, ' ' apply to the militia only, the Court said :
"By the Fifth Article of Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, *no person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in
eases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger. '
The decision below is based upon the construction that
the words 'when in actual service in time of war or public
danger' refer, not merely to the last antecedent, *or in
the militia,' but also to the pervious clause, 4n the land
or naval forces.' That construction is grammatically
possible. But it is opposed to the evident meaning of
the provision, taken by itself, and still more so, when it is
considered together with the other provisions of the Con-
stitution. The whole purpose of the provision in ques-
tion is to prevent persons, not subject to the military
law, from being held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime without presentment or indictment by a
grand jury. All persons in the military or naval service
of the United States are subject to the military law ; the
members of the regular army and navy at all times ; the
militia, so long as they are in actual service. ' '
•-158 U. a 109.
96 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 44
§44. Brown v. Walker ^^ — Iinrnnnlty for witnesses
under act of 1893 applies to state as well as federal
courts. In this case, after declaring that the English
rule of evidence — Nemo tenetur seipsum Mcusare —
' * became clothed in this conntry with the impregnability
of a constitutional enactment/' the Court held that the
constitutional guarantee of protection to every person
against being compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself is not infringed by the Act of Con-
gress of Feb. 11, 1893, exempting a witness from prosecu-
tion on account of any transaction to which he may testify
before the Interstsate Commerce Commission; that such
exemption extends not only to Federal courts, but to state
courts as well ; that the power of Congress to pass such
acts of general amnesty as that of Feb. 11, 1893, is not
taken away by the constitutional power of the President
to grant pardons. The Court said: **This case involved
an alleged incompatibility between the clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution which declares that no
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself,* and the act of Congress of
February 11, 1893 (27 Stat, at L. 443), which enacts that
'no person shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agree-
ments, and documents before the Interstate Commerce
Conmiission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Com-
mission. • . . The act is supposed to have been passed
in view of the opinion of this court in Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 3 Inters. Cent Eep. 816, to the ef-
fect that U. S. Rev. Stat 860, providing that no evidence
given by a witness shall be used against him, his prop-
erty or estate, in any manner, in any court of the United
States, in any criminal proceeding did not afford that
complete protection to the witness which the Amendment
was intended to guarantee. . . . The act of Congress in
•question, securing to witnesses immunity from prosecu-
tion, is virtually an act of general amnesty, and belongs to
10—161 U. S. 591.
§45 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1866-1896) 97
a dass of legislation which is not uncommon either in
England (2 Taylor, Ev. 1455), where a large number of
similar acts are collated, or in this country. Although
the Constitution vests in the President * power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States, except in cases of impeachment,' this power has
never been held to take away from Congress the power
to pass acts of general amnesty, and is ordinarily exer-
cised only in cases of individuals after conviction, as was
said by this court in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380,
*it extends to every offense known to the law, and may be
exercised at any time after its commission, either before
legal proceedings, or during their pendency or after con-
viction and judgment. ' . . . If, as was justly observed
in the opinion of the court below, witnesses standing in
Brown's position were at liberty to set up an immunity
from testifying, the enforcement of the interstate com-
merce law or other analogous acts wherein it is for the
interest of both parties to conceal misdoings, would be-
come impossible, since it is only from the mouths of those
having knowledge of the inhibited contracts that the facts
can be ascertained. While the constitutional provision in
question is justly regarded as one of the most valuable
prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accom-
plished by the statutory immunity. ' '
§ 45. Case of Wong Wing, sequel of the case of Fong
Yue Ting. In the case of Wong Wing, 163 U. S. 228,. it
was held that the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, relating to criminal procedure, protect all
aliens in the territory of the United States ; and that a
pretended judgment rendered by a Commissioner of a
Circuit Court commanding **that they be imprisoned at
hard labor at and in the Detroit House of Correction for
a period of sixty days from and including the day of
commitment, and that at the expiration of said time they
be removed from the United States to China," without
presentment or indictment, and without trial by jury, is
Dae
98 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 45
a denial of due process of law. The court said: **It is,
indeed, obvious, from some expressions used by the court
in a previous opinion under the exclusion acts, that it was
perceived that the question now presented mi^ht arise;
but care was taken to reserve any expression of opinion
upon it. . • • Our views upon the question thus
specifically pressed upon our attention may be briefly
expressed thus : We regard it as settled by our previous
decisions that the United States can, as a matter of public
policy, by Congressional enactment forbids aliens or
classes of aliens from coming within their borders, and
expel aUens or classes of aliens from their territory, in
order to mate effectual such decree of exclusion or expul-
sion, devolve the power and duty of identifying and
arresting the persons included in such decree, and causing
their deportation, upon executive or subordinate oflScials.
But when Congress sees fit to further promote such
a policy by subjecting the persons of such aliens to
infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating
their property, we think such legislation, to be valid, must
provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the
accused. No limits can be put by the courts upon the
power of Congress to protect, by summary methods, the
country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits
render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if
they have already found their way into our land and
unlawfully remain here. But to declare unlawful resi-
dence within the country to be an infamous crime, pun-
ishable by deprivation of liberty and property, would be to
pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless
provision were made that the fact of guilt should be first
established by a judicial trial. . . . Applying this rea-
soning to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be
concluded that all persons within the territory of the
United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed
by those amendments, and that even aliens shall not be
held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime,
unless on a presentment, or indictment of grand jury,
§46 FIFTH AMENDMENT-CONTINUED (1866-1896) 99
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. ' '
§46. Talton v. Mayes ^^— Fifth Amendment has no
application to courts of Cherokee Nation. In that case
it was held that as the Cherokee Nation enjoyed local
self-government before the Constitution of the United
States was adopted, the crime of murder committed by
a Cherokee Indian upon the person of another, within the
jurisdiction of that Nation, is an offense against its local
laws and not against the United States; that for that
reason, the provision of the Fifth Amendment as to a
presentment or indictment by a grand jury has no appli-
cation to criminal procedure in the courts of the Chero-
kee Nation, where the number composing a grand jury
is regulated entirely by the local law. The court said :
**The question therefore is. Does the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution apply to the local legislation of the
Cherokee Nation so as to require all prosecutions for
offenses committed against the laws of that nation to be
initiated by a grand jury organized in accordance with
the provisions of that amendment ? The solution of this
question involves an inquiry as to the nature and origin
of the power of local government exercised by the Chero-
kee Nation and recognized to exist in it by the treaties
and statutes above referred to. Sini3e the case of Barron
v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, it has been settled that the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is a
limitation only upon the power of the general govern-
ment, that is, that the amendment operates solely on the
Constitution itself by qualifying the powers of the
national government which the Constitution called into
being. . . . The case in this regard therefore depends
npon whether the powers of local government exercised
by the Cherokee Nation are Federal powers created by
and springing from the Constitution of the United States,
and hence controlled by the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
11—163 U. a 376.
100 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 46
stitution, or whether they are local powers not created by
the Constitutioiiy although subject to its general pro-
visions and the paramount authority of Congress. The
repeated adjudications of this court have long since
answered the former question in the negative/'
* J
> ^
CHAPTER m
FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ITS CONSTBUCTION (1896-1917)
§ 47. Hovey v. Elliott ^— Fifth Amendment limits the
judicial as well as legislative power of the Federal Grov-
enment. On February 12, 1878, the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia at general term made the fol-
lowing decree : ' * The answer of defendants having been
removed from the files for their contempt in refusing to
obey the order of the court and deposit in registry the
sum of $49,279.50, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed
that the bill be taken pro confesso against them. On
April 17, 1878, that order was made absolute by another
order or decree, which, after reciting material allegations
in the complainants ' bill as ^ standing without denial on
the part of defendants, * ordered and adjudged * that the
complainants have a lien upon the claim of Augustine B.
McDonald against the United States . • . of $197,190,
and upon any draft, money, evidence of indebtedness, or
proceeds thereof. ' ' The court held that a decree pro con-
fesso entered, after removing defendants' answer from
the files as a punishment for their contempt in refusing
to obey an order of the court, was a denial of due process,
because the power to withhold a favor or privilege from
one in contempt does not include the power to refuse to
such a one the right to defend on the merits in the princi-
pal case. Counsel for plaintiff in error contended that
"The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provided that no person shall be deprived of his
'property without due process of law.* This means
process adapted to the character of the case. It does not
mean that the practice in common law cases shall be the
1—167 u. S. 409.
101
•.
• •
• ••
• • • •
• • •
102 ..••%/• DUB PROCESS OF LAW §47
• • •
• • • •
cphk^utional right of a defendant who is sued in a conrt
\ of • admiralty or equity. Defendants had ten months'
.•••/•. .•time to comply with the order of the court for the deposit
of the money, and over three months to apply to have the
answer reinstated. This was due process of law. Since
the English court of chancery began to exercise its powers
there never was a time when a defendant in such circum-
stances had the right to be heard upon the merits of his
alleged defense. *' In passing adversely upon that con-
tention the court said : . * * Story, in his treatise on the
Constitution (vol. 2, 1789), speaking of the clause in the
Fifth Amendment, where it is declared that no person
* shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, ^ says : * The other part of the clause
is but an enlargement of the language of Magna Carta,
*Nec super eum ibimus, nee super eum mittimus, nise per
legale judicium parium su4)rum, vel per legem terrae*
(neither will we pass upon him, or condemn him, but by
the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land). Lord Coke says that these latter words, per
legem terrae (by the law of the land), mean by due
process of law, that is, without due presentment or
indictment, and being brought in to answer thereto by
due process of the common law. So that this clause in
effect aflSrms the right of trial according to the process
and proceedings of the common law. ' Can it be doubted
that due process of law signifies' a right to be heard in
one 's defense 1 If the legislative department of the gov-
ernment were to enact a statute conferring the right to
condemn the citizen without any opportunity of being
heard, would it be pretended that such an enactment
would not be violative of the Constitution? // this be
true, as it undoubtedly is, how can it be said that the judi-
cial department, the source and fountain of justice itself ^
has yet the authority to render lawful that which if done
under express legislative sanction would be violative of
the Constitution. If such power obtains, then the judi-
cial department of the government sitting to uphold and
§48 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896.1917) 103
eiiforce the Constitution is the only one possessiag a
power to disregard it. If such authority exists then in
consequence of their establishment, to compel obedience
to law and to enforce justice, courts possess the right to
inflict the very wrongs which they were created to pre-
vent. . . . The necessary effect of the judgment of the
supreme court of the District of Columbia was to decree
a portion of the award made in favor of the defendant,
in other words his property belonged to the complainants
in the cause. The decree therefore awarded the prop-
erty of the defendant to the complainant upon the
hypothesis of fact that by contract the defendant had
transferred the right to this property to the complainant.
If the court had power to do this, by denying the right to
be heard to the defendant, what plainer illustration could
there be of taking property of one and giving it to another
without hearing or without process 1 The power to vio-
late fundamental constitutional safeguards securing
property exists, and if they may be with impunity set
aside by courts on the theory that they do not apply to
proceedings in contempt, why will they not also apply to
proceedings against the liberty of the subject! Why
should not a court in a criminal proceeding deny to the
accused all right to be heard on the theory that he is in
contempt, and sentence him to the full penalty of the law ?
No distinction between the two cases can be pointed out. * '
§ 48. Scranton v. Wheeler ^ — ^Riparian owner deprived
of access to navigable stream. In this case it was held
that a riparian owner is not entitled to any compensa-
tion under the guarantee of the Fifth Amendment declar-
ing that private property shall not be taken for public
use, without just compensation, despite the fact that he
is permanently denied access to a navigable stream by a
pier, erected by the Federal government merely for the
improvement of navigation, on land submerged under
navigable water, the title to which is vested in such ripa-
2-179 u. S. 141.
104 DUB PEOCESS OP LAW § 48
rian owner, for the reason that no matter whether the
title to the land is vested in the riparian owner or the
state, it was so vested subject to the public right of navi-
gation in such stream. The court said : * * Undoubtedly
compensation must be made or secured to the owner when
that which is done is to be regarded as a taking of private
property for public use within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution; and of course in its
exercise of the power to regulate commerce Congress may
not override the provision that just compensation must be
made when private property is taken for public use. . . .
Is the broad power with which Congress is invested bur-
dened with the condition that a riparian owner whose
land borders upon a navigable water of the United States
shall be compensated for his right of access to naviga-
bility whenever such right ceases to be of value solely in
consequence of the improvement of navigation by means
of piers resting upon submerged lands away from the
shore line! We think not. The question before us does
not depend upon the inquiry whether the title to the sub-
merged lands on which the new south pier rests is in the
state or in the riparian owner. It is the settled rule in
Michigan that * the title of the riparian owner extends to
the middle line of the lake or stream of the inland waters. '
Webber v. Pere Marquette Boom Co., 2 Mich. 636, and
authorities there cited. But it is equally well settled in
that state that the rights of the riparian owner are sub-
ject to the public easement or servitude of navigation.
Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 ; Ryan v. Brown, 18 Mich.
195, 207. So that, whether the title to the submerged
lands of navigable waters is in the state or in the ripa-
rian owners, it was acquired subject to the rights which
the public have in the navigation of such waters. ' '
§ 49. Wight V. Davidson ^ — ^Meaning of due process in
the District of Columbia. In this case was involved the
constitutionality of the act of March 3, 1899, entitled
3—181 u. S. 371.
§49 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 105
** An Act to Extend S Street in the District of Columbia,
and for Other Purposes,** under which was made an
assessment upon lands of the appellees for alleged bene-
fits accruing from the opening of certain streets Adjoin-
ing such lands. The act was held to be valid upon the
ground that Congress has the power to legislate for
the District of Columbia in such a way as to provide for
the assessment, on abutting lands and lands benefited, of
one half or more of the damages resulting from such con-
demnation. The Court said: ^^In the present case is
involved the constitutionality of an act of Congress regu-
lating assessments on property in the District of Colum-
bia, and in respect to which the jurisdiction of Congress,
in matters municipal as well as political, is exclusive, and
not controlled by the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. No doubt, in the exercise of such legislative
powers, Congress is subject to the provisions of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
which provide, among other things, that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation. But it by no
means necessarily follows that a long and consistent con-
struction put upon the Fifth Amendment, and maintain-
ing the validity of the acts of Congress relating to public
improvements within the District of Columbia, is to be
deemed overruled by a decision concerning the operation
of the Fourteenth Amendment as controlling state legis-
lation. However, we need not pursue this suggestion,
because we think the court of appeals, in regarding the
decision in Norwood v. Baker, [172 U. S. 269], as over-
ruling our previous decisions in respect of congressional
legislation in respect to public local improvements in the
District of Columbia, misconceived the meaning and
effect of that decision. There the question was as to the
validity of a village ordinance which imposed the entire
cost and expenses of opening a street, irrespective of the
question whether the property was benefited by the open-
106 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 49
ing of the street. The legislature of the state had not
defined or designed the abutting property as benefited by
the improvement, nor had the village authority made any
inquiry into the question of benefits. There having been
no legislative determination as to what lands were bene-
fited, no inquiry instituted by the village councils, and no
opportunity afforded to the abutting owner to be heard
on that subject, this court held that the exaction from the
owner of private property of the cost of a public improve-
ment in substantial excess of the special benefits accru-
ing to him is, to the extent of such excess^ a taking under
the guise of taxation, of private property for pubUc use,
without compensation, and accordingly affirmed the
decree of the circuit court of the United States, which,
while preventing the enforcement of the particular assess-
ment in question upon the plaintiff ^s abutting property
for so much of the expense of opening the street as would
be found upon due and proper inquiry to be equal to the
special benefits accruing to the property. That it was
not intended by this decision to overrule Bauman v. Boss,
[167 U. S. 548], and Parsons v. District of Columbia
[170 U. S. 45], is seen in the opinion where both those
cases are cited, and declared not to be inconsistent with
the conclusion reached. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S.
269,294.'^
The precise issue of constitutional law involved in this
important case can be best defined in the words of
Mr. Justice Harlan who in his dissenting opinion, said :
*'The court in the present case says that Congress has
exclusive jurisdiction, municipal and political, in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and is not controlled by the Fourteenth
Amendment, although it is controlled by the Fifth
Amendment providing, among other things, that no per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation. *But,' the
court proceeds, *it by no means necessarily follows that
a long and consistent construction put upon the Fifth
§50 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 107
Amendment and maintaining the validity of the acts of
Congress relating to public improvements within the
District of Columbia, is to be deemed overruled by a
decision concerning the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment as controlling legislation.* These observa-
tions were made to sustain the proposition that the prin-
ciples announced in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, in
reference to the validity of state enactments relating to
local public improvements, have no necessary application
to a case of a like kind arising under a similar act of
Congress relating to local public improvements in the
District of Columbia. As the court does not pursue this
subject, nor express any final view upon the question
referred toy I refer this part of its opinion only for the
purpose of recording my dissent from the intimation
that what a state might not do in respect of the depriva-
tion of property without due process of law, Congress
under the Constitution of the United States could, per-
haps, do in respect of property in this District. The
Fifth Amendment declares that no person shall be
deprived of property 'without due process of law/ The
Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall
deprive any person of property 'without due process of
law. ' It is inconceivable to me that the question whether
a person has been deprived of his property without due
process of law can be determined upon principles applica-
ble under the Fourteenth Amendment but not applicable
under the Fifth Amendment, or upon principles appliCd-
ble under the Fifth and not applicable under the Four-
teenth Amendment. It seems to me that the words 'due
process of law^ mean the same in both Amendments.
The intimation to the contrary in the opinion of the court
is, I take leave to say, without any foundation upon which
to rest, and is most mischievous in its tendency. ' '
§ 50. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses ^—Bankruptcy
act of July 1, 1898, did not deny due process. The Court
4—186 U. a 181.
108 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 50
said: '*But it is contended that as to voluntary pro-
ceedings the act is in violation of the Fifth Amendment
in that it deprives creditors of their property without
due process of law in failing to provide for notice. Thfe
act provides that *any person who owes debts, except a
corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits of this act as
a voluntary bankrupt/ (4a), aud that *upon the filing
of a voluntary petition the judge shall hear the petition
and make the adjudication or dismiss the petition. * 18g.
With the petition he must file schedules of his property
and * of his creditors, showing their residences, if known,
if unknown, that fact to be stated.' 7, subd. 8. The
schedules must be verified and the petition must state
that * petitioner owe© debts which he is unable to pay in
full,' and *that he is willing to surrender all his prop-
erty for the benefit of his creditors, except such as is
exempt by law.' This establishes those facts so far as
a decree of bankruptcy is concerned, and he has com-
mitted an act of bankruptcy in filing the petition. These
are not issuable facts, and notice is unnecessary, unless
dismissal is sought, when notice is requested. § 59g.
. . . It is also provided by § 15 that a discharge may
be revoked, on the application within a year, if pro-
cured by fraud and not warranted by the facts. Not-
withstanding these provisions, it is insisted that the
want of notice of filing the petition is fatal because the
adjudication per se entitles the bankrupt to a discharge,
and that the proceedings in respect of discharge are in
personam, and require personal service of notice. The
adjudication does not itself have that effect, and the first
of these objections really rests on the ground that the
notice provided for is unreasonably short, and the right
to oppose discharge unreasonably restricted. Consid-
ering the plenary power of Congress, the subject matter
of the suit and the common rights and interests of the
creditors, we regard the contention as untenable. Con-
gress may prescribe any regulations concerning discharge
in bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as
§51 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 109
to be incompatible with fundamental law, and we can
not find anything in this act on that subject which would
justify us in overthrowing its action/'
§61. Dreyer v. Illinois ^—Foimer jeopardy, XT. S. v.
Perez reviewed. The Court said: ^'The contention is
that, notwithtsanding the recital in the record that the
jury were discharged by the court because they were
unable to agree upon a verdict, such discharge was with-
out moral or physical necessity, and operated as an
acquittal of the defendant.'' When called upon under
such a contention to pass upon the prohibition of double
jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amendment, the court
answered that the plea was untenable. That conclusion
is notable because it was reached after a careful review
of United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, decided in 1824,
the first case in which the Amendment in question was
ever construed. In the course of that review the Court
said: **Upon the face of the question under examina-
tion the inquiry might arise whether the due process of
law required by the Fourteenth Amendment protects one
accused of crime from being put twice in jeopardy of
life or limb. In other words, is the right not to be put
twice in jeopardy of life or limb forbidden by the Four-
teenth Amendment ; or, so far as the Constitution of the
United States is concerned, is it forbidden only by the
Fifth Amendment, which, prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, had been held as restricting only
the powers of the national government and its agencies f
We pass this important question without any considera-
tion of it upon its merits, and content ourselves with
referring to the decision of this court in United States
V. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579. That was a capital case, in
which, without the consent of the prisoner or of the
attorney of the United States, the jury being unable to
agree, were discharged by the court from giving any
verdict This court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, said :
5—187 u. s. 71.
110 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 51
*We are of opinion that the facts constitute no legal
bar to a future trial. The prisoner has not been con-
victed or acquitted, and may again be put upon his
defense. We think that in all cases of this nature the
law has invested courts of justice with the authority
to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever,
in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into con-
sideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or
the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject;
and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which
would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the
power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under
urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious
causes; and, in capital cases especially, courts should
be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the
chances in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they
have the right to order the discharge; and the security
which the public have for the faithful, sound, and con-
scientious exercise of this discretion rests in this, as in
other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under
their oaths of office. We are aware that there is some
diversity of opinion and practice on this subject in the
American courts, but, after weighing the question with
due deUberation, we are of opinion that such a discharge
constitutes no bar to further proceedings, and gives no
right of exemption to the prisoner from being again put
upon trial.' If the due process of law required by the
Fourteenth Amendment embraces the guaranty that no
person shall be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb, —
upon which question we need not now express an
opinion, — ^what was said in United States v. Perez [9
Wheat. 579] is applicable to this case upon the present
writ of error, and is adverse to the contention of the
accused that he was twice put in jeopardy.
**The principles settled in United States v. Perez, we
may remark, were reaffirmed in Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall.
175 ; Summons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148 ; Logan v.
852 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 111
United States, 144 U. S. 263 ; Thompson v. United States,
155P. S. 274/'
§52. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock <^— Fifth Amendment
does not limit the power of Congress when exercising
control over lodian tribes. A treaty was concluded in
1867 with the Eiowa and Comanche tribes of Indians,
and snch other friendly tribes as might be united with
them^ setting apart a reservation for the use of such
Indians. The Apache tribe of Indians was incorporated
with those two tribes by a separate treaty, and thus
became entitled to share in the benefits of the reserva-
tion. By the sixth article of the first treaty it was pro-
vided that heads of families might select a tract of land
within the reservation, not exceeding 320 acres in extent,
which should thereafter cease to be held in common,
and should be for the exclusive possession of the Indian
making the selection, so long as he or his family might
continue to cultivate the land. The twelfth article of
the treaty was as follows: ** Article 12. No treaty for
the cession of any portion or part of the reservation
herein described, which may be held in common, shall
be of any validity or force as against the said Indians,
unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of
all the adult male Indians occupying the same, and no
cession by the tribe shall be understood or construed in
such manner as to deprive, without his consent, any indi-
vidual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of
land selected by him as provided in article 3 (6) of this
treaty. ' ' Thereafter was passed the Act of June 6, 1900,
at a time when the tribal relations between the confed-
erated tribes of Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches still
existed, for the purpose of dealing with the tribal prop-
erty in a manner other than that prescribed by the treaty.
Lone Wolf, suing for himself as well as for all others
of the confederated tribes, filed a bill in the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia to enjoin the carrying
6—187 u. s. 56?.
112 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 52
into effect of the Act of Congress of Jnne 6, 1900 (31
Stat, at L. 677, a 813), dealing with the tribal prop-
erty in question. In stating the precise issue involved,
the Court said: ^^The appellants base their right to
relief on the proposition that by the effect of the article
just quoted the confederated tribes of Kiowas, Co-
manches, and Apaches were vested with an interest
in the lands held in common within the reservation,
which interest could not be divested by Congress in any
other mode than that specified in the said twelfth article,
and that as a result of the said stipulation the interest
of the Indians in the common lands fell within the pro-
tection of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and such interest, indirectly at least,
came under the control of the judicial branch of the gov-
ernment. We are unable to yield our assent to this view.
. . . Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the
Indians has been exercised by Congress from the begin-
ning, and the power has always been deemed a political
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial depart-
ment of the government. Until the year 1871 the policy
was pursued of dealing with Indian tribes by means of
treaties, and, of course, a moral obligation rested upon
Congress to act in good faith in performing the stipu-
lations entered into on its behalf. But, as with treaties
made with foreign nations (Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U. S. 581, 600), the legislative power might pass laws
in conflict with treaties made with the Indians. • . .
When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the
United States and a tribe of Indians, it was never doubted
that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that
in a contingency such power might ber availed of from
considerations of governmental policy, particularly if
consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians. * '
Upon that ground the court refused to extend its judicial
control over the treaty or contract in question under the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
§53 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 113
§ 53. IT. S. v. Lynah 7— Liability under Fifth Amend-
ment for land taken to improve navigation. In this case
it was held that the United States was liable for the
taking of land within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment when, as the necessary result of an improvement
in navigation executed under the authority of Congress,
a valuable rice plantation was converted into a valueless
and irreclaimable bog. The Court said: **It is clear
from these authorities that where the government by the
construction of a dam or other public works so floods
lands belonging to an individual as to substantially
destroy their value, there is a taking within the scope
of the Fifth Amendment. While the government does
not directly proceed to appropriate the title, yet it takes
away the use and value ; when that is done it is of little
consequence in whom the fee may be vested. Of course,
it results from this that the proceeding must be regarded
as an actual appropriation of the land, including the
possession, the right of possession, and the fee; and
when the amount awarded as compensation is paid, the
title, the fee, with whatever rights may attach thereto —
in this case those at least which belong to the riparian
proprietor — ^pass to the government and it becomes
henceforth the full owner. Passing to the third question,
it is contended that what was done by the government
was done in improving the navigability of a navigable
river, that it is given by the Constitution full control
over such improvements, and that if in doing any work
therefor, injury results to riparian proprietors or others,
it is an injury which is purely consequential, and for
which the government is not liable. But if any one
proposition can be considered as settled by the decisions
of this court, it is that, although in the discharge of its
duties the government may appropriate property, it can
not do so without being liable to the obligation cast by
the Fifth Ajnendment of paying just compensation. ' * In
distinguishing this case from that of Scranton v. Wheeler,
7—188 XJ. S. 446.
Doe
114 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 53
179 V. S. 141, the Court said : * * It is true that a majority
of the court held, in that case, that the destruction of
access to land abutting on a navigable river by the con-
struction by Congress of a pier on the submerged lands
in front of the upland was not a taking of private prop-
erty for public use, but only an instance of consequential
injury to the property of the riparian owner. But the
right of compensation in case of a taking was conceded. ' '
In the Scranton Case the Court said that ** Undoubtedly
compensation must be made or secured to the owner
when that which is done is to be regarded as a taking
of private property for public use within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, and, of
course, in its exercise of the power to regulate commerce.
Congress may not override the provision that just com-
pensation must be made when private property is taken
for public use.**
§ 54. The Japanese Immigrant Case ®— ^Application of
the due process clause in a case of deportation after
entry. Proceeding under the act of Congress of March
3, 1891, relating to the exclusion of certain classes of
alien immigrants, the Secretary of the Treasury issued
a warrant, July 23, 1901, addressed to the immigrant
inspector at Seattle, reciting that the appellant had come
to the United States contrary to the provisions of the
above act of 1891, and ordering that she be taken into
custody and returned to Japan at the expense of the
vessel importing her. The Court said : * * It is contended,
however, in respect of an alien who has already landed
it is consistent with the acts of Congress that he may
be deported without previous notice of any purpose to
deport him, and without any opportunity on his part
to show by competent evidence before the executive
officers charged with the execution of the acts of Con-
gress, that he is not here in violation of law; that the
deportation of an alien without provision for such a
8—189 U. S. 86.
§ 54 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896.1917) 115
notice and for an opportunity to be heard was incon-
sistent with the due process of law required by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. Leaving on one side
the question whether an alien can rightfully invoke the
due process clause of the Constitution who has entered
the country clandestinely, and who has been here too
brief a period to have become, in any real sense, a part
of our population, before his right to remain is disputed,
we have to say that the rigid construction of the Acts
of Congress suggested by the appellant are not justified.
Those acts do not necessarily exclude opportunity to the
immigrant to be heard, when such opportunity is of
right. It was held in Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken
Land and Improv. Co., 18 How. 272, 280, 281, 283, that
•though due process of law generally implies and includes
actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to
answer, and a trial according to some settled course of
judicial proceedings, . . . yet this is not universally
true,' and *that though generally both public and private
wrongs are redressed through judicial action, there are
more summary extra-judicial remedies for both. ' Hence,
it was decided in that case to be consistent with due
process of law for Congress to provide summary means
to compel revenue officers — and, in case of default, their
sureties — ^to pay such balances of the public money as
might be in their hands. Now, it has been settled that
the power to exclude or expel aliens belonged to the
political department of the government, and that the
order of an executive officer invested with the power to
determine finally the facts upon which an alien's right
to enter this country, or remain in it, depended, was
^due process of law, and no other tribunal, unless ex-
pressly authorized to do so, was at liberty to re-examine
the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its suffi-
ciency.' Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S.
651, 659; Fong Yue Ting v. United State, 149 U. S. 698,
713; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547.
But this court has never held, nor must we now be
116 DUE PEOCBSS OP LAW § 54
understood as holding, that administrative officers, when
executing the provisions of a statute involving the lib-
erty of persons, may disregard the fundamental prin-
ciples that inhere in 'due process of law' as understood
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One
of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to We
heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon
which that liberty depends — ^not necessarily an opportu-
nity upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the
forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the
prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and
at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the
case upon which such officers are required to act. There-
fore, it is not competent for the Secretary of the Treas-
ury or any executive officer, at any time within the year
limited by statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien who has
entered the country, and has become subject in all
respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population,
although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into
custody and deported without giving him all opportunity
to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be
and remain in the United States. No such arbitrarv
power can exist where the principles involved in due
process of law are recognized.'*
§55. Hawaii v. Mankichi — ^How colonists must win
right to participate in constitution of the parent state.
In the ancient Mediterranean world, where the state was
the city-commonwealth, those who went out of the city
went out of the state. Therefore, according to Greek
ideas, the eflfect of an emigration for the foundation of
a new settlement was an absolute political severance
from the mother state, which retained no more substan-
tial hold upon its colonies than the sentimental tie aris-
ing out of the community of blood and speech and com-
mon religious rights. When a conquering city extended
its dominions by reducing other self-governing cities to
§ 55 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 117
the condition of dependent allies, such allies were often
permitted to enjoy local autonomy under their own con-
stitutions, without the right to participate in any way
in the political affairs of the ruling state. The most
favored member of the Athenian Alliance or Empire,
even Chios or Mitylene, could not have a voice in the
general direction of the confederacy, for the simple rea-
son that Greek exclusiveness rejected to the last the
idea of a fusion of any large number of cities into a
single body with equal rights common to all.
Not until after the Teutonic nations had settled upon
the wreck of the Boman Empire did the ancient concep-
tion of the state as the city-conmaonwealth give way to
the modem conception of the state as the nation, — ^an
aggregation of people occupying a definite portion of
the earth's surface with fixed geographical boundaries,
the state as known to modem international law. When
the time came for states of the new type to send out
bands of emigrants to found colonies in distant lands,
an entirely new conception of the relation that should
bind such colonies to the mother state came into exist-
ence. Instead of the emigrants leaving the mother state
behind them, they were supposed to take it upon their
backs. "The notion was, where Englishmen are, there
IS England, where Frenchmen are, there is France; and
so the possessions of France in North America were
called New France, and one group at least of the Eng-
lish possessions New England.*' Seeley, The Expan-
sion of England, p. 49. On that principle all the western
hemisphere passed under the control of a colonial
system of complete monopoly by mother countries,
and, as a general rule, was excluded from direct
communication with Europe, outside of the respective
parent states. According to the theory of the* English
Constitution, the title to all newly discovered lands
accrued to the King in his public and regal character,
and the exclusive right to grant them resided in him
as a part of the royal prerogative ; upon these principles
118 DUE PROCESS OP LAW . § 55
rest the various charters and grants of territory made
on this continent. The title-deed nnder which the English
took possession of the greater part of the Atlantic
seaboard is represented by the charter granted by James
I, April 10, 1606, creating two distinct corporations as
colonizing agents. In that charter it was declared * * that
all and every the persons within the said colony and
plantation, and every their children and posterity, which
shall happen to be bom within any of the limits thereof,
shall have and enjoy all Uberties, franchises, and immu-
nities of free denizens and natural subjects within our
dominations, to all intents and purposes as if they had
been abiding and bom within this our realm of England
or in any other of our dominions. ' * It is not, therefore,
strange that, under the principles of the English Con-
stitution, a country subdued by an army of the Empire
should become immediately a part of the King's domin-
ions in right of his crown, and its inhabitants, so soon as
they pass under the King's protection, cease to be enemies
or aliens and become subjects. In a word, foreign ter-
ritory becomes a part of the British Empire and its
inhabitants British subjects, both as to the conquering
state and foreign nations ipso facto, by the conquest
itself, without any enabling or confirming legislation
upon the part of the Imperial Parliament. As Lord
Coke declared in Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1, **they that
were bom in those parts of France that were under actual
allegiance and obedience were no aliens, but capable of,
and heritable to, lands in England." And yet the lib-
erality with which the English constitution thus bestows
citizenship and legal rights upon those under its dominion
in foreign lands has ever been offset by the exclusive
spirit, sanctioned by all the precedents of the past, that
denies to all colonists the right to representation in the
sovereign assembly at home which directs the affairs of
the Empire as a whole. That assembly, while denying
to all colonists, as every other home assembly had denied,
the boon of being heard through their representatives.
§55 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 119
has ever claimed the right to invade the jurisdiction of
all colonial assemblies in order to legislate directly upon
internal colonial concerns. See the author's The Origin
and Growth of the American Constitution^ pp. 91-92,
380 sq.
When the founders of our colonial system defined its
principles in the famous Ordinance of July 13, 1787,
entitled **An Ordinance for the government of the ter-
ritory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio,'*
they, in obedience to a principle, universal in the ancient
and modem world, excluded the colonists from all right
to participate in the constitution of the mother state,
save so far as particular provisions of it might be
extended to them as a matter of grace and not as a
matter of right. Really the only connection between the
colonial government of the Northwest and the legislature
of the parent state was through * * a delegate to Congress,
who shall have a seat in Congress with the right of
debating, but not of voting.'* The rank heresy of a later
time, that **the Constitution follows the flag,'* finds
nothing but refutation in the terms of the acts through
which our early colonial systems were organized. The
fundamental principle upon which all of them rests is
that the Constitution is the exclusive possession of the
fully organized states. That fact was emphasized with
peculiar force in the case of American Ins. Co. v. Canter,
1 Pet. 511, in which it was held that a territorial court
whose judges hold their offices for four years can not
be a court of the United States within the meaning of
the Constitution, because that provides that the judges
shall hold their offices during good behavior. As Mar-
shall, C. J., has expressed it: **We have only to pursue
this subject one step further, to perceive that this provi-
sion of the Constitution does not apply to it. The next
sentence declares that *the judges both of the supreme
and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good
behavior. ' The judges of the superior courts of Florida
hold their offices for four years. The courts, then, are
120 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 55
not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution on the General Govern-
ment can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving
it. They are legislative courts, created by virtue of the
general right of sovereignty which exists in the Govern-
ment, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress
to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory belonging to the United States.*' It was thus
settled at an early day that the colonies or territories
of the United States are governed, as all other colonies
in the world 's history have been governed, by the parent
state, without the right to participate in its Constitution.
With all the fundamentals thus clearly defined in har-
mony with the past history of the world as to the relation
of colonies to the constitution of the parent state, there
was really no occasion for the great forensic contest and
subsequent conflict among the judges which assumed
such large proportions in what are known as the Insular
Tariff Cases, the most important of which are De Lima
V. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S.
244. In the first, the question was this : Was the island
of Porto Rico, after the treaty with Spain for the trans-
fer of sovereignty had been ratified and proclaimed, and
prior to any action by Congress in regard to the island,
a part of the territory of the United States, and subject
to that provision of the Constitution which declares that
* * all duties, imports and excises shall be uniform through-
out the United States '*! It was held that, at the time
the duties in question were levied, *' Porto Rico was not
a foreign country, within the meaning of the tariff laws,
but a territory of the United States ; that the duties were
illegally exacted, and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover
them back.'* In the second, the same question arose,
after the passage, on April 12, 1900, of the Foraker Act,
which provided for a territorial government in Porto
Rico and levied a duty upon such products of the island
AS migh{ be brought into the United States. When the
questioi) of the validity of the duty so imposed arose,
§55 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896 1917) 121
it was held to be valid, regardless of the riniformity
clause of the Constitution, because, in the opinion of
Mr. Justice Brown, who delivered the judgment, the
Constitution does not, by its own force, extend to the
possessions of the United States, whether created into
territories with a regular form of government, or exist-
ing as unorganized possessions. As a qualification of
that statement, that ever sane and luminous judge said :
"To sustain the judgment in the case under considera-
tion, it by no means becomes necessary to show that none
of the articles of the Constitution apply to the island
of Porto Rico. There .is a clear distinction between such
prohibitions as go to the very root of the power of Con-
gress to act at all, irrespective of time or place, and
such as are operative only * throughout the United States'
or among the several states. Thus when the Constitution
declares that *no bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed,' and that *no title of nobility shall be
granted by the United States, ' it goes to the competency
of Congress to pass a bill of that description. Upon
the other hand, when the Constitution declares that all
duties shall be uniform * throughout the United States,'
it becomes necessary to inquire whether there be any
tei«ritory over which Congress has jurisdiction which is
not a part of the * United States,' by which term we
understand the States whose people united to form the
Constitution,and such as have since been admitted to
the Union upon an equality with them." Thus it was
expressly decided that incorporation into the United
States territory acquired by treaty or cession in which
there are conditions against the incorporation of the
territory until Congress provides therefor, will not take
place until in the wisdom of Congress it is deemed that
the acquired territory has reached that state where it
is proper that it should enter into and form a part of
the American family. Until the fiat is given by Con-
gress, no territory can pass from a colonial or territorial
122 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 55
condition into that full statehood which alone confers
the right to participate in the national Constitution.
With the foregoing preface clearly in view, it will be
easy to explain the principles of that class of cases to
which Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, belongs. Upon
a petition for habeas corpus, the District Court of the
United States for the Territory of Havaii discharged
Mankichi, who had been convicted of manslaughter upon
an indictment not found by a grand jury and upon a
verdict rendered upon the agreement of nine jurors.
Following the usual course of procedure in Hawaii, prior
to its incorporation as a territory of the United States,
the prisoner was tried upon an indictment by the attor-
ney general, resembling an information at common law,
and indorsed **a true bill found this 4th day of May,
A. D. 1899. A. Perry, first judge of the circuit court,'*
etc. From the order discharging the prisoner the attor-
ney general of the territory appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, where it was contended for
the prisoner that **It is contrary to the Constitution of
the United States that any person should be held to
answer for a capital crime unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, and that in a criminal prose-
cution a conviction should be had by verdict of nine
members of the jury.*' In disallowing that contention,
the court held that the then existing criminal procedure
of the Hawaiian islands was not superseded by the
criminal proceedings by grand and petit juries, as pre-
scribed by Amendments Five and Six to the Constitution
of the United States, by the annexation of said islands
as a part of the territory of the United States and sub-
ject to the sovereign dominion thereof, under the New-
lands resolution of July 7, 1898, accepting the cession
thereof made by the Republic of Hawaii, and continuing
the municipal legislation of such islands not inconsistent
with such resolutions, **nor contrary to the Constitution
of the United States,*' until Congress should otherwise
determine. In concluding its judgment the Court said:
§56 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 123
** Inasmuch as we are of opinion that the status of the
islands and the powers of their provisional government
were measured by the Newlands Resolution, and the case
has been argued upon that theory, we have not deemed
it necessary to consider what would have been its posi-
tion had the important words *nor contrary to the Con-
stitution of the United States' been omitted, or to
reconsider the questions which arose in the Insular Tariff
Cases regarding the power of Congress to annex terri-
tory without, at the same time, extending the constitution
over if
§ 56. Rassmussen v. XT. S.® — ^Incorporation of Alaska
with the United States and the right of trial by a jury of
twelve men. Despite the fact that the Sixth instead of
the Fifth Amendment was directly involved in this case,
it should be considered here because it illustrates in
such a vivid way the constitutional results of an actual
incorporation of a colony or territory with the parent
state. The plaintiff in error was convicted of a misde-
meanor by a jury of six men, in accordance with section
171 of the Code of Alaska adopted by Congress, wherein
it was provided ^*That hereafter in trials for misde-
meanor six persons shall constitute a legal jury.** At
the trial a common-law jury of twelve was demanded
and refused, and upon an exception to that ruling the
case was determined on appeal. The Court said: **At
the threshold of the case lies the constitutional question
whether Congress had power to deprive one accused in
Alaska of a misdemeanor of trial by a common-law jury ;
that is to say, whether the provision of the act of Con-
gress in question was repugnant to the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. . . . The va-
lidity of the provision in question is, therefore, sought to
be sustained upon the proposition that the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Constitution did not apply to Congress in
legislating for Alaska. And this rests upon two conten-
»— 197 u. 8. 516.
124 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 56
•
tions, which we proceed separately to consider. 1st.
Alaska was not incorporated into the United States, and
therefore the Sixth Amendment did not control Congress
in legislating for Alaska. . . . 2d. That even if Alaska
was incorporated into the United States, as it was not an
organized territory, therefore the provisions of the Sixth
Amendment were not controlling on Congress when leg-
islating for Alaska.^' In rejecting those contentions, and
in reaching the conclusion that by the treaty nnder which
it was acquired, and by the subsequent congressional
legislation imposing internal revenue taxation, and ex-
tending the laws of the United States as to customs,
commerce and navigation over Alaska, and establishing
a collection district therein, Alaska was so incorporated
into the United States as to render the article of the Code
in question (31 Stat, at L. 358, c. 786) repugnant to the
Sixth Amendment, the Court said : * * Without attempting
to examine in detail the opinions in the various cases, in
our judgment it clearly results from them that they sub-
stantially rested upon the proposition that where territory
was a part of the United States, the inhabitants thereof
were entitled to the guaranties of the Fifth, Sixth and
Seventh Amendments, and that the act of Congress pur-
porting to extend the Constitution were considered as de-
claring merely of a result which existed independently by
the inherent operation of the Constitution. It is true that,
in some of the opinions, both the application of the Con-
stitution and the statutory provisions declaring such
application were referred to, but in others no reference
to such statutes was made, and the cases proceeded upon
a line of reasoning leaving room for no other view than
that the conclusion of the court was rested upon the self-
operative application of the Constitution. Springville v.
Thomas, 166 U. S. 707; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343;
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof , 174 U. S. 1 ; Black v. Jack-
son, 177 U. S. 349. ... As it conclusively results from
the foregoing considerations that the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution was applicable to Alaska, and as, of
5 57 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 125
course, being applicable, it was controlling upon Con-
gress in legislating for Alaska, it follows that the provi-
sion of the act of Congress under consideration, depriving
persons accused of a misdemeanor in Alaska of a right
to trial by a conunon-law jury, was repugnant to the Con-
stitution and void.'*
§ 57. A group of cases involving the extension of due
process to the Philippine Islands. Consideration should
be given here to a group of cases involving the extension
of due process to the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands, residing on territory not incorporated into the
United States. In the case of Dorr v. United States,
195 U. S. 138, the court, in reaching the conclusion that
the Constitution, of its own force, and without legisla-
tion, did not extend the right of trial by jury to the
Philippine Islands, ceded by Spain to the United States,
and not incorporated by congressional action, said : ** As
we have had occasion to see in the case of Kepner v.
United States, 195 U. S. 100, the President, in his instruc-
tions to the Philippine Commission, while impressing the
necessity of carrying into the government the guaranties
of the Bill of Bights securing those safeguards to life
and liberty which are deemed essential to our govern-
ment, was careful to reserve the right to trial by jury,
which was doubtless due to the fact that the civilized
portion of the island had a system of jurisprudence
founded upon the civil law, and the uncivilized parts of
the archipelago were wholly unfitted to exercise the right
of trial by jury. The Spanish system, in force in the
Philippines, gave the right to the accused to be tried
before judges, who acted, in effect, as a court of inquiry,
and whose judgments were not final until passed in
review before the audiencia, or superior court, with right
of final review, and power to grant a new trial for errors
of law, in the supreme court at Madrid. To this system
the Philippine Commission, in executing the power con-
ferred by the orders of the President, and sanctioned by
126 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 57
act of Congress (act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stai at L. 691,
0. 1369), has added a guaranty of the right of the accused
to be heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speech
and public trial, to meet the witnesses against him face
to face, and to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf. And, further, that
no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law, nor to be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, nor to be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. As appears in the Kepner Case, 195 U. S. 100,
the accused is given the right of appeal from the judg-
ment of the court of first instance to the supreme court,
and, in capital cases, the case goes to the latter court
without appeal. '* It was therefore held in Trono v.
United States, 199 U. S. 521, that while the act of Con-
gress of July 1, 1902, provided (Sec. 5) that **no per-
son for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment,** the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands did not err in reversing the judgment of the
court of first instance, and convicting the accused of
the crime of homicide (substantially murder in the sec-
ond degree), included in, and a lower degree of the crime
charged in the complaint, and yet a higher degree of
crime than that of which the accused was convicted
(assault) in the primary court The Court said: **We
may regard the question as thus presented as the same
as if it arose in one of the Federal courts in this coun-
try.'* In Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, in
which an acquittal of homicide, as defined by the Philip-
pine criminal code, was pleaded as a bar to a subsequent
trial for the same offense in a civil court, the accused
based his plea in part upon the Fifth Amendment and in
part upon that section of the Philippine act which declares
that **no person, for the same offense, shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment.** The plea was sus-
tained and the conviction in civil court reversed. See
S 58 PIPTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 127
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, and Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U. S. 325, in which it was said: **As
to the objection that no indictment was f onnd by a grand
jury, as required by article 5 of the Amendment of the
Constitution, there is no such requirement in the Philip-
pine act of July 1, 1902. It is therein provided that *no
law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law/
This court has held that due process of law does not
require presentment of an indictment found by a grand
jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516/* See also,
Tiaco V. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549 ; MacLeod v. United States,
229 U. S. 416; Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91.
§58. Bedford v. U. 8.^ <> — Distinguished from the
Lynah Case. Appellant claimed that the Fifth Amend-
ment had been violated by the taking of private property
for public use by the United States through the con-
struction of certain revetments on the Mississippi river,
which caused injury to his lands as a riparian property,
through overflow and erosion as the result of the action
of that river through a series of years. The government
contended that as the revetments were not on appellant 's
lands, the damage was too remote to constitute a taking,
because of its right to claim, in protecting the property
intrusted to its care, the benefit of the principle which
authorizes a riparian owner to preserve existing condi-
tions, although he may not erect constructions which will
change those conditions. Subject to that limitation, he
may preserve his property irrespective of the conse-
quences to his neighbors. Jn sustaining that contention
the Court said : * * The constitution provided that private
property shall not be taken without just compensation,
but a distinction has been made between damage and
taking, and that distinction must be observed in applying
the constitutional provision. An excellent illustration is
found in Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269. The
10—192 TJ. S. 217.
128 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 58
distinction is there instructively explained, and other
cases need not be cited. It is, however, necessary to
refer to United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, as it is
especially relied upon by appellants. . . . The question
was asked : *Does this amount to a taking! ' To which it
was replied: *The case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay and
M. Canal Co., 13 Wall. 166, answers this question in the
aflSrmative.' And further: *The Green Bay Company,
as authorized by statute, constructed a dam across Fox
river, by means of which the land of Pumpelly was over-
flowed and rendered practically useless to him. There,
as here, no proceeding had been taken to formally con-
demn the land.' In both cases, therefore, it was said
that there was an actual invasion and appropriation of
land as distinguished from consequential damage. In
the case at bar the damage was strictly consequentiaL
It was the result of the action of the river through a
course of years. The case at bar, therefore, is distin-
guishable from the Lynah Case in the cause and manner
of the injury. In the Lynah Case the works were con-
structed in the tide of the river, obstructed the natural
flow of its waters, and were held to have caused, as a
direct consequence, the overflow of Lynah 's plantation.
In the case at bar the works were constructed along the
banks of the river, and their effect was to resist erosion
of the banks by the water of the river. There was no
other interference with natural conditions. Therefore,
the damage to appellant's land, if it can be assigned to
the work at all, was but an incidental consequence of
theuL" i
§59. Bnttfleld v. Stranahan ^^— How far the power
to regulate foreign commerce is limited by due process.
The constitutionality of the Act of March 2, 1897, which
had for its purpose the exclusion from the country of
the lowest grades of tea, was assailed under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment upon the fol-
11—192 U. S. 470.
859 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CX)NTINTJBD (1896-1917) 129
lowing grounds: **lst, that the act of March 2, 1897,
confers authority to establish standards, and that such
power is legislative and can not constitutionally be dele-
gated by Congress to administrative ofBcers; 2d, that
the plaintiff in error had a vested right to engage as a
trader in foreign commerce and as such to import teas
into the United States, which, as a matter of fact, were
pure, wholesome, and free from adulteration, fraud, and
deception, and which were fit for consumption ; 3d, that
the establishment and enforcement of standards of qual-
ity of teas, which operated to deprive the alleged vested
right, constituted a deprivation without due process of
law ; 4th, that the act is unconstitutional, because it does
not provide that notice and opportunity to be heard
afforded an importer before the rejection of his tea by
the tea examiner, or the tea board of general appraisers ;
and, 5th, that, in any event, the authority conferred by the
statute to destroy goods upon the expiration of the time
limit for their removal for export, and the destruction
of such property without a judicial proceeding, was con-
demnation of property without hearing and the taking
thereof without due process of law.'* These several
grounds rested upon the fundamental contention that
the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and between the states is subject to such limita-
tipns as are prescribed by the Constitution and its amend-
ments; that if in the exercise of such power Congress
deems it necessary to take private property for a public
use, then it must proceed subject to the limitations im-
posed by the Fifth Amendment, and can do so only on
payment of just compensation. In holding that no one
has such a vested right to trade with foreign nations as
prevents Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power
to regulate foreign commerce, from prohibiting by the
inspection Act of March 2, 1897, the importation of
teas below the government standards, when it considers
it wise policy to do so, the Court said: **The claim
that the statute conunits to the arbitrary discretion of
Due Process — 9
130 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 59
the Secretary of the Treasury the determination of what
teas may be imported, and therefore in eflfect vests that
oflScial with legislative power, is without merit. We are
of opinion that the statute, when properly construed, as
said by the circuit court of appeals, but expresses the
purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether de-
monstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption,
or presumably so because of their inferior quality. This,
in effect, was the fixing of a primary standard, and
devolved upon the Secretary of the Treasury the mere
executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared
in the statute. The case is within the principle of
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 643, where it was
decided that the 3rd section of the tariff act of October 1,
1890, was not repugnant to the Constitution as conferring
legislative and treaty-making power on the President,
because it authorized him to suspend the provisions of
the act relating to the free introduction of sugar, molas-
ses, coffee, tea, and hides. We may say of the legislation
in this case, as was said of the legislation considered in
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, that it does not in any
real sense, invest administrative officials with the power
of legislation. Congress legislated on the subject as far
as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities
of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials
the duty to bring about the result pointed out by the stat-
ute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a
duty would in effect, amount but to declaring that the
plenary power vested in Congress to regulate foreign
commerce could not be efficaciously exerted. ... It is
urged that there was denial of due process of law in fail-
ing to accord plaintiff in error a hearing before the board
of tea inspectors and the Secretary of the Treasury in
establishing the standard in question, and before the gen-
eral appraisers upon the reexamination of the tea. Waiv-
ing the point that the plaintiff in error does not appear
to have asked for a hearing, and assuming that the statute
did not confer such a right, we are of opinion that the stat-
§ 60 FIFTH AMtBNDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 131
Bte was not objectionable for that reason. ... It re-
mains only to consider the contention that the provision of
the statute conunanding^ the destruction of teas not ex-
ported within six months after their final rejection was
unconstitutional. . . . The duty to take such action "viras
enjoined upon him (the importer), and, if he failed to ex-
ercise it, the collector was under the obligation, after the
expiration of the time limit, to destroy the goods. That
plaintiff in error had knowledge of the various steps taken
with respect to the tea, including the final rejection by
the board of general appraisers, is conceded. We think
the provision of the statute complained of was not want-
ing in due process of law/'
§ 60. Adams v. New York ^^ — ^Dne process and the ad-
mission of evidence illegally obtained. Adams was con-
victed of the crime of having in his possession, knowingly,
certain gambling paraphernalia used in the game com-
monly known as policy, in violation of § 344a of the Penal
Code of the State of New York. The principal assign-
ment of error was * * that the court erred in holding that
by the reception in evidence of the defendant's private
papers seized in the raid of his premises, against his pro-
test and without his consent, which had no relation what-
soever to the game policy, for the possession of papers
used in connection with which said game he was con-
victed, his constitutional right to be secure in his person,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures was not violated, and that he was also thereby
not compelled to be a witness against himself, in contra-
vention of the 4th, and 5th, and 14th Articles of Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States.'' The
essence of that contention, was that a trial and convic-
tion in an unconstitutional way is as violative of a def end-
ant 's constitutional rights as a trial and conviction under
an unconstitutional law. Ee Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176. In
overruling that contention the Court said: **So far as
12—192 n. S. 585.
134 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 61
ment to summarily arrest him wherever he may be found,
transport him, perhaps, far away from his home, and sub-
ject him, among strangers, to the diflSculties and expense
of making his defense. It is unnecessary to definitely de-
termine this question. It is sufiicient for this case to
decide, as we do, that the indictment is prima facie evi-
dence of the existence of probable cause. This is not in
conflict with the views expressed by this court in Greene
V. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249. . . . With reference to other
questions we remark that, so far as respects technical
objections, the sufficiency of the indictment is to be deter-
mined by the court in which it was found, and is not a
matter of inquiry in removal proceedings (Greene v.
Henkel, 183 U. S. 249) ; that the defendant has there no
right to an investigation of the proceedings before the
grand jury, or an inquiry concerning what testimony was
presented to, or what witnesses were heard by, that body.
In other words, he may not impeach an indictment by
evidence tending to show that the grand jury did not have
testimony before it sufficient to justify its action. ' * '
§ 62. Public Clearing House v. Coyne ^* — ^Due process
as a limitation on power to regulate the mails. Appel-
lant filed a bill in equity to enjoin the postmaster at
Chicago from seizing and detaining his mail, stamping it
' 'fraudulent," and returning it to the senders, and from
denying to him the use of the registered-letter and money
order systems, upon the ground that the statutes author-
izing such conduct were unconstitutional, under the due
process of law clause of the Federal constitution, because
they direct * * the Postmaster General, upon evidence sat-
isfactory to him, and which do not provide for any trial,
hearing, or inquiry of any kind, arbitrarily to seize the
honest mail of any citizen of the United States as alleged
in the bill, and to interdict and prohibit its receiving
any mail, to destroy its business and its property and
property rights, and to subject its papers and sealed
14—194 U. S. 497.
§ 62 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 135
packets to unreasonable searches and seizures." In
upholding the constitutionality of such statutes the
Supreme Court said: **It is too late to argue that due
process of law is denied whenever the disposition of
property is affected by the order of an executive depart-
ment. . . . That due process of law does not necessarily
require the interference of the judicial power is laid down
in many cases and by many eminent writers upon the sub-
ject to constitutional limitations. Den ex dem. Murray
V. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 18 How. 272 ; Bushnell v.
Leland, 164 TJ. S. 684, ... If the ordinary daily trans-
actions of the departments, which involve an interference
with private rights, were required to be submitted to the
courts before action was finally taken, the result would
entail practically a suspension of some of the most impor-
tant functions of the government. Even in the recent case
of the American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAn-
nulty, 187 U. S. 94, the constitutionality of the law
authorizing seizures of this kind by the Postmaster Gen-
eral was assumed, if not actually decided, the only reser-
vation being that the person injured may apply to the
courts for redress in case the Postmaster General has
exceeded his authority, or his action is palpably wrong.
So, too, in the recent case of Bates & G. Co. v. Payne,
194 TJ. S. 106, ante, p. 894, the law was also assumed to
be constitutional, the only doubtful question being
whether this court should accept the findings of the Post-
master General as to the classification of the mail matter
as final under the circumstances of the case. Inasmuch
as the action of the Postmaster in seizing letters and
returning them to the writers is subject to revision by
the judicial department of the government in cases where
the postmaster has exceeded his authority under the
statute (American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAn-
nuMy, 187 TJ. S. 94), we think it within the power of
Congress to intrust him with the power of seizing and
detaining letters upon evidence satisfactory to himself,
and that his action will not be reviewed by the court in
136 DUE PBOCESS OP LAW § 62
doubtful cases/* Thus it was settled that because the
action of the Postmaster General *4s subject to revision
by the judicial department of the government in cases
where the postmaster has exceeded his authority under
the statute, *' the absence of any provision for a judicial
hearing on the question of legality does not render such
statute or statutes repugnant to the due process of law
clause of the Federal Constitution.
§ 63. U. S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams ^^ — ^Dne process
as a limitation on power to exdnde alien anarchists. In
his petition for habeas corpus Turner alleged : ** Second.
Your relator is so imprisoned by virtue of a warrant
sworn out by the Secretary of the Department of Com-
merce and. Labor, which warrant charges your relator
with being an anarchist, and being unlawfully within the
United States, in violation of 2 and 20 of the immigration
laws of the United States, as amended by act of March
3, 1903 (32 Stat, at L. 1213, chap. 1012). Third. Upon
information and belief, that a special board of inquiry,
consisting of Charles Dempsey, Captain Weldon, super-
vising inspector, and L. C. Stewart, all of whom are
executive officers of the United States, has inquired into
your relator 's case, and decided that your relator is an
anarchist, and is in the United States in violation of
law, within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1903.'*
Petitioner claimed that said act is unconstitutional be-
cause in contravention of the 1st, 5th and 6th articles
of amendment of the constitution, and of § 1 of article 3
of that instrument; and because no power *4s delegated
by the Constitution to the general government over
alien friends with reference to their admission into the
United States or otherwise, or over the beliefs of citi-
zens, denizens, sojourners, or aliens, or over freedom of
speech or the press.** In overruling that contention
the Court said : * * Bepeated decisions of this court have
determined that Congress has the power to exclude
16—194 U. S. 279.
§ 63 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 137
aliens from the United States; to prescribe the terms
and conditions on which they may come in; to estab-
lish regulations for sending out of the country such
aliens as have entered in violation of law, and to com-
mit the enforcement of such conditions and regula-
tions to executive officers; that the deportation of an
alien who is found to be here in violation of law not a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and
that the provisions of the Constitution securing the right
to trial by jury have no application. Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U. S. 581 ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U. S. 651; Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U. S. 698 ; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S.
538; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228; Fok
Yung Yo V. United States, 185 U. S. 296; Japanese
Immigrants Case, 189 U. S. 86 ; Chin Bak Kan v. United
States, 186 U. S. 193 ; United States v. Sing Tuck, 194
U. S. 161. ... In the present case alienage was con-
ceded, and was not in dispute, and it was the question of
fact thereupon arising that was passed on by the board,
and by the Secretary on appeal. Whether rested on the
accepted principle of international law, that every sov-
ereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance
of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only
in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit
to prescribe ; or on the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, which includes the entrance of ships, the
importation of goods, and the bringing of persons into
the ports of the United States, the act before us is not
open to constitutional objection. And while we held in
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, a certain
provision of an immigration law invalid on that ground,
this act does not come within the ruling. . . . We do
not feel called upon to reconsider these decisions, and they
dispose of the specific contentions as to the application
of the 5th and 6th Amendments, and § 1 of article 3,
138 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 63
and the denial of the delegation to the general govern-
ment of the power to enact this law. ' ^
§ 64. Shepard v. Barron ^<^— When estoppel to contest
constitutionality may be set up against promoters of
public improvement. The plaintiffs in this case filed a
bill in a Circuit Court of the United States attacking the
validity of an act of the legislature of Ohio on the ground
that the frontage rule of assessment fixed by the Statute
under which the improvement was made operated as a
denial of due process of law. In the words o(f the
Supreme Court: **But the plaintiffs also insist that the
act is void as a violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments
to the Federal Constitution. The assessment per front
foot, it is contended, leads in this case to a confiscation
of the property of the plaintiffs, and is not based upon
the fact of benefits received, and it results in a taking of
the property of plaintiffs without due process of law.**
When that contention was met by the plea that the abut-
ting owners who petitioned for the improvement were
estopped by their recognition of the justice of the assess-
ment, and by their active participation in carrying on
the work, the Court sustained it, saying: ** Where, as in
this case, the work is done and the assessment made
at the instance and request of plaintiffs and the other
owners, and pursuant to an act (in form at least) of
the legislature of the state, and in strict compliance with
its provisions and with the petition of the landowners,
there is an implied contract arising from such facts that
the party at whose request and for whose benefit the work
has been done will pay for it in the manner provided for
by the act under which the work was done. ... On
principles of general law, we are satisfied that the plain-
tiffs are not in a position to assert the unconstitution-
ality of the act under which they petitioned that pro-
ceedings should be taken. ... In Wight v. Davidson,
181 U. S. 371, this court, while not positively deciding
16—194 IT. S. 553.
§65 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 139
the proposition, yet strongly intimated, that by reason
of the acts of appellees they were not in a position to
question the validity of the statute there under consid-
eration. * *
§ 65. Fayerweather v. Ritch ^^ — ^Relation of due proc-
ess to res judicata. In this case it was held that where
a Federal court gives effect to the judgment of a state
court, as res judicata, in the face of a claim that such
judgment deprived the parties of their property under
forms of law, while failing to provide a judicial finding
of the essential facts that alone could have justified
such deprivation, the application of the due process of
law clause of the Federal Amendment is so involved as
to justify a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. After
stating the facts, that Court said: **The contention is
that, by article 5 of the Amendments to the Federal Con-
stitution, no person can *be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;' that these plain-
tiffs were entitled to large shares of the estate of Daniel
B. Fayerweather; that they were deprived of this prop-
erty by the judgment of the circuit court, which gave
unwarranted effect to a judgment of the state courts;
that this action of the circuit court is not to be considered
a mere error in the progress of a trial, but a deprivation
of property under the forms of legal procedure. In Chi-
cago, B. & Q. B. Co. V. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, we held
that a judgment of a state court might be here reviewed
if it operated to deprive a party of his property without
due process of law, and that the fact that the parties
were properly brought into court and admitted to make
defense was not absolutely conclusive upon the question
of due process. ... If a judgment of a state court
can be reviewed by this court on error upon the ground
that, although the forms of law were observed, it neces-
sarily operated to wrongfully deprive a party of his prop-
erty (as indicated by the decision just referred to), a
17-i-195 U. S. 276.
140 DXJE PRCK3ESS OF LAW § 65
judgment of the circuit court of the United States, claimed
to give such unwarranted effect to a decision of a state
court as to accomplish the same result, may also be con-
sidered as presenting the question how far it can be sus-
tained in the view of the prohibitory language of the 5th
Amendment, and thus involve the application of the Con-
stitution. * *
§66. McOray v. U. S.^^— Due process and constitn-
tionality of oleomargarine tax. The essence of plaintiff
in error ^s contention was thus stated: **The district
court erred in refusing to hold that the act of Congress
approved August 2, 1886, as amended by the act of Con-
gress approved May 9, 1902, is in contravention of the
Constitution of the United States of America, and of
the Amendments thereto, and is illegal and void, for the
reasons: (a) The act deprives the defendant of his prop-
erty without due process of law. (b) The act is an
unwarranted encroachment upon, and an interference
with the police powers reserved to the several states
and to the people of the United States, (c) The act so
arbitrarily discriminates against oleomargarine in favor
of butter as to destroy the oleomargarine industry for
the benefit of the butter industry of the United States,
and is thus repugnant to those fundamental principles
which are inherent in the Constitution of the United
States. The district court erred in holding, if said act
be not in contravention of the Constitution of the United
States, that oleomargarine, which contains no artificial
coloration than that imparted to it by the use of butter
which itself contains coloring matter, and which there-
fore causes said oleomargarine to look like butter of a
shade of yellow, is subject to a tax of 10 cents per pound
instead of a tax of one-fourth of 1 cent per pound.** In
reaching the conclusion *Hhat the manufacture of arti-
ficially colored oleomargarine may be prohibited by a
free government without a violation of fundamental
18— 195 U. S. 27.
§ 66 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 141
rights/' the Court said: *^The errors relied upon em-
brace not only the contention that the act of Congress
imposing the tax is repugnant to the Constitution, but
also that the penalty was wrongfully enforced, because
the one-quarter of a cent per pound which had been paid
on the oleomargarine was the only tax to which it was
liable under the act of Congress when rightly construed.
• . . it is insisted that the acts in question are void,
because the burdens which they impose are repugnant
to both the 5th and 10th Amendments. To the 5th Amend-
ment, because the amount of the tax is so out of propor-
tion to the value of the property taxed as to destroy that
property, and thus amount to a taking thereof without
due process of law.'' In holding that the motives of
Congress in imposing the tax in question on artificially
colored oleomargarine are not to be inquired into by
the judiciary, the Court added : * * The right of Congress
to tax within its delegated power being unrestrained,
except as limited by the Constitution, it was within the
authority conferred on Congress to select the objects
upon which an excise should be laid. It therefore follows
that, in exerting its power, no want of due process of
law could possibly result, because that body chose to
impose an excise on artificially colored oleomargarine,
and not upon natural butter artificially colored. The
judicial power may not usurp the functions of the legisla-
tive in order to control that branch of the government
in the performance of its lawful duties. This was aptly
pointed out in the extract heretofore made from the opin-
ion in Treat v. White, 181 U. S. 264. ... It hence re-
sults that, even although it be true that the effect of the tax
in question is to repress the manufacture of artificially
colored oleomargarine, it can not be said that such repres-
sion destroys rights which no free government could
destroy, and therefore, no ground exists to sustain the
proposition that the judiciary may invoke an implied pro-
hibition upon the theory that to do so is essential to save
such rights from destruction. And the same considera-
142 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 66
tions dispose of the contention based upon the due proc-
ess clause of the 5th Amendment. ' '
§ 67. U. S. V. Ju Toy ^^— Due process of law in Chinese
exclusion cases — Conclusiveness of decision of ezecutiye
officer. In this case it was held that the provision of the
act of August 18, 1894, making the decision of the proper
department on the right of a person of Chinese descent
to enter the United States conclusive on the Federal
Courts in habeas corpus proceedings, when there has
been no abuse of authority, even when the right of entry
is based of citizenship, does not violate the guarantee of
due process contained in the Fifth Amendment. In the
words of the Court: **If for the purpose of argument,
we assume that the 5th Amendment applies to him (the
petitioner), and that to deny entrance to a citizen is to
deprive him of liberty, we nevertheless are of opinion
that with regard to him due process of law does not
require judicial trial. That is the result of the cases
we have cited, and the almost necessary result of the
power of Congress to pass exclusion laws. That the deci-
sion may be intrusted to an executive officer, and that
his decision ig due process of law, was affirmed and
explained in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S.
651, 660, and in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U. S. 698, 713, before the authorities to which we have
already referred. '^ At an earlier stage of its opinion
the Court had said: **The broad question is presented
whether or not the decision of the Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor is conclusive. It was held in United
States V. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 167, that the act of
August 18, 1894, purported to make it so, but whether
the statute could have that effect constitutionally was left
untouched by a reference to cases where an opinion
already had been expressed. ... It is established, as
we have said, that the act purports to make the decision of
the Department final, whatever the ground on which the
19—198 U. S. 253.
§68 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) J43
right to enter the country is claimed, — ^as well when it
is citizenship as when it is domicile, and the belonging
to a class excepted from the exclusion acts. United States
V. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 167 ; Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U. S. 538, 546, 547. It also is established by
the former case and others which it cites that the relevant
portion of the act of August 18, 1894, is not void as a
whole. The statute has been upheld and enforced. But
the relevant portion being a single section, accomplishing
all its results by the same general words, must be valid
as to all that it embraces, or altogether void. It neces-
sarily follows that when such words are sustained, they
are sustained to their full extent.*'
§ 68. South Carolina v. U. S.^^— Due process as a limi-
tation on federal power to tax dispensing agents of a
state. In stating the case the Court said that the impor-
tant question *4s whether persons who are selling liquor
are relieved from liability for the internal revenue tax
by the fact that they have no interest in the profits of
the business, and are simply the agents of a state which,
in the exercise of the sovereign power, has taken charge
of the business of selling intoxicating liquors. '^ In
answering that question, the Court, after stating that
*'By the 1st clause of § 8 of article 1 of the Constitution,
Congress is given the * power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States ; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States,' '' — admitted that
such grant of power was limited by several enumerated
provisions of the Constitution, the last of which, "Article
5 of the amendment provides that no one shall be deprived
of 'life, liberty, or property without due process of law. * *'
Notwithstanding that, and all the other enumerated limi-
tations upon the taxing power in question, the court held
that "whenever a state engages in a business which is |
20—199 U. S. 437. |
144 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 68
of a private nature, that business is not withdrawn from
the taxing power of the nation. For these reasons we
think that the license taxes charged by the Federal gov-
ernment upon persons selling liquor are not invalidated
by the fact that they are the agents of the state, which
has itself engaged in the business. ' '
§ 69. Hale v. Henkel ^i— Effect of statutory inunmiity
upon constitutional protection against self-incrimination.
The Court said: ** Appellant also invokes the protec-
tion of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, which
declares that no person ' shall be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be witness against himself,* and in reply to
various questions put to him he declined to answer, on
the ground that he would thereby incriminate himself.
The answer to this is found in a proviso to the general
appropriation act of February 25, 1903, that *no person
shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter,
or thing concerning which he may testify or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding,
suit, or prosecution under said acts,' of which the anti-
trust law is one, providing, however, that *no person so
testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punish-
ment for perjury committed in so testifying.' While
there may be some doubt whether the examination of
witnesses before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution,
we have no doubt that it is a 'proceeding' within the
meaning of the proviso. The word should receive as wide
a construction as is necessary to protect the witness in
his disclosures, .whenever such disclosures are made in
pursuance of a judicial inquiry, whether such inquiry be
instituted by a grand jury, or upon the trial of an indict-
ment found by them. The word 'proceeding' is not a
technical one, and is aptly used by the courts to designate
an inquiry before a grand jury. . . . The interdiction of
the 5th Amendment operates only where a witness is asked
21—201 u. S. 43.
§70 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 145
to incriminate himself, — ^in other words, to give testi-
mony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge.
But if the criminality has already been taken away, the
amendment ceases to apply. ' ' After citing with approval
the cases of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 ; and
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, the Court proceeded to
say: **But it is further insisted that, while the immunity
statute may protect individual witnesses, it would not
protect the corporation of which appellant was the agent
and representative. This is true, but the answer is that
it was not designed to do so. The right of a person
under the 5th Amendment to refuse to incriminate him-
self is purely a personal privilege of the witness. '*
Despite the fact that the case of McAllister v. Henkel,
201 U. S. 90, differed from the foregoing *'in two impor-
tant particulars: First, in the fact that there was a
complaint and charge made on behalf of the United States
against the Aimerican Tobacco Company and the Imperial
Tobacco Company under the so-called Sherman act, and
second, that the subpoena pointed out the particular writ-
ings sought for (three agreements), giving in each case
the date, the names of the parties, and in one instance, a
suggestion of the contents, * V the court concluded **that
the inmiunity provided by the 5th Amendment against
self-incrimination is personal to the witness himself, and
that he can not set up the privilege of another person
or of a corporation as an excuse for a refusal to answer ;
in other words, the privilege is that of the witness him-
self, and not that of the party on trial.*' And in the
case of Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S. 92, the same
doctrine was so extended as to compel a witness to testify
under the immunity statutes, even though they may fail
to afford immunity from prosecution in the state courts
for the offense disclosed.
§70. &i re Horan ^^— Claim that prisoner was con-
Ticted without indictment and compelled to testify
against himself. This was a petition for habeas corpus
22—203 n. 8. 96.
Dae Proeess — ^10
146 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 70
and certiorari presented by one imprisoned on a convic-
tion for murder, alleging that the judgment under which
he was held was void. The first constitutional contention
was that the guaranty of the Fifth Amendment was vio-
lated because the pretended indictment upon which the
prisoner was convicted was no indictment at all, that it
was wholly insufficient to give the trial court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. The Court answered :
**The next ground argued is that the laws of the terri-
tory were not followed in the selection of the grand jury,
because the persons selected were not electors of the ter-
ritory, and some of them were nonresidents, with other
subordinate matters. The order for the summons stated
the reason, which was that there had been no election
held in the county, and there were no names of jurors
in the jury box; whereupon the presiding judge ordered
the sheriff to summon twenty persons from the body of
the county. We have heard no answer to the material
portion of the reasoning of the circuit court of appeals
upon this point. If the legislature of Oklahoma had
prescribed the method of selection followed, that method
would not have violated tiie Constitution or any law or
treaty of the United States. If it did prescribe a differ-
ent one, a departure from that was a violation of the
territorial enactment alone. The acts of the legislature
of Oklahoma are not laws of the United States within
the meaning of Eev. Stat. 753 U. S. Comp. Stat 1901,
p. 592. If any laws have been violated, it is the latter
one. Therefore the petitioner is not entitled to release
on this ground under Rev. Stat. 753. The 5th Amend-
ment, requiring the presentment of a grand jury, does
not take up into itself the local law as to how the grand
jury should be made up, and raise the latter to a consti-
tutional requirement. See Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S.
638.*' In disposing of the second constitutional objec-
tion the Court said: ** Finally, it is contended that the
petitioner was compelled to be a witness against himself,
contrary to the 5th Amendment, because he was com-
§71 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 147
pelled to stand up and walk before the jury, and because
during a recess the jury was stationed so as to observe
his size and walk. If this was an error, as to which we
express no opinion, it did not go to the jurisdiction of
the court Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123/^
- § 71. Union Bridge Co. v. U. S.^^— Due process invoked
as a restraint on power of Secretary of War to order
alterations in a bridge over a waterway. After stating
that *^the Secretary of War found the bridge to be an
unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation of the
Allegheny river, and required the Bridge Company to
make certain changes or alterations in order that navi-
gation be rendered free, easy, and unobstructed ; ^ ' which
alterations, it was charged, the company wilfully failed
and refused to make, the Court said: **The next prin-
cipal contention of the Bridge Company is that the act
of 1899 is unconstitutional, in that it makes no provision,
and the United States has not offered to compensate it
for the sum that will necessarily be expended in order
to make the alterations or changes required by the order
of the Secretary of War. In other words, the defendant
insists that what the United States requires to be done
in respect of defendant's bridge is a taking of private
property for public use, which the government is for-
bidden by the Constitution to do without making just
compensation to, or without making provision to justly
compensate, the owner.*' The Government, after deny-
ing that there had been a taking of private property for
public use as contemplated by the Constitution, contended
**that the cost of such alterations or changes is to be
deemed incidental only to the exercise of an undoubted
function of the United States, when exerting, through
Congress, its power to regulate commerce among the
states, and therefore navigation upon the waterways on
and over which such commerce is conducted.'* After
reviewing the leading cases of Gibson v. United States,
23—204 IT. S. 364.
148 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 71
166 U. S. 269, 271 ; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S.
4 ; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 ; Eldridge v. Trezevant,
160 U. S. 452 ; Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S,
635; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 153, 162; New
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U. S.
453, 461; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561,
582, 593; West Chicago Street B. Co. v. Illinois, 201
U. S. 506, 524, the Court said: **Do the principles an-
nounced in the above cases require us to hold, in the
present case, that the making of the alterations of its
bridge specified in the order of the Secretary of War will
be a taking of the property of the Bridge Company for
public use? We think not. Unless there be a taking, within
the meaning of the Constitution, no obligation arises
upon the United States to make compensation for the
cost to be incurred in making such alterations. The dam-
age that will accrue to the Bridge Company, as the result
of compliance with the Secretary's order, must, in such
case, be deemed incidental to the exercise by the govern-
ment of its power to regulate commerce among the states,
which includes, as we have seen, the power to secure
free navigation upon the waterways of the United States
against unreasonable obstructions. There are no circum-
stances connected with the original construction of the
bridge, or with its maintenance since, which so tie the
hands of the government that it can not exert its power
to protect the freedom of navigation against obstruction.
Although the bridge, when erected under the authority
of a Pennsylvania charter, may have been a lawful struc-
ture, and although it may not have been an unreasonable
obstruction to commerce and navigation as then carried
on, it must be taken, under the cases cited, ai^d upon prin-
ciple, not only that the company, when exerting the power
conferred upon it by the state, did so knowing of the
paramount authority of Congress to regulate commerce
among the states, but that it erected the bridge subject
to the possibility that Congress might, at some future
time, when the public interest demanded, exert its power
§72 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 149
by appropriate legislation to protect navigation against
anreasonable obstructions. ... It is for Congress to
determine when it will exert its power to regulate inter-
state commerce. Its mere silence or inaction when indi-
viduals or corporations, under the authority of a state,
place unreasonable obstructions in the waterways of the
United States, can not have the eflfeot to cast upon the
government an obligation not to exert its constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce except subject to
the condition that compensation be made or secured to the
individual or corporation who may be incidentally
affected by the exercise of such power."
§ 72. U. S. V. Heinszen ^^— Due process and the rights
of importers imder Philippine act of June 30, 1906. In
this case it was held that importers were not deprived
of their property without due process of law, even though
they had commenced suits to recover the amount of duties
collected before the passage of the act of June 30, 1906,
ratifying the illegal collection of duties on imports to
the Philippine Islands, levied under the President's order
of June 12, 1898, between the dates of the ratification
of the treaty of peace with Spain and the approval of
the act of July 1, 1902, providing a tariff of duties for
those islands. On the main question the Court said : ' * It
is urged that the ratifying statute can not be given effect
without violating the 5th Amendment to the Constitution,
SLQce to give eflScacy to the act would deprive the claim-
ants of their property without due process of law, or
would appropriate the same for public use without just
compensation. This rests upon these two contentions:
It is said that the money paid to discharge the illegally
exacted duties after payment, as before, * justly and
equitably belonged* to the claimants, and that the title
thereto continued in them as a vested right of property.
It is consequently insisted that the right to recover the
money could not be taken away without violating the 5th
24—206 U. S. 370.
150 DXJE PROCESS OP LAW § 72
Amendment, as stated. But here, again, the argument
disregards the fact that when the duties were illegally
exacted in the name of the United States, Congress pos-
sessed the power to have authorized their importation in
the mode in which they were enforced, and hence, from
the very moment of collection, a right in Congress to
ratify the transaction, if it saw fit to do so, was engen-
dered. In other words, as a necessary result of the power
to ratify, it followed that the right to recover the duties
in question was subject to the exercise by Congress of
its undoubted power to ratify. To hold to the contrary
would be to say that whilst the unauthorized act of an
oflBcer done on behalf of the United States was subject
to ratification by the United States, yet, if the officer
acted without authority the act, when performed, annihi-
lated the power to ratify ; that is, that the very condition
which engendered the power destroyed it. . . . Nor
does the mere fact that, at the time the ratifying statute
was enacted, this action was pending for the recovery of
the sums paid, cause the statute to be repugnant to the
Constitution. The mere commencement of the suit did
not change the nature of the right. Hence, again, if it be
conceded that the capacity to prosecute the pending suit
to judgment was, in a sense, a vested right, certainly
also the power of the United States to ratify was, to say
the least, a right of as high a character. To arrogate
to themselves the authority to divest the right of the
United States to ratify, is then, in reason, the assumption
upon which the asserted right of the claimants to recover
must resf
§ 73. Adair v. U. S.^^— Due process as a limitation upon
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce —
Relative rights of employer and employee. In this very
important case it was held "that the provision of the
statute under which the defendant was convicted must
be held to be repugnant to the Fifth Amendment, and
2&— 208 u. S. 161«
1 73 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 151
as not embraced by nor within the power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce, but, under the guise of
regulating interstate commerce and as applied to this
case it arbitrarily sanctions an illegal invasion of the
personal liberty as well as the right of property of the
defendant Adair, ^ ' who was indicted for violating the Act
of Congress of June 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 424, c 370), con-
cerning carriers engaged in interstate commerce. Sec-
tion 10 of the act in question is in these words : ' ' That
any employer subject to the provisions of this act and
any officer, agent or receiver of such employer, who shall
require any employee, or any person seeking employ-
ment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into
an agreement, either written or verbal, not to become or
remain a member of any labor corporation, association,
or organization; or shall threaten any employee with loss
of employment, or shall unjustly discriminate against
any employee because of his membership in such a labor
corporation, association, or organization; or who shall
require any employee or any person seeking employment,
as a condition of such employment, to enter into a con-
tract whereby such employee or applicant for employ-
ment shall agree to contribute to any fund for charitable,
social, or beneficial purposes; to release such employer
from legal liability for any personal injury by reason of
any benefit received from iauch fund beyond the propor-
tion of the benefit arising from the employer's contri-
bution to such fund ; or who shall, after having discharged
an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent such em-
ployee from obtaining employment, or who shall, after
the quitting of an employee, attempt or conspire to pre-
vent such employee from obtaining employment, is hereby
declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon con-
viction thereof in any court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction in the district in which such
offense was committed, shall be punished for each offense
by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars and not
more than one thousand dollars/* The specific charge
152 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 73
in the first count of the indictment was ''that William
Adair, agent and employee of said common carrier and
employer, as aforesaid, in the district aforesaid, on and
before the 15th day of October, 1906, did unlawfully dis-
criminate against 0. B. Coppage, employee as aforesaid,
by then and there discharging said 0. B. Coppage from
such employment of said common carrier and employer,
because of his membership in said labor organization,
and thereby did unjustly discriminate against an em-
ployee of a common carrier and employer engaged in
interstate commerce because of his membership in a labor
organization, contrary to the forms of the statute in such
cases made and provided. * *
In the course of its opinion the Court said : * ' The first
inquiry is whether the part of the 10th section of the
Act of 1898 upon which the first count of the indictment
is based is repugnant to the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution declaring that no person shall be deprived
of liberty or property without due process of law. In
our opinion, that section, in the particular mentioned, is
an invasion of the personal liberty, as well as the right
of property, guaranteed by that Amendment. Such lib-
erty and right embraces the right to make contracts for
the purchase of the labor of others and equally the right
to make contracts for the sale of one^s own labor; each
right, however, being subject to the fundamental condi-
tion that no contract, whatever its subject matter, can
be sustained which the law, upon reasonable grounds,
forbids as inconsistent with the public interests or as
hurtful to the public order or a' detrimental to the com-
mon good. This court has said that *in every well ordered
society, charged with the duty of conserving the safety
of its members, the right of the individual in respect of
his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great
dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general pub-
lic may demand.' Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 XJ. S.
§74 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 153
1129, and authorities there cited. • . . It was the right
of the defendant to prescribe the terms upon which the
services of Coppage would be accepted, and it was the
right of Coppage to become or not, as he chose, an em-
ployee of the railroad company upon the terms offered
him. • • • The right of a person to sell his labor upon
such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same
as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the con-
ditions upon which he will accept such labor from the
person offering to sell it. So the right of the employee
to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason,
is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever
reason, to dispense with the services of such employee.
... In all such particulars the employer and the em-
ployee have equality of right, and any legislation that dis-
turbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the
hberty of contract which no government can legally
justify in a free land. These views find support in
adjudged cases, some of which are cited in the margin. ' *
§ 74. Twininjf v. New Jersey ^^ — ^Exemption from self-
incrimination not a fundamental right of national citizen-
ship. It is only necessary to refer to that part of the
opinion in this notable case which settles the fact that
the Fifth Amendment had no application to the question
at issue, for the reajson that while exemption from self-
incrimination is secured by that Amendment, as against
Federal action, it is not one of the * * privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States*' which, as a
fundamental right of national citizenship, is protected
against state action by the Fourteenth. On that subject
the Court said: **The defendants contend, in the first
place, that the exemption from self-incrimination is one of
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States which the 14th Amendment forbids the states to
abridge. It is not argued that the defendants are pro-
28—211 IT. S. 78.
154 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 74
tected by that part of the 5th Amendment which provides
that *no person . . . shall be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself/ for it is recog-
nized by counsel that by a long line of decisions, the first
ten Amendments are not operative on the state. Barron
V. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131;
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172 ; Barrington v. Mis-
souri, 205 U. S. 483. But it is argued that this privilege
is one of the fundamental rights, of national citizenship,
placed under national protection by the 14th Amend-
ment, and it is specifically argued that the * privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States,' pro-
tected against state action by that Amendment, include
those fundamental personal rights which were protected
against national action by the first eight Amendments;
that this was the intention of the framers of the 14th
Amendment, and that this part of it would otherwise
have little or no meaning and effect.*' In rejecting that
contention the Court said : * * Even if the historical mean-
ing of due process of law and the decisions of this court
did not exclude the privilege from it, it would be going
far to rate it as an immutable principle of justice which
is the inalienable possession of every citizen of a free
government. Salutary as the principle may seem to a
great majority, it can not be ranked with the right to
hearing before condemnation, the immunity from arbi-
trary power not acting by general laws, and the inviola-
bility of private property. The wisdom of the exemption
has never been universally assented to since the days
of Bentham, many doubt it today and it is best defended
not as an unchangeable principle of universal justice, but
as a law proved by experience to be expedient. See Wig-
more, Ex. 2251. It has no place in the jurisprudence of
civilized and free countries outside the domain of the
common law, and it is nowhere observed among our own
people in the search for truth outside the administration
of the law.''
§ 75 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 155
§ 75. U. S. ex reL v. Delaware & H. Co.^^— Due process
and the commodities clause of the Hepburn act of June
29| 1906. The text of the commodities clause upon which
these cases depended is as follows: *'From and after
May first, nineteen hundred and eight, it shall be imlaw-
ful for any railroad company to transport from any
state, territory, or the District of Columbia to any other
state, territory, or the District of Columbia, or to any
foreign country, any article or commodity, other than
lumber and the manufactured products thereof, manu-
factured, mined, or produced by it, or under its authority,
or which it may own in whole or in which it may have
any interest, direct or indirect, except such articles or
commodities as may be necessary and intended for its
use in the conduct of its business as a common carrier. ' '
In the words of the Court: *' Except as we have said,
in the particular that one of the corporations claimed
that it was not a railroad company within the meaning
of the commodities clause, they all defended substan-
tially upon the ground that, when correctly interpreted,
the commodities clause did not forbid the interstate com-
merce traffic in coal by them carried on. If it did, the
clause was assailed as inherently repugnant to the Con-
stitution, because the right to enact was not embraced
within the authority conferred upon Congress to regu-
late commerce. In addition it was contended that even
if, abstractly considered, the clause might be embraced
within the grant of power to regulate commerce, never-
theless its provisions were in conflict with the due proc-
ess clause of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution,
because of the destructive effect which the enforcement
of its provisions would produce on the rights of prop-
erty which the corporations possessed and had long
enjoyed under the sanction of valid state laws.'* After
holding that when properly construed, **the statute was
inherently within the power of Congress to enact as a reg-
ulation of commerce/' the Court said: "We think it un-
27—213 IT. S. 366.
156 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 75
necessary to consider at length the contentions based upon
the dne pgrocess clanse of the 5th Amendment. In form of
statement those contentions apparently rest npon the
ruinons consequences which it is assumed would be op6r.
ated ni)on the property rights of the carriers by the en-
forcement of the clause, interpreted as the government
construed it. For the purpose of our consideration of the
subject it may be conceded, as insisted on behalf of the
United States, that these contentions proceed upon
the mistaken and baleful conception that inconvenience,
not power, is the criterion by which to test the constitu-
tionality of legislation. When, however, mere forms of
statement are put aside and the real scope of the argument
at bar is grasped, we think it becomes clear that, in sub-
stance and effect, the argument really asserts that the
clause as construed by the government, is not a regulation
of commerce, since it transcends the limits of regulation
and embraces absolute prohibitions, which, it is insisted,
could not be exerted in virtue of the authority to regulate.
The whole support upon which the propositions and the
arguments rest hence disappears as a result of the con-
struction which we have given the statute. Through
abundance of caution, we repeat that our ruling here
made is confined to the question before us. Because,
therefore, in pointing out and applying to the statute the
true ride of construction, we have indicated the grave
constitutional questions which would be presented if we
departed from that rule, and we must not be considered
as having decided those questions. We have not entered
into their consideration, as it was unnecessary for us to
doso.^^
§76. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan^^ — ^Due
process and the act of March 3, 1903, making it unlawful
to bring into the U. S. any alien afflicted with a loath-
some or contagious disease. In this case it was held that
the statute in question is not repugnant to the due proc-
28—214 TJ. S. 320.
§ 76 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 157
•
ess clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it makes
the ofScial medical examination at the port of arrival
conclusive for the purpose of imposing the penalty,
enforceable by refusing clearance papers until paid, as
authorized by such statute, when its provisions are vio-
lated by the bringing into the country of an alien afSicted
with a loathsome or contagious disease from which he
was suffering at the time of embarkation, the presence
of which might have been detected through a competent
medical examination then and there made. Before reach-
ing that conclusion the Court said: ''It is urged that
the fines which constituted the exactions were repugnant
to the 5th Amendment, because amounting to a taking
of property without due process of law, since, as asserted,
the fines were imposed, in some cases, without any pre-
vious notice, and in all cases without any adequate notice
or opportunity to defend. Stated in the briefest form,
the findings below show that on the arrival of a vessel,
if the examining medical ofScers discover that an immi-
grant was afflicted with one of the prohibited diseases,
the owner of the vessel was notified of the fact, and,
indeed, that the steamship company had at the place
where the examination was made what is known as a
landing agent, whose business it was to keep informed
as to the result of medical examinations, and to know
when an immigrant was detained by the medical officers
because afflicted by a prohibited disease. The findings
also established that, where a fine was imposed under
§ 9 by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, it was only
done after the transmission to that official of the certifi-
cate of the examining medical officer that a particular
alien immigrant had been found to be afflicted with one
of the prohibited diseases, and that the state of the dis-
ease established in the opinion of the medical officer that
it existed at the time of embarkation, and could then
have been detected by a competent medical examination. * ^
In holding that due process was not denied by such pro-
ceedings, the Court said: **In effect, all the contentions
158 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 76
pressed in argument concerning the repugnancy of the
statute to the due process clause really disregarded the
complete and absolute power of Congress over the sub-
ject with which the statute deals. They mistakenly
assume that mere form, and not substance, may be made
by the courts the conclusive test as to the constitutional
power of Congress to enact a statute. These conclusions
are apparent, we think, since the plenary power of Con-
gress as to the admission of aliens leaves no room for
doubt as to its authority to impose the penalty, and its
complete administrative control over the granting or
refusal of a clearance also leaves no doubt of the right
to endow administrative officers with discretion to refuse
to perform the administrative act of granting a clearance,
as a means of enforcing the penalty which there was law-
ful authority to impose.'^
§77. Brantley v. Georgia ^^— Fifth Amendment in-
yoked upon plea of former jeopardy. A writ of error to
the Supreme Court of Georgia to review a judgment
affirming a conviction for murder, after a reversal in the
Court of Appeals of that state upon an appeal from a
conviction of voluntary manslaughter. At the second
trial Brantley pleaded former jeopardy, claiming that
be had been tried for murder, and having been found
guilty of a lesser grade of homicide, that operated to
acquit him of the charge of murder, and to try him again
for murder under the same indictment would be to try him
twice for an offense of which he had been previously
acquitted. His contention was that he could only be tried
again for voluntary manslaughter. In disposing of that
plea the court said: **The Constitution of the state of
Georgia provides that * no person shall be put in jeopardy
of life or liberty more than once for the same offense,
save on his or her own motion for anew trial, after con-
viction, or in case of mistrial.* This writ of error was
sued out, and plaintiff in error contended that the judg-
20—217 IT. S. 284.
1 78 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 159
ment of the Supreme Court of Georgia was in violation
of the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, and that the provisions of the Constitution of the
state of Georgia were null and void as construed by the
state supreme court. The contention is absolutely with-
out merit. It was not a case of twice in jeopardy under
any view of the Constitution of the United States. ' '
§78. Holt v. U. S.^^ — ^Protection against self-incrimi-
nation invoked in trial for a crime committed within a
military reservation. Holt was convicted in a circuit
court of the United States of a murder, alleged to have
been committed ** within the Fort Worden Military
Beservation, a place under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States. ^ ' During the trial a question arose as
to the ownership of a blouse which a witness testified
fitted the prisoner after he had put it on. In disposing
of the claim that the prisoner was thus subjected to the
self-incrimination which the Amendment in question for-
bids, the Court said: ** Another objection is based upon
an Qxtravagant extension of the 5th Amendment. A
question arose as to whether a blouse belonged to the
prisoner. A witness testified that the prisoner put it on
and it fitted him. It is objected that he did this under
the same duress that made his statement nnadmissible,
and that it should be excluded for the same reason. But
the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communica-
tions from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material. The objection in principle
would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare
his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover, we
need not consider how far a court would go in compelling
a man to exhibit himself. For when he is exhibited,
whether voluntarily or by order, and even if the order
30—218 IT. S. 245.
160 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 78
goes too far, the evidence, if material, is competent.
Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585.''
§79. Atlantic 0. L. B. Oo. v. Riverside Mills— Due
process not denied by Oarmack amendment of June 29,
1906. In this ease, 219 U. S. 186, it was contended that the
statute in question (the Carmack amendment of June 29,
1906, to the act of February 4, 1887, 20), by providing
that the initial carrier shall issue a bill of lading, and shall
be liable to its holder for any damage caused by any con-
necting carrier, renders the initial carrier liable for the
debts of the connecting carrier, in violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In overruling
that contention the Court said : * * It is obvious, from the
many decisions of this court, that there is no such thing
as absolute freedom of contract. Contracts which con-
travene public policy can not be lawfully made at all ; and
the power to make contracts may in all cases be regulated
as to form, evidence, and validity as to third persons.
The power of government extends to the denial of liberty
of contract to the extent of forbidding or regulating ^very
contract which is reasonably calculated to injuriously
affect the public interests. Undoubtedly the United
States is a government of limited and delegated powers,
but in respect of those powers which have been expressly
delegated, the power to regulate commerce between the
states being one of them, the power is absolute, except
as limited by other provisions of the Constitution itself.
... it is said that the act violates the 5th Amendment
by taking the property of the initial carrier to pay the
debt of an independent connecting carrier whose negli-
gence may have been the sole cause of the loss. But this
contention results from a surface reading of the act, and
misses the true basis upon which it rests. The liability
of the receiving carrier which results in such a case is
that of a principle for the negligence of his own agents/'
When, in the later case of Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Dixie
Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593, the question of constitution-
§ 80 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 161
ality was again presented, the Court said : * * The supreme
court of appeals followed the ruling in Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S, 186 (to which
may be added Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace,
223 U. S. 481), as conclusive. The plaintiff in error con-
tends that these cases may be distinguished on the ground
that in both of them it was to be presumed that the car-
rier was a voluntary party to a through route and rate,
whereas here the stipulation against liability beyond its
line, and the fact that it had no through route with the
steamship company, exclude that presumption. It argues
that it was bound to accept goods destined beyond its line
for delivery to the next carrier, and was required by the
statute to give a through bill of lading, if, on such com-
pulsory acceptance, it is made answerable for damages
done by others, its property is taken without due process
of law. But in the former case there was the same stipu-
lation in the bill of lading, and the supposed through
routes were only presumed. In the second case the car-
rier is spoken of as voluntarily accepting goods for a
point beyond its line ; but there, too, there was the same
attempt to limit liability, and in the present case the
acceptance was voluntary in the same degree as in that.
There is no substantial distinction between the earlier
decisions and this."
§80. Briscoe v. Rudolph ^^ — ^Due process as involved
in a special assessment for benefits in Washington City.
In that case it was held that where there is nothing to
show that the actual assessments were in substantial
excess of the benefits, there was no denial of the due
process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment in pro-
ceedings under the act of February 10, 1899, providing
that one-half of the amount awarded as damages in the
extension of an avenue in the City of Washington was to
be assessed against lands within a designated area as
benefits, when there was a taking into account the bene-
31—221 U. 8. 547.
Due Proceae — 11
162 DUB PEOCBSS OP LAW S 80
fits received by each lot within such area. The Conrt said :
**The objection to the constitutionality of the act of Feb-
ruary 10, 1899, as stated in appellant's brief, is 'that it
authorizes an assessment of appellant's property to meet
the cost of public improvements, in substantial excess of
the special benefits conferred by the improvements, and
to the extent of such excess confiscates appellants'
property to public use without compensation.' . . .
That Congress, under its wide legislative power over the
District of Columbia, may create a special improvement
district, and charge a part or all the cost upon the prop-
erty in that improvement district, can hardly be doubted.
It would be but an exercise of the power taxation for a
public purpose in an area carved out for the purpose.
In Webster v. Fargo, 181 U. S. 394, it was held that a
state might create such special taxing districts, and
charge the whole or part of the cost of a local improve-
ment upon the property in the district, either according
to valuation, superficial area, or frontage. That it is
within the power of Congress to create such a special
improvement district, and charge the cost of improve-
ment therein according to the benefits received by the
property within such district, has been more than once
aflSrmed. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, Wight v. David-
son, 181 U. S. 371 ; Martin v. District of Columbia^ 205
U. S. 135; Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217
U. S. 547."
§ 81. Wilson v. XT. S. — ^Privilege against self-incrimina-
tion when invoked by an officer of a corporation. In
these cases, 221 IT. S. 361, appeals were taken from a
United States circuit court to review a judgment commit-
ting an officer of a corporation for contempt in refusing to
produce the corporate books before the grand jury. The
books belonged to a corporation of which he was president,
and were required to be produced by a subpoena duces
tecum, he claiming the privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. In reaching the
§ 81 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 163
conclusion that ^^None of his personal papers are subject
to inspection under the writ, and his action in refusiag to
permit the examination of the corporate books demanded
fully warranted his commitment for contempt/' the Court
said: **We come, then, to the broader contention of the
appellant, — thus stated in the argument of his counsel:
' * An officer of a corporation who actually holds the physi-
cal possession, custody and control of books or papers of
the corporation, which he is required by a subpoena duces
tecum to produce, is entitled to the same protection
against exposing Ihe contents thereof which would tend
to incriminate him, as if the books and papers were abso-
lutely his own.' That is, the power of the courts to
require production depends not upon their character as
corporate books and the duty of the corporation to submit
them to examination, but upon the particular custody in
which they may be found. . . . But the physical cus-
tody of incriminating documents does not of itself protect
the custodian against their compulsory production. The
question still remains with respect to the nature of the
documents and the capacity in which they are held. . . .
The fundamental ground of decision in this class of cases
is that where, by virtue of their character and the rules of
law applicable to them, the books and papers are held
subject to examination by the demanding authority, the
custodian has no privilege to refuse production although
their contents tended to criminate him. In assuming their
custody he has accepted the incident obligation to permit
their inspection. ' ' In Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S.
478, it was said : *^ We are of opinion that this case is vir-
tuaUy ruled by Wilson v. United States [221 U. S. 361],
. . . and that there was no self-incrimination of such
officer, because he was not compelled to produce his pri-
vate books, but the books of the corporation, which were
not within the protection given to the private books and
papers of an individual. We are unable to see that this
case differs in principle from that one." In Grant v.
United States, 227 U. S. 74, it was held that despite the
164 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 81
fact that the legal title to the books and papers of a de-
funct corporation may not be in him, a stockholder of such
corporation, having the same in his possession, can not
plead the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as a justification of his refusal to produce them be-
fore the grand jury under a subpoena duces tecum ; that no
question of professional privilege is involved when an '
attorney refuses to obey a subpoena duces tecum requiring
the production of his clients ' books and papers before a
grand jury when they may tend to incriminate such
clients ; in such a case the sole question involved is the
client's personal privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court rested its conclusion in this case upon Wilson
V. United States, 221 U. S. 361 ; Wheeler v. United States.
226 U. S. 478.
§82. Breese v. U. S.— Presentment of an indictment
by grand jury in a body not required by Fifth Amend-
ment. The Court, 226 U, S. 1, said: **We do not think it
necessary to discuss the contention that the 5th Amend-
ment to the Constitution requires the indictment to be
presented by the grand jury in a body or that their fail-
ure so to present it goes to the jurisdiction of the Court.
See Keizo v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146 ; Harlan v. McGourin,
218 U. S. 442; United States v. McKee, 4 Dill 1, 9, Fed.
Cas. No. 15,687. The reasons for the requirement, if
they ever were very strong, h'as disappeared, at least
in part, and we have no doubt that Congress, like the
state of North Carolina, could have done away with it, if
it had seen fit to do so instead of remaining silent. See
Danforth v. Georgia, 75 Ga. 614, 620, 58 Am. Rep. 480;
United States v. Butler, 1 Hughes 457, 461, Fed Cas. No.
14,700; Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 163.'^ In
this connection it may be well to reproduce the following :
**To the intimation in Breese v. United States that the
reasons for requiring an indictment to be presented by
the grand jury in a body were no longer persuasive, may
be opposed several decisions holding that the return of
1 83 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 165
the indictment must be made in the presence of the grand
jury. Bobinson v. State, 33 Ark. 180; People v. Black-
weU, 27 CaL 65; State v. Gaines, 86 N. C. 632; State v.
Bordeaux, 93 N. C. 560. And in Cachute v. State, 50 Miss.
169, the rule in Mississippi is said to be that the indict-
ment must be brought into court by the grand jury as
a body, or through the foreman accompanied by the other
jurors. And this view is strongly upheld in Renegar v.
United States, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 683, 97 C. C. A. 172,
172 Fed. 646, 19 Ann. Cas. 1117, where the foreman of
the grand jury had handed a paper indorsed *A True
Bill,' to the clerk of the court, when the court was not in
session, and when none of the grand jurors, except the
foreman, were present. The court held that this was not
sufficient to place the accused on trial for an infamous
crime under the provision of the Federal Constitution
that no person shall be held to answer for such a crime
unless by an indictment of the grand jury, and that to
constitute a valid indictment, the paper must be brought
publicly into court by the grand jury as a body.*' Co-op.
ed. of Supreme Court Reports, 57 Law ed. note to this
case, p. 97.
§ 83. Ensign v. Pennsylvania ^^ — States not oompelled
to accord the protection against self-incrimination gnar-
anteed by Fifth Amendment. The Court said : ^ ^ Article
5 of Amendments to the Federal Constitution is invoked,
which provides (inter alia) — *No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. * But, as has been often reiterated, this amend-
ment is not obligatory upon the governments of the sev-
eral states, or their judicial establishments, and regulates
the procedure of the federal courts only. Barron v.
Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 ; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131 ;
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 XJ. S. 172 ; Barrington v. Mis-
souri, 205 TJ. S. 493 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 TJ. S.
78, 93. We are referred to a similar proposition in art. 1,
as— 227 U. S. 592.
166 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 83
9, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania; Uat, even if the
trial of the plaintiffs in error proceeded in disregard of
this provision, no Federal right was thereby infringed. ' '
§ 84. Heike v. U. S.^^— Self-incrimination and daim of
immunity based on a proviso ta act of February 26| 1903.
In this case it was held that petitioner, an officer of a
sugar refining company who had testified before a
United States grand jury investigating alleged viola-
tions by such company of the anti-trust act of July 2,
1890, presenting in the main, documentary evidence fur-
nished by the books and papers of the company, produced
in response to a subpoena directed to him, could not
escape a prosecution for a conspiracy to conunit a crime
against the Federal Government by making entries of
raw sugar at less than their true weights, under a claim
of immunity based on the proviso to the act of February
25, 1903. The Court said: **The petitioner contended
that, as soon as he had testified upon a matter under the
Sherman act, he had an amnesty by the statute from
liability for any and every offense that was connected
with that matter in any degree ; or, at least, every offense
towards the discovery of which his testimony led up, even
if it had no actual effect in bringing the discovery about.
. . . Of course there is a clear distinction between an
amnesty and the constitutional protection of a party from
being compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself. Amendment 5. But the obvious purpose of the
statute is to make evidence available and compulsory that
otherwise could not be got. We see no reason for suppos-
ing that the act offered a gratuity to crime. It should be
construed, so far as its words fairly allow the construc-
tion, as coterminous with what otherwise would have
been the privilege of the person concerned. We believe
its policy to be the same as that of the earlier act of
February 11, 1893, chap, 83, 27 Stat, at L. 443, U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, p. 3173, which read: *No person shall be
33—227 U. S. 131.
§85 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1517) 167
excused from attending and testifying, ' etc. *But no per-
son shall be prosecuted/ etc., as now, thus showing the
correlation between constitutional right and inununity by
the form. That statute was passed because an earlier
one, in the language of a late case, 'was not coextensive
with the constitutional privilege.' American Litho-
graphic Co. V. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603, 611. . . •
Taking all these considerations together we think it plain
that the petitioner could take nothing by his plea. ' '
§ 85. Zakonaite v. Wolf ^^ — ^Due process invoked by an
alien found to be practicing prostitution within three
yean after her entry. This was an appeal from an order
dismissing a petition for discharge upon habeas corpus
filed by appellant, who had been arrested and held in
custody under warrants of arrest and deportation issued
by the Acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor under
the immigration act of February 20, 1907, it having been
ascertained that she was subject to deportation in that
she was a prostitute, and had been found practicing
prostitution three years after her entry into the
United States. The Court said: **In her behalf it
was contended in the court below, and is here con-
tended, first, that there was no evidence before the Secre-
tary of Commerce and Labor sufiBcient to warrant the
findings of fact upon which the order of deportation was
based ; and, secondly, that § 3 of the act of February 20,
1907, which provides that * any alien woman or girl who
shall be found an inmate of a house of prostitution or
practicing prostitution, at any time within three years
after she shall have entered the United States, shall be
deemed to be unlawfully within the United States, and
shall be deported as provided by sections twenty and
twenty-one of this act, — ^is unconstitutional because vio-
lative of the guaranties that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
34^226 IT. S. 272.
168 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 85
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impar-
tial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, as contained in the 5th and 6th
Amendments. As to the first point, an examination of
the evidence upon which the order of deportation was
based convinces us that it was adequate to support the
Secretary's conclusion of fact. That being so, and the
appellant having had a fair hearing, the findings are not
subject to review by this court. With respect to the
second point little more need be said. It is entirely settled
that the authority of Congress to prohibit aliens from
coming within the United States, and to regulate their
coming, includes authority to impose conditions upon the
performance of which the continued liberty of the alien
to reside within the bounds of this country may be made
to depend ; that a proceeding to enforce such regulations
is not a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the
5th and 6th Amendments ; . . . that such an inquiry
may be properly devolved upon an executive department
or subordinate oflBcials thereof, and that the findings of
fact reached by such oflScials, after a fair though summary
hearing, may constitutionally be made conclusive as they
are made by the provisions of the act in question. Fong
Tue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730; United
States V. Zucker, 161 U. S. 481 ; Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U, S. 228; United States ex rel. Turner v.
Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 289; Chin Tow v. United States,
208 U. S. 8, 11; Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 675;
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 468. *'
•
§86. Ochoa v. Hernandez ^^ — ^Due process denied by
order of military governor of Porto Rico taking property
from lawful owner without notice or hearing. In this
case it was claimed that due process was denied by a
judicial order, dated April 4, 1899, by Major General
Henry U. S. Volunteers, at that time military governor
of Porto Rico, which by its terms reduced from twenty
35—230 U. S. 139.
§86 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 169
years to six years the period during which real estate
must be held in order to permit the conversion in the
registry of a possessory title to a dominio title. The trial
court held that such order was void because it denied
* * due process of law ^ ' as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
menty **so far as it operated retrospectively upon the
rights of the complainants, who were minors at the time
and for some time thereafter, and who owned the land
during the entire period of nine years that elapsed
between the fraudulent entry of possessory title in the
name of their maternal grandfather. Morales, and the
promulgation of General Henry's order.'' In sustaining
that eminently just judgment the Court said : * * Without
the guaranty of *due process' the right of private prop-
erty can not be said to exist, in the sense in which it is
known to our laws. The principle, known to the common
law before Magna Carta, was embodied in that Charter
(2 Coke, Inst. 45, 50), and has been recognized since the
Bevolution as among the safest foundation of our insti-
tutions. Whatever else may be uncertain about the defini-
tion of the term 'due process of law,' all authorities
agree that it inhibits the taking of one man's property
and giving it to another, contrary to settled usages and
modes of procedure, and without notice or an oppor-
tunity for a hearing. Now, the effect and operation of
the retroactive clause in the judicial order of April, 1899,
as applied to the facts of the concrete case, were such
that, although Morales had until then no right, title, or
interest in the land in question, and had merely estab-
lished through fraudulent means and without notice to
the i)ersons concerned a footing of possession, as a result
of which, if they should permit his claims to remain
unchallenged, and he should in fact maintain continuous
possession for nearly twelve years longer, he would
thereby be enabled to procure, by ex parte proceedings,
an apparent title in himself as against them, yet the order
permitted him at once, and without notice to the owners,
to procure such record of ownership in his name, although
170 DXJB PEOCBSS OP LAW § 86
they were then infants, and, so far as appears, not cog-
nizant of his possession of the land or of any of his pro-
ceedings ; and then, by virtue of other provisions of the
mortgage law, he could completely deprive them of their
property if he could make sale of it to a bonafide pur-
chaser without notice of the infirmity of his apparent title.
. . . Since the proceeding for converting the entry of
possession into a dominio title, as well as the proceeding
for an entry of possession itself, was taken without notice
to the owners, the effect of the judicial order was pre-
cisely the same as if the military governor had declared
that the property in question should be taken from the
lawful owner and given to the fraudulent occupant. ' '
§ 87. Delaware, L. & W. B. Co. v. XT. S.^^*— ]
in Hepburn act of transport from market to mine does
not deny due process. The railroad in question was
indicted for hauling over its lines twenty car loads of hay
belonging to the company, but not necessary for its use
as a common carrier. Such hay had been purchased for
the use of animals employed in and about certain mines,
all the coal taken from them being sold for use by the
public, except the steam coal used as fuel for the com-
pany's locomotives. It appeared on the trial that the
defendant was not only chartered as a railroad, but had
been authorized to operate coal mines; and it claimed
that the commodities clause of the Hepburn act of June
29, 1906, "violated the 5th Amendment, deprived the com-
pany of a right to contract, and prevented it from carry-
ing its own property needed in a legitimate intrastate
business, conducted under authority of a charter granted
by the state of Pennsylvania, many years before the
adoption of the Hepburn bill.'* In rejecting that con-
tention the Court said : * * This contention must be over-
ruled on the authority of United States ex rel. Atty. Gen.
V. Delaware & H. Co. 213 U. S. 366, 416. It is true that
the decision in that case related to shipments of coal
36—23111.8.363. *
§ 88 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 171
from mine to market, while here the merchandise was
transported from market to mine. But the statute relates
to *aU conunoditieSy except lumber, owned by the com-
pany/ and includes inbound as well as outbound ship-
ments. Both classes of transportation are within the
purview of the evil to be corrected, and therefore subject
to the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
The exercise of that power is, of course, limited by the
provisions of the 5th Amendment (Monongahela Nav. Co.
V. United States, 148 U. S. 336 ; McCray v. United States,
195 U. S. 27 ; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S.
364), but the commodity clause does not take property,
nor does it arbitrarily deprive the company of a right of
property. The statute deals with railroad companies
as public carriers, and the fact that they may also be
engaged in a private business does not compel Congress
to legislate concerning them as carriers so as not to inter-
fere with them as miners or merchants. ' '
§ 88. Billings v. TT. S.^^— Imposition of an excise tax
based on gross tonnage upon the use of foreign built
pleasure yachts does not deny due process. The consti-
tutional contention of plaintiff in error was that the
classification in 37 of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment; that such violation resulted
from the imposition of an excise tax based upon gross
tonnage upon the use of foreign built pleasure yachts
owned by American citizens in the absence of a like
imposition upon the use of domestic yachts under like
conditions. In rejecting that contention the Court said :
"It has been conclusively determined that the require-
ment of uniformity which the Constitution imposes upon
Congress in the levy of excise taxes is not an intrinsic
uniformity but merely a geographical one. Flint v.
Stone, Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107; McCray v. United States,
195 U. S. 27 ; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41. It is also
settled beyond dispute that the Constitution is not self-
37—232 IT. S. 2ftL.
172 DUB PEOCESS OP LAW § 88
destructive. In other words, that the powers which it
confers on the one hand it does not immediately take
away on the other; that is to say, that the authority to
tax which is given in express terms is not limited or re-
stricted by the subsequent provisions of the Constitution
or the Amendments thereto, especially by the due process
clause of the 5th Amendment. McCray v. United States,
195 U. S. 27, and authorities there cited. Nor is there any-
thing in Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, or
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, which in the remot-
est degree nullifies or restricts the principle thus stated.
Indeed it is apparent, if the suggestion as to the meaning
of those cases were assented to, it would result in render-
ing the Constitution unconstitutional. This certainly was
the view entertained by the pleader when the answer in
the case was prepared, shice the sole attack on the consti-
tutionality of the statute was based upon the assertion
that it was repugnant to the due process clause of the
5th Amendment. And such also is the line of the argu-
ment at bar where the fundamental rights secured by
the 5th Amendment are constantly referred to as the
basis upon which the unconstitutionality of the statute
is urged. Is there foundation for this claim under the
5th Amendment, is then the issue, and that, of course,
requires a statement of the grievances which it is as-
serted resulted from the upholding the tax. They all
come to this, — ^that to impose a burden in the shape of
a tax upon the use of a foreign built yacht when a like
tax is not imposed on the use of a domestic yacht under
similar circumstances is so beyond the power of classifi-
cation, so abhorrent to the sense of justice, and so repug-
nant to the conception of free government as to be void
even in the absence of express constitutional limitation.
• • . we are of opinion the conclusion can not be
escaped that the propositions, each and all of them, what-
ever may be their form of expression, are in substance
and effect but an assertion that the tax which the statute
imposes is void because of a want of intrinsic uniformity ;
§89 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 173
and therefore all the contentions are adversely disposed
of by the previons decisions of this court on that subject.'^
See to the same effect. United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S.
299; Bainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310.
§89. Herbert v. Bicknell ^^— Due process not denied
when judgment by default is rendered against absent
defendant on summons left at last and usual place of
abode. This action was begun in the District Court of
Honolulu against the defendant at a time when it is
admitted he was absent from the territory. The sum-
mons was left at a place which, according to the return,
Was the defendant's last and usual place of abode. He
claimed however that he had changed his domicile to Aus-
tralia before the beginning of the suit ; that his last and
usual place of abode, before his change of domicile, was
at WaikiM ; and that the place at which the summons was
left was a lodging house at which he was temporarily
stopping, and was not therefore his last and usual place
of abode within the meaning of 2114 of the Revised Laws
of Hawaii. Upon that state of facts the defendant
claimed that the provision for substituted service by leav-
ing the notice **at his last and usual place of abode''
referred either to one who was inhabitant, or a resident
at the time of the service. Therefore, as the defendant
was in neither category, that the attempted constructive
or substituted service gave the court no jurisdiction. In
rejecting that contention the Court said: **The argu-
ment for the plaintiff in error assumes a wider range
than is open upon this motion. The supreme court says
that the question whether the evidence was suflScient to
support the judgment can not be raised in this way, and
we would follow the decision below even if it seemed less
obviously reasonable than it does. Montoya v. Gonzales,
232 U. S. 375. Moreover, the only errors assigned here
are in holding that the service prescribed by 2114 of the
Bevised Laws of Hawaii, as construed by the court, and
38—233 V. S. 70.
174 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 89
that leaving a copy of the summons as above stated after
garnishment of a debt due to the defendant, were suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the 5th Amendment
(the court having assumed that the defendant referred
to the 5th when he mentioned the 14th in his motion
below). The Supreme Court was of opinion that, if the
question was open, leaving copy of the summons at the
place where the defendant last had stopped was leaving
it at his last and usual place of abode within 2114. On
that point we see no sufficient reason for disturbing the
judgment. Phoenix E, Co. v. Landis, 231 U. S. 578, 579/'
See the instructive note to this case, entitled ** Service
of process on resident in action in personam by leaving
copy at residence as due process of law'* in Co-op. ed. of
S. C. Reports, 58 Law ed. p. 854, where it is said that
''the doctrine that a personal judgment upon constmc-
tive or substituted service upon a nonresident who does
not appear is contrary to due process is not generally
regarded as applicable to a judgment in personam ren-
dered upon constructive or substituted service upon a
resident of the state, even though he may have been
absent from the state at the time. * * Citing notes to Pinney
V. Providence Loan & Invest. Co., 50 L. B, A. 585, and
Raher v. Raher, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292.
§ 90. n. S. V. Atchison, T. and S. F. K. Oo.»»— Act of
February 4, 1887, § 4, as amended by act of June 18, 1910,
§ 8, not repugnant to Fifth Amendment. These appeals
were taken to review an interlocutory order and final
decree of the Conamerce Court, enjoying the enforce-
ment of an order of the Interstate Commerce Comnds-
sion based upon the long and short haul clause of the act
to regulate conunerce. In holding that the statute as
amended is not made repugnant to the Fifth Amend-
ment, as denying due process of law, by the imperative
enforcement of its provisions prohibiting common car-
riers to charge a lesser rate for a longer than for a
39—234 IT. S. 476.
§91 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 175
shorter haul, which results when the Interstate Commerce
Commission has performed the duty imposed upon it by
the statute to refuse in a proper case an application by a
carrier for relief from such long and short haul clause, the
Court said : ''It is said in the argument on behalf of one
of the carriers that as in substance and effect the duty is
imposed upon the Commission in a proper case to refuse
an application^ therefore the law is void because in such
a contingency the statute would amount to an imperative
enforcement of the long and short haul and would be
repugnant to the Constitution. It is conceded in the argu-
ment that it has been directly decided by this court that
a general enforcement of the long and short clause would
not be repugnant to the Constitution (Louisville & N. B.
Co. V. Kentucky, 183 U, S, 503), but we are asked to
reconsider and overrule the case, and thus correct the
error which was manifest in deciding it. But we are not
in the remotest degree inclined to enter into this inquiry,
not only because of the reasons which were stated in the
case itself, but also because of those already expounded
in this opinion, and for an additional reason, which is,
that the contention by necessary implication assails
numerous cases which, from the enactment of the act
to regulate commerce down to the present time, have
involved the adequacy of the conditions advanced by
carriers for justifying their departure from the long and
short haul clause. We say this because the controversies
which the many cases referred to considered and decided
by a necessary postulate involved an assertion of the
validity of the legislative power to apply and enforce the
long and short haul clause.''
§ 91. Pennsylvania Oo. v. TT. S. In this case (236 U. S.
351), the Court held: first, that the Interstate Commerce
Commission has jurisdiction to compel an interstate car-
rier to receive and transport over its terminals carload
interstate freight from one carrier having a physical
connection with its lines on the same terms on which it
176 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 91
performs such service for other connecting carrier in a
like situation ; second, that such an order is not an appro-
priation of terminal property of the carrier in violation
of the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment
but a regulation of its terminal facilities within the
authority delegated to Congress (Grand Trunk By, v.
Michigan Railroad Commission, 231 U. S. 457 ; followed ;
Louis, and N. R. R. v. Stock Yards Co,, 212 U- S. 132, dis-
tinguished) ; third, that Congress may so control the ter-
minal facilities of a carrier, and the Interstate Commerce
Commission may make such orders, as will prevent the
creation of monopolies within the limitations and prohibi-
tions of the Anti-trust Act. United States v, St. Louis
Terminal, 224 U. S. 383. Li passing upon the constitu-
tional question the Court said : **The third and last objec-
tion is that the effect of the order of the Conunission is
to appropriate the property of the Pennsylvania Com-
pany without compensation to the use of the Rochester
Company, in violation of the Constitution of the United
States. Certainly the railroad can not maintain, in view
of the provisions of the statute to which we have referred,
that these terminal facilities are exempt from public
regulation and under all circumstances subject to its con-
trol, to be dealt with in such manner as it may see fit.
This court recognized, in the cases of United States v.
Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 224 U. S. 383, that teiminal facili-
ties might be so used as to create monopolies, which it was
within the power of Congress to control, a power which
it might ..exercise within the prohibitions and limitations
of the Sherman Act. So in the present case, all that the
order requires the Pennsylvania Company to do is to
receive and transport over its terminals by its own motive
power, for the Rochester Company, as it does for other
companies, similarly situated, carload freight in the
course of interstate transportation. To support the con-
stitutional argument in this connection, reliance is had
upon the decision of this court in Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Stock Yards, 212 U. S. 132. That case was also relied
§ 92 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 177
upon to support a like argmnent in the Grand Trunk
Case, supra, and in the opinion of the court was analyzed
and its application to the situation then presented denied.
An examination of the LouisviUe Case shows that it was
unlike the one now presented. * * * So here there is
no attempt to appropriate the terminals of the Pennsyl-
vania Company to the use of the Rochester Company.
What is here accomplished is only that the same trans-
portation facilities which are afforded to the shipments
brought to the point of connection over the tracks used
in common by the Baltimore and Ohio, Railroad and the
Rochester Company shall be rendered to the Rochester
Company as are given to the Baltimore and Ohio Com-
pany under precisely the same circumstances of connec-
tion for the transportation of interstate traffic*'
§ 92. Oreenleaf Lumber Oo. v. Oarrison. In this case
(237 U. S. 251), it was held: first that as the power of a
state over navigable waters is subordinate to the control
of Congress, the state can grant no right to the soil of
the bed of navigable waters which is not subject to Fed-
eral regulation (Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S.
605 ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53) ;
second, that as the sovereign power of a state or nation
is perpetual it can not be exhausted by one exercise. All
privileges granted in public waters are subject to that
state power whose' exercise is not the taking of private
property for public use but a lawful exercise of govern-
mental authority for the common welfare; tWrd, that
when any one acting under authority erects a structure of
any kind in navigable waters, he does so with full knowl-
edge of the perpetual paramount authority of Congress to
regulate commerce among the states; fourth, that the
power of Congress extends to the entire expanse of a
navigable stream, regardless of the depth or shallowness
of the water, and as the power of a state over navigable
waters is subordinate to that of Congress, the state can
grant no right to the soil of the bed of navigable waters
Due Process — 12
178 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 92
which is not subject to Federal control. (Philadelphia Co,
V. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 ; United States v. Chandler-Dun-
bar Co.y 229 U. S. 53) ; fifth, that although a wharf was
originally erected within the harbor lines tlien duly estab-
lished by both the state and Federal authority, the United
States is not liable under the Fifth Amendment to com-
pensate the owner of a wharf erected in navigable
waters for the removal of that part of the structure out-
side of the new property established by Federal author-
ity. In reaching those conclusions the Court said: ^'It
is, however, contended that the jurisdiction to establish
harbor lines is given by statute only * where it is made
manifest to the Secretary of War that the establishment
of harbor lines is essential to the preservation and pro-
tection of harbors;' and that it is shown by the agreed
statement of facts and the correspondence attached
thereto that the Secretary of War acted at the sugges-
tion of the Navy Department for the improvement of the
river opposite the Norfolk Navy Yard and in pursuance
of the act making appropriations for the naval service
for the year ending June 30, 1912, § 239, 36 Stat 1265,
1275 ; and that this was the ^ sole purpose of tiie change
in the harbor lines and the required removal of the com-
pany's (complainant's) property is shown by the addi-
tional fact that it appears that the United States moors
abreast its war vessels, colliers and other vessels in front
of its Navy Yard, so that they may project out in the
channel which it so uses for the storage of its vessels/
We may grant that such was the inducement and such
the occasional use, but neither militates against the valid-
ity of the power exercised. The mooring of vessels is as
necessary as their movement, and the navigability of a
river can be maintained or increased as legally for the
accommodation of war vessels as for trading vessels,
those of public ownership as well as those of private
ownership, and we can not enter into a consideration of
what may be necessary for either purpose.
It was said in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
§ 93 FIFTH AMENDMENT— (X)NTINUED (1896-1917) 179
Water Co., 229 U, S. at page 64: So unfettered is the
^control of Congress over the navigable streams of the
country, that its judgment as to whether a construction
in or over such a river is or is not an obstacle and a hin-
drance to navigation, is conclusive. Such judgment and
determination is the exercise of legislative power in
respect of a subject wholly within its control.* And in
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 162 : * Whether navi-
gation upon waters over which Congress may exert its
authority requires improvement at aU, or improvement
in a particular way, are matters wholly within its discre-
tion. ' This power has been exercised by the act of March
3, 1899, delegating to the Secretary of War the power to
establish harbor lines and, necessarily, to require the
removal of structures which project beyond them. Union
Bridge Company v. United States, 204 U. S. 364/'
§ 93. Louisville and Naahville R. K. v. U. S. In this
case (238 U. S. 1), it was held that neither the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor the provision in § 15
of the Commerce Act that a carrier shall not be required
to give the use of its tracks or terminals to another car-
rier engaged in like business, were violated by an order
requiring the carrier to extend to connecting carriers, as
to competitive business, the same facilities that it extends
to some of the other carriers, in regard to the same class
of business. After making this quotation from the Dis-
trict Court, — * * There is furthermore no evidence that the
switching practices prescribed will violate the constitu-
tional provision against taking property without due pro-
cess of law. See Grand Trunk Ry, v. Michigan Commis-
sion, 231 U. S. 468. And it may well be assumed that the
petitioners will not themselves establish a switching
charge, so low as to be confiscatory,'* — ^the Court said:
**The question, as to power of the Commission to make
this part of the order, is settled by the decision in Pennsyl-
vania Company v. United States, 236 U. S. 318, recently
decided. The appellants, however, insist that that case
180 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 93
did not involve switching but transportation; and further
they claim that the Pennsylvania road was there ordered
to discontinue discrimination — ^while here the appellants
are required by an affirmative order to devote their prop-
erty to the use of a parallel and competing carrier. But
the alleged differences do not serve to take the present
case out of the principle announced in that just cited.
For in this order the prohibition against the existing
practice and requirement to furnish equal facilities come
to the same thing.**
§ 94. Chicago and Alton R. R. v. Tranbarger. In this
case (238 U. S. 67), it was held that a statute compelling
owners of a railroad to provide means for passing water
under embankments amounts rather to an application of
the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas; and, as a
legitimate exercise of the police power, is not a taking of
property without compensation within the meaning of
the Federal constitution. The Court said: **We deem
it very clear that the act under consideration is a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power, and not in any proper
sense a taking of the property of plaintiff in error. The
ease is not at all analogous to those which have held that
the taking of a right of way across one *s land for a drain-
age ditch, where no water-course exists, is a taking of
property within the meaning of the constitution. The
present regulation is for the prevention of drainage
attributable to the railroad embankment itself, and
amounts merely to an application of the ma,xim sic utere
ttio ut alienum non laedas/*
§95. Anderson v. Forty-two Broadway Co. In that
case (239 U. S. 69), it was held that the provision in Cor-
poration Tax Act of 1909, 36 Stat. 112 limiting interest
deductions to an amount of the indebtedness not exceed-
ing capital is not an arbitrary classification denying due
process of law under the 5th Amendment, as Congress
has power to adopt a baais of distinction between cor-
§ 98 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 181
porations carrying current indebtedness exceeding capi-
tal and those that do not
§ 96. Williams v. Johnson. In that case (239 U. S.
414), it was held (1) That as Indians are wards of the
Nation, Congress has plenary power over tribal property
and relations, that power continuing after the Indians
are made citizens and may be exercised as to restrictions
on alienation of allotments (Tiger v. Western Investment
Co., 221 U. S. 286 ; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 dis-
tinguished) ; (2) That the provision in the Act of April
21, 1904, c- 33, Stat. 204, removing certain restrictions on
alienation of allotments to Choctaw Indians imposed by
the Act of July 1, 1902, was within the authority of Con-
gress, and was not, under the due process clause of the
5th Amendment, an unconstitutional deprivation of prop-
erty of Indians to whom allotments had been made.
§97. Seven Cases v. U. S. In that case (239 U. S.
510), it was held (1) That the power of Congress to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce authorized the
enactment of the Sherley Amendment of August 23, 1912,
to the Food and Drugs Act under which misbranding
includes false and fraudulent statements regarding cura-
tive effects of drugs ; (2) That such Amendment does not
by reason of uncertainty operate as a deprivation of
property without due process of law as guaranteed by
the 5th Amendment.
§ 98. Broshaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Oo. In that
case (240 U. S. 1), it was held that the 5th Amendment is
not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon
Congress by the Constitution ; that the income provisions
of the Tariff Act of 1913 are not unconstitutional by rea-
son of retroactive operation, the period covered not
extending prior to the time when the Amendment was
operative; nor are those provisions unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the 5th Amendment ; nor
182 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 98
do they deny due process of law, nor equal protection of
the law by reason of the classifications therein of things
or persons subject to the tax.
§99. Dodge v, Osbom. In that case (240 U. S, 118),
it was held that the due process clause of the 5th Amend-
ment was not violated by the provisions of Rev, Stat,
§§ 3220, 3226, and 3227, requiring an appeal to the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue after payment of taxes
and only giving a right to sue after his refusal to refund.
The Court said: **And this doctrine has been repeat-
edly applied until it is no longer open to question that a
suit may not be brought to enjoin the assessment
or collection of a tax because of the alleged unconstitu-
tionality of the statute imposing it. Shelton v. Piatt,
139 U. S. 591 ; Pittsburgh & C. Ry. v. Board of Public
Works, 172 U. S. 32; Pacific Whaling Co. v. Smith &
Stutes, 187 U. S. 447, 451, 452. ' ' See also Dodge v. Brady,
240 U. S. 122.
§99a. Wilson, U. S. Attorney v. New and Ferris,
Receivers. Eight-Hour-Law Case. This case, known as
the Eight-Hour-Law Case, decided March 19, 1917, and
not yet reported, involved the constitutionality of the Act
of Congress of September 3, 5, 1916, 39 Stat. 721, c. 436,
entitled ^^An act to establish a/n eight-hour day for em-
ployees of carriers engaged in interstate and foreign
commerce, and for other purposes.' ' In the majority
opinion, announced by Mr. Chief Justice White, after a
review of the circumstances out of which the legislation in
question arose, the following statement of the issues was
made : ' ' The court below, briefly announcing that it was of
opinion that Congress had no constitutional power to
enact the statute, enjoined its enforcement and as the re-
sult of the direct appeal which followed we come, after
elaborate oral and printed arguments, to dispose of the
controversy. All the propositions relied upon and argu-
ments advanced ultimately come to two questions: first,
899a FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 183
the entire want of constitutional power to deal with the
subjects embraced by the statute, and second, such abuse
of the power if possessed as rendered its exercise uncon-
stitutional.'* After a separate consideration of each
objection the court held, first, that the subjects embraced
by the statute were within the Commerce clause of the
Constitution, when the special circumstances are con-
sidered under which the legislative power in question was
exercised ; second, that by the exercise of such legislative
power by Congress under such special circumstances, no
other limitations imposed by the Constitution on the
power to regulate conunerce were violated. In conclusion
the court said : ^ ^ Being of the opinion that Congress had
the power to adopt the act in question, whether it be
viewed as a direct fixing of wages to meet the absence
of a standard on that subject resulting from the dispute
between the parties or as the exertion by Congress of
the power which it undoubtedly possessed to provide by
appropriate legislation for compulsory arbitration — a
power which inevitably resulted from its authority to
protect interstate commerce in dealing with a situation
like that which was before it — ^we conclude that the court
below erred in holding the statute was not within the
power of Congress to enact and in restraining its enforce-
ment and its decree therefore must be and is reversed
and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the
bill.*' In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice McKenua
said : * * It is the contention of the Government that the
Act is an hours-of-service law, the intent of Congress
being by its enactment, Ho proclaim a substantial eight-
hour day. ' The opposing contention is that * the language
of the Act shows that it deals solely with the construction
of contracts and with the standard and amount of com-
pensation, and not with any limitation upon the hours of
labor.' Upon these opposing contentions the parties
respectively assert and deny the power of Congress to
enact the law." From the conclusion reached by the
majority four of the Justices dissented.
184 DUB PEOCESS OP LAW § 99a
Mr. Justice Day in his dissenting opinion, after saying
that he was *'not prepared to deny to Congress, in view
of its constitutional authority to regulate commerce
among the states, the right to fix by lawful enactment
the wages to be paid to those engaged in such commerce
in the operation of trains carrying passengers and
freight,'^ asserted that *4t is equally true that this regu-
latory power is subject to any applicable constitutional
limitations. This power, cannot any more than others
conferred by the Constitution, be the subject of lawful
exercise when such exertion of authority violates funda-
mental rights secured by the Constitution. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 ; Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336 ; United States v. Joint
Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505, 571 ; Lottery Case, 188 U. S.
321, 353. The power to legislate, as well as other powers
conferred by the Constitution upon the coordinate branches
of the Government, is limited by the provisions of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution preventing depriva-
tion of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
. . . It results from the principles which have been
enforced in this court, and recognized by writers of
authority, that due process of law, when applied to the
legislative branch of the Government, will not permit
Congress to make anything due process of law which it
sees fit to declare such by the mere enactment of the
statute ; if this were true, life, liberty, or property might
be taken by the terms of the legislative act, depending
for its authority upon the will or caprice of the legislature,
and constitutional provisions would thus become a mere
nullity. . . . Applying these principles, in my opinion,
this Act cannot successfully withstand the attack that is
made upon it as an arbitrary and unlawful exertion of
supposed legislative power. It is not an act limiting the
hours of service. Nor is it, in my judgment, a legitimate
enactment fixing the wages of employees engaged in such
service. ... Such legislation, it seems to me, amounts to
the taking of the property of one and givingit to another
§ 99a FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 185
in violation of the spirit of fair play and equal right
which the Constitution intended to secure in the Due
Process Clause to all coming within its protection, and is
a striking illustration of that method which has always
been deemed to be the plainest illustration of arbitrary
action, the taking of the property of A and giving it to
B by legislative fiat. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S.
97, 104/' Justices Pitney and Van Devanter concurred
in all that Justice Day had said as to the invalidity of
the Act in question by reason of its repugnancy to the
Fifth Amendment. Speaking for both on that subject,
Justice Pitney said : * * The right to immunity from con-
fiscation is not the only right of property safeguarded
by the Fifth Amendment. Rights of property include
something more than mere ownership and the privilege
of receiving a limited return from its use. The right to
control, to manage, and to dispose of it, the right to put
it at risk in business, and by legitimate skill and enter-
prise to make gains beyond the fixed rates of interest,
the right to hire employees, to bargain freely with them
about the rate of wages, and from their labors to make
lawful gains — ^these are among the essential rights of
property, that pertain to owners of railroads as to others.
The devotion of their property to the public use does not
give to the public an interest in the property, but only
in its use. This Act, in my judgment, usurps the right
of the owners of the railroads to manage their own prop-
erties, and is an attempt to control and manage the
properties rather than to regulate their use, in commerce.
In particular^ it deprives the carriers of their right to
agree with their employees as to the terms of employment.
Without amplifying the point, I need only refer again to
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 174, 178.'^
With equal emphasis Justices Pitney and Van Devanter
denied the power of Congress to legislate at all upon
the subject matter by virtue of the Commerce clause.
Speaking for both on that subject the former said : * * I
am convinced, in the first place, that the Act cannot be
186 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 99a
sustained as a regalation of cominercey because it has no
such object, operation, or effect, • • • The simple
eflfect of section 3 is to increase, during the period of
its operation, the rate of wages of railroad trainmen
employed in interstate commerce* It comes to this, — ^that
whereas the owners of the railroads have devoted their
property to the movement of interstate as well as intra-
state commerce, and whereas the trainmen have accepted
employment in such commerce, and thus employers and
employees are engaged together in a qiuisi public service,
the Act steps in and prescribes how the money earned in
the public service shall be divided between the owners of
the railroads and these particular employees. This, in
my view, is a regulation not of commerce but of the in-
ternal affairs of the commerce carriers, — ^precisely as if
an act were to provide that the rate of interest payable
to the bondholders must be increased and the dividend
payments to the stockholders correspondingly decreased
— and is not only without support in the Commerce clause
of tiie Constitution, but, as I shall endeavor to show, trans-
gresses the limitations of the Fifth Amendment/* Mr.
Justice McReynolds, in his dissenting opinion, agreed,
in no uncertain terms, with Justices Pitney and Van
Devanter in the conclusion that the Act could not be sus-
tained as a regulation of commerce. He said : * * I have
not heretofore supposed that such action was a regula-
tion of commerce within the fair intendment of those
words as used in the Constitution; and the argument
advanced in support of the contrary view is unsatisfac-
tory to my mind. I cannot, therefore, concur in the con-
clusion that it was within the power of Congress to enact
the statute.*'
§100. Review— Persistent and harmful influence of
Murray v. Hoboken Land and Lnprovement Go. The
author feels that he can not conclude this prolonged
review of the weighty expositions made by the Supreme
Court of the United States of the due process of law
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 187
clause of the Fifth Amendment, without reproducing
the substance of a criticism in which he has heretofore
attempted to demonstrate that the entire stream of expo-
sition was poised at its source by the first judgment pro-
nounced on the subject in 1856, — radically unsound, as the
author believes, both from the historical and logical point
of view.
The English idea of due process waa first embodied in
chapter 39 of Magna Carta which provides that **No
freeman shall be arrested or detained in prison, or
deprived of his freehold, or outlawed, or banished, or in
any way molested : and we will not set forth against him,
nor send against him*, unless by the lawful judgment of
his peers and by the law of the land/* After being
reproduced in all the original state constitutions chapter
39 passed into the Federal Constitution *® in this form :
**No person shall be . • . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law/' Not until 1856
was that vital provision construed in the famous case of
Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Company.**
In that case, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Curtis, undertook to define, for the first time, the term
"due process of law** as contained in the Fifth Amend-
ment, and to adjudge that such due process had not been
denied Samuel Swartwout in a case in which his land
had been sold under a warrant issued by the solicitor of
the Treasury under an act of Congress of May 15, 1820,
authorizing the issuance of such a wjirrant. The account
of Swartwout, as collector of the customs for the Port of
New York, **was audited by the first auditor, and certi-
fied by the comptroller of the Treasury ; and for the bal-
ance thus found, amounting to the sum of $1,374,119.65,
the warrant in question was issued by the solicitor of the
Treasury.** It was admitted by the court that all the
proceedings fixing that vast sum as a lien on the land of
Swartwout were purely ex parte; that he had no notice
40 — Fifth Amendment.
41^18 How. 272.
188 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 100
from or hearing before the purely ministerial officers by
whom that so-called judgment for more than a miUion and
a quarter of dollars was rendered against him. It was
careful to declare in express terms that the Treasury
oflScials who thus rendered judgment against Swartwout
were purely ministerial officers armed with no judicial
power whatever. * * It must be admitted, * ' said the Court,
*Hhat, if the auditing of this account and the ascertain-
ment of its balance, and the issuing of this process, was
an exercise of the judicial power of the United States, the
proceeding was void ; for the officers who performed these
acts could exercise no part of that judicial power. They
neither constituted a court of the United States, nor were
they, or either of them, so connected with any such court
as to perform even any of the ministerial duties which
arise out of judicial proceedings.'^ The sole question at
issue was this : Did a warrant or execution so issued, in
conformity with the terms of an act of Congress direct-
ing its issue, after ministerial officers, armed with no
judicial authority whatever, had, in a purely ex parte
proceeding', without notice or hearing of any kind,
entered up a judgment as a lien on Swartwout *s land,
constitute **due process of law*' as defined by the Fifth
Amendment? It is impossible for an American lawyer
to understand how su^ch an ex parte proceeding, without
notice or hearing, could have constituted due process of
law, if he is unable to accept the startling contention set
up by the court in a vain effort to defend it.
That contention was this : (1) that by virtue of certain
statutes *^ passed in the most despotic days of the Tudor
monarchy, a special rule or practice had grown up in the
Court of Exchequer that authorized the collection of debts
due to the crown from receivers of the revenue by a sum-
mary process which only required that auditors should,
in an ex parte proceeding, without any notice whatever
to the alleged debtor, ascertain the amount supposed to
be due, for the collection of which an execution against
42—33 Hen. VIII., c. 39; 13 Eliz., c. 4.
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 189
the debtor could be forthwith delivered by the Pipe Office
to the sherifiEs; (2) that such rule or practice had been
established in England as an exception to the general
role known as the law of the land or due process ordained
by Magna Carta, by reason of a certain supposed neces-
sity which the court described in these terms : * * It may
be added, that probably there are few governments which
do or can permit their claims for public taxes, either on
the citizen or the officer employed for their collection or
disbursement, to become subjects of judicial controversy
according to the course of the law of the land. Impera-
tive necessity has forced a distinction between such claims
and all others, which has sometimes been carried out by
summary methods of proceeding, and sometimes by sys-
tems of fines and penalties; but always in some way
observed and yielded to;*' (3) that such special rule or
practice, supposed to have been built up in the Tudor
time in defiance of and as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the law of the land or due process as
ordained by Magna Carta, was brought over by our ances-
tors and so firmly established in our colonial system that
it lived on in defiance of the Petition of Eight and the
Bill of Bights, until it was finally embedded, by implica-
tion, in the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Curtis frankly admits that the special rule
or practice in question, as a means of collecting debts
due to the Crown, was one of the abuses that had existed
prior to the granting of Magna Carta, Chapter 9 of which
was specially designed for its removal. He says, **It is
difficult, at this day, to trace with precision all the pro-
ceedings had for these purposes (sunmaary methods for
the collection of debts due to the Crown) in the earliest
ages of the common law. That they were summary and
severe and had been used for purposes of oppression, is
inferable from the fact that one chapter (9) of Magna
Carta treats of their restraint. * ' That vitally important
part of the matter should be made more clear by the aid
of historical knowledge not available in 1856. Due
190 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 100
process as now understood throughout the English-speak-
ing world had its origin in Chapter 39 of the Great
Charter of Liberties of 1215, which provided that **No
freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or
deprived of his freehold, or outlawed, or banished, or in
any way molested ; and we will not set forth against him,
nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgment of
his peers and by the law of the land.** What was the
meaning, at the time they were used, of those italicized
words f In explaining them the foremost commentator
on Magna Carta has said: ''Its main object (Chap. 39)
was to prohibit John from resorting to what is sometimes
whimsically known in Scotland as 'Jeddart justice.* It
forbade Mm for the future to place execution before
judgment. Three aspects of this prohibition may be
emphasized. (1) Judgment must precede execution. In
some isolated cases, happily not numerous, John pro-
ceeded, or threatened to proceed, by force of arms against
recalcitrants as though assured of their guilt, without
waiting for legal procedure.'* And then, after stating
that ' ' Complaint was made of arrests and imprisonments
suffered 'without judgment,' *' the same authority adds:
"Mr. Bigelow considers that such cases were numerous.
See Procedure, 155: 'The practice of granting writs of
execution without trial in the courts appears to have
been common. ^ » ' *» Thus we know for certain what was
the real moving cause that prompted the baronage to
demand that the Crown should bind itself, by the terms
used in Chapter 39 of Magna Carta, not to render judg-
ment first, without a hearing or legal procedure of any
kind, as in the case of Swartwout ; and then to send out
a writ of execution, without a trial in the courts. The
phrase "we will not set forth against him, nor send
against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers
and by the law of the land,'* which has such a strange
and incoherent sound in modem ears, was perfectly un-
derstood early in the thirteenth century when John was
43— McEeclinie, Magna Carta, 437-38.
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 191
in the habit of setting forth against a man, or sending
an armed retinae against him to collect some debt due
to the Crown upon which no proceeding had been had
in any couri Again, to quote Professor McKechnie : ^
**The idea of open violence, thus clearly indicated, is
expressed in contemporary documents by the fuller
phrase, per vim et arma/^
Is it natural, is it reasonable to suppose that the debtors
of the Crown, most numerous among the baronage who
led the fight for Magna Carta primarily for their own
benefit, deliberately excluded themselves from the protec-
tion against execution before judgment given by Chapter
39 f It is impossible for such an assumption to arise
because it is answered in advance by Chapter 9, specially
designed to prevent any doubt on that subject : * * Neither
we nor our bailiffs shall seize any land or rent for any
debt, so long as the chattels of the debtor are sufficient
to repay the debt; nor shall the sureties of the <^ebtor
be distrained, so long as the principal debtor is able to
satisfy the debt; and if the principal debtor shall fail
to pay the debt, having nothing wherewith to pay it, then
the sureties shall answer for the debt ; and let them have
the lands and rents of the debtor, if they desire them,
until they are indemnified for the debt which they have
paid for him, unless the principal debtor can show proof
that he is discharged thereof as against the said sure-
ties." In explaining the history and meaning of that
chapter. Professor McKechnie says:*' **The Charter
now passes to another group of grievances. Chapters 9
to 11 treat of the kindred topics of debts, usury and the
Jews, and should be read in connection with each other,
and with Chapter 26, which regulates the procedure for
attaching the personal estate of deceased Crown tenants
who were also Crown debtors. The present chapter,
although quite general in its terms, had special reference
to cases where the Grown was the creditor; while the
44— p. 436, note 2.
46— P. 262.
192 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 100
two following chapters treated more particularly of debts
contracted to Jews or other money lenders. The fact
that John 's subjects owed debts to his exchequer did not,
of course, imply that they had borrowed money from
the King. The sums entered as due" in the Rolls of th^
Exchequer represented obligations which had been in-
curred in many different ways. What with feudal inci-
dents and scutages and indiscriminate fines, ^o heavy in
amount that they could only be paid by installments, a
large proportion of Englishmen must have been perma-
nently indebted to the Crown. At John 's accession most
of the northern barons still owed the scutages demanded
by Eichard. John remitted none of the arrears, while
imposing new burdens of his own. The attempts made
to collect these debts intensified the friction between John
and his barons. It was, further, the Crown *s practice
wherever possible to make its debtors find sureties for
their debts, thus widening the circle of those liable to
distraint, while the officers who enforced payment were
guilty of irregularities, which became the cloaks of grave
abuses.'^ The legal historians have thus fixed the fact
that the great motive cause that prompted the baronage
to demand the insertion in the Great Charter of Chapter
39, guaranteeing due process of law, pr the law of the
land, was John's oppressive practice of collecting debts
due to the Crown from its debtors by force of arms, *'per
vim et arma/^ thus carrying into effect ^^ writs of execvr
tion without trial in the courts** — ^words that exactly
describe the writ issued and executed by ministerial offi-
cers of the United States in the case of Swartwout. In
order to render impossible the issuance of such writs for
all time were inserted in Magna Carta, first. Chapter 39,
as a general prohibition, and second. Chapter 9, as a
special prohibition against the collection of Crown debts
by execution prior to judgment. **The attempts made
to collect these debts intensified the friction between John
and his barons.'*
After admitting that the special rule or practice in
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 193
question, the sole and only basis of the judgment in Mur-
ray V. Hoboken Land & Improvement Company, had been
stigmatized by Chapters 9 and 39 of Magna Carta as
contrary to due process of law, Mr. Justice Curtis under-
took the dreary task of demonstra&ng by the aid of a
few authorities, sharply hostile to his contention, that
suoh special rule or practice prevailed in the Court of Ex-
chequer by virtue of two statutes, 33 Hen, VII, c. 39,
and 13 Eliz., a 4. The leading authority he cites is Coke,
whose ** Second Institute,'* a commentary on Magna
Carta, was published in 1632, Its author, who as Privy
Councillor sat in the Star Chamber, died September 3,
1634, while the entire code of Star Chamber law and
High Commission law was in full force. It is not there-
fore strange that Mr. McKechnie*® should say what
everybody now knows, that * * Coke, following the vicious
method of assuming the existence, in some part of Magna
Carta, of a warrant for every legal principle in his own
day, has utterly mislead several generations of commen-
tators.*' And yet even with Coke's aid the learned jus-
tice was unable to prove that the special rule or practice
upon which he relied ever cut off, even in the darkest
days of the Tudor despotism, the right of a Crown debtor
to have the amount of his debt ascertained by the verdict
of a jury in a court of justice prior to the issue of an
execution for its collection. The nemesis of his argu-
ment is to be found in the phrase **writ of extent,*' to
which he constantly refers and whose real nature he
entirely misunderstood. He says : ^'To authorize a writ
of extent, however, the debt must be matter of record in
the King's exchequer. The 33 Henry VIII, ch. 39, sec. 50,
made all specialty debts due to the King of the same
force and effect as debts by statute staple, thus giving
to such debts the effect of debts of record. In regard to
debts due upon simple contract, other than those due
from collectors of the revenue and other accountants of
the Crown, the practice, from very ancient times, has
46— P, 447.
Due Process— 13
194 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 100
been to issue a commission to inquire as to the existence
of the debt. This commission being returned, the debt
f oxmd was thereby evidenced by a record, and an extent
could issue thereon. No notice was required to be given
to the alleged debtor of the execution of this commission
(2 Tidd's Practice, 1047), though it seems that, in some
cases, an order for notice might be obtained. 1 Ves. 269.
Formerly, no witnesses were examined by the commis-
sion (Chitty's Prerogative, 267; West, 22), the affidavit
prepared to obtain an order for an immediate extent
being the only evidence introduced. But this practice
has been recently changed. 11 Price, 29. ' ' Let us pause
here and examine the authority last cited,*^ a case ex-
plaining the nature of a ^^writ of extent/' and the cir-
cumstances under which it might be issued. From the
head note we learn that **the inquisition upon which
the Fiat was obtained and the Extent sued out, was made
without viva voce testimony having been given to the
jury of the existence of the debt, and that they found
the debt to be due, solely on the usual affidavit on which
the Judge 's Fiat is Obtained, made for that purpose, by
or on the part of the prosecutors of the Extent/' In his
opinion, delivered in this case. Baron Wood said:**
** There are two things necessary to be done before an
extent can be properly issued, without which it can not
be supported. First, an affidavit must be made to pro-
duce before the Judge, and then, an inquisition must be
taken before a jury. Now, all inquisitions so taken before
a jury can only by course of law be taken on viva voce
testimony produced before them.'*
In the later case of Begina v. Eyle,*® in which the
Crown had sued out an immediate extent, in order to
collect 2,492£. 7s. 7d. from a defaulting Crown officer, we
have a complete and luminous exposition of the entire
47— Bex ▼. Hornblower, Vol. XI, p. 29, Price's, ''Reports of CaMs
Argued and Determined in the Ck>urt of Exchequer."
48— P. 39.
49—9 M. ft W. 227.
§100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 1S5
subject. In that case the Court reviewed Rex v. Hom-
blower and modified the requirement as to viva voce
testimony before the jury in the inquisition taken prior
to the issuance of the writ of extent. It held that an
affidavit was sufficient, because, as the Solicitor General
contended : * * The debt is not conclusively found by the
inquiry before the jury but the party (the Crown debtor)
is at liberty to traverse the debt in the proceedings which
subsequently take place.' ^ In confirming that contention,
the Court said : * * That there can be no debt of the Crown
upon which process can issue, except it be a debt on rec-
ord. Upon what is that founded t Upon nothing but
usage. One does not see any principle why the Crown
should not be able to proceed for the recovery of a debt
in the same way as a subject, but a usage has grown up
which we do not disturb, that the debts of the Crown
must be found by record, must be on the records of the
court, before the process can issue to enforce them. For-
merly that process called upon the party to appear, and
to contest his debt in the suit The statute of the 33
Henry Vlll was passed for the purpose of giving the
Crown a more rapid procedure, and for the very purpose
of securing the debt before the party should have time
to abscond or make way with his goods. The process by
scire factor would give him that opportunity. The legis-
lature, therefore, in the time of Henry VIII, passed this
act for the purpose of authorizing the Court of Ex-
chequer, or any other court in which the King's debt is
entered on record, to issue an immediate process for exe-
cution, a capias, extendi facias, or a subpoena. But that
statute has provided a remedy for all possible incon-
venience that might result ; for it enacts, by the. 79th
section, *that if any person or persons of whom any such
debt or duty is or at any time hereafter shall be demanded
or required, allege, plead or declare, or show, in any of
the said courts, good, perfect and sufficient cause and
matter in law, reason, or good conscience, in bar of the
said debt or duty, etc., the said courts, and every one
196 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 100
of them, shall have full power and authority to aocept,
adjudge, and allow the same proof, and wholly and clearly
to acquit and discharge all and every person and per-
sons that shall be so impleaded, sued, vexed, or troubled
for the same.' That clause allows the party to plead
to the extent, or to apply by summary motion, which is
often done, to the court, for the purpose of showing good
grounds to discharge him from that process, and the
court often acted upon it, and hence, as well in law as
in equity and good conscience, the court has an equitable
jurisdiction, in all cases of process of this sort, to enter
upon the whole merits of the case, and to discharge the
party, if, in equity and good conscience, he ought to be
discharged." After holding that an afiBidavit was suffi-
cient proof before the jury in the preliminary inquisition,
the Court concluded by saying: **! think it was such
evidence as the jury might take and find the debt upon.
The party is not prejudiced by not being summoned to
attend before them, because the appeal is open to him
afterwards when the process is issued, and the very
object of the statute of Henry VIII was to enable the
court to issue a more immediate process, leaving it open
to the party to plead before execution as he might have
done previously .' ' Here we have the whole matter in a
nut shell. (1) The Crown was so hampered by an old
usage that it could not proceed at all against a Crown
debtor until its debt was **on the records of the Court"
For that reason, it was necessary to call in the auditors
of the exchequer when a collector of the revenue made
default, so that their finding {ex parte because it did
not bind the debtor) might put the claim of the Crown
* * on the records of the court, ' ' to the end that an extent in
chief might be applied for. (2) Before such a writ could
issue a jury had to be called and proof taken, at one time
viva voce, at another by affidavit, convincing the first
jury of the existence of the debt. (3) Not until that pro-
ceeding had been completed could the writ of extent issue
under the statute of Henry VIH, which carefully pro-
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 197
vided that after the Crown debtor's lands and goods
had been seized, **for the very pnrpose of securing the
debt," such debtor could come into court, dispute the
debt by any defense that he might see fit to set up, thus
giving to the court jurisdiction ^'to enter upon the whole
merits of the cctse/^ What fixes the fact that the writ
of extent was, as we would say here, simply on dttach-
ment to secure a debt, aud not an execution, is the author-
ity which declares that the sheriff is not entitled to sell
the goods and chattels he has seized under the extent
without the issue of a writ of venditioni exponas.^ Thus
it appears that two jury trials were necessarily provided
in every proceeding against Crown debtors by writ of
extent. The first ascertained whether there was prob-
able cause justifying its issuance, including of course a
preUminary examination as to the amount of the debt.
The second gave the Crown debtor his day in court, cou-
pled with the right to make every defense, and **to enter
upon the whole merits of the case," before there could
be a sale of the goods under a venditioni exponas, which
could not be issued until the second and real trial was
over. (4) But in the event that third persons came in
and claimed that the goods seized as the Crown debtor's
were really their own, then a third jury trial was ordered
for their benefit.*^^ In the last case cited, illustrating
the Crown's priority in a colony, it was *'held, that the
rights of the Crown to be paid, in preference to other
creditors, out of the estate of a defaulting treasurer (at
Trinidad), was confined to his default in respect of
moneys in his hands as treasurer, and as a part of the
revenue of the colony/'
Here the fact should be emphasized that the writ of
extent is not one of the prerogative writs, and that the
right to its issuance did not accrue to the King by virtue
60— Bex ▼. Hopper, (1816) 3 Price 40; 18 B. B. 641.
51..See Bex v. Gollingridge, 3 Price 280; Bex v. Bandell, 5 Price 376;
Bex y. Lambton, 5 Price 421; Wildes v. Atty. Gen. for Trinidad, 3 Moore,
P. C. 200.
198 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 100
of the common law, but solely by sections 50 and 53 of
the statute 33 Henry VTII, c. 39. So says West, the
great authority on the subject.*^* The writ is in full force
in England today, and a complete account of it may be
found in the Earl of Halsbury^s great work, **The Laws
of England/* »» It is there thus defined: " *'The writ
of extent is the process by which the Crown can seize
the body, lands, goods, and debts or other choses in action
of its debtor by summary process for the purpose of
obtaining satisfaction of debts due it.'* The old pro-
ceeding, as heretofore described, has not been changed
in any material particular ; trial by jury is still guaran-
teed at every stage of it. And now, as always, careful
provision is made by the laws of England for court pro-
cedure and trial by jury in all cases in which the Crown
is compelled to enforce the collection of its revenue.
From the same authority we learn ^* that *' Proceedings
for the recovery of penalties under the Customs Acts
in the High Court of Justice may be commenced either
by writ of subpcena, or by writ of capias. . . . The
writ of capias is issued by direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral and on the fiat of a judge. . . . The suit is set
down for hearing by the Crown. Notice of trial, which
must be given by the Crown, is ten days in all cases,
and countermand of notice of trial must be given four
days before the time mentioned in tl^e notice of trial,
unless short notice of trial has been given, when two
days are suflScient. The trial is usually before a judge
and special jury, and the associate in all cases at nisi
prius is to take the verdict.^' It thus appears that Mr.
Justice Curtis was in the gravest possible error, so far
OrS the law of England is concerned, when he said **that
probably there are few governments which do or can
52 — Treatise of the Law and Practice of Extents, c. 1.
53 — ^Vol. Xf under the title, '^Proceedings on the Bevenue Bide of the
King's Bench Division." e
54— P. 14.
55— P. 8.
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 199
permit their claims for public taxes, either on the citizen
or the officer employed for their collection or disburse-
ment, to become subjects of judicial controversy, accord-
ing to the course of the law of the land.'* Upon the con-
trary in England, ever since Chapters 9 and 39 of Magna
Carta went into effect, most careful provision has been
made for court procedure, including trial by jury ** ac-
cording to the course of the law of the land, * * whenever
the Crown asserts ** claims for public taxes, either on
the citizen or the officer employed for their collection or
disbursement/^ Mr. Dicey, in expounding the doctrine
of due process as it is understood in the English consti-
tutional system, has said : ** * * In England the idea of
legal equality, or of the universal subjection of all classes,
to the law administered by the ordinary courts, has been
pushed to its utmost limit. With us every official, from
the Prime Minister down to a constable or collector of
taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done
without legal justification as any other citizen/* The
idea that a special class of persons, for example Crown
debtors, could be exempt from the protection of a sys-
tem whose main feature is its universal application to
all classes, is an unthinkable solecism which no English
judge could possibly embody in a judgment or decree.
That solecism becomes still more pronounced when we
remember that the protection of Crown debtors against
execution before judgment was the leading motive that
compelled the insertion of Chapter 39 of the Great Char-
ter upon which due process is founded. In attempting
to prove the existence of the special Exchequer rule or
practice upon which alone he based the judgment of the
court in the case in question, Mr. Justice Curtis not only
ignored the general principle of due process in England,
so luminously stated by Mr. Dicey, but, stranger still,
he fell into hopeless confusion by mistaking a writ of
extent for a writ of execution. It is undoubtedly true,
as he says, that there was a time when, in the event of
56 — ^Tbe Law of tlie Constitution, 183.
200 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 100
defaults by collectors of the revenue, the balances against
them were made up by auditors of the Exchequer. To
use his own words, *' these balances were found by audi-
tors, the particular oflScers acting thereon have been,
from time to time, varied by legislation and usage/'
What was the effect of their findings t He gives us the
answer. '^By the statute 13 Eliz., ch. 4, balances due from
receivers of the revenue and all other accountants of
the Crown were placed on the same footing as debts
acknowledged to be due by statute staple. '' That is to
say, a debt due upon open account was by the action of
the auditors converted into a debt of record, upon which
the writ of extent could be sued out. It could not be
sued out at all until the debt was first made a matter
of record. In the words of the learned Justice: **To
authorize a writ of extent, however, the debt must be a
matter of record in the King's exchequer. The 33 Henry
Vin, c. 39 sec. 50, made all specialty debts due to the
King of the same force and effect as debts by statute
staple, thus giving to such debts the effect of debts of
record.'' The fact is thus fixed that after the auditors
of the Exchequer had converted the balance due on open
account from a collector into a debt of record, a writ of
extent could be issued for its collection; and a writ of
extent was simply what American lawyers call an attach-
ment, because its sole purpose was to give the Crown a
preference lien upon the lands and goods of the debtor
as against bona fide purchasers. Blackstoiie makes it
all very plain when, in describing the writ of extent, he
says x^"^ * * The lands and goods may be taken by the proc-
ess, usually called an extent, or extendi facias, because
the sheriff is to cause the lands, etc., to be appraised to
their full extended value, before he delivers them to the
plaintiff, that it may be certainly known how soon
the debt will be paid ; ... so that, if such oflScer of the
Crown aliens for a value consideration, the land shall
be liable to the sovereign's debt even in the hands of a
57—3 Bl. Com. 424-5.
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 201
bona fide purchaser, though the debt to the Crown was
contracted by the vendor many years after the aliena-
tion. ' ' Thus we know for certain that the writ of extent
that went into the hands of the sheriffs, at the suit of the
Crown, to collect its debt of record, was not an execution,
as Mr. Justice Curtis erroneously supposed, ending a
litigation, hut an attachment beginning one. Before the
writ could be issued the Crown had first to satisfy the
jury on the first inquisition that the circumstances jus-
tified its issue. Then followed the trial on the merits
upon every defense the Crown debtor saw fit to impose,
as explained heretofore by the opinion of the Exchequer
judges in Eex v. Homblower, and in Begina v. Byle.
No trained lawyer who will read the perfectly clear
history of the processes provided by English law for the
collection of debts due to the Crown since the violent
methods of John, based on the **grantings of writs of
execution without trial in the courts, * * were abolished by
Chapters 9 and 39 of the Great Charter, can doubt for
a moment that the single ground upon which the judg-
ment in Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Com-
pany was based is absolutely foundationless. The entire
history, illuminated as it is by the Exchequer reports,
West 's Treatise, and the recent restatement of the whole
matter by the Earl of Halsbury in **The Laws of Eng-
land, ' ' annihilates the assumption that, even in the dark-
est days of the Tudor despotism, auditors of the Ex-
chequer, without notice or hearing, could enter up a
balance against a collector of the revenue as a final judg-
ment upon which execution could issue. As no such rule
or practice ever existed in England at any time, the Act
of Congress of May 15, 1820, authorizing ministerial
officers of the Treasury of the United States, armed with
no judicial powers whatever, to do such a thing here was
of course grossly unconstitutional because forbidden by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which
denies, when properly interpreted, that claims against
collectors of the revenue can ever cease to be ** subjects
202 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 100
of judicial controversy according to the course of the law
of the land.''
It is equally impossible to defend the judgment of the
court in the case in question, even if we admit for
the sake of the argument, the existence in England of
the special rule or practice which is its sole and only
basis, for the simple and conclusive reason that the entire
fabric of despotic law, generally known as Star Chamber
law, built up during the Tudor period, was swept away
by the Revolutions of 1640 and 1688. The English con-
stitutional law that passed into our first state consti-
tutions, and thence into the first eight amendments to the
Federal Constitution, was drawn from the reformed Eng-
lish system as Blackstone defined it in 1758, and not
from the unref ormed system as Coke described it in 1632,
with the Star Chamber and High Commission intact.
That vital historical fact was first accepted by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, in Hurtado v. Califor-
nia *® when, in openly repudiating the definition of due
process contained in Murray v. Hoboken Land & Im-
provement Company, it said : **It is urged upon us, how-
ever, in argument, that the claim made in behalf of the
plaintiff in error is supported by the decision of this
court in Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Com-
pany, 18 How. 272. . . . The point in tlte case cited
arose in reference to a summary proceeding, questioned
on that account, as not due process of law. The answer
was : however exceptional it may be, as tested by defini-
tions and principles of ordinary procedure, nevertheless,
this, in substance, has been immemorially the actual law
of the land and, therefore, is due process of law. But
to hold that such a characteristic is essential to due proc-
ess of law, would be to deny every quality of the law but
its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improve-
ment. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and
Persians. This would be all the more singular and sur-
58—110 U. S. 528.
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (1896-1917) 203
prising in this qnick and active age, when we consider
that, owing to the progressive development of legal ideas
and institutions, the words of Magna Carta stood for
very different things at the time of the separation of the
American colonies from what they represented orig-
inally/* The good work thus begun by Mr. Justice
Matthews was continued in Twining v. New Jersey*^®
when the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moody, in
repudiating the definition of due process in question for
a second time, said: *'What is due process of law may
be ascertained by an examination of those settled usages
and modes of proceedings existing in the common and
statute law of England before the emigration of our
ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited to their
civil and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country. This test was
adopted b^the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cur-
tis, in Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
ment Company, 18 How. 272. ... Of course, the part
of the constitution then before the court was the Fifth
Amendment." After approving Mr. Justice Matthew's
repudiation in Hurtado v. California, Mr. Justice Moody
added : * * It does not follow, however, that a procedure
settled in English law at the time of the emigration and
brought to this country and practiced by our ancestors,
is an essential element of due process of law. // that
were so, the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth
century would he fastened upon American jurisprudence
like a straight jacket, only to be u/nloosed by a constitu-
tional amendment J*
And yet, despite these emphatic repudiations of the
unhistorical and misleading definition of due process
cofntained in the cade in question, its tap-root remains
unbroken. The tap-root consists of the entirely un-
founded assumption that there were in England a certain
class of Crown or government cases, which were imme-
Mortally excluded by a special rule or practice of the
5^—211 V. 8. 78.
204 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 100
Court of Exchequer from the protection of due process
or the law of the land, because, as Mr. Justice Curtis
expressed it, no government can allow certain matters
**to become subjects of judicial controversy according
to the course of the law of the land. ' * The earnest pur-
pose of the author is to demonstrate, first that no such
principle ever existed or could exist in the English con-
stitutional system; second, that no such special rule or
practice of the Court of Exchequer as Mr. Justice Curtis
put forward, ever did or does exist in England; third,
that the deadly doctrine drawn from that indefensible
assumption is eating like a canker sore into the vitals
of American constitutional law. As a striking illustra-
tion, reference may be made to the case of United States
V. Ju Toy,®* in which it is said: **It is unnecessary to
repeat the often-quoted remarks of Mr. Justice Curtis,
speaking for the whole court in Den ex dem. Murray v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Company, 18 How. 272,
280, to show that the requirement of a judicial trial does
not prevail in every case. Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U. S. 538, 546, 547 ; Japanese Immigrant Case
(Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U. S. 100; Public Clearing
House V. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 508, 509. '* In the second
case cited, the court, after referring to Murray v. Hobo-
ken Land & Improvement Company by name and saying
that ^4t was decided in that case [upon the false assump-
tion that has been herein exi)osed] to be consistent with
due process of law for Congress to provide summary
means to compel revenue officers and, in case of default,
their sureties to pay such balances of the public money
as might be in their hands,'* added: **Now, it has been
settled that the power to exclude or expel aliens belonged
to the political department of the government, and that
the order of an executive officer invested with the power
to determine finally the facts upon which an alien's right
to enter this country, or remain in it, depended, was
*due process of law,' and no other tribunal, unless ex-
60—198 U. 8. 253.
§ 100 FIFTH AMENDMENT— CONTINUED (18961917) 205
pressly authorized to do so, was at liberty to re-examine
the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its suffi-
dency/'** But unfortunately that deadly and entirely
unsupported doctrine has by no means been limited to
cases involving the expulsion of aliens. The last case
cited, Public Clearing House v, Coyne, involved the regu-
lation of the mails, and even as to that sacred subject
the court said: ^^It is too late to argue that due process
of law is denied whenever the disposition of property is
affected by the order of an executive department. • . .
The action of the department is accepted as final by the
courts, and even when involving questions of law this
action is attended by a strong presumption of its correct-
ness. Bates & G. Company v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, ante
894. That due process of law does not necessarily require
the interference of the judicial power is laid down in
many cases and by many eminent writers upon the sub-
ject of constitutional limitations. Den ex dem. Murray
v. Hoboken Laad & Improvement Company, 18 How. 272,
280.'* The regulation of the mails, including the free-
dom of the press, has thiis passed under the autocratic
control of an administrative system whose authority rests
now upon the judicial finding by our highest court that
under the American constitution there is a widening cir-
cle of governmental cases not protected hy the law of the
land, because certain matters can not be suffered by gov-
ernment *Ho become subjects of judicial controversy
according to the course of the law of the land.'' No sudi
rule of law ever existed in England in the past or present.
It finds its only parallel in the administrative law (droit
administratif) of France, a term for which there is no
equivalent in English legal phraseology for the reason
that among Anglican peoples the thing itself does not
exist. It has been defined to be **that portion of French
law which determines (i) the position and liabilities of
all state officials, and (ii) the civil rights and liabilities
of private individuals in their dealings as representa-
61— Ekiu ▼. United States, 142 U. 8. 651, and other eases cited.
206 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 100
tives of the state, and (iii) the procedure by which these
rights and liabilities are enforced, ' ' Droit administratif
has no right to exist in a country in which there is due
process of law or the law of the land, because it assumes
that the ordinary courts have no jurisdiction to admin-
ister it. Such law is administered by administrative
courts (tribunaux administratif s), at the head of which
stands in France the Council of State. Under the fatal
exception to the law of the land, bom of a lamentable
misapprehension in Murray v. Hoboken L^nd & Improve-
ment Company, we are rapidly building up a droit admin-
istratif in the United States, despite the noble effort
made in the historic case of United States v. Lee, 106
U. S. 196, to make such a result impossible.
CHAPTER IV
FEDEBAL POWEB OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND DUE PBOCESS
§ 101. Power of eminent domain vested in all states^
federal as well as single. The term seems to have orig-
inated with Grotius. De Jure BeUi et Pads, i, 3, 6, ii,
14, 7. See Bynkershoek QtuBstiones I, p. ii, 15. As it is
employed by Vattel, it was probably imported into the
English langaage through the Translation of 1760. See
Holland, Jurisprudence, p. 377, note 1. In Gardner v.
Newburg, 2 Johns, j a 162, Chancellor Kent says : * * Gro-
tius, Pnffendorf and Bynkershoek, when speaking of
the eminent domain of the sovereign, admit that private
property may be taken for public uses, when public neces-
sity or utility require it. ' * See also Thayer Cos. Const
Law, 945, 947. In Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367,
the Court said : * * The powers vested by the Constitution
in the General Government demand for their exercise the
acquisition of lands in all the states. These are needed
for forts, armories and arsenals, for navy yards and
light-houses, for custom houses, postoffices, and court
houses, and for other public uses. The right is the off-
spring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from
sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law.
Vatt. eh. 20, 34 ; Bynk., lib. 2, ch. 15 ; Kent, Com. 338-340 ;
Cooley, Const. Lim., 584, et seq. But it is no more neces-
sary for the exercise of the powers of a state government
than it is for the exercise of the conceded powers of the
Federal Government. That Government is a sovereign
within its sphere as the states are within theirs. True,
its sphere is limited. Certain subjects only are com-
mitted to it ; but its power over those subjects is as full
and complete as is the power of the states over the sub-
207
208 DUE PBOCBSS OF LAW { 101
jects to which their sovereignty extends. The power is
not changed by its transfer to another holder." In
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, Mr. Justice Johnson, in
defining the right of eminent domain, said: '^A right
which a magnanimous and just government will never
exercise without amply indemnifying the individuals, and
which perhaps amounts to nothing more than the power
to oblige him to sell and convey, when the public neces-
sities require if In the United States v. Jones, 109
U. S. 513, it was held that as the right is an incident of
sovereignty, it requires no constitutional recognition.
See also, Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 ; Charles River Bridge
V. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420.
§ 102. The eminent domain vested in Federal Govern-
ment paramount. In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan-
sas B. Co., 135 U. S. 661, the Court said: ^'As was said
by Mr. Justice Bradley in Stockton v. Baltimore & N.
Y. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9, 19 : * The argument based upon
the doctrine that the states have the eminent domain or
highest dominion in the lands comprised within their
limits, and that the United States have no dominion in
such lands, can not avail to frustrate the supremacy given
by the Constitution to the government of the United
States in all matters within the scope of its sovereignty.
This is not a matter of words, but of things. If it is
necessary that the United States government should have
an eminent domain still higher than the states, in order
that it may fully carry out the objects and purposes of
the Constitution, then it has it. Whatever may be the
necessities or conclusions of theoretical law as to eminent
domain or anything else, it must be received as a postu-
late of the Constitution that the government of the
United States is invested with full and complete power
to execute and carry out its purposes. ' It would be very
strange if the national government, in the execution of
its rightful authority, could exercise the power of emi-
nent' domain in the several states, and could not exercise
§ 103 FEDERAL POWER OP EMINBNT'DOMAIN 209
the same power in a territory occupied by an Indian tribe
or nation,'^ The paramount right of eminent domain
vested in the Federal Government, so far as it effects
public waters, was reasserted with great emphasis in the
recent case of Greenleaf Lumber Go. v. Garrison, 237
U, S. 251, in which the Court, after a careful review of
the authorities, said: ^^We have recognized that the
states have a certain control and management over the
navigable streams within their territory, but subject to
be superseded by the interference of Congress. Gilman
V. Philadelphia, supra; Pound v. Turck, 95 IT. S. 459;
Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678. When Congress
acts, necessarily its power extends to the whole expanse
of the stream, and it is not dependent upon the depth
or shallowness of the water. To recognize such distinc-
tion would be to limit the power when and where its
exercise might be most needed. In Scranton v. Wheeler,
179 U. S. 141, the water was very shallow between the
high land and the pier erected in the river by the author-
ity of Congress and which it was contended cut off access
to navigability/* n
§ 103. Paramoimt right of eminent domain limited by
due process. Over and above the paramount right of
eminent domain vested in the Federal Government sits
the restraining power of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which provides that **No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.'' If the last em-
phasizing clause had been omitted, the right to compen-
sation for the taking of private property for a public
use would have been complete under the due process
clause alone. In construing the North Carolina consti-
tution, which contained no specific provision for compen-.
sation, the Court, in Baleigh, etc. B. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev.
& B. L. 451, after referring to the guaranty of * * the law
of the land," said : ** Under the guaranty of this article.
Doe ProcoM— 14
210 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 103
it has been held, and in our opinion properly held, that
private property is protected from the arbitrary power
of transfer by one person to another We doubt not
that it is also protected from the power of despotic
resumption, upon a legislative declaration of forfeiture,
or merely to deprive the owner of it, or to enrich the
treasury, unless as a pecuniary contribution by way of
tax. Though not so obvious, it may also be true that the
clause under consideration is restrictive of the right of
the public to the use of private property, and impliedly
forbids it, without compensation. ' * In Monongahela Nav-
igation Co. V. United States, 148 IT. S. 12, a higher court
said: ^^In the case of Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N. J.
L. 129, 145, cited in the case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay &
M. Canal Co., 13 Wall. 166, 178, it was said that Hhis
power to take private property reaches back of all con-
stitutional provisions ; and it seems to have been consid-
ered a settled principle of universal law that the right to
compensation is an incident to the exercise of that power ;
that the one is so inseparably connected with the other
that they may be said to exist not as separate and dis-
tinct principles, but as parts of one and the same prin-
ciple.'* And in Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns., ch. 162,
Chancellor Kent afSrmed substantially the same doctrine.
In Bauman v. Boss, 167 IT. S. 574, the Court said: **In
the 5th article of the earliest Amendments to the con-
stitution of the United States, in the nature of a bill of
rights, the inherent and necessary power of the govern-
ment to appropriate property to the public use is recog-
nized, and the rights of private owners are secured by
the declaration, *nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation. * The right of emi-
nent domain, as was said by this court, speaking through
the Chief Justice, in a recent case, *is the offspring of
political necessity, and is inseparable f r<Hn sovereignty
unless denied to it by the fundamental law. It can not
be exercised, except upon condition that just compensa-
tion shall be made to the owner; and it is the duty of
§ 104 PBDERAL POWER OP EMINENT DOMAIN 211
the state, in the conduct of the inquest by which the com-
pensation is ascertained, to see that it is just, not merely
to the individual whose property is taken, but to the
public which is to pay for it/ Searl v. Lake County
School Dist. No. 2, 133 U. S. 553, 562. The just compen-
sation required by the constitution to be made to the
owner is to be measured by the loss caused to him by
the appropriation. He is entitled to receive the value
of what he has been deprived of, and no more. To award
him less would be unjust to him; to award him more
would be unjust to the public. ' * See Wilson v. Lambert,
168 U. S. 611 ; Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237
U. S. 251.
§ 104. The taking must be for a pnUic use. In Wil-
kinson V. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, it was held that under the
right of eminent domain private property can only be
taken for a public use, upon the payment of just com-
pensation ; the right can not be asserted for the purpose
of taking private property for private purposes. West
Biver Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507 ; Cole v. La Grange,
113 U. S. 1, The taking must be for some of the recog-
nized necessities of government, such as the construction
of arsenals, forts, armories, navy yards, light-houses,
custom houses, postoffices, court houses, highways, rail-
ways, canals, bridges, wharves, parks for public use and
recreation and the like. See Kohl v. United States, 91
IT. S. 367; Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S.
525; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282; Chap-
pell V. United States, 160 U. S. 499; Wilson v. Lambert,
168 U. S. 611. In United States v. Gettysburg Electric
B. Co., 160 U. S. 668, the Court, in giving perhaps the
widest possible extension to the right of eminent domain,
said : * * The really important question to be determined
in these proceedings is whether the use to which the
petitioner desires to put the land described in the peti-
tions is that kind of public use for which the government
of the United States is authorized to condemn land. It
212 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 104
has authority to do so whenever it is necessary or appro-
priate to use the land in the execution of any of the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. Kohl v. United
States, 91 U. S. 367 ; Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan-
sas B. Co., 135 U. S. 641-656; Chappell v. United States,
160 U. S. 499. Is the proposed use to which this land
is to be put a public use within the limitation t The
purpose of the use is stated in the first act of Congress.
The appropriation act of August 18, 1894, also contained
the following: *For continuing the work of surveying,
locating, and preserving the lines of battle at Gettysburg,
Pa., and for purchasing, opening, constructing, and im-
proving avenues along the portions occupied by the
various commands of the Armies of the Potomac and
Northern Virginia on that field, . . . Any act of Con-
gress which plainly and directly tends to enhance the
respect and love of the citizen for the institutions of his
country and to quicken and strengthen his motives to
defend them, and which is germane to and intimately
connected with and appropriate to the exercise of some
one or all of the powers granted by Congress must be
valid. This proposed use comes within such description.
The provision comes within the rule laid down by Chief
Justice Marshall in McCuUoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
421, in these words: *Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adequate to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional.^ ''
§105. Right of legislature to determine what is a
public use. There can be no doubt that the right to deter-
mine whether or no an appropriation of private property
to a particular use, because of its public character, is
justifiable, is vested primarily in the legislature. It is
equally clear that after it has acted, stating its reasons
thereof, the power of review is vested in the judiciary, —
§ 106 FEDBEAL POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 213
to that department belongs the ultimate right to deter-
mine whether or no the use in question is in contempla-
tion of laW; a public use. A vivid illustration of the
relations actually existing between the two departments
is to be found in the foregoing case of United States v.
Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668, in which the
Court said: ^^In examining an act of Congress it has
been frequently said that every intendment is in favor
of its constitutionality. Such act is presumed to be
valid unless its invalidity is plain and apparent; no pre-
sumption of invalidity can be indulged in; it must be
shown clearly and unmistakably.'' That is to say that
in reviewing the legislative declaration of a public use,
the courts will permit it to prevail unless it is manifestly
erroneous when measured by legal standards. * * The judi-
cial function is merely that of fixing the outside border
of reasonable legislative action, the boundary beyond
which the taxing power, the power of eminent domain,
police power, and legislative power in general can not
go without violating the prohibitions of the constitution,
or crossing the line of its grants. ' ' Prof. J. B. Thayer,
7 Harvard Law Rev. 148. In Shoemaker v. United States,
147 U. S. 282, it was held that land in a city, appropriated
by law for public parks and squares, is taken for a public
use, no matter whether advantageous to the public, for
recreation, health or business.
§ 106. What constitutes a taking. That a physical
invasion and actual ouster of possession is necessary, at
least such a serious interruption to the necessary and
common use as will be equivalent to a taking, is explained
in Pumpelly v. Canal Co., 13 Wall. 166, in which the
Court said: **But there are numerous authorities to
sustain the doctrine that a serious interruption to the
common and necessary use of property may be, in the
language of Mr. Angell, in his work on water courses,
equivalent to the taking of it, and that under the constitu-
tional provisions it is not necessary that the land should
214 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 106
be absolutely taken. Ang. Wat. Sec 465, a ; Hooker v. N.
Haven and Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146; Eowe v.
Granite Bridge Co., 21 Pick. 344; Canal Appraisers v.
People, 17 Wend. 604 ; Lackland v. North Mo. R. E. Co.,
31 Mo. 180; Stevens v. Prop, of Middlesex Canal, 12
Mass. 466. And perhaps no state court has given more
frequent utterance to the doctrine that overflowing land
by backing water on it for dams built below is within
the constitutional provision, than that of Wisconsin.**
See Head v. Amoskeag M. Co., 113 U. S. 26; Pennsyl-
vania R. Co. V. MiUer, 132 U. S. 83 ; United States v.
Alexander, 148 U. S. 187. In United States v. Lynah,
188 U. S. 445, in which it was held that there was a tak-
ing of land within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, —
by the turning of a valuable rice plantation into an irre-
claimable bog as the necessary result of an improvement
in navigation by the Federal Government, — ^the Court
said: **But if any one provision can be considered as
settled by the decisions of this court, it is that, although
in the discharge of its duties the government may appro-
priate property, it can not do so without being liable to
the obligation cast by the 5th Amendment of paying just
compensation.*' And yet where acts are done in the
proper exercise of governmental power, not directly en-
croaching upon private property, although their conse-
quences may injure its use, they do not entitle the owner
to compensation. Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99
U. S. 635. See also, Montana Co. v. St. Louis Min., etc.,
Co., 152 U. S. 160. In Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S.
269, where the riparian owner was deprived during a
greater part of the season of access to his landing by the
construction of a dike by the Federal Government in the
improvement of a navigable stream, — ^the Court said:
**The 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. Here, how-
ever, the damage of which Mrs. Gibson complained was
not the result of the taking of any part of her property,
§ 107 FEDERAL POWER OP EMINENT DOMAIN 215
whether upland or sabmerged, or a direct invasion
thereof, but the incidental consequence of the lawful and
proper exercise of a governmental power. ' ' In Scranton
V. Wheeler, 179 TJ. S, 141, it was held that there was no
violation of the Fifth Amendment, although a pier
erected by the Federal Government on land submerged
under navigable waters permanently destroyed access to
such waters upon the part of a riparian proprietor own-
ing the title, when the act complained of was merely for
the improvement of navigation. It was said that no mat-
ter whether the title to the land was owned by a riparian
proprietor or the state, it was acquired subject to the
rights which the public have in the navigation of such
waters. In Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217,
compensation was denied where damage to land was the
consequence of flooding resulting from the construction
of revetments by the United States. The Court said:
''In the case at bar the damage was strictly consequen-
tial. It was the result of the action of the river through
a course of years. The case at bar, therefore, is distin-
guishable from the Lynah Case [188 U. S. 445] in the
cause and manner of the injury. In the Lynah Case the
works were constructed in the bed of the river, obstructed
the natural flow of its water, and were held to have
caused, as a direct consequence, the overflow of Lynah *s
plantation. In the case at bar the works were constructed
along the banks of the river, and their effect was to resist
erosion of the banks by the waters of the river. There
was no other interference with natural conditions.*' See
also Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473 ; Union Bridge
Co. V. United States, 204 U. S. 364 ; Monongahela Bridge
Co. V. United States, 216 U. S. 177; Jackson v. United
States, 230 U. S. 1 ; Peabody v. United States, 231 U. S.
530; Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S.
546 ; Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 267.
§ 107. Necessity that justifies the taking. In Missis-
sippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403,
216 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 107
the Court said : ^ ^ The right of eminent domain, that is
the right to take private property for public uses, apper-
tains to every independent government. It requires no
constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sov-
ereignty. The clause found in the constitutions of the
several states providing for just compensation for prop-
erty taken is a mere limitation upon the exercise of the
right When the use is public, the necessity or expe-
diency of appropriating any particular property is not
a subject of judicial cognizance,'^ In Shoemaker v.
United States, 147 U. S. 282, the Court said: *'The
adjudicated cases likewise establish the proposition that
while the courts have power to determine the use for
which private property is authorized by the legislature
to be taken is in fact a public use, yet, if this question
is decided in the affirmative, the judicial function is
exhausted; that the extent to which such property shall
be taken for such use rests wholly in the legislative dis-
cretion, subject only to the restraint that just compensa-
tion must be made.'' See also, Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 159, 160. In Backus
V. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 568, the Court
said: ** Neither can it be said that there is any funda-
mental right secured by the Constitution of the United
States to have the questions of compensation and neces-
sity both passed upon by one and the same jury. In
many states the question of necessity is never submitted
to the jury which passes upon the question of compensa-
tion. It is either settled affirmatively by the legislature,
or left to the judgment of the corporation invested with
the right to take property by condemnation. The ques-
tion of necessity is not one of a judicial character, but
rather one for determination by the lawmaking branch
of the government. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co.
v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 402, 406 ; United States v. Jones,
109 U. S. 513 ; Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Rail-
way, supra. ' ' In Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Smith, 171
U. S. 270, the Court said: **By granting a right of way
§ 108 PEDBEAL POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 217
400 feet in width, Congress must be understood to have
conclusively determined that a strip of that width was
necessary for a public work of such importance, and it
was not competent for a court at the suit of a private
party, to adjudge that only 25 feet thereof were occupied
for railroad purposes.'^ See also Northern Pac. R. Co.
V. Townsend, 190 U, S. 267, 272. In the light of the fore-
going cases it is hard to challenge the fact that ^'The
general principle is now well settled that when the uses
are in fact public, the necessity or expediency of taking
private property for such uses by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, the instrumentaUties to be
used and the extent to which such right shall be delegated
are questions appertaining to the political and legislative
branches of the government. ^ ' Matter of Niagara Falls,
etc., B. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 383.
§ 108. Necessity for compensation. If the legislative
power is the judge of the necessity which authorizes the
taking of private property, it is under a double necessity
to provide for the payment of just compensation. As
heretofore pointed out, the guaranty of due process of
law alone obliges a sovereign to compensate the owner
whose property is taken by its authority. The express
constitutional guaranties, state and Federal, simply
restate and intensify that primary obligation. When
Grotius defined the right of eminent domain, he coupled
with it the right of the party deprived of his property
to receive its value from the public treasury. That
right to compensation, founded on a ** clear principle of
natural equity'' (Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,
148 U. S. 312) has been reaffirmed id express terms in
most of the state constitutions, and in the constitution
of the United States. Such provisions are limitations
upon the right of eminent domain, the conditions upon
which it must be exercised. United States v. Jones, 109
U. S. 613 ; Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 13
218 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 108
Wall. 166; Hot Springs B. Co. v. Williamson, 136
U. S. 121.
Only upon condition that just compensation shall be
made to the owner — compensation just not only to the
individual whose property is taken, but to the public
charged with its payment — can the right of eminent do-
main be exercised. Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 133 U. S.
553. The statute granting the right of eminent domain
must provide for reasonable compensation to the owner
as a condition precedent to the exercise of the right.
Sweet V. Eechel, 159 U. S. 380. Even when the Federal
Government, in the exercise of its supreme control over
the regulation of commerce, can take private property,
it can do so only on payment of just compensation.
Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312.
Whenever private property is thus taken for public pur-
poses it must be after full compensation to the owner-
United States V. Russell, 13 Wall. 623. There is no
authority to enter upon the property of an individual
or of a state and appropriate it without just compensa-
tion, under a Federal franchise to a corporation, state
or national, to establish interstate communication. Rich-
mond V. Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 174 U. S.
761. In the absence of an express provision requiring
it, it is not necessary that compensation be made in
advance of the taking. The constitutional guaranty that
private property can not be taken for public use without
just compensation is satisfied, provided provision is made
for compensation at once certain and adequate. Chero-
kee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641;
Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380. In condemnation cases
the sovereign may authorize the taking of possession
prior to the final adjudication of the amount of compen-
sation and the payment of the same. Backus v. Fort
Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557.
§109. What kind of property may be taken. The
power of eminent domain extends to all kinds of prop-
§ 110 FEDERAL POWER OP EMINENT DOMAIN 219
erty, real and personal, including f ranchises, easements
and incorporeal hereditaments. Richmond, F. & P. B.
Co. V. Louisa R. Co., 13 How. 71. In West River Bridge
Co. V. Dix, 6 How. 507, it was held that the power of
eminent domain extends over all private rights vested
under the government, including tiioee held by charter
or other contracts. In New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Lou-
isiana Light & Heat Prod, and Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650,
it was held that under the power of eminent domain,
and upon the payment of just compensation, rights and
privileges which had become vested upon the faith of
contracts made by the state could be taken away. See
Stone V. Southern Illinois & M. Bridge Co., 206 U. S.
267. A bridge possessed by an incorporated company
chartered by a state may be condemned and taken as a
part of a public road, under the laws of such state. West
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507. A water supply
system may be condemned under the power of eminent
domain. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn,
166 U. S. 685. The absence of a non-resident owner of
real estate from the state in which the property is situ-
ated, can not, in that way, prevent the exercise over it
of the power of eminent domain. Huling v. Kaw Valley
R. and Improv. Co., 130 U. S. 559. In Western U. Teleg.
Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 195 U.* S 570-574, the Court said :
"A railroad's right of way has, therefore, the substan-
tiality of the fee, and it is private property, even to the
public, in all else but an interest and benefit in its use.
It can not be invaded without the guilt of trespass. . . .
It follows from these views that the act of 1866 does not
grant the right to telegraph companies to enter upon and
occupy the rights of way of railroad companies, except
with the consent of the latter, or grant the power of
eminent domain. ' ' See also Spokane Falls & N. R. Co. v.
Zeigler, 167 U. S. 65.
§110. As the question of compensation is a judicial
one, a competent tribunal necessary. As the question
220 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 110
of compensation is a judicial one, it must be determined
by some kind of a tribunal capable of making a decision
after notice and hearing. In United States v. Jones^ 109
U. S. 513, the Court said : * * The proceeding for the ascer-
tainment of the value of the property and consequent
compensation to be made, is merely an inquisition to
establish a particular fact as a preliminary to the actual
taking; and it may be prosecuted before conunissioners
or special boards or the courts, with or without the inter-
vention of a jury, as the legislative power may designate.
All that is required is that it shall be conducted in some
fair and just manner, with opportunity to the owners of
the property to present evidence as to its value, and to
be heard thereon. Whether the tribunal shall be created
directly by an Act of Congress, or one already established
by the states shall be adopted for the occasion, is a mere
matter of legislative discretion. ^ ^ In Bauman v. Boss,
167 U. S. 593, the Court said: **By the constitution of
the United States, the estimate of the just compensation
for property taken for the public use, under the right
of eminent domain, is not required to be made by a jury ;
but may be intrusted by Congress to commissioners
appointed by a court or by the executive, or to an inquest
consisting of more or fewer men than an ordinary jury.
Curtiss V. Georgetown & A. ^ump. P. Co., 6 Cranch 233 ;
Secombe v. Milwaukee & St. P. E. Co., 23 Wall. 108, 117,
118; United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 519; Shoe-
maker V. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 300, 301; Long
Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685."
While the proceeding for the condemnation of land is a
judicial proceeding, it does not include the right to trial
by jury as a constitutional right. Kohl v. United States,
91 U. S. 367. See Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S.
499. In Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.
S. 568-569, the Court said: ** Neither can it be said that
there is any fundamental right secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States to have the questions of com-
pensation and necessity passed upon by one and the same
§ HI FEDERAL POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 221
jury. In many states the question of necessity is never
submitted to the jury which passes on the question of com-
pensation. It is either settled affirmatively by the legis-
lature, or left to the judgment of the corporation invested
with the right to take property by condemnation. The
question of necessity. is not one of a judicial character,
but rather one for determination by the lawmaking
branch of the government. Mississippi Biver Boom Co.
v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 402, 404 ; United States v. Jones,
109 U. S. 513 ; Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Bail-
way Company, supra. All that is essential is that in some
appropriate way, before some properly constituted tri-
bunal^ inquiry shall be made as to the amount of com-
pensation, and when this has been provided there is that
due process of law which is required by the Federal Con-
stitution. Bauman v. Boss, 167 U. S. 548, 593." See
Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U. S.
290 ; District of Columbia v. Lynchburg Invest. Corpora-
tion, 236 U. S. 692.
§ 111. Right of Congress to legislate against laches. In
Kankauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal
Co., 142 U. S. 254, the Court said : * * Congress was not
obliged to keep th0 act of 1875 (admitting the liability of
the TTnited States to pay for property taken for a public
use) in operation forever, and reasonable opportunity
having been afforded to the plaintiffs in error to obtain
compensation for the damages sustained by the con-
struction of the improvement, we think they must be
deemed to have waived their right to them. Where a
statute for the condemnation of lands provides a definite
and complete remedy for obtaining compensation, this
remedy is exclusive; the common law remedy or pro-
ceeding is superseded by the statute, and the owner must
pursue the course pointed out by it. Mills, Eminent
Domain, 87, 88. It is true that if the statutory remedy
be incomplete or imperfect, the owner is not thereby
debarred from his common law remedy and may recover
222 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § HI
his damages in an action of trespass or ejectment. But
it does not follow even from this that he has a right,
especially after acquiescing in the appropriation of his
land for a number of years, to take the law into his own
hands, and, manu forti, repossess himself of his own/*
PART II
DUE PROCESS AS A LIMITATION
ON STATE POWER
CHAPTEE V
THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
§ 112. Interstate citizenship created by Articles of Con-
federation. The one particular in which our first Federal
Constitution rose above the older Teutonic leagues, after
which it wks patterned, was embodied in the new princi-
ple of interstate citizenship it originated. That principle
infused itself neither into the constitution of the old Ger-
man Empire, nor of Switzerland, nor of Holland. Sec-
tion 1 of Article IV of the Articles of Confederation
provided that **the better to secure and perpetuate
mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of
different states in this Union, the free inhabitants of
each of these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens of the several states.''
Apart from that invention of an interstate citizenship
American statesmen in their first effort exhibited no f elr-
tility of resource whatever in the making of Federal
constitutions. The Articles of Confederation simply em-
bodied the old story of a federal league, with the federal
power vested in a single assembly, without an executive
head and without a judiciary, operating only on the states
as corporations.
§ 113. Developed by our second Federal Constitution
of 1789. In the words of Tocqueville, our second Federal
constitution of 1789 is based * * upon a wholly novel theory
which may be considered a great discovery in modem
political science.'^ That **novel theory** embodies (1) a
federal government with the independent power of taxa-
tion; (2) the division of the federal head into three
225
Dae Proeesfl — ^15
226 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 113
departments, legislative, executive, and judicial; (3) the
division of the federal legislature into two chambers;
(4) a federal government with delegated powers, the
residuum of power remaining in the states; (5) a federal
government operating not upon states in their corporate
capacity, but directly on individuals as such. If the basic
principle last stated had been carried at the outset,
to its logical conclusion, it would have been settled
from the beginning that the individuals upon whom
the new and unique creation acts are primarily its
own citizenB. But at the time of the drafting of
our existing constitution the sense of nationality had
not sufficiently advanced to permit the statement
of the ultimate and inevitable conclusion, that every
citizen of the Union is primarily a citizen of the United
States, and not merely of one of the states which com-
pose them. The thought of the Federal Convention of
1787 upon this vitally important subject was embodied
in Section 2 of Article IV, which provides that * * the citi-
zens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states." Beyond
that point the f ramers of the more perfect union were
not prepared to go. They did not attempt to do more
than establish an interstate citizenship to which they
imparted the qualities of uniformity and equality by
denying to every state the right to discriminate in favor
of its own citizens as against those of any other state.
In the absence of any positive assertion by federal
authority of any such thing as & primary citizenship of
the United States as such, thore was really no substan-
tial basis upon which to maintain its existence. The
better view is that prior to the adoption of the 14th
Amendment a man was a citizen of the United States
only by virtue of his citizenship in one of the states com-
posing the Union. If any such thing as a federal or
national citizenship then existed at all, it was nothing
more than a secondary and dependent relation »
§ 114 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 227
§ 114. The grand inquest in the Dred Soott Case. An
account has been given already of the grand inquest held
in the Dred Scott Case, 19 How. 393, in order to ascer-
tain whether or no such a thing existed as a citizenship
of the United States, defined as such by its Constitution
and laws, independent of state citizenship. The most
earnest seeker for such a citizenship was Mr. Justice
Curtis, who was in the highest degree qualified to ascer-
tain it, if it existed at all. His conclusion was that there
was no such thing, at that time, as a citizenship of the
United States, as a substantive thing independent of
state citizenship. He said: ''I can find nothing in the
Constitution, which, propria vigore, deprives of their cit-
izenship any class of persons who were citizens of the
United States at the time of its adoption, or who should
be native born citizens of any state after its adoption;
nor any power enabling Congress to disfranchise persons
bom on the soil of any state, and entitled to citizenship
of such state by its constitution and laws. And my
opinions that, under the Constitution of the United
States, every free person bom on the soil of a state, who
is a citizen of that state by force of its constitution or
laws, is also a citizen of the United States. . . . That
the Constitution itself has defined citizenship of the
United States by declaring what persons, bom within the
several states, shall or shall not be citizens of the United
States, will not be pretended. It contains no such dec-
laration.^^ Even if the learned Justice was right in his
assumption that Sandf ord 's plea to the jurisdiction was
baseless, and that Scott had the right to sue because
* * every such citizen, reisiding in any state, has the right to
sue, and is liable to be sued in the federal courts, as a citi-
zen of that state in which he resides, '^ it appears that
such citizenship of the United States as Scott was thus
supposed to possess was nothing more than a secondary
and dependent relation resulting from his state citizen-
ship.
228 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 115
§ 115. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
scope. To fill the vacuum disclosed by the grand inquest
held in the Dred Scott Case, 19 How. 393, was adopted
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which,
without making any direct reference to the question of
race at all, contains the first positive definition ever given
of citizenship of the United States as a primary and sub-
stantive thing, independent of state citizenship. It pro-
vides that **A41 persons bom or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States, nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.*^ An account has hereto-
fore been given of the historical side of the constitutional
revolution through which the creation of the new citizen-
ship shifted the center of gravity of the composite struc-
ture, partly national and partly federal, from the states
to the nation, thus nationalizing for the first time the
entire sphere of civil liberty. It was then ascertained
that as the Amendment made no direct reference to
the question of race, it was severed from its history and
given a construction as broad as the unqualified terms
that appear upon its face, thus settling the fact that the
new national citizenship was not created for the exclusive
benefit of the colored race, not limited to their protection.
§ 116. The new citizenship as defined in the Slaughter
House Cases. The sequel of the Dred Scott Case, 19
How. 393, is to be found in the Slaughter House Cases
(1872), 16 Wall. 36, in which another grand inquest was
held in order to ascertain the nature of the new citizen-
ship brought into existence by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The case for the plaintiffs in error was
presented in a far-reaching argument by the Hon. John
§ 116 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 229
A. Campbell, who had sat as one of the Justices in the
Dred Scott Case. The Court, speaking through Mr. Jus-
tice Miller, declared : ( 1 ) * * The first section of the Four-
teenth Article, to which our attention is more specially
invited, opens with a definition of citizenship — ^not only
citizenship of the United States, but citizenship of the
states. No such definition was previously found in the
Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define
it by Act of Congress. It had been the occasion of
much discussion in the courts, by the executive depart-
ments and in the public journals. It had been said by
eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United
States, except as he was a citizen of one of the states
composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been
bom and resided always in the District of Columbia
or in the territories, though within the United States,
were not citizens. Whether this proposition was sound
or not, had never been judicially decided. But it had
been held by this Court, in the celebrated Dred Scott
Case, only a few y^ars before the outbreak of the Civil
War, that a man of African descent, whether a slave or
not, was not and could not be a citizen of a state or of the
United States. This decision, while it met with the con-
demnation of some of the ablest statesmen and consti-
tutional lawyers of the country, had never been over-
ruled; and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional
limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the negro
race who had recently been made freemen were still, not
only not citizens, but were incapable of becoming so by
anything short of an amendment to the Constitution;''
(2) '*it (Section 1 of Article XIV) declares that persons
may be citizens of the United States without regard to
their citizenship in a particular state, and it overturns
the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within
the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens
of the United States. That its main purpose was to
establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no
doubt;'' (3) **the distinction between citizenship of the
230 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 116
United States and citizenship of a state is clearly rec-
ognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen
of the United States without being a citizen of a state,
but an important element is necessary to convert the
former into the latter. He must reside within the state
to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that
he should be bom or naturalized in the United States
to be a citizen of the Union ;*^ (4) ** there is a citizenship
of the United States and a citizenship of a state, which
are distinct from each other, and which depend upon
different characteristics or circumstances in the indi-
vidual;^' (5) ** privileges and inmiunities of the citizens
of the United States are placed by this clause under the
protection of the Federal Constitution, and that tiie lat-
ter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any
additional protection by this paragraph of the Amend-
ment. If then there is a difference between the privileges
and immunities belong to a citizen of the United States
as such, the latter must rest for their security and pro-
tection where they have heretofore rested, for they are
not embraced in this paragraph of the Amendment;'*
(6) ** having shown that the privileges and immunities
relied on in the argument are those which belong to citi-
zens of the states as such, and that they are left to the
state governments for security and protection, and not
by this article placed under the special care of the Fed-
eral Government, we may hold ourselves excused from
defining the privileges and inmiunities of citizens of the
United States which no state can abridge, until some
case involving these privileges make it necessary to do
so. But lest it should be said that no such privileges
and immunities are to be found if those we have been
considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some
which owe their existence to the Federal Government,
its national character, its Constitution, or its laws. One
of these is well described in the case of Crandall v. Ne-
vada, 6 Wall. 36. It is said to be the right of tiie citizen
of this great country, protected by implied guaranties
§ 117 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSfflP 231
of its Constitution, Ho come to the seat of government
to assert any claim he may have upon that government, to
transact any business he may have with it, to seek its pro-
tection, to share its offices, to engage in administering
its functions. He has the right to free access to its sea-
ports, through which all operations of foreign commerce
are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, land offices, and
courts of justice in the several states.' . . . Another
privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the
care and protection of the Federal Government over his
life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within
the jurisdiction of a foreign government. Of this there
can be no doubt, nor that the right depends upon his char-
acter as a citizen of the United States. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of griev-
ances, the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, are
rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Consti-
tution. The right to use the navigable waters of the
United States, however they may penetrate the territory
of the several states, and all rights secured to our citizens
by treaties with foreign nations, are dependent upon citi-
zenship of the United States, and not citizenship of the
state/'
§ 117. Question of birth as settled in U. S. v. Wong
Kim Ark. Twenty-six years passed by before the orig-
inal definition of the new citizenship given in the Slaugh-
ter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1872), was rounded out
in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898)
by an exposition of the phrase, **A11 persons bom or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof.^' Where the parents of a child bom in
the United States were citizens, there could be no diffi-
culty as to its nationality ; but the status of a child bom
in the United States of Indian, or of Chinese, or other
alien parentage was quite another matter. In the case
of Elk V. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 98, it was held that an
Indian bom a member of one of the Indian tribes still
232 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 117
recognized as snch — although he had voluntarily sepa-
rated himself from his tribe and taken up his residence
among the white people, but without being naturalized
or taxed — ^was born ** subject to the jurisdiction^* of his
tribe. Therefore he was not a citizen of the United
States, because not bom ''subject to the jurisdiction'*
thereof. Such was the prelude to the great case in which
was settled the legal status of all persons bom in the
United States of alien parentage. In the case of Wong
Kim Ark it was held that a child bom in the United
States of parents of Chinese descent — ^who at the time of
his birth are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have
a permanent domicile and residence in this country, and
are carrying on business here, and not employed in any
diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of
China — becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the
United States, by virtue of the first clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Here the rule of the civil law as to
the allegiance of the parents was set aside in favor of
the common law rule of locality of birth, under which it
has been long held that every child bom in England of
alien parents is a natural bom subject, unless the child
of a diplomatic representative of a foreign state, or of
an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where
the child was born. In tracing that principle, with its
qualifications, back to the leading case known as Calvin 's
Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1, or the case of the Postnati, decided
in 1608, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Gray,
said that the Constitution of the United States must be
interpreted in the light of the common law. The inter-
pretation of the Constitution of the United States is
necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are
framed in the language of the English common law, and
are to be read in the light of its history. 124 U. S. 478.
**The fundamental principle of the common law with
regard to English nationality was birtii within the alle-
giance, also called Migealty,* * obedience,' * faith,* or
* power* of the King. The principle embraced all persons
§ 118 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 233
bom within the King's allegiance and subject to his pro-
tection.^' See Keck v. United States, 172 U. S. 446,
where it is said: ''These conclusions arising from a
consideration of the text of the statute are rendered yet
clearer by taking into view the definite legal meaning
of the word smuggling. That term had a well understood
import at common law, and, in the absence of a particu-
larized definition of its significance in the statute creating
it, resort may be had to the common law for the purpose
of arriving at the meaning of the word. Sweringen v.
United States, 161 U. S. 446; United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649.''
§ 118. Aliens, resident and nonresident. While aliens
are undoubtedly entitled to due process, the distinction
must be clearly drawn between such as are resident and
such as are nonresident. Every sovereign state has an
inherent right to forbid the entrance of foreigners within
its limits, or to admit them only upon such conditions
as its sovereign will may impose. As the exercise of
that power belongs to the political department of the
government. Congress may so legislate as^to provide for
the exclusion of aliens, fixing the conditions on which
they may be admitted, and the regulations under which
they may be deported in the event they have entered
contrary to law. It may also entrust the enforcement
of such regulations to executive oflScers. In United States
ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, the Court said :
* * It is contended that the act of Maroh 3, 1903, is uncon-
stitutional because in contravention of the 1st, 5th and
6th articles of amendment of the Constitution, and of
1 of article 3 of that instrument; and because no power
'is delegated by the Constitution to the general govern-
ment over alien friends with reference to their admission
into the United States or otherwise, or over the beliefs
of citizens, denizens, sojourners, or aliens, or over the
freedom of speech or of the press. ' Bepeated decisions
of this court have determined that Congress has the
234 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 118
power to exclude aliens from the United States ; to pre-
scribe the terms and conditions on which they may come
in ; to establish regulations for sending out of the country
such aliens as have entered in violation of law, and to
commit the enforcement of such conditions and regula-
tions to executive officers; that the deportation of an
alien who is found to be here in violation of law is not
a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and
that the provisions of the constitution securing the right
of trial by jury have no application. Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U, S. 581 ; Nishimura EMu v. United
States, 142 U. S. 651 ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U. S. 698; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158
U. S. 538; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228;
Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S, 296 ; Japanese
Immigration Case, 189 U. S. 86 ; Chin Bak Kan v. United
States, 186 U. S. 193 ; United States v. Sing Tuck, 194
U. S. 161/* Thus it seems to be settled that the order
of an executive officer excluding aliens, if made in accord-
ance with statutory authority, is necessarily due process.
In the cases of Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, and
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, just cited, it was held
that though Congress may, if it pleases, authorize the
courts to investigate and ascertain the facts upon which
the right of an alien to land is made by the statutes to
depend, still it may conunit the final determination of
such facts to an administrative officer. In that event
his order or determination is due process, and no other
tribunal, not expressly authorized by law to do so, has
the jurisdiction to examine the evidence upon which he
acted or to question its sufficiency. It was said, how-
ever, in a later case that **This court has never held,
nor must we now be understood as holding, that admin-
istrative officers, when executing the provisions of a stat-
ute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the
fundamental principles that inhere in *due process of
law' as understood at the time of the adoption of the
constitution. One of these principles is that no x>er8on
§ 118 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 235
shall be deprived of his Uberty without opportunity at
some time to be heard before such oflScers in. respect of
the matters upon which that liberty depends — ^not neces-
sarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and
according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one
that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contem-
plated by Congress, and as tiie same time be appropriate
to the nature of the case upon which officers are required
to act.*' Japanese Immigrant Case,- 189 U. S. 86. See
also TJ. S. V. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 ; and U. S. v. Ju
Toy, 198 U. S. 253, specially dissenting opinions in that
case of Justices Brewer and Peckham,
An yet, no matter how absolute or arbitrary the right
of exclusion may be, after an alien has once been admit-
ted according to law, he becomes entitled at once to the
protection due to a native or naturalized citizen of the
country, to whom belongs all the guaranties of life, lib-
erty and property secured by the constitution to all per-
sons within the jurisdiction of the United States. He
is entitled to the regular course of judicial proceedings
accorded to all other citizens when his life and liberty
are involved; he can not be deprived of either upon a
mere executive hearing. It follows, therefore, that the
exclusion laws can not be applied either to citizens of
the United States, nor to any other person who is not
in strictness an alien, although he may not be a full citi-
zen. Such equality of right is not to be acquired, how-
ever, by a clandestine entry and residence for a period
too brief to make the alien a part of the population. The
act of Congress fixing the period of one year after the
landing of such an alien, as the time within which he
may be deported on the order of the appropriate execu-
tive oflBcer, is constitutional. While temporary confine-
ment or detention may be prescribed as a means of giving
effect to the exclusion acts, an infamous punishment can
not be inflicted without a judicial trial to fix the guilt
of the accused. Congress can not declare that the offense
of unlawful residence by an alien is an infamous crime
236 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 118
punishable by imprisonment or at hard labor or by con-
fiscation of property upon a summary hearing. As to
the right to determine the status of a person entering
the country, it was held in 1895, in the case of an admitted
alien, that, under the act of Congress of August 18, 1894,
the holding of the immigration conmiissioner was conclu-
sive of the alien *s right to enter **by virtue of some law
or treaty." Three years later the decision of an admin-
istrative officer excluding an alien was reversed on habeas
corpus when the facts appeared by the government's
admission that the excluded person was a citizen of the
United States. When as a consequence of that decision
many claims of citizenship were set up by excluded aliens
in order to oust the jurisdiction of the immigration
officer, the Supreme Court in 1902 held (189 U. S. 86) that
the mere claim of citizenship did not affect the jurisdic-
tion of the immigration officer ; that * * the facts on which
such claim is rested must be made to appear.*' The
equality acquired by a resident alien, except as to his
property remaining here, is lost by a departure from the
country even for a temporary purpose. When he at-
tempts to return, after such an absence, he is subject to
the jurisdiction of the administrative official to the same
extent as upon his original entry. * * He can not by reason
merely of his domicil in the United States for purposes of
business demand that his claim to re-enter this country by
virtue of some statute or treaty shall be determined ulti-
mately, if not in the first instance, by the courts of the
United States, rather than exclusively and finally, in
every instance, by executive officers charged by an act of
Congress with the duty of executing the will of the i>oliti-
cal department of the government in respect of a matter
wholly political in its character.'* Lem Moon Sing v.
U. S., 158 U. S. 538, 548. In a case of Chin Bak Kan
v. United States, 186 U. S. 193, just cited, the court
said: *'It is impossible for us to hold that it is not compe-
tent for Congress to empower a United States commis-
sioner to determine the various facts on which citizenship
§ 119 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 237
depends;*' and two years later it was held that when a
claim to citizenship is decided adversity by an immigra-
tion inspector there is no immediate right of recourse to
the courts; that an appeal, according to the procedure
defined by the statute, must first be taken to the secretary
of the treasury, as an indispensable prerequisite of an
appeal to the courts by habeas corpus. (U. S. v. Sing
Tuck, 194 U. S. 161.) When in 1905 a person claim-
ing citizenship was denied the right of entry by the
collector of the port of San Francisco, and an appeal
was taken to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, by
whom the ruling was confirmed, an application was made
for a habeas corpus to the District Court which held,
** seemingly on new evidence,*' that the applicant was a
native bom citizen of the United States. That decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court upon the ground
that the District Court should have disposed of the ques-
tion presented by the writ without the hearing of new
evidence as to citizenship, as there was no proof tend-
ing to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the
administrative officer, in the absence of which the decision
of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor was conclusive,
even upon the question of citizenship. The Court speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Holmes said: **If, for the
purpose of argument, we assume that the Fifth Amend-
ment applies to him, and that to deny entrance to a
citizen is to deprive him of liberty, we nevertheless are
of opinion that with regard to him, due process of law
does not require judicial trial. That is the result of the
cases which we have cited, and the almost necessary
result of the power of Congress to pass exclusion laws. ' *
U. S- V. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253.
§ 119. Right to due process in unincorporated territory.
After commenting in another work, upon the case of
Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603, the author said: "By that
time (1850) the following propositions had become firmly
settled in the constitutional law of this country: (1) That
238 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 119
when territory is subdued by the axmies of the United
States, it passes under the despotic power of the Presi-
dent, as commander-in-chief, who, in the exercise of that
power, is unrestrained by the Constitution and laws of
the United States; (2) that when territory is thus
acquired by conquest, its holding is a mere military occu-
pation until, by a treaty of peace, the acquisition is
confirmed; (3) that when the new acquisition passes into
a territorial condition, the despotic war power vested in
the President, as conunander-in-chief, is superseded by
the power of Congress, which is equally unlimited, except
as to such constitutional * provisions as go to the very
root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective
of time or place;' (4) that until the ceded territory is
admitted as a state, it is not drawn within the circle of
constitutional guarantees which apply in their entirety to
states alone/' Origin and Growth of the Am, Const., p.
387, Prior to incorporation by act of Congress, ''the
territory is to be governed under the power existing in
Congress to make laws for such territories, and subject
to such constitutional restrictions upon the powers of
that body as are applicable to the situation.'' So long
as held in that way such territory is subject to the will
of Congress as the supreme law subject only to certain
''fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights,"
imbedded rather in the spirit than the letter of the Con-
stitution. While bills of attainder and ex post facto laws
could not be applied by Congress to such territory it
has been held that the right to a jury trial, and the right
to indictment by a grand jury, as provided for in the
Fifth and Sixth Articles of Amendment, are not included
among the rights to which the inhabitants of unincorpo-
rated territory are entitled. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S.
244. Are the inhabitants of such unincorporated territory
entitled, as a fundamental right, to due process of lawf
That question was answered in the affirmative in Ochoa v.
Hernandez, 230 U. S. 139, where the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Pitney, said: "The court below held
§ 120 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 239
(5 Porto Bico Fed. Bep. 463) that, assuming General
Henry possessed all the legislative power that is pos-
sessed by Congress under the Constitution, he was still
necessarily subject (as Congress would be) to the due
process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment. And since
his judicial order, because of its retroactive clause, by its
terms covered the present case, where the real owners of
the land were infants and unable to protect themselves,
and where they still had, under the mortgage law as it
stood, nearly twelve years in which to attain maturity and
contest the possession and right of Morales, and since
the order shortened the period of limitation to six years,
which period in their case had already elapsed, the order
at the same time contained no provision for saving exist-
ing rights or giving to them or to others in like situation
any opportunity to assert their rights, — ^it was the same
in effect as taking their property without due process
of law. Under all the circumstances we deem it clear
that the governor was without authority from the Presi-
dent to make any order, judicial in its nature, that would
have the effect of depriving any person of his property
without due process of law. . . . Without, the guaranty
of *due process' the right of private property can not be
said to exist, in the sense in which it is known to our
laws. The principle, known to the common law before
Magna Carta, was embodied in that Charter (2 Coke,
Inst. 45, 50), and has been recognized since the Bevolu-
tion as among the safest foundations of our institutions.
Whatever else may be uncertain about the definition of
the term *due process of law,' all authorities agree that
it inhibits the taking of one man's property and giving
it to another, contrary to settled usages and modes of
procedure, and without notice or an opportunity for a
hearing. ' '
§ 120. Right to due process in incorporated territory.
After territory has been ** incorporated into the United
States," it is subject to its Constitution, and its inhabi-
240 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 120
tants are then entitled to all the guaranties of life, liberty,
and property contained in the national bill of rights
embodied in the first eight articles of Amendment. Such
incorporation may result from the terms of the treaty
of session through which the United States acquires it
from the sovereign ceding it, and from the legislation
of Congress enacted after its acquisition. Subject to
the rights thus acquired Congress must legislate for all
the territories, including Alaska and Hawaii Like
restrictions rest upon Congress when legislating for all
places acquired by the United States within the several
states for forts, arsenals, and the like, and for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, the
Court said : * ' There is nothing in the history of the Con-
stitution or of the original amendments, to justify the
assertion that the people of this District (of Columbia)
may be lawfully deprived of the benefit of any of the
constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, and property —
especially of the privilege of trial by jury in criminal
cases. ' ' It was held however in Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U. S. 1, that a trial by a jury of twelve men
before a justice of the peace, having been unknown in
England or America before the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, is not a trial by jury within the Seventh Article
of Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
§ 121. A corporation a person within the meaning of
Section 1. The Fifth as well as the Fourteenth Amend-
ment uses the word ** person'* to describe those who are
entitled to the protection of due process of law, that term
embracing all within the territory of the United States,
regardless of differences of nationality, race or color.
Wong Wing v. U. S., 163 U. S. 236; Tick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U. S. 369. Not until the case of Santa Clara Co. v.
Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U. S. 394 (1886) was it
definitely held for the first time that a corporation is a
person within the meaning of the section in question.
Then followed the cases of Minn. By. Co. v. Beckwith, 129
§ 122 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 241
U. S. 26 ; Covington & L, Tump. Boad Co. v. Sandf ord,
164 U. S. 578 ; and Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, in which
''it is now settled that corporations are persons within
the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding
the deprivation of property without due process of law
as well as the denial of the equal protection of the laws. ' *
Thus it was settled that corporations are ''persons" but
not citizens entitled to the "privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States." As the Santa Clara
case involved a domestic corporation it was afterwards
held in Philadelphia Fire Ass^n. v. New York, 119 U. S.
110, that a state could prescribe whatever condition it
saw fit for permitting a foreign insurance company to
transact business within its limits even to the extent of
total exclusion although it could not exclude an indi-
vidual. Such power of exclusion can not be applied,
however, to corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce, or to agencies of the General Government ' ' The
only limitation upon this power of the state to exclude
a foreign corporation from doing business within its
limits, or hiring officers for that purpose, or to exact con-
ditions for allowing the corporation to do business or
hire officers there, arises where the corporation is in the
employ of the Federal Government, or where its business
is strictly commerce, interstate or foreign. The control
of such commerce, being in the Federal Government, is
not to be restricted by state authority. * '
§ 122. Two bulwarks against the unlawful or unequal
exercise of state power. Due consideration has now
been given to the creative part of Section 1, which pro-
vides that "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside.'' What remains is the protective part which
declares that "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States ; nor shall any state deprive
Due Process — 16
242 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 122
any person of life, Uberty or property , without due
process of law ; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. ' ' As explained
heretofore the final clause guaranteeing the equal pro-
tection of the laws is an American invention that
originated with the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and therefore stands entirely apart from the due
process clause which came to us from the mother country.
The equal protection clause will therefore be made the
subject of Part III, where it will be treated entirely apart
from the due process clause, which is the subject of Part
n. The two clauses have, however, one motive in com-
mon that must never for a moment be lost sight of. Prior
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the citi-
zens of a state could rely for due process, or for
protection against unequal laws upon the institutions
of the state alone. When such protection was denied
the Federal Government had no right whatever to
interfere. Section 1 was intended to fill that vacuum
by imposing two limitations universal in their appli-
cation. In the words of the Court in the Civil Eights
Cases, 109 XJ. S. 3. **It is state action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the Amend-
ment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and
makes all state legislation, and state action of every kind,
which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, or which injures them in life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or which
denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.
It not only does this, but, in order that the national will,
thus declared, may not be a mere brutum fulmen, the last
section of the Amendment invests Congress with power
to enforce it by appropriate legislation. ' ' To quote again
the words of the Court in Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310 :
*'The Fourteenth Amendment, it has been held, legiti-
mately operates to extend to the citizens and residents of
the states the same protection against arbitrary state
§ 123 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 243
legislation affecting life, liberty, and property as is
offered by the Fifth Amendment against similar legisla-
tion by Congress. ' '
§123. Due process clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments should receive identical construction. There
is no foundation for the idea that the ancient English
formula of due process of law — ^thus expressed in the
Fifth Amendment, *'No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;*' and
thus expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment, **nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law — '* should not
receive an identical construction, regardless of the part
of the constitution in which it is contained. The fact
that the formula passed first into the Fifth Amendment,
and thence into the Fourteenth only strengthens the idea
that it should have the same meaning in both. It is not
likely that any doubt would ever have been entertained
as to a truth so obvious had it not have been for the
grave mistake made in the definition first given of due
process as contained in the Fifth Amendment in the case
of Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18
How. 272, heretofore examined at great length. The fact
was then emphasized that the unsound definition thus
given was formally repudiated, first in Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U. S. 516, and then in Twining v. New Jersey,
211 TJ. S. 78. In the case last cited the Court said: **0f
course, the part of the Constitution then before the
Court was the Fifth Amendment. If any different mean-
ing of the same words, as they are used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, can be conceived, none has yet appeared in
judicial decision.'* And yet something like a doubt had
been expressed in the earlier case of Carroll v. Greenwich
Ins. Co., 199 TJ. S. 401, where it was said that ''While
we need not affirm that in no instance could a distinction
be taken, ordinarily if an act of Congress is valid under
the Fifth Amendment it would be hard to say that a state
244 DUB PEOCESS OF LAW § 123
law in like terms was void under the Fourteenth. It
is true that, by the provision in the body of the instru-
ment, Congress has power to regulate commerce, and
that the act of Congress referred to in the cases cited
was passed in pursuance of that power. But even if the
Fifth Amendment were read as contemporaneous with
the original Constitution, the power given in the com-
merce clause would not be taken to override it so far as
the Fifth Amendment protects fundamental personal
rights. It is only on the ground that the right to combine
at will is a fundamental personal right that it can be held
to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, from any
abridgement by the states. ' ' If that statement was really
intended to express a doubt as to the question at issue,
it was removed by the subsequent and emphatic declara-
tion that **If any different meaning of the same words,
as they are used in the Fourteenth Amendment, can be
conceived, none has yet appeared in judicial decision."
§124. Only national dtizMisliip as such protected
against state action by the due process clause of Section
1, In the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, these dec-
larations were made : * * It is quite dear, then, that there
is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of
a state, which are distinct from each other and which
depend upon different characteristics or circumstances
in the individual. ... If , then, there is a difference be-
tween the privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen
of the United States as such, and those belonging to the
citizen of the state as such, the latter must rest for their
security and protection where they have heretofore
rested ; for they are not embraced by this paragraph of
the Amendment. . . . Having shown that the privileges
and immunities relied on in the argument are those which
belong to citizens of the United States as such, and that
they are left to the state governments for security and
protection, and not by this article placed under the special
care of the Federal Government, we may hold ourselves
§ 124 THE NEW NATIONAL CITIZENSfflP 245
excused from defining the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States which no state can abridge,
until some case involving these privileges may make it
necessary to do so. • • . But it is useless to pursue this
branch of the inquiry, since we are of opinion that the
rights claimed by these plaintiffs in error, if they have
any existence, are not privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States within the meaning of the
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under considera-
tion. ' ' That case grew out of an attempt upon the part
of the butchers of New Orleans to induce the Supreme
Court of the United States to annul an act of the state
legislature creating a certain monopoly, because, they
said, that it abridged their privileges and immunities as
citizens of the United States of property rights without
due process of law, contrary to Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court denied relief upon the
ground that whatever rights had been violated, if any,
belonged to ** citizens of the states as such,'* and not to
citizens of the United States as such. In other words that
the subject matter was one entirely under the control of
the police power of the State of Louisiana whose Supreme
Court had approved of the manner in which it had been
exercised in that particular case.
In order to guarantee to the states as great a latitude
as possible in the regulation of their systems of interior
law, it was likewise held in Hurtado v. California, 110
U. S. 516, that they are under no obligation to perpetuate
the grand jury as a means of presentment even in a
case of murder ; that a conviction for murder in the first
degree and a sentence of death, where the prosecution
was begun by information, is not illegal by reason of con-
flict with the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court said: **We are to construe this
phrase (due process of law) in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by the t^us loquendi of the Constitution itself. The
same words are contained in the Fifth Amendment. That
article makes specific and express provision for per-
246 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 124
petnating the institution of the grand jury, so far as
relates to prosecutions, for the more aggravated crimes
under the laws of the United States. It declares that
*No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in
time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb ; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself/ It then imme-
diately adds : *nor be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law. ^ According to a recognized
canon of interpretation, especially applicable to formal
and solemn instruments of constitutional law, we are
forbidden to assume without clear reason to the contrary,
that any part of this most important Amendment is
superfluous. The natural and obvious inference is, that
in the sense of the Constitution, *due process of law' was
not meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the insti-
tution and procedure of a grand jury in any case. The
conclusion is equally irresistible, that when the same
phrase was employed in the Fourteenth Amendment to
restrain the action of the states', it was used in the same
sense and with no greater extent; and that if in the
adoption of that Amendment it had been part of its pur-
pose to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in
all the states, it would have embodied, as did the Fifth
Amendment, express declarations to that effect. Due
process of law in the latter refers to that law of the land,
which derives its authority from the legislative powers
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the
United States, exercised within the limits therein pre-
scribed, and interpreted according to the principles of
the common law. In the Fourteenth Amendment, by
parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land in each
state, which derives its authority from the inherent and
reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of
§ 124 THE NEW NATIONAL CTTIZENSHIP 247
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all of our civil and political institutions,
and the greatest security for which resides in the right
of the i)eople to make their own laws, and alter them at
their pleasure. *The Fourteenth Amendment,^ as was
said by Mr. Justice Bradley in Mo. v. Lewis [101 XJ. S.
22], *does not profess to secure to all persons in the
United States the benefit of the same laws and the same
remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist
in two states separated only by an imaginary line. On
one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury
and on the other side no such right. Each state pre-
scribes its own modes of judicial proceeding. ' ^ ^
The same line of reasoning induced the Court, in Twin-
ing V. New Jersey, 211 XJ. S. 78, to hold that while an
exemption from self-incrimination is guaranteed as
against the action of the Federal Government by the
Fifth Amendment, such exemption is not such a funda-
mental right of national citizenship as to be included
among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States which the state governments are forbidden
to abridge by the Fourteenth Amendment. Before reach-
ing the conclusion that exemption from self-incrimination
is not guaranteed by the due process clause of that
Amendment, the Court said: *'But assuming it to be
true that the exemption from self incrimination is not,
as a fundamental right of national citizenship, included
in the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, counsel insist that, as a right specifically granted
or secured by the Federal Constitution, it is included in
them.^^ Li rejecting that contention the Court said:
''In Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, where the plaintiff
in error had been convicted in a state court of a felony
upon an information, and by a jury of eight persons, it
was held that the indictment, made indispensable by the
Fifth Amendment, and the trial by jury guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment, were not privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, as those words were
248 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 124
used in the Fourteenth Amendment. The discussion in
that case ought not to be repeated. All the arguments
for the other view were considered and answered, the
authorities were examined and analyzed, and the decision
rested upon the ground that this clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not forbid the states to abridge the
personal rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments,
because those rights were not within the meaning of the
clause * privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States.^ If it be possible to render the principle which
governed the decision more clear, it is done so by the
dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan. We conclude, therefore,
that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination
is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship
guaranteed by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgement by the states.''
CHAPTER VI
OENBBAL SCOPE OF THE GUAKANTY OF DUE PBOCESS
§ 125. The guaranty in English law. It has ever been
an elementary principle of American constitutional law
that every state legislature is endowed by its very nature
with the omnipotence of the English Parliament, save so
far as that omnipotence is restrained by express consti-
tutional limitations. That invention embodies the funda-
mental difference that divides two kindred political
systems, the one resting on the sovereignty of the people
as expressed in written constitutions, the other on the
sovereignty of Parliament. All of the national move-
ments in England through which the charters were
won were directed against the crown and not against
the parliament. **It is easy to see,^' says Mr. Justice
Miller in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, *Hhat
when the great Barons of England wrung from King
John, at the point of the sword, the concession that
neither their lives nor their property should be disposed
of by the crown, except as provided by the law of the
land, they meant by *law of the land^ the ancient and
customary laws of the English people, or laws enacted by
the parliament of which those barons were a controlling
element. It was not in their minds, therefore, to protect
themselves against the enactment of laws by the Par-
liament of England.^* The only suggestion ever made
in England that a limitation could be put by law upon
the onmipotent Parliament is that contained in Bonham 's
Case, 8 Coke 118a, where Coke says: **And it appears
in our books, that in many cases, the conmion law will
control acts of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them
to be utterly void; for when an act of Parliament is
249
250 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 125
against common right and reason, or repugnant or im-
possible to be performed, the common law will control
it and adjudge such act to be void. ' ' A closet speculation
equally valueless was indulged in by Blackstone (i, p. 40)
who says that * * the law of nature being coeval with man-
kind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in
obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe,
in all countries and at all times ; no human laws are of any
validity if contrary to this; and such of them as are
valid derive all their force and all their authority,
mediately or immediately, from this original. ^ * In com-
menting upon that declaration Mr, Dicey has said that
*^ expressions are sometimes used by modem judges
which imply that the courts might refuse to enforce
statutes going beyond the proper limits (internationally
speaking) of parliamentary authority. But to words
such as those of Blackstone, and to the obiter dicta of
the Bench, we must give a very qualified interpretation.
There is no legal basis for the theory, that judges, as
exponents of morality, may overrule acts of parliament.
Language which might seem to imply this amounts in
reality to nothing more than the assertion that the
judges, when attempting to ascertain what is the mean-
ing to be affixed to an act of parliament, will presume
that i)arliament did not intend to violate the ordinary
rules of morality, or the principles of international law,
and will therefore, whenever possible, give such an
interpretation to a statutory enactment as may be con-
sistent with the doctrines both of private and of inter-
national morality.'* The Law of the Constitution, pp.
59-60. Despite Austin's empty contention that an act cif
parliament, which violates fundamental principles, though
legal and binding, may still be unconstitutional, (Province
of Jurisprudence, Vol. VI) the fact is and has always been
that the English Parliament is legally omnipotent. Burke
did not go too far when he said that the ** Parliament of
Great Britain sits at the head of her extensive empire in
two capacities. One, as the local legislature of this island,
§ 126 SCOPE OF GUARANTY OP DUB PROCESS 251
providing for all things at home immediately, and by no
other instmment than the executive power. The other,
and I think her nobler capacity, is what I call her imperial
character, in which, as from the throne of heaven, she
superintends all the several inferior legislatures, and
guides and controls them all without annihilating any.**
Works, 4th ed. Vol. ii, p. 75.
While no limitation could restrain the omnipotent
parliament, even when it saw fit to pass bills of attainder
and other statutes providing for punishment without
trial, it was a recognized principle that, as against the
King and those who acted under his authority, the person
and property of the subject were protected by **the law
of the land, ' * including of course a jury in a proper case.
When therefore Henry VI granted to a London corpora-
tion of dyers the power to search for cloth, coupled with
the power to forfeit it when it was found to be dyed with
logwood, it was held that a charter granting such a right
of forfeiture was against the law of the land, because no
forfeiture can grow by letters patent. 2 Inst. 47, stated
in London's Case, 8 Coke 125a. In the same way it was
held in Bagg's Case, 11 Coke 100, that the law of the
land afforded protection against any unjust or arbitrary
action upon the part of a municipal corporation, because,
in the words of Lord Coke, such corporations ** derive
their authority from the King.** In that case it was
held that unless a city or borough had express authority
to do so by its charter or by prescription, it could not
disfranchise from the corporation any freeman of such
city or borough. In the absence of express authority it
was the right of such freeman, under the provision of
the Great Charter, to be convicted before removal by due
process of law. Reference is also made by Coke to a case
in which it was adjudged that a custom in a city was void
because ** against the law of the land.** 2 Inst. 46. See
McGehee, p. 24 $q.
§ 126. The guaranty in American law. Why does the
guaranty of due process, which in English law extends
252 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 126
only to executive action, extend in American law to the
three departments of power, executive, legislative and
judicial! The answer must be found in the history of
the process through which American constitutions, state
and federal came into existence. When the tie of political
dependence that bound the colonies to the mother country
was severed, the English provinces in America rose to
the full statute of sovereign states. **When the Revo-
lution took place the people of each state became them-
selves sovereign. * ^ And as soon as they * * took into their
own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives
and regalities which before belonged either to the crown
or the Parliament became immediately and rightfully
vested in the state. *^ Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 16
Pet. 410 sq. On the 10th of May, 1776, the Continental
Congress recommended to the several conventions and
assemblies of the colonies the establishment of independ-
ent governments * * for the maintenance of internal peace
and the defense of their lives, liberties, and properties. ' ^
Before the end of the year in which the reconunendation
was made, by far the greater part of the colonies had
adopted written constitutions in which were restated in
a dogmatic form all of the seminal principles of the
English constitutional systenL Thus ended that mar-
velous process of growth through which the . English
colonies in America were rapidly developed into a group
of independent commonwealths in which each individual
member was, in its organic structure, a substantial repro-
duction of the English kingdouL With the adoption of
the written constitutions of 1776, the typical English
state in America reached its full growth.
In coming into existence the typical American state
gave birth to the idea of constitutional limitations on all
state powers, executive, legislative, and judicial, a purely
American invention without a precedent in history. Such
limitations, of which the European world knew nothing,
grew naturally out of the process through which Amer-
ican legislatures were organized. From the very begin-
§ 126 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 253
ning the powers of the colonial assemblies were more or
less limited through the terms of the characters by which
such assemblies were either created or recognized. Even
in colonial times ** questions sometimes arose whether
the statutes made by these assemblies were in excess of
the powers conferred by the charter ; and if the statutes
were found in excess, they were held invalid by the
courts this is to say, in the first instance, by the colonial
courts, or, if the matter was carried to England, by the
Privy CounciL^* The colonial charter embodied a sys-
tem of government established by a superior authority
creating a subordinate law-making body that could do
everything except violate the terms and transcend the
powers of the instrument to which it owed its existence.
So long as the colony remained under the English crown
the superior authority which could amend or remake
the system of government was the English crown or
Parliament. When the tie binding the colonies to the
mother country was severed, that authority passed over,
not to the state legislature, which remained limited, as
it always has been, but to the people of the independent
commonwealth, whose will speaks through what is now
the state constitution, acting upon every department of
state power, executive, legislative and judicial, just as
the will of the crown or Parliament had spoken through
the charters of 1628 and 1691. As Mr. Justice Matthews
has well said in Hurtado v. California, 110 TJ. S. 516,
*'In this country written constitutions were deemed
essential to protect the rights and liberties of the people
against the encroachments of power delegated to their
governments, and the provisions of Magna Carta were
incorporated into bills of rights. They were limitations
upon all the powers of government, legislative as well as
executive and judicial. It necessarily happened, there-
fore, that as these broad and general maxims of liberty
and justice held in our system a different place and per-
formed a different function from their position and ofSce
in English constitutional history and law, they would
254 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 126
receive and justify a corresponding and more compre-
hensive interpretation. Applied in England only as
gaards against executive usurpation and tyranny, here
they have become bulwarks also against arbitrary legis-
lation ; but, in that application, as it would be incongruous
to measure and restrict them by the ancient customary
English law, they must be held to guarantee not particu-
lar forms of procedure, but the very substance of
individual rights to life, liberty and property. Restraints
that could be fastened upon executive authority with
precision and detail, might prove obstructive and injuri-
ous when imposed on the just necessary discretion of
legislative power, and, while in every instance, laws, that
violated express and specific injunctions and prohibitions,
might without embarrassment, be judicially declared
to be void, yet, any general principle or maxim founded
on the essential nature of law, as a just and reasonable
expression of the public will and of government, as insti-
tuted by popular consent and for the general good, can
only be applied to cases coming clearly within the scope
of its spirit and purpose, and not to legislative provisions
merely establishing forms and modes of attainment.
Such regulations, to adopt a sentence of Burke's *may
alter the mode of application but have no power over the
substance of original justice.' Tract on the Property
Laws, 6 Burke's Works, ed. Little and Brown, 323.''
While, as a general rule, the colonies, after being trans-
formed into independent states, adopted new constitu-
tions, the charter granted to Connecticut in 1662 was
continued as l^er organic law until 1818 ; and that granted
to Rhode Island in 1663 was continued as her organic law
until 1842. And it is certainly worthy of note, as hereto-
fore pointed out, that one of the first caises, if not the very
first, in which a legislative enactment was declared uncon-
stitutional and void, on the ground of conflict with the
constitution of a state, was decided under the charter last
named. But what is far more important is the fact that
this novel and supreme power of declaring an act of the
§126 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS 255
legislature void was assumed by the state oonrts, as a
creation of judge-made law, without a line or word of
authority on the subject in the state constitutions. The
state judges simply reasoned out the right on abstract
principles. As an illustration, reference may be made
to the words of Wythe, J., who, in the case of Com. v.
Caton, 4 Call, 5, said: Nay, more, if the whole legisla-
ture, an event to be deprecated, should attempt to over-
leap the bounds prescribed to them by the people, I, in
administering the public justice of the country, will meet
the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal ; and, point-
ing to the constitution, will say to them, here is the
limit of your authority ; and hither shall you go, but no
farther.^' When the new system of limitations, thus
developed in the states, was lifted into a higher sphere
through its application to the legislative power vested in
the unique federal republic created by the constitution of
1787, the inevitable outcome was the Supreme Court of
the United States, the only court in history that has ever
assumed the right to pass on the validity of a national
law. As there is no line or word in the federal constitu-
tion intimating directly the existence of such a right, it
was there reasoned out, as in the states, as a matter of
judge-made law. Not until thirteen years after the
organization of the Supreme Court was the first attempt
made, in the casQ of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137
(1803), to put the stamp of nullity upon a national law;
and not until twenty years after its organization was the
first attempt made, in the case of Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch, 87, (1810), to put the stamp of nullity upon a
state law — in both instances by reason of repugnancy to
the Federal constitution. Thus, by means of judicial
logic, and not by the authority of «in express constitu-
tional provision, was the Supreme Court of the United
States able to maintain its right to put the stapap of
nullity upon a law, stater or federal.
The limitation imposed upon the powers of a state for-
bidding it to deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
256 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 126
erty, without due process of law, extends to the exercise
of executive, legislative or judicial power, no matter by
what ofl5cers or agent, or agency it be exercised, so it be by
state authority. In that way is included the action of any
subordinate division of a state, such as a municipal cor-
poration. After referring to the words of Section I, of
the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court in
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, said: **They have
reference to the actions of the political body denominated
the state, by whatever instruments or in whatever modes
that action may be taken. A state acts by its legislative,
its executive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no
other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must
mean that no agency of the state, or of the officers or
agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. Whoever, by virtue of public positions under a
state government, deprives another of property, life or
liberty without due process of law, or denies or takes
away the equal protection of the laws, violates the con-
stitutional inhibition ; and as he acts in the name of and
for the state, and is clothed with the state's power, his
act is that of the state. This must be so or the constitu-
tional inhibition has no meaning. Then the state has
clothed one of its agents with power to annul or to
evade if
The wrongful acts or proceedings of individuals sim-
ply constitute private wrongs, or crimes of individuals.
Such acts when unsupported by state authority, do not
fall within the purview of the amendment. In the case
of Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, involving the valid-
ity of a moinicipal ordinance of the City and County of
San Francisco, providing that it should be unlawful for
any person to engage in the laundry business within the
corporate limits *' without having first obtained the con-
sent of the board of supervisors, except the same be
located in a building construed either of brick or stone,'*
it was held that * * Though the law itself be fair on its face
§ 127 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 257
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circum-
stances, material to theii* rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.
This principle of interpretation has been sanctioned by
this court in Henderson v. Mayor, eta, of New York,
92 U. S. 259 ; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275 ; Ex parte
Va,, 100 U. S. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U, S. 370; and
Soon Hing v. Crowley/' [113 U. S. 703.]
§ 127. Supreme Court of the United States as a super-
Yiaing and aniiTiniTTg tribimaL An effort has been made
heretofore to emphasize the fact that prior to the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment the citizens of a state
could rely for due process of law on the institutions of
the state alone; and when such protection was denied
the Federal Government had no right whatever to inter-
fere. The original constitution guaranteed nothing more
than a republican form of government in each state, and
the right of the citizens of each state to all the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the several states, a state of
things in which private property might have been confis-
cated and vested rights divested by the states without the
possibility of intervention by the Federal courts. Such
courts possessed no authority to interfere with state
action, executive, legislative or judicial, except in the case
of bills of attainder or laws impairing the obligation of
contract. The prohibition against ex post facto laws was
limited strictly to criminal cases. In the Words of
Mr. Justice Field, employed in Bartemeyer v. Iowa,
18 Wkll. 129, '* Before this amendment (14) and the
Thirteenth Amendment were adopted, the states had
supreme authority over all these matters, and the
National Government^ except in a few particulars, could
afford no protection to the individual against arbitrary
and oppressive legislation. After the Civil war had
Dae Proceflfl — ^17
258 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 127
closed^ the same authority was asserted, and, in the states
recently in insurrection, was exercised to the oppression
of the freemen; and towards the citizens of the North
seeking residence there, or citizens resident there who
had maintained their loyalty during the war for nation-
ality, a feeling of jealousy and dislike existed which could
not fail soon to find expression in discriminating and
hostile legislation. It was to prevent the possibility of
such legislation in future, and its enforcement where
already adopted, that the Fourteenth Amendment was
directed. It grew out of the feeling that a Union which
had been maintained by such costly sacrifices was, after
all, worthless if a citizen could not be protected in all his
fundamental rights everywhere — ^North and South, East
and West — ^throughout the limits of the Republic. The
amendment was not, as held in the opinion of the major-
ity, primarily intended to confer citizenship on the negro
race. It had a much broader purpose; it was intended
to justify legislation, extending the protection of the
National Government over the common rights of all citi-
zens of the United States, and thus obviate objections to
the legislation adopted for the protection of the emanci-
pated race. It was intended ta make it possible for all
persons, which necessarily included those of every race
and color, to live in peace and security wherever the
jurisdiction of the nation reached. It, therefore, recog-
nized, if it did not create, a national citizenship, «nd made
all persons citLsens except those who preferred to remain
under the protection of a foreign government; and
declared that their privileges and immunities, which
embraced the fundamental rights belonging to citizens of
all free governments, should not be abridged by any
state.*'
In order to fill the vacuum thus described, as existing
under the original constitution, was adopted the amend-
ment in question which in the language of the Supreme
Court (Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 325), '* legitimately
operates to extend to the citizens and residents of the
§ 127 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS 259
states the same protection against arbitrary state legislar
tion affecting life, liberty and property as if offered by
the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Con-
gress/' The result is that if the state fails to guarantee
due process of law and the equal protection of the laws
to citizens of the United States, as such, the Federal judi-
ciary can supervise the performance of that duty in such
a way as to vest the ultimate decision of every question,
involving due process of law and the equal protection of
the laws, in the Federal courts. But in the particular
case the Federal court can only determine whether the
state has failed in that duty; and, in that event, it can
only declare the proceedings void. The vital question
therefore in every case is whether or no the person who
complains has been deprived by official state action of
some right or immunity guaranteed to him by virtue of
his national citizenship, considered as a thing separate
and apart from his state citizenship, because it was
settled at the outset 'Hhat there is a citizenship of the
United States and a citizenship of the state, which are
distinct from each other and which depend upon different
characteristics or circumstances in the individual. * ' Only
the privileges and immunities that belong to a citizen of
the United States as such are placed by the amendment
under its protection ; those belonging to the citizen of the
states as such **must rest for their security and protec-
tion where they have heretofore rested ; for they are not
embraced by this paragraph of the amendment. '^ The
majority of the court who determined in the Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, to confine the amendment
within the narrowest possible limits determined so to
limit the revolution wrought by it as to prevent a radical
change of the whole theory of the relations of the state
and federal governments to each other, and of both gov-
ernments to the people. It was therefore held in United
States V. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, that **The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law;
260 DUE PEOCESS OF LAW § 127
but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as
against another. It simply furnished an additional guar-
anty against any encroachment by the states upon the
fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a
member of society. ' ^ And so it was said in Ee Kemmler,
136 U. S. 436, that ''The Fourteenth Amendment did not
radically change the whole theory of the relations of the
state and federal governments to each other, and of both
governments to the people. The same person may be at
the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen
of the state. Protection to life, liberty, and property
rests, primarily with the states, and the amendment fur-
nishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment
upon those fundamental rights which belong to citizen-
ship, and which the state governments were created to se-
cure.'^ The internal sovereignty of the state thus re-
mained BO unimpaired that it could still exercise the
sovereign rights of taxation, eminent domain, the police
power, the administration of justice, in civil and criminal
cases, with no restraint whatever so long as the guaran-
tees in favor of the new national citizenship were not vio-
lated. It was also considered necessary so to limit the
scope of the amendment as to prevent the Federal courts
from being submerged under a mass of new litigation in-
volving a review of nearly every transaction between the
state and its citizens. Its f ramers had no idea of convert-
ing the Supreme Court of the United States into a general
court of appeal with jurisdiction so wide and plenary as to
enable it to review all cases involving the taking away
of life, liberty and property when only questions of
equitable consideration or broad ideas of justice are
involved. That court remains as before a court not of
general but special appeal with power to supervise under
the amendment in question only when the oflBcial action
of the state has violated either its provisions, or those
of some act of Congress passed in pursuance of it.
When the question involves only the conformity of the
act with the constitution of a state, the decision of its
§ 127 SCOPE OP QUABANTT OP DUE PROCESS 261
highest court is final no matter how harsh or oppressive
the act may be. In Kirtland v. Eotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 ,
involving the state power of taxation, the Court said:
' ' It may therefore, be regarded as the established doctrine
of this court, that so long as the state, by its system of
taxation does not intrench upon the legitimate authority
of the Union, or violate any right recognized or secured
to the citizen by the constitution of the United States, this
court as between the citizen and his state, can afford no
relief against state taxation, however unjust, oppressive
or onerous/* The Federal courts have nothing whatever
to do with the policy or expediency of state laws, nor is
the hardship or injustice of such laws necessarily an
objection against their constitutional validity, * * The rule,
briefly stated, is that whenever an act of the legislature
is challenged in court the inquiry is limited to the ques-
tion of power, and does not extend to the matter of expe-
diency, the motives of the legislators, or the reasons
which were spread before them to induce the passage
of the act. This principle rests upon the independence of
the legislature as one of the co-ordinate departments of
the government. * * Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, etc., Eail-
way, 151 U. S. 1. There is no denial of due process when
the law is executed according to the established forms
and usages of a particular state, provided they embody
the fundamentals, no matter how much they may differ in
form from the laws of another state. As Mr. Justice
Bradley said in a leading case : * * The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not profess to secure to all persons in the
United States the benefit of the same laws and the same
remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist
in two states separated only by an imaginary line. On
one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury,
and on the other side no such right. Each state prescribes
its own modes of judicial proceeding. If diversities of
laws and judicial proceedings may exist in the several
states without violating the equality clause in the Four-
teenth Amendment, there is no solid reason why there
262 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 127
may not be such diversities in different parts of the same
state. ' ' Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22. As the Court
well said in a kindred case, involving the presence of due
process in a proceeding for the collection of state taxes,
it is always necessary **to distinguish between the
essentials of due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment and matters which may or may not be
essential under the terms of a state assessing or taxing
law. The two are neither correlative nor coterminous.
The first, due process of law, must be found in the state
statute and can not be departed from without violat-
ing the constitution of the United States. The other
depends on the law-making power of the states, and, as it
is solely the result of such authority, may vary or change
as the legislative will of the state may see fit to ordain.
It follows that to determine the existence of one (due
process of law) is the final province of this court, while
the ascertainment of the other (that is, what is merely
essential under the state statute) is a state question
within the final jurisdiction of the courts of last resort
in the several states. When, then, a state court decides
that a particular formality was or was not essential
under the state statute, such decision presents no federal
question, providing always the statute, as thus construed,
does not violate the constitution of the United States bv
depriving of property without due process of law. This
paramount requirement being fulfilled, as to other mat-
ters, the' state *s interpretation of its own laws is con-
trolling and decisive. ' ' Castello v. McConnico, 168 U. S.
674. In upholding the validity of a state statute limit-
ing the hours of labor in mines, the Court, in Holden
V. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, said: **We have no disposi-
tion to criticise the many authorities which hold that
state statutes restricting the hours of labor are uncon-
stitutional. Indeed, we are not called upon to express an
opinion upon this subject. It is sufficient to say of them
that they have no application to cases where the legis-
lature had adjudged that a limitation is necessary for the
§ 127 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUB PROCESS 263
preservation of the health of employees, and there are
reasonable grounds for believing that snch determination
is supported by the facts. The question in each case is
whether the legislature has adopted the statute in exer-
cise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action be
a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination, or the oppres-
sion, or spoliation of a particular case. The distinction
between these two different classes of enactments can not
be better stated than by a comparison of the views of
this court found in the opinion in Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U. S. 27, and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703,
with those later expressed in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U. S. 356. * ' Mere errors and irregularities in the decision
of a state court acting within its jurisdiction, do not
involve a denial of due process, so long as the funda-
mentals are observed. In Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 118
U. S. 194, a case in which a minor complained that he had
been deprived of dup process in a sale of his estate by his
guardian under a judicial order, the court said: **The
bond in question was a matter of procedure only, and if
it ought to have been required the court erred in order-
ing a sale without having first caused it to be filed and
. approved. At most, this was an error of judgment in
the court. The constitutional provision is, *Nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law.' Certainly a state can not be
deemed guilty of a violation of this constitutional obli-
gation simply because one of its courts, while acting within
its jurisdiction, has made an erroneous decision. '* In
Iowa Central Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, wherein
it was held that the refusal of a jury trial is not a denial
of a right protected by the Federal constitution, even
though it may have been clearly erroneous to construe the
laws of the state as justifying the refusal, — ^the Court
said : ** As said by this court, speaking through Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller, in Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 468:
*Law in its regular course of administration through
courts of justice is due process, and when secured by the
264 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 127
law of the state the constitutional requirement is satis-
fied.' There was a ^regular course of administratipn' in
the case at bar, as that term was employed in the case
cited. It is manifest that it was never contemplated by
the framers of the constitution that this court should
sit in review, as an appellate court, of such a question as
that presented by the record in the case at bar, viz.,
whether or not the highest court of a state erred in hold-
ing that it could rightfully determine from the statements
in the pleadings filed by both parties to a controversy
pending before it, that the averments of an answer set
forth no defense to the claim of the plaintiff. * *
But while it is thus settled that erroneous decisions
of a state court do not deny due process so long as they
are limited to questions involving conformity with the
constitution and laws of the state, the fact remains that
such decisions must not deprive a person of those funda-
mental rights which the Federal constitution guarantees.
Such rights must not be abridged either by the law which
the court is administering or by the conduct of the court
itself while acting under it. In United States v. Walker,
109 U. S. 258, the Court said: *'In the case of Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, Mr. Justice Field, after a review
of the cases bearing upon this subject, announces their
result as follows : * The doctrine invoked by counsel, that
when a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right
to decide every question which arises in the case, and its
judgment, however erroneous, can not be collaterally
assailed, is undoubtedly correct as a general proposition,
but is subject to many qualifications in its application.
It is only correct when the court proceeds, after acquir-
ing jurisdiction of the cause, according to established
modes governing the class to which the case belongs, and
does not transcend, in the extent or character of its judg-
ment, the law which is applicable to it. ' ' ' Such was the
basic principle of the decision in Wetmore v. Karrick,
205 U. S. 141, in which the Court said : * * To sanction a
proceeding rendering a new judgment without notice at a
§ 127 SCOPE OP GUABANTT OP DUE PROCESS 265
subsequent term, and hold that it is a judgment rendered
with jurisdiction, and binding when set up elsewhere,
would be to violate the fundamental principles of due
process of law as we understand them, and do violence to
that requirement of every system of enlightened juris-
prudence which judges after it hears, and condemns only
after a party has had an opportunity to present his
defense. By the amendment and new judgment the pro-
ceedings are given an effect against the defendant in
error which they did not have when he was discharged
from them by the judgment of dismissal. By the judg-
ment of dismissal the court lost jurisdiction of the cause
and of the person of the defendant. A new judgment
in personam could not be rendered against the defendant
until, by voluntary appearance or due service of process,
the court had agSn Quired jurisdiction over hL As
a matter of common right, before such action could be
taken he should have an opportunity to be heard and
present objections to the rendition of a new judgment, if
such existed.'^ In Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U. S. 672,
the court reiterated the long established doctrine so
clearly announced in West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illi-
nois, 201 U. S. 506, to the effect that **A state court can
not, by resting its judgment upon some ground of local
or general law, defeat the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States, if a Federal right
or immunity was specially set up or claimed which, if
recognized and enforced, would require a different judg-
ment.'* In restating that rule in Wood v. Chesborough
the Court said * * that the sufficiency of the Federal right
set up can not be evaded if necessary to the determina-
tion of the case, and, it may be admitted, that of such
necessity this court must in each instance decide. To the
extent necessary to do so the power exists as a necessary
incident to a decision upon the claim of denial of the
Federal right. ' * In Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 540,
it was held that *' If a Federal question is fairly presented
by the record and its decision is actually necessary to
266 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 127
the determination of the case, a judgment, which rejects
the claim, but avoids all reference to it, is as much against
the right, within the meaning of Section 709 of the Re-
vised Statutes, as if it had been specifically referred to
and the right directly refused.'*
§128. Congress as a protecting and enforcing body.
It was the manifest purpose of the far-sighted framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment not only to arm the Fed-
eral judiciary with the negative power to annul all state
action, executive, legislative and judicial, when in deroga-
tion of the rights possessed by national citizens as such,
but also to arm the Congress with the positive power to
protect and enforce such rights by direct legislation. Sec-
tion 5 of the amendment provides that **The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article/* In Eolden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 366, the Court said: ''The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which was finally adopted July 28, 1868, largely
expanded the power of the Federal courts and Congress,
and for the first time authorized the former to declare
invalid all laws and judicial decisions of the states abridg-
ing the rights of citizens or denying them the benefit of
due process of law.*' In view of the fact that Congress
had already, first, such express power to legislate for the
protection of all rights as is given it by the direct grant
contained in the constitution ; second, that it had already
the implied power or duty to protect its citizens in the
enjoyment of all rights conferred on them, as a correla-
tive to the grant of such rights, — ^it is not strange that
the fresh grant of legislative power contained in Section
5 of the amendment in question should have suggested
to some minds the thought that Congress had been thereby
armed with an express power to enact a code of munici-
pal law for the states, providing, among other things, for
the enjoyment of due process by citizens of the several
states. The first answer to be found to that alarming
and far-reaching suggestion was embodied in a reductio
§ 128 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OF DUB PROCESS 267
ad horible, which maintained that the admission of the
existence of snch a new power in Congress would mean
a radical change in the whole theory of the relations of
the state and Federal governments to each other and of
both governments to the people, a result which the Su-
preme Court, in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall 36,
declared was not intended.
When the momentous question was presented in the
case of the United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,
the Court said: **We have in our political system a gov-
ernment of the United States and a government of the
several states. Each one of these governments is dis-
tinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own
who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its juris-
diction, it must protect. The same person may be at the
same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen
of a state, but his rights of citizenship under one of these
governments will be different from those he has under
the other. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 74. * * *
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from deny-
ing to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws; but this provision does not, any more
than the one which precedes it and which we have just
considered add anything to the rights which one citizen
has under the constitution against another. The equality
of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism.
Every republican government is in duty bound to protect
all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within
its power. That duty was originally assumed by the
states; and it still remains there. The only obligation
resting upon the United States is to see that the states
do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees,
but no more. The power of the National Government is
limited to the enforcement of this guaranty. ' ' Such was
the prelude to the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, in
which the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley,
said: "The 1st section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is the one relied on, after declaring who shall be
268 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 128
Icitizens of the United States, and of the several states, is
prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory upon the
states. It declares that ^No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States ; nor shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws/ It is state
action of a particular character that is prohibited. Indi-
vidual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-
matter of the amendment. In has a deeper and broader
scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation
and state action of every kind, which impairs the priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
or which injures them in life, liberty or property without
due process of law, or which denies to any of them the
equal protection of the laws. It not only does this, but, in
order that the national will, thus declared, may not be a
mere brutum fvlmen, the last section of the amendment
invests Congress with power to enforce it by appropriate
legislation. To enforce whaif To enforce the prohibi-
tion. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting
the effects of such prohibited state laws and state acts,
and thus to render them effectually null, void and innocu-
ous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Con-
gress and thus is the whole of it. It does not invest
, Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are
within the domain of state legislation; but to provide
modes of relief against state legislation or state action,
of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress
to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of
private rights; but to provide modes of redress against
the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers,
executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the
fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive
rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but they are secured by way of
prohibition against state laws and state proceedings
^
§ 128 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUB PBOCESS 269
affecting those rights and privileges, and power given
Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such
prohibition into effect ; and such legislation must, neces-
sarily, be predicated upon such supposed state laws or
state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of
their operation and effect A quite full discussion of this
aspect of the amendment may be found in United States
V. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Va. v. Rives, 100 XT. S. 313,
and Ex parte Va., 100 U. S. 339. '^
After it had been thus firmly settled that the amend-
ment in question *Moes not invest Congress with power
to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of
state legislation,*' it was necessarily held in Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, that a state statute prohibiting
independent military companies from drilling and parad-
ing, unless licensed by the governor, does not deprive a
citizen of any rights guaranteed by the Federal consti-
tution ; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, that a state statute
is valid providing for the electrocution of criminals ; and
in Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, **That by the Four-
teenth Amendment the powers of states in dealing with
crime within their borders are not limited, except |that no
state can deprive particular persons, or classes of per-
sons of equal and impartial justice imder the law; that
law in its regular course of administration through courts
of justice is due process, and when secured by the law of
the state the constitutional requirement is satisfied; and
that due process is so secured by laws operating on all
alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government unrestrained by the
established principles of private right and distributive
justice. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 535, and
cases cited. ' ' By that luminous statement the truth was
emphasized that the amendment in question did not take
away from any state the inherent sovereign right, pos-
sessed by it, before the Union was formed, to regulate its
interior life by a system of law deemed by it necessary to
advance its special local wants and peculiar interests and
270 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 128
traditions. The amendment in question does not require
any state to mould legal procedure in strict compliance
with the technical rules of the common law, nor does it
deny to any state the right to regulate in any reasonable
way its system of police and internal order. And yet the
fact remains that with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment the exercise of every state power passed
under the yoke of its paramount authority. Every state
can perform every function precisely as it did before, pro-
vided that its performance does not violate the mandate :
*'No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States ; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.*' Any exhaustive treatment of the
subject must therefore involve; first, a classification of
the various subject-matters upon which state power oper-
ates ; second, an examination of the sphere within which
such power may be exercised in each particular case, with-
out an infraction of the limitations which the amendment
imposes.
§129. Due process the common heritage of all the
states. An effort has heretofore been made to emphasize
the all important fact that the constitutional principle
embodied in the phrase, '^due process of law,'* a purely
English invention, is the common heritage of all the
states, and drawn from a single source — chapter 39 of the
Great Charter of 1215. Within narrow limits the history
has been unfolded of the famous formula from its advent
in the Great Charter down to its embodiment in the
American state constitutions adopted in 1776 or shortly
thereafter. Emphasis was then given, first, to the fact
that during the five hundred and sixty-one years interven-
ing between those dates the meaning of the formula varied
from age to age, each generation perceiving in it its own
peculiar conception of civil liberty and law ; second, to the
§ 129 SCOPE OP GUABANTY QP DXJB PROCESS 271
fact that our American states adopted it with the mean«
ing attached to it in England, not at the time of the emi-
gration, but at the time of the severance from the mother
country in 1776. The first notable extension given to the
old formula in the new land was that which resulted from
its application to all three departments of state power,
including of course the legislative. The founders of our
state systems were careful to abolish the idea of an
omnipotent parliament and the possible spoliation or
arbitrary denial of personal rights upon the part of the
executive under the maxim that **the King can do no
wrong.*' In the words of a great jurist: ''In this
country written constitutions were deemed essential to
protect the rights of the people against the encroach-
ments of power delegated to their governments, and the
provisions of Magna Carta were incorporated into Bills
of Eights. They were limitations upon all the powers of
government, legislative, as well as executive and judicial.
. . . In the Fourteenth Amendment, by parity of rea-
son, it (due process) refers to that law of the land in each
state, which derives its authority from the inherent and
reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,
and the greatest security for which resides in the right
of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at
their pleasure.** Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516.
And yet despite the fact that all of the states drew the
famous formula from a common source; that all of
them accepted it with the meaning attached to it in the
mother country in 1776; that all of them so expanded
it as to embrace all three departments of state power,
it never has secured to all persons the benefit of the
same laws and same remedies in every state. As each
state has always possessed the power to give local color
to its own conception of ''due process,** no violation
of the formula occurs so long as the law of a particular
state is executed according to its customary forms or
272 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 129
establisherl usages. Therefore the Court sud in Bowman
V. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22: "The Pourteenth Amendment
doe3 not profess to secure to all persona in the United
States the benefit of the same laws and the same reme-
dies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two
states separated only by an imaginary line. On one side
of this line may be a right of trial by jury, and the other
side no sucli right. Each state prescribes its own modes
of judicial proceeding." In the prior case of Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, the Court had said: "The states,
so far as tins amendment (Art. VII) is concerned, are
left to regulate trials in their own courts in their own
way. A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in
the state courts is not, therefore, a privilege or immunity
of national citizenship, which the states are forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment to abridge. A state can not
deprive a person of his properly without due process of
law ; but this does not necessarily imply that all trials in
the state courts affecting the property of persons must
be by jury. This requirement of the constitution is met,
if the trial is had according to the settled course of judi-
cial proceedings. Murray v. Hoboken Land & I. Co., 18
How. 280. Due process of law is process according to
the law of the state. This process in the state is regu-
lated by the law of the state. Our power over the law is
only to determine whether it is in conflict with the supreme
law of the land; that is to say, with the constitution and
laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, or
with any treaty made under the authority of the United
States." In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, the
Court said : " it is not possible to hold that where by the
laws of the state the party aggrieved has, as regards the
issues affecting his property, a fair trial in a court of
justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable
to such case, that he has been deprived of that property
without due process of law." In Kennard v. Louisiana,
92 U. S. 480, where the question was whether a mode of
trying the title to an office, in which there was no pro-
§ 129 SCOPE OP GUAEANTY OP DUE PROCESS 273
vision for a jury, was dne process of law, its validity
was affirmed. The Court said: **From this it appears
that ample provision has been made for the trial of the
contestation before a court of competent jurisdiction;
for bringing the party against whom the proceeding is
had before the court and notifying him of the case he is
required to meet; for giving him an opportunity to be
heard in his defense ; for thie deliberation and judgment
of the court; for an appeal from this judgment to the
highest court of the state, and for hearing and judg-
ment there. A mere statement of the facts carries with
it a complete answer to all the constitutional objec-
tions urged against the validity of the act. ' * And yet the
fact that due process of law is process according to the
system of law obtaining in each state, and not according
to any general law of the United States, does not imply
that the right of a state to prescribe its own laws and
procedure is without limitations. In Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U. S. 516, the Court said: **But it is not to be
supposed that these (state) legislative powers are abso-
lute and despotic, and that the amendment prescribing
due process of law is too vague and indefinite to operate
as a practical restraint. It is not every act, legislative
in form, that is law. Law is something more than mere
will exerted as an act of power. • • • The Supreme
Court of Mississippi, in a well considered case of Brown
V. Comrs., 50 Miss. 468, speaking of the meaning of the
phrase *due process of law,' says: 'The principle does
not demand that the laws existing at any point of time
shall be irrepealable, or that any forms of remedies shall
necessarily continue. It refers to certain fundamental
rights which that system of jurisprudence, of which ours
is a derivative, has always recognized. If any of these are
disregarded in the proceedings by which a person is
condenmed to the loss of life, liberty or property, then
the deprivation has not been by *due process of law.'
'It must be conceded,' said this Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Miller, in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall.
Dae Process — ^18
274 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 129
655-662, * that there are such rights in every free govern-
ment beyond the control of the state. * ' ' In emphasizing
the same principle the Court said in Wynehamer v. The
People, 13 N, Y. 378: **To say, as has been suggested,
that 'the law of the land,^ or 'due process of law,' may
mean the very act of legislation which deprives the
citizen of his rights, privileges or property, leads to a
simple absurdity. The constitution would then mean,
that no person shall be deprived of his property or rights,
unless the legislature shall pass a law to effectuate the
wrong, and this would be throwing the restraint entirely
away. . . . Where rights of property are admitted to
exist, the legislature can not say they shall exist no longer ;
nor will it make any difference, although a process and a
tribunal are appointed to execute the sentence. If this
is the 'law of the land,* and 'due process of law,' within
j the meaning of the constitution, then the legislature is
omnipotent. It may, under the same interpretation, pass
a law to take away liberty or life without a pre-existing
cause, appointing judicial and executive agencies to exe-
cute its will. Property is placed by the constitution in
the same category with liberty and lif e. '' Thus it appears
that while each state is given a wide latitude and broad
discretion as to the forms and modes in which it may
regulate judicial pi^ocedure and the rights of property
within its limits, all such state regulation offends against
I the Federal constitution when it fails to provide due
I process by ignoring "certain fundamental rights which
1 that systeni of jurisprudence, of which ours is a deriva-
tive, has always recognized. ' '
§130. Notable attempts to define due process. The
gravest desideratum in English and American law is and
has ever been a clear, comprehensive and authoritative
definition of the elements which, under all circumstances
and conditions, constitute due process of law, as a guar-
anty of "certain fundamental rights which that system
of jurisprudence, of which ours is a derivative, has always
L
§ 130 SC50PE OP GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS 275
recognized. ^ ' The mother country, from which the doc-
trine of due process was drawn, furnished no such defini-
tion to the colonies ; and, after they were transformed into
sovereign states, each armed with a wide discretion as to
the form in which and the extent to which due process
should be recognized, they naturally failed to evolve a
definition sufficiently authoritative to win the acceptance
of all. Not until the guaranty of due process passed into
the Federal constitution, first, in the Fifth Amendment as
a limitation on the powers of the Federal government;
second, in the Fourteenth Amendment, as a limitation on
the powers of the state governments,— did the hope arise
' of an authoritative definition from a single tribunal
armed with the power to enforce its mandates. The good
work began in earnest when in the Dartmouth College
case, 4 Wheat. 518, involving the validity of an act of a
state legislature taking away franchises and rights vested
in the college by a prior charter, the contention was made
that such act violated that provision of the New Hamp-
shire constitution which declared that no one shall be
deprived of ''property, privileges or immunities but by
the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.'*
Mr. Webster, in defining the term due process in its rela-
tion to substantive rights as well as procedure, in a case
in which the act, in the nature of a judgment operating
on rights already acquired, was directed against a single
corporation, and passed without giving to it a legal
opportunity to defend, said: ''By the law of the land is
most clearly intended the general law ; a law which hears
before it condenms; which proceeds upon inquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that
every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and
immunities under the protection of the general rules
which govern society. Everything which may pass under
the form of an enactment is not therefore to be consid-
ered the law of the land. If this act were so, acts of
attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation,
acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring
276 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 130
one man's estate to another, legislative judgments,
decrees, and forfeitures, in all possible forms, Vonld be
the law of the land. Such a strange construction would
render constitutional provisions of the highest impor-
tance completely inoperative and void. It would tend
directly to establish the union of all powers in the le^-
lature. There would be no general permanent law for
courts to administer or men to live under." The famous
case in question was decided at the February term, 1819,
and at that term wm also decided Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 4 Wheat 235, invohing the validity of the act of
the Assembly of Maryland of 1793, incorporating the
bank, and giving to it a summary process by execution,
in the nature of an attachment, against its debtors who
had, by express consent, in writing, made the bonds, bills,
or notes, by them drawn or indorsed, negotiable at the
bank. In holding that the act in question was not repug-
nant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of
Maryland the Court said : "That this view of the subject
is giving full effect to the Seventh Amendment of the Con-
stitution, is not only deducible from the general intent,
but from the express wording of the article referred to.
Had the terms been, that 'the trial by jury shall be pre-
served,' it might have been contended that they were
imperative, and could not be dispensed with. But the
words are, that the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, which places it on the foot of a lex pro se intra-
ducta, and the benefit of it may therefore be relinquished.
As to the words from Magna Carta, incorporated into the
constitution of Maryland, after volumes spoken and writ-
ten with a view to their exposition, the good sense of
mankind at length settled down to this : that they were
intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercises of the powers of government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private rights and distribu-
tive justice." After that definition of the "law of the
land" by Mr. Justice Johnson, quoted in many cases, and
ranked with that of Webster, the subject was involved in
§ 130 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUB PROCESS 277
serious confusion by the indefensible decision rendered
by Mr. Justice Curtis in Murray v. Hoboken Land and
Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, in which the court under-
took to define, for the first time, the term **due process
of law*' as contained in the Fifth Amendment, and to
adjudge that such due process had not been denied Samiuel
Swartwout in a case in which his land had been sold
under a warrant issued by the solicitor of the treasury
under an act of Congress of May 15, 1820, authorizing the
issuance of such warrant. It was admitted by the Court
that the proceedings fixing the sum of $1,374,119.65 as a
lien on the land of Swartwout were purely ex parte; that
he had no notice from or hearing before the purely min-
isterial ofl&cers by whom that so-called judgment was
rendered; and that the purely ministerial officers who
attempted to render the so-called judgment had no judi-
cial powers whatever. The definition given of due process
in that case is this: **The words *due process of law,*
were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning
as the words *by the law of the land,' in Magna Carta.
Lord Coke, in his commentary on these words (21 inst.
50), says they mean due process of law. The constitu-
tions which had been adopted by the several states before
the foundation of the Federal constitution, following the
language of the Great Charter more closely, generally
contained the words, *but by the judgment of his peers,
or the law of the land.* ** Nothing need be added here to
the demonstration heretofore made that the deadly origi-
nal sin embodied in that definition consisted of the refusal
to accept the vital historical fact that the English con-
stitutional law that passed into our first state constitu-
tions, and thence into the first eight amendments to the
Federal constitution, was drawn from the reformed
English system as Blackstone defined it in 1758, and not
from the unref ormed system as Coke described it in 1632,
when the Star Chamber and High Commission were
intact. In openly repudiating the definition of due process
contained in the case in question, the Court, in Hurtado
273
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
§130
V. Califoniia, 110 17. S. 516, said: "It is urged upon ns,
however, in argument, that the claim made in behalf of
the plaintiff in error is supiwrted by the decision of this
coart in Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement
Ccmipany, 18 How. 272. The point in the ease cited arose
in reference to a Bnnunary proceeding, questioned on
that account, as due process of law. The answer was :
however exceptional it may be, aa tested by definitions
and principles of ordinary procedure, nevertheless, this,
in substance, has been inmiemorially the actual law of the
laud and, therefore, is due process of law. But to hold
that such a diaracteristic is essential to due process of
law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age,
and to render incapable of progress or improvement. It
would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchange-
ahleness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Per-
sians, This would be all the more singular and surpris-
ing, in this quick and active age, when we consider that
owing to the progressive development of legal ideas and
institutions, the words of Magna Carta stood for very
different things at the time of the separation of the Amer-
ican colonies from what they represented originally."
Turning from the definitions given of the due process
clause as contained in the Fifth Amendment to like defini-
tions, often mere descriptions of due process, as embod-
ied in the Fourteenth, we find the Court saying in Kon-
nard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480, that, "It is substantially
admitted by counsel in the argument that such is not the
case (denial of due process) if it has been done 'In the
due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules
and forms which have been established for the protection-
of piivate rights.' From this it appears that ample pro-
vision bas been made for the trial of the contestation
before a court of competent jurisdiction; for bringing the
party against whom the proceeding is had before the
court, and notifying him of the case he is required to
meet ; for giving him an opportunity to be heard in bis
defense; for the deliberation of the court; for an appeal
~\
§ 130 SCOPE OP GUABANTY OP DUE PEOCESS 279
from this judgment to the highest court of the state, and
for hearing and judgment there. A mere statement of the
facts carries with it a complete answer to all the consti-
tutional objections urged against the validity of the act. * '
In Pennoyer v. Neff , 95 XJ. S. 714, the Court said : ' ' What-
ever difficulty may be experienced in giving to those terms
(due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment) a defini-
tion which will embrace every possible exertion of power
affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden,
there can be no doubt of their meaning when applied to
judicial proceedings. They then mean a course of legal
proceedings according to those rules and principles which
have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for
the protection and enforcement of private rights. To
give such proceedings any validity, there must be a
tribunal competent by its constitution — ^that is, by the law
of its creation — ^to pass upon the subject matter of the
suit ; and, if that involves merely a determination of the
personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought
within its jurisdiction by service of process within the
state, or his voluntary appearance. * ^
In Ex parte Wall, 107 U- S. 265, the Court said: ^*It
is a mistaken idea that due process of law requires a
plenary suit and a trial by jury, in all cases where prop-
erty or personal rights are involved. The important right
of personal Uberty is generally determined by a single
judge, on a writ of habeas corpus, using affidavits or
depositions for proofs, where facts are to be established.
Assessments for damages and benefits occasioned by
public improvements are usually made by commissioners
in a summary way. Conflicting claims of creditors,
amounting to thousands of dollars, are often settled by
the courts on affidavits or depositions alone. And courts
of chancery, bankruptcy, probate and admiralty admin-
ister immense fields of jurisprudence without trial by
jury. In all cases, that kind of procedure i^ due process
of law, which is suitable and proper to the nature of the
case, and sanctioned by the established customs and
280 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 130
usages of the courts." In Hagar v. Reclamation Dist
No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, the Court said: "It is sufficient to
observe here, that by *due process' is meant one which,
following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and
just to the parties to be afFected. It must be pursued in
the ordinary mode prescribed by law ; it must be adapted
to the end to be attained; and wherever it is necessary
for the protection of the parties, it must give them an
opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the
judgment sought. The clause in question means, there-
fore, that there can be no proceeding against life, liberty
or property which may result in the deprivation of either,
without the observance of those general rules established
in our system of jurisprudence for the security of private
rights." In Freeland v. "Williama, 131 U. S. 405, the
Court said "that the remedy provided by the Constitu-
tion of the State, as carried out by the ancient proceed-
ing of a bill in a court of equity, was not void for want
of due process of law, nor in conflict with the Consti-
tution of the United States." In BeU's Gap Railroad
Co. v. Pcnn., 134 U. S. 232, the Court said: "The
process of taxation does not require the same kind of
notice as is required in a suit at law, or even in pro-
ceedings for taking private property under the power of
eminent domain. It involves no violation of due process
of law when it is executed according to customary forms
and established usages, or in subordination to the princi-
ples which underlie them." In Caldwell v. Texas, 137
tJ. S. 692, the Court said : * ' Law, in its regular course of
administration through courts of justice, is due process,
and when secured by the law of the state, the constitu-
tional requisition is satisfied. 2 Kent, Com. 13. And due
process is so secured by laws operating on all alike, and
not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exerdse of
the powers of government, unrestrained by the estab-
lished principles of private right and distributive justice.
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat 235." In Hallinger
v. Davis, 146 IT. S. 314, in whidi it was held that trials
§ 130 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 281
had under the New Jersey statute authorizing persons
indicted for murder to plead guilty and submit the degree
of their guilt to the determination of the court, are due
process — ^the Court said: **In Re Kemmler, 136 IT. S.
436, a fruitless effort was made to induce this Court to
hold that a statute of the State of New York, providing
that punishment of death should be inflicted by an elec-
trical apparatus, was void under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and it was said : ^ The enactment of this statute was
in itself within the legitimate sphere of the legislative
power of the state and in the observance of those general
rules prescribed by our system of jurisprudence; and the
Legislature of the State of New York determined that it
did not inflict cruel and unusual punishment, and its
courts have sustained that determination. We can not
perceive that the state has thereby abridged the privi-
leges or immunities of the petitioner, or deprived him of
due process of law.' Applying the principles of these
decisions to the case before us we are readily brought to
the conclusion that the appellant, in voluntarily availing
himself of the provisions of the statute and electing to
plead guilty, was deprived of no right or privilege within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment^' In
Giozza V. Tieman, 148 U. S. 657, the Court said: **The
amendment does not take from the states these powers of
police that were reserved at the time the original consti-
tution was adopted. Undoubtedly it forbids any arbi-
trary deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and secures
equal protection to all under like circumstances in the
enjoyment of their rights; but it was not designed to
interfere with the power of the state to protect the lives,
liberty, and property of its citizens, and to promote their
health, morals, education, and good order. Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 ; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436.
Nor in respect of taxation was the amendment intended
to compel the state to adopt an iron rule of equality ; to
prevent the classification of property for taxation at dif-
ferent rates; or to prohibit legislation in that regard,
282 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 130
special either in the extent of which it operates or the
objects sought to be obtained by it. It is enough that
there is no discrimination in favor of cftie against another
of the same elasB. In Seott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, in
whicli it was held that "No judgment of a court is due
process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the
court, or without notice to the party" — the Court
reaffirmed the definition of ' ' due process of law ' ' as given
by Mr. Justice Field in Penoyer v. NefF, 95 U. S. 714.
In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, it was held that
a state statute limiting the period of employment of
working men in underground mines, or in the smelt-
ing, redaction, or refining of ores or metals, to eight
hours a day and making its violation a misdemeanor,
is a constitutional exercise of the police power — the
Court said: "This Court has never attempted to de-
fine with precision the words 'due process of law,' nor
is it necessary to do so in this case. It is sufficient to say
that there are certain immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government which
no member of the Union may disregard, as that no man
shall be condemned in his person or property without duo
notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense."
In Reetz v. Michigan, 188 TJ. S. 505, in which it was held
that due process requires no special provision for grant-
ing a hearing to applicants for registration by the board
of registration in medicine when provision is made for
meetings of the board at specified times at the state capi-
tol^tlie Court, adopting the language of Mr. Justice
Matthews in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, said :
" ' It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctified by age and custom, or newly
devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in fur-
therance of the general public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be
held to be due process of law.* Neither is the right of
appeal essential to due process of law. In nearly every
state are statutes giving, in criminal cases of a minor
§ 130 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 283
nature, a single trial, without any right of review.'* In
the recent and important case of Ochoa v. Hernandez,
230 XJ. S. 139, in which the construction of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment was involved the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Pitney, said : ** Without the
guaranty of *due process' the right of private property
can not be said to exist, in the sense in which it is known
to our laws. The principle, known to the common law
before Magna Carta, was embodied in that Charter
(2 Coke, Inst 45, 50), and has been recognized since the
Revolution as among the safest foundations of our insti-
tutions. Whatever else may be uncertain about the defini-
tion of the term *due process of law,' all authorities agree
that it inhibits the taking of one man's property and
giving it to another, contrary to settled usages and modes
of procedure, and without notice or an opportunity for a
hearing. *' This long procession of definitions, or rather
descriptions of the elements that constitute due process,
will end with definitions of due process given by
three famous text writers which have received general
approval. Mr. Justice Story in his Commentary on the
Constitution (5 ed. 1945), has said: **Due process in
each particular c&se means such an exertion of the powers
of government as the settled maxinls of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection
of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the
class of cases to which the one being dealt with
belongs.'* Kent, in his Commentaties (II, 3) says: **It
may be received as a self-evident proposition, universally
understood and acknowledged throughout this country,
that no person can be taken or imprisoned, or disseised
of his freehold, or liberties, or estates, or exiled or con-
demned, or deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless
by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers. The
words, by the law of the land, as used in Magna Carta,
in reference to this subject, are understood to mean due
process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of
good and lawful men; and this, says Lord Coke, is the
284 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 130
true sense and exposition of those words. " Judge Cooley
in his Constitutional Limitations (354-55) says: "Per-
haps no definition is more often quoted than that given
by Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College Case [4 Wheat.
518] : 'By the law of the land is most clearly intended
the general law : A law which hears before it condemns ;
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold
life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protec-
tion of the general rules which govern society. Every-
thing which may pass under the form of an enactment is
not, therefore to be considered the law of the land. ' . . .
While every man has a right to require that his own con-
troversies shall be judged by the same roles which are
applied in the controversies of his neighbors, the whole
community is also entitled, at all times, to demand the
protection of the ancient principles which shield private
rights against arbitrary interference, even though snch
interference may be under a rule impartial in its opera-
tion. It is not the partial nature of the rule, so much as
its arbitrary and unusual character, that condemns it as
unknown to the law of the land."
§ 131. Difficulties in the way of a complete and authori-
tative definition— The rule of inclusion and ezcltuion.
No critical mind ciii examine the foregping definitions of
due process, if such they may be called, without being
impressed with the fact that the basic diflBculty in the
way of a complete and authoritative definition applicable
to all cases consists of the radical differences existing
between the many subject-matters to which it mnst be
applied. A proceeding in which the taking is enforced
by the sovereignty of a state through the power of taxa-
tion, or througli that of eminent domain, where the
process does not require the same kind of a tribunal
or the same kind of a notice as is required in a suit at
law, certainly differs very widely from a litigation
between private individuals in a court whose jurisdiction
§ 131 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 285
must be perfect, and in which equal law must be admin-
istered after adequate legal notice and a hearing con-
ducted according to traditional law. In the words of
Mr. Justice Bradley, in two notable cases: **In judging
what is *due process of law^ respect must be had to the
cause and object of the taking, whether under the taxing
power, the power of eminent domain, or the power of
assessment for local improvements, or none of these ; and,
if found to be suitable or admissible in the special case,
it will be adjudged to be *due process of law;' but, if
found to be arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust, it may be
declared to be not *due process of law.' '* Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97. Concurring opinion. Again :
* * The process of taxation does not require the same kind
of notice as is required in a suit at law, or even in proceed-
ings for taking private property under the power of
eminent domain. It involves no violation of due process
of law,. when it is executed according to customary forms
and established usages, or in subordination to the princi-
ples which underlie them.*' Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 134 U. S. 232. In the presence of such diflS-
culties rendering impossible any comprehensive and
explicit definition equally applicable to an ever changing
series of widely different subject-matters, the Court, in
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, wisely resolved to
adopt, as the only practical expedient, the rule of inclu-
sion and exclusion, stated in the following form : * * But,
apart from the inmainent risk of a failure to give any
definition which would be at once perspicuous, compre-
hensive and satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think, in
the ascertaining of the intent and application of such an
important phrase in the Federal constitution, by the
gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as
the cases presented for decision shall require, with the
reasoning on which such decisions may be founded. * ' In \
other words, when a given case is presented, it must first
be classified, before the question can be asked whether or
no due process has been denied when the deprivation is
DUB PROCESS OF LAW
§131
tested by the special standard appropriate to such a sub-
ject-matter. ThuB under the rule of inclusion and exclu-
sion the mental process involves, first, a classification of
the particQlar subject-matter ; second, a selection of the
standard of due process applicable to it; third, the appE-
cation of that standard to the subject-matter as classified.
So in the last analysis the real duty imposed npon the
text writer is that of offering to the practitioner the rules
which, under the decided cases, will best enable Mm, first,
to classify the subject-matter of his suit ; second, to deter-
mine what are the essential elements of due process when
such a subject-matter is involved.
§ 132. Fundamental requisites of due process — ^Notice.
All the authorities agree that the fundamental requisites
of due process are, first, adequate notice ; second, a hear-
ing; third, the application of equal laws ; fourth, jurisdic-
tion, when proceedings before a regularly constituted
court are in question. Of each in its order. A certain kind
of notice is required in judicial proceedings before courts
strictly organized ; another in proceedings before admin-
istrative boards and officers ; another in the levy and col-
lection of taxes ; and still another in cases involving public
improvements. In all cases, it must be remembered, that
the reasonableness of the notice required under a state
statute involves a vital element of due process, and that
the decision of a state court on that question is not binding
on the Federal Supreme Court. In Scott v. McNeal, 154
U. S. 34, the Court said: "Upon a writ of error to
review the judgment of the highest court of a state npon
the ground that the judgment was against a right claimed
under the Constitution of the United States, tiiis court is
no more bound by that court's construction of a statute
of the territory, or of the state, when the question is
whether the statute provided for the notice required to
constitute due process of law, than when the question is
whether the statute created a contract which has been
impaired by a subsequent law of the state, or whether
^
§ 132 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 287
the original liability created by the statute was such that
a judgment upon it has not been given due faith and
credit in the courts of another state. In every such case,
this court must decide for itself the true construction of
the statute. Huntington v. AtbuU, 146 U. S. 657, 683, 684 ;
Mobile and 0. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486. No
judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered
without jurisdiction, or without notice to the party. * * In
Boiler V. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, the Court said: **The
question in dispute, then, is whether a notice served upon
the plaintiff in Rockingham county, Virginia, December
30, 1890, to appear in Limestone county, Texas, on Janu-
ary 5> 1891, to answer the foreclosure suit is due process
of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment f Without undertaking to determine what is a rea-
sonable notice to non-residents, we are of opinion, under
the circumstances of this case, and considering the dis-
tance between the place of service and the place of return,
that five days was not a reasonable notice, or due process
of law ; that the judgment obtained upon such notice was
not binding upon the defendant Roller, and constitutes no
bar to the prosecution of this action.^* But as the power
to prescribe the length of the notice is vested in the legis-
lature, a very clear case of unreasonableness must be
made out before the courts will interfere. In the case of
Bellingham Bay, etc, R. Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 XJ. S.
314, in which a railroad company complained that a reas-
sessment against its property for the cost of a local
improvement was wanting in due process, because the
notice was not reasonable, the Court said: **The fact
that the owner after being notified is required to appear
and file his objections within ten days, is thus the sole
ground of complaint. But how many days can the courts
fix as a minimum? How much time can be adjudged
necessary as a matter of law for preparing and filing
objections 1 How many and intricate and diflBcult are the
questions involved? Regard must always be had to the
probable necessities of ordinary cases. No hardship to
P!
288 DUE PaOCESS OF LAW § 132
a particular individual can invalidate a genera! rule."
As a general rule it may be said that the notice is suffi-
cient when the person who is to be deprived of life,
liberty, or property has at some stage of the proceedings
an opportunity to present objections to the action pro-
posed against him to a court having authority to give
effect to such objections, provided it considers them valid.
Wilson V. Standerfer, 184 U. S. 399, 415. It has even
been held that, after judgment in a suit, a rule to show
cause why he should not be compelled to pay the amount
of it against a person not a party was sufficient; and that
the same was due process when followed by a hearing
wherein an opportunity to defend was given. Louisville,
etc., K. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230. See also, Simon v.
Craft, 182 U. S. 436 ; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 314,
318. The proceeding may constitute due process when a
remedy is given by motion in a state court which gives
notice and affords an opportunity to be heard. Iowa C. B.
Co. V. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389. But due process did not exist
when a court, acting under tie erroneous belief that no
action had been taken in the case for a year rendered a
judgment of dismissal, then set aside such judgment after
the term, or the rule day which, under the local practice,
is equivalent to the end of the term, without motion or
proceedings to vacate the judgment, and without notice,
proceeded to render a personal judgment against the
defendant. "Wetmore v. Karriek, 205 U. S. 141. A person
was not deprived of liberty without due process of law in
a trial of the issue of lunacy under the Code of Ala., pro-
viding that the sheriff may take possession of the person
"and, if consistent with his health or safety have him
present at the place of trial," when notice of the inquisi-
tion was served on tlie lunatic, who was not personally
present because after an examination by a physician, it
was deemed to be inconsistent with her health and safety
that tlie sheriff should produce her on the trial. Simon
V. Craft, 182 U. S. 427. In Chaloner v. Sherman, 242
U. S. 455, the Court said: "The proceedings were held
§ 132 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 289
in New York City where much of plaintiff *s property
was located. For over two years prior to the entry of the
earUer order plaintiff had been an inmate of Blooming-
dale, a private hospital near that city. At each stage of
the proceedings leading up to the order of June 23, he
[Chaloner] was personally served there with notice and
was given an opportunity to be heard. Thus he had
notice of the motion, on May 19, to appoint the conmiis-
sion de lunatico inquirendo; of the inquisition of June
12 ; and of the motion to confirm the inquisition and for
the appointment of a conmiittee on June 23. . . . At the
inquisition the commission and the jury after hearing
witnesses, concluded that his attendance was unnecessary
and did not require him to attend. There was evidence
that his enforced attendance would be detrimental to his
mental health. As the plaintiff had notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard at each stage of these proceedings
the essential elements of due process of law were fully
met, and the court had jurisdiction to enter the order.
It is not open to collateral attack, although plaintiff
was then under commitment at Bloomingdale. See
Simon v. Craft, 182 XJ. S. 427/^ When due process is
wanting in a proceeding in which judgment is taken in a
state court under a warrant of attorney annexed to a
promissory note, authorizing confession of judgment **in
favor of the holder, ^ ' when the party in whose favor the
judgment was rendered has ceased, before the beginning
of the suit, to be the owner of the note, is settled in
National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257. For fur-
ther illustrations of this branch of the subject, see Old
Wayne Mut. L. Ass *n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 ; Han-
over Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 XJ. S. 181; Hamilton v.
Brown, 161 XJ. S. 256 ; Cunnius v. Beading School District,
198 XJ. S. 458; Bothschild v. Knight, 184 XJ. S. 334; Leigh
V. Green, 193 XJ. S. 79 ; Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator
Co., 119 XJ. S. 388; St. Mary's Franco-American Petro-
leum Co. V. West Virginia, 203 XJ. S. 183 ; Lynde v. Lynde,
181 U. S. 183 ; LouisvUle & N. B. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S,
Due ProcesB — 19
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§132
230; Laarg v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531; Kanffman v. Wool-
ers, 138 U. S. 285; Pittsburg, C, C. and St. L. B. Co. v.
Backos, 154 U. S. 421; Central of Georgia R. Co. v.
Wright, 207 U. S. 127 ; Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U. S. 414 ;
Home Teleph. and Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S.
265; Ontario Land Co. v. Tordy, 212 U. S. 152; North
American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306; Watson
V. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173; Kentnoky Union Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 219 U. S. 140 ; Washington ex rel. Oregon R. and
Nav. Co. V. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510; Ross v. Stewart, 227
U. S. 530; Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120.
Taming next to proceedings before boards and officers
special reference must be made to Chicago, M. and S. P.
R. Co. V. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, in which it was held
that there was not the semblance of due process where
neither summons or notice to a carrier, nor hearing was
provided for, before a raUroad commission ascertained
and declared what it was to declare, without opportunity
provided for the company to introduce witnesses before
it In San Diego Land and Town Co. v. National City,
174 XT. S. 739, it was held that in as much as the constitu-
tion of California gives notice of the fact that ordinances
will be passed annually in February to take effect on July
Ist next, with certain other details, it is not necessary to
dne process that formal notice be given as to the precise
day upon which water rates will be fixed by ordinance.
ti Reetz V. Michigan, 188 TT. S. 505, the Court said:
**Wben a statute fixes the time and place of meeting of
any board or tribunal, no special notice to parties inter-
ested is required. The statute is itself sufficient notice.
If the plaintiff in error has applied at any meeting for
a hearing, the board would have been compelled to grant
it, and if on snch hearing his offer of or demand for testi-
mony had been refused, the question might have been
fairly presented to the state courts, to what extent the
action of the board had deprived him of his rights." See
also, Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 V. S. 470; Passavant v.
United States, 148 U. S. 214; United States v. Heinszen,
§ 132 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUB PBOCESS 291
206 TJ. S. 370 ; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S.
497; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304; Chicago, B.
and Q. B. Co. v. Nebraska ex rel. Omalia, 170 U. S. 57;
Interstate Commerce Cont v. Illinois C. B. Co., 215 U. S.
452 ; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S.
177 ; Beaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U. S. 296 ; Ochoa v. Her-
nandez, 230 U. S. 139; United States ex rel. Brown v.
Lane, 232 U. S. 598.
In considering cases involving pubUc improvements
prominence should be given to Hagar v. Beclamation Dis-
trict No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, in which it was held that the
judgment did not deprive the owner of his property with-
out due process, when by the laws of the state a tax,
assessment, servitude or other burden is imposed upon
property for the public use, and provision made for
notice to the person taxed, and opportunity given for con-
testing the charge thus imposed in the ordinary courts of
justice. In Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, it was held
that when the charter of a city grants power to construct
sewers, the validity of such a grant does not depend upon
an explicit statement either of the necessity or the time
and manner of notice to the taxpayer of an assessment
for the construction of a sewer. In Bauman v. Boss, 167
U. S. 548, it was held that a landowner's property was not
taken without due process where the legislature, in taxing
lands benefited by a highway or other public improve-
ment, made provision for a notice to each landowner and
for hearing him. In Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, it
was held that even where the judgment of the local body
making the assessment is conclusive, due process is not
denied the owner of the property assessed for a local
improvement where an opportunity is given him to be
heard before the body making the assessment. In Ballard
V. Himter, 204 U. S. 241, it was held that due process may
exist even when the nonresident owners of land ** within
a levee district did not have personal notice of the pend-
ency of a suit to collect the levee taxes assessed on their
lands. '* See also, Fallbrook Irrig. District v. Bradley,
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§132
164 U. S. 112; Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. S. 399; Parsona
V. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45; Voight v. Detroit,
184 U. S. 115; Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U. S. 432; Carson
V. Sewer Com'rs, 182 U. S. 398; Spencer v. Merchant, 125
U. S. 345; Bellingham Bay and B. C. E. Co. v. New
Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314; Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota,
176 U. S. 550; Londoner v. Denver, 210 TJ. S. 373; Cleve-
land, C, C. and St. L. E. Co. v. Porter, 210 U. S. 177;
District of Colombia v. Brooke, 214 F. S. 138; Briscoe v.
Rudolph, 221 TJ. S. 547; Soliah v. Heskin, 222 V. S. 522;
TJnited States ex rel. Turner v. Fisher, 222 V. S. 204;
Reitler v. Harris, 223 XT. S. 437; McGovem v. New York,
229 U. S. 363 ; Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 TJ. S. 148 ; Richards v.
Washington Terminal Co., 233 TJ. S. 546; Kiyder v. Wil-
son, 242 U. S. 171 ; Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 242 U. S. 255.
The question of the sufficiency of notice in tax cases will
be specially considered hereafter under that head.
§ 133. Fundamental requisites of due process — ^Hear-
ing. Text writers and digest makers usually link to-
gether "Notice and hearing" as one phrase for the
reason, no doubt, that the two distinct rights are so inter-
laced that it is practically impossible to consider the one
without reference to the other. Mr, Justice Earl well said
in Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. T. 183, 188, that "It is not
enough that the owners may by chance have notice, or that
they may as a matter of favor have a hearing. The law
must require notice and give them the right to a hearing
and an opportunity to be heard. It matters not upon the
question of the constitutionality of such a law, that the
assessment has in fact been fairly apportioned. The con-
stitutional validity of law is to be tested not by what was
done under it, but by what may by its authority be done. ' '
The difficulty is to determine whether or no in a particu-
lar case there has been such a hearing as the constitu-
tional gnaranty contemplates. In tax proceedings, and in
certain summary processes before administrative officers.
"^
§ 133 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUB PBOCESS 293
while the right to a hearing has been invariably recog-
nized, the formalities attending it have been reduced to
the minimnnL In the State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S.
575, involving the validity of a state law providing for
the assessment of railroad property by a state board of
equalization, setting at a time and place designed, and fix-
ing the assessments by the aid of a schedule of such prop-
erty made by its own officers, the Court said : * ' The main
function of this board is to equalize these assessments
over the whole state. If they find that a county has had
its property assessed too high in reference to the general
standard, they may reduce its valuation; if it has been
fixed too low, they raise it to that standard. When they
raise it in any county they necessarily raise it on the prop-
erty of every individual who owns any in that county.
Must each one of these have notice and a separate hear-
ingf If a railroad company is by law entitled to such
notice, surely every individual is equally entitled to it.
Yet if this be so, the expense of giving notice, the delay
of hearing each individual, would render the exercise of
the main function of the Board impossible. The very
moment you come to apply to the individual the right
claimed by the corporation in this case, its absurdity is
apparent. Nor is there any hardship in the matter. This
board has its time of sitting fixed by law. Its sessions
are not secret. No obstruction exists to the appearance of
anyone before it to assert a right or redress a wrong ; and,
in the business of assessing taxes, this is all that can be
reasonably asked.*' In perfect harmony with the fore-
going are the Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S.
321, in which the Court said: '*And if the plaintiffs in
error have the constitutional right to such hearing, for
which they contend, the statute is properly to be con-
strued so as to recognize and respect it, and not to deny
it. The Constitution and the statute will be construed
together as one law. This was the principle of construc-
tion applied by this court, following the decisions of the
state court, in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, where
296
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§133
It
The law must require notice to them, and give them the
right to a hearing and an opportunity to be heard. * The
soundness of this doctrine has repeatedly been recognized
by this court. Thus in Security Trust Co. v. Lexington,
203 U. S. 323, 333, the court, by Mr. Justice Peckham,
said, with, respect to an assessment for back taxes : *if the
statute did not provide for a notice, in any form, it is
not material that as a matter of grace of favor notice may
have been given of the proposed assessment. It is not
what notice, uncalled for by the statute, the taxpayer may
have received in a particular case that is material, but
the question is, whether any notice is provided by the
statute' (citing the New York case). So, in Central of
Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 138, the Court said :
*This notice must be provided as an essential part of the
statutory provision and not awarded as a mere matter
of favor or grace.' In Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 409,
the Court declared : * The right of a citizen to due process
of law must rest upon a basis more substantial than favor
or discretion.' And in Louis, and Nash. R. R. v. Stock
Yards Co., 212 U. S. 132, 144, it was said : *The law itself
must save the parties* rights, and not leave them to the
discretion of the courts as such. ' *
Special reference should also be made to the leading
case of Hovey v. Elliott, 167 XJ. S. 409, heretofore ex-
amined, in which the right to a hearing under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, was given a
notable exposition. The Court then said: '*Can it be
doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be
heard in onfe^s defense! If the legislative department of
the government were to enact a statute conferring the
right to condemn the citizen without any opportunity of
being heard, would it be pretended that such an enact-
ment would not be violative of the constitution! If this
be true, as it undoubtedly is, how can it be said that the
judicial department, the source and foundation of justice
itself, has yet the authority to render lawful that which
if done under express legislative sanction would be viola-
il M
il
I
m
§ 134 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 297
tive of the Constitution. . . . The decree therefore
awards the property of the defendant to the complainant
upon the hypothesis of fact that by contract the defendant
had transferred the right to this property to the com-
plainant. If the court had power to do this, by denying
the right to be heard to the defendant, what plainer illus-
tration could there be taking property of one and giving
it to another without hearing or without process!'*
§ 134. Fundamental requisites of due process — ^Oener-
ality and equality of laws. In Caldwell v. Texas, 137
U. S. 691, the Court said : * * By the Fourteenth Amend-
ment the powers of the states in dealing with crime within
their borders are not limited, but no state can deprive
particular persons or classes of persons of equal and
impartial justice under the law. Law, in its regnilar
course of administration through courts of justice, is due
process, and when secured by the law of the state, the
constitutional requisition is satisfied. 2 Kent. Com. 13.
And due process is so secured by laws operating on all
alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private right and distributive
justice. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244.
The power of the state must be exerted within the limits
of those principles, and its exertion can not be sustained
when special, partial and arbitrary. Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U. S. 516, 535. The same principles were re-
stated with even greater emphasis in Leeper v. Texas,
139 U. S. 462. The conception thus expressed of the gen-
erality and equality of laws, as a necessary part of due
process, is purely an American creation. Even in Coke 's
time the idea was in full force that the Parliament of
Great Britain was a **High Court'* armed with the power
to make special decrees in individual cases in the form of
acts of legislation. Coke says : ** As every court of justice
hath laws and customs for its direction, — some the civil
and canon, some the common law, others their own pecu-
298 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 134
liar laws and customs, — so the high court of parliament
hath its own law, called the lex et consuetude parlia-
menti/^ The author has attempted elsewhere (Origin
and Growth Am. Const., p. 146) to emphasize the fact
that no distinct or definite division of the powers of gov-
ernment into executive, legislative and judicial ever
existed in the English system, either in theory or in fact.
In his Spirit of Laws (bk. xi, ch. 6) Montesquieu simply
described the very imperfect division which he perceived
in the English Constitution, and the political maxim
usually attributed to him, that the three departments of
power shall forever remain separate and distinct was
adopted by the original thirteen states in the same quali-
fied sense in which it was understood in the English sys-
tem. Speaking of the constitution of the mother country,
Madison said : * ' On the slightest view of the British con-
stitution we must perceive that the legislative, executive,
and judiciary departments are by no means totally sepa-
rate and distinct from each other. '^ Speaking of the
constitution of the state he spid : * ' If we look into the con-
stitutions of the several states, we find, that, notwith-
standing the emphatical, and, in some instances, the
unqualified terms in which the axiom has been laid down,
there is not a single instance in which the several
departments of power have been kept absolutely sepa-
rate and distinct.'* Federalist, No. xlvi, pp. 335, 337.
Each state constitution, after stating the maxim in ques-
tion in a far too absolute form, has made such a qualified
division between the three powers as it deemed best
for its own interests and convenience; and the Supreme
Court has held that it will regard such a division as a
matter of state law not within the purview of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Dreyer
V. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 84, the Court said: ** Whether
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers (of a
state) shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or
whether persons or collections of persons belonging to
one department may in respect to some matters exert
§ 134 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 299
powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another de-
partment of government, is for the determination of the
state. And its determination one way or the other can
not be an element in the inquiry, whether the due process
of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment has been
respected by the state or its representatives, when dealing
with matters involving life or liberty. * When we speak,'
said Story, *of a separation of the three departments of
government, and maintain that separation is indispen-
sable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim
in a limited sense.' Story, Const 5th ed. 393. ' ' In Liv-
ingston V. Moore, 7 Pet. 546, the court speaking through
Mr. Justice Johnson, said: **The objection made to the
exercise of this power is, that it is one of a judicial char-
acter, and could not exist in the Legislature of a country
having a constitution which distributes the powers of
government into legislative, executive and judicial. • . .
The power existing in every body politic is an absolute
despotism ; in constituting a government, the body politic
distributes that power as it pleases, and in the quantity it
pleases, and imposes what checks it pleases upon its public
functionaries. The natural distribution and the necessary
distribution to individual security, is into legislative, ex-
ecutive and judicial; but it is obvious that every com-
munity, may make a perfect or imperfect separation and
disposition of these powers at its will. It has pleased
Pennsylvania, in her constitution, to make what most
jurists would pronounce an imperfect separation of those
powers.*' See also, Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 ; Watkrns v. Hohnan, 16 Pet. 25 ; Os-
bom V. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat 738 ; Wayman
V. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
B. Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 ; Kilboum v. Thompson, 103
U. S. 168.
The omnipotent Parliament of Great Britain, which
claimed to be a "High Court*' with a law of its own, pos-
sessed not only the physical power but the theoretical
rights to make all kinds of judicial decrees and to pass
300
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§134
IK
'
1
all kinds of special acts applicable to one individual or to
any class of individuals which it might see fit to subject
to its paramount authority. It is not therefore strange
that from such a source should have flowed through many
centuries the stream of ^^acts of attainder, bills of pains
and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judg-
ments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to
another, legislative judgments, decrees, and forfeitures,*'
against which Webster thundered in the Dartmouth Col-
lege Case, 4 Wheat 518. And yet against such arbitrary
enactments or decrees there was from the time of the
Great Charter a spirit of opposition based on the con-
sciousness that they were in violation of * ' the law of the
land" which its vital chapter embodied. As early as the
reign of Edward II, in which it was declared by statute
that ' ' the matters to be established for the estate of the
king and his heirs, and for the estate of the realm and of
the people, should be treated, accorded, and established in
parliament by the king, and by the assent of the prelates,
earls, and barons, and the commonalty of the realm, ac-
cording as had been before accustomed, — " the disinher-
itance and exile of the Despencers, decreed in an assembly
of magnates irregularly summoned, was reversed in a
later parliament on the ground that the * * said award was
made without calling them [the Despencers] to answer,
and without the assent of the prelates, which are peers
of the realm in parliament, and against the Great Charter
of the franchises of England, which says that no freeman
shall he banished or other way destroyed, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or the law of the la/nd, and for that
they were not called in court to make answer, and for
these errors and for that the causes in the said award
were not duly proved.'^ When in 1330 the sentence
against the Earl of Arundel was annulled, his son peti-
tioned the king to consider how his father was taken,
imprisoned, and put to death and his lands and chattels
forfeited ** against the law and custom of the country;"
and the supplementary statute of 1354 was enacted on a
§ 134 SCX)PE OP GUARANTY OP DUE PROCESS 301
petition stating that there was no record or evidence of
any just cause showing that said Earl ought to have been
destroyed or put to death ** without judgment and due
process of law'* {scmz juggement et due process de lei).
In the same year the attainder of Roger, Earl of Morti-
mer, was reversed upon the petition of his heir, alleging
that the record of the attainder was * * erroneous and de-
fective at all points, especially in so far as the said earl
was put to death and disinherited without any accusation
and without .being put to judgment or to answer {sam
estre mesne en juggement ou en respons).^^ Proceedings
against the Despencers, 1 How. S. Tr. 33 ; 2 Rot. Pari. 55,
4 Edw. in. A. D. 1330; 2 Rot. Pari. 256, 257, 28 Edw. III.
A. D. 1354 ; 2 Rot. Pari. 256, 28 Edw. HL A. D. 1354. See
McGehee, pp. 65-67.
In another place the author has said : ^ ^ In connection
with the despotic practices which at this time pervaded
the administration of justice in the ordinary tribunals,
should also be noted the gravest of all judicial abuses
which, during the reigns of Henry VI and Edward IV,
recurred with shocking frequency in the proceedings of
the high court of parliament itself. Although bills of
attainder had been employed at a much earlier day, it was
during the period of passion engendered by the civil war
that the summary power to punish criminals by statute
was for the first time perverted and abused. The calm
and deliberate exercise of the judicial power of the whole
parliament by process of impeachment, wherein the com-
mons as the grand inquest of the realm were required to
maintain their accusations by sufficient evidence adduced
before the lords sitting as judges, but satisfied the neces-
sities of a dynastic struggle in which the victors were
ever eager for the heads of the vanquished. Far bet-
ter adapted to this condition of things was the proceeding
by bills of attainder, in which, if the parliament saw fit to
refuse to hear the accused in his defense, the validity of
the judgment could never be questioned in any court
whatsoever. The accused, even under a bill of attainder,
a
t
f I
» I
-
i \:
> i
t^
:i
302
DXJE PROCESS OP LAW
§134
was, however, as a matter of grace, usually permitted to
defend himself both by counsel and witnesses. ^ The pro-
ceedings of parliament in passing bills of attainder, and
of pains and penalties, do not vary from those adopted in
regard to other bills. They may be introduced in either
house, but ordinarily commence in the house of lords:
they pass through the same stages ; and when agreed to
by both houses, they received the royal assent in the usual
form. But the parties who are subjected to these pro-
ceedings are admitted to defend themselves by counsel
and witnesses, before both houses ; and the solemnity of
the proceedings would cause measures to be taken to en-
force the attendance of members upon their service in
parliament.' '* Origin and Growth of the Eng. Const.,
i, pp. 582-3. It seems to be clear that during the
reign of Henry VIII the practice was first established of
condemning, without citation or opportunity to be heard,
those who were ready to answer in the ordinary courts.
The judges, after some hesitation, declared under pres-
sure that while such a procedure was dangerous, if a bill
of attainder was so passed its validity could not be ques-
tioned at law. Against such an injustice, so contrary to
**the law of the land,*' public opinion naturally revolted,
and to such an extent that earnest protestations were
heard in the Commons upon the passage of such a bill
against Lord Admiral Seymour in 1549. And yet such
judicial legislation continued to be employed, whenever it
became necessary for the crown to depart from the usual
and orderly administration of justice, down to the bill
presented against Queen Caroline in 1820. In the words
of a great authority: ** Bills of attainder were, in the
reign of Henry Vlll, used instead of impeachments ; as
for instance in the cases of Wolsey Thomas Cromwell,
Queen Katherine Howard, the Duke of Norfolk, and the
Earl of Surrey. They have occurred occasionally in our
later history. The most memorable case is that of Lord
Strafford. Other instances are those of Lord Danby, the
Duke of Monmouth, and Sir John Fennick. As instances
§ 134 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OP DUB PEOCESS 303
of a bill of pains and penalties I may refer to the bill
against Bishop Atterbury, and to the bill against Queen
Caroline, which will probably long continue to be referred
to as the last instance of such legislation/' Stephen,
Hist. Crim, Law, i, p. 161,
The primary purpose of the framers of our original
state constitutions, — ^prefaced by bills of rights epitomiz-
ing the seminal principles of English constitutional law
as it existed in 1776, — was to make impossible here all
forms of arbitrary and confiscatory legislation, whether
in the form of ex post facto laws, or laws lacking general-
ity and equality, and ignoring the division between leg-
islative and judicial power, under which could be
confiscated or forfeited the life, Uberty or property of a
private citizen by a legislative edict passed in defiance of
**the law of the land/' In the language of Cummings v.
Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323: **If the punishment be less
than death, the Act is termed a bill of pains and penalties.
Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder
include bills of pains and penalties. In these cases the
legislative body, in addition to its legitimate functions,
exercises the powers and oflSce of judges ; it assumes, in
the language of the text books, judicial magistracy; it
pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of
the forms or safeguards of trial ; it determines the suffi-
ciency of the proofs produced, whether conformable to
the rules of evidence or otherwise ; and it fixes the degree
of punishment in accordance with its own notions of the
enormity of the offense. ' ' The fact was also recognized
that confiscatory legislation directed against private prop-
erty is just as lacking in due process as legislative de-
crees imposing penalties for crime. In Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, the Court said: **But when, in the
year of grace 1866, there is placed in the constitution of
the United States a declaration that ^No state shall de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law,' can a state make anything due process of
law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare
304 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 134
sucht To affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the
states is of no avail, or has no application where the
invasion of private rights is affected under the forms of
state legislation. It seems to ns that a statute which
declared in terms, and without more, that the full and
exclusive title of a described piece of land, which is now
in A, shall be and is hereby vested in B, would, if effectual,
deprive A of his property without due process of law,
within the meaning of the constitutional provision." In
Van Home v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304> in which it was held
that the right of acquiring and holding property is not
ex gratia from the Legislature, but ex debito from the con-
stitution, the Court said: "If this be the Legislature of a
republican government, in which the preservation of
property is made sacred by the constitution, I ask, wherein
it differs from the mandate of an Asiatic prince! Om-
nipotence in legislation is despotism. According to the
doctrine, we have nothing that we can call our own, or are
sure of for a moment ; we are all tenants at wUl, and hold
our landed property at the mere pleasure of the Le^s-
lature."
The primary purpose of the founders of American con-
stitutional law was to wipe out the entire system of legis-
lative despotism over life, liberty and property, based in
England not only upon a denial of the right to due process,
but also upon the denial of the principles demanding gen-
erality and equality in the laws. Their effort was, first, to
subject all state power — executive, legislative and judicial
— to the yoke of constitutional limitations consisting of
epitomies of English constitutional law as it existed in
1776 ; second, to further limit the legislative power with
the requirement that all laws must be equal and general.
The end in view has been thus expressed in Sears v. Cot-
trell, 5 Mich. 351: "By the law of the land we under-
stand laws that are general in their operation, and that
affect the rights of all alike, and not a special act of the
legislature, passed to affect the rights of an individual
against his will and in a way in which the same rights
§ 134 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OF DtJE PROCESS 305
of other persons are not affected by existing laws. Such
an act, nnless expressly authorized by the Constitution,
or clearly coming within the general scope of legislative
power, would be in conflict with this part of the Constitu-
tion, and for that reason, if no other, be void. ' ^ In Giozza
V. Tieman, 148 U. S. 657, the Court said : *' And due proc-
ess of law within the meaning of the amendment is secured
if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the
individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of gov-
ernment. Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462. * ^ It was easy
enough to give scientific definition to the new American
ideal of equal laws; the practical difficulty has been to
convert that ideal into a working rule capable of applica-
tion to existing conditions. In practice it has been neces-
sarily modified by two important exceptions, First, where
the state constitution does not expressly limit the power of
the legislature to pass special or local laws (See Waite v.
Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302), it may pass laws confined in
their operation to particular localities without offending
against the constitutional limitation in question; second,
in the language of Giozza v. Tieman, just cited, **Nor in
respect of taxation was the amendment intended to com-
pel the state to adopt an iron rule of equality ; to prevent
the classification of property for taxation at different
rates; or to prohibit legislation in that regard, special
either in the extent to which it operates or the objects
sought to be obtained by it. It is enough that there is no
discrimination in favor of one against another class.
BelPs Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; Home
Ins. Co. V. New York, 134 U. S. 594 ; Pacific Exp. Co. v.
Seibert, 142 U. S. 339. And due process of law within the
meaning of the amendment is secured if the laws operate
on all alike and do not subject the individual to an arbi-
trary exercise of the powers of government. Leeper v.
Texas, 139 U. S. 462.'' An elaborate exposition of this
state right of classification is contained in State Rail-
road Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, and Kentucky Railroad
Cases, 115 TJ. S. 321, heretofore cited for another purpose.
Dae Proeesv— 20
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
§134
In Dow V. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, the Court said : "The
Legislature, in the exercise of its power of regulating
fares and freights, may classify the raUroada according
to the amount of the business which they have done or
appear likely to do. . . . If the same rule is applied
to all railroadB of the same class, there is no violation of
the constitutional provision securing to all the equal pro-
tection of the laws. ... It was proper, therefore, to
provide in aome way for an adaptation of the rates to the
circumstances of the different roads; and the General
Assembly, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, has
seen fit to do this by a system of classification. Whether
this was the best that could have been done is not for us
to decide.*' In Louisville and N. B. Co. v. Kentucky, 183
U. S. 503, it was held that the constitution and statutes of
Kentucky giving to a railroad commission, — not a mere
administrative body but a constitutional tribunal, — ^power
to make exceptions in particular cases, after investigation,
from the general prohibition of greater rates for shorter
than for longer banls, did not infringe the guaranty of due
process contained in the Federal constitution. It is only
necessary that the regulation in question shall operate
uniformly on each cIms. Chicago K. Co. v. Iowa (4 U. S.
155). In harmony with that principle it was said in
Adams v. New York, 192 V. S. 585, — in response to the
contention "that the law of the state of New York (344b)
which makes the possession by persons other than a public
officer of papers or documents, being the record of chances
or slips in what is commonly known as policy, or policy
slips, or the possession of any paper, print, or writing
commonly used in playing or promoting the game of pol-
icy, presumption of possession thereof knowingly, in vio-
lation of 344a, is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States in that it deprives
a citizen of his liberty and property without due process
of law, — " that "It is argued, lastly, that §344h is un-
constitutional because the possession of the policy tickets
is presumptive evidence against all except public officers,
§ 135 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS 307
and it is urged that public officials, from the governor to
notaries public, would thus be excluded from the terms of
the law which apply to all non-official persons. This
provision was evidently put into the statute for the pur-
pose of excluding the presumption raised by possession
where such tickets or slips are seized and are in the cus-
tody of officers of the law. This was the construction
given to the act by the New York courts, and is the only
one consistent with its purposes. The construction sug-
gested would lead to a manifest absurdity, which has not
received, and is not likely to receive judicial sanction.'*
Thus it was settled that the constitutional principle re-
quiring a regulation to operate uniformly on each class
was not violated by a law providing that the possession
of policy slips **by any person than a public officer'*
shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has them
knowingly, simply by reason of the exception of public
officers, when it is plain that the exception applies only
to such public officers as have acquired possession of
such slips in the performance of their official duties.
Such then is the nature of the fundamental requisite of
due process, so far as generality and equality of laws is
concerned, which, with its inevitable exceptions, is an
element inherent in due process in its American form. As
such it existed long before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and is therefore something entirely separate
and apart from the guaranty embodied in its provision
that no state shall *'deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. ' *
§ 135. Fundamental requisites of due process — Juris-
diction. The system of law by analogy, generally known
as international law, rests upon the postulate that terri-
tory and jurisdiction are co-extensive. As a general rule
a sovereign state has jurisdiction over all persons and
things within its territorial limits, and in some instances
such jurisdiction over both extends beyond its limits and
thus becomes exterritorial. Jurisdiction is in fact an
DUB PBOCESS OP LAW
§135
attribute inherent in sovereignty that follows it wherever
it goes. As Chief Justice Marshall has expressed it : " The
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is neces-
sarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself." The Schooner Ex-
change V. McFaddon, 7 Cranch. 136. Or in the ampler
phrase of Foelix "every state possesses the power of reg-
ulating the conditions on which real or personal property,
within its territory, may be held or transmitted ; and of
determining the state and capacity of all persons therein,
as well as the validity of the contracts and other acts
which arise there, and the rights and obligations which re-
sult from them ; and finally of prescribing the conditions
on which suits at law may be commenced and carried on
within its territory. ' ' Droit Int. Prive, 9. From this gen-
eral right of control results the exclusive power of every
state to fix by legislation the personal and civil status of
its citizens and the status and condition of all real and
personal properiy situated within its limits whether be-
longing to citizens or aliens. Under our Federal consti-
tution the several states bear to each other the relations
of independent sovereignties save so far as such sover-
eignty is modified by its provisions, notable among which
are those which declare first that "The citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states;" second, that "full faith
and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state."
In Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, the Court
said: "The Act of May 26, 1790 (1 Stat, at L., 122),
gives to a judgment rendered in any state such faith and
credit as it had in the courts of the state where it was
recovered. But this provision, though general in its
terms, does not extend to judgment rendered against
persons not amenable to the jurisdiction rendering the
judgments. D 'Arcy v. Ketehum, 11 How. 165. And con-
sequently notwithstanding the Act of Congress, whenever
an action is brought in one state on a judgment recovered
§ 135 SCOPE OP GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS 309
in another, it is not enough to show it to be valid in the
state where it was rendered ; it must also appear that the
defendant was either personally within the jurisdiction
of the state, or had legal notice of the suit, and was in
some way subject to its laws, so as to be bound to appear
and contest the suit, or suffer judgment by default. In
more general terms, the doctrine of this court, as well as
the courts of many of the states, is that this Act of Con-
gress was not designed to displace that principle of
natural justice which requires a person to have notice of
a suit before he can be conclusively bound by its result ;
nor those rules of public law which protect persons and
property within one state from the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over them by another. ' '
As that decision was rendered in 1855, long before
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Federal
courts had then no right to consider whether or no due
process of law was guaranteed in the proceedings culmi-
nating in judgments rendered in a state court against
persons or property within its limits. In the leading case
of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, decided in 1877, after
conditions had been changed by the adoption of the
amendment in question, the Court said : * * Since the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution, the validity of such judgments may be directly
questioned, and their enforcement in the state resisted,
oiji.the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to
determine the personal rights and obligations of parties
over whom that court had no jurisdiction, do not consti-
tute due process of law. Whatever difficulty may be expe-
rienced in giving to those terms a definition which will
embrace every possible exertion of power affecting pri-
vate rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can
be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial
proceedings. They then mean a course of legal proceed-
ings according to those rules and principles which have
been established in our system of jurisprudence for the
protection and enforcement of private rights. To give
CHAPTER VII
DTTE PBOCESS AND JUBISDICTION
§ 136. A competent tribunal and notice. As the right
to notice and hearing constitutes the essence of due
process of law neither element can exist in a judicial pro-
ceeding in which there is a total absence of jurisdiction
over the person or thing to be affected by the judgment.
**To give such proceedings any validity there must be a
tribunal competent by its constitution — that is by the law
of its creation — to pass upon the subject-matter of the
suit ; and, if that involves merely a determination of the
personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought
within its jurisdiction by service of process within the
state, or his voluntary appearance. ' ' Pennoyer v. Neff ,
95 U. S. 714.
In Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, — in which it was
held that no sentence of a court is a judicial determination
entitled to respect in any other court when it is pro-
nounced against a party without adequate notice and with-
out an opportunity to be heard, — the Court said: *'That
there must be notice to a party of some kind, actual or con-
structive, to a valid judgment affecting his rights, is ad-
mitted. Until notice is given, the court has no jurisdiction
in any case to proceed to judgment, whatever its authority
may be, by the law of its organization, over the subject-
matter. But notice is only for the purpose of affording
the party an opportunity of being heard upon the claim
or the charges made ; it is a sunmions to him to appear
and speak, if he has anything to say why the judgment
sought should not be rendered. A denial to a partj'^ of
the benefit of a notice would be in effect to deny that he is
entitled to notice at all, and the sham and deceptive pro-
312
m
§ 136 DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 313
ceeding had better be omitted altogether. It would be
like saying to a party : appear, and you shall be heard ;
and, when he has appeared, saying: your appearance
shall not be recognized, and you shall not be heard. In
the present case, the district court not only in effect said
this, but inunediately added a decree of condemnation,
reciting that the default of all persons had been duly
entered. It is difficult to speak of a decree thus rendered
with moderation ; it was, in fact, a mere arbitrary edict,
clothed in the form of a judicial sentence. ' ' In Scott v.
McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, the Court said: **No judgment of
a court is due process of law, if rendered without juris-
diction in the court, or without notice to the party. The
words ' due process of law, ^ when applied to judicial pro-
ceedings, as was said by Mr. Justice Field, speaking for
this court, ^mean a course of legal proceedings according
to those rules and principles which have been established
in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights. To give such proceedings
any validity there must be a tribunal competent by its
constitution — ^that is, by the law of its creation — ^to pass
upon the subject-matter of the suit ; and if that involves
merely a determination of the personal liability of the
defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by
service of process within the state, or his voluntary
appearance. ' Pennoyer v. Neff , 95 IT. S. 714, 733. ' ' See
also, Hassell v. Wilcox, 130 IT. S. 493 ; Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U. S. 167; Iowa C. E. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389; New
Orleans Water Works v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 480;
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409 ; Blake v. McClung, 172
U. S. 230; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427; National Exch.
Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257; Old Wayne Unit. Ass'n v.
McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 ; Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S.
141; Bemheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516; Longyear
V. Toolan, 209 U. S. 414; Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 212
U. S. 152 ; Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S.
140; McCaughey v. Lyall, 224 U. S. 558; Soliah v.
Heskin, 222 U. S. 522; Blum v. Nelson, 222 U. S. 1;
314
DITE PROCESS OF LAW
$136
Jacob V. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261; Michi^n Trust Co. v.
Ferry, 228 IT. S. 346; Plymoatb Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,
232 U. S. 531 ; Strauss v. Foxworth, 231 V. S. 162 ; Sturges
& Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beaucbam, 231 U. S. 320; Miedreicli
V. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236 ; Herbert v. Bicknell, 233 U. S.
70; Grannia v. Ordean, 234 TJ. S. 385; Selig v. Hamilton,
234 U. S. 653; Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Eupp, 235
U. S. 261; Baltimore & 0. B. Co. v. Hostetter, 240 U. S.
620; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518;
G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U. S. 22.
§-137. Necessity of service to validity of judgment.
The law of the land authorizes no court to render a judg-
ment or decree against a person or his estate until he has
been notified by service of process to appear and defend.
HoUingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466. A person who has *
not been served with process, actual or constructive, or
who has had no notice of proceedings has had no day in
court, and therefore can not be bound by a judgment
in personam. Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334. Until
citation is issued and an opportunity to be heard given,
no one can be said to have had his day in court. Mason
V. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231. Unless a party voluntarily
appears, or is found within the jurisdiction of the court,
so as to be served with process, a court can not, in the
ordinary administration of justice, render a judgment or
decree against him. Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308;
Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Tmmble, 10 Wall. 367.
At conmion law a court can not exercise jurisdiction over
a party, unless he voluntarily appears, or is served Tvith
process within the court's territorial jurisdiction. Mexi-
can C. E. Co. V. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194. Unless a person
has agreed in advance to accept, or does actually accept
some other form of service as sufficient, the notice must
be personally served upon him within the territorial juris-
diction of the court by whose judgment his personal liabil-
ity is to be ascertained. Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S. 41.
Where there has been no service on the defendant, or
§ 137 DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 315
appearance entered for him, and he is never in conrt, a
proceeding to enforce a lien npon a mining daim can not
work a transfer of title to such claim. Turner v. Sawyer,
150 U. S. 578. Unless process has been served upon a
defendant who is an inhabitant of the district, or unless
he waives the necessity for it by an appearance, no judg-
ment can be rendered by a Federal Court against such a
defendant. In the absence of such notice, or waiver, an
original proceeding is not only voidable, but absolutely
void. Walden v. Craig, 14 Pet. 147 ; Levy v. Fitzpatrick,
15 Pet. 167. A different rule applies to the decision of a
collateral question, when the parties are already before
the court. Walden v. Craig, 14 Pet. 147. Where there
are several defendants, the judgment is a nullity as to the
one not served with process, if he did not appear. Shelton
V. TiflSn, 6 How. 163. For a special application of the rule
in a case iu which only twenty out of sixty-four parties
to a decree were served with process, or voluntarily
appeared in the proceeding, see Godfrey v. Terry, 97
U. S. 171. A delivery of the summons at the usual place
of defendant's abode, to his wife, in accordance with the
procedure established by the court in question, was held
to be a proper service of the process of the United States
provisional court for Porto Eico. Santiago v. Nogueras,
214 U. S. 260. For the conditions under which substituted
service will satisfy the requirements of due process, see
Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261. As to service upon
** unknown claimants of interests in the premises adverse
to the plaintiff,'' see Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604.
As to service in a proceeding culminating in the fore-
closure of a mortgage wherein it was claimed that there
was a lack of due process, despite the fact that the state
had made provision for the service of process, and the
original party in the foreclosure proceeding had done all
the law required in the issue of and attempt to serve
process, reported to the court by the sheriff, contrary to
the fact, as duly made, see Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232
U, S. 236. Where a party had actual knowledge of a suit
316
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§137
before the time for Bning out a writ of error had expired,
and where he might have brought about a setting aaide of
the judgment and a retrial of the case, it was held that
the principal defendant in a gamiBhment snit in a conrt
having jurisdiction over small debts was not deprived
of due process because a judgment by default was taken
against him, after such service of process only as that
provided by Hawaii Bev. Laws, 2114, i. e., the leaving a
copy of the summons at his last and usual place of abode.
Herbert v. Bicknell, 233 U. S. 70. See Grannis v. Ordean,"
234 U. S. 385; Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 V. S. 115;
Washington-Virginia R. Co. v. Real Estate Trust Co.,
238 U. S. 185.
§ 138. Oxaing lack of notice or service by appeu«nce.
Defects in procedure waived by appearance, Penhallow v.
Doane, 3 Dall. 54. All antecedent irregularity of service
of process cured by defendant's appearance by attorney,
Knox V. Summers, 3 Cranch 496. Where the defendant
has appeared and pleaded to the issue, no question on
process can arise, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet
657. But an objection that goes to the power of the court
over the subject-matter or parties is not waived by
appearance and pleading to the issue. Ibid., 657. As a
corporation can only appear by attorney, such an appear-
ance to plead to the jurisdiction of the court can not be
a waiver of objection to the jurisdiction, Commercial &
E. Bank v. Stocomb, 14 Pet. 60. When made by individ-
ual defendants in a court of general jurisdiction, an
appearance by attorney waives all objection to the court's
jurisdiction, Ibid., 60. A defendant may waive the per-
sonal privilege of having a suit against him only in the
district of which he is an inhabitant by pleading to the
merits, St. Louis & S. F. B. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127.
A waiver of the objection that he was not an inhabitant
of the district or found therein is made by a defendant
who appears without making an exception, Gracie v.
Palmer, 8 Wheat 699. Any right to challenge thereafter
"^
§ 138 DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 317
the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the suit
has not been brought in the proper district is waived by
a party who, in the first instance, appears and pleads to
the merits. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S.
127. A nonresident waives his privilege and makes a
voluntary appearance, when he appears by counsel and
moves to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction and also
for want of equity, Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 327. When
a defendant makes a special appearance in order to move
that the service of process be set aside, any illegality in
such service by which jurisdiction must be obtained, is
not waived, even by an answer to the merits after such a
motion is overruled, Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476;
Mexican C. E, Co. v. Pinkney, 149 IT. S. 194. A proceed-
ing in rem is converted into a proceeding in personam by
the appearance of the defendant. Cooper v. Reynolds,
10 Wall. 308. See also, Creighton v. Kerr, 20 Wall. 8.
It was held that a proceeding lacked due process when
a judgment was taken in a state court under a warrant
of attorney attached to a promissory note, directing a
confession of judgment **in favor of the holder, '* when
the party in whose favor the judgment was rendered had
ceased to own it, or to be entitled to receive the proceeds
to his own use, before the commencement of the suit.
National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 TJ. S. 257. Since in
such cases the consent of both parties can not confer
jurisdiction, it was held that an objection to the jurisdic-
tion based upon a total lack of any controversy of a
Federal character was not waived by a general appear-
ance of the plaintiff in a Federal circuit court after the
case had been removed from a state court. Re Winn, 213
U. S. 458. When an appearance is entered for the sole
purpose of presenting the question of jurisdiction and
removing the cause from a state to a Federal court such
an appearance does not amount to a general appearance
in the suit. Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213
XJ. S. 245. In passing upon the waiver of illegal service
in a case removed from the state to the Federal court, the
318
DUE PE0C3BSS OF LAW
§138
CI
It
Supreme Court said: ** Plaintiff further contends that,
under the' Mississippi Code, the filing of the petition for
removal constitutes a general entry of appearance ; that
therefore, if 29 does not compel the removing party to
plead to the declaration within thirty days, *then under
914, U. S. Eev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 684, the
* practice, pleadings, forms, and modes of proceeding* in
the state court adopted by the Federal court, would make
the plea to the jurisdiction here in the district court a
general entry of appearance, and would require a plea to
the merits at the next term of the district court under the
Code of the State,' because * a special is a general entry of
appearance under 3946, Code of 1906.' The contention
is untenable.'' Cain v. Com. Pub. Co., 232 U. S, 134,
citing Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, and Me-
chanical App. Co. V. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437. See also
Arizona & New Mexico By. v. Clark, 235 U. S. 669.
§ 139. Jurisdiction over nonresident persons. A state
can not justly exercise jurisdiction over a person owing
it no allegiance, simply because he is found within its
limits. Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481. If service is made
outside of its limits, a territorial court can have no juris-
diction to render a personal judgment against any one.
Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476. And yet the mere fact
that a defendant is without the jurisdiction of the court
is not conclusive evidence that the judgment is void,
because he may have authorized counsel to defend the suit
in his absence. Landes v. Brant, 10 How. 348. Jurisdic-
tion may be so acquired as to sustain a judgment against
foreigners who have a storehouse and agent in the coun-
try, and who have appeared and are engaged in litigation
simply to prevent their property within the jurisdiction,
but not in the custody of the court, from being seized to
satisfy any judgment that might be rendered against
them. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113. It is elementary
that a personal judgment against a nonresident is invalid
in an ordinary civil case where the service of process has
!
§ 140 DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 319
been by publication. In order to render the judgment or
decree of the court effectual it must have jurisdiction of
the subject-matter or the parties. A money judgment
rendered against a nonresident defendant served only by
the publication of process against him is without jurisdic-
tion, and therefore lacking in due process of law. Pen-'
noyer v. Neff, 95 XJ. S. 714. In that case the Court said :
^'The force and effect of judgments rendered against non-
residents without personal service of process on them, or
their voluntary appearance, have been the subject of fre-
quent consideration in the courts of the United States
and of the several states, as attempts have been made to
enforce such judgments in states other than those in
which they were rendered, under the provision of the con-
stitution requiring that *Full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial
proceedings of every other state;' • . . Since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be
directly questioned, and their enforcement in the state
resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of
justice to determine the personal rights and obligations
of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not
constitute due process of law.'' See also. Cooper v.
Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Brooklyn v. Etna L. Ins. Co.,
99 U. S. 362 ; Empire Twp. v. Darlington, 101 XT. S. 87 ;
Grover & B. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 IT. S.
287; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1;
Jacob V. Roberts, 223 IT. S. 261 ; Miedreich v. Lauenstein,
232 U. S. 236 ; Herbert v. Bicknell, 233 U. S. 70 ; Grannis
V. Ordean, 234 IT. S. 385 ; Mercelis v. Wilson, 235 U. S.
579; Simon v. Southern Railway, 236 U. S. 115.
§ 140. Jurisdiction over nonresident corporations. In
the recent case of Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills
v. Menefee, 237 IT. S. 189, it was held that a corporation,
no more than an individual, is subject to be condemned
without a hearing in violation of the due process clause ;
Ml' |.
I «
320 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 140
and the mere fact that one who is a director, but who is
not a resident agent, of a foreign corporation resides
within the state does not give the courts of that state"
jurisdiction over a corporation which is not doing busi-
ness and has no resident agent therein. The Court speak-
ing through Mr, Chief Justice White, said: **That to
condemn without a hearing is repugnant to the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment needs noth-
ing but statement Equally well settled is it that the
courts of one state can not, without a violation of the due
process clause, extend their authority beyond their juris-
diction so as to condemn the resident of another state
when neither his person nor his property is within the
jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment, since
that doctrine was long ago established by the decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U, S. 714. . . . Whatever long
ago may have been the difficulty in applying the princi-
pies of Pennoyer v. Neff to corporations, that is, in deter-
mining when, if at all, a corporation created by the laws
of one state could be sued in the courts of another sov-
ereignty, because of the conception that as an ideal being
a corporation could not migrate and its officers in going
into another sovereignty did not take with them their
power to represent the corporation, such difficulty ceased
to exist with the decision of this court rendered more than
thirty years ago in St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, which,
together with the leading cases which have followed, have
been already referred to.*^ The cases in question are,
Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, Wilson v. Seligman,
144 U. S. 41; Scott V. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34; Caledonian
Coal Co. V. Baker, 196 U. S. 432 ; Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U. S. 562; Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164; Hunter v.
Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573. In St. Clair
V. Cox, the Court said: *'A corporation of one state can
not do business in another state without the latter 's con-
sent, express or implied, and that consent may be accom-
panied with such conditions as it may think proper to
impose. As said by this court in Ins. Co. v. French,
§ 141 DUB PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 321
' These conditions must be deemed valid and effectual by
other states and by this court, provided they are not
repugnant to the Constitutions or laws of the United
States nor inconsistent with those rules of public law
which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each state
from encroachment, by all others, or that principle of
natural justice which forbids condemnation without
opportunity for defense. 18 How. 407 ; Paul v, Virginia,
8 Wall. 181. The state may therefore, impose as a condi-
tion upon which foreign corporation shall be permitted
to do business within her limits, that it shall stipulate
that, in any litigation arising out of its transactions in
the state, it will accept as suflScient the service of process
on its agents or persons specially designated; and the
condition would be eminently fit and just. And such
condition and stipulation may be implied as well as.
expressed. If a state permits a foreign corporation to do
business within her limits, and at the same time provides
that in suits against it for business there done, process
shall be served upon its agents, the provision is to be
deemed a condition of the permission ; and corporations
that subsequently do business in the state are to be
deemed to assent to such condition as fully as though
they had specially authorized their agents to receive
service of process. Such condition must not, however,
encroach upon that principle of natural justice which
requires notice of a suit to a party before he can be bound
by it. It must be reasonable, and the service provided for
should be only upon such agents as may be properly
denied representative of the foreign corporation. The
decision we have already referred sustains these views.**
See Simon v. Southern Eailway, 236 IT. S. 115.
§141. Proceedings in rem. In the leading case of
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 279, — ^involving the validity
of an act of Congress authorizing the confiscation of the
property of rebels, in which the owner of the land seized
appeared and filed an answer, stricken out by the trial
Due Proee8»— 21
I
I
i!
w
n
itJ;
I'
322
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§141
court on the ground that it appeared from it that the
owner was ** within the Confederate lines and a rebel, — *'
the Supreme Court said : * * The jurisdiction acquired by
the seizure is not to pass upon the question of forfeiture
absolutely, but to pass upon that question after oppor-
tunity has been afforded to its owner and parties inter-
ested to appear and be heard upon the charges. To this
end, some notification of the proceedings, beyond that
arising from the seizure, prescribing the time within
which the appearance must be made, is essential. Such
notification is usually given by monition, public proclama-
tion, or publication in some other form. The manner of
the notification is immaterial.'* In Roller v. Holly, 176
TJ. S. 398, it was held in a suit for the foreclosure of a lien
upon land within the state that personal service on non-
residents, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, may be
suflficient. The Court said : * ' Without undertaking to de-
termine what is a reasonable notice to nonresidents, we
are of opinion, under the circumstances of this case, and
considering the distance between the place of service and
the place of return, that five days was not a reasonable
notice, or due process of law ; that the judgment obtained
upon such notice was not binding upon the defendant
EoUer, and constitutes no bar to the prosecution of this
action. *' A creditor is not deprived of property without
due process of law where debts to nonresident creditors
are attached at the place of the debtor's residence. Roths-
child V. Knight, 184 U. S. 334. A nonresident defendant,
who has no property within the jurisdiction of the court,
is not deprived of his property without due process of law
by the garnishment of a resident debtor to reach a debt
due him. King v. Cross, 175 U. S. 396. Because there was
no publication, under the act of June 30, 1902, against
unknown heirs or next of kin, until after the verdict, no
suggestion being made at any time that there were no
such persons, the court will not at the instance of the
caveator set aside probate proceedings in the District of
Columbia in which a verdict sustaining the will had been
§ 142 DUB PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 323
rendered by a jury after a trial of the issues made up
under a caveat Lewis v. Luckett, 221 U. S, 554, In
MichigMi Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S- 346, Edward P.
Ferry was appointed executor by the Ottawa probate
court, qualified and entered upon his duties. In 1878
he removed to Utah, and becoming incompetent, was
put under guardianship of two sons. The Court said:
** Jurisdiction is power, and the power of the Michigan
court was not affected by the insanity of Ferry. The
authority of the state to remove him and to require his
account to be settled at the same time remained, and
therefore, subject to any restrictions that might be
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment, it was for the
state to determine how he should be represented, and
steps should be taken to protect his rights. As the juris-
diction extended only to the cause, and not to any inde-
pendent proceeding for guardianship, the orders made
necessary were orders in the cause. ' ' It is scarcely neces-
sary to add here that in order to force all cases of valid
service by construction or substitution within the class
of proceedings in rem, the idea of the res has been
extended to such intangible things as the probate of wills,
and the grant of letters of administration. * * The decree
of the court admitting the will to probate is in the nature
of a judgment in rem which establishes the will against
all the world. ^' Bonnemot v. Gill, 167 Mass. 338. Li
Cunnius v. Beading School Dist., 198 U. S. 458, — ^in which
the grant of letters of administration was treated in effect
as a proceeding in rem, — ^the court held that the notice
fixing the period of a person's absence from his last
domicil in the state was not so unreasonable as to render
the statute in question repugnant to the due process of
law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
§142. Divorce proceedings, strictly speaking, neither
in rem nor in personam. An able text writer has said:
**As preliminary to a discussion of the principles gov-
erning the effect of foreign divorce, it is necessary to
«
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324
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§142
observe the important distinctions between judicial pro-
ceedings in personam and in rem. The purpose of a pro-
ceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment
or decree of the court whose aid is invoked, some respon-
sibility or liability directly upon the person of the defend-
ant. ... Of this character are criminal prosecutions,
suits to compel a defendant to perform some specific act
or actions to fasten a general pecuniary liability upon
him. A proceeding in rem, on the other hand, is aimed
not at the person of the defendant, but at his property
or some other thing within the power and jurisdiction of
the court. Most important consequences flow from the
distinction between these modes of procedure. The Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal constitution provides
that no state shall deprive any person, life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; that is, without
notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard in his own
behalf. But the notice required under this constitutional
provision is very different in the two modes of procedure.
In proceedings in personam, no judgment or decree
against a defendant is valid unless he has been person-
ally served with notice of the action or suit within the
territorial limits of the court ^s jurisdiction, or has volun-
tarily appeared. This much is always required, and in
some instances even more. But in proceedings in rem,
if the res be within the court's jurisdiction, due process
of law does not demand that actual notice of the suit
should be served upon the defendant personally. Even
though he be a nonresident of the forum, the law pre-
sumes that he keeps in touch with his property, wherever
it is situated, and that he will be straightway informed if
any peril threatens it. • . . Divorce causes being
proceedings quasi in rem, it becomes important and neces-
sary to determine what is the res, for the court 's jurisdic-
tion in proceeding in rem depends upon its jurisdiction
of the res. It is generally admitted that the res is the
marriage status, which includes the status of both con-
sorts, the situs of the status of each being his or her
§ 142 DUE PROCESS AND JUKISDIOTION 325
domicil Strictly speaking^ therefore, the jurisdiction of
the status of the husband or wife belongs to the courts
of his or her domicil, and to no other, because those courts
alone have jurisdiction of the res. But in the case of
marriage the status is double or correlative status.
There can be no such thing as a husband without a wife,
or a wife without a husband. Hence when a court
assumes to pronounce a decree destroying the marriage
status of one of the consorts, it must necessarily destroy
so far as its decree has any effect at all, the status of the
other consort also. If then the consorts are domiciled in
different states, it is a matter of grave importance to
ascertain how far the power of the courts of either of
these domicils extends in dissolving the marital union.''
Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 184 sq.
Only with the foregoing principles clearly in view is
it possible to understand and apply the decisions, not very
numerous, in which the Supreme Court of the United
States has expounded this abstruse subject of jurisdic-
tion which, without exaggeration, may be said to embody
the metaphysics of American law. In divorce cases the
jurisdiction must depend upon the domicil of one or both
of the parties, because every state claims, as a part of its
sovereignty, the right to determine the status of its domi-
ciled subjects or citizens. In Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175,
the Court said: **No valid divorce from the bond of
matrimony can be decreed on constructive service by the
courts of a state in which neither party is domiciled. '*
See also, Streitwolf v. Streitwolf , 181 U. S. 179 ; Winston
V. Winston, 189 U. S. 507. The right of a state to deter-
mine the status of its domiciled citizens necessary
involves the res, because * * the res is the marriage status,
which includes the status of both consorts, the situs of
the status of each being his or her domicil. ' ' It is there-
fore certain, first, that where neither party has a hona
fide domicil in the state wherein the decree of divorce is
rendered (a question not dependent entirely on local
law) the decree, not binding in any other state, is not
; I
I;) t
IK t
t
I
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■ J i l| i
326
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
§142
within the due faith and credit clause of the constitution
(Bell V. Bell, 181 U. S. 175) ; second, that where both par-
ties are domiciled in the state granting the divorce, by a
decree made after proper service of process, it is within
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, and
valid everywhere (Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155) ;
third, that the same conditions exist where one of the par-
ties has voluntarily appeared, though not personally
served with process within the state ( Cheever v. Wilson,
9 Wall, 108 ; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183). In Pennoyer
V. Neff, 95 U. S. 734, the Court, after explaining the rules
as to the validity of state judgments in rem and in
personam, was careful to say: **To prevent any mis-
application of the views expressed in this opinion, it is
proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by
anything that we have said, that a state may not author-
ize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citi-
zens toward a nonresident, which would be binding within
the state, though made without service of process or per-
sonal notice to the nonresident. • • . One of the par-
ties guilty of acts for which, by the law of the state, a
dissolution may be granted, may have removed to a
state where no dissolution is permitted. The complain-
ing party would, therefore, fail if a divorce were sought
in the state of the defendant; and if application could not
be made to the tribunals of the complainant's domicil in
such case, and proceedings be there instituted without
personal service of process, or personal notice to the
offending party, the injured citizen would be without
redress. ' '
Only when proceedings for divorce are regarded as
quasi in rem, with the marriage status of the parties the
res or subject-matter in dispute as the real ground of
jurisdiction, is it possible to fix the extraterritoriality of
divorce decrees upon a basis in harmony with general
theory. And yet even then the extraterritoriality of such
decrees can not so extend beyond the dissolution of the
marriage status as to fix to such judgments the qualities
§ 142 DUB PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 327
of a judgment in personam. It can not draw after it the
payment of alimony, unless it be decreed after the volun-
tary appearance of the nonresident defendant. In Lynde
V. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183, the Court said: ''The husband,
as the record shows, having appeared generally in answer
to the petition for alimony in the court of chancery in
New Jersey, the decree of that court for alimony^ was
binding on him. Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531. ' * In the
case of Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, in which a decree
for divorce and alimony was rendered, both parties being
domiciled in New York, the court held that such a decree
or judgment rendered in any state of the Union, the court
having jurisdiction, will be carried into judgment in any
other state, there to have the same effect that it has in the
state in which rendered. See also, Cheever v. Wilson,
9 Wall. 108, in which the defendant made a voluntary
appearance. While in Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701,
a divorce was held to be void because the court had not
acquired jurisdiction in accordance with the local law, it
waa said that **the courts of the state of the domicil of
the parties doubtless have jurisdiction to decree a divorce,
in accordance with its laws, for any cause allowed by those
laws, without regard to the place of the marriage, or to
that of the commission of the offense for which the
divorce is granted; and a divorce so obtained is valid
everywhere. ' '
Reference must next be made to the notable case of
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, decided in 1900, in
which it appeared that ^ * On October 17, 1888, the parties
were married at Clinton, Oneida County, New York, the
plaintiff being a resident of that place, and the defendant
a resident of Louisville, Kentucky. Immediately after
the marriage, the parties went to and resided at Louis-
ville in the house with the defendant's parents, had a
child bom to them on January 8, 1890, and there con-
tinued to reside as husband and wife until October 3,
1891. Then, owning to his cruel and abusive treatment,
without fault on her part, she left him, taking the child
328
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§142
i
with her, and in a few days thereafter returned to her
mother at Clinton, and has ever since resided there with
her mother, and is a resident of and domiciled in the state
of New York, and has not lived or cohabited with the
defendant. * ' After the lapse of a sufficient time required
by the laws of Kentucky the husband sued there for
divorce on the ground of desertion, making affidavit under
the local law as to defendant's residence and postoffice.
Thereupon an order was made warning the defendant to
defend within sixty days, and appointing an attorney for
such defendant, '* whose duty it shall be to make diligent
efforts to inform the defendant by mail concerning the
pendency and nature of the action, '* and report to the
court. After a careful observance of all the requirements
of the Kentucky law a decree of divorce was granted the
husband. When the wife brought a subsequent action in
New York for divorce on the ground of cruelty the court
of that state, refusing to recognize the Kentucky decree
as binding there, rendered a decree of divorce in the
wife's favor on the ground set up by her, it being dis-
tinctly held that she had acquired a separate domicil in
New York by reason of the husband's cruelty. On that
theory the New York court maintained its jurisdiction.
Its decree was reversed by the Federal Supreme Court on
the ground that the Kentucky court had acquired juris-
diction of the case by the constructive service provided by
the local law, and that its judgment was under the protec-
tion of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution,
and therefore binding in all the states. It was careful,
however, to say : ' ' This case does not involve the validity
of a divorce granted on constructive service, by the court
of a state in which only one of the parties ever had a
domicil; nor the question to what extent the good faith
of the domicil may be afterwards inquired into. In this
case, the divorce in Kentucky was by the court of the state
which had always been the undoubted domicil of the
husband and which was the only matrimonial domicil of
the husband and wife. The single question to be decided
§1
DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION
is the validity of that divorce, granted after such notice
had been given as was required by the statutes of Ken-
tucky." The conrt clearly admitted that the constructive
service brought the res before the court, if not the non-
resident wife. In speaking of the validity of the con-
structive notice required by the Kentucky law it said:
"The undisputed facta show that such efforts were
required by the statute^ of Kentucky and were actually
made, to give the wife actual notice of the suit in Ken-
tacky, as to make the decree of the court there granting
a divorce upon the ground that she had abandoned her
husband, as binding on her as if she had been served with
notice in Kentucky, or had voluntarily appeared in the
suit Binding her to that full extent, it established,
beyond contradiction, that she hiid abandoned her hus-
band, and precludes her from asserting that she left him
on account of his cruel treatment," as asserted in her suit
in New York. Certainly the decision in question clearly
settled the fact that where reasonable efforts to give a
nonresident defendant actual notice are required by the
state law, and are actually made, actual notice of divorce
proceedings is not required in th^ court of a state, which
had always been the domicil of the plaintiff and the only
matrimonial domicil of the consorts. It was held that as
all the requirements of the local law were complied with,
the decree for abandonment was as binding on the absent
wife in a court of a state in which she resided as if she
had been served with notice in Kentucky, or had entered
a voluntary appearance there. The Conrt said: "The
purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond
of matrimony by a court of competent jiuisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of hus-
band and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without
a hnsband, is unknown to the law."
In Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1905) the court
by a majority of one (Brown, Harlan, Brewer and Holmes,
330
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§142
JJ. dissenting) virtually reversed Atherton v. Atherton,
181 U. S. 155, in a decision holding that a decree against
a nonresident def'endant in a divorce proceeding, who did
not appear and was only constructively served with
notice of the pendency of the suit, is not enforceable in
all the other states by virtue of thjB full faith and credit
clause of the Federal constitution, because mere domicil
within the state of one party to the marriage does not
give the courts of that state jurisdiction to render such a
decree. Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion
said : * ' It is important to bear in mind that the present
decision purports to respect, and not to overrule, Ather-
ton V. Atherton, For that reason, among others, I spend
no time in justifying that case. And yet it appears to me
that the whole argxunent which prevails with tiie majority
of the court is simply an argument that Atherton v.
Atherton is wrong. I have tried in vain to discover any-
thing tending to show a distinction between that case and
this.'* In Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, it was held that
the protection of the full faith and credit clause of the
Federal constitution can not be denied to the decrees of
New York courts for the future payment of alimony
through annulments or modifications by such courts as to
overdue and unsatisfied instalmentsw
In the recent case of Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S.
551, in which it was held that the courts of the state of
the domicil of the husband, and the only matrimonial
domicil, have jurisdiction to render a decree in his favor
entitled to full faith and credit in the District of Colum-
bia, despite the fact that the wife had left the jurisdiction,
and could only be served by publication, — ^the Court said :
*'This subject, in its relation to actions for divorce, has
been most exhaustively considered by this court in two
recent cases : Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 ; Had-
dock V. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562. In the Atherton case the
matrimonial domicil was in Kentucky, which was also
the domicil of the husband. The wife left him there and
returned to the home of her mother in the state of New
I
! 142 DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 331
York. He began suit in Kentncky for a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii because of his abandonment, which was a
cause of divorce by the laws of Kentncky, and took such
proceedings to give her notice as the laws of that state
required, which included mailing of notice to the post-
office nearest her residence in New York. No response or
appearance having been made by her, the Kentucky court
proceeded to take evidence and grant to the husband an
absolute decree of divorce. It was held that this decree
was entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of New
York. In the Haddock case, the husband and wife were
domiciled in New York, and the husband left her there,
and after some years, acquired a domicil in Connecticut,
and obtained in that state, and in accordance with its
laws, a judgment of divorce, based upon eonstmctive, and
not actual service, service of process on the wife, she hav-
ing meanwhile retained her domicil in New York, and
having made no appearance in the action. The wife
afterwards sued for divorce in New York, and obtained
personal service in that state upon the husband. The
New York court refused to give credit to the Connecticut
judgment, and this court held that there was no violation
of the full faith and credit clause in the refusal, and this
because there was not at any time a matrimonial domicil
in the state of Connecticut, and therefore the res — the
marriage status — ^was not within the sweep of the judicial
power of that state. In the present case it appears that
the parties were married in the state of Virginia, and
had a matrimonial domicil there, and not in the District
of Columbia or elsewhere. The husband had his actual
domicil in that state at all times until and after the
conelnsion of the litigation. It is clear, therefore, under
the decision in the Atherton ease and the principles upon
which it rests, that the state of Virginia bad jurisdiction
over the marriage relation, and the proper courts of that
state could proceed to adjudicate respecting it upon
grounds recognized by the laws of that state, although
the wife had left the jurisdiction and could not be reached
332
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§142
by formal process. But in order to make a divorce valid,
even when granted by the courts of the state of the mat-
rimonial domicily there must be notice to the defendant,
either by service of process, or (if the defendant be a
nonresident) by such publication or other constructive
notice as is required by the law of thi state. Cheely v.
Clayton, 110 U. S. 701 ; Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S.
155. In Cheely v. Clayton, because the notice was pub-
lished against the defendant without making such effort
as the local law required to serve process upon her within
the state, this court held, following repeated decisions of
the state court, that the decree of divorce was wholly void
for want of jurisdiction in the court that granted it ; and
that the liberty conferred by the local statute upon a de-
fendant on whom constructive service only had been
made, to apply within three years to set the decree aside,
did not make it valid when the constructive service was
so defective.*' The lucid exposition made in this recon-
ciling opinion may be regarded as the existing law on
this difficult subject.
§ 143. When judgments are subject to collateral attack.
In considering, as was necessary in the preceding section,
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal constitution
as to judgments of sister states, it is necessary to remem-
ber that it has no reference to judgments rendered with-
out jurisdiction. As the fact of jurisdiction is always
open to inquiry, the record of a judgment rendered in a
sister state may be attacked collaterally as to the existence
of the jurisdictional facts involved in it. In Hanley v.
Donoghue, 116 U. S. 4, the Court said: ** Judgments re-
covered in one state of the Union, when proved in the
courts of another, differ from judgments recovered in a
foreign country in no other respect than that of not being
re-examined upon the merits, nor impeachable for fraud
in obtaining them, if rendered by a court having jurisdic-
tion of the cause and the parties. Buckner v. Finley,
2 Pet. 586; McEhnoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 324; D^Arcy
il43
DUE PBOCESS AND JURISDICTION
V. Ketchnm, 11 How. 165, 176; Christmas v. Enesell, 5
Wail. '290, 305; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457."
The proceedings are not merely voidable but void, and
may be rejected when collaterally attacked, if there is a
total want of jurisdiction. Bose v. Himely, 4 Cranch
241; Griffith V. Frazier, 8 Cranch 9; Elliot v. Piersol, 1
Pet. 328; Shriver v. Lynn, 2 How. 43; Williamson v.
Berry, 8 How. 495. A judgment is void and subject to
collateral attack when rendered without jurisdiction of
the defendant. No error can be considered that does not
show want of jurisdiction in the court that rendered the
judgment condemning the property, where confiscation
proceedings are brought before the court collaterally as
the foundation of the defendant's title. Tyler v. Defrees,
11 Wall. 331. In the leading case of Scott v. McNeal, 154
U. S. 34, in which the Court said: "The fundamental
question in this case is whether letters of administration
upon the estate of a person who is in fact alive have any
validity or effect against him;" and in which the plain-
tiff clfiimed "that to give effect to the probate proceed-
ings under the circumstances would be to deprive him of
his property without due process of law," — it was held
that "No judgment of a court ia due process of law, if
rendered without jurisdiction in the court, and without
notice to the party." Approved in Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U. S. 164 ; New Orleans Water Works Co. v. New Orleans,
164 IT. S. 480, and distinguished in Hamilton v. Brown,
161 U. S. 274, wherein it was held that a judgment in an
escheat proceeding is conclusive against all having con-
structive notice by "publication. The judgment of a court
which has once acquired jurisdiction is unassailable col-
laterally only when after acquiring jurisdiction, it pro-
ceeds according to established modes governing the class
to which the particular case belongs. When it transcends,
in the extent and character of its judgment, the law ap-
plicable to it, its judgment is not only erroneous but void.
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 V. S. 274. See also, United
States V. Walker, 109 XJ. S. 258. A judgment is not only
334
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§143
voidable but void and subject to collateral attack when
rendered in excess of jurisdiction. Re Terry, 128 U. S.
289.
In United States v. Morse, 218 U. S. 493, in which the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia had jurisdic-
tion over the res and the parties, in a proceeding for the
sale of an infant's real estate for purposes of investment,
it was held that the decree was not open to collateral
attack, despite the error of the court in holding that a
case had been made either under its statutory authority,
or under its inherent power as a court of equity. In Bris-
coe V. Eudolph, 221 U. S. 547 — upon an objection chal-
lenging an assessment as excessive, and asserting that a
second jury should have been called under the local code,
— it was held that a judgment of the Supreme Court of
the District, confirming a special assessment for benefits
resulting from a street extension, can not be attacked
collaterally, since the matter complained of was, at best,
only an error reviewable on appeal. See also, Johannes-
sen V. United States, 225 U. S. 227 ; Herbert v. Crawford,
228 U. S. 204; Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551;
Priest V. Board of Trustees, 232 U. S. 604 ; Magruder v.
Drury, 235 U. S. 106 ; Simon v. Southern Eailway, 236
U. S. 115. Special reference should be made in this con-
nection to Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, in
which it was held : first, that due process of law can not
be denied in fixing, by judgment, against one beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, an amount due, even though the
enforcement of the judgment be postponed until execu-
tion issue ; second, that the fact that a judgment rendered
without due process of law may not, under the full faith
and credit clause, be enforced in another state, affords no
ground for the court entering a judgment without juris-
diction in violation of due process of law. In reachinsf
those conclusions the Court said: **It is self-evident that
the application of these settled principles establishes the
error of the decision of the court below unless it be that
the distinction upon which the court acted be well founded,
§143
DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION
that is, that the enforcement of dne process under the
Fourteenth Amendment was without influence upon the
power to render the judgment since that limitation wa8
pertinent only to the determination of when and how the
judgment after it was rendered could be enforced. But
this doctrine while admitting the operation of the due
process clause, simply declines to make it effective. That
is to say, it recognizes the right to invoke the protection
of the clause but denies its remedial efBciency by postpon-
ing its operation and thus permitting that to be done
which if the constitutional guaranty were applied would
be absolutely prohibited. But the obvious answer to the
proposition is that wherever a provision of the Constitu-
tion is applicable, the duty to enforce it is imperative and
all embracing, and no act which it forbids may therefore
be permitted." See also, Doran v. Kennedy, 237 U. S.
CHAPTER Vin
STATE POWEB OP TAXATION AND DUB PBOCESS
§ 144. Taxing power of the Imperial Parliament. The
charters under which our colonial governments were or-
ganized were royal grants ; they were not concessions from
the English legislature. In contemplation of English
law the whole group of colonial governments in America,
created or confirmed by royal charters, were mere cor-
porations created by the King and subject, like all others
of their kind, to his visitorial power, and to the power of
his courts, to dissolve them in a proper case presented for
the purpose. But until some cause of forfeiture arose,
the grant, as between the crown and the patentees, was
irrevocable, — it being the settled doctrine of English
law that after a grant of corporate power made by the
Crown had been once accepted, the Crown could not re-
sume the grant without the consent of those in whom
its privileges had been vested. The irrevocable rights
thus acquired by the colonists as against the Crown were
revocable, however, at the hands of the Parliament. Un-
der the theory of the English Constitution, then, as now,
* *Its power is, legally speaking, illimitable. It may create
and abolish and change, at its pleasure, with or without
the assent of the people or corporation to be thereby
affected. ' ' Dillon, Municipal Corporations, i, 109, 2d ed.,
and cases cited. In the hands of a tax-loving statesman
like Grenville that imperial theory was not confined to
mere supervision ; in such hands it was held to mean that
the Imperial Parliament could at any moment override
the acts of the colonial assemblies, without consulting
their wishes at all, and tax and legislate for the people of
336
§146
STATE POWER OF TAXATION
MassachnsettB and Virginia jnst as it conld for the people
of Kent and Middlesex.
§ 145. Extension of parliamentary control over the
colonies. At the outset the English colonies in America,
created by the Crown on land considered as terra regis,
were not subjected to the control of Parliament The
earliest form of direct legislative control to which any of
the colonists were subjected, in the form of ordinances or
instructions for their government, emanated, not from the
law-making power of the King in Parliament, but from
the King in Council. With the founding of the colonies,
and with the organization of their political systems, the
Crown had everything to do, the Parliament practically
nothing. Apart from the control which had existed from
the beginning over their external affairs in matters of
trade and navigation, the colonies, prior to the latter part
of the eighteenth century, had not been drawn within the
widening circle of its imperial authority. In their local
legislatures the colonists had learned how to tax them-
selves, and how to regulate their home affairs through
laws of their own making. Losing sight of the fact that
England had grown into an empire since the work of col-
onization began, the colonists clave to the earlier concep-
tion which regarded the home Parliament simply as the
legislative organ of the United Kingdom. As such, they
held that it had no right to invade the jurisdictions of
their colonial assemblies in order to legislate directly
upon their internal concerns.
§ 146. Colonies tnuisformed into sovereign states.
When the tie of political dependence that bound the colo-
nies to the mother country was severed, the English prov-
inces in America rose to the fuU statute of sovereign
states. "When the Revolution took place the people of
each state became themselves sovereign." And so soon
as they "took into their own hands the powers of sov-
ereignty the prerogatives and regalities which before
Doe Proeeu — 22
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j
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t
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1
r
i:
338 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 146
belonged either to the Crown or the Parliament became
immediately and rightfully vested in the state. ' * Martin
V. The Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 410, 416. On the 10th
of May, 1776, the Continental Congress recommended
to the several conventions and assemblies of the colonies
the establishment of independent governments ' * for main-
tenance of internal peace and the defence of their lives,
liberties, and properties.*' Before the end of the year
in which the recommendation was made, by far the greater
part of the colonies had adopted written constitutions in
which were restated in a dogmatic form all of the seminal
principles of the English constitutional system. Thus
ended that marvelous process of growth through which
the English colonies in America were rapidly developed
into a group of independent commonwealths in which
each was, in its organic structure, a substantial reproduc-
tion of the English Kingdom.
§147. Constitutional limitations an American inven-
tion. Subject to a grave limitation, the unlimited taxing
power of the omnipotent Parliament passed at its birth
into every American state legislature. It has ever been an
elementary principle of American constitutional law that
every state legislature is endowed by its very nature with
the omnipotence of the English Parliament, save so far
as that omnipotence is restrained by express constitu-
tional limitations. Such limitations, of which the Euro-
pean world knew nothing, grew naturally out of the
process through which American legislatures came into
existence. From the very beginning the powers of the
colonial assemblies were more or less limited through the
terms of the charters by which such assemblies were either
created or recognized. Even in colonial times * * questions
sometimes arose . . . whether the statutes made by
these assemblies were in excess of the powers conferred
by the charter ; and if the statutes were found in excess,
they were held invalid by the courts, that is to say, in the
first instance, by the colonial courts, or, if the matter
§148
STATE POWER OF TAXATION
was carried to England by the Privy Conncil.'* Bryce,
The Am. Commonw., i, 243. While, as a general rule,
the colonies, after being transformed into independent
states, adopted new constitutions, the charter granted
to Connecticat in 1662 was continued as her organic
law until 1818; and that granted to Bhode Island in
1663 was continued as her organic law until 1842. It is
worthy of note that one of the first cases, if not the very
first, in which a lepslative enactment was declared uncon-
stitutional and void, on the ground of conflict with the
constitution of a state, was decided under the charter last
named. But what is far more important is the fact that
this novel and supreme power of declaring an act of the
legislature void was assumed by the state courts, as a
matter of judge made law, without a line or word on the
subject in any state constitution. And here may be quoted
the words of "Wythe, J., who, in Com. v. Caton, 4 Call
(Va.), 5, said: "Nay, more, if the whole legislature, an
event to be deprecated, should attempt to overleap the
bounds prescribed to them by the people, I, in adminis-
trating the public justice of the country, will meet the
united powers, at my seat in this tribunal ; and, pointing
to the constitution, will say, to them, Here is the limit of
your authority; and hither shall you go, but no further."
§ 14S. Nature and extent of limitations on state taxing
power — Exemption of governmental agencies. Passing
from generals to particulars it now becomes necessary to
indicate the nature and extent of the limitations imposed
upon the taxing power of a state, first, by the peculiar
structure of our dual system of government ; second, by
the fundamental principles of judicial administration em-
bodied in the American theory of due process of law.
The idea of an indestructible Union of indestructible
states rests necessarily upon the principle that neither
the state nor Federal Government may tax the property,
the agencies, or operations of the other, for the conclusive
reason that the power to tax carries with it the power to
iJ,
: T
■'t
340
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§148
destroy. In the leading case of McCuUoch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, in which it was settled that the banks of
the United States had the constitutional right to establish
its branches within any state; and that the state within
which such branches may be established, can not, without
violating the constitution, tax that branch, — ^the Court
said : * * If the states may tax one instrument, employed
by the government in the execution of its powers, they
may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax
the mail, they may tax the mint, they may tax patent-
rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house;
they may tax judicial process ; they may tax all the means
employed by the government, to an excess which would
defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended
by the American people. They did not design to make
their government dependent on the states. • . . the
states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impeach, burden, or in any manner control the opera-
tions of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the general gov-
ernment.^^ As illustrations of the application of this
principle, see Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 466 ; Bank of
Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black 732 ; Van Allen v.
Assessors, 3 Wall. 590 ; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 ;
Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 ; Van Rocklin v. Tennes-
see, 117 U. S. 151; United States v. Baltimore Electric
Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322 ; Wisconsin Central Railroad
Co. V. Price County, 133 U. S. 496; Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan, etc., Co., 157 TJ. S. 429; United States v. Richart,
188 U. S. 438; United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1;
Thames and Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237
U. S. 19.
§ 149. Federal power to regulate interstate commerce
not to be hampered by state taxation. While the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce if within a state, may
be subjected to taxation by it, the exercise of the power
to regulate interstate commerce, which is vested solely in
§150
STATE POWER OP TAXATION
the national government, can not be hampered hy the
imposition of a state tax npon the privilege of transacting
such commerce. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 ;
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18;
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S.
194; Atlantic & P. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S.
160; Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 191 U. S. 171;
Keprer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.
V. Babcoek, 204 U. S. 585 ; Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S.
23; Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549;
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Heyman v. Havs,
236 U.S. 178.
§ 150. State can only tax proper^ within its jurisdic-
tion. Dne process of law is denied to the owner of
property when it is taxed by a state in defiance of the
rale which provides that its taxes, no matter what their
form, may be levied only on property, persons, and busi-
ness within its jurisdiction. When real property or tan-
gible personal property is iu question jurisdiction depends
not npon the domicil of the owner but upon the actual
situs of the thiug to be taxed. In Bewey v. Des Moines,
173 U. S. 193, the Court said: "The jurisdiction to tax
exists only in regard to persons and property or upon the
business done within the state, and such jurisdiction can
not be enlarged by reason of a statute which assumes to
make a nonresident personally liable to pay a tax of the
nature of the one in question. All subjects over which
the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of
taxation. Cooley 's Taxation, 1st ed., pp. 3, 4 ; Borroughs,
Taxation, sec. 6. The power of the state to tax extends to
all objects within the sovereignty of the state. Per Mr.
Justice Clifford, in Hamilton Mfg. Company v. Massa-
chusetts, 6 Wall. 632, 639. The power to tax is, however,
limited to persons, property and business within the state,
and it can not reach the person of a nonresident. Case
of the State Tax on Poreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319.
In Cooley 's Taxation, Ist ed., p. 121, it is said that 'a state
342
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§150
can no more subject to its power a single person or a
single article of property whose residence or legal situs is
in another state than it can subject all the citizens or all
the property of such other state to its power.' '* See
Louisville, etc., Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 TJ. S. 385;
Delaware, etc, R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 V. S. 341;
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S.
194; Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549;
Wright V. Central of Georgia Ry., 236 U. S. 674; Wilson
Cypress Co. v. Del Poyo, 236 U. S. 635; Heyman v. Hays,
236 TJ. S. 178; Bothwell v. Bingham County, 237 U. S.
642; Equitable Life Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S.
143.
§ 151. Taxation of corporate proper^ (dtnated In ser-
•ral stat^. In taxing corporationB two things are to be
considered; first, the four elements to be taxed — capital
stock in the hands of the corporation ; shares of the capi-
tal stock in the hands of the individual stockholders ; cor-
porate property; corporate franchises; (Tennessee v.
Whiteworth, 117 U. S. 129) second, that when the corpo-
ration has property in more than one state each state in
taxing its portion must exclude the value of the portions
situated beyond its limits. Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Atty. Gen., 125 U. S. 530; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490;
Delaware, etc., E. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341. In
the case last cited — in which it was held that a domestic
corporation was deprived of its property without doe
process of law by an appraisement of its capital stock,
which included the value of coal mined by it within the
state, but situated in other states, where it was awaiting
sale when the appraisement was made — the Conrt said :
"It is plain that in the case at bar the coal had lost its
situs in Pennsylvania by being transported from that
state to foreign states for the purposes of sale, with no
intention that it should ever return to its state of origin.
It was, therefore, as much outside the jurisdiction of the
"•^
S151a
STATE POWER OF TAXATION
state of PeQnsylvaiiia to tax it as was the Indiana fran-
chise in the case just cited, and it has been taxed just as
directly and specifically under the facts stated in this case
as was the Indiana franchise^ taxed in Kentucky by the
valuation of the Kentucky franchise, which value waa in-
creased by the value of the franchise created by Indiana."
See also, Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23. In Wright
V. Louis, and Nash. B. R., 236 V. S. 690, the Court said:
"The railroads not being domiciled in G-eorgia are not
taxable there for stock and bonds of other companies
merely appearing to be owned by them." In Equitable
Life Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 143, it was held
that as a state has the right to tax life insurance com-
panies upon business done within the state, measuring the
tax upon the premiums on policies of residents of the
state, such companies are not deprived of their property
without due process of law because, in estimating the
amount of premiums, those paid by the residents of for-
eign insurance companies outside of the state are in-
cluded. The Court said: "The only question concerns
the mode of measuring the tax. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U. S. 107, 162, 163. As to that a certain latitude must
be allowed. It is obvious that many incidents of the con-
tract are likely to be attended to in Pennsylvania, such as
payment of dividends when received in cash, sending an
adjuster into the state in case of dispute, or making proof
of death. See Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Spratley, 172 IT. S. 602, 611; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 415."
§ 151a. Due process not denied by state statute impos-
ing annual frandiise tax on a consolidated railway cor-
poration. In Kansas City M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242
tr. S. Ill, it was held that neither the due process, com-
merce, or equal protection of the laws clauses of the
Federal constitution were violated by an Alabama statute
imposing the annual franchise' tax exacted from domestic
corporations upon a consolidated railway corporation ex-
344
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§151a
isting by virtue of the consolidation under concurrent
acts of the states of Alabama, Mississippi and Tennessee,
of three independent and distinct railroad corporations
created by and formerly operating solely within the re-
spective states named, and in meaisuring such tax by the
entire capital stock of the consolidated corporation, in-
stead of measuring it by the amount of capital employed
in the state, as is done in the case of foreign corporations,
where the consolidating statute expressly provided that
the consolidated corporation shall be subject in all re-
spects to the laws of the state as a domestic corporation.
The Court said : * * The Alabama supreme court has held
that the railroad company is a corporation organized
under the laws of that state, and, as such, subject to the
franchise tax imposed by that section of the statute.
. . . When the companies comprised in this consolida-
tion sought to avail themselves of the laws of Alabama,
they were asking a privilege and right which, subject to
the limitations of the Federal Constitution, was within
the authority of the state. This principle was succinctly
stated in Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 442. .. . This
doctrine has been affirmed since. Louisville & N. B. Co.
V. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 703, and previous cases in this
court therein cited; Interstate Consol. Street B. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79, 84. The railroads com-
prising this consolidation entered upon it with the Ala
bama statute before them and under its conditions, and,
subject to constitutional objections as to its enforcement,
they can not be heard to complain of the terms under
which they voluntarily invoked and received the grant of
corporate existence from the state of Alabama. ' ^
§ 152. Taxation of tangible personal property. Until
it passes beyond its limits and becomes subject to federal
regulation as an export or as having actually entered into
commerce between the states, the state possesses the
power to tax all tangible personal property within its
jurisdiction. When in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,
§152
STATE POWER OP TAXATION
345
the qnestion arose whether a state could limit the right of
Congress to regulate foreign commerce by requiring the
importer of foreign articles to take out a license from the
state before being permitted to sell a bale or package so
imported, the Court said : "There is no difference in the
effect between a power to prohibit the sale of an article,
and the power to prohibit its introduction into the conn-
try. . . . It is sufficient for the present to say, generally
that when the importer baa so acted upon the thing im-
ported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with
the mass of property in the county, it has, perhaps, lost its
distinctive character as an import, and has become subject
to the taxing power of the state." While remaining in
the original package "a tax upon it is too plainly a duty
on imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution."
In Coe V. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, the Court said: "But no
definite rule has been adopted with regard to the point of
time at which the taxing power of the state ceases as to
goods exported to a foreign country or to another state.
What we have already said, however, in relation to the
products of a state intended for exportation to another
state will indicate the view which seems to us the sound
one on that subject, namely: that such goods do not cease
to be part of the general mass of the property in the state,
subject, as such, to its jurisdiction and to taxation in the
usual way until they have been shipped or entered with a
common carrier for transportation to another state or
have been started upon such transportation in a continu-
ous route or journey." When such property thus trans-
ported reaches its destination it mingles with the general
mass of property of the state into which it is received and
there becomes subject to taxation. Brown v. Houston,
114 U. S. 622 ; Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577.
In American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S.
70 — in which it was held that where refrigerator cars are
employed as vehicles of transportation in the interchange
of interstate commerce, the state may tax the average
nnmber of such oars used by railroads within the state,
n
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
SI
but owned by a foreign corporation which has no office or
place of business within the state — ^the Court shid: "It
having been settled, as we have seen, that where a corpo-
ration of one state brings into another, to use and employ,
a portion of its movable personal property, itis legitimate
for the latter to impose upon snch property, thus used
and employed, its fair share of the burdens of taxation
imposed upon similar property used in like way by its
own citizens, we think that such a tax may be properly
assessed and collected, in cases like the present, where the
specific and individual items of property bo used and em-
ployed were not continuously the same but were constantly
changing according to the exigencies of the business and
that the tax may be fixed by an appraisement and valua-
tion of the average amount of property thus habitually
used and employed. Nor would the fact that such cars
were employed aa vehicles of transportation in the inter-
change of interstate commerce render their taxation
invalid. Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R. B. Co., 127 U. S.
123; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 TJ. S.
18." While property thus at rest may be taxed by a
state, property in transit from one state to another can
not be. In Kelly v. Rhoades, 188 IT. S. 1, the Court said:
"The question to be determined then is whether the stock
of the plaintiff (a flock of 10,000 sheep, which was being
driven from Utah by direct route across Wyoming to
Nebraska at the rate of about 9 miles a day) was brought
into the state for the purpose of being grazed at the time
it was assessed for taxation. . . . The substance of
these cases is that, while the property is at rest for an
indefinite time awaiting transportation, or awaiting a sale
at its place of destination, or at an intermediate point, it
is subject to taxation. But if it be actually in trtmsit to
another state, it becomes the subject of interstate com-
merce, and is exempt from local assessment." See also,
Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 TT. S. 82, 95. In
Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549, the
Court said: "But transportation between the parts of a
§153
STATE POWER OP TAXATION
347
8tat« IB not interstate commerce, excladed from the taxing
power of the state, because as to a part of the journey
the course is over the territory of another state. Lehigh
Valley R. E. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192; Ewing v.
City of Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464; and see CinciDnati
Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179, 183."
§ 163. Taxation of intan^fible personal proper^. An
able text writer, in considering the situs of debts for the
purpose of taxation, has said: "The general practice is
to treat debts as located, for purposes of taxation, at the
creditor's domicil, and there is no doubt that they may
have their situs there for that purpose. On the other
hand, it would seem that, if the creditor were domiciled
in one state and the debtor in another, there should be no
reason why the latter state (which is the situs of the obli-
gation and the actual situs of the debt) can not lay a tax
upon the creditor's property actually situated there,
namely, the debtor's obligation to pay, provided in so
doing, it does not impair the obligation of contracts. And
some courts have upheld such taxation." Minor, Con-
flict of Laws, p. 281, citing Bridges v. Griflin, 33 Ga. 113 ;
Railroad Co. v. Collector, 100 U. S. 595; United States v.
R. R. Co., 106 IT. S. 327; Finch v. York County, 19 Neb.
50. The same anthor then adds : * ' But, strangely enou^^,
the general trend of judicial opinion seems to be in the
direction of regarding such taxation as unlawful, upon
the ground that the debtor has no property in the debt
which can be taxed," citing State Tax on Foreign-held
Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319, 320, involving the right to tax
bonds held by nonresidents and secured by state mort-
gages. In that notable case the maxim, mohUia seguun-
tur personam was fully and emphatically recognized. In
announcing the principle that debts can have no situs
apart from the residence of the creditor, the Court said :
"It is undoubtedly true that the actual situs of personal
property which has a visible and tangible existence, and
not the domicil of its owner, will in many eases, deter-
348
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§153
mine the state in which it may be taxed. The same thing
is true of public securities consisting of state bonds and
bonds of municipal bodies, and circulating notes of bank-
ing institutions; the former, by general usage have
acquired the character of and are treated as property, in
the place where they are found, though removed from the
domicil of the owner; the latter are treated and pass as
money wherever they are. But other personal property,
consisting of bonds, mortgages, and debts generally, has
no situs independent of the domicil of the owner, and
certainly can have none where the instruments, as in the
present case, constituting the evidences of debt, are not
separated from the possession of the owners. '' The prin-
ciple thus broadly stated was soon modified in Tappan v.
Merchants Nat. Bank, 19 Wall. 490, wherein it was held
that personal property, for the purposes of taxation, may
be separated from the person of the owner, and he may
be taxed on its own account at the place where it is actu-
ally located ; that shares of stock in a national bank, being
personal property, may be separated by the law which
creates them from the person of the owner, and a situs of
their own given them for the purposes of taxation. See
also. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 607; Pullman's
Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Corry v.
Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466. In Blackstone v. Miller, 188
XJ. S. 206, the Court said: ** There is no conflict between
our views and the point decided in the case reported
under the name of State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15
Wall. 300. The taxation in that case was on the interest
on bonds held out of the state. Bonds and negotiable
instruments are more than merely evidences of debt. The
debt is inseparable from the paper which declares and
constitutes it, by a tradition which comes down from more
archaic conditions. Bacon v. Hooker, 177 Mass. 335, 337.
Therefore, considering only the place of the property, it
was held that bonds held out of the state could not be
reached. The decision has been cut down to its precise
point by later cases. Savings & Loan Soc. v. Multnomah
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§ 154 STATE POWER OP TAXATION 349
County, 169 U. S. 421, 428; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175
U. S. 309, 319, 320." In Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v.
Board of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, the Court said : ' ' The
legal fiction expressed in the maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam yields to the fact of actual control elsewhere.
And in the case of credits, though intangible, arising as
did those in the present instance, the control adequate to
confer jurisdiction may be found in the sovereignty of the
debtor's domicil. The debt, of course, is not property in
the hands of the debtor; but it is an obligation of the
debtor, and is of value to the creditor, because he may
be compelled to pay; and power over the debtor at his
domicil is control of the ordinary means of enforcement.
Blackstone v. Miller, 180 U. S. 205, 206. Tested by the
criteria afforded by the authorities we have cited, Louisi-
ana mnst be deemd to have had jurisdiction to impose
the tax." See Orient Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221
U. S. 358 ; Southern P. Co. v. Kentucky ex rel Alexander,
222 U. S. 63.
§ 154. Exemptions ^om taxation strictly construed.
It is well settled that a state, acting through its legis-
lature, may exempt the property of particular persons,
or particular parcels of property from taxation, perpetu-
ally or for a specified period, unless restrained by an ex-
press constitutional limitation. In Mobile and Ohio
Railroad Company v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, it was
held that an exemption from taxation was granted for the
purposes and to the extent stated by a provision in the
charter of that company declaring that ' * no tax shall ever
be laid on said road or its fixtures which shall reduce the
dividends below 8 per cent." As early as Piqua Branch
of State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, it was held that a
state had the constitutional power to make a binding con-
tract, imposing a specific tax on a bank in lieu of all other
taxes. It was also held at a very early day that unless a
state has manifested a deliberate purpose to abandon its
taxing power, no such intention will be presumed. In
350
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§154
^H
^H^H^H^^H
1 ^H
1
^■1
1 ^Hl
iB^H^Ull
Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet 514, the Court said:
' ' It would seem that the relinquishment of such a power
is never to be assumed. We will not say that a state may
not relinquish it; that a consideration sufficiently valu-
able to induce a partial release of it may not exist ; but as
the whole community is interested in retaining it undi-
minished, that community has a right to insist that its
abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which
the deliberate purpose of the state to abandon it does not
appear.'* Unless its intention to do so has been declared
in positive and unmistakable terms, the legislature can
not be presumed to have intended to surrender the taxing
power. New Orleans City & L. R. Co. v. New Orleans,
143 U. S. 192. An exemption from taxation must appear
with absolute distinctness as the taxing power is neces-
sary to the very existence of government. Wilmington &
W. R. Co. V. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279 ; Phoenix F. & M.
Ins. Co. V. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 174. In Wells v. Savan-
nah, 181 TJ. S. 531, 539, the Court said: **The payment
of taxes on account of property otherwise liable to taxa-
tion can only be avoided by clear proof of a valid contract
of exemption from such payment, and the validity of such
contract presupposes a good consideration therefor. If
the property be in its nature taxable, the contract exempt-
ing it from taxation must, as we have said, be clearly
proved. It will not be inferred from facts which do not
lead irresistibly and necessarily to the existence of the
contract.'' Every reasonable doubt must be resolved
against the existence of a contract involving an exemption
from taxation. Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527. As
such exemptions are in derogation of the conamon right
as well as that of the sovereign, they are not to be
extended beyond the express and necessary requirements
of the language, construed strictissimi juris. Yazoo & M.
VaUey R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174.
In New York ex rel. Metropolitan Street R. R. Co. v.
State Board of Tax Commissioners, 199 U. S. 1, a serious
attempt was made to draw under the protection of the due
§154
STATE POWER OF TAXATION
process clauae of the Fourteenth Amendment exemptions
from taxation claimed by public service corporations
operating street railways, which had paid already a lump
sum, or were paying annually specific amounts or a fixed
percentage of receipts for the privilege of occupying the
streets. It was contended that there was an impairment
of the obligation of contracts and a denial of due process
of law by a state statute imposing a subsequent tax on the
franchises of such corporations, despite the fact that such
taxing statute provided for the deduction from the tax
levied of smns being paid by the corporations for the use
of the streets. In overruling such contentions the Court
said: "We are of opinion that no contract right of the
relator was impaired by the legislation in question. It is
further insisted that the special franchise tax law denies
the relator the eqaal protection of the laws and due
process in three separate and distinct aspects, namely:
(1) in that it adds to the obligations of their various con-
tracts while preserving all the burdens of those contracts;
(2) in that it provides for the deduction of annual pay-
ments covered by existing contracts for the amount of
tax levied, by reason of which deduction those who agreed
to pay for their franchise, lump sums or annual amounts
less than the net tax are discriminated against; and (3)
in that it discriminates against them and subjects them to
taxation, while their competitors, operating under the
surfaces of many of the same streets, are to be exempted.
The first specification is answered by the conclusion that
we have reached in respect to the claim of an impairment
of contract obligations ; for if there was no such impair-
ment, the fact that the companies have escaped the burden
for these many years is their good fortune, and in no man-
ner discharges them from the ordinary burdens of taxa-
tion which the present law imposes. With respect to the
second, it may be observed that the lump sum is so
obviously a payment for the franchise that it can not be
considered in any just sense as possessing the nature of
a tax. It is not even rental. It is like money paid for a
352
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
§154
tract of land, — ^part of the purchase price. It does not,
like a percentage of the gross receipts, vary with the
changes of business, has no resemblance to a continuing
discharge of the obligation which property is under for
contribution to the support of the government. Further,
this whole matter of allowing a reduction on account of
that which is spoken of as *in the nature of a tax,' is a
matter of grace on the part of the legislature. The fran-
chises granted were, as we have held, subject to taxation,
and the fact that upon equitable considerations, the state
has consented that a certain reduction shall, in some cases,
be made, does not entitle every holder of a franchise to a
like reduction. It is akin to an exemption, and there is
nothing in the Federal Constitution to prevent a state
from granting exemptions from taxation. BelPs Gap R.
R. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232.'*
§ 155. Taxation must be for a public purpose. A state
conunits an act of confiscation and deprives the citizen
of due process of law when a contribution is levied upon
his property in violation of the fundamental principle
which demands that the taxing power of a constitutional
government can only be exercised for the public use and
benefit. In the leading case of Citizens' Sav. and L.
Ass'n V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, the Court said: **The
power to tax is, therefore, the strongest, the most pervad-
ing of all the powers of government, reaching directly or
indirectly to all classes of the people. It was said by
Chief Justice Marshall in the case of McCuUoch v. Md.,
4 Wheat. 431, that the power to tax is the power to de-
stroy. A striking instance of the truth of the proposition
is seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten per cent,
imposed by the United States on the circulation of all
other banks than the National Banks, drove out of ex-
istence every state bank of circulation within a year or
two after its passage. This power can as readily be em-
ployed against one class of indi^dduals and in favor of
another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited
§ 155 STATE POWER OP TAXATION 353
wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no implied
limitation of the uses for which power may be exercised.
To lay, with one hand, the power of the government on
the property of the citizen, and with the other bestow
it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and
build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery
because it is done under the form of law and is called
taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under
legislative forms. . . . We have established, we
think, beyond cavil, that there can be no lawful tax which
is not laid for a public purpose. It may not be easy to
draw the line in all cases so as to decide what is a public
purpose in this sense and what is not." The duty rests
primarily with the legislature of course to determine what
is or is not such a public use as will authorize the employ-
ment of the taxing power. In the words of the Court, in
the case just cited, "It is undoubtedly the duty of the
legislature, which imposes or authorizes municipalities
to impose a tax to see that it is not to he used for purposes
of private interest instead of a public use, and the courts
can only be justified in interposing when a violation of
this principle is clear and the reason for interference
cogent. And in deciding whether, in the given case, the
object for which taxes are assessed falls upon one side or
the other of the line, they most be governed mainly by the
course and usage of the government, the objects for which
taxes have been customarily and by long course of legis-
lation levied, what objects or purposes have been consid-
ered necessary to the support and for the proper use of
the government, whether state or municipal."
There is however a Federal power which sits above the
state power and determines for itself what is or is not a
pnblic nse, regardless of the decisions of state courts. In.
Pallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, it
was held that when the taking for any other than a public
use is alleged to be a deprivation of private property
without due process of law, the question whether the tak-
ing was for any other than a public nse is a Federal qnes-
DdsT
354
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
§155
tion, despite the absence of any prohibition in the Federal
Constitution acting upon the states^ and denying their
right to take private property for any but a public use.
In that case the Court said : **If the act of the state legis-
lature as construed by its highest court conflicts with the
Federal Constitution or with any valid act of Congress, it
is the duty of the circuit court and of this court to so
decide, and to thus enforce the provision of the Federal
Constitution. The following are some of the numerous
cases in which this principle has been announced and car-
ried into effect : Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361 ; Nesmith
V. Sheldon, 7 How. 812 ; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11
How. 297 ; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488 ; Lefl5ngwell v.
Warren, 2 Black. 599 ; Hagar v. Reclamation District 107,
111 U. S. 701, 704 ; Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492. We
should not be justified in holding the act to be in violation
of the state constitution in the face of clear and repeated
decisions of the highest court of the state to the contrary
under the pretext that we were deciding principles of gen-
eral constitutional law. If the act violates any provision,
expressed or properly implied or the Federal Constitu-
tion, it is our duty to so declare it, but if it do not, there is
no justification for the Federal courts to run counter to
the decisions of the highest state courts upon questions
involving the construction of state statutes or constitu-
tions, on any alleged ground that such decisions are in
conflict with sound principles or general constitutional
law. The contrary has not been held in this court by the
case of Citizens' Sav. & L. Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. '^
Either general or local taxation may be authorized by
the legislature, after the fact has been settled that the
use to which the tax is to be applied is a public one. In
the case of Mobile County v. Kunball, 102 tJ. S. 691,—
where a tax was levied upon the people of that county for
a harbor improvement for the special benefit of the
county and the general benefit of the whole state, — ^the
court, in upholding an act authorizing the issue of bonds
to meet the expenses, held that it was not a taking of
§ 155 STATE POWER OF TAXATION 355
private property for pnblic nse within the meaning of the
constitutional clanse. The Conrt said : "It was the loan
of the credit of the county for a work public in its char-
acter, designed to be of general benefit to the state, but
more especially and immediately to the county. The
expenses of the work were of course to be ultimately
defrayed by taxation upon the property and people of the
county." Approved in Washer v. BuUitt Co., 110 U. S.
564; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 355; Charlotte, etc.,
R. R. V. Gibbes, 142 TJ. S. 395; Fallbrook Irr. Diet. v.
Bradley, X64 U. S. X5X; Baoman v. Ross^ 167 U. S. 589;
Norwood V. Baker, 172 XT. S. 278. Thus it has been
settled that after a public work has been properly author-
ized, the legislature, in the absence of an express consti-
tutional restraint, may determine the manner in which the
taxation necessary to defray the expense may be imposed.
See Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 XT. S. 705. In the
case of Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U. S. 611, in which it was
held that special assessments on property in the District
of Columbia for a public park in that District for the
benefit of the entire people of the United States were not
unconstitutional, as a deprivation of property without
due process of law, the Court said: "The residents and
property holders of the District of Columbia most be
regarded as coming within the class of beneficiaries ; and,
so far from being injured by the declaration that the
park shall also have a national character, it is apparent
that thereby the welfare of the inhabitants of the District
will be promoted." Emphasis must however be given
here to the fact that if the purpose for which a tax is
levied is purely local, its burdens can not be imposed upon
another community or upon other property in no way
benefited by its proceeds. Speaking on that subject in
Morford v. Muger, 8 Iowa 82, the Court said; "There
must be some limit to this legislative discretion; which, in
the absence of any other criterion, is held to consist in the
discrimination to he made between what may reasonably
he deemed a just tax, for which a just compensation is
1 i'
356 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 155
provided in the object to which it is devoted, and that
which is palpably not a tax, but which, nnder the form of
a tax, is the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. If there be such a flagrant
and palpable departure from equality in the burden
imposed; if it be imposed for the benefit of others, and
for purposes in which those objecting have no interest,
and are, therefore, not bound to contribute, it is no matter
in what form the power is exercised — ^whether in the
unequal levy of the tax, or in the regulation of the bounda-
ries of the local government, which results in subjecting
the party unjustly to local taxes, it must be regarded
as coming within the prohibition of the constitution
designed to protect private rights against aggression,
however made, and whether under the color of recognized
power or not. ' ' Unless however there is a clear abuse of
the legislative discretion, unless the object of the tax is
palpably of no benefit to the particular community or dis-
trict taxed, or to the property taxed, it will be sustained
under a construction based upon the presumption that
such legislation is valid. See Wilson v. Lambert, 168
U. S. 611 ; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S.
592 ; Booth v. Woodburg, 32 Conn. 128.
§ 156. Legislature may act directly or delegate its func-
tions to local authorities. In dealing with that question
in Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, — ^in which it was
held that while a state legislature may commit the ascer-
tainment of a sum to be raised by taxation, and of the
benefited district to commissioners, it is not bound to do
so; — the Court said: '*The legislature, in the exercise
of its power of taxation, has the right to direct the whole
or a part of the expense of a public improvement, such as
the laying out, grading or repairing of a street, to be
assessed upon the owners of lands benefited thereby, and
the determination of the territorial district which should
be taxed for a local improvement is within the province of
legislative discretion. Willard v. Presburg, 14 Wall. 676 ;
S 156 STATE POWEB OF TAXATION 357
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 ; Mobile Connty v.
KimbaU, 102 U. S. 691; Hagar v. Reclamation District,
111 U. S. 701. If the legislature provides for notice to
and hearing of each proprietor, at some stage of the pro-
ceedings, npon the question what proportion of the tax
shall be assessed npon Ms land, there is no taking of his
property withont due process. MeMillen v. Anderson,
95 U. S. 37 ; Davidson v. New Orleans and Hagar v. Recla-
mation District, above cited." In Walston v. Nevin, 128
U. S. 578, — in which it was held that the definition of the
taxing district and the method of the apportionment are
all within the legislative power, — ^the Court said: "And
whenever the law operates alike on all persons and prop-
erty, similarly situated, equal protection can not be said
to be denied. Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606; Rich-
mond, F. & P. R. Co. V. Richmond, 96 V. S. 529." See
also, Paulsen v. Portland, 149 IT. S. 30; Fallbrook Irr.
Diet. V. Bradley, 164 TT. S. 112 ; Bamnan v. Ross, 167 U. S.
548 ; Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 TJ. S. 45 ; French
V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324; Louisville,
etc, R. Co. V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430;
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210
TJ. S. 217, 221 ; WiUonghby v. Chicago, 235 U. S. 45 ; Choc-
taw & Golf R. R. V. Harrison, 235 V. S. 298 ; Tost v. Dallas
Connty, 236 U. S. 50; Equitable Life Society v. Pennsyl-
vania, 238 U. S. 143. In the case of Banman v. Ross,
above quoted, the Court said that "the legislature in the
exercise of the right of taxation has the authority to direct
the whole or such part as it may prescribe, of the expense
of a public improvement, such as the establishing, the
widening, the grading or the repair of a street, to be
assessed npon the owners of lands benefited thereby.
. , . The rule of apportionment among the parcels of
land benefited also rests within the discretion of the legis-
lature, and may be directed to be in proportion to the
position, the frontage, the area, or the market value of
the lands, or in proportion to the benefits as estimated by
commissioners." See also, Mattingly v. District of Co-
358
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§156
lumbia, 97 U. S. 687, 692 ; King v. Portland, 184 U. S.
161 ; Chadwick v. Kelly, 187 U. S. 540; Seattle v. Kelleher,
195 U. S. 351.
There are however some states in which it has been
held that the legislature exceeds its powers in making
statutory rules* fixing absolutely the proportion of ex-
pense to be borne by abutting owners, or which fail to
provide for the indenmification of the land owner sub-
jected to the operation of the law, in the event the cost of
the improvements shall exceed the benefits conferred. See
State V. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415 ; Tide Water Co. v. Coster,
18 N. J. Eq. 518 ; and Provident Sav. Inst. v. Jersey City,
113 U. S. 506, all quoted by McGehee, Due Process of Law,
p. 249. These cases contend that there is no longer a
rightful exercise of the taxing power but an unconstitu-
tional employment of the power of eminent domain when
a rule of apportionment is adopted by the legislature that
fails to provide for the equalizing of benefits to burdens
in individual cases, for the reason that, if the method of
apportionment is fixed absolutely by the legislature, the
burden in individual cases may exceed the benefits, thus
involving the taking of private property for a public use
without compensation.
§157. Due process requires compensation to owner
when property is taken by state for public use. In the
notable case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, it was
held : first, that no matter whether private property is
taken by the state directly, or under its authority due
process requires compensation to be made or secured to
the owner ; second, that there is a taking, under the form
of taxation, of private property for public use without
compensation, when there is an exaction from the owner
of such property of the cost of a public improvement in
substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him ;
that to the extent of such excess the taking is illegal;
third, that there is a taking of private property for public
use without compensation when there is a special assess-
3157
STATE POWER OP TAXATION
ment upon abutting property by the front foot that does
not take into accoont special benefits for the entire cost
and expense of opening a street, including not only the
amonnt to be paid for the land, bnt the cost and expense
of the proceedings. The Court said : "But the power of
the legislature in these matters is not unlimited. There
is a point beyond which the legislative department, even
when exerting the power of taxation, may not go con-
sistently with the citizen's right of property. As already
indicated, the principle underlying special assessments to
meet the cost of public improvements is that the property
upon which they are imposed is peculiarly benefited, and
therefore the owners do not, in fact, pay anything in
excess of what they receive by reason of such improve-
ment But the guaranties for the protection of private
property would be seriously impaired, if it were estab-
lished as a rule of constitutional law, that the imposition
by the legislature upon particular private proper^ of the
entire cost of a public improvement, irrespective of any
peculiar benefits accruing to the owner from such improve-
ments, could not be questioned by Mm in the courts of the
country. It is one thing for the legislature to prescribe
it as a general rule that property abutting on a street
opened by the public shall be deemed to have been spe-
cially benefited by such improvement, and therefore
should specially contribute to the cost incurred by the
public. It is quite a different thing to lay it down as an
absolute rule that sudi property, whether it is in fact
benefited or not by the opening of the street, may be
assessed by the front foot for a fixed sum representing
the whole cost of the improvement, and without any right
in the property owner to show, when an assessment of
that kind is made, or is about to be made, that the sum
so fixed is in excess of the benefits received. In our judg-
ment the exaction from the owner of private property of
the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of
the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of
such excess, a taking under the guise of taxation of pri-
I I
I
i :
360
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
§157
vate property for public use without compensatioiL We
say 'substantial excess' because exact equality of taxa-
tion is not always attainable, and for that reason the
excess of cost over special benefits, unless it be of a mate-
rial character, ought not to be regarded by a court of
equity when its aid is invoked to restrain the enforce-
ment of a special assessment. * '
The foregoing case, which seems to <condenm the front
foot rule when applied absolutely without any provision
for a preliminary hearing upon benefits conferred, and to
establish the rule that special assessments must be so
limited by the benefits received that there shall be no
taking in ' ' substantial excess ' ' of such benefits, must be
read in connection with a series of qualifying cases
decided in 1901, as follows : French v. Barber Asphalt
Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324; Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S.
371; Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389; Webster v.
Fargo, 181 U. S. 394; Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U. S.
396 ; Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. S. 399 ; Wormley v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 181 U. S. 402; Shumate v. Herman,
181 U. S. 402 ; Farrell v. West Chicago Park Commis-
sioners, 181 U. S. 404. In French v. Barber Asphalt
Paving Co., it was held that there was no taking of pri-
vate property for a public use without due process of
law when the apportionment of the entire cost of a street
pavement upon the abutting lots according to their front-
age was authorized by the legislature without any pre-
liminary hearing as to benefits. The Court said: **But
we agree with the supreme court of Missouri, in its view
that such is not the necessary legal import of the decision
in Norwood v. Baker [172 IJ. S. 269]. That was a case
where, by a village ordinance apparently aimed at a single
person a portion of whose property was condemned for
a street, the entire cost of opening the street, including
not only the full amount paid for the strip condemned,
but the cost and expenses of the condemnation proceed-
ings was thrown upon the abutting property of the person
whose land was condenmed. This appeared both to the
U58
STATE POWER OP TAXATION
361
court below and to a majority of the jndges of this court,
to be an abuse of law, an act of confiscation, and not a
valid exercise of the taxing power. , . . That this
decision did not go to the extent claimed by the plaintiff
in error in this case is evident, because in the opinion of
the majority it is expressly said that the decision was not
inconsistent with our decisions in Parsons v. District of
Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 56; and in Spencer v. Merdiant,
125 U. S. 345, 357." In Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S.
389, the Court said: "It was not the intention of the
court, in that case (Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269), to
hold that the general and special taxing systems of the
states, however long existing and sustained as valid by
their courts, have been subverted by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The purpose of that amendment is to extend to the citi-
zens and residents of the states the same protection
against arbitrary state legislation aifecting life, liberty,
and property, as is afforded by the Fifth Amendment
against similar legislation by Congress. The case of
Norwood v. Baker presented, as the judge in the court in
the present case well said, 'considerations of peculiar
and extraordinary hardship,' amounting, in the opinion of
a majority of the judges of this court, to actual confisca-
tion of private property to public use, and bringing the
case fairly within the reach of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." See King v. Portland, 184 U. S. 61; Voigt v.
Detroit, 184 U. S. 115; Chadwick v. Kelly, 187 U. S. 540;
Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310; Seattle v. Kelleher, 195
U. S. 351 ; Willonghby v. Chicago, 235 U. S. 45.
§158. Collection of taxes by sammary proceedings.
How far the summary methods of seizure and sale neces-
sarily employed in the collection of taxes are consistent
with the principles involved in due process of law is a
question which has given rise to grave discussion in both
the state and Federal courts. It has been held in several
states that a forfeiture of lands can not be declared by
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362
liUB PROCESS OP LAW
§158
the state as a penalty for the nonpayment of taxes with-
out adequate provision for some procedure in which the
owner may have the opportunity upon notice to defend
against such forfeiture. See Marshall v. McDaniel, 12
Bush 378; Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 424; Parish v. East
Coast Cedar Co., 133 N. Car. 478. In other states abso-
lute forfeiture have been held to be constitutional. Wild
v. Serpell, 10 Gratt. 405 ; Levasser v. Washburn, 11 Gratt.
572 ; McClure v. Maitland, 24 W. Va. 561 ; Holly Eiver Coal
Co. v. Howell, 36 W. Va. 486. ,When in McMillen v.
Anderson, 95 U. S. 37, the Supreme Court of the United
States was called upon to deal with the subject under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it was held that it does not re-
quire that taxes shall be collected through a judicial pro-
ceeding ; neither does it require that the person taxed by a
state law shall be present or have an opportunity to be
present when the tax is assessed against him. The Court
said: '*The mode of assessing tax in the states by the
Federal Government, and by all governments, is neces-
sarily summary, that it may be speedy and effectual. By
summary is not meant arbitrary, or unequal, or illegal.
It must, under our Constitution, be lawfully done. But
that does not mean, nor does the phrase 'due process of
law' mean by a judicial proceeding. The Nation from
whom we inherit the phrase 'due process of law' has
never relied upon the courts of justice for the collection
of her taxes, though she passed through a successful
revolution in resistance to unlawful taxation. We need
not here go into the literature of that constitutional pro-
vision, because, in any view that can be taken of it, the
statute under consideration does not violate if
In 1898 was decided the case of King v. Mullins, 171
U. S. 404, in which the Court said : ' * The question of con-
stitutional law thus presented is one of unusual gravity.
On the one hand, it must not be forgotten that the clause
in the national Constitution which this court is now asked
to interpret is a part of the supreme law of the land, and
that it must be given full force and effect throughout the
S 158 STATE POWER OF TAXATION 363
entire Union. The due process of law enjoined by the
Fourteenth Amendment must mean the same thing in all
the states. On the other hand, a decision of this court
declaring that that amendment forbids a state, by force
alone of its Constitution or statutes, and without inquisi-
tion or inquiry in any form, to take to itself the absolute
title to lands of the citizen because of his failure to put
them on record for taxation or to pay the taxes, might
greatly disturb the land titles of two states, under a sys-
tem which has long been upheld and enforced by their
respective legislatures and courts. Under these circum-
stances, our duty is not to go beyond what is necessary
to the decision of the particular case before us. If the
rights of the parties in this case can he fully determined
witbont passing upon the general question whether the
clause of the West Virginia Constitution in question,
alone considered, is consistent with the national Consti-
tution, that question may properly be left for examina-
tion until it arises in some case in which it must be
decided." While thus postponing the decision of the
vital question, the court declared that where the conten-
tion is made that a state constitution provides for a
forfeiture of property for nonpayment of taxes without
due process of law, it will examine the statutes of the
state in connection with the constitution as a connected
whole in order to determine whether a system of taxation
exists which in its especial features is consistent with due
process of law. The end was not reached until the deci-
sion made in 1909 in King v. West Virginia, 216 II. S. 92,
the author being of counsel, in which the court assumed
that the vital question it had declined in express terms to
pass upon in King v. Mullins, had been actually decided in
that case. The language used is this : "The only serious
question in the case, if we assume that King saved it, is
whether the West Virginia Constitution and statute are
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. But that
question was answered in King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404.
The construction of the state constitution by the state
364
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§158
court as not confined in its operation to the title vested and
remaining in the state when the Constitution went into
effect (which, of course, is final) is the only natural con-
struction and was to be expected. . • . The question
is not open and we shall discuss it no more. ' ' Thus, by
an unprecedented method of reasoning, the conclusion
was finally reached that a state constitution which pro-
vides absolutely that lands shall be forfeited for nonpay-
ment of taxes and a failure for five years in succession to
place them on the land books, guarantees due process of
law, provided the legislature subsequently passes statutes
affording an opportunity to be heard which the constitu-
tion itself expressly denied. See to the same effect Ken-
tucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, in which the
Court said: **The state of West Virginia, by its Consti-
tution, in 1872, inaugurated a system of forfeiture of
lands for nonpajmtient of taxes in some respects analo-
gous to the one now under consideration. . . • In the
present case the statute does not undertake to forfeit the
lands for the failure to register them and pay the taxes
upon them for the years stated without a judicial pro-
ceeding by which the owner of the title may have the
taxes assessed, and, upon payment thereof the forfeiture
avoided ; and the forfeiture is declared only after a judi-
cial proceeding instituted by the commonwealth's attor-
ney, in which there is opportunity for a hearing and after
which the forfeiture may be declared. The case of King
V. MuUins, supra, was followed and approved in this court
in King v. West Virginia, 216 U- S. 92, and in Fay v.
Crozier,217U.S.455.'^
§159. Notice and hearing in tax proceedings. Even in
the most summary proceedings for the collection of taxes,
including such as the West Virginia and Kentucky tax
cases just cited, involving a forfeiture of the title to the
land itself, the courts always recognize the principle that
the legislature must afford to the taxpayer notice of some
kind and a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard. As
% 159 STATE POWBB OF TAXATION 365
the character of the notice and the nature of the hearing
differ widely according to the subject-matters involved,
nothing like precise definitions of either can be attempted.
It is only possible to reproduce the more notable indica-
tions given by the Supreme Court as to what will or will
not be considered by it aa adequate notice and hearing in
certain classes of cases. The right in question practically
disappears when the legislature itself levies directly gen-
eral taxes, in the form of an annual levy, a fi^ed time
being given within which the assessment shall be made, a
fixed time and place being set for the equalization of the
assessment and the levy of the tax. In Tarpin v. Lemon,
187 U. S. 58, the Court said: "Exactly what due process
of law requires in the assessment find collection of gen-
eral taxes has never yet been decided by this court,
although we have had frequent occasion to hold that, in
proceedings for the condemnation of land under the laws
of eminent domain or for the imposition of special taxes
for local improvements, notice to the owner at some stage
of the proceedings, as well as an opportunity to defend,
is essential. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Huling
v. Kaw Valley R. B. & Improv. Co., 130 U. S. 559 ; Hagar
V. Eeclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 XT. S. 701; Paulsen v.
Portland, 149 U. S. 30. But laws for the assessment of
general taxes stand upon a somewhat different footing
and are construed with the utmost liberality sometimes
even to the extent of holding that no notice whatever is
necessary. Due process of law was well defined by
Mr. Justice Field in Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108,
111 U. S. 701, in the following words: 'It is sufficient to
observe here that by 'due process* is meant one which,
following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case,
and just to the parties to be affected. It must be pursued
in the ordinary mode prescribed by law; it must be
adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever it is
necessary for the protection of the parties it must give
them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of
the judgment sought.' " Proceedings for the assessment
i 'i
366
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§159
and collection of taxes are so far similar to proceedings
in rem that notice by publication has been held sufficient
to confer jurisdiction. Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316;
Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30; Merchants' Bank v.
Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461 ; Bellingham Bay R. Co, v.
New Whatcom, 152 U. S. 318.
In Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255, the Court, in
upholding an assessment of 'Hhe ordinary annual tax
upon personal property,*' — said: '* These proceedings
are sufficient to constitute due process of law. Although,
with respect to this class of taxes, we have never had
occasion to determine exactly what the Fourteenth
Amendment required, we have held that the proceedings
should be construed with the utmost liberality, and, while
a notice may be required at some stage of the proceedings,
such notice need not be personal, but may be given by
publication or by posting notices in public places. It can
only be said that such notices shall be given as are suit-
able in a given case, and it is only where proceedings are
arbitrary, oppressive, or unjust that they are declared to
be not due process of law. ' ' See cases there cited.
Here the distinction must be carefully drawn between
specific and ad valorem taxes, because by the selection of
one or the other form the right of the individual to notice
and hearing may be narrowed or widened by the legis-
lature. In Hagar v. Eeclamation District, No. 108, 111
U. S. 709, the Court said : ' ' Of the different kind of taxes
which the state may impose there is a vast number of
which, from their nature, no notice can be given to the
taxpayer, nor would notice be of any possible advantage
to him, such as poll taxes, license taxes (not dependent
upon the extent of his business), and generally specific
taxes on things, persons or occupations. In such cases
the legislature, in authorizing the tax, fixes its amounts,
and that is the end of the matter. If the tax be not paid,
the property of the delinquent may be sold and be thus
deprived of his property. Yet there can be no question,
that the proceediug is due process of law, as there is no
§159
STATE POWER OF TAXATION
inquiry into the weight of evidence, or other element of a
judicial natnre, and nothing conid be changed hy hearing
the taxpayer. . . . Bnt where a tax Is levied on prop-
erty, not specifically hut according to its value, to be
ascertained by assessors appointed for that purpose upon
such evidence as they may obtain, a different principle
comes in. The officers, in estimating the value, act judi-
cially, and in most of the states provision is made for the
correction of errors committed by them, through boards
of revision or equalization, sitting at designated periods
provided by law, to hear complaints respecting the
justice of the assessments. The law, in prescribing the
time when such complaints will be heard, gives all the
notice required, and the proceeding by whidi the. valua-
tion is determined, though it may be foUowed, if the tax
be not paid, by a sale of the delinquent's property, is due
process of law." Thus the distinction is clearly drawn
between those cases in which the legislature has nothing
to do but to fix the rate of taxation upon property of a
definite and certain value, such as money, the face value
of secnrities, the interest on bonds and the like (Dollar
Sav. Bank v. United States, 19 "Wall. 240; United States
V. Philadelphia R. Co., 123 U. S. 113 ; Bell 's Gap R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232), and those in which the tax
is levied "on property, not specifically but according to
its value, to be ascertained by assessors appointed for
that purpose, upon such evidence as they may obtain,"
through a quasi judicial proceeding. When the legis-
lature selects the specific instead of the ad valorem
method, it may become necessary for it to make a direct
adjudication without notice or hearing of the amount due
from the individual taxpayer. In Hodge v. Masoatine
County, 196 U. S. 276, — involving the validity of an Iowa
statute imposing an annual charge upon cigarette dealers
and, "upon the real property and the owner thereof," —
the Court said: "Coming now to the provisions for its
enforcement, it is clear that, as to the person actually
carrying on the business, no notice of the assessment or
■J
I
t
• t
368
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§159
levy of the tax is necessary. If the person carries on the
husiness, the imposition of the tax follows as a matter of
course. There is no discretion as to the amount McMil-
len V. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37 ; Hagar v. Beclamation Dist.
No. 108, 111 U. S. 701 ; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51 ;
Ee Smith, 104 Iowa 199. *'
As' each of the original states developed its own theory
of due process as a part of its state system, including of
course its own peculiar proceedings for the assessment
and collection of taxes, long prior to the adoption of the
existing Federal Constitution, there has always been a
disposition to consider whether a given proceeding for
the assessment and collection of taxes is in accordance
with the due process doctrine existing in that state. It
was therefore said in Bell 's Gap E. Co. v. Pennsylvania,
134 U. S. 232 : * * The process of taxation does not require
the same kind of notice as is required in a suit at law, or
even in proceedings for taking private property under
the power of eminent domain. It involves no violation of
due process of law when it is executed according to cus-
tomary forms and established usages, or in subordination
to the principles which underlie them ' ' ; and in Turpin v.
Lemon, 187 U. S. 57: **and it would appear that the
Fourteenth Amendment would be satisfied by show-
ing that the usual course prescribed by the state laws
required notice to the taxpayer and was in conformity
with natural justice.'* The most complete definition,
however, as to the sufficiency of notice in tax proceedings
is that given by the court in Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U. S. 97, — a case in which the plaintiff in error resisted
an assessment of his real estate in the City of New
Orleans for draining the swamps of that city. The Court
said : * * That whenever by the laws of a state, or by state
authority, a tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden
is imposed upon property for the public use, whether it
be of the whole state or of some more linuted portion of
the community, and those laws provide for a mode of con-
firming or contesting the charge thus imposed, in the
§159
STATE POWER OF TAXATION
ordinary courts of jastice, with such notice to the person,
or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appro-
priate to the nature of the case, tiie judgment in such
proceedings can not be said to deprive the owner of his
property without dae process of law, however obnoxious
it may be to other objections." In the Kentucky Bail-
road Tax Cases, 115 TJ. S. 336, the Court— after approv-
ing the rules as to notice laid down in Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, and Hagar v. Reclamation District
No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, said, in special reference to the case
last named: "In that case the statute of California,
which conferred the jurisdiction, authorized any defense,
going either to the validity or to the amount of the tax
assessed, to be pleaded. What inquiries may be per-
mitted in such cases, of course, is a matter that depends
upon the particular provisions of the law of the jurisdic-
tion. In the absence of sach provisions, and as a princi-
ple of general jurisprudence, it is safe to say that any
defense is admissible which establishes the illegality of
the proceeding, resulting in the alleged assessment,
whether because it is in violation of the local law which
is relied on as conferring the authority upon which it is
based or because it constitutes a denial of a right secured
to the party complaining, by the Constitution of the
United States."
From the foregoing authorities it clearly appears that
when in proceedings for the assessment and collection
of taxes notice is necessary at all, it need notj as a general
rule, be personal notice. And yet no personal judgment
against a nonresident owner in a proceeding strictly
against property to enforce by sale a lien for unpaid
taxes is valid unless he has been personally served with
notice, or has voluntarily appeared. In Dewey v. Des
Moines, 173 TJ. S. 203, the Court said: "A judgment
without personal service against a nonresident is only
good so far as it affects the property which is taken or
brought under the control of the court or other tribunal
in an ordinary action to enforce a personal liability, and
Ihie Proeess— 24
! i .•
370
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§159
no jurisdiction is thereby acquired over the person of a
nonresident further than respects the property so taken.
• . . The jurisdiction to tax exists only in regard to
persons and property or npon business done within the
state, and such jurisdiction can not be enlarged by reason
of a statute which assumed to make a nonresident per-
sonally liable to pay a tax of the nature of the one in
question. . . . The power to tax is, however, limited
to persons, property and business within the state, and it
can not reach the person of a nonresident. Case of the
State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319.''
While it is not necessary that the property owner should
be present when his property is assessed, he must at some
sta«e of the proceeding's be given an opportunity to be
heard as to the amount of the tax, before some kind of a
board of equalization or review constituted for that pur-
pose. McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 88; Spencer v.
Merchant, 125 U. S. 345 ; Pahner v. McMahon, 133 U. S.
669 ; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30 ; Pittsburgh E. Co.
V. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S. 45 ; Gallup v. Schmidt,
183 U. S. 301, 307 ; Voigt v. Detroit, 184 U. S. 115 ; Hodge
V. Muscatine County, 196 U. S. 276.
And so it has been settled that an importer can not
demand the right to be present throughout the appraise-
ment, when the collection ot duties on imported mer-
chandise is in question. He can not demand the right to
be confronted by the witnesses or to cross-examine them.
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310. If the appraisers
do not exceed their statutory powers, and have not pro-
ceeded contrary to law, the values fixed by them, in the
absence of fraud, are conclusive. Passavant v. United
States, 148 U. S. 214; Origet v. Hedden, 155 U. S. 228.
As the appraisers are qimsi judicial oflScers their ascer-
tainment of values, through summary, constitute due
process of law. In Hilton v. Merrit, 110 U. S. 97, the
Court said : * * Plaintiffs in error contend further, that a
denial of the right to bring an action at law to recover
duties paid under an alleged excessive valuation of dutia-
i 160 STATE POWER OP TAXATION 371
blc merchandise is depriving the importer of his property
without dae process of law and is therefore forbidden by
the Constitution of the tTnited States. The cases of
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken L. & I. Co., 18 How. 272, and
Springer v. United States, 102 XT. S. 586, are conclusive
on this point against the plaintiffs in error." See also,
Eamshaw v. United States, 146 U. S. 60 ; Pasaavant v.
United States, 148 U. S. 214.
§ 160. Sesidniiin. of taxing power renuUninj^ in the
state. Early in this chapter the observation was made
that every state legislature is endowed with all the
omnipotence of the English parliament save so far as
that omnipotence is restrained: first, by the limitations
imposed by our dual system of Federal. Government;
second, by the limitations imposed by the constitution of
the state itself. An attempt was then made to indicate, in
a somewhat systematic way, just what those limitations.
Federal and state really are. After the areas covered by
such limitations have been deducted, the remainder repre-
sents the residnum of taxing power still vested in a state
legislature. That snch residuum is very large no one can
doubt after an examination of the notable exposition con-
tained in McCuUoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, in which
the Court speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, said :
"Whether the state of Maryland may without violating
the constitution, tax that branch! That the power of
taxation is one of vital importance; that it is retained by
the states ; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar
power to the government of the Union; that it is to be
concurrently exercised by the two governments: are
truths which have never been denied. . . . The argu-
ment on the part of the state of Maryland is not that the
states may directly resist the law of Congress, but that
they may exercise their acknowledged powers upon it,
and the constitution leaves them this right in confidence
that they will not abuse it Before we proceed to exam-
ine this argument and to subject it to the test of the con-
{ r
372
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§160
stitution, we must be permitted to bestow a few considera-
tions on the nature and extent of the original right of
taxation^ which is acknowledged to remain in the states.
It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and
their property is essential to the very existence of gov-
ernment, and may be legitimately exercised on the sub-
jects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to
which the government may choose to carry it. The only
security against the abuse of this power is found in the
structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax,
the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is in
general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppres-
sive taxation. The people of a state, therefore, give to
their government a right of taxing themselves and their
property and as the exigencies of government can not be
limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this
right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislators
and on the influence of the constituents over their repre-
sentatives, to guard them against its abuse. . . . All
subjects over which the sovereign power of a state
extends, are objects of taxation ; but those over which it
does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt
from taxation. This proposition may almost be pro-
nounced self-evident. The sovereignty of a state extends
to everything which exists by its authority or is intro-
duced by its permission ; but does it extend to those means
which are employed by Congress to carry into execu-
tion— ^powers conferred on that body by the people of the
United States t ... If we measure the power of
taxation residing in a state, by the extent of sovereignty
which the people of a single state possess, and can confer
on its government, we have an intelligible standard,
applicable to every case to which the power may be
applied. We have a principle which leaves the power of
taxing the people and property of a state unimpaired;
which leaves to a state the command of all its resources,
and which places beyond its reach, all those powers which
are conferred by the people of the United States on the
S160
STATE POWER OF TAXATION
373
government of the Union, and all those means which are
given for the purpose of carrying those powers into
execution."
The famous and luminous dictiim thus pronoonced by
the great Chief Justice is generally cited to maintain the
proposition that a state, apart from constitutional limita-
tions, may exercise its taxing power on all the objects to
which it extends — persons, property, and occupations —
to the utmost limit to which it may choose to carry it, —
the remedy for any abuse of such power being political
not judicial. That principle is a part of the English
inheritance equally applicable to the Federal and state
governments. Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 WaU.
655, 660; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 615;
Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 669. In Meriwether
v. Garrett, 102 TJ. S. 472, the Court said : "The levying
of taxes is not a judicial act. It has no elements of one.
It is a high act of sovereignty to be performed only by
the legislature upon considerations of policy, necessity,
and the public welfare. . . . Having the sole power
to authorize the tax, it (the legislative power) must
equally possess the sole power to prescribe the means by
which the tax shall be collected, and to designate the
oflScers through whom its will shall be enforced." And
so it has been held that the amount of the tax to be levied
is exclusively within the discretion of the legislature.
Spencer v. Merchant, 123 XJ. S. 355 ; New Orleans v. Dun-
can, 2 La. Ann. 186; People v. Fitch, 148 N. Y. 78. An
inseparable incident to the power of taxation is that of
apportionment. In People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, it
was said : ' ' The power of taxing and the power of appor-
tioning taxation are identical and inseparable. Taxes can
not be laid, without apportionment, and the power of
apportionment is therefore unlimited, unless it be
restraiaed as a part of the power of taxation." A state
legislature also possesses the ri^ht of classification and
exemption. It may not only classify the subjects of taxa-
tion, but it may also determine the basis of assessment
374
DXJB PROCESS OP LAW
§160
I
and the manner in which the assessment may be made,
subject only to the limitation that all property or persons
within a given class shall receive like treatment In the
leading case of Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134
U. S. 232, the Court said that a state "may if it chooses
exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at
all, such as churches, libraries, and the property of chari-
table institutions.. It may impose different specific taxes
upon different trades and professions, and may vary the
rates of excise upon various products; it may tax real
estate and personal property in a different manner; it
may tax visible property only and not tax securities for
payment of money ; it may allow deductions from indebt-
edness, or not allow them. . . . We think that we are
safe in saying the Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to compel the state to adopt an iron rule of
equal taxation. If that were its proper construction, it
would not only supersede all those constitutional pro-
visions and laws of some of the states, whose object is to
secure equality of taxation, and which are usually accom-
panied with qualifications deemed material ; but it would
render nugatory those discriminations which the best
interests of society require. '^ See also, Minot v. Phila-
delphia, W. & B. R. R. Co., 18 Wall. 206 ; Tucker v. Fergu-
son, 22 Wall. 527 ; Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Tennessee,
153 U. S. 486.
Apart from the power of the state to impose general
taxes through an annual levy, it can impose special and
local assessments determining at the same time the limits
of the taxing district as an incident necessarily involved
in the taxing power. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S.
304. Thus in providing for such public improvements as
involve the draining or irrigation of lands, the opening
and grading of streets, and the laying of sewer-pipes, the
legislative power must pass not only upon the necessity
of the improvements and the method by which the
expense must be defrayed, but upon the limits of the area
upon which the burden must be imposed, and the appor-
§160
STATE POWER OF TAXATION
375
tionment of sncb burden among- the several parcels lying
within such area. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108,
111 U. S. 701; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Nor-
wood V. Baker, 172 U. S. 269. In Banman v. Boss, 167
V. S. 548, the Court said: "The legislature, in the exer-
dse of the right of taxation, has the authority to direct
the whole or such part as it may prescribe, of the expense
of a public improvement, such as the establishing, the
widening, the grading, or the repair of a street, to be
assessed npon the owners of lands benefited thereby.
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; . . . The
class of lands to be assessed for the purpose may be
either determined by the legislature itself, by defining a
territorial district, or by other designation ; or it may be
left by the legislature to the determination of commis-
sioners, and be made to consist of such lands, and such
only, as the commissioners shall decide to benefit.
Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, and Shoemaker v.
United States, 147 U. S. 282. Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U. S. 112. ... The rule of apportion-
ment among the parcels of ^and benefited also rests
within the discretion of the legislature, and may be
directed to be in proportion to the position, the frontage,
the area or the market value of the lands, or in propor-
tion to the benefits as estimated by the commissioners.
Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 TJ. S. 687. ' ' And so
the legislature may by direct action determine absolutely
the necessity for the improvement, the area to be bene-
fited by it, and the rate of apportionment; or it may dele-
gate to the local authorities the power to consider and
pass upon all such questions.
Thus it appears that while the power of taxation, which
belongs exclusively to the legislature, can not be dele-
gated by it either to other departments of the govern-
ment or to private corporations, it may be delegated to
those instrumentalities of the state known as municipal
corporations, instituted for the more convenient applica-
tion of state power to local concerns. Rees v. Watertown,
376 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 160
19 Wall. 107; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472;
United States v. New Orleans, 98 TJ. S. 381. In the case
last cited the Court said : * * The position that the power
of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch
of the government, no one will controvert. Under our
system it is lodged nowhere else. But it is a power that
may be delegated by the legislature to municipal corpora-
tions, which are merely instrumentalities of the state for
the better administration of the government in matters
of local concern. When such a corporation is created, the
power of taxation is vested in it as an essential attribute,
for all the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise
be in express terms prohibited. * ^ But no matter whether
a state legislature exercises its taxing power absolutely
and directly, or indirectly and conditionally through a
municipal corporation, it does so subject to that constitu-
tional limitation known as due process of law, which
annuls it the moment it attempts to pass the bounds which
its principles define. Those principles antedate all
American constitutions, and no state legislature has the
power to change them. In Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U. S. 97, the Court said: **But when, in the year of
grace 1866, there is placed in the Constitution of the
United States a declaration that *No state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law,* can a state make anything due process of law
which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such T
To affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the states
is of no avail, or has no application where the invasion of
private rights is affected under the forms of state legisla-
tion. ' ' In Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, the Court said :
*'If life, liberty, and property could be taken away by the
direct operation of a statute, the enjoyment of these
rights would depend upon the wiU and caprice of the
legislature, and the provision (of the constitution) would
be a mere nullity. ^ '
CHAPTEE IX
STATE POWEB OP EMINENT DOMAIN AND DUE PBOCESS — ^FEDERAL
BIGHT OP SUPEBVISION
§161. Review heretofore made of federal power of
eminent domain. In the review heretofore made of the
Federal power of eminent domain an effort was made to
explain; first the origin and general nature of that
power ; second, the fact that it is necessarily vested in all
states, federal as well as single ; third, that as vested in
onr Federal Government it is paramount to the like power
vested in the states ; fourth, that such paramount power
so vested can only be asserted subject to the limitation
embodied in the due process of law clause of the Fifth
Amendment amplified and emphasized ad it is by the
additional provision: **nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation. ' * With
such a preface clearly in view it will be easier to explain
that just as the paramount power of eminent domain
vested in our Federal Government is limited by the due
process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment, so the
corresi)onding power vested in the state governments is
limited, first, by the appropriate clauses of the state con-
stitutions ; second, by the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Only in that way can we reach
the all important conclusion that the Federal Supreme
Court, in enforcing the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is limited to a review of the pro-
ceedings had in the state courts for the appropriation of
private property to public uses, in order to determine
whether such state proceedings rested upon any rule of
law which absolutely disregarded the owner's right to
377
378
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§161
just compensation. To that Federal right of review this
chapter will be specially devoted.
§162. Power of eminent domain inherent in states.
In Kohl V. United States, 91 U. S. 367, the Court said:
^'No one doubts the existence in the state governments of
the right of eminent domain— a right distinct from and
paramount to the right of ultimate ownership. It grows
out of the necessities of their being, not out of the tenure
by which lands are held. It may be exercised, though the
tends are not held by grant from the Government, either
mediately or immediately, and independent of the con-
sideration whether they would escheat to the Government
in case of failure of heirs. The right is the offspring of
political necessity ; and it is inseparable from sovereignty,
unless denied to it by its fundamental law. Vatl. ch. 20,
34; Bynk., lib. 2, ch. 15; Kent, Com. 338-340; Cooley,
Const. Lun., 584, et seq/^ In Searl v. School District
No. 2, 133 U. S. 553, the Court said: '*The Constitution
of the state of Colorado provides *that no person shall
be deprived of Ufe, liberty or property without due
process of law'; and 'that private property shall not be
taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just
compensation. . . .' The circuit court was not dealing
with an action of ejection or trespass, but simply with a
proceeding in the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
That right is the offspring of political necessity, and is
inseparable from sovereignty unless denied by its funda-
mental law. It can not be exercised except upon condi-
tion that just compensation shall be made to the owner,
and it is the duty of the state, in the conduct of the inquest
by which the compensation is ascertained, to see that it is
just not merely to the individual whose property is taken,
but to the public which is to pay it. Garrison v. New
York, 21 Wall. 196, 204; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S.
367, 371. '^ Approved in Chicago, etc., E. R. v. Chicago,
166 U. S. 238 ; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 574; Norwood v.
Baker, 172 U. S. 277.
§ 163 STATE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 379
§ 163. Dnty of state to guarantee protection to life,
liberty tmd property through due process. An attempt
has been made heretofore to explain in some detail the
different forms in which chapter 39 of the Great Charter,
out of which the modem doctrine of due process of law
has arisen, were reproduced in the constitutions of the
original states. As there was no common arbiter, no
common standard for imitation, apart from the general
principles to be drawn from the mother country, there
were naturally wide divergences in local usage ; wide dif-
ferences of opinion as to what constituted due process in
a given case. On one side of a state line the right to trial
by jury in a certain proceeding might exist, while on the
other, it might be denied under identical circumstances.
And so the state constitutions bare naturally differed in
their provisions as to eminent domain, and the state
courts in the interpretations put upon them. While the
general rule prevails that the determination of what is a
public use, justifying an appropriation of private prop-
erty, is purely a legislative function, in certain states
there are constitutional provisions declaring the question
to be purely a judicial one to be determined "without
regard to any legirfative assertion that the use is public."
Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54 ; Healy Lumber Co. v.
Morris, 33 Wash. 490; McGehee, Due Process of Law,
pp. 256, 261. In Massachusetts it has recently been held
that under the power of eminent domain a condemnation
is warranted for purposes purely aesthetic. An act for-
bidding the erection of any house around Copley Square
in the City of Boston to a height greater than ninety feet,
and providing for compensation to all persons damages
by such a rule, was upheld aa a valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain "for the benefit of the public who use
Copley Square." Atty.-Gen. v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476,
affirmed in Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491. As elabo-
rated heretofore, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, due process of law waa secured to the citi-
zens of the several states by their institutions alone; and
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when it was denied them the Federal Government had
no power to interfere; the Federal judiciary possessed
no right of review whatever.
§ 164. Right to review state action established by Four-
teenth Amendment. That amendment did not attempt
to disturb the primary duty of the states to provide for
the protection of life, liberty and property through the
due process of law established by their own constitutions ;
it was simply intended as an additional guaranty to the
freshly created national citizen, upon which he could rely
for due process from the Federal Government, in the
event that the government of his state failed him. It did
not propose to make any radical change in the ancient
theory of the relations of the state and Federal Govern-
ment to each other and of both governments to the people.
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. In United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, the Court said: **The Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any
person pf life, liberty or property, without due process of
law ; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as
against another. It simply furnishes an additional guar-
anty against any encroachment by the states upon the fun-
damental rights which belong to every citizen as a member
of society. ^ ^ See also. In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 ; Orr
V. Gihnan, 183 U. S. 278, 286. The primary function of
the Federal courts imder the amendment in question is to
determine whether the state, by some official action, has
failed in the duty to provide due process ; if so, then the
proceedings must be declared void. Thus, in every such
case, the sole and only question is this : Has the act of
the state violated the provision of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or a valid act of Congress made in pursuance
thereof.
§ 165. Chicago, B. ft Q. R. Co. v. Chicago— Regard must
be had to substance, not to form. In that case (166 U. S.
226) is to be found a striking illustration of the appliea-
S 165 STATE POWER OP EMINENT DOMAIN 381
tion of the supervisory power in question, invoked to
remedy the denial of due process by a state in a proceed-
ing involving the power of eminent domain. In reaching
the conelusion that the owner of private property, taken
under the power of eminent domain, receives just com-
pensation, although a nominal sum, if it be awarded to
him as a full and fair equivalent for the thing taken from
him for the public, the Court said: "It is therefore
necessary to inquire at the outset whether *due process'
requires compensation to be made or secured to the owner
of private property taken for public nse, and also as to
the circumstances under which the final judgment of the
highest court of a state in a proceeding instituted to con-
demn such property for public use may be reviewed by
this court. . . . Nor is the contention that the rail-
road company has been deprived of its property without
due process of law entirely met by the suggestion that it
had due notice of the proceedings for condemnation,
appeared in court, and was admitted to make defense.
It is true that this Court has said that a trial in a court
of justice according to the modes of proceeding applicable
to such a case, secured by the laws operating on all alike,
and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exer-
cise of the powers of government unrestrained by the
established principles of private right and distributive
justice — the court having jurisdiction of the subject-
matter and of the parties, and the defendant having full
opportunity to be heard — met the requirments of due
process of law. United States v. Cruiksbank, 92 U. S.
542, 554 ; Leeper v. Texas, 139 F. S. 462, 468. But a state
may not, by any of its agencies, disregard the prohibi-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its judicial authori-
ties may keep within the letter of the statute prescribing
forms of procedure in the courts and give the parties
interested the fullest opportunity to be heard, and yet it
might be that its final action would be inconsistent with
that amendment. In determining what is due process of
law regard must be had to substance, not to form. This
II
382
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§165
Court, referring to the Fourteenth Amendment has said :
* Can a state make anything due process of law which, by
its own legislation, it chooses to declare such! To aflSirm
this is to hold that the prohibition to the states is of no
avail, or has no application where the invasion of private
rights is affected under the forms of legislation. ' David-
son V. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 102. The same question
could be propounded, and the same answer should be
made, in reference to judicial proceedings inconsistent
with the requirement of due process of law. If compen-
sation for private property taken for public use is an
essential element of due process of law as ordained by
the Fourteenth Amendment, then the final judgment of a
state court, under the authority of which the property is
in fact taken, is to be deemed the act of the state within
the meaning of that amendment. ' '
§ 166. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley— Heed
to be given to decisions of state courts construing state
statutes and constitutions. In that case (164 U. S. 112),
while the theory of the supervisory power in question is
clearly recognized, there is at the same time a strong
disposition manifested to find in such precedure as the
states provide the elements of due process which the
Fourteenth Amendment requires. The Court said : * * The
decree is based upon the sole ground that the act (an
irrigation act of California) violates the Federal Consti-
tution in that it in substance authorizes the taking of the
land of the appellee 'without due process of law.' . . .
If the act of the state legislature as construed by its high-
est court conflicts with the Federal Constitution or with
any valid act of Congress, it is the duty of the circuit
court and of this court to so decide, and to thus enforce
the provisions of the Federal Constitution. The follow-
ing are some of the numerous cases in which this princi-
ple has been announced and carried into effect : Shelby
V. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812;
Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297; Webster v.
S 166 STATE POWER OP EMINENT DOMAIN 383
Cooper, 14 How. 488; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599;
Hagar v. Keclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 704 j
Detroit v. Osborne, 135 IT. S. 492. We shoald not be
justified in holding the act to be in violation of the state
constitution in the face of clear and repeated decisions of
the highest court of the state to the contrary, under the
pretest that we were deciding principles of general
constitutional law. If the act violates any provision,
expressed or properly implied, of the Federal Constitu-
• tion, it is our duty to so declare it, but if it do not, there
is no justification for the Federal courts to run counter
to the decisions of the highest state courts upon questions
involving the construction of state statutes or constitu-
tions, or any alleged ground that such decisions are in
conflict with sound principles of general constitutional
law. The contrary has not been held in this court by the
case of Citizens' Sav. L. Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655.
It is claimed, however, that the citizen is deprived of his
property without due process of law, if it be taken by or
under state authority for any other than a public use,
either under the guise of taxation or by the assumption
of the right of eminent domain. In that way the question
whether private property has been taken for any other
than a public use becomes material in this court, even
where the taking is under the authority of the state
instead of the Federal G-overnment. Is this assessment,
for the nonpayment of which the land of the pjaintiff was
to be sold, levied for a public purpose I The question has,
in substance been answered in the affirmative by the
people of California, and by the legislative and judicial
branches of the state government. . . . The use must
be regarded as a public use, or else it would seem to follow
that no general scheme of irrigation can be formed or
carried into effect." Thus while admitting that the ques-
tion whether private property has been taken for any
other than a public use is a Federal question, the right
to decide that question was conceded to the state
authorities.
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DUB PROCESS OP LAW
1167
§167. Henderson Brid^re Co. v. Hendenon— It must
clearly appear that state taxation is really spoliation.
In that case (173 U. S. 592), involvmg the right to review
the judgment of the highest court of a state upon the
ground that it denied the due process of law guarantied
by the Federal Constitution, — the Court said : * * It is said
that the bridge property outside of low-water mark on
the Kentucky shore is so far beyond the reach of munici-
pal protection by the authorities of the City of Hen-
derson that it can not be said to receive any benefits
whatever from the municipal government, and that to
impose taxes for the benefit of the city upon such prop-
erty is a taking of private property for public use with-
out just compensation, and therefore inconsistent with
the due process of law ordained by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Chicago, Burlington & Q. B. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S.
226, 241. It is conceivable that taxation may be of such
a nature and so burdensome as properly to be character-
ized a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. But in order to bring taxation
imposed by a state or under its authority within the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the National Constitu-
tion the case should be so clearly and palpably an illegal
encroachment upon private rights as to leave no doubt
that such taxation by its necessary operation is really
spoliation under the guise of exerting the power to tax.
As an act of Congress should not be declared unconstitu-
tional unless its repugnancy to the supreme law of the
land is too clear to admit of dispute, so a local regulation
under which taxes are imposed should not be held by the
courts of the Union to be inconsistent with the National
Constitution unless that conclusion be unavoidable. All
doubt as to the validity of legislative enactment must be
resolved, if possible, in favor of the binding force of such
enactments. ' ' See "Wheeler v. New York, N. H. & H. E.
Co., 178 U. S. 321 ; King v. Portland, 184 U. S. 61.
§ 169 STATE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 385
§ 168. Hoolrar v. Lob Angeles— Case must be clearly
stated in trial court. That case (188 XT. S. 314), empha-
sizes the necessity for stating clearly in the trial court
the ease which the party, who claims that his property has
been taken without just compensation, desires to present
for review in the Federal tribunals. On that subject the
Court said : ' ' The truth is there is nothing in this record
adequately showing that the state courts were led to snp-
poee that any claim under the Constitution of the United
States was made by plaintiffs in error, or that any ruling
involved a decision against a right set up by them under
that instrument. In Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180,
after stating the contention of plaintiff in error that the
effect of the judgment of the state court was 'to deprive
him of his property without due process of law, or to
deny him the equal protection of the laws, and amounted
to a decision adverse to the right, privilege, or immunity
of plaintiff in error under the Constitution, of being pro-
tected from such deprivation or denial,' we said: 'But
it nowhere affirmatively appears from the record that
snch a right was set up or claimed in the trial court when
the demurrer to the complaint was overruled, or evidence
admitted or excluded, or instructions given or refused,
or, in the supreme court in disposing of the rulings below.
. . . We are not called on to revise these views of the
principles of general law considered applicable to the case
in hand. It is enough that there is nothing in the record
to indicate that the state courts were led to suppose that
plaintiff in error claimed protection under the Constitu-
tion of the United States from the several rulings, or sus-
pect that each ruling as made involved a decision against
a right specially set up trader that instrument.' "
§ 169. Clark v. Nash — Respect to be given to state defi-
nitions of a public use. In that ease (198 U. S. 361), the
Court held that, under the peculiar conditions existing in
Utah, an individual landowner might proceed under a
state statute authorizing a condemnation for a public use
Doe Proeew— 8S
386
DUB PROCESS OF LAW
§169
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of a right of way across his neighbor's land, for the
enlargement of an irrigation ditch for the purpose of
obtaining in that way water from a stream, in which he
had an interest, with which to irrigate land, that would
otherwise remain valueless. In answer to a vigorous con-
tention that the use for which the condemnation was
sought was not a public use within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said: *'This Court
has stated that what is a public use may frequently and
largely depend upon the facts surrounding the subject,
and we have said that the people of a state, as also its
courts, must, in the nature of things, be more familiar
with such facts, and with the necessity and occasion for
the irrigation of the lands, than can anyone be who is a
stranger to the soil of the state, and that such knowledge
and familiarity must have their due weight with the state
courts. Fallbrook Irrig. District v. Bradley, 164 U. S.
112, 159. It is true that in the Fallbrook case the ques-
tion was whether the use of the water was a public use
when a corporation sought to take land by condemnation
under a state statute, for the purpose of making reser-
voirs and digging ditches to supply landowners with the
water the company proposed to obtain and save for such
purpose. This Court held that such use was public. The
case did not directly involve the right of a single indi-
vidual to condemn land under a statute providing for that
condemnation. ' ' It is very difficult of course to reconcile
that extreme conclusion reached in this case, simply
because peculiar local conditions in Utah made such a
rule convenient, with the theory so emphatically stated in
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, that no state has
the right to **make anything due process of law which, by
its own legislation, it chooses to declare such. ' '
§ 170. Hanigault v. Springs— When flooding does not
constitute a taking. In that case (199 IT. S. 473), it was
held that when flooding can be prevented by raising the
height of the dikes around the lands, a flooding of lands
§ 171 STATE POWER OP EMINENT DOMAIN
387
consequent upon the private erection of a dam under a
state statute enacted in the exercise of the police power
to promote the drainage of lowlands does not constitute
a taking requiring compensation to be made to the owner
in order to afford the due process of law guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of that conclu-
sion the Court said : * * The damage claimed by the plain-
tiff in the interruption of access to his lands and the
impairment of his right to navigate the creek does not
demand separate consideration. We Imve repeatedly
held that where the Government of the United States has,
for the purposes of improving the navigation of a river,
erected piers or other structures by which access to plain-
tiff ^s land is rendered more difficult, there is no claim for
compensation. Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269;
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141. We see no reason
why the same principle should not apply to cases where
the state legislature, exercising its police power, directs
a certain dam to be built, and thereby incidentally impairs
access to lands above the dam. In both cases the sover-
eign is exercising its constitutional right, — in one case in
improving the navigation of the river, and in the other,
in draining its lowlands, and thereby enhancing the value
for agricultural purposes. ' ^
§ 171. Ohicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois— When there
is no taking of private property for public use. In that
case (200 U. S. 561), the Court, after declaring *Hhat the
failure of the state court to pass on the Federal right or
immunity specially set up, of record, is not conclusive, but
this Court will decide the Federal question if the neces-
sary effect of the judgment is to deny a Federal right or
immunity specially set up or claimed, and which, if recog-
nized and enforced, would require a judgment different
from one resting upon some ground of local or general
law," — ^held that there was no taking of private property
for public use, requiring compensation in order to afford
the due process of law required by the Fourteenth
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DUB PBOCBSS OF LAW
§171
Amendmenty throngh the imposition upon a railway com-
pany of the entire cost of removing and rebuilding a
railway bridge and culvert rendered necessary by the
proposed widening and deepening of the channel of a
creek hy commissioners of drainage acting under the
provisions of the Illinois farm drainage act of July 1,
1885. In support of that conclusion the Court said : * * We
assume, also, without discussion — as from the decisions
of the state courts, we may properly assume — ^that the
draining of this large body of lands so as to make them
fit for human habitation and cultivation is a public pur-
pose, to accomplish which the state may, by appropriate
agencies, exert the general powers it possesses foi" the
common good. By the removal of water from large bodies
of land, the state court has said, and by ^the subjection of
such lands to cultivation, they are made to bear their
proper proportionate burden to the support of the inhabi-
tants and the commerce of the state, their value is in-
creased, and thereby their contribution in taxes to the
state and local governments is increased/ [Chicago, B.
&Q.R. Co. V. People], 212 111. 103, 119, . • . Indeed
it is admitted that the plan of the commissioners is appro-
priate and the best that can be devised for draining the
lands in question. ' ' In a very vigorous dissenting opinion
Mr. Justice Brewer, after characterizing the judgment of
the court * * a grievous wrong to owners of private prop-
erty, ' ' said : * * Whenever any unjust burden is cast upon
the owner of private property which can not be supported
under the power of eminent domain or that of taxation,
it is referred to the police power. But no exercise of the
police power can disregard the constitutional guaranties
in respect to the taking of private property, due process,
and equal protection, nor should it override the demands
of natural justice. The question in the case is not how far
the state may go in compelling a railroad company to
expend money in increasing its facilities for transporta-
tion, but how far it can go in charging upon the company
the cost of improving farms alon^ the line of its road.''
:i '. . '
II ill
§ 172 STATE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
389
See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min, Co., 200 U. S-
527 ; West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illinois, 201 U. S. 506 ;
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189.
§ 172. Noble State Bank v. Haskell— Use really public,
when judged by the ultimate and not by the proximate
effect. In that case (219 U. S. 104, 575), the court held
(575) that a state statute authorizing the levy and collec-
tion of an assessment, based on average daily deposits
from every bank existing under the laws of the state, for
the purpose of creating a guaranty fund to secure to de-
positors the full payment of their deposits, in the event
any such bank should become insolvent, did not deprive
any solvent bank of its life, liberty or property without
due process of law, because the taking was for a public
use, although, judged from the proximate effect of the
taking, the use seemed to be a private one. In its first
opinion (104) the Court said: **The plaintiff says that
it is solvent and does not want the help of the guaranty
fund, and that it can not be called upon to contribute
toward securing or paying the depositors in other banks,
consistently with article 1, § 10, of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States. . . .
In answering that question, we must be cautious about
pressing the broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment
to a drily logical extreme. Many laws which it would be
vain to ask the court to overthrow could be shown, easily
enough, to transgress a scholastic interpretation of one or
another of the great guaranties in the Bill of Rights.
They more or less limit the liberty of the individual, or
they diminish property to a certain extent. We have few
scientifically certain criteria of legislation, and as it often
is difficult to mark the line where what is called the police
power of the states is limited by the Constitution of the
United States, judges should be slow to read into the lat-
ter a nolumus mutare as against the lawmaking power. ' '
The difficulty in understanding what that statement really
means may be relieved somewhat by the following sup-
390
DUB PROCESS OF LAW
8172
plement contamed in the opinion denying a rehearing:
"We fally understand the practical importance of the
question, and the very powerful argument tiiat can he
made ftgainst the wisdom of the le^slation, but on that
point we have nothing to say, as it is not our concern.
Clark V. Nash, 198 U. S. 361; Strickley v. Highland Boy
Gold Min. Co., 200 U. S. 527, were cited to establish, not
that property might be taken for a private use, bat that,
among the public uses for which it might be taken, were
some which, if looked at only in their immediate aspect,
according to the proximate effect of the taking, might
seem to be private. This case, in our opinion, is of that
sort."
§ 173. Ettor V. Tscoma— When a vested ri^ht is pro-
tected against destruction by a repeal of the remedy. In
that case (228 U. S. 148), the Court held that there is a
vested right of property, protected by the due process of
law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from destruc-
tion by a repeal, after the damage is done, of the compen-
satory provision of a certain law of the State of Wash-
ington, the sole legislative authority for the municipal
action, providing for abutting owners the right of com-
pensation for consequential damages arising from an orig-
inal street grading under mnnicipal direction. The Court
said: "The necessary effect of the repealing act, as con-
strued and applied by the court below, was to deprive the
plaintiff in error of any remedy to enforce the fixed liabil-
ity of the city to make compensation. This was to deprive
the plaintiffs in error of a right which had vested before
the repealing act, — a right which was in every sense a
property right. Nothing remained to be done to complete
the plaintiffs* right to compensation except the ascer-
tainment of the amount of damage to their property. The
right of the plaintiffs in error was fixed by the law in
force when their property was damaged for public pur-
jwses, and the right so vested can not be defeated by sub-
sequent legislation. El^n v. Eaton, 83 HI. 535 ; Healy v.
S 175 STATE POWEB OP EMINENT DOMAIN 391
New Haven, 49 Coim. 394; Harrington v. Berkshire, 22
Pick. 263 ; People ex rel. Fountain v. Westchester County,
4 Barb. 64, are cases arising under street or highway
statutes."
§ 174. McGovern v. New Ym-k— There must be some-
thing more than an ordinary honest mistake of law. In
that case {229 U. S. 363) the court held that where made
without prejudice, in due form, and after a full and fair
hearing, an award to the owner of one of the many parcels
of land taken by eminent domain for a site for a reservoir
for a municipal water supply, can not be said to deny due
process of law, because the courts and commissioners
refused to take into consideration the value of the land as
a part of a natural reservoir site. The Court said:
"When property is taken by eminent domain, it equally
is recognized that there must be something more than an
ordinary honest mistake of law in the proceedings for
compensation before a party can make out that the state
has deprived him of his property unconstitutionally. A.
Backus Jr. & Sons v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169
U. S. 557, 575, 576. As it is put in the case most frequently
cited in favor of the right to a writ of error, *we are per-
mitted only to inquire whether the trial court prescribed
any rule for the guidance of the jury that was in absolute
disregard of the company's right to juet compensation.'
And again the final judgment of a state court 'ought not
to be held in violation of the due process of law enjoined
by the Fourteenth Amendment unless 1^ the the rulings
upon questions of law the company was prevented from
obtaining sabstantially any compensation.' Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co. V. Chicago, 166 TJ. S. 226, 246, 247; Appleby
V. Buffalo, 221 U. S. 524, 531, 532."
§ 175. New York v. Sage— The mle by which the value
of property should be measnred. In that case (239 TJ. S.
57) the Court said: "This is a proceeding for the taking
of land for the Ashokan reservoir, similar to the one be-
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§175
fore ns in McGovern v. New York, 229 U. S. 363. . . .
No doubt when this class of questions first arose it was
said in a general way that adaptability to the purposes for
which the land conid be need most profitably was to be
considered, and that is tme. But it is to he considered
only BO far as the public would have considered it if the
land had been offered for sale in the absence of the city's
exercise of the power of eminent domain. The fact that
the most profitable use could be made only in connection
with other land is not conclnsive against its being taken
into account, if the union of properties necessary is so
practicable that the possibility would affect the market
price. But what the owner is entitled to is the value of the
property taken, and that means what it fairly may be be-
lieved that a purchaser in fair market conditions would
be given for it in fact, — not what a tribunal at a later date
may think a purchaser would have been wise to ^ve, nor a
proportion of the advance due to its union with other
lots."
§ 176. Union Lime Co. v. Ohicajro & N. W. R. Co.— No
nnlawful taking even when the extension of a spur track
is for the benefit of a sing'le indostry. In that case (233
IT. S. 211) it was held that by the exercise of the power
of eminent domain nnder a state statute condemning the
land required for the extension of a spur track ordered
by the state railroad commission there was no taking of.
private property for a private nse, forbidden by the due
process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even
when such extension may be for the benefit of a single
industry, burdened with the initial cost. The Court said :
"The assignments of error come to the single point, —
as to the character of the use. The state, through its
highest court, declares the use to be a public one, and we
should accept its judgment unless it is clearly without
ground. Fallbrook Irrisr. Dist. v. Bradley. 164 U. S. 112,
160 ; Clark v. Nash, 198 V. S. 361, 369 ; Strickley v. High-
land Boy Gold Min. Co., 200 U. S. 527, 531 ; Offield v. New'
§177 STATE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 393
York, N. H. & H. E. Co., 203 U. S. 372, 377; Haviston v.
DanviUe & W. R. Co., 208 U. S. 598, 607. The general
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for
the eonstniction of spnrs is found in 1831 a, Stat. (Wis.).
. . . The supreme court of the state Bustained the
validity of this provision in Chicago & N. W. E. Co. v.
Morehoase, 112 Wis. 1, holding that 'the fact that a spilr
track may run to a single industry does not militate
against the devotion of the property thereto being a pub-
lic use thereof, so long as the purpose of maintaining the
track is to serve all persons who may desire it, and all
can demand, as a right, to be served without discrimina-
tion.' " See also. Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Michigan E.
C(Hnmission, 231 U. S. 457; Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co.
V. Minneapolis, 232 TJ. S. 430.
§ 177. Brand v. Union Elevated R. Co.— What should
be excluded In a proceeding to recover for a decline in
market value. In that case (238 U. S. 586), it was held
that where the only proof concerning the market value of
the property before or immediately after the road was
built shows that no change in such value occurred, and
there was no proof as to what increase, if any, resulted
from the improvement, the property rights of an abuttmg
proprietor were not taken without compensation contrary
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because, in a proceeding by him to recover for the decline
in market value resulting from the erection and operation
of an elevated railway in the street, the judge at the trial
directed a verdict in favor of the railway company, in
which he refused to submit questions of damage to the
jury under positive instruction to exclude from the
market value subsequent to the construction of the rail-
way snch increase, if any, as resulted from facilities aris-
ing out of the improvement itself . The Court said : "The
suit is for loss of market value consequent upon erection
and operation of the elevated road, and is now prosecuted
upon the theory that the trial judge erred in not submit-
^
DUB PROCESS OF LAW
§177
ting questions of damage to the jury under positive
instruction to exclude from market value subsequent to
the construction such enhancement, if any, as resulted
from facilities furnished by the improvement itself. It
was, of course, necessary for the court to determine
whether there was any evidence upon which such loss could
be found. Rv merely viewing the property in 1909 the
jury could not ascertain its market value either before or
just after the road was built, and the only testimony relat-
ing thereto showed no change occurred. Neither could
the jury tell without evidence what enhancement, if any,
resulted from the improvement, and the record discloses
none. In the circumstances we think the refusal to give
positive direction to exclude from consideration some-
t}ung impossible of ascertainment was dearly right."
CHAPTER X
STATE POUCE POWEB AND DUE FB0CBS3
§ ire. English origin of state police power. In draw-
ing to itself the right to initiate and control legislation,
the English parliament stopped short of complete victory,
— it left in the hands of the King in council an undefined
residuum of legislative power which was for a long time
exercised in the making and revoking of a class of tem-
porary enactments known as ordinances. The ordaining
power of the King in council became of immense impor-
tance after Edward IV and Henry VII had completed the
work of reorganizing and consolidating the powers of the
monarchy. Under the Tudor system the council hecame,
as in the Norman and early Angevin days, the body from
which emanated all the more important acts of govern-
ment, whether administrative, legislative (by way of ordi-
nance), fiscal, or political. As Mr. Dicey {The Privy
Council, p. 50) has expressed it: "It had at one moment
to settle questions of policy; at another to provide funds,
by which the administration could be carried on ; at an-
other to review minute accounts, to communicate with
aliens or merchants, or to interfere for the preservation
of the King's peace." The source of the strength of the
Tudor system of government was not in a standing army,
but in the moral force of the royal authority, which exer-
cised a supervising and directing power over every branch
of the administration through the council, whose functions
were to a limited extent legislative as well as judicial and
political. And when the destiny of England widened
through the planting of colonies in the New "World by
adventurers who derived their right to the soil from
charters granted by the crown and not by the parlia-
396
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
§178
ment, the council was called upon to assume still another
vitally important branch of administration. The govern-
ing power in the colony was usually vested in a local
legislature, limited by the charter, which sat as a subordi-
nate body subject to the control of the King in council, to
whom all matters passed in the last resort. In the home-
land the council likewise undertook to supervise, and to
a certain extent control, every branch of the political
administration, from parliament itself down to the local
self-governing agencies. But chief among the council 's
functions as an administrative body were those that
related to the finances, the regulation of commerce,
including the intercourse with foreign merchants, the
supervision of the church and the preservation of the
peace. And finally a central control was exercised by the
privy council over vaccination and the prevention of
disease. See the author's Origin and Growth of the Eng.
Const., i, pp. 252, 546, 547 ; ii, pp. 565, 580, 585.
§179. The typical English state in America. When
the tie of political dependence that bound the colonies to
the mother country was severed, the EngUsh provinces in
America rose to the full stature of sovereign states.
**When the Revolution took place the people of each
state became themselves sovereign'' (Martin v. The Les-
see of Waddell, 16 Pet. 460) ; and so soon as they *Hook
into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the pre-
rogatives and regalities which before belonged either to
the crown or the parliament, became immediately and
rightfully vested in the state" (Ibid., p. 416). Into each
of the state legislatures passed the entire deposit of
purely legislative power which the English parliament
had won. And so it has ever been an elementary prin-
ciple of American constitutional law that every state
legislature is endowed by its very nature with the om-
nipotence of the English parliament, save so far as that
omnipotence is restrained by the express terms of con-
stitutional limitations. But into the corporate person of
§ 180 STATE POLICE POWER 397
the typical American -Btate passed alao certain "preroga-
tives and regalities" — not clearly defined — ^whieh had
never been vested in or exercised by the English parlia-
ment, to wit, the high state functions, whether adminis-
trative, legislative (by way of ordinance), fiscal, or
political which, down to the settlement of this country,
had been exercised exclusively by the King in council.
Out of those "prerogatives and regalities," once vested
in the King in council, has been evolved, through judicial
interpretation, what is now known as the police power in
the "United States. The exercise of that power, once be-
longing in the main to the King in coundl, is now vested
in the state legislatures as an addition or supplement to
the purely legislative powers derived hy them from par-
liament as a legislative body; and is subject of course, to
all limitations imposed by the state and federal consti-
tutions.
§ 180. The police power as defined hj American jurists
and text writers. So far as the author knows, the fore-
going is the first attempt ever made to indicate histor-
ically the source from which the police power, as now
vested in the typical American state, was derived. In
the light of that exposition, it wUl be far easier to grasp
the meaning of the definitions which attempt to state
dogmatically what the power in question really is. In
Thorpe v. Rutland R. E., 27 Vt. 150, Redfield, C. J., said:
"This police power of the state extends to the protection
of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all per-
sons, and the protection of all property within the state.
According to the maxim, sic utere tuo at alienum, non
laedas, it being of universal application, it must of course
be within the range of legislative action to define the
mode and manner in which every one may so use his own
as not to injure others."
In Com. V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, Shaw, C. J., defined the
police power as "the power vested in the legislature by
the Constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all man-
I
I
i 398 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 180
«
ner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordi-
nances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth and of the subjects of
the same/' In describing the object of the police power
the Supreme Court of the United States in Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U. S. 31, declared it to be ** to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, educa-
tion, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as
to increase the industries of the state, develop its re-
sources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. ' ' In Law-
ton V. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, the same Court said: **It is
universally conceded to include everything essential to
the public safety, health, and morals, and to justify the
destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of
whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under
this power it has been held that the state may order the
destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise en-
dangering the lives of passersby; the demolition of such
as are in the path of a conflagration ; the slaughter of dis-
eased cattle ; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome
food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the
regulation of railways and other means of public con-
veyance, and of interments in burial grounds ; the restric-
tions of objectionable trades to certain localities; the
compulsory vaccination of children ; the confinement of the
insane or those afflicted with contagious diseases; the
restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards ;
the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill
fame ; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places
where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, how-
ever, the state may interfere wherever the public inter-
ests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion
is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not
only what the interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such inter-
ests. ' ' Judge Cooley has said : * * The police of a state, in
a comprehensive sense, embraces its whole system of
§ 180 STATE POLICE POWER 399
internal regulation, hy which the state seeks not only to
preserve the pnblic order and to prevent offenses against
the state, but also to establish for the interconrse of
citizens with citizens those rules of good manners and
good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a con-
flict of rights, and to insure to each the nnintermpted
enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent
with a like enjoyment of rights by others.'* Const Lim.
572. When in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583, Taney,
C. J., asked the question, "What are the police powers
of a state!" he answered: "They are nothing more or
less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether
a state passes a quarantine law, or a law to panish
offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring
certain instruments to be recorded to regulate commerce
within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same
power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power
to govern men and things within the linuts of its domin-
ion." In Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 478, the Court,
in recognizing the distinction between the wider and nar-
rower meaning of the term police power, said: "It only
remains to consider, in connection with this branch of the
case, whether the act of the general assembly of 1903
was a proper exercise of the police power of the state.
Of this we have no doubt. Although it was not an exercise
of that power in its ordinarily accepted sense of protect-
ing the health, lives, and morals of the community, it is
defensible in its broader meaning of providing for the
general welfare of the people by the reclamation of
swampy, overflowed, and infertile lands, and the erection
of dams, levees, and dikes for that purpose." In Louis-
vUIe & N. E. Co. V. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, it was held
that the legislature is endowed with a wide discretion
beyond the reach of judicial inquiry, if it is exercised bona
fide for the protection of the public, whenever it is neces-
sary for it to deal with matters contrary to public policy
or inimical to the public interest.
400
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
§181
!
v§181. Delegation of police power to municipalities.
As such corporations are mere agencies created by the
state for the purposes of local government, a large part of
its police power is usually delegated to them, subject to
such limitations as are contained in the grants by which
it is conferred. It is thus well settled that, subject to con-
stitutional limitations, and such further limitations as the
legislature may impose, a municipality may enact ordi-
nances for the promotion of the health, comfort, con-
venience, good order and general welfare of its citizens.
In Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 370, the Court said :
* * The power of the legislature to authorize its municipali-
ties to regulate and suppress all such places or occupa-
tions as, in its judgment, are likely to be injurious to the
health of its inhabitants, or to disturb people Uving in the
inmaediate neighborhood by loud noises or offensive
odors, is so clearly within the police power as to be no
longer open to question. Ee Linhan, 72 Cal. 114 ; Quincy
V. Kennard, 151 Mass. 563; Love v. Recorder's Court
Judge, 128 Mich. 545. ' ' And in California Reduction Co.
V. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, it was held
that municipal ordinances were not wanting in the due
process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment,
even when some of the substances destroyed, possessing
some value, were taken without compensation under a
system that required all garbage and other refuse matter
to be delivered at a crematory or reduction plant, there to
be destroyed at the expense of the person or corporation
conveying the same. As the exercise of the police power
does not involve the ** taking '* of property as such as in
eminent domain, no obligation to make compensation is
imposed when its loss of destruction is an incidental and
necessary consequence. 1 Dillon, Munic. Corp., 4th ed.
141 ; Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal. 326 ; State v. Campbell, 64
N. H. 402 ; Health Dept. v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32 ;
Com. V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 ; Thorpe v. Rutland R. Co., 27
Vt. 140 ; McGehee, pp. 203, 303.
In devising schemes for the execution of the police
o\
§1
STATE POLICE POWER
power the legislature may east upon public officials func-
tions purely administrative (Reagan v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362) ; or it may clothe them with
functions, judicial or quasi-judicial, without a denial of
due process, provided even a general notice and hearing
is guaranteed in matters of fact involving private right.
In Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 509, the Court said:
"When a statute fixes the time and the place of meeting
of any board or tribunal, no special notice to parties inter-
ested is required. If plaintiff in error had applied at any
meeting for a hearing the board would have been com-
pelled to grant it, and if on such hearing his offer or
demand for testimony had been refused, the question
might have been fairly presented to the state courts to
what extent the action of the board had deprived him of
his rights."
§ 182. Reasonableness as a limitation on the police
power. In Tick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, the Court
held that "Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and adminis-
tered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal dis-
criminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution." That conclu-
sion was reached after the court had declared that "The
same principle has been more freely extended to the quasi
legislative acts of inferior municipal bodies, in respect to
which it is an ancient jurisdiction of judicial tribunals to
pronounce upon the reasonableness and consequent valid-
ity of their by-laws. In respect to these, it was the
doctrine that every by-law must be reasonable, not incon-
sistent with the charter of the corporation, nor with any
statute of Parliament, nor with the general principles of
the common law of the land, particularly those having
relation to the liberty of the subject or the rights of pri-
vate property." See also, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127
Due Proceaa — 26
402
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
U. S. 677 ; Morgan *s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U. S.
455; Holden v. Hardy, 16 U. S. 366; Lake Shore, etc.,
R. Co. V. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177
U. S. 587 ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 469 ; Cun-
nius V. Reading School Dist., 198 U. S. 469; Lochner v.
New York, 198 U. S. 53 ; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 416 ;
New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31 ; Welch
V. Swasey, 214 XT. S. 91 ; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms,
212 U. S. 159 ; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S.
86; Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U. S. 302; Laurel
Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358; Kidd,
Dater & Price Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 U. S.
461; Shelvin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57;
American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47 ; Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104; Assaria State Bank v.
Dolley, 219 U. S. 121; Engel v. O^Malley, 219 U. S. 128;
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541 ; Murphy v.
California, 225 U. S. 623 ; Central Lumber Co. v. South
Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 ; Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 TJ. S.
303 ; Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572 ; Schmiedinger v.
Chicago, 226 U. S. 578 ; Purity Extract & T. Co. v. Lynch,
226 U. S. 192;, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cram, 228 U. S.
70 ; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26 ; Eubank v. Richmond,
226 U. S. 137 ; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232
U. S. 531 ; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S.
389 ; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1. From the foregoing
cases it clearly appears that as reasonableness is primar-
ily a subject for the determination of the legislature, the
courts will not set the legislative judgment as to reason-
ableness aside and substitute its own in its stead except
when it is manifest that the law in which the legislature
has embodied its will is arbitrary or enacted in bad faith.
Whether the application of a police regulation, reasonable
in itself, is, under the circumstances of a particular case,
reasonable or arbitrary, is a question of fact, which can
not be raised for the first time in the appellate court. In
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53,
the Court said : * * The charge is that the property of plain-
it
m
§ 183 STATE POLICE POWER 403
tiff in error is taken withont due process of law; bat
whether so taken is made to depend upon a question of
fact, — the requirement of * an unnecessary and wh^y use-
less expenditure of money. ' It is well established that on
error to a state court this court can not re-examine the
evidence, and when the facts are found we are concluded
by such finding. Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188. ' '
§ 183. Tested rights as a limitation on police power.
Whenever the defense of dae process is set up against the
exercise of the state's police power or its general legis-
lative power, it must appear that the state's action inter-
fered with the private right of some individual or
corporation. In Pennie v, Reis, 132 U. S. 464, relief was
denied because a police officer who had contributed to a
fund, a certain portion of which should on the death of
each officer be paid to his representatives, had no vested
right in such fund, prior to his death. The Court said :
"Being a fund raised in that way, it was entirely at the
disposal of the government, until by the happening of one
of the events stated — the resignation, dismissal or death
of the oflScer — the right to the specific sum promised
became vested in the officer or his representative." In
New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 IT. S.
79, it was held that no one can be said to be deprived of
his property without due process, unless it appears that
such person has a property in the particular thing of
which he is alleged to have been deprived. In the words of
the Court: "The only property of which it was deprived
was the right it had possessed imder the Act of 1877 of
paying for its water supply in taxes; but, if this were
property at all, even within the liberal definition of that
word given by Mr. Justice Bradley, in Campbell v. Holt,
115 U. S. 620, 630, it waa not such a vested right as was
beyond the control of the Legislature. * ' See also, Morley
v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 146 U. S. 162 ; Chicago, B. & Q.
R. Co. V. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57; Gritts v. Fisher, 224
U. S. 640; Choate v. Trapp, 242 F. S. 665; English v.
404
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§183
i!!l
l«
&
yt
t»
t :.ii 1
ii :i
ft
Richardson, 224 U. S. 680 ; Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S.
148 ; Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310 ; Willoughby
V. Ch5(J|go, 235 U. S. 45.
§ 184. The right of forfeiture. And yet even when the
right to property is vested the legislature may decree its
confiscation and destmction as a penalty for its misuse in
certain ways. **It may be stated that the decisions of the
courts, in different parts of the country, have very gen-
erally sustained laws for the prohibition of the sale of
intoxicating liqnors in any manner, form or bulk what-
ever, and on the ground that the trade works an injury to
society, and may, therefore, be prohibited.^' Tiedeman's
Limitations of Police Power, p. 304, citing Fisher v.
McGirr, 1 Gray 26, in which the court, speaking through
Shaw, C. J., said that **the property of which injurious or
dangerous use is made shall be seized and confiscated, be-
cause either it is so unlawfully used by the owner or per-
son having the power of disposal or by some person with
whom he has placed and intrusted it, or at least that he has
so carelessly and negligently used his power and control
over it that by his default it has fallen into the hands of
those who have made and intended to make the injurious
or dangerous use of it, of which the public have a right to
complain, and from which they have a right to be relieved.
Therefore, as well to abate the nuisance as to punish the
offending or careless owner the proi>erty may be justly
declared forfeited, and either sold for the public benefit
or destroyed, as the circumstances of the case may require
and the wisdom of the legislature direcf As to the
validity of legislation providing for similar forfeitures,
see Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371 ; Hastings v. Hang, 85
Mich. 87; Com. v. Gaming Implements, 119 Mass. 332;
The Alexander, 60 Fed. R. 914; McCandlish v. Com., 76
Va. 1002 ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 ; Kidd v. Pear-
son, 128 U. S. 1. In the case last named the court held
that a law of Iowa authorizing the abatement as a nui-
sance of a distillery used for the unlawful manufacture
ftbU :<l
§185
STATE POUCB POWER
405
and sale of mtozicating liquors did not conflict with the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
principles of that case were approved in Qeer v. Connec-
ticut, 161 U. S. 531, in which it was held that the police
power of a state may be so exercised as to preserve game
birds as a valuable food supply for its people, through a
prohibition of their transportation beyond lie state,
despite the fact that interstate commerce may be indi-
rectly and remotely affected thereby.
§ 185. LimitatioiLs on the enjoyment of property. The
state, while protecting the public safety, health or morals,
may so exercise the police power as to destroy or dimin-
ish the value of property employed in a particular pur-
suit, without involving snch a taking for the public use as
will compel compensation to the owner suffering thereby,
111 Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, the
Conrt, — after holding that the charter of the Boston Beer
Co., conferring the right to manufacture malt Uquors in
Boston, did not constitute a contract, the obligation of
which was impaired by the Prohibitory Liquor Law
passed in 1869, — said : "We do not mean to say that prop-
erty actually in existence, and in which the right of the
owner has become vested, may be taken for the public
good without due compensation. But we infer that the
liquor in this case, as in the case of Bartemeyer v. Iowa,
18 Wall. 129, was not in existence when the liquor law
of Massachusetts was passed. Had the plaintiff in error
relied on the existence of the property prior to the law, it
behooved it to show that fact. But no such fact is shown,
and no such point is taken. The plaintiff in error boldly
takes the ground that being a corporation it has a right
by contract to manufacture and sell beer forever, not-
withstanding and in spite of any exigencies which may
occur in the morals or the health of the community, re-
quiring snch manufacture to cease. We do not so under-
stand the rights of the plaintiff. The Legislature had no
power to confer any snch rights." Proceeding on the
Ul
406
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§185
same lines the court, iii Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v.
Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, held that no exemption from
the police power resulted from a charter authorizing the
manufacture of animal matter into a fertilizer in a certain
selected locality, because such diarter did not constitute
a contract guaranteeing such an exemption, no matter
how serious the nuisance might become in the future by
reason of growth or population in such locality. In Stone
V. Mississippi, 101 IT. S. 814, the Court, — after holding
that no legislature can curtail the power of its successors
to make sucU laws as they may deem necessary in matters
of police, — said : * * The contrax^ts which the Constitution
protects are those that relate to property rights, not gov-
ernmental. It is not always easy to tell on which side of
the line that separates governmental from property
rights a particular case is to be put ; but in respect to lot-
teries there can be no difficulty. ' * In Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U. S. 623, it was held that there was no conflict
between the Prohibition Law of Kansas and that clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides that **No
state shall, make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;'* that
by the adoption of the amendment in question the
states did not intend to restrict the exercise of their police
powers for the protection of the health, morals or safety
of the community , that a prohibition simply upon the use
of property declared by the legislative power to be inju-
rious to the health, morals or safety of the public,
can not in any proper sense be deemed a taking of
property for the public benefit; that when any illegal
manufacture or traffic is injurious to such interest, the
state has power to declare any place employed or main-
tained for such illegal traffic or manufacture a common
nuisance, which may be abated, despite the incidentiil
inconvenience which individuals or corporations may
suffer. That principle, which always subordinates the
S186
STATE POLICE POWER
407
rights of indlTidaais in bannful materials to the general
welfare, underlies California Eeduetion Co. v. Sanitary
Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, in which it was held that
a municipal ordinance requiring garbage to be delivered
and destroyed at a designated crematory at the expense
of the person delivering the same is not a taking of pri-
vate property for the public use without compensation,
even if the substances so destroyed may have had some
elements of value; and Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U. S.
325, in which it was held that the due process of law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by an
ordinance ^ving to a city contractor the exclusive right
to collect and dispose of garbage, so far as it relates tx)
the refuse from hotel tables, although such refuse might
be valuable as food for swine, and for other purposes.
§ 186. Property or bnitmess clothed with a public inter-
est. In the great case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113,
in which it was held that when private property is devoted
to a public nse, it is subject to public regulation, the Court
said: "Property does become clothed with a public inter-
est when used in a manner to make it of public conse-
quence, and affect the community at large. When, there-
fore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public
has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an inter-
est in that nse, and must submit to be controlled by the
public for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by dis-
continuing the use ; but so long as he maintains the use, he
must submit to the control. Thus, as to ferries. Lord Hale
says, in his treatise De Jure Maris, 1 Harg. L. Tr. 6, the
Bang has 'A right of franchise or privilege, that no man
may set up a common ferry for all jmssengers, without
a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from the
Bang, . . . because it doth in consequence tend to a
common charge, and is become a thing of public interest
and use, and every man for his passage pays a toll, which
is a common charge, and every ferry ought to be under a
408
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§186
public regulation/ . . . And again, as to wharves
and wharfingers, Lord Hale, in his treatise De Portibus
Maris, already cited, says: *A man, for his own private
advantage, may in a port or town, set up a wharf or
crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can
agree for cranage, wharfage, houselage, pesage, for the
doth no more than is lawful for any man to do, viz. : make
the most of his own. ... If the King or subject have
a public wharf, into which all persons that come to that
port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for
the purpose, because they are the wharves only licensed
by the Queen, or because there is no other wharf in that
port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected ; in
that case there can not be taken arbitrary and excessive
duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, etc., neither can
they be enhanced to an immoderate rate, but the duties
must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the
King's license or charter. For now the wharfs cmd crane
and other conveniences are affected with a pvhlic interest ^
and they cease to be juris privati only ; as if a man set out
a street in new building on his own land, it is now no
longer bare private interest, but is affected by a public
interest.' ''
Thus it appears that in defining the scope of the police
power over * * property affected by a public interest, ' ' as
employed by ferrymen, warfingers, innkeepers, ware-
housemen, millers, and common carriers, the court based
its judgment upon medival precedents current at a time
when the police power of the state, as enforced not only
by the King in parliament but by the King in council,
covered an almost indefinable area, embracing the regu-
lation of both prices and wages. (See Freund, Pol.
Power, 374 ; Cunningham, Growth of English Com., vol.
II, p. 232 ; The Power of the State to Regulate Prices and
Charges, by G. A. Finkelnburg, 32 Am. L. Rev. 502 ; note
to Munn Case, 16 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 539 ; McGehee, pp.
315-316). The principle of a virtual monopoly as a basis
for the doctrine in question, — ^thus stated by Mr. Justice
§186
STATE POLICE POWER
409
Bradley in his dissenting opinion in Sinking Fund Cases,
99 U. S. 700, 747: "When an emqloyment or business
. . . becomes a practical monopoly, to which the citi-
zen is compelled to resort, and by means of which a tribute
can be exacted from the community, it is subject to regu-
lation by the legislative power, — '* was however ap-
parently abandoned in Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U. S. 391,
403, and later cases. By the Munn case, and the othor
so-called "granger cases" the doctrine was firmly settled
that although the warehouses affected are used by those
engaged in interstate commerce as well as in conmicrce
within the state, a state statute fixing the maximum of
charges for the storage of grain is not unconstitutional as
a regulation of commerce (Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 487;
Morgan's S. S. Co. v. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 467;
Wabash, St. L. & P. E. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 564) ; Ihat
a statute fixing a maximum charge for the storage of
grain does not violate the equal protection of the laws
granted by the Fourteenth Amendment (Stone v. Farm-
ers' Loan and T. Co., 116 U. S. 335) ; that as private
property devoted to a public use is subject to public
regulation, the legislature of a state can, under the
Federal Constitution, fix maximum rates for the storage
of grain in warehouses in the state ; that "for protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to
the polls, not to the courts. ' ' (Munn v. IlUnois, 94 U. S.
113, 133, 134).
In German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, the
Court, after reviewing Munn V. Illinois, said: "The cases
need no explanatory or fortifying comment. They demon-
strate that a business, by circumstances and its nature,
may rise from private to be a public concern, and be
subject in consequence, to governmental regulation. And
they demonstrate, to apply the language of Judge An-
drews in the Budd Case (117 N. Y. 27), that the attempts
made to place the right of public regulation in the cases
in which it has been exerted, and of which we have given
example, upon the ground of special privileges conferred
410
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§186
by the public on those affected, can not be supported.
* The underlyiu^ principle is that business of certain kinds
hold such a peculiar relation to the public interest that
there is superinduced upon it the right of public regula-
tion. ' Is the business of insurance within the principle f
It would be a bold thing to say that principle is fixed,
inelastic, in the precedents of the past, and can not be
applied though modem economic conditions may make
necessary or beneficial its application. In other words,
to say that government possessed at one time a greater
power to recognize the public interest in a business and
its regulation to promote the general welfare than gov-
ernment possesses to-day. We proceed, then, to consider
whether the business of insurance is within the prin-
ciple.*^ The outcome was the conclusion that the fire
insurance business is so far affected with a public interest
as to justify a regulation of its rates by the legislature
without offense to the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, despite the fact that no public trust
is imposed upon the property, and that the pubUc may
not have a legal right to demand and receive service.
§ 187. Interstate Commerce act and the common law.
The principles of the common law applicable to common
carriers regulated the railway traffic of this country prior
to the Interstate Commerce Act. Interstate Com. Com.
V. Baltimore & 0. E. Co., 145 U. S. 263. In the absence
of such statutory regulation a railroad company owes
only such duties to the public or to individuals, corpo-
rations or associations as the common law, or some cus-
tom having the force of law, has established. Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co. V. Denver & N. 0. R. Co., 110 U. S. 667.
The act of Congress to regulate commerce of the United
States, foreign and interstate, created a commission
which is a body corporate, entitled to apply to the judicial
power for the enforcement of its orders. Texas & P. R.
Co. V. Interstate Com. Com., 162 U. S. 197. But that act
leaves common carriers free, as they were at common law,
§188
STATE POLICE POWER
to make special contracts for the increase of tlieir busi-
ness, to classify their traffic and to apportion their rates
BO as to meet the necessities of commerce, provided they
observe the prohibitions that their charges shall not be
unreasonable or unjust, and that they shall not unjustly
discriminate, so as to give undue preference or advan-
tage to persons or traffic similarly situated. Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. V. Interstate Com. Com., 162 U. S.
184. Provided there is no violation of the limitation that
the carriage shall not be required without reward or
upon conditions amounting to the taking of property for
public nse without just compensation, and that it does
not amount to a regulation of foreign or interstate com-
merce, a state legislature has the power to prescribe the
rates of a railroad company for the carriage of persons
and merchandise within its limits, in the absence of any
provision in the charter of the company constituting a
contract vesting in it absolute control over such traffic.
Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174.
§188. Keasonableness of rates and the delegation of
legislatiTe power. In the Railroad Commission Cases,
116 TJ. S. 307, the Court said: "This power to regulate is
not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the eqoivar
lent of confiscation. Tinder pretense of regulating fares
and freights, the state can not require a railroad corpora-
tion to carry persons or property without reward ; neither
can it do that which in law amounts to a taking of private
property for public use without just compensation, or
without due process of law." See also, Chicago, M. and
St. P. R. Co. V. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418. Merely the
power to fix reasonable charges, leaving the state free,
within the limits of its general authority, to declare what
shall be deemed reasonable, is conferred by a grant to a
railroad company of the power "from time to time to fix,
regulate, and receive the tolls and charges" to be received
by it for transportation. Railroad Com. Cases, 116 U. S.
307. The courts can only interfere when railroad rates
410
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§186
by the public on those affected, can not be supported.
* The underlying principle is that business of certain kinds
hold such a peculiar relation to the public interest that
there is superinduced upon it the right of public regula-
tion. ' Is the business of insurance within the principle f
It would be a bold thing to say that principle is fixed,
inelastic, in the precedents of the past, and can not be
applied though modem economic conditions may make
necessary or beneficial its application. In other words,
to say that government possessed at one time a greater
power to recognize the public interest in a business and
its regulation to promote the general welfare than gov-
ernment possesses to-day. We proceed, then, to consider
whether the business of insurance is within the prin-
ciple.** The outcome was the conclusion that the fire
insurance business is so far affected with a public interest
as to justify a regulation of its rates by the legislature
without offense to the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, despite the fact that no public trust
is imposed upon the property, and that the public may
not have a legal right to demand and receive service.
§ 187. Interstate Commerce act and the common law.
The principles of the common law applicable to common
carriers regulated the railway traffic of this country prior
to the Interstate Commerce Act. Interstate Com. Com.
V. Baltimore & 0. E. Co., 145 U. S. 263. In the absence
of such statutory regulation a railroad company owes
only such duties to the public or to individuals, corpo-
rations or associations as the common law, or some cus-
tom having the force of law, has established. Atchison,
T. & S. F. E. Co. V. Denver & N. 0. E. Co., 110 U. S. 667.
The act of Congress to regulate commerce of the United
States, foreign and interstate, created a commission
which is a body corporate, entitled to apply to the judicial
power for the enforcement of its orders. Texas & P. E.
Co. V. Interstate Com. Com., 162 U. S. 197. But that act
leaves common carriers free, as they were at common law,
1 188 STATE POLICE POWER ^j,
to make special contracts for the increase of their busi
ness, to classify their traffic and to apportion their rates
so as to meet the necessities of commerce mo^riJ^ *i!
observe the prohibitions that their cha^Xhr^l t
nnreasonable or nnjnst, and that they shall not unjnstlv
discrumnate, so as to give nndue preference or advln
^ & T Tp % "^r T^^'^^ «^*'^«*^- Cine wT
N. 0. & T. P. E. Co. V. Interstate Com Com moiT^'
184. Provided there is no violation ofThe'^SaU^^^^^^^
the carnage shall not be reqnired without reward «*
upon conditions amounting to the taking of vvoZr^f
pubhc use without iust compensation, and thaHt^Hn
not amount to a regulation of foreign or "nte^^^^^^^ 1^'
merce a state legislature has the Zer^pretrih^Z
rates of a railroad company for tho /.« • i'^^scriDe the
and merchan^se within its limitrf^ i 5® ^^ Persons
provision in the charter of T !' *^^®°<^ ^^ anj
contract vesting in it aW "Sf"^ constituting a
Georgia E. & Bkg. Co. v. Smift, ^ U. rm"'^ *''^*
§ 188. ReasonaUeneas ot mj.
gislative power. In the Itaiir^S^,*^® del^gatton of
7^ XT a onT +l,«n L^ ..'^^llPoad Conim;„„:-_ «
■^warrtS
I
ll
'J
I
without due process of law." a. J^ '^^PensatL^ i
St. P. B. Co. T. Minnesota, 1^/?' ^^T* "^I
power to fix reasonable cWo i ^: ^^^-U^r^' !?^
Lhin the limits of its generaK'"^ theT? ^ /^^
shall be deemed reasonable, ig ^2"^, to de^w ^?^'
railroad company of the power «'f, ^ V a m *
regulate, and receive the toUs and C^<> to K„*J '^
by U for transportation. KaUroad >«% W • ^
307. The courts can only interfet^ Jj Vs, Ug*^^^
414 DUE PKOCESS OF LAW § 189
arbitrarily selected, such as the giving to purchasers of
one thousand mile tickets rights denied to the public
generally. Such a discrimination constitntea a taking
of property without due process of law. Lake Shore,
etc., R. Co. V. Smith, 173 XJ. S. 684. The starting point
of any estimate of reasonable rates must be the present
value of the property employed in the public service, and
the owner is deprived of his property without just com-
pensation when the rate imposed fails to give "a fair
return" on that value. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466;
San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739;
Colling V. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79, 91.
In estimating the value of the property in the public
service, "the original cost of construction, the amount
expended in permanent improvements, the amount and
market value of ita bonds and stocks, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction, the prob-
able earning capacity of the property under particular
rates prescribed by statute, and the smn required to meet
operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and
are to be given such weight as may be just and right in
each case." Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466. fThe public
are not however to be oppressed with increased rates
necessary to meet a bond issue exceeding a fair valua-
tion, reckless operating expenses or a fictitious capital-
ization. Reagan v. Farmers' L. & F., etc, Co., 154 U. S.
362; Smyth v. Ames, 169 TT. S. 466; San Diego Land Co.
V. National City, 174 U. S. 739. And yet the interest of
mortgage bondholders must be considered, because if the
interest due on such debts can not be paid the result ordi-
narily is confiscation. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v, Dey, 35
Fed. Rep. 866. In that case it was held that "when the
proposed rates will give some compensation, however
small, the courts have no power to interfere," a rule that
has yielded to the more mature conclusion that reason-
ableness is always an equitable question under all the
circumstances of the case. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Board
of Railroad Com'rs, 78 Fed. Rep. 261. In Cotting v.
§ 189 STATE POLICE POWER 415
Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 V. S. 79, the Court
said: "It has not been held affinnatiTely, that the legis-
lature may enforce rates which stop only tiiis side of
confiscation and leave the property in tiie hands and
under the care of the owners without any remuneration
for its use." A railroad company can not, however,
"claim the right to earn a net profit from every mUe,
section, or other part into which the road might be
divided, nor attack as unjust a regulation which fixed a
rate at which some such part would be unremunerative."
St Louis, etc, E. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649. When there
has been a consolidation of several pre-existing lines, the
reasonableness of the rate fixed for the new entity is to
be determined by its effect on its entire line, and not by
its effect on any one road belonging to the original enti-
ties. In measuring the rights of the public the courts
must look into all of the conditions surrounding the actual
value of the property: "There may have been extrava-
gance and needless expenditure of money; there may be
waste in the management of the road ; enormous salaries ;
unjust discrimination as between individual shippers, re-
sulting in general loss. The construction may have been
at a time when material and labor were at the highest
price, so that the actual cost far exceeds the present
value." Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T., etc., Co., 154 IT. S.
362. No matter whether the rates be established by the
legislature itself, or by one of its creations in the form
of an administrative board, "The question of the reason-
ableness of a rate or charge for transportation by a rail-
road company, involving as it does the element of
reasonableness both as regards the company and as
regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial
investigation, requiring due process of law for its deter-
mination." Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 IT. S.
418. In Lonisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kentncky, 183 U. S. 503,
a ruling requiring the same rates for long and short hanls
was sustained. Where the business is one the state might
perform and the owner of the property is deliberately
416 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 189
performing state functions, with the aid of state fran-
chises, "He expresses his willingness to do the work of
the state, aware that the state in the discharge of its pub-
lic duties is not guided solely by a question of profit. It
may rightfully determine that the particular service is of
such importance to the public that it may be conducted
at a pecuniary loss, having in view a larger general
interest At any rate, it does not perform its services
with the single idea of profit Its thought is the general
public welfare." Getting v. Kansas City Stock Yards
Co., 183 U. S. 79. When however the business is in the
nature of a private enterprise and becomes subject to
governmental control, solely because it is affected with
a public interest, the rule is otherwise, as its owner is
not doing the work of the state, nor can he appropriate
its powers. Under such conditions it is but just that the
owner of such a business should be "subject to the ordi-
nary conditions of the market and the freedom of con-
tract. He can force no one to sell to him, he can not
prescribe the price he shall pay. . . . He has a right
to do business. He has a right to charge for each separate
service that wbicii is a reasonable compensation there-
for, and the legislature may not deny him such reason-
able compensation ; and may not interfere simply because
out of the multitude of his transactions, the amount of
his profits is large." Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards
Co., 183 U. S. 79.
§ 190. fiecent cases on the subject of rates and dne
process. In Peoria Gas & Electric Co. v. Peoria, 200
U. S. 48, it was held that a contract to fix the price of
gas between rival gas companies, made in violation of
Illinois antitrust act of June 11, 1891, did not, after they
had ceased to act under it, take away their right to invoke
the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in order to defeat a municipal ordinance having the
effect, through the establishment of unremunerative
rates, of taking private property for pablic use without
5 190 STATE POUCE POWER 417
compenBation. In Seaboard A. L. Railway v. Florida,
203 U. S. 261, it was held that due process of law was not
denied to a railway company whose transportation of
phosphates constitutes about one-sixth of its local freight
business, by an order of a state railroad commission com-
manding that the local freight rate for phosphates should
not be more than 1 cent per ton per mile, when the rate so
fixed was nearly 2 mills per ton greater than the average
local freight rate of the c<Knpany. In Ex parte Young,
209 F. S. 123, it was held that as the act of a state legis-
lature fixing rates for the transportation of either freight
or passengers is deemed prima facie valid, the burden
of proof rests on the carrier who undertakes to maintain
the contrary. In Railroad Commission v. Cumberland
Teleph. and Teleg. Co., 212 IT. S. 414, it was held that a
telephone company seeking to enjoin, as unreasonable and
confiscatory, the enforcement of rates fixed by a state
commission, mast assume the burden of proving what
part, if any, of the depreciation fund accumulated by it
from receipts, was added to the capital upon which
dividends are to be paid. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, it was held that although the
Virginia State Corporation Commission is, for some
purposes, a court, acting only after hearing and inquiry,
the Establishment by it of railway passenger rates is not
res adjudicata in a suit seeking injunctive relief on the
ground that such rates are confiscatory, because proceed-
ings to establish rates are in their very nature legislative
and not judicial. In Northern P. K. Co. v. North Dakota,
216 IT. S. 579, it was held that where a state court has
enjoined a carrier from farther violations of a state law
fixing rates for the transportation of coal within the
state, against the contention that the maximum rates so
fixed are confiscatory, the Federal Supreme Court will
afifirm the judgment, if the evidence leaves the question
of reasonableness in doubt, without prejudice however to
the right of the carrier to reopen the case, if, after a
further trial, it believes it can demonstrate more clearly
Due Vnam — 27
418 DUE PEOCBSS OP LAW § 190
the fact that such rates are confiscatory. In Simpson v.
Shepard, 230 TJ. S. 352, the Court said : ** Are the state's
acts and orders confiscatory! The rate-making power
is a legislative power and necessarily implies a range of
legislative discretion. We do not sit as a board of revi-
sion to substitute our judgment for that of the legislature,
or of the commission lawfully constituted by it, as to
matters within the province of either. San Diego Land
& Town Co. V. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 446. The case falls
within a well defined category. Here we have a general
schedule of rates, involving the profitableness of the inter-
state operations of the carrier, taken as a whole, and the
inquiry is whether the state has over-stepped the consti-
tutional limit by making the rates so unreasonably low
that the carriers are deprived of their property without
due process of law, and denied the equal protection of the
laws.'' It was held that an interstate carrier's intra-
state rate may not be fixed so low by the state that its
entire revenue from all sources, interstate and intrastate,
after deducting only operating expenses and taxes, shall
amount to only about 4 per cent on the value of its
property within the state. * * In view of the actual results
of the business in the state, and the clearly established
facts with respect to the conditions of traffic upon this
road, the conclusion can not be escaped that the rates
prescribed by the acts and orders of Minnesota would
not permit a fair return to this company." United
States V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 234 U. S. 476,
involved the correctness of a decree of the Commerce
Court, enjoining the enforcement of an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, based upon the long
and short haul clause of the act to regulate com-
merce. After construing that act the Supreme Court
held that the Commerce Court had erred; that the due
process of law clause of the Federal Constitution had
not been violated because the act in question, as con-
strued by said commission, does not authorize the arbi-
trary destruction of the rights of persons or communities.
§ 191 STATE POLICE POWER 419
In Northern P. E. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 V. S. 585, it
was held that a state law was confiscatory and due process
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment denied,
where the maximum intrastate rates fixed for the trans-
portation of coal in carload lots, taking into account the
entire traflSe to which such rates are applied, compel
the carrier to transport the commodity for less than cost,
or without substantial compensation in addition to cost,
even when the return to the carrier from its entire intra-
state business may be adequate. In Milwaakee Elec. B.
and L. Co. V. Railroad Com., 238 XT. S. 174, it was held
that a street railway company was not deprived of its
property without due process of law by the exercise of a
state's lawful power to fix street railway rates, notwith-
standing a municipal rate ordinance, called a "contract-
ing ordinance." See, by way of illustration, O'Keefe v.
United States, 240 U. S. 294, holding that where Congress
has forbidden them from considerations affecting the
public welfare, a trunk line railway has no right pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
to build up its business by paying tap line railroads
rebates or bonuses. And also United States v. Mer-
chants & M. Traffic Asso., 242 U. S. 178.
§ 191. Police power to promote public convenience. In
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, a case
involving the police power and due process, it was held
that a state's police power embraces regulations framed
to promote the public convenience or the general pros-
perity, as well as those designed to promote the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety. In the
case in question the Court said: "The learned counsel
for the railway company seem to think that the adjudica-
tions relating to the police power of the state to protect
the public health, the public morals, and the public safety
are not applicable, in principle, to eases where the police
power is exerted for the general well-being of the com-
munity apart from any question of the pablic health, the
DUE PROCESS OP LAW
1191
public morals, or the public safety. Hence, he presses the
thought that the petition in this case does not in words
suggest that the drainage in question h&s anything to do
with the health of the drainage district, but only avers that
the system of drainage adopted by the commissioners will
reclaim the lands of the district and make them tillable
or fit for cultivation. We can not assent to the view es-
pressed by counseL We hold that the police power of a
state embraces regulations designed to promote the pub-
lic convenience or the general prosperity, as well as
regulations designed to promote the public health, the
public morals, or the public safety. Lake Shore & M. S.
E. Co. V. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 292 ; Gihnan v. Philadelphia,
3 Wall. 713, 729; Pound v. Turck, 95 IT. S. 459, 464; Han-
nibal & St. J. E. Co. V. Husen, 95 TT. S. 470." See to the
same offeet, Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, governing
Bown V. Walling, 204 V. S. 320.
§ 192. Felice power and the exclusion of snicide as a
defense on policies of life insurance. In Whitfield v.
Aetna L. Ins. Co., 205 U. S. 489, it was held that, unless
suicide was contemplated at the time application was
made for the policy, the exclusion of suidde as a defense
in suits on policies of life insurance, effected by the Mo.
Rev. Stat, of 1879, is a legitimate exercise of police power
bythestnte. In that case the Court said : "That the stat-
ute is a legitimate exercise of police power by the state
can not be successfully disputed. An insurance company
is not bound to make a contract which is attended by the
results indicated by the statute in question. If it does
business at all in the state, it must do so subject to such
valid regulations as the state may choose to adopt. Even
if the statute in question could be fairly regarded by the
court as inconsistent with public policy or some morality,
it can not, for that reason alone, be disregarded; for it is
the province of the state, by its legislature, to adopt such
policy as it deems best, provided it does not, in so doing,
come into conflict with the Constitution of the state or
STATE POLICE POWER
■421
the Constitntion of the "CTnited States." It is hardly nec-
essary to add that if the exercise of this high and ques-
tionable state function can not be justified as an asser-
tion of the police power, the sappresaion of the right to
make a particular defense in a court of justice is mani-
festly a denial of due process of law.
§ 193. Due process not infringed by limitation on hours
of labor of women. In MuUer v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412,
it was held that the limitation of the hours of labor of
women employed in lamidries to ten hours daily, made
by the Oregon Laws of 1903, does not infringe the due
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment The
Court said : ' ' We held in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45, that a law providing that no laborer shall be required
or permitted to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in
a week or ten hours in a day was not, as to men, a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power of the state, but an
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference
with the right and liberty of the individual to contract in
relation to his labor, and as such was in conflict with, and
void under the Federal Constitution. That decision is
invoked by plaintiff in error as decisive of the question
before us. But this assumes that the differences between
the sexes does not justify a different rule respecting a
restriction of the hours of labor. . . . The two sexes
differ in structure of body, in the functions to be per-
formed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the
capacity for long continued labor, particularly when done
standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future
well being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one
to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the
struggle for existence. This difference justifies a differ-
ence in legislation, and upholds that which is designed to
compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon
her."
§ 194. Due process not denied by the prevention of the
diversion of waters. In Hudson County Water Co. v.
422 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 194
MeCarter, 209 17. S. 349, it was held that a law of New
Jer&ej preventing a riparian owner from diverting the
waters of a stream of that state into any other state,
for use therein, does not conflict either with the due
process of law or the equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said:
"It sometimes is difficult to fix the boundary stones
between the private right of property and the police
power when, as in the case at bar, we know of few deci-
sions that are much in point. But it is recognized that
the state, as quasi-sovereign and representative of the
interests of the public, has a standing in court to protect
the atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its
territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of the
private owners of the land most immediately concerned.
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 tl. S. 125, 141, 142; Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 IT. S. 230, 238. What it may
protect by suit in this court from interference in the
name of property outside of the state's jurisdiction, one
would think that it could protect by statute from inter-
ference in the same name within. On this principle of
public interest and police power, and not merely as the
inheritor of a royal prerogative, the state may make
laws for the preservation of game, which seems a stronger
case. Greer v. Connecticut, 161 TJ. S. 519, 534."
§ 195. Dne process and the prohibition of ezportJation
of Philippine coin. In Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218
U. S. 302, it was held that the prohibition against the
exportation of Philippine silver coin from the Philippine
Islands under penalty of forfeiture and fine or imprison-
ment, did not deprive the owner of such coin of due
process of law. The Court said : * ' Conceding the title of
the owner of such coins, yet there is attached to such
ownership those limitations which public policy may re-
quire by reason of their quality as a legal tender and as
a medium of exchange. . . . However unwise a law
may be, aimed at the exportation of such coins, in the face
S196
STATE POLICE POWEB
of the axioms against obstmcting the free flow of com-
merce, there can be no serious donbt but that the power to
coin money iuclndes the power to prevent its outflow from
the coontry of its origin. To jnstify the exercise of such a
power it is only necessary that it shall appear that the
means are reasonably adapted to conserve the general
public interest, and are not an arbitrary interference with
private rights of contract or property. The law here
in question is plainly within the limits of the police power,
and not an arbitrary or unreasonable interference with
private rights."
§ 196. Forbiddinj: burial within city limits. In Laurel
Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, it was
held that an ordinance forbidding the burial of the dead
in a burial ground situated within the limits of the city
and county of San Francisco did not deprive the owner
of such burial gronnd of its property without due process
of law. The Court said : "The only question that needs
to be answered, if not the only one before us, is whether
the plaintiff's property is taken contrary to the Four-
teenth Amendment. In considering it, the allegation as
to the large tracts available for burying purposes may
be laid on one side. The plaintiff has no grievance with
regard to them. The Winnebago, 205 U. S. 354, 360.
Moreover, it is said by the supreme court of the state that
burial within the San Francisco city or county limits
already was forbidden by statute, except in existing
cemeteries or such as might be established by the board
of supervisors. The board of supervisors passed the
ordinance now complained of; so that, as pointed out by
the court, the ordinance in effect merely prohibited
burials in existing cemeteries. . . . the extent to
which le^lation may modify and restrict the uses of
property consistently with the Constitution is not a ques-
tion for pure abstract theory alone. Tradition and the
habits of the coromnnity count for more than logic. Since,
as before the making of constitutions, regulations of
424
DUE PROCESS OP, LAW
§196
li
burial and prohibition of it in certain spots, especially in
crowded cities, have been f amilier to the Western world.
This is shown sufficiently by the cases cited by the court
below ; e. g., Coates v. New York, 7 Cow. 585 ; Kincaid 's
Appeal, 66 Pa. 411 ; Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass.
1, 21 ; Carpenter v. Yeadon, 86 C. C. A. 122, 158 Fed. 766.
The plaintiff must wait until there is a change of prac-
tice, or at least established consensus of civilized opinion,
before it can expect this court to overthrow the rules that
the lawmakers and the court of his own state uphold. ' ^
§ 197. Due process not denied by Michigan Sajles-in-
Bulk act. In Kidd, Dater & Price Co. v. Musselman
Grocer Co., 217 U. S. 457, it was held that a valid exercise
of the police power, not in conflict with either the due
process or the equal protection of the laws clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, was embodied in the act in ques-
tion (1905) which avoided, as against creditors, sales in
bulk otherwise than in the regular course of business,
unless an inventory was made at least five days before the
sale, the purchaser receiving a list of the seller's creditors
and notifying them of the proposed sale personally, or by
registered mail, at least five days before its completion,
a purchaser not complying with the statute being made
a receiver for the benefit of the creditors of the seller.
The Court said : * ' Substantially the same arguments are
urged as were presented in Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S.
489, decided after this writ of error was sued out. . . .
The requirement of the Michigan law, that a full and
detailed inventory shall be made does not seem to us to
be oppressive and arbitrary, as, in bone fide purchases of
stocks of goods in bulk, a careful purchaser is solicitous
to demand such an inventory, and in the purchase in
question an inventory was in fact made. Nor can we say,
in view of the ruling in the Lemieux Case, to the effect
that a state may, without violating the Constitution of the
United States, require that creditors be constructively
notified of the proposed sale of a stock of goods in bulk,
STATE POUCE POWER
425
that a requirement for what is in effect actnal notice to
each creditor is so QDreasonable as to be a mere arbitrary
exertion of power, beyond the aQthority of the legislature
to exert."
§ 198. Creation of depositors' guaranty fund valid
exerdse of police power. In Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
219 tJ. S. 104:, it was held that a valid exercise of the
police power, not depriving a solvent bank of its liberty
or property without due process of law, was embodied in
a state statute authorizing the levy and collection from
every bank existing under the laws of the state of an
■assessment based upon average daily deposits, for the
purpose of creating a depositors' guaranty fund to secure
the full payment of deposits in the event such bank
becomes insolvent. The Court said: "The only contract
that it (the bank) relies on is its charter. That is subject
to alteration or repeal, as nsual, so that the obligation
hardly could be said to be impaired by the act of 1907
before us, unless that statute deprives the plaintiff of
liberty or property without due process of law. See
Sherman v. Smith, 1 Black 587. Whether it does so or
not is the only question in the case. In answering that
question, we must be cautious about pressing the broad
words of the Fourteenth Amendment to a drily logical
extreme. Many laws which it would be vain to ask the
court to overthrow could be shown, easily enough, to
transgnress a scholastic interpretation of one or another
of the great guaranties in the Bill of Rights. They more
or less limit the liberty of the individual, or they dimin-
ish property to a certain extent. "We have few scien-
tifically certain criteria of legislation, and as it often is
difficult to mark the time where what is called the police
power of the states is limited by the Constitution of tiie
United States, judges should be slow to read into the
latter a nolumus mutare as against the lawmaking power.
... In short, when the Oklahoma legislature declares
by implication that free banking is a public danger, and
426
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§198
1
:i
that incorporation, inspection, and the above described
co-operation are necessary safeguards, this court cer-
tainly can not say it is wrong. ' ' In denying an applica-
tion for rehearing the original opinion was amended by
this additional statement: ** Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S.
361 ; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 200 U. S.
527, were cited to establish, not that property might be
taken for a private use, but that, among the public uses
for which it might be taken, were some which, if looked at
only in their immediate aspect, according to the proxi-
mate effect of the taking, might seem to be private. This
case, in our opinion, is of that sort. The analysis of the
police power, whether correct or not, was intended to.
indicate an interpretation of what has taken place in the
past, not to give a new or wider scope to the power. '*
§ 199. Due process not denied by ordinance prohibiting
the use of advertising trucks or vans. In Fifth Avenue
Coach Co. V. City of New York, 221 U. S. 467, it was held
that a valid exercise of the police power, not depriving
a stage coach company of its property without due proc-
ess of law, was embodied in a municipal ordinance pro-
hibiting the use of advertising trucks, vans, or wagons
in the streets of the city. The Court said : *'The court (of
appeals) cited Com. v. McCafferty, 145 Mass. 384, in
which an ordinance was sustained which prohibited the
placing or carrying on sidewalks, show board&, placards,
or signs for the purpose of there displaying the same.
It was said in this case, that the tendency and effect of
such signs might be to collect crowds, and thus interfere
with the use of the sidewalks by the public, and lead to
disorder, and that such a provision applicable to the
crowded streets of a populous city was not unreason-
able. . . . Plaintiff's stages are therefore brought
under even a broader principle than that of its charter.
The same rule is applied to that as to other wagons, and
within the exercise of the police power illustrated in Com.
V. McCafferty, supra. We concur with the court of ap-
3 201 STATE POUCE POWER 427
peals, for we can not say that it was an arbitrary exercise
of such power."
§ 200. Due process not denied by ordinance prohibiting
billiard or pool rooms. In Murphy v. California, 225
U. S. 623, it was held that a valid exercise of the police
power, not depriving the proprietor of an existing billiard
and pool room of his property withont due process of law,
was embodied in a municipal ordinance prohibiting the
keeping of billiard or pool tables for hire or public use,
while permitting hotel keepers to maintain a billiard or
pool room in which their regular and registered guests
may play. The Court said: "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects the citizen in hifi right to engage in any
lawful buainees, but it does not prevent legislation
intended to regulate useful occupation which, because of
their nature or location, may prove injurious or offensive
to the public. Neither does it prevent a municipality
from prohibiting any business which is inherently vicious
and harmful. But, between the useful business which
may be regulated and the vicious business which can be
prohibited lie many nonuaeful occupations which may or
may not be harmful to the public, according to local con-
ditions, or the manner in v/hicb conducted. . . . The
ordinance is not aimed at the game, but at the pleice ; and
where, in the exercise of the police power, the municipal
authorities determine the keeping of such resorts should
be prohibited, the courts can not go behind their finding
and inquire into local conditions ; or whether the defend-
ant's hall was an orderly establishment, or had been
conducted in such manner as to produce the evils sought
to be prevented by the ordinance,'* citing Booth v.
Illinois, 184 V. S. 425, 429.
§201. Unconstitutional exercise of police power in
establishing a building line. In Eubank v. Richmond,
226 U. S. 137, it was held that a municipal ordinance
passed under the authority of the laws of Virginia, re-
i 1
11 i ■
1 1 ' i 1
: 1 ^lll' ^ 1
1l
u
I
1!
I
4£8
DXJE PROCESS OP LAW
§201
quiring the committee on streets, at the request of the
owners of two-thirds of the abutting property to estab-
lish a building line on the side of the square on which
such property abuts, not less than five nor more than
thirty feet from the street line, was a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court said: '*It leaves no discretion in the committee
on streets as to whether the street line shall or shall not
be established in a given case. The action of the com-
mittee is determined by two-thirds of the property own-
ers. In other words, part of the property owners front-
ing on the block determine the extent of use that other
owners shall make of their lots, and against the restric-
tion they are impotent. . . . One person having a
two-thirds ownership of a block may have that power
against a number having a less collective ownership. If
it be said that in the instant case there is no such con-
dition presented, we answer that there is control of the
property of plaintiff in error by other owners of prop-
erty, exercised under the ordinance. This, as we have
said, is the vice of the ordinance, and makes it, we think,
an unreasonable exercise of the police power. *'
§ 202. Due process not denied by prohibition of local
sales of malt liquors, whether intoxicants or not. In
Purity Extract and Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, it
was held that the due process of law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment was not denied by the assertion
of its police power by the State of Mississippi in the form
of a law prohibiting local sales of malt liquors, whether
intoxicants or not The Court said: '*It does not follow
because a transaction, separately considered, is innocu-
ous, it may not be included in a prohibition the scope of
which is regarded as essential in the legislative judgment
to accomplish a purpose within the admitted power of
the government. Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425 ; Otis v.
Parker, 187 U. S. 606 ; Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U. S. 500,
504; New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31;
S 203 STATE POLICE POWER 429
Murphy v. Califoniia, 225 U. S. 623. ... It was compe-
tent for the legislature of Mississippi to recognize the
difficulties besetting the administration of laws aimed at
the prevention of traffic in intoxicants. It prohibited,
among other things, the sale of 'malt liquors.' In thus
dealing with a class of beverages which, in general, are
regarded as intoxicating, it was not bound to resort to a
discrimination with respect to ingredients and processes
of manufacture which, in the endeavor to eliminate innoc*
U0U8 beverages from the condemnation, would facilitate
subterfuges and frauds and fetter the enforcement of the
law. A contrary conclusion, logically pressed, would save
the nominal power while preventing its effective exercise.
. . . The inquiry must be whether, considering the end
in view, the statute passes the bounds of reason and
assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat. . . .
The state, within the limits we have stated, must decide
upon the measures that are needful for the protection of
its people, and, having regard to the artifices which are
used to promote the sale of intoxicants under the guise of
innocent beverages, it would constitute an unwarrantable
departure from accepted principle to hold that the pro-
hibition of the sale of all malt liquors, including the bev-
erage in question, was beyond its reserved powers."
§ 203. Due process not denied by ordinance re^ro^ting
si» of loaves of bread. In Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226
U. S. 578, it was held that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was not offended by a municipal
ordinance fixing the weight of the standard loaf of bread
to be sold in the city of Chicago at one pound, and pro-
hibiting the making or selling of loaves not up to the
weight of the standard loaf, or of a specific fractional
part or multiple of such loaf . The Court said : "Further-
more, laws and ordinances of the character of the one here
under consideration, and tending to prevent frauds, and
requiring honest weights and measures in the sale of
articles of general consumption, have long been consid-
430
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§203
ered lawful exertions of the police power. McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U. S. 550; Freund, Pol. Power, 274, 275.
Laws prescribing standard sizes of loaves of bread and
prohibiting, with minor exceptions, the sale of other sizes,
have been sustained in the courts of Massachusetts and
Michigan. Com. v. McArtkur, 152 Mass. 522; People v.
Wagner, 86 Mich. 594. . . . Thousands of transac-
tions in bread in the city of Chicago are with people who
buy in small quantities, perhaps a loaf at a time, and,
exercising the judgment which the law imposed upon it,
the council has passed an ordinance to require such peo-
ple to be sold loaves of bread of full weight. We can not
say that the fixing of these standards in the exercise of
the legislative discretion of the council is such an unrea-
sonable and arbitrary exercise of the police power as to
bring the case within the rare class in which this court
may declare such legislation void because of the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, securing due process of law from
deprivation by state enactments. ' '
§ 204. Due process not denied by ordinance requiring
instaUation of water-doBets under certain conditions.
In Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U. S. 303, it was held that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
not offended by a municipal ordinance adopted, under the
authority of the laws of Georgia, by an inland town con-
taining less than 6,000 inhabitants, under which the owners
of property abutting on any street along which sewer
mains had been laid were compelled to install water-
closets in their houses, and connect them with the main
sewer within thirty days from the enactment of the ordi-
nance, under penalty of fine and imprisonment. The
Court said: **It is the conmaonest exercise of the police
power of a state or city to provide for a system of sewers,
and to compel property owners to connect therewith.
And this duty may be enforced by criminal penalties.
District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 IT. S. 138. It may be
5 205a STATE POLICE POWBE 431
that an arbitrary exercise of the power could be re-
strained, bnt it would have to be palpably bo to justify a
court in interfering with so salutary a power and one so
necessary to the public health."
§ 205. Due process not denied by ordinance conceming
milk not subjected to tuberculin test. In Adams v. Mil-
waukee, 228 U. S. 572, it was held that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not offended by
an ordinance providing for the confiscation, forfeiture,
and immediate destruction of milk, not conforming to the
requirements forbidding the shipment into the city of
milk draton from cows outside, unless such cows shall
have first been subjected to the tuberculin test, and an
officieJ certificate of their exemption from tuberculosis
or other diseases shall have been filed with the health
officer. The Court said: "The different situations of the
animals require different regulations. Cows kept outside
the city camiot be inspected by the health officer; they can
be inspected by a licensed veterinary surgeon, and a cer-
tificate of the fact and the identity of the cows and the
milk authenticated as required by the ordinance. The
requirements are not unreasonable; they are properly
adaptive to the conditions. They are not discriminatory ;
they have proper relation to the purpose to be accom-
plished. That purpose and the necessity for it we can
not question. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 TJ. S. 11 ;
Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 TJ. S. 358;
Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225 ; Purity Extract
6 Tonic Co. V. Lynch, 226 IT. S. 192 ; Grossman v. Luman,
192 U. S. 189; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage
Cwnmission, 197 U. S. 453."
§ 205a. Due process not denied by statutes ^ox^bitinj^
the saleaa "ice cream" of a product ocmtaininfr less than
a fixed, percentage of butter fat. In Hutchinson Ice Cream
Co. V. Iowa, 242 U. S. 153, the Court said: "The right
• of the state under the police power to regulate the sale
432 DUB PROCESS OP LAW S 205a
of products with a view to preventing frauds or pro-
tecting the public health is conceded by plaintiffs in error.
And they do not contend that the particular percentages
of butter fat set by Iowa and Pennsylvania are so exact-
ing as to be in themselves nnreasonable. . . . The ice
cream of commerce is not iced or frozen cream. It is a
frozen confection — a compound. The ingredients of this
compound may vary widely in character, in the number
used, and in the proportions in which they are used. . . .
Plaintiffs in error contend that as ice cream is shown
to be a generic term embracing a large namber and
variety of products, and the term as used does not neces-
sarily imply the use of dairy cream in its composition, it
is arbitrary and unreasonable to limit the ice cream of
commerce to that containing a fixed minimum of butter
fat. But the legislature may have found in these facts
persuasive evidence that the public welfare required the
prohibition enacted. . . . Laws prohibiting the sale of
milk or cream containing less than fixed percentages of
butter fat present a familiar instance of such legislation.
Cases in the state courts upholding laws of this character
are referred to in the margin. This court has repeatedly
sustained the validity of similar prohibitions. Schmid-
inger v. Chicago, 226 tJ. S. 578; Armour & Co. v. North
Dakota. 240 U. S. 510."
§ 206. Dae process not denied by state law regfnlating'
barrier pillars between adjoining coal properties. In
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 V. S. 531, it was
held that the Pennsylvania act of June 2, 1891, prescribing
the width of the barrier pillar to be left between ad-
joining coal properties, which must be sufficient to protect
the employees of either mine in case the other shall
be abandoned and allowed to fill with water, is not so
uncertain or unjust as to constitute a taking of property
without due process of law, because such width of pillar
is to be determined under the statute "by the engineers
of the adjoining property owners, together with the
S207
STATE POLICE POWER
inspector of tbe dietrict ia which the mine ia situated,"
nor because the statute does not require that notice be
given to the leasor, being satisfied with reasonable notice
to the leasee, nor prescribe the procedure, nor give a right
to appeal. The Court said: "Indeed, the statute seems
to contemplate some judicial control, for it prescribes no
penalty for a violation of the findings of the engineers
and inspector, nor any mode of enforcing their determina-
tion except by a suit for injunction under art 15 of the
act. In such a suit a party deeming himself aggrieved
becaase of arbitrary action by the statutory tribunal may
presumably have his opportunity to be heard with
respect to this aa well as other fundamental defenses.
. . . it is a general and fundamental rule that if a
statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations,
one of which would render it unconstitutional and the
other valid, it is the duty of the couri;8 to adopt that
construction which upholds its validity, . . . We
think it not an unreasonable construction that if the en-
gineers disagree they shall submit their differences to the
inspector, and that a determination agreed on by one of
them in conjunction with the inspector shall fulfill the
requirements of the act. It must be remembered that
this tribunal is to settle, not a private property right, but
a matter affecting the public safety ; hence, in the absence
of clear language to the contrary, the section is open to
the construction that, as in other public matters, a ma-
jority of the referees or arbitrators may act. Omaha v.
Omaha "Water Co., 218 U. S. 180, 192."
§207. Constitational exercise of the police power in
reference to depositors' {piaranty fund. In Lankford v.
Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S. 461, it was held that the
police power asserted under the Oklahoma laws upon,
this subject, heretofore considered, did not offend the
due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the state instead of committing the fund to the
mere ministerial administration of the banking board.
Due Proecw— 28
f
434
DUB PROCESS OP LAW
§207
«.
X -r
i >
saw fit to vest the title to the fund in itself. The Court
said: ^^This court, in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U. S. 104, sustained the constitutionality of the act as an
exercise of the police power of the state. The law in its
general purpose was there presented and passed on. The
relation of the state to the fund did not come up for
consideration, but necessarily this is but a detail in ad-
ministration, not one affecting legality of the law. The
creation of the fund was said to be justified by its purpose,
and the power of the state was declared adequate to ac-
complish it. *The purpose of the fund,* it was said, *is
shown by its name. It is to secure the full repayment of
deposits.' Where the state should vest the title to the
fund for the purpose of its administration was inmaa-
terial to the essence of the power to creat the fund.
Whether the state should commit it to the mere minis-
terial administration of the bank commissioner and
banking board, and subject them to controversies with
depositors, or draw around them the circle of its im-
munity, was a matter within its competency to determine,
and we are brought to the question of interpretation —
which has the state done f To that question this answer
was given: **It appears that the law intended to give to
the state as definite a title to the depositors' guaranty
fund as to the common school fund ; as definite, therefore,
as the title of South Carolina to the assets of the state dis-
pensary, which was the subject in Murray v. Wilson Dis-
tilling Co., 212 U. S. 578. In both cases there were
ultimate beneficiaries — ^in the pending case, the bank
depositors; in the other case, the creditors of the dis-
pensary. And the purpose of the law — or, if you will, the
command of the law — in each case was or is the satisfac-
tion of the claims of those beneficiaries. The fund, having
this ultimate destination, does not take its administra-
tion from the officers of the state, or subject them to judi-
cial control. We can not assume that it will not be
faithfully managed and applied. ' '
§ 208 STATE POLICE POWER 435
§ 208. Due process denied by Kansas act inflicting pen-
alties on employer for imposing certain conditions on
employee. The Kansas act of March 13, 1903, as con-
strued and applied by the highest court of that state
(State v. Coppage, 87 Kan. 752), imposed fine or impris-
onment upon an employer or his agent for having pre-
scribed as a condition upon which one may secure
employment, or remain in the service of, snch employer
(such employment being terminable at will) that the em-
ployee shall enter into an agreement not to become or
remain a member of any labor organization while so
employed, such employee being subject to no disability or
incapacity depriving him of the right to exercise a volun-
tary choice. In declaring that said act, as so applied
and construed, is repugnant to the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment the Court in Coppage v.
Kansfia, 236 U. S. 1, said: "When a man is called upon
to agree not to become or remain a member of the union
while working for a particular employer, he is in effect
only asked to deal openly and frankly with his employer,
so as not to retain the employment upon terms to which
the latter is not willing to agree. And the liberty of mak-
ing contracts does not include a liberty to procure em-
ployment frcan an onwilling employer, or without a fair
understanding. Nor may the employer be foreclosed by
legislation from exercising the same freedom of dioice
that is the right of the employee. To ask a man to agree,
in advance, to refrain from affiliation wifh the union while
retaining a certain position of employment, is not to ask
him to ^ve np any part of his constitutional freedom.
He is free to decline the employment on those terms,
just as the employer may decline to offer employment
on any other; for 'it takes two to make a bargain.' Hav-
ing accepted employment on those terms, the man is still
free to join the anion when the period of employment
expires; or, if employed at will, then at any time upon
simply quitting the employment. And, if bound by his
own agreement to refrain from joining during a stated
436 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 208
period of employment, he is in no different situation from
that which is necessarily incident to term contracts
in general. For constitutional freedom of contract does
not mean that a party is to be as free after maldng a
contract as before; he is not free to break it without
accountability, ' *
§ 209. Due process not denied by the so-called Ohio
^'run-of-mine'' or ^'anti-screen'' law. In Bail and Biver
Coal Co. V. Taple, 236 U. S. 338, it was held that the Ohio
* * run-of-mine ' ' or ** anti-screen'* law, — requiring the pay-
ment to coal miners, whose compensation is fixed on the
basis of ton or other weight, according to the total of all
the coal contained in the mine car in which it has been
removed from the mine, provided that no greater per-
centage of dirt and impurities shall be contained therein
than that ascertained to be unavoidable by the state In-
dustrial Commission, whose orders are subject to review ;
and provided that nothing therein contained shall dimin-
ish the right of a miner and his employer to agree upon
deductions by the scheme known as docking, on account
of such impurities, — does not impair the freedom of con-
tract secured by the due process of law clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court said: **The objection
that the law is unconstitutional as unduly abridging the
freedom of contract in prescribing the particular method
of compensation to be paid by employers to miners for
the production of coal was made in the case of McLean
V. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, in which this court sustained
a law of the state of Arkansas, requiring coal mined to
be paid for according to the run-of-mine system accord-
ing to its weight when brought out of the mine in cars.
In that case the constitutional objections founded upon
the right of contract which are made here were consid-
ered and disposed of. This court has so often affirmed
the right of the state, in the exercise of its police power,
to place reasonable restraints like that here involved,
upon the freedom of contract, that we need only refer to
§ 211 STATE POLICE POWER 437
some of the cases in passing. Scbmidinger v. Chicago,
226 IT. S. 578; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219
U. S. 549, and cases therein cited and reviewed."
§ 210. Due process not denied by ordinance prohiMtiiifr
brick yards in certain portions of a city. In Hadacheck
V. Lob Angeles, 239 IT. S. 394, the plaintiff in error, who
had been convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of
an ordinance of the City of Los Angeles, which makes it
unlawful for any person to establish or operate a brick
yard, or brick kiln, or any establishment, factory or place
for the manufacture or burning of brick within described
limits in the city, — claimed that such ordinance did not
state a public offense, and that it was in violation of the
due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court held that, without a violation of that clause,
the police power might be exerted under proper condi-
tions to declare, under particular circtimstances and in
particular localities, specified businesses, such as brick
making, which are not nuisances per se, to be nuisances
in fact and law.
§ 211. Dne process not denied by police statute requir-
ing hotel keepers to give notice to guests in case of Are.
In Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, it was held that a state
may prescribe the duties of hotel keepers lu regard to
taking precautions against fire and to giving notice to ful-
fill the obligations imposed on such business; that rules
of conduct must necessarily be expressed in general terms
and depend upon varying circnmstances ; that a police
statute requiring hotel keepers to give notice to guests in
case of fire is not lacking in due process of law because it
does not prescribe fixed rules of conduct. Nash v. United
States, 229 U. S. 373, followed, and International Har-
vester Co. V. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, distinguished. The
Court said: "It is entirely aside from the questions in
the case and the requirements of the statute to consider
the dismays and perils of an extrane situation, and what
438 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 211
then might be expected of courage or excused to timidity.
It was one of the purposes of the statute to preclude such
extremity. ' '
§ 211a. Due process not denied by ordinance subjecting
business of private detective to police supervision. In
Lehon v. Atlanta, 242 U. S. 53, the Court said that the con-
tention of the plaintiff in error, * * in its most general form,
is that the ordinances abolish the occupation of private
detective by the requirement of application for a permit
to the police conmiission of the city, the approval of the
chief of police, oath of oflSce, and to work under police
supervision. These requirements, it is insisted, offend
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The contention makes a Federal question, and,
as we are not disposed to consider it frivolous, a motion
to dismiss which is made will be denied. . . . The ex-
tent of the police power of the state has been too recently
explained to need further enunciation. The present case
is easily within its principle. It would be very conunon-
place to say that the exercise of the police is one of the
necessary activities of government, and all that pertains
to it may be subjected to regulation and surveillance as
a precaution against perversion. The Atlanta ordinances
do no more. * '
§ 212. Due process not denied by legislation declaring
the emission of dense smoke in cities a nuisance. In
Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486, the
Court said: **The protection of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
is invoked. It is insisted that the ordinance is void be-
cause its standard of efficiency requires the remodeling
of practically all furnaces which were in existence at the
time of its adoption ; it forbids remodeling or substituted
equipment without a prescribed license; it forbids new
construction without such license; it fails to specify
S 213 STATE POLICE POWER 439
approved equipment, and instead delegates first to the
inspector, and, second, to the smoke abatement commis-
sion, the nuregiilated discretion to arbitrarily prescribe
the requirements in each case, without reference to any
other as to the required character of smoke prevention
device, thus making the right of complainants and their
class to own and operate such fnmaces subject to the
pleasure of the inspector and commission.*' It was held
that a state, in the exercise of its police power, may by
direct legislation or through authorized municipalities,
declare the emission of dense smoke in cities or populous
neighborhoods a nuisance and restrain it; and regula-
tions to tiiat effect, if not arbitrary, are not unconstitu-
tional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment even though they effect the use of property
or subject the owner to expense in complying with their
terms.
§ 213. Dne process not denied by statute Teqniring full
switching crews on railroads exceeding one hundred
miles in len^rtb* In St. L. and Iron Mt. By. v. Arkansas,
240 U. S. 518, it was held that a statute of the st^te of
Arkansas, requiring full switching crews on railroads
exceeding one hundred miles in length, is not unconsti-
tutional as depriving the owning company of its prop-
erty without doe process of law. The Court said: "In
the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. v. Arkan-
sas, 219 U. S. 453, a statute of Arkansas was considered
which required freight trains to be equipped with crews
consisting of an engineer, a foreman, a conductor, and
three brakemen, ' regardless of any modern equipment or
automatic couplings and air brakes.' . . . The statute
did not apply to railroads whose line or lines did not ex-
ceed fifty miles in length, nor to any railroad, regardless
of length of its line, where the freight train should consist
of less than twenty-five cars. The statute was sustained
on the authority of prior cases against charges of con-
flict with the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce
440 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 213
clause of the Constitution. We need not cite the cases
relied on or repeat the argument of the court. ' '
§214. Due process not denied by statute imposing
license taxes on the privilege of using profit sharing
coupons and trading stamps. In Tanner v. Little, 240
U. S. 369, it was held that a statute of the state of Wash-
ington of 1913, imposing license taxes on the privilege
of using profit sharing couj)on8 and trading stamps, is in
its essential particulars similar to the statute of Florida
sustained in East v. Van Deman and Lewis, 240 U. S.
342 ; that such statute was properly enacted in the exer-
cise of the police power of tiie state in regard to matters
subject to regulation, and that it is not unconstitutional
under the Federal Constitution as interfering with or
burdening interstate commerce, impairing the obligation
of contracts, denying equal protection of the law, or
depriving merchants of their property without due
process of law. The Court said : '* Discrimination aside,
the power to enact the legislation we need not discuss,
but may refer to the opinion in East v. Van Deman and
Lewis. Of course, it is in the exercise of the police power
of the state. We will not here define it or its limitations.
As was said by Mr. Justice Brown, in Camfield v. United
States, 167 U. S. 518,524, citing Eideout v. Knox, 148
Mass. 368: *The police power is not subject to any defi-
nite limitations, but is coextensive with the necessities of
the case and the safeguard of the public interests.^ In
the view that the license is prohibitive we may concur,
and concede that such is the effect given it by the
Supreme Court of the state in State v. Pitney, 80 Wash.
699, one of the cases submitted with this one. And we
think it was competent for the state to give it that effect. ' *
§ 215. Due process not denied by the fixing of certain
absolute liabilities. In St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Matthews,
165 U. S. 1, — a case in which the validity of a statute of
§215
STATE POLICE POWER
441
Missouri, declaring railroad companiee liable absolutely
for fires caused hy their engines, was upheld, — the Court
said : "The right of the citizen not to have his property
burned without compensation is no less to be regarded
than the right of the corporation to set it on fire. To
require the utmost care and diligence of the railroad cor-
porations in taking precautions against the escape of fire
from their engines might not a£ford sufficient protection
to the owners of property in the neighborhood of rail-
roads. When both parties are equally faultless, the legis-
lature may properly consider it just that the duty of
insuring private property against loss or injury caused
by the use of dangerous instruments should rest upon
the railroad company, which employs the instrumentB
and creates the peril for its own profit, rather than upon
the owner of the property, who has no control over or
interest in those instruments." To the same effect is
Jones V. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, — a case in which a Utah
statute, providing that persons driving stock along high-
ways should be liable for damages done by the animals
in destroying the banks of, or in rolling rocks into, the
highway, — was upheld against the objection that it denied
due process. The Court said: "In effect the legislature
declared that the passage of droves or herds of animals
over a hillside highway was go likely, if great precau-
tions, were not observed, to result in damage to the road,
that where this damage followed such driving, there
ought to be no controversy over the existence or non-
existence of negligence, but there should be an absolute
legal presumption to that effect resulting from the fact
of having driven the herd. ... It was obviously the
province of the state legislature to provide the nature
and extent of the legal presumption to be deduced from
a given state of facts, and the creation by law of such
presumptions is, after all, but an illustration of the power
to classify. ... As the statute clearly specifies the
condition under which the presumption of negligence
442 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 215
axises and provides for the ascertainment of liability by
judicial proceedings, there is no foundation for the asser-
tion that the enforcement of such ascertained liability
constitutes a taking of property without due process of
law/'
CHAPTER XI
PBOPBBT; BIOBTS as PBOTECTED BT due FBOOESS — ^VESTED
BIOHTS AND THEIB IMPAIBMENT
§ 216. Ohapter 39 of Magna Carta and its amendments.
The protection extended by dne process of law to the
great trilogy of rights known as "life, liberty, and prop-
erty" has as its historical comer stone the famous chap-
ter 39 of Magna Carta which provided that "No freeman
shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of his
freehold, or outlawed, or banished, or in any wise mo-
lested ; and we will not set forth against him, nor send
against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers
and by the law of the land." An additional protection
was given to property rights when that provision was
widened in the reissues of the Great Charter by the
insertion in the second (2 Hen. Ill, 1217) and third
(9 Hen. HI, 1225) of the words, "of his freehold or lib-
erties, or free cnstoms (de libero tenemento suo vel Ub-
ertatibus, vel liberis consuetudinihus suts).'* After that
amendment the chapter, in its final form, provided that
"No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or
deprived of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or
outlawed, or bamshed, or in any way molested ; and we
will not set forth against him, nor send against him,
unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the
law of the land."
§ 217. Orowth in England of the idea of vested rights.
Emphasis has been given heretofore to the fact that the
baronial leaders of the English parliament who estoried
the Great Charter from King John were intent upon
imposing limitations in favor of "life, liberty and prop-
443
444 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 217
erty" upon the crown and not npon the legislature. The
idea of imposing constitutional limitations in favor of the
rights of ^'Ufe, liberty and property'^ upon an omnipo-
tent parliament involved a contradiction in terms. And
yet while in theory the power of parliament is and always
has been admitted to make any modifications in such
rights as its wisdom or caprice might suggest, the belief
has steadily developed that there are, under what is called
* * the law of the land, ' ' certain fundamental rights, involv-
ing substauce as contrasted with form, which even an
omnipotent parliament should not disturb arbitrarily.
That vague conception of a 'tested right, ^' as against the
English parliament, has been thus vaguely expressed by
Austin ( Jur. 5 ed., 856-857) who says : ** When it is said
that the legislature ought not to deprive persons of the
'vested rights,' all that is meant is this: that the rights
styled * vested' are sacred or inviolable, or are such as the
parties ought not to be deprived of by the legislature.
Like a thousand other propositions, which sound
speciously to the ear, it is either purely identical and tells
us nothing, or begs the question in issue.'* Again he
says (857) **If it [the claim that parliament ought not to
deprive subjects of their vested rights] means that there
are no cases in which the rights of parties are not to
yield to questions of expediency, the proposition is mani-
festly false, and conflicts with the practice of every
legislature on earth. In every case, for example, in
which a road or canal is run by authority of parliament
through the land of private persons, the rights, or vested
rights, of the private owners are practically abolished by
the legislature. They are compelled to yield up a por-
tion of their rights of exclusion, and to receive compen-
sation agreeably to the provisions of the act.*' Thus the
principle has ever been recognized by English jurists
that the enjoyment by the individual of the rights of life,
liberty, and property, even in their most perfect form, is
always subject to the sovereign powers of the state, which
may be asserted through the power of eminent domain,
{218
VESTED BIGHTS
the taxing power and the police power, whenever the
public good may require it. At the same time the
emphatic condemnation by the Roman jurists of all retro-
active laws, well expressed in the maxim of Papinian
(Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius inju-
riant, Dig. 50, 17, 75), was recognized as early as the
thirteenth century by Braoton (lib. 4, § 228 (nova consti-
tutio futuris formam imponere debet et non praeteritis)
was repeated at a later day by Coke (2 Inst. 292) and
Bacon (De Ang. Sci. lib., 8, c. 3, aph. 47-51), "and applied
by the English courts in the only way possible under an
omnipotent parliament ; namely, as a rule of construction
to the effect that a statute will never be held to divest
vested rights if it is capable of any other meaning."
McGhee, pp. 153-4, quoting Gilmore v. Shuter, 1 Vent.
330, 2 Show. 16, 2 Lev. 227, T. Jones 108, 2 Mod. 310;
Courch V. Jeffries, 4 Burr. 2460.
§218. Development of idea of "vested rights" ad-
vanced by constitutional limitations on legislative power.
Nothing did more to develop the very imperfect concep-
tion of a "vested right" as it existed in the mother coun-
try at the time of the American Bevolution than the
American invention of constitutional limitations on legis-
lative power, evolved out of the process through which
the English colonies on our Atlantic seaboard were trans-
formed into sovereign states. In that way a long step
forward was taken by the demonstration that the legis-
lative as well as the executive power of a state can be
restrained by constitutional limitations, any violation of
which can be annulled by the judgment of any court.
In another work (Jurisdiction and Procedure of the
Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 2-5) the author
has attempted to explain in some detail the ori^n of the
American system of constitutional limitations on state
powers, executive and legislative, as illustrated by the
earlier decisions of th.e state courts. He then said : "In
speakiDg of the case of Trevett v. "Wheeden, decided in
446 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 218
Bhode Island in 1786, in which an act was declared void
because it impaired the right of trial by jury guaranteed
by the colonial charter, Judge Cooley said that *it is
worthy of note that, the first case in which a legislative
enactment was declared unconstitutional and void, on the
ground of incompatibility with the constitution of a state,
was decided under one of the royal charters. ' Const Lim,
p. 26, note 1. Those who claim that the honor of a first
decision belongs to North Carolina base their contention
on the case of Doe ex dem. Bayard v. Singleton, decided,
in the first instance by the supreme court judges on cir-
cuit in May, 1786. See 1 Taylor, Origin and Growth of
English Const, p. 80, note. It is admitted, however,
that the North Carolina caae did not come before the
supreme court of that state until November, 1787, when
an act passed in 1785, authorizing summary proceedings
in suits concerning confiscated property, was declared
void because destructive of the right of trial by jury, a
decision which removed from the docket many cases of
like character. 1 N. C. 5 (1 Martin, p. 1, 48). . . .
Those who claim the honor in question for New Jersey
contend that at some uncertain date, prior to 1785, Chief
Justice Brearley held, in Holmes v. Walton, cited in
9 N. J. L. 44, an act void which provided for trials by
juries consisting of six men. The fact that that decision
was made prior to 1785 depends upon a statement made
by Gouveneur Morris in an address to the assembly of
Pennsylvania in that year, to the effect that *a law was
once passed in New Jersey which the judges pronounced
unconstitutional, and therefore void.' Jared Spark's
Life of Gouveneur Morris, vol. 3, p. 438. See also the
vague reference to the case in opinion of Kirkpatrick,
Ch. J., in State v. Parkhurst, 9 N. J. L. 444, appx. Those
who claim the honor for Virginia rely upon the case of
Com. V. Caton, which came before the court of appeals
of that state in November, 1782. 4 Call. (Va.) 5-21. As
the chief advocate of that claim admits that * there was
not a direct conflict between the so-called law and the
§ 218 VESTED RIGHTS 447
Constitution, and therefore tlie remarks of tlie judges are
to be regarded as obiter dicta, it ia hard to onderstand
how Virginia can be considered as a party to a contro-
versy the essence of which is the actual annnhnent of a
legislative act, on the ground of conflict with a state con-
stitution.' (Carson, History of the Supreme Court,
p. 121, where the whole subject is well stated.) Pendle-
ton, president of the court, expressly states that the con-
stitutionality of a legislative act was not before the court
in that case: 'I am happy,' he says, *'m being of opinion
there is no occasion to consider it upon this occasion.'
It is nevertheless true that the abstract right of a state
court to declare a legislative act void was nobly and
forcibly declared in that case by Wythe J., who said:
'Nay, more, if the whole legislature, an event to be depre-
cated, should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed
to them by the people, I, in administering the public
justice of the country, will meet the united powers, at
my seat in this tribunal ; and, pointing to the constitution,
will say to them here is the limit of your anthority; and
hither shall you to go, but no further.' The Reporter
says that Chancellor Blair and the rest of the judges
were of the same opinion as to the abstract right. See
also Rives 's Life of Madison, Vol. 2, pp. 262 et seq. In
Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held in 1792 that an act passed by the
colonial legislature in 1712 was ipso facto void because
in contravention of Magna Carta." It is all important
to note the fact that in all or nearly all these early cases
in which acts of state legislatures were declared void, it
was because they attempted to intermeddle with the
sacred right of trial by a jury composed of twelve men.
It was everywhere assumed that the right to a trial by
a jury so constituted was guaranteed by '*the law of the
iMid," or in other words, by the due process clause of
Magna Carta, invariably embodied, in some form, in the
state constitutions.
448 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 219
§ 219. Formula in Declaration of Independence. The
mandate of the Continental Congress under which our
first state constitutions were formed was preceded by the
adoption of the Declaration of Independence in which it
is declared, as a self-evident truth, that all men **are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,
and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness/' a formula substantially equivalent to the
older phrase, ^Mife, liberty, and property.'^ In his dis-
senting opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall.
36, Mr. Justice Field says that the * * Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to give practical effect to the Declara-
tion of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the
gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer, but
only recognizes. ' ' The same great judge, in his dissent-
ing opinion in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, said: **By
the term * life, ' as here used something more is meant than
mere animal existence. The inhibition against its depri-
vation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which
life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the
mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or
leg, or the putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any
other organ of the body through which the soul conmiuni-
cates with the outer world. The deprivation not only of
life, but of whatever God has given to every one with life,
for its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the pro-
vision in question, if its efficacy be not frittered away by
judicial decision.*' In AUgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S.
578, the Supreme Court, in defining the *4iberty*' men-
tioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, has said that it
** means not only the right of the citizen to be free from
the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarcera-
tion, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties ; to
be free to use them in all lawful ways ; to live and work
where he will ; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling ;
to pursue any livelihood or avocation ; and for that pur-
pose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, neo-
§ 220 VESTED EIGHTS 449
essary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.'* From that
broad and comprehensive definition it clearly appears
that the word ** liberty'' as thus employed does not mean
simply personal liberty as understood by English jurists
and statesmen (see C. E. Shattuck's article 4 Harv. L.
Rev, 365, quoted in 1 Thayer, Cases, Const. Law, 644,
note), but a wider ** liberty" which protects a number of
the rights embraced within in the guaranty of *' prop-
erty" in the same provision. McGehee, pp. 138-144. But
it is folly to contend that the rights of **life, liberty, and
property," as defined in American constitutions, state
and federal, are inalienable or unalterable, when the
necessities of the sovereign require either their modifica-
tion or abolition. They all exist sjibject to the necessi-
ties of the sovereign, acting through the taxing power,
the police power, the power of eminent domain, or other
supreme powers which may demand their modification or
abolition. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 29,
the Court said that a citizen or person may be compelled
* * by force if need be, against his will and without regard
to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even
his religious or political convictions, to take his place in
the ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance
of being shot down in its defence. ' ' The real purpose of
the guaranty in question is to protect the individual
against the exercise of purely personal and arbitrary
power by placing him under the protection of what Lieber
calls **a government of law as contradistinguished to a
government of functionaries " ; or what the Massachusetts
Bill of Bights calls **a government of laws and not of
men." See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370.
§ 220. No state shall make any law impauring the obli-
gation of contracts. A little more than ten years after
the birth of the American system of constitutional limita-
tions as embodied in the state constitutions of 1776, the
movement to define and protect ** vested rights" made a
Bne Process— 29
450 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 220
second advance when the continental Congress adopted
the Ordinance for the government of the Northwestern
Territory which provided, among other things, *Hhat no
law onght ever to be made or have force in the said
territory that shall in any manner whatever interfere
with or affect private contracts or engagements bona fide
and without fraud previously formed.'* No matter
whether that epoch making thought had its origin in the
brain of Lee or Dane (Meigs, Growth Const, p. 183), it
passed from the Continental Congress into the Federal
Convention on August 28, 1787 (The Madison Papers,
Vol. m, pp. 1443-44) when Eufus King moved to add to
the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder, **in the words used in the Ordinance of Con-
gress establishing new states, a prohibition on the states
to interfere in private contracts/' Not long after
Mr. Dickinson had informed the Convention that, accord-
ing to Blackstone (1 Com. 132), the phrase ex post facto
related only to criminal cases, the great clause for the
preservation of the ** obligation of contracts*' passed into
the existing Constitution of the United States.
§221. Contract clause limited to vested rights that
arise out of it. In Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.
122, Marshall, C. J., said: **What is the obligation of a
contract? and what will impair itt It would seem diflS-
cult to substitute words which are more intelligible or
less liable to misconstruction, than those which are to be
explained. A contract is an agreement in which a party
undertook to do, or not to do, a particular thing. The
law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is, of
course, the obligation of his contract.'* The clause in
question embraces only contracts concerning property or
some object of value, and conferring rights that may be
asserted in a court of justice. Hunt v. Hunt, 97 U. S.
444. The protected contracts are those that relate to
property rights, not government. Stone v. Miss., 101
U. S. 814. The prohibition against the states embraces
§ 222 VESTED BIGHTS 451
all contracts, executed and executory, whether between
individuals or a state and individuals. Green v.
Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Charles River Bridge v, Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet. 582 ; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 750.
It is only those contracts in existence when the hostile
law is passed that are protected ; the states may legislate
as to contracts thereafter made as they see fit. Denny v.
Bennett, 128 U. S. 489. A state statute can not be held to
be unconstitutional merely on the ground that it divests
a right previously vested; the clause extends only to
vested rights which arise out of and have their origin in
contract. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380 ; Watson v.
Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. The Supreme Court is specially
charged with the high duty to take care that the prohibi-
tion against states impairing the obligation of contracts
shall neither be evaded nor frittered away. Murphy v.
Charleston, 96 U. S. 432.
§ 222. The Fifth Amendment. On the heels of the con-
tract clause came the Fifth Amendment, promoting the
development of the idea of vested rights by introducing
into our Federal Constitution, for the first time, the guar-
anty of due process in the provision that no person shall
**be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. * ' That safeguard was amplified by other
provisions guaranteeing trial by jury, and forbidding
double jeopardy, self incrimination, and the taking of pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation.
But the guaranties thus introduced by that amendment
were not prohibitions operating on the states ; they were
simply limitations upon the powers of the Federal Gov-
ernment itself. ' * The people of the United States framed
such a government for the United States as they sup-
posed best adapted to their situation and best calculated
to promote their interests. The powers they conferred
upon this government were to be exercised by itself; and
the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms,
452 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 222
are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable io
the government created by this instrument. * ' Barron v.
Baltimore, 7 Pet 243. See also, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
123; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; FaUbrook Irriga-
tion Dist. V. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112.
§ 223. The great vacutim to be filled. From what has
just been said it appears that while the states were for-
bidden by the contract clause to impair the obligation of
contracts, they were not forbidden by the Fifth Amend-
ment to deprive private persons of due process of law,
as there was no prohibition against retrospective state
legislation. Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment the states were at liberty to pass laws depriv-
ing private persons of due process of law; the only
security such persons possessed in proceedings by the
state had to be found, if at all, in its constitution and
laws. At the time in question the power of the states to
pass retrospective laws, not ex post facto nor impairing
the obligation of contracts, was clearly recognized (Dart-
mouth College V. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Baltimore,
etc., R. Co. V. Nesbit, 10 How. 395), even when such laws
divested rights of property antecedently vested (Watson
V. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110). See also. Carpenter v. Pennsyl-
vania, 17 How. 463; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How.
296; Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall 624; Drehman v. Stifle,
8 Wall. 603; St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall.
663; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 157; Williams v. Paine,
169 U. S. 79).
§224. The Fourteenth Amendment. To fill the vacuum
just described was adopted the Fourteenth Amendment,
the capstone of the Constitution, which while it does not
prohibit retrospective laws as such (League v. Texas, 184
U. S. 156) does forbid all arbitrary interference with
fundamental rights, including vested rights of property,
regardless of the source, contractual or otherwise, from
which such vested rights emanated. It was therefore held
§ 225 VESTED RIGHTS 453
in Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U. S. 1, that a law, divesting a
right vested under a contract, thus impairing its obliga-
tion by working a deprivation of a right of property, is
offensive to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In that case the Court said: ** Accepting
the construction of the act by the state court, and its
coiiclusion that it applies to Mrs. Bradley, then the ques-
tion is whether such a statute so applied does not impair
the obligation of the contract previously existing between
the mortgagee and the mortgagor, or deprive the mort-
gagee of property rights without due process! That
question was raised in the Supreme Court of Dlinois, and
the court held that it did not. 201 HI. 511. Confessedly,
subsequent laws which in their operation amount to the
denial of rights accruing by a prior contract are obnox-
ious to constitutional objections. ... As we have
said, when Mrs. Bradley took this mortgage there was
no statutory limitation as to the time within which a
master ^s deed must be taken out, and no loss of right by
reason of failure to do so was prescribed. After she had
filed her bill, and while she was in possession, the act of
1872 went into effect, and, it may be conceded, limited
Mrs. Bradley ^s right to obtaining a deed on foreclosure
sale, and so far affected any remedy through a deed she
might have had. But, reading the act, as the view of the
supreme court compels us to do, as taking away her right
to maintain her possession, we are of opinion that it mate-
rially impairs the obligation of her contract, cmd deprives
her of property without due process of law/^
§ 225. What constitutes a vested right. In Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386, it was held that a right vested in a citi-
zen means that he has the power to do certain acts, or to
possess certain things, according to the law of the land.
Speaking of vested rights of property, Mr. Justice Chase
said in that case : * * If anyone has a right of property
such a right is a perfect and exclusive right ; but no one
can have such right, before he acquired a better right to
454 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 225
the property than any other person in the world/* In
Sim's Lessee v. Irvine, 3 DalL 425, it was held that a legal
right once established and incorporated as such with prop-
erty and tenures, notwithstanding any new distribution
of judicial powers, must be treated as such by the
courts. In Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, it was held that
where a law is in its nature a contract, and absolute rights
have vested under it, a repeal of such law can not divest
such rights. See also, Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S.
270. In Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187, it was held that
when all the precedent conditions prescribed by the pre-
emption laws, including the payment of the price of the
land, have been satisfied by the settler, he, for the first
time, acquires a vested interest in the premises occupied
by him, of which he can not be subsequently divested. In
Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 673, the
Court said: **A * vested right' is defined by Feame in
his work upon Contingent Remainders, as *an immediate,
fixed right of present or future enjoyment ; ' and by Chan-
cellor Kent as * an immediate right of present enjoyment,
or a present fixed right of future enjoyment' 4 Kent.,
Com. 202.'' Cooley, Const. Law, 332, in drawing the dis-
tinction between vested and expectant rights, has said
that ** rights are vested, in contradistinction to being
expectant or contingent. They are vested when the right
to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
property of some particular person or persons, as a pres-
ent interest. They are expectant when they depend upon
the continued existence of the present condition of things
until the happening of some future event. They are con-
tingent when they are only to come into existence on an
event or condition which may not happen or be performed
-until some other event may prevent their vesting."
** Accepting the words, in accordance with convenience
and settled usage, as synonymous with rights protected
by the law of the land or due process of law, the essential
qualities of a vested right are that it must be a funda-
mental right, which is concerned with substance as con-
§ 225 VESTED RIGHTS 455
trasted with form, and it must be complete and perfect
in a definite person, either over particular things (vested
right of property) or enforceable in favor of definite
persons whenever in the future conditions already-
determined arise (vested personal rights)/* McGehee,
p. 144-5.
In Amett v. Eeade, 220 IT. S. 311, it was held that the
husband had no vested rights in the community prop-
erty acquired prior to the New Mexico law of 1901, of
which he would be deprived by the application to such
property of a certain section of that law. The Court said :
* ' We should require more than a reference to Randall v.
Krieger, 23 Wall. 137, as to the power of the legislature
over an inchoate right of dower, to make us believe that
a law could put an end to her interest without compensa-
tion consistently with the Constitution of the United
States.'* In Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U. S. 640, it was held
that members of the Cherokee tribe living on September
1, 1902, and enrolled under the act of July 1, 1902, were
not deprived of their vested rights to participate in the
allotment and distribution of the remaining tribal
lands and funds — ^their individual allotments not being
affected — ^by the provision of the act of April 26, 1906,
admitting newly bom members of the tribe to the allot-
ment and distribution from which they were excluded by
the earlier act, if bom after September 1, 1902. See also
as to vested right to exemption from state taxation, pro-
tected by the Federal Constitution against abrogation by
Congress during a given period, English v. Richardson,
224 U. S. 680; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665. In Wil-
loughby V. City of Chicago, 235 U. S. 45, it was held tha t
by the overruling of earlier decisions so as to render real
property liable for an assessment for the benefits result-
ing from the widening of a street, after the damages for
the part taken have been fixed by judgment in due form,
no vested rights of the owners of such property can be
said to be* interfered with.
456 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 226
§ 226. Rights below the standard of vested rights. In
the language of Austin (2 Jurisp. 5th ed. 856), *'When
we oppose a vested or present to a future or contingent
right, we are not, I apprehend, opposing a right of one
class to a right of another, but we are rather opposing a
right to a chance or possibility of a right * ^ First among
such chances or possibilities are certain expectancies, or
mere contingencies which are not in any full and com-
plete sense rights at all. In Bandall v. Krieger, 23 Wall.
137, it was held that during the life of the husband, the
right of dower is a mere expectancy or possibility, and
during that period the legislature may increase or dimin-
ish it or may take it away entirely. It was therefore held
in that case that there was no violation of vested rights
when a married woman's claim to dower in land con-
veyed was taken away by a legislative act giving validity
to an ineffectual acknowledgment of the deed of a mar-
ried woman. And so a husband has no such vested right
in the future profits of his wife's land, as may not be
taken away by statute, Neilson v. Kilgore, 145 U. S. 487.
In Pennie v. Reis, 132 U. S. 464, it was held that neither
police officers or their representatives had such vested
right in a public fund created by statute, to be paid to
them upon their disability, death or resignation, as pre-
vented the repeal or modification of such statute prior
to the happening of any such event. In Mobile Transp.
Co. V. Mobile, 187 U. S. 479, it was held that as an Ala-
bama statute, granting to the city of Mobile so much of
the shore and soil under an adjacent tidal stream as is
within the city boundaries, amounted to no more than a
declaration that the rights possessed by the state in such
shore and soil were granted to such city, no vested rights
of owners of land adjacent to such stream were disturbed
thereby. In Randall v. Krieger, 23 Wall. 137, it was held
that the expectation of a person that he will succeed as
heir to the fee simple estates of a living ancestor or to
his estates in fee tail is not a vested right ; until that
event (the ancestor's death) occurs the law of descent
§ 227 VESTED RIGHTS 457
and distribution may be moulded according to the will
of the legislature. In tKe same category stands a joint
tenant's claim to take by survivorship property held in
joint tenancy. Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 568.
§227. Curative legislation. Mention must here be
made of the right of a state to enact curative legislation
for the perfection of rights already equitably vested by
the removal of certain technical defects in legal titles by
reason of the omission of certain formalities the state
might have dispensed with in the first instance. Vested
rights are not thereby interfered with; **Laws curing
defects which would otherwise operate to frustrate what
must be presumed to be the desire of the party affected,
can not be considered as taking away vested rights*
Courts can not regard rights as vested contrary to the
justice and equity of the case.*' State v, Newark, 27
N. J. L. 197. A proceeding may be validated by a retro-
spective act curing its irregularities, whenever such pro-
ceeding might have been authorized in advance by the
legislature. Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759; Street v.
United States, 133 U. S. 299 ; Thompson v. Lee County,
3 Wall. 327; St. Joseph Twp. v. Eogers, 16 Wall. 644;
Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806.
The claim of a party to such irregular proceeding,
because of its irregularity, to insist on titles which, but
for that irregularity, would have passed to others, is not
a vested right protected by the Constitution, and is subor-
dinate to the equitable rights acquired under the proceed-
ing validated. Eaverty v. Fridge, 3 McLean 230 ; Barton
V. Morris, 15 Ohio 408 ; Chestnut v. Shane, 16 Ohio 599.
The rights of third persons, depending on the invalidity
of the original proceeding, and acquired bona fide before
the curative act, are vested, and therefore exempt from
its operation. Brinton v. Seevers, 12 Iowa 389 ; Barrett
V. Barrett, 120 N. C. 127 ; McGehee, p. 156-8, & notes. See
also, Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627 ; McFaddin v. Evans-
458 DXJE PROCESS OP LAW § 227
Snider-Buel Co., 185 TJ. S. 505 ; Satterlee v. Mathewson,
2 Pet. 380 ; Randall v. Krieger, 23 Wall. 137.
§ 227a. No vested right in any general role of law or
policy of legislation* In Chicago & A. B. Co. v. Tran-
barger, 238 U. S. 67, the Court said: **For just as no
person has a vested right in any general rule of law or
policy of legislation entitling him to insist that it shall
remain unchanged for his benefit (Munn v. Illinois, 94
U. S. 113, 134; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 532;
Buttfield V. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 493 ; Martin v. Pitts-
burg & L. E. R. Co., 203 U. S. 284), so an immunity from a
change of the general rules of law will not ordinarily be
implied as an unexpressed term of an express contract.
See Gross v. United States Mortg. Co., 108 U. S. 477;
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75, 83.'' In hold-
ing that a mere departure by the courts of a state from a
rule of property established by prior decisions does not
violate any equity under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court, in O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrig. Co., 242
TJ. S. 20, said : ' * It is suggested that the cases cited estab-
lished a rule of property and that any departure from it
violated the plaintiff's rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. But we already have said that the cases do
not establish the rule supposed, and if they did, something
more would be necessary before the plaintiff could come
to this court. Saner v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 547, 548 ;
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 76."
§ 228. Right of a state to regulate its procedure. En-
tirely apart from the two classes just described of imper-
fect rights, below the standard of vested rights, affecting
vested rights of property only, stands the great subject
of procedure, affecting the rights of life, liberty and prop-
erty,— ** adjective law," which can not confer a vested
right because * * there is no vested right in a mode of pro-
cedure. " League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156 ; Backus v. Fort
Street Union Depot Co., 169 IT. S. 557. And yet the con-
§ 229 VESTED RIGHTS 459
trol of a state over its procedure is not absolute. ' * The
state has full control over the procedure in its courts,
both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the quali-
fication that such procedure must not work a denial of
fundamental rights,, or conflict with ^specific applicable
provisions of ihe Federal Constitution/' Brown v. New
Jersey, 175 U. S. 175. See also West v. Louisiana, 194
U. S. 263.
§229. All laws unpauing vested rights within the
scope of due process. It is all-important to keep steadily
in view the foregoing distinctions between vested rights
and such expectancies, possibilities and contingencies as
do not measure up to that standard, because the first
question that arises in every case is whether or no the
right involved is a vested right, or a right of the con-
tingent class below that standard. If the right is vested,
then the next question that arises is whether or no there
has been such an arbitrary interference with such a
fundamental right as will bring the infraction within the
due process clauses of the Constitution. There are a
great many lawful interferences that may take place witli
a vested right, such for instance as result from a proper
exercise of the taxing power, the power of eminent
domain, the police power, and such supreme sovereign
powers as the Federal Government may constitutionally
exercise. As the due process clauses do not prohibit
retroactive laws as such (League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156,
161), a vested right may be impaired without redress by
such a law provided the interference is not purely arbi-
trary in character. In the recent case of Wagner v.
Leser, 239 U. S. 207, the Court said: '* Taking the
decision in this court together, we think that it results
that the legislature of a state may determine the amount
to be assessed for a given improvement and designate
the lands and property benefited thereby, upon which the
assessment is to be made without first giving an oppor-
tunity to the owners of the property assessed to be heard
460 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 229
upon the amount of the assessment or the extent of the
benefit conferred. We do ^ot understand this to mean
that there may not be cases of such flagrant abuse of legis-
lative power as would warrant the intervention of a court
of equity to protect the constitutional rights of land
owners, because of arbitrary and wholly unwarranted
legislative action. The constitutional protection against
deprivation of property without due process of law would
certainly be available to persons arbitrarily deprived of
their private rights by such state action, whether under
the guise of legislative authority or otherwise.*' In
0 'Neill V. Learner, 239 IT. S. 244, the announcement was
made that **We have repeatedly said that the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, embodying fundamental
conceptions of justice, can not be deemed to prevent a
state from adopting a public policy for the irrigation of
arid lands or for the reclamation of wet or overflowed
lands. . . . there is nothing in the Federal Constitution
which denies to them the right to formulate this policy
or to exercise the power of eminent domain to carry it
into effect. ' ' In Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage Dist.,
239 U. S. 478, the Court held, first, that although under
the laws of Louisiana the action of the police jury in
determining, in the exercise of its discretion, what prop-
erty shall be included in a drainage district can not be
inquired into except on a special averment of fraud, one
not charging fraud or attacking the state statute, may
attack the law as administered as depriving him of his
property without due process of law by the inclusion
within a drainage district of property in no wise benefited
by the proposed system; second, that power arbitrarily
exerted, imposing a burden without a compensating
advantage of any kind, amounts to confiscation and vio-
lates the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. **We are not dealing," said the Court, **with
motives alone, but as well with their resultant action ; we
are not dealing with disputable grounds of discretion or
disputable degrees of benefit, with an exercise of power
§ 230 VESTED RIGHTS 461
determined by considerations not of the improvement of
plaintiff's property, but solely of the improvement of the
property of others — ^power, therefore, arbitrarily exerted,
imposing a burden without a compensating advantage of
any kind." Li Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co.,
240 IT. S. 55, the Court said : * * The legislature may cre-
ate taxing districts to meet the expense of local improve-
ments, and may fix the basis of taxation without encoun-
tering the Fourteenth Amendment unless its action is
palpably arbitrary or a plain abuse. Houck v. Little
River Drainage District, 239 TJ. S. 254, 262. '^ In Embree
V. Kansas City Road Dist., 240 TJ. S. 242, the Court said :
^^A legislative act of this nature [establishing zones of
benefits with graduate ratings for assessments] can be
successfully called in question only when it is so devoid
of any reasonable basis as to be essentially arbitrary and
an abuse of power. Wagner v. Leser, 239 U. S. 207;
Houck V. Little River Drainage District, 239 U. S. 254 ;
Myles Salt Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55.''
§ 230. Application of the rule of inclusion and ezdu-
sion. From the authorities just cited it clearly appears
that when a fundamental or vested right has been im-
paired, and redress is sought under the due process clause
either of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, it can be
had (entirely apart from the specific guarantees of the
Fifth Amendments), only **when it (the act causing the
impairment) is so devoid of any reaaonable basis as to be
essentially arbitrary and an abuse of power.'' If an
assertion of power by a state legislature is assailed, it
can not be successful, unless its action is palpably arbi-
trary or a plain abuse. No more delicate or difficult
function was ever confided to a court of last resort than
that imposed upon the Supreme Court of the United
States whenever it is called upon to apply such abstract
formulas to the concrete facts of a particular case. As
there were no precedents to guide it, either in the juris-
prudence of this country or any other, that court at the
462 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 230
beginning of its real work, mapped out the only course
possible when it adopted in Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U. S. 97, the famous rule of inclusion and exclusion
under which the court, without defining the meaning of
the phrase, due process of law, attempts in each case to
ascertain its intent and meaning * * by the gradual process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented
for decision shall require, with the reasoning on which
such decisions may be founded.'* In attempting to in-
terpret the real meaning of the mass of judge-made law
thus piled up during a period of nearly fifty years, the
text writer is likewise forced to adopt a rule of inclusion
and exclusion, under which he can only hope to lift up
from a voluminous and rapidly growing literature such
cases as are really leading, instructive and illustrative of
the processes of reasoning the court habitually employs.
Upon that principle what remains of this chapter,
specially devoted to property rights as protected by due
process, will be arranged.
§231. Legitimate modification of rights of abutting
owner. In Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, it was held
that as an abutting owner has no easement of light, air,
or access as against any improvement of the street for
the purpose of adapting it to public travel, such owner is
not deprived of his property without due process of law
when a municipality erects in one of its streets, under a
statute making no provision for compensation to abutting
owners, an elevated iron viaduct for the public use,
by which travelers are enabled to use such street in con-
nection with other streets, where, under the law of the
state as expounded by its highest court, such owner has
no easement of light, air or access. The Court said:
**In earlier and simpler times the surface of the streets
was enough to accommodate all travel. But under the
more complex conditions of modern urban life, with its
high and populous buildings, and its rapid interurban
transportation, the requirements of public travel are
§ 232 VESTED RIGHTS 463
largely increased. Sometimes the increased demands
may be met by subways and sometimes by viaducts. The
construction of either solely for public travel may well
be held by a state court to be a reasonable adaptation
of the streets to the uses for which they were primarily
designed. ' ' Here we have a vivid illustration of the man-
ner in which the subtle and refining hand of judge-made
law is permitting state power to modify private rights in
such a way as to satisfy the wants of a complex and
advancing society.
§ 232. How the outstanding shares of an owner of stodc
may be condemned without denial of due process. The
same principle received a different application in Offield
V. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 203 U. S. 372, in which
it was held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not violated by the condemnation for a
public use of outstanding shares in a railroad company
owned by a person who refused to agree to the terms of
purchase. The Court said : * * The power of the state to
declare uses of property to be public has lately been
' decided in Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, and in the case
of Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 200 U. S.
527. These <3ases exhibit more striking examples of the
power of a state than the case at bar. In the first case
the statute of the state permitted an individual to enlarge
the ditch of another to obtain water for his own land ; in
the second case the statute authorized the condemnation
of a right of way to transport ore from a mine to a rail-
road station. . . . The ultimate purpose of defend-
ant in error in the case at bar is the improvement of the
New Haven & Derby Railroad, which * connects [we quote
from the opinion of the supreme court of errors, New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Offield, 77 Conn. 419] at New
Haven, on the east, with four, and at its western ter-
minals with two, important railroad lines owned by the
plaintiff (defendant in error).' ... In this purpose
464 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 232
the public has an interest^ and to accomplish it the court
applied the statute. ' '
§233. Power of a state to reorganise a co-operatiye
association without consent of its members. In Polk v.
Mutual Reserve Fund L. Ass'n, 207 U. S. 310, it was held
that a state has the power to reorganize an association,
insuring lives upon the co-operative plan, as a mutual
level premium company, under a new name and without
the consent of its members, without taking away vested
rights, privileges or property rights of its members as
protected by due process. The Court said: **A similar
question was before the court in Wright v. Minnesota
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 657, where it was held that a
law of Minnesota, authorizing an assessment insurance
company to change its business to that of insurance upon
a regular premium basis, was not in violation of this pro-
vision of the constitution. • . . In fact, the only sug-
gestion of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
made to us is that the reincorporation, under the circum-
stances of this case, deprived the complainants of vested
rights and privileges and property rights under their
contracts, without due process of law. Since the incor-
poration has deprived the complainants of no vested
rights, privileges, or property, the contention fails.'*
§ 234. Power of a state to make discriminating prop-
erty classifications. In Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91,
it was held that property is not taken without due process
of law by state legislation making a discrimination or
classification between the commercial and residential sec-
tions of Boston, by limiting the maximum height of build-
ings in the commercial district to 125, and in the residen-
tial district to from 80 to 100 feet, when the highest
court of the state has upheld such legislation as a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power. The Court said : **The
particular circumstances prevailing at the place or in the
state where the law is to become operative, — whether the
§ 235 VESTED RIGHTS 465
statute is really adapted, regard being had to all the dif-
ferent and material facts, to bring about the results
desired from its passage ; whether it is well calculated to
promote the general and public welfare, — are all matters
which the state court is familiar with ; but a like famili-
arity can not be ascribed to this court, assuming judicial
notice may be taken of what is or ought to be generally
known. For such reason this court, in cases of this kind,
feels the greatest reluctance in interfering with the well
considered judgments of the court of the state whose
people are to be affected by the operation of the law. * '
§235. Right to compel abutting owner of dwelling
house to connect it with a sewer. In District of Columbia
V. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, it was held that the attempt
made in an act of Congress creating a drainage system in
the District of Columbia, under which an abutting owner
is assessed for the expense of connecting her property
with a sewer, give a controlling evidential effect to the
existence of such improvements, does not deprive such
owner of due process of law. The Court said: ** How-
ever, the question of the power of Congress, broadly con-
sidered, to discriminate in its legislation, is not necessary
to decide, for, whether such power is expressly or im-
pliedly prohibited, the prohibition can not be stricter or
more extensive than the Fourteenth Amendment is upon
the states. That amendment is unqualified in its declara-
tion that a state shall not * deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' Passing
on that amendment, we have repeatedly decided — so often
that a citation of the cases is unnecessary — ^that it does
not take from the states the power of classification. And
also that such classification need not be either logically
appropriate or scientifically accurate. The problems
which are met in the government of human beings are
different from those involved in the examination of the
objects of the physical world, and assigning them to their
proper associates."
Due ProcesB— 30
466 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 236
§ 236. Right of Congress to confiscate an o£Bice without
compensation. In Alvrez y Sanchez v. United States,
216 U. S. 167, it was held that without a violation of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment Congress
could confiscate the office of solicitor of the courts of first
instance in the capital of Porto Rico, lawfully purchased
in perpetuity, prior to the occupation of the island by the
military authorities of this country, and the cession of the
island to the United States. The Court said: **It is
clear that claimant is not entitled to be compensated for
his office by the United States because of its exercise of
an authority unquestionably possessed by it as the lawful
sovereign of the island and its inhabitants. The abolition
of the office was not, we think, in violation of any pro-
vision of the Constitution, nor did it infringe any right
of property which the claimant court assert as against
the United States. See O'Reilly de Camara t. Brooke,
209 U. S, 45.'^
§ 237. How railroad property may be burdened by the
construction of a bridge over a highway. In Cincinnati,
I and W. R. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336, it was held
that the guaranty of due process, requiring that com-
pensation be made when private property is taken for
public use, was not violated when the expense of con-
structing a railway bridge over a highway, made neces-
sary by the action of a municipality in opening such high-
way through the railway company's embankment, was
cast upon such company. The Court said : * * If the rail-
way company was not entitled to compensation on account
of the construction of this bridge, — ^whether regard be
had to the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution, or to the general reserved police power of
the state, — then it is clear that the jury were not mis-
directed as to what should be considered by them in esti-
mating the damages which, under the law, the railway
company was entitled to recover. The question as to the
right of the railway company to be reimbursed for any
S 239 VESTED EIGHTS 467
moneys necessarily expended in constructing the bridge
in question is, we think, concluded by former decisions of
this court ; particularly by Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. v. Illi-
nois, 200 U. S. 562, 584, 591 ; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v.
Drainage Com'rs, 197 U. S. 453; New York & N. E. R.
Co. V. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 571 ; Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co.
V. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 ; Northern Transp. Co. v. Chi-
cago, 99 U. S. 635. ' '
§238. Amounts awarded as damages against lands
within a designated area in street extension proceedings.
In Briscoe v. Rudolph, 221 U. S. 547, it was held that an
act of Congress providing that one half the amount
awarded as damages in certain street extension proceed-
ings be assessed against the lands within a designated
area as benefits, considering the benefits received by each
lot within such area, where there is nothing to show
that the actual assessments thereunder were in substan-
tial excess of the benefits, was not a taking of private
property for public use without compensation. The
Court said : *'In Webster v. Fargo, 181 U. S. 394, it was
held that a state might create such special taxing dis-
tricts, and charge the whole or part of the cost of local
improvement upon the property in the district either
according to valuation, superficial area or frontage. That
it is within the power of Congress to create a special
improvement district, and charge the cost of an improve-
ment therein according to the benefits received by prop-
ertv within such district, has been more than once
affirmed. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548 ; Wight v. David-
son, 181 U. S. 371 ; Martin v. District of Columbia, 205
IT. S. 135; Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217
U.S. 547."
§239. Restraint on land owner drawing unnatural
quantities of mineral waters from common source of sup-
ply. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U. S. 61, it was held that a statute of New York forbid-
468 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 239
ding a landowner engaged in collecting and vending as a
separate commodity the carbonic acid gas contained in
natural mineral waters in a common underground reser-
voir from pumping or drawing artificially, by meansi of
wells on his property, unnatural quantities of such water
from the common source of supply, and wasting them to
the injury or impairment of the rights of other proprie-
tors, did not deprive such landowner of the due process of
law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
in this unique case said: '^Coming to the provision in
question, it is necessary to inquire what construction has
been put upon it by the highest court of the state, for that
construction must be accepted by the courts of the United
States, and be regarded by them as a part of the provision
when they are called upon to determine whether it vio-
lates any right secured by the Federal Constituttion.
Weightman v. Clark, 103 U. S. 256, 260; Morley v. Lake
Shore & M. S. E. Co., 146 TJ. S. 162, 166; Olsen v. Smith,
195 IT. S. 333, 342. The court of appeals of the state had
the statute before it in Hawthorn v. Natural Carbouio
Gas. Co., 194 N. Y. 326, and again in People v. New York
Carbonic Acid Gas Co., 196 N. Y. 421, and the elaborate
opinions then rendered disclose that the court, having
regard to the title of the act and to the doctrine of correla-
tive rights in percolating waters which prevails in that
state, as recognized in Forbell v. New York, 164 N. Y. 522,
construed this provision, not as prohibiting the specified
acts absolutely or unqualifiedly, but only when the min-
eral waters are drawn from a source of supply not con-
fined to the lands of the actor, but extending into or
through the lands of others, and then only when the draft
made upon that source of supply is unreasonable or waste-
ful, considering that is a coequal right in all the surface
owners to draw upon it. In other words, the court, by
processes of interpretation having its approval, read into
the provision an exception or qualification making it inap-
plicable where the waters are not drawn from a common
source of supply, and 'also where, if they be drawn from
§ 241 VESTED RIGHTS 469
sncli a source, no injury is done thereby to others having
a like right to resort to it.'* The fact that the highest
court of state may thus amend an act of the legislature,
by ** processes of interpretation having its approval/'
before it is svhjected to the final test, is rich in philo-
sophic interest.
§240. State control over deposits in savinlfs banks,
inactive and unclaimed for thirty years. In Provident
Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, it was
held that a statute directing that deposits in a savings
bank that have remained inactive and unclaimed for
thirty years, in cases where the claimant is unknown or
the depositor can not be found, shall be paid to the treas-
urer and receiver general of the state to be held by him
as trustee for the use of the true owner or his legal rep-
resentatives, does not deprive such bank of its property
without due process of law. The Court said : * * The stat-
ute here is reasonable in its terms and is so framed as
to work injustice to no one. It only applies to cases
where no deposit has been made, no interest added on pass
book, no check drawn against the account, for thirty years,
and where no claunant is known, and the depositor can
not be found. ' '
§241. Making a municipality liable for damages to
property within its limits caused by a mob. In Chicago
V. Sturges, 222 IT. S. 313, it was held that a statute of
Illinois, saving to the property owner his action against
rioters and giving to the municipality a lien upon any
judgment against participants for reimbursement, or a
remedy to the municipality directly against the individ-
uals causing the damage, to the amount of any judgment
it may have paid the sufferer, did not deny due process to
the municipality because it imposed upon it liability for
three-fourths of the damage done to property within its
limits by a mob or riot, irrespective of any question of the
power of such municipality to have prevented the same by
470 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 241
its own acts. In the words of Mr. Justice Lurton: **It is
said that the act denies to the city due process of law,
since it imposes liability irrespective of any question of
the power of the city to have prevented the violence, or
of negligence in the use of its power. • . • The state
is the creator of subordinate municipal governments. It
vests in them the police powers essential to the preserva-
tion of law and order. It imposes upon them the duty of
protecting property situated within their limits from the
violence of such public breaches of the peace as are mobs
and riots. This duty and obligation thus intrusted to the
local subordinate government is by this enactment em-
phasized and enforced by imposing upon the local com-
munity absolute liability for property losses resulting
from the violence of such tumults. ' ^ It was likewise held
that due process was not denied to a township, compelled
by the power of a state to levy and collect, as one of its
political divisions, taxes for the purpose of paying the
amount assessed against such township for the public
benefits accruing from the construction of a drain. Soliah
V. Heskin, 222 U. S. 522.
§ 242. Due process denied to a railroad company sub-
jected to double liability and an attorney's fee. Only
at long intervals does the court find a case in which it
can actually enforce the protection guaranteed by due
process. Belief was given in St. Louis, L M. & S. B. Co.
V. Wyime, 224 U. S. 354, in which it was held that a rail-
road company's property was taken without due process
of law by an Arkansas statute imposing double liability
and an attorney's fee for a refusal to pay within thirty
days an excessive demand for the killing of live stock by
one of its trains. The Court said : * * The owner of two
horses which were killed within the state by a train of a
railroad company served upon the company a written
notice demanding damages in the sum of $500. The com-
pany refused to pay the demand, and after the expiration
of thirty days the owner brought suit in a court of the
§ 243 VESTED RIGHTS 471
state to recover his damages^ alleged in the complaint to he
$400. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict for the owner,
assessing his damages at the amount sued for, and the
court, deeming the statute applicable, gave judgment for
double that amount and for an attorney's fee of $50. The
company objected that the statute, as thus applied, was
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment • . . We think the conclusion is un-
avoidable that the statute, as so construed and applied, is
an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government and
violative of the fundamental rights embraced within the
conception of due process of law. It does not merely pro-
vide a reasonable incentive for the prompt settlement,
without suit, of just demands of a class admitting of
special treatment by the legislature, as was the case with
the statute considered in Seaboard Air Line Co. v. See-
gers, 207 TJ. S. 73, but attaches onerous penalties to the
nonpayment of extravagant demands, thereby making
submission to them the preferable alternative. ' '
§ 243. A state may take away the property of an absen-
tee, tmder certain circumstances, without a denial of due
process. In Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U. S. 1, it was held that
a state statute fixing the time for the distribution of the
estate of an absentee, and for the barring of actions relat-
ing to the property, is not so unreasonable and arbitrary
as to offend the principles embodied in due process,
because its provisions bar the rights of the absentee abso-
lutely after one year from a receiver's appointment, in
the event that such appointment was not made within
thirteen years from the date of the disappearance of
the absentee, in other words, after fourteen years from
such disappearance. The Court said: **If the legis-
lature thinks that a year is long enough to allow a
party to recover his property from a third hand, and
establishes that time in cases where he has not been
heard of for fourteen years, and presumably is dead, it
acts within its constitutional discretion. Now and then
472 DUE PEOCESS OF LAW § 243
an extraordinary case may turn np, but^ constitutional
laWy like other mortal contrivances, has to take some
chances, and in the great majority of instances, no doubt,
justice is done. See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, supra
(219 U. S. 47, 67). Shorter time than one year has been
upheld. Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 TJ. S. 140,
156 ; Turner v. New York, 168 TJ. S. 90 ; Terry v. Ander-
son, 95 U. S. 628. See Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 201
U.S. 359, 369.''
§ 244. Creek freedmen by blood whose names had been
duly entered on the rolls entitled to protection by due
process. In United States ex rel. Turner v. Fisher, 222
U. S. 204, the Court said: **1. Where, under the provi-
sions of acts of Congress, and after a hearing, the names
of relators were duly entered as Creek freedmen by blood
on the rolls made and approved by the Secretary of the
Interior, rights were acquired of which the freedmen
could not be deprived without that character of notice
and opportunity to be heard essential to due process of
law. Garfield v. United States, 211 U. S. 249. 2. Notice
to the attorney of such freedmen, given a few hours before
the hearing of a motion to strike their names, on the
ground that their enrollment had been secured by per-
jury, was not such notice as afforded due process.
Eoller V. Holly, 176 U. S. 399 ; Hagar v. Eeclamation Dist.
No. 108, 111 U. S. 708 ; Iowa C. E. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S.
393 ; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 414.^^
§ 245. One man's property can not be taken and given
to another contrary to settled usages and modes of pro-
cedure. Such was the essence of the notable judgment
rendered in Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U. S. 139,
in which the Court said : ** Without the guaranty of 'due
process ' the right of private property cannot be said to
exist, in the sense in which it is known to our laws. The
principle, known to the common law before Magna Carta,
was embodied in that Charter (2 Coke, Inst. 45, 50), and
§ 246 VESTED BIGHTS 473
has been recognized since the Revolution as among the
safest foundations of our institutions. Whatever else
may be certain about the definition of the term *due proc-
ess of law, ' all authorities agree that it inhibits the taking
of one man's property and giving it to another contrary
to settled usages and modes of procedure, and without
notice or an opportunity for a hearing. . . . With
reference to statutes of limitations, it is well settled that
they may be modified by shortening the time prescribed,
but only if this be done while the time is still running,
and so that a reasonable time still remains for the com-
mencement of an action before the bar takes effect. Terry
V. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632; Re Brown, 135 IT. S. 662,
701, 705 ; Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 IT. S. 245, 255 ; Turner
V. New York, 168 TJ. S. 90, 94; Wilson v. Iseminger, 185
U. S. 55, 63. . . . Since the proceeding for convert-
ing the entry of possession into a dominio title, as well as
the proceeding for an entry of possession itself, was
taken without notice to the owners, the effect of the judi-
cial order was precisely the same as if the military gov-
ernor had declared that the property in question should
be taken from the lawful owner and given to the fraudu-
lent occupanf
§246. When the property rights of a private water
company may be taken away by the municipal construc-
tion of a competing plant. In Madera Waterworks v.
Madera, 228 U. S. 454, it was held that such a result might
be worked out, without a violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the absence of
contract immunity from such competition, despite the fact
that the waterworks company may be forbidden by the
local law to apply its property to other uses, and may be
called upon to pay taxes to help its rival to succeed. The
Court said: **An appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect property from a congenital defect must be
vain. Abilene Nat. Bank v. DoUey, 228 U. S. 1, 5. It is
impossible not to feel the force of the plaintiff's argument
474 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 246
as a reason for interpreting the Constitution so as to
avoid the result, if it might be, but it comes too late.
There is no pretense that there is any express promise to
private adventurers that they shall not encounter subse-
quent municipal competition. We do not find any lan-
guage that even encourages that hope, and the principles
established in this class of cases forbid us to resort to the
fiction that a promise is implied. The constitutional pos-
sibility of such a ruinous competition is recognized in the
cases, and is held not sufficient to justify the implication
of a contract. Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton,
146 U. S. 258 ; Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co., 191
U. S. 150, 156; Helena Waterworks Co. v. Helena, 195
U.S. 383, 388, 392.*'
§247. Due process denied by imposition of excessive
penalties. In Missouri P. R. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340,
it was held that property was taken without due process
of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, through
the imposition hy a state statute of a liability of $500 as
liquidated damages, along with a reasonable attorney's
fee, for every charge by a common carrier in excess of
the rates therein fixed for shipments of oil between points
within the state. The Court said: **The state court,
although recognizing that the solution of the problem is
not free from difficulty, reached the conclusion that *so
long as the defendant [the carrier] can not be made to
suflfer until a competent court has passed upon the justice
of the legislative rates, the guaranties of the Federal
Constitution are not infringed. ' But that this view fails
to recognize the real plight of the carrier is made plain
by the following extract from the opinion in Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123 : *If the law be such as to make the
decision of the legislature of the commission conclusive
as to the sufficiencv of the rates, this court has held such
a law to be unconstitutional. Chicago, M, & St. P. R. Co.
V. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418. A law which indirectly
accomplishes a like result by imposing such conditions
§ 248 VESTED RIGHTS 475
upon the ri^ht to appeal for judicial relief as works an
abandonment of the right rather than face the conditions
upon which it is offered or may be obtained is also uncon-
stitutional. It may therefore be said that when the pen-
alties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and
imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and
its officers from resorting to the courts to test the valid-
ity of the legislation, the result is the same as if the law
in terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial
construction of laws which deeply affect its rights/ *'
§248. Claim of abutting owners to compensation for
consequential diamages a vested right protected by due
process. In Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, it was held
that the claim of abutting owners to compensation for
consequential damages growing out of an original street
grading made under municipal direction, drawn from
state laws, which were the only legislative authorization
for such municipal action, constituted a vested right of
property protected from destruction by a repeal of the
compensation provision after the damage had occurred.
The Court said : * * The necessary effect of the repealing
act, as construed and applied by the court below, was to
deprive the plaintiffs in error of any remedy to enforce
the fixed liability of the city to make compensation. This
was to deprive the plaintiffs in error of a right which
had vested before the repealing act, — a right which was
in every sense a property right. Nothing remained to
be done to complete the plaintiffs ' right to compensation
except the ascertainment of the amount of damages to
their property. The right of the plaintiffs in error was
fixed by the law in force when their property was damaged
for public purposes, and the right so vested can not be
defeated by subsequent legislation. Elgin v. Eaton, 83
111. 535 ; Healy v. New Haven, 49 Conn. 394 ; Harrrington
V. Berkshire, 22 Pick. 263; People ex rel. Fountain v.
Westchester County, 4 Barb. 64, are cases arising under
street or highway statutes. The principle has been ap-
476 DUE PEOCESS OF LAW § 248
plied in reference to rights axscruing under a variety of
statutes when affected by a subsequent change of the law.
Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Miller v.
Union Mill Co., 45 Wash. 199 ; Grey v. Mobile Trade Co.,
55 Ala. 388; Stephens v. MarshaU, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 203;
Gorman v. McArdle, 67 Hun 484, 22 N. Y. Supp. 479;
Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202 ; Creighton v. Pragg,
21 Cal. 115; State Trust Co. v. Kansas City P. & G. R.
Co., 115 Fed. 367.^'
§ 249. Initial cost of spur track for public use may be
imposed upon a single industry. In Union Lime Co. v.
Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 233 U. S. 211, it was held that
the condemnation of the land needed for. the extension of
a railroad spur track ordered by a state railroad commis-
sion, although such extension be made for the present
benefit of a single industry that is to bear the initial
cost, is not a taking of private property protected by due
process, where the state courts declare the use to be a
public use, on the ground that, subject to the subsequent
equitable division of initial cost, such spur track is an
integral of the railroad system and, as such, at the service
of the public. The Court said: **It was said by this
Court in Hairston v. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U. S. 598,
608 : * The uses for which the track was desired are not
the less public because the motive which declared its
location over this particular land was to reach a private
industry, or because the proprietors of that industry
contributed in any way to the cost. There is a clear dis-
tinction betwen spurs which are owned and operated by
a common carrier as a part of a system and under its
public obligation and merely private sidings. See De
Camp V. Hibemia Underground R. Co., 47 N. J. L. 43 ;
Chicago, B. & N. R. Co. v. Porter, 43 Minn. 527 ; XJlmer
V. Lime Rock R. Co., 98 Me. 579 ; St. Louis, L M. & S. R.
Co. V. Petty, 57 Ark. 359 ; Dietrich v. Murdock, 42 Mo.
279; Bedford Quarries R. Co. v. Chicago, L and L. R.
Co., 175 Ind. 303." See in connection with this case,
§ 251 VESTED EIGHTS 477
Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Michigan E. Commission, 231 U. S.
457; Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232
U. S. 430.
§ 250. Due process denied by exaction of double liabU-
1^ for failure to pay damages within a certain time. In
Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. v. Kennedy, 232 U. S. 628, it
was held that there was a taking of private property
without due process through a state law imposing a double
liability on a railroad company failing to pay, within
sixty days, a claim for damage caused by fire set by a
locomotive, except where the owner recovers a less sum
as damages than the amount of any tender by such com-
pany, in which case the latter is to recover its costs. The
court rested its decision upon Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co.
V. Polt, 232 U. S. 165, in which it was said: ''No doubt
the states have a large latitude in the policy that they
will pursue and enforce, but the rudiments of fair play
required by the Fourteenth Amendment are wanting
when a defendant is required to guess what a jury will
find, or pay double if that body sees fit to add 1 cent to
the amount that was tendered, although the tender was
obviously futile because of an excessive demand. The
case is covered by St. Louis, I. M. & S. E. Co. v. Wynne,
224 U. S. 354/'
§ 251. When double liability and an attorney's fee may
be exacted without denial of due process. In Kansas
City S. E. Co. V. Anderson, 233 TJ. S. 325, it was held
that due process was not denied by the imposition under
state law of double liability and an attorney's fee upon
a railroad company refusing to pay for the killing of live
stock by one of its trains within thirty days after the
owner's demand, when the justice of the demand is fully
established in the suit resulting from the refusal to pay.
The Court said: **In Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. v. Polt,
232 U. S. 165, a statute of South Dakota was passed upon
which makes a railroad liable for double damages if,
478 DUE PEOCESS OF LAW § 251
within sixty days after demand, it does not pay the dam-
ages actually sustained for property destroyed by fire
communicated from its locomotive engine. The plaintiflF
in the case got a verdict for less than he demanded, but
for more than the railroad offered. Judgment for double
the amount of the verdict was entered and sustained by
the supreme court of the state. It was reversed by this
court, the ruling of the Wynne case, supra, being applied.
We said : * The case is not like those in which a moderate
penalty is imposed for failure to satisfy a demand found
to be just. Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar
Co., supra [226 U. S. 217].' It is contended, however,
that the statute having been declared unconstitutional as
applied to one state of facts that properly raises the
question, it is void for all purposes. The contention is
based on the assumption that we decided the statute in
the Wynne case to be unconstitutional; but the ground
of the decision was, as we have se^, that the statute was
there applied to a case where the plaintiff in the action
had recovered less than he demanded before the suit. We
decline to extend our opinion to cases where the amount
of the judgment corresponded to the demand; in other
words, declined to pronounce the act entirely unconstitu-
tional.'* See also, Missouri, K. and T. R. Co. v. Harris,
234 U. S. 412, in which it was held that due process was
not denied by a Texas law allowing a reasonable attor-
ney's fee, not exceeding $20 to the successful plaintiff in
a litigation in which such attorney is actually employed
upon a claim not exceeding $200, against * * any person or
corporation doing business in this state, for personal
service rendered, or for labor done, or for material fur-
nished, or for overcharges on freight or express, or for
any claim for lost or damaged freight, or for stock killed
or injured by such person or corporation, its agent or
employees," where the claim is not paid in thirty days
after demand, and the recovery is for the full amount
claimed.
§ 252 VESTED EIGHTS 479
§ 252. Due process not denied by state law prohibiting
killing of wild bird or animal by unnaturalized foreign-
bom resident In Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S.
138, it was held that there was no deprivation of property
without due process of law by a state statute prohibiting
the killing by an unnaturalized foreign-born resident of
any wild bird or animal, except in defense of person or
proi)erty; and **to that end*' making it unlawful for any
such person to own or be possessed of a rifle or shotgun.
The Court said : * * Under the Fourteenth Amendment the
objection is twofold : unjustly depriving the alien of prop-
erty, and discrimination against such aliens as a class.
But the former really depends upon the latter, since it
hardly can be disputed that if the lawful object, the pro-
tection of wild life (Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519),
warrants the discrimination, the means adopted for
making it effective also might be adopted. The possession
of rifles and shotguns is not necessary for other purposes
not within the statute. . . . The prohibition does not
extend to weapons such as pistols that may be supposed
to be needed occasionally for self defense. So far, the
case is within the principle of Lawton v. Steele, 152 TJ. S.
133. See further. New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg,
211 U. S. 31 ; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226
U. S. 192. The discrimination undoubtedly presents a
more diflScult question. But we start with the general
consideration that a state may classify with reference to
the evil to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated
against is, or reasonably might be considered to define
those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it
properly may be picked out.** The conclusion reached
on that branch of the subject is this: *'The question
therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say
that the legislature of Pennsylvania was not warranted
in assuming as its premise for the law that resident un-
naturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil
that it desired to prevent. Barrett v. Indiana, 229 TJ. S.
26,29.**
480 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 253
§ 253. When state tax imposed upon gross earnings of
railroads is not confiscatory. In Ohio and W. B. Co. v.
Dittey, 232 U. S. 576, it was held that a state tax can not
be said to be confiscatory, as rendering railway franchises
valueless, merely because the present earnings of the rail-
road are not adequate to pay more than can be derived
from high grade investments, readily available on the
market, or may not even be adequate to defray operating
exi)en8es. The Court said : * * The tax is, however, in sub-
stance as well as in form, an excise or privilege tax. Its
reasonableness, unless some Federal right be violated, is
within the discretion of the state legislature. We have
seen that the classification adopted can not be deemed
illusory; that is, there is no apparent violation of the
equality provisions of the state Constitution or of the
* equal protection * clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
although railroad and pipe line companies are required
to pay at the rate of 4 per cent of the annual intrastate
earnings, while other public-service corporations pay a
less percentage. It is, of course, entirely settled that a
state can not, consistently with the Federal control of
interstate commerce, lay such taxes, either upon property
rights or upon franchises or privileges, as in effect to
burden such conmierce. But the line is not always easily
drawn, as recent cases sufficiently show. Galveston, H. &
S. A. R. Co. V. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 225, 229; United
States Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 TJ. S. 335, 344; Williams
V. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 416 ; Baltic Min. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 231 U. S. 68. The present act does not on its
face manifest a purpose to interfere with interstate com-
merce, afnd we are unable to accept the historical facts
alluded to as sufficient evidence of a sinister purpose, such
as would justify this court in striking down the law.*'
§ 254. Due process not denied by prohibiting removal
of assets from safe deposit companies under certain con-
ditions. In National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232
U. S. 58, it was held that such a company was not de-
§ 255 VESTED EIGHTS 481
prived of its property without due process of law or
arbitrarily burdened with a liability, by a state statute
prohibiting the removal of the contents of a safe deposit
box, after the death of the renter, whether standing solely
in his name or held jointly with others, unless the com-
pany retained assets sufficient to pay the state inheritance
tax. The Court said : * * The Illinois supreme court held
that the relation created by the Deposit Company *s con-
tract was that of bailor and bailee. That construction by
the state court is controlling, unless, as claimed by the
complainant, it makes the statute violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, as being an arbitrary attempt to create lia-
bilities out of possession, where there was no possession
in fact. . . . The boxes were leased with the knowl-
edge that the state had so legislated as not only to protect
the interests of one dying after the rental, but also to
secure the payment of the state tax out of whatever might
be found in the box belonging to the deceased. The incon-
venience was one of the not unreasonable incidents of the
joint relationship.**
§ 255. Due process not denied by statute declaring that
ten years' possession by a disseizor under a deed gives
title to all land covered by it. In Montoya v. Gonzales,
232 U. S. 375, it was held that a statute of Mexico did not
deprive of their property without due process of law the
heirs of the original grantee in the Alameda land grant
by providing that ten years * possession by a disseizor of
a strip of such grant, lying between the Eio Grande and
the foothills to the West, under a deed purporting to
convey the land from the river westward to a certain
ridge, gives title to the whole. The Court said : * ' They
[the interveners] have no documentary evidence of a
title derived from Juan Gonzales, but they and their pred-
ecessors in title have occupied the bottom lands between
the Eio Grande and the foothills to the West for more
than ten years under deeds purporting to convey a fee
simple in the respective strips to the ridge of Eio Puerco.
Due Process — 31
482 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 255
. . . The title rests upon a peculiar statute that has
been in force unchanged in any particular affecting this
case, it is said, since 1858. Comp. Laws 1865, chap. 73,
§ 1 ; Comp. Laws 1897, § 2937. By this act, possession for
ten years, under a deed purporting to convey a fee simple,
of any lands which have been granted by Spain, Mexico,
or the United States, gives title in fee to the quantity of
land specified in the deed, if, during the ten years, no claim
by suit in law or equity, effectually prosecuted, shall have
been set up. . . . The purpose of the act is to ripen
disseizin into title according to the deed under which the
disseizor holds, and it is especially directed against
ancient claims such as the appellants set up."
§ 256. Right to alter charters can not be so
as to take property of corporations without due process.
In Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U. S.
491, the Court said : * * In the brief of counsel for the state
it is argued that the statute can be sustained as a valid
exercise of the state's reserved power to alter the charter
of the company. That question does not seem to have been
raised in the state court, nor was its decision based on
that proposition. Indeed, such a ruling would seem to
have been opposed to State ex rel. Northern P. R. Co. v.
Bailroad Commission, 140 Wis. 157, and the Water Power
Cases, 148 Wis. 124, where it was held that the right to
amend a charter does not authorize the taking of the
company *s property without just compensation. The
same view has been repeatedly expressed in the decisions
of this court. For example, in Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S.
324, it was said that *the power of alteration and amend-
ment is not without limit. The alterations must be
reasonable . . . and be consistent with the scope and
object of the act of incorporation.* . . . Again, in
Steams v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 259, it was held
that the reserved right to amend a corporate charter * does
not confer mere arbitrary power, and can not be so exer-
cised as to violate fundamental principles of justice by
§ 257 VESTED RIGHTS 483
. . . taking of property without due process of law/
Lake Shore & M. S. E. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S, 690 ; Stanis-
laus County V. San Joaquin & K. River Canal & Irrig. Co.,
192 U. S. 201 ; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 720 ; Miller v.
New York, 15 Wall. 498. See also, Delaware, L. & W. E.
Co. V. Public Utilities, 85 N. J. L. 28, 38, where it was
held that, under such a power, the company could not be
required to furnish free transportation to certain desig-
nated o£Scials."
§257. Due process denied by prohibiting the letting
down of an unengaged and unoccupied upper berth in
sleeping car. In the foregoing case it was held that
property was taken without compensation, in violation of
the guaranty of due process, by a state statute prohibit-
ing the letting down of an unengaged and unoccupied
upper berth in a sleeping car when the lower berth in the
same section is occupied. The Court said: **The plain-
tiff also insists that the requirement that the upper berth
should not be let down until actually engaged also de-
prives the company of its right of management, and pre-
vents it from conducting its business so aa to secure the
privacy of the man or woman occuping the lower berth.
It is not necessary to refer to the evidence on that subject
because it is a matter of common knowledge that to let
down the upper berth during the night would necessarily
be an intrusion upon the privacy of those occupying lower
berths. For the glare of the lights and the noise of low-
ering the upper berth would disturb any except the
soundest sleepers. In this respect the statute would
lessen the ability of the company to furnish the place of
sleep and rest it offers to the public* A sleeping car may
not be an 4nn on wheels,* but the operating company does
engage to furnish its patrons with a place in which they
can rest without intrusion upon their privacy. Holding
out these inducements and seeking this patronage, the
company is entitled to the privilege of managing its busi-
ness in its own way so long as it does not injuriously
484 DUE PEOCESS OP LAW § 257
affect the health, comfort, safety, and convenience of the
public. The right of the state to regulate public carriers
in the interest of the public is very great. But that great
power does not warrant an unreasonable interference
with the right of management, or the taking of the car-
rier's property without compensation. Lake Shore & M.
S. E. Co. V. Smith, 173 U. S. 684; Northern P. E. Co. v.
North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585 ; Washington ex rel. Oregon
E. & Nav. Co. V. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510; Missouri P. E.
Co. V. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403 ; Great Northern E. Co. v.
Minnesota, 238 TJ. S. 340, ante. Just decided. * *
§ 258. Due process not denied a foreign insurance com-
pany by certain requirements as to investments within
a state. Li South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins.
Co. V. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63, it was held that due process
was not denied by the act of a state insurance commis-
sion,— armed with the power to determine, in the exer-
cise of his discretion, which applicants for the privilege
of doing insurance business in the state shall deposit an
approved bond, and which shall deposit approved securi-
ties,— in refusing to accept the bond of a surety company
tendered with the application of the insurance company
for a license, unless it shall invest one-fourth of its reserve
on South Carolina policiek in the approved securities of
that state. The Court said : * * The case is presented here
only in its aspect of deprivation of alleged rights by the
Federal Constitution. We fail to see any substantial
merit in the contention that the applicant has been de-
prived of due process of law in the* exercise of the discre-
tion given to the commissioner to accept or reject
applicants for the insurance privilege under the laws of
the state, and in requiring some to give bonds and others
to deposit securities, after having investigated their con-
dition and methods of doing business.*'
§259. When maximum intrastate rates are confisca-
tory and deny carriers due process. In Northern P. B.
§ 260 VESTED EIGHTS 485
Co. V. Dakota ex rel. McCue, 236 U. S. 585, it was held
that a law of that state fixing maximnin intrastate rates
for the transportation of coal in carload lots was confisca-
tory, because, when the entire traffic to which such rates
are applied is taken into account, the carrier is compelled
to transport the commodity for less than cost or without
substantial compensation, although the return to the car-
rier may be adequate from its entire intrastate operations.
The Court said: **But a different question arises when
the state has segregated a commodity, or a class of traffic,
and has attempted to compel the carrier to transport it
at a loss or without substantial compensation, even though
the entire traffic to which the rate is applied is taken into
account. On that fact being satisfactorily established,
the presumption of reasonableness is rebutted. If in such
a case there exists any practice, or what may be taken to
be (broadly speaking) a standard of rates with respect
to that traffic, in the light of which it is insisted that the
rate should still be regarded as reasonable, that should
be made to appear. As has been said, it does not appear
here. Frequently attacks upon state rates have raised
the question as to the profitableness of the intrastate busi-
ness under the state requirements. But the decisions in
this class of cases (which we have cited in the margin)
furnish no ground for saying that the state may set apart
a conmiodity or a special class of traffic and impose upon
it any rate it pleases, provided only that the return from
the entire intrastate business is adequate.*'
§ 260. Due process denied a foreign corporation by a
money judgment rendered upon service on a resident
director. In Riverside & D. E. Cotton Mills v. Menefee,
237 U. S. 189, it was held that due process was denied by
the rendition of a money judgment against a corporation
organized under the laws of another state upon servicfe
on a resident director, when such corporation had no
qualified agent in the state upon whom process might be
served, no property therein, and had not come into the
486 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 260
state for the purpose of doing business therein. The
Court said : * * Whatever long ago may have been the dif-
ficulty in applying the principles of Pennoyer v. Neff [95
IT. S. 714] to corporations, that is, in determining when,
if at all, a corporation created by the laws of one state
could be sued in the courts of another sovereignty, be-
cause of the conception that, as an ideal being, a corporar
tion could not migrate and its officers, in going to another
sovereignty, did not take with them their power to repre-
sent the corporation, such difficulty ceased to exist with
the decision of this court rendered more than thirty years
ago in St. Clair v. Cox, 106 TJ. S. 350, which, together
with the leading cases which have followed it, has been
already referred to. • . . Without restating the St.
Clair case or the leading cases which have followed and
applied it, we content ourselves with saying that it re-
sults from them that it is indubitably established that the
courts of one state may not, without violating the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, render a
judgment against a corporation organized under the laws
of another state where such corporation has not come
into the state for the purpose of doing business therein,
or has done no business therein, or has no property
therein, or has no qualified agent therein upon whom
process may be served. ' *
§261. A state may make certain requirements of a
member of a Oreek letter fraternity without denying him
due process of law. In Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237
U. S. 589, it was held that there was no denial of due
process of law by a state requirement that a member of
a chapter of a Greek letter fraternity at another college
should renounce his allegiance to and affiliation with the
same before admission as a student into any educational
institution supported by the state, despite the fact that
the fraternity to which he belongs may be a disciplin-
ary and moral force. The Court said: **It is said that
the fraternity to which complainant belongs is a moral
§ 262 VESTED BIGHTS 487
and of itself a disciplinary force. This need not be de-
nied. But whether such membership maJ^es against dis-
cipline was for the state of Mississippi to determine. It
is to be remembered that the University was established
by the state, and is under the control of the state, and the
enactment of the statute may have been induced by the
opinion that membership in the prohibited societies
divided the attention of the students and distracted from
that singleness of purpose which the state desired to
exist in its public educational institutions. It is not for
us to entertain conjectures in opposition to the views of
the state, and annul its regulations upon disputable con-
siderations of their wisdom or necessity. Nor can we
accommodate the regulations to the assertion of a special
purpose by the applying student, varying, perhaps, with
each one, and dependent alone upon his promise. * *
§ 262. Due process denied by taxation without juris-
diction. In Provident Savings L. Assur. Soc. v. Ken-
tucky, 239 IT. S. 103, it was held that the principle that
taxation without jurisdiction violates the due process pro-
vision of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the asser-
tion of authority on the part of the state to exact a license
tax for the privilege of doing acts beyond the sphere of
local control. The Court said : * * And we can not doubt
that the question whether the state is taxing a foreign
corporation for a privilege not granted— that is, whether
the acts done by the corporation at the time to which the
tax relates are of such a nature as to subject it to local
authority upon the ground that it is doing acts which can
only be done with the permission of that authority — ^must
be regarded as a Federal question. Taxation without
jurisdiction has been held to be a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment (Louisville & Jefferson Ferry Co. v.
Kentucky, 188 XJ. S. 385 ; Del., Lack. & West E. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 358 ; Union Ref rig. Transit Co. v,
Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 209) ; and the principle involved
applies to the assertion of authority on the part of the
488 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 262
state to exact a license tax for the privilege of doing actb
which lie beyond the sphere of local control. * *
§263. Due process denied by arbitrary assertion of
power imposing burdens without an advantage of any
kind. In Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage Dist., 239
U. S. 478, it was held that power arbitrarily exerted,
imposing a burden without a compensating advantage
of any kind, amounts to confiscation and violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ; that such a
result is accomplished by the action of a local adminis-
trative body in including land within a drainage district
which is palpably arbitrary, such inclusion not being for
the purpose of benefiting such land directly but for the
purpose of obtaining revenue therefrom. The Court
said: **We are not dealing with motives alone, but as
well with their resultant action ; we are not dealing with
disputable grounds of discretion or disputable degrees
of benefit, but with an exercise of power determined by
considerations not of the improvement of plaintiflP *s prop-
erty but solely of the improvement of the property of
others — power, therefore, arbitrarily exerted, imposing a
burden without a compensating advantage of any kind. * *
§264. Legislature can not create taxing district by
action palpably arbitrary or plain abuse. In Gast Realty
and I. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55, it was
held that a state legislature may create taxing district to
provide for the expense of local improvements, without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment, unless its action
is palpably arbitrary or a plain abuse. The Court said :
* * The legislature may create taxing districts to meet the
expense of local improvements, and may fix the basis of
taxation without encountering the Fourteenth Amend-
ment unless its action is palpably arbitrary or a plain
abuse. Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 239
U. S. 254, 262. The front-foot rule has been sanctioned
for the cost of paving a street. In such a case it is not
§ 264 VESTED EIGHTS 489
likely that the cost will exceed the benefit, and the law
does not attempt an imaginary exactness or go beyond
the reasonable probabilities. French v. Barber Asphalt
Co., 181 U. S. 324 ; Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U. S.
396, 397. So in the case of a square bounded by principal
streets, the land might be assessed half way back from the
improvement to the next street. Louis. & Nash. R. R. v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430. But, as is
implied by Houck v. Little River Drainage District, if the
law is of such a character that there is no reasonable
presumption that substantial justice generally will be
done, but the probability is that the parties will be taxed
disproportionately to each other and to the benefit con-
ferred, the law can not stand against the complaint of one
so taxed. Martin v. District of Columbia, 250 TJ. S. 135,
139.''
CHAPTER Xn
PBOPEBTY BIGHTS AS PBOTECTBD BY DUB PBOCESS — ^FBEEDOM
OF CONTBACT
§265. The word ''liberty'' as defined in state law.
The word * liberty'* as an element in^that famous trilogy
of rights defined by the formula, ''life, liberty and prop-
erty, ' ' means far more than ' ' the rights of the citizen to
be free from the mere physical restraint of his person;**
it covers and protects many rights embraced within the
guaranty given by the word ''property'' in the same
formula. Turning to the states as the first source of
interpretation we find that in State v. Goodwill, 33 W. V.
179, the Court said : ' ' The vocation of an employer, as
well as that of his employee, is his property. Depriving
the owner of property of one of its attributes is depriving
him of property under the provision of the Constitution.
People V. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48. The right to use, buy and sell
property, and contract in respect thereto, including con-
tracts for labor— which is, as we have seen, property-
is protected by the constitution. If the legislature with-
out any public necessity, has the power to prohibit or
restrict the rights of contract between private persons
in respect to one lawful trade or business then it may
prevent the prosecution of all trades, and regulate all
contracts.*' In State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, the Court
said : ' ' The principle upon which the cases, English and
American, proceed, is, that every man has the right to
employ his talents, industry and capital as he pleases,
free from the dictation of others; and if two or more
persons combine to coerce his choice in this behalf, it is a
criminal conspiracy. The labor and skill of the workman,
be it of high or low degree, the plant of the manufacturer,
490
§ 266 FREEDOM OP CONTRACT 491
the equipment of the fanner, the investments of com-
merce, are all in equal sense property. '* In Braceville
Coal Company v. People, 147 Dl. 66, the Court said : " The
right of property preserved by the constitution, is the
right not only to possess and enjoy it, but also to acquire
it in any lawful mode, or by following any lawful indus-
trial pursuit which the citizen, in the exercise of the lib-
erty guaranteed, may choose to adopt. Labor is the
primary foundation of all wealth. The property which
each one has in his own labor is the common heritage.
And, as an incident to the right to acquire other property,
the liberty to enter into contracts by which labor may be
employed in such way as the laborer shall deem most
beneficial, and of others to employ such labor, is neces-
sarily included in the constitutional guaranty. '^ See
also. Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98 ; People v. Marx, 99
N. Y. 377. In Young's Case v. Virginia, 101 Va. 853, the
Court said: '*The word * liberty,* as used in the Constitu-
tion of the United States and of the several states, is
deemed to embrace the right of a citizen to be free in the
employment of all faculties ; to be free to u* them in all
lawful ways ; to live and work where he will ; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling, and for that purpose to
enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclu-
sion the purpose aforementioned.''
§266. The word ''liberty" as defined in federal law.
In his concurring opinion in Butchers' Union, etc., Co. v.
Crescent City, etc., Co., Ill U. S. 746, Justice Field said :
**As in our intercourse with our fellow-men certain prin-
ciples of morality are assumed to exist, without which
society would be impossible, so certain inherent rights
lie at the foundation of all governmental action, and upon
a recognition of them alone can free institutions be main-
tained. These inherent rights have never been more
happily expressed than in the Declaration of Independ-
ence, that new evangel of liberty to the people : * We hold
492 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 266
these truths to be self-evident, ' that is, so plain that their
truth is recognized upon their mere statement, Hhat all
men are endowed, ' not by edicts of Emperors or decrees
of Parliament or Acts of Congress, but * by their Creator,
with certain inalienable rights,' that is, rights which can
not be bartered away or given away or taken away ex-
cept in punishment of crime, ^and that among these are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and to secure
these,*' not grant them but secure them, * governments are
instituted among men deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed. ' Among these inalienable rights,
as proclaimed in that great documejut, is the right of men
to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to
pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner
not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which
may increase their property or develop their faculties, so
as to give to them their highest enjoyment.'* The same
great judge in his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, said that the ** Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to give practical effect to the
Declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are
the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer, but
only recognizes.*' In his dissenting opinion in that case,
Justice Swayne said: ** Property is every thing which
has an exchangeable value, and the right of property
includes the power to dispose of it according to the will
of the owner. Labor is property, and as such means
protection. The right to make it available is next in
importance to the rights of life and liberty. * * In AUgeyer
V. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, the Court said: **The 'lib-
erty* mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but
the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to
be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties ; to be free
to use them in all lawful ways ; to live and work where
he will ; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling ; to
pursue any livelihood or avocation ; and for that purpose
§ 267 FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 493
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclu-
sion the purposes above mentioned. ' ' In Lochner v. New
York, 198 U. S, 45, the Court said: '^The general right
to make a contract in relation to his business is part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. ... Of
course the liberty of contract relating to labor includes
both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase
as the other to sell labor.'' In Adair v. United States,
208 U. S. 161, the Court said: **The first inquiry is
whether the part of the tenth section of the act of 1898
upon which the first count of the indictment was based, is
repugnant to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
declaring that no person shall be deprived of liberty or
property without due process of law. In our opinion
that section, in the particular mentioned, is an invasion
of personal liberty as well as of the right of property
guaranteed by that amendment. Such liberty and right
embrace the right to make contracts for the purchase of
the labor of otiiers, and equally the right to make con-
tracts for the sale of one's labor; each right, however,
being subject to the fundamental condition that no con-
tract, whatever its subject matter, can be sustained which
the lata, upon reasonable grownds, forbids as inconsistent
with the public interests, or as hurtful to the public order,
or as detrimental to the common good/'
§ 267. Freedom of contract subject to certain sovereign
powers of the state. In the italicized portion of the
opinion just quoted the couii; has emphasized the fact that
the rights of life, liberty and property" are all subject to
certain sovereign powers of the state, such as the taxing
power, the power of eminent domain and the police power.
Such rights are not therefore in any strict sense either
absolute or ** unalienable." No man is at liberty to
carry on a business injurious to the public morals or
health, or to enter into immoral contracts. Stone v. Mis-
494 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 267
sissippi, 101 U. S, 814 ; Loon Hung v, Crowley, 113 U. S.
703 ; Munger v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 ; Kidd v, Pearson,
128 U. S. 16; L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S- 587; Booth
V. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606;
Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 ; Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U. S.
500 ; Foppino v. Speed, 199 U. S. 501, A business affected
with a public interest may be regulated, provided due
consideration be given to vested rights and to prior con-
tracts entered into by the state. St. Louis, etc., B. Co. v.
Paul, 173 U. S. 404. See also,' Gundling v. Chicago, 177
TJ. S. 188. Purely private vocations are, sfi a general
rule, not subject to restraint by state power. Li Lochner
v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, it was held that a law restrict-
ing the employment of bakers to sixty hours a week was
arbitrary interference with freedom of contract. See
also, Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98 ; Bessette v. People,
193 111. 334 ; People v. Beattie, 96 N. Y. App. Div. 383.
There is no infringement, however, by the enactment of
mechanic's lien laws. Provident Sav. Inst. v. Jersey
City, 113 U. S. 506. A state has however no power to
regulate extra-territorial contracts. In Allgeyer v. Louis-
iana, 165 U. S. 578, it was said : ''Although it may be con-
ceded that this right to contract in relation to persons or
property or to do business within the jurisdiction of the
state may be regulated, and some prices prohibited, when
the contract or business conflict with the policy of the
state as contained in its statutes, yet the power does not
and cannot extend to prohibiting a citizen from making
contracts of the nature involved in this case outside of
the limits and jurisdiction of the state, and which are
also to be performed outside of such jurisdiction. ' '
§ 268. Right of a state to regulate monopolies and com-
binations. While such enactments modify to a certain
extent the freedom of contract, a state has the right to
make laws to regulate and suppress, if necessary, monop-
olies and other combinations tending to control prices.
In National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 TJ. S. 115, it was
§ 268 FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 495
said: **It is certainly the conception of a large body of
public opinion that the control of prices through combi-
nations tends to restraint of, trade and to monopoly,
and is evil. The foundations of the belief we are not
called upon to discuss nor does our purpose require us
to distinguish between the kinds of combinations or the
degrees of monopoly. It is enough to say that the idea
of monopoly is liot now confined to a grant of privilege.
It is understood to include a * condition produced by the
acts of mere individuals. ' Its dominant thought now is,
to quote another, 'the notion of exclusiveness or unity;'
in other words, the suppression of competition by the
unification of interest or management, or it may be
through agreement and concert of action. . • . And
this concern and the policy based upon it has not only
expression in the Texas statutes ; it has expression in the
statutes of other states and in a well known national
enactment. According to them competition, and not com-
bination, should be the law of trade.'* In Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, the Court said : *'Many
state laws which limit the freedom of contract have been
sustained by this court, and therefore an objection to this
law on the general ground that it limits that freedom can
not be upheld. There is no greater sanctity in the right
to combine than in the right to make other contracts.
Indeed, Mr. Dicey in his recent work on Law and Public
Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century indi-
cates that it is out of the very right to make what contracts
one chooses, so strenuously advocated by Bentham, that
combinations have arisen which restrict the very freedom
that Bentham sought to attain and which even might
menace the authority of the state. * ' In Aikens v. Wiscon-
sin, 195 U. S. 194, the Court said: *'It would be impos-
sible to hold that the liberty to combine to inflict such
mischief, even upon such intangibles as business or repu-
tation, was among the rights which the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to preserve. *' And again:
'^When the acts consist of making a combination calcu-
496 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 268
lated to cause temporal damages, the power to pmiish
such acts, when done maliciously, cannot be denied
because they are to be followed and worked out by con-
duct which might have been lawful if not preceded by the
acts. No conduct has such an absolute privilege as to
justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part.
The most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts
or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and
if it is a step in a plot, neither its innocence nor the Con-
stitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the
plot by law. ' '
§269. Freedom of contract as defined in Adair v.
United States. Ih Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161,
already referred to, the Court said : * ' In Lochner v. New
York, 198 TJ. S. 45, which involved the validity of a state
enactment prescribing certain maximum hours for labor
in bakeries, and which made it a misdemeanor for an
employer to require or permit an employee in such an
establishment to work in excess of a given number of
hours each day, the Court said: 'The general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578. Under that provision no state
can deprive any person of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell
labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment,
unless there are circumstances which exclude the right.
There are, however, certain powers existing in the sov-
ereignty of each state in the Union, somewhat vaguely
termed ' police powers, ' the exact description and limita-
tion of which have not been attempted by the courts. . . .
In every case that comes before this court, therefore,
where legislation of this character is concerned, and where
the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the
question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable,
and appropriate exercise of the public power of the state.
§ 270 FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 497
or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary inter-
ference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to
labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary
for the support of himself and family? Of course, the
liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties
to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the other
to sell labor.* Although there was a diiference of opin-
ion in that case among the members of the court as to
certain propositions, there was no disagreement as to
the general proposition that there is a liberty of contract
which can not be unreasonably interfered with by legis-
lation. * *
§ 270. Freedom of contract not infringed by a state law
preventing miners from contracting for wages on a cer-
tain basis. In reaching that conclusion in McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, the Court said: ''That the Con-
stitution of the United States, in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment thereof, protects the right to make contracts for the
sale of labor, and the right to carry on trade or business,
against hostile state legislation, has been affirmed in de-
cisions of this court, and we have no disposition to ques-
tion those cases in which the right has been upheld and
maintained against such legislation. AUgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U. S. 578 ; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161.
But, in many cases in this court, the right of freedom of
contract has been held not to be unlimited in its nature,
and when the right to contract or carry on business con-
flicts with laws declaring the public policy of the state,
enacted for the protection of the public health, safety, or
welfare, the same may be valid, notwithstanding they have
the effect to curtail or limit the freedom of contract. It
would extend this opinion beyond reasonable limits to
make reference to all the cases in this court in which
qualifications of the right of freedom of contract have
been applied and enforced. Some of them are collected
in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, in which it was held
Due Process — 32
498 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 270
that the hours of work in mines might be limited. In
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, it was held
that an act of the legislature of Tennessee, requiring the
redemption in cash of store orders or other evidences of
indebtedness issued by employers in payment of wages
due to employees, did not conflict with any provisions of
the Constitution of the United States, protecting the
rights of contract . . . We take it that there is no
dispute about the fundamental propositions of law which
we have thus far stated: the difficulties and diflferences
of opinion arise in their application to the facts of a given
case. ' ' In applying the principles in question to the facts
of that particular case, involving the validity of a state
statute under which miners employed at quantity rates
were prevented from contracting for wages upon the basis
of screened coal instead of the weight of the coal as orig-
inally produced in the mine, the Court said : **It is insisted
that the miner is deprived of a portion .of his just due
when paid upon the basis of screened coal, because, while
the price may be higher, and theoretically he may be com-
pensated for all the coal mined in the price paid him for
screened coal, that practically, owing to the manner of the
operation of the screen itself, and its diiferent operation
when differently adjusted, or when out of order, the miner
is deprived of payment for coal which he has actually
mined. It is not denied that the coal which passes through
the screen is sold in the market. It is not for us to say
whether these are actual conditions. It is sufficient to
say that it was a situation brought to the attention of the
legislature, concerning which it was entitled to judge and
act for itself in the exercise of its lawful power to pass
remedial legislation. ' '
§ 271. Freedom of contract not destroyed by regulating
distribution of railway coal cars. In Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,
215 U. S. 452, involving the duty of that company to obey
an order of that conmiission, it was held that freedom of
§ 272 PKE5ED0M OP CONTRACT 499
contract was not destroyed by a requirement that a rail-
road company in making its daily distribution of coal
cars, in times of car shortage, to the bituminous coal
mines on its line, should desist from its practice not to
count the fuel cars of the company against the share of
the mine receiving them, on the theory that such discrim-
ination as resulted from such practice arose from the fact
that the company saw fit to purchase its fuel coal from
a particular mine or mines. The Court said : * ^ The right
to buy is one thing, and the power to use the equipment
of the road for the purpose of moving the articles pur-
chased in such a way as to discriminate or give preference
are wholly distinct and different things. The insistence
that the necessary effect of an order compelling the count-
ing of company fuel cars in fixing, in case of shortage, the
share of cars a mine from which coal has been purchased
will be entitled to, will be to bring about a discrimination
against the mine from which the company buys its coal,
and a preference in favor of the other mines, but inveighs
against the expediency of the order. ' '
§ 272. Freedom of contract not unreasonably abridged
by law condemning a trade agreement between retail
lumber dealers. In Grenada Lumber Company v. Missis-
sippi, 217 U. S. 433, it was held that when an agreement
between retail lumber dealers not to deal with any manu-
facturer or wholesale dealer who sells direct to consumers
in localities in which such retail dealers conduct their
business and keep a sufficient stock to meet demands, and
to inform each other of any such sales was condemned
as a combination in restraint of trade by a state statute,
as construed by the highest court of the state, there was
no such unreasonable abridgement of freedom of contract
as the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. The Court said :
'*The contention is that this statute abridges unreason-
ably the freedom of contract, which is as much within the
protection of that Amendment as is liberty of person.
That any one of the persons engaged in the retail lum-
500 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 272
ber business miglit have made a fixed rule of conduct not
to buy his stock from a producer or wholesaler who should
sell to consumers in competition with himself is plain. No
law which would infringe his freedom of contract in that
particular would stand. But when the plaintiffs in error
combine and agree that no one of them will trade with
any producer or wholesaler who shall sell to a consumer
within the trade range of any of them, quite another case
is presented. An act harmless when done by one may
become a public wrong when done by many acting in
concert for it then takes on the form of a conspiracy, and
may be prohibited or punished if the result be hurtful to
the public or to the individual against whom the concerted
action is directed. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 555, 556.*'
See also. Western Union Telegraph Company v. Com-
mercial Milling Company, 218 U, S. 406.
§273. Freedom of contract as guaranteed by Fifth
Amendment not denied by Carmack amendment of June
29, 1906. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v.
Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, it was held that the Car-
mack amendment of June 29, 1906, to the act of February
4, 1887, 820, — ^by which an interstate carrier voluntarily
receiving property for transportation from a point in one
state to a point in another is made liable to the holder of
the bill of lading for a loss anywhere en route, regardless
of any agreement to the contrary, with a right of recovery
over against the carrier actually causing the loss, — ^was a
constitutional exercise by Congress of its power under
the commerce clause which does not conflict with the free-
dom of contract guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Court said : * * It is obvious, from the many decisions
of this court, that there is no such thing as absolute free-
dom of contract. Contracts which contravene public
policy can not be lawfully made at all ; and the power to
make contracts may in all cases be regulated as to form,
evidence, and validity as to third persons. The power of
government extends to the denial of liberty of contract to
§ 273 FREEDOM OP CONTRACT 501
the extent of forbidding or regulating every contract
which is reasonably calculated to injuriously affect the
public interests. Undoubtedly the United States is a gov-
ernment of limited and delegated powers, but in respect
to those powers which have been expressly delegated, the
power to regulate commerce between the states being one
of them, the power is absolute, except as limited by other
provisions of the Constitution itself. Having the express
power to make rules for the conduct of commerce among
the states, the range of Congressional discretion as to the
regulation best adapted to remedy a practice found ineffi-
cient or hurtful is a wide one. . • . The rule is
adapted to secure the rights of the shipper by securing
unity of transportation with unity of responsibility. The
regulation is one which also facilitates the remedy of one
who sustains a loss, by localizing the responsible carrier.
. . . But it is said that the act violates the Fifth
Amendment by taking the property of the initial carrier
to pay the debt of an independent connecting carrier
whose negligence may have been the sole cause of the
loss. But this contention results from a surface reading
of the act, and misses the true basis upon which it rests.
The liability of the receiving carrier which results in
such a case is that of a principal for the negligence of his
own agents. . . • The conclusion we reach in respect
to the validity of the amendment has the support of some
well-considered cases. Among them we cite : Smeltzer
V. St. Louis and S. F. R. Co., 158 Fed. 649; Pittsburg,
C, C. and St. Louis Bailroad Company v. Mitchell, 175
Ind. 196; Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Scott, 133 Ky. 724.''
See also, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467,
in which it was held that by the provisions of the act of
June 29, 1906, 86, rendering unenforceable a prior con-
tract, valid when made, by which an interstate carrier
agreed to issue annual passes for life in consideration of
a release of a claim for damage,— was not taking away
the freedom of contract which the Constitution guar-
antees.
602 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 274
§274. Freedom of contract not infringed by amend-
ment of Iowa Code defining liability of railway corpora-
tions for injuries. In Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co. v. McGuire,
219 U. S. 549, it was held that the amending of certain
provisions of the code of Iowa, — defining the liability of
railway corporations for injuries resulting from negli-
gence and mismanagement in the operation of their rail-
ways, so that a railroad company when sued on such
liability is precluded from making the defense that a
recovery is barred by the acceptance of benefits under a
contract of membership in its relief department, — did not
infringe the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment, The Court said : ' ' The first ground
of attack is that the statute violates the Fourteenth
Amendment by reason of the restraint it lays upon lib-
erty of contract. This section of the Code of Iowa
(§2071), as originally enacted, imposed liability upon
railroad corporations for injuries to employees, although
caused by the negligence or mismanagement of fellow
servants. And it was held by this court that it was clearly
written the competency of the legislature to prescribe this
measure of responsibility, Minneapolis and St. L, B, Co.
V. Herrick, 127 U. S, 210, following Missouri P. B, Co. v.
Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, The statute in its original form
also provided that *no contract which restricts such lia-
bility shall be legal or binding. ' Subsequent to this enact-
ment, the railroad company established its relief depart-
ment, and the question was raised in the state court as to
the legality of the provision then incorporated in the con-
tract of membership, by which, in case of suit for dam-
ages, the payment of benefits was to be suspended until
the suit should be discontinued, and the acceptance of
benefits was to operate as a full discharge. The two prin-
cipal contentions against it were, first, that it was against
public policy, and second, that it was a violation of the
statute. Both were overruled, and with reference to the
statute, it was held that the contract of membership did
not fall within the prohibition, for the reason that it did
§ 275 FREEDOM OP CJONTBACT 503
not restrict liability but put the employee to his election.
Donald v. Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co., 93 Iowa 284 ; Maine v,
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 109 Iowa 260. The legislature
then amended the section by providing expressly that a
contract of this sort and the acceptance of benefits should
not defeat the enforcement of the liability the statute
defined. . . . The policy of the amendatory act was
the same as that of the original statute. Its provision
that contracts of insurance relief, benefit or indemnity,
and the acceptance of such benefits, should not defeat
recovery under the statute, was incidental to the regula-
tion it was intended to enforce. Assuming the right of
enforcement, the authority to enact this inhibition can
not be denied.*'
§ 275. Freedom of contract not interfered with by need-
ful state regulation of boards of trade. In House v.
Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, it was held that constitutional free-
dom of contract was not impaired by the regulation of
the business of boards of trade, organized to enforce as
between its members a high standard of business deal-
ings, by such means, neither arbitrary or unreasonable,
as the state may deem necessary to protect its people
against such unfair practices as are likely to occur. The
Court said: **That it is with the state to devise the
means to be employed to such ends, taking care always
that the means devised do not go beyond the necessities
of the case, have some real or substantial relation to the
objects to be accomplished, and are not inconsistent with
its own constitution or of the Constitution of the United
States. . . . The Supreme Court of Missouri well
observed that the object of the statute was to prevent the
enforcement of a rule of a board of trade, under the ordi-
nary operation of which unfair and fraudulent practices
occur, or would most probably occur, in the sale of grain
and the other conmiodities named. . . . Such regula-
tions do not, in any true sense, interfere with that
* liberty of contract* which the individual members of the
504 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 275
board of trade are undoubtedly entitled, under the Con-
stitution to enjoy, without unnecessary interference from
government. ^ * See also, Broadnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S.
285, in which it was likewise held that there was no uncon-
stitutional interference with the freedom of contract by
a state statute, providing that the keeping of a place
where grains, provisions, and other commodities and
corporate stocks and bonds are bought and sold, but not
paid for and delivered at the time, and where no com-
plete record of the transactions, including a minute of
the time of delivery, is made in a book kept for the pur-
pose, and no memorandum of the sale, properly stamped,
is given the- purchaser, is a criminal offense.
§276. No unwarranted interference with freedom of
contract in Section 5 of Employers' Liability act, 1908.
In Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1
(Second Employers' Liability Cases) it was held that
there is no unconstitutional interference with the freedom
of contract guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment by the
fifth section of the employers' liability act, of April 22,
1908, which puts the stamp of nullity upon any contract,
rule, regulation, or device the purpose of intent of which
is to enable the carrier to exempt itself from the liability
created therein. The Court said: *'But of this it
suffices to say, in view of our recent decisions in Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. V. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, Atlantic Coast
Lin^ R. Co. V. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, and Balti-
more & Ohio R. Co. V. Interstate Conunerce Commission,
221 U. S. 612, that if Congress possesses the power to
impose that liability which we here hold that it does, it
also possesses the power to insure its efficacy by prohib-
iting any contract, rule, regulation, or device in evasion
of it. Coming to the question of classification, it is true
that the liability which the act creates is imposed only on
interstate carriers by railroad, although there are other
interstate carriers, and is imposed for the benefit of all
employees of such carriers by railroads who are employed
§ 277 FBBEDOM OF CONTRACT 505
in interstate commerce, although some are not subjected
to the peculiar hazards incident to the operation of trains,
or to hazards that differ from those to which other
employees in such commerce, not within the act, are
exposed. But it does not follow that this classification is
violative of the *due process of law* clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Even if it be assured that that clause is
equivalent to the 'equal protection of the laws* clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the most that can
be claimed for it here, it does not take from Congress the
power to classify nor does it condemn exertions of that
power merely because they occasion some inequalities.
On the contrary, it admits of the exercise of a wide dis-
cretion in classifying according to general, rather than
minute, distinctions, and condemns what is done only when
it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely
arbitrary. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U. S. 61. Tested by these standards, this classification is
not objectionable.'*
§ 277. Freedom of contract not interfered with by ordi-
nance fixing the size of loaves of bread. In Schmidinger
V. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578, it was held that the freedom of
contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment was
not interfered with by reason of the existence of a con-
siderable demand in the city of Chicago for loaves of
bread of sizes other than those fixed by an ordinance of
that city forbidding the sale of other than standard sizes.
The Court said : * * It is further urged that this ordinance
interferes with the freedom of contract guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment, for it is said that there is a
demand for loaves of bread of sizes other than those fixed
in the ordinance, which demand exists among many people
and also among contractors whose business requires
special sizes to be made for them. This court has had
frequent occasion to declare that there is no absolute
freedom of contract. The exercise of the police power
fixing weights and measures and standard sizes must
506 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 277
necessarily limit the freedom of contract which would
otherwise exist. Snch limitations are constantly imposed
upon the right to contract f reely^ because of restrictions
upon that right deemed necessary in the interest of the
general welfare. So long as such action has a reasonable
relation to the exercise of the power belonging to the local
legislative body, and is not so arbitrary or capricious as
to be a deprivation of due process of law, freedom of con-
tract is not interfered with in {i constitutional sense. See,
in this connection, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire,
219 U. S. 549, and the previous cases in this court re-
viewed in the course of the opinion in that case. ' '
§ 278. Freedom of contract not abridged by state law
punishing the selling of goods at a lower rate in one place
than another. In Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota,
226 U. S. 157, it was held that a law of South Dakota
punishing the selling of goods at a lower rate in one place
than in another, for the purpose of destroying the com-
petition of any regular established dealer therein, or to
prevent the competition of any person, who in good faith,
intends and attempts to become such dealer, does not
abridge the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court said: **0n the first of
these points it is said that an indefensible classification
may be disguised in the form of a description of the acts
constituting the offense, and it is urged that to punish
selling goods in one place lower than at another in effect
is to select the class of dealers that have two places of
business for a special liability, and in real facts is a blow
aimed at those who have several lumber yards along a
line of railroad, in the interest of independent dealers.
All competition, it is added, imparts an attempt to destroy
or prevent the competition of rivals, and there is no dif-
ference in principle between the prohibited act and the
ordinary efforts of traders at a single place. The prem-
ises may be conceded without accepting the conclusion
that this is an unconstitutional discrimination. If the
§ 279 FBEEDOM OF CONTRACT 507
legislature shares the now prevailing belief as to what is
public policy, and finds that a particular instrument of
trade war is being used against that policy in certain
cases, it may direct its law against what it deems the
evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field
of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the
forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are
allowed. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S,
61 ; Missouri P. B. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205. That is
not the arbitrary selection that is condemned in such
cases as Southern E. Co. v. Greene, 216 XJ. S. 400. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation
special in character. Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Sav-
ings Bank, 170 U. S. 283. It does not prohibit a state
from carrying out a policy that cannot be pronounced
purely arbitrary, by taxation or penal laws. Orient
Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 562 ; Quong Wing
V. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 62. If a class is deemed to
present a conspicuous example of what the legislature
seeks to prevent, the Fourteenth Amendment allows it
to be dealt with, although otherwise and merely logically
not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law.
Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, 411. We
must assume that the legislature of South Dakota con-
sidered that people selling in two places made the pro-
hibited use of their opportunities, and that such use was
harmful, although the usual efforts of competitors were
desired. ''
§ 279. Freedom of contract not abridged by state law
making it a crime for a junk dealer to buy certain mate-
rials under certain circumstances. In Bosenthal v. New
York, 226 U. S. 260, it was held that a law of that state,
as construed by its highest court, making it a crime for
a dealer in junk, metals, or second-hand materials to buy
or receive any stolen copper, lead, wire, cable, solder,
brass or iron used by or belonging to a railroad, tele-
graph, telephone, gas, or electric light company, prior to
508 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 279
diligent inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the person selling or delivering it has a legal right to
dispose of the same, does not abridge the freedom of
contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court said : ** We have said enough to indicate the char-
acter of the arguments employed in the effort to show
that the act of 1903 is wholly arbitrary and constitutes
so groundless an interference with the citizen's liberty
of contract as to bring it within the denunciation of the
due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It seems to us that the object of the legislation is well
within the legitimate bounds of the police power of the
state, and sustainable upon the principles discussed in
Mugler V. Kansas, 123 XJ. S. 623, 626, of which more recent
applications are to be found in Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S.
425, 429, and Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489. See also,
Chicago, B, & Q, R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 568.''
§ 280. Freedom of contract abridged by state law mak-
ing it a crime for a person to act as a railway conductor
without certain qualifications. In Smith v. Texas, 233
U. S. 630, it was held that a law of that state making it
a misdemeanor for any one to act as a conductor on a
railway train without previous service for two years as a
freight conductor or brakeman, embodied an unconstitu-
tional abridgment of the freedom of contract guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said: **The
liberty of contract is, of course, not unlimited ; but there
is no reason or authority for the proposition that condi-
tions may be imposed by statute which will admit some
who are competent and arbitrarily exclude others who are
equally competent to labor on terms mutually satisfac-
tory to employer and employee. None of the cases sus-
tains the proposition that under the power to secure
public safety, a privileged class can be created and be
theii given a monopoly of the right to work in a special
or favored position. Such a statute would shut the door,
without a hearing, upon many persons and classes of per-
§ 282 FREEDOM OP CONTRACT 509
sons who were competent to serve, and wonld deprive
them of the liberty to work in a calling they were quali-
fied to fill with safety to the public and benefit to
themselves. ' '
§ 281. Freedom of contract not infringed by state law
forbidding emplojrment of a child or woman for more
than ten hours a day. In Biley v. Massachusetts, 232
U. S. 671, it was held that a law of that state forbidding
the employment of a child or woman for more than ten
hours in any one day, or more than fifty-six hours a week,
in any manufacturing or mechanical establishment, does
not infringe the freedom of contract guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said : ' * The statute
of the state which is assailed provides that no child or
woman shall be employed in laboring in any manufactur-
ing or mechanical establishment more than ten hours in
any one day, except as hereinafter provided in this sec-
tion, unless a different apportionment of the hours of
labor is made for the sole purpose of making a shorter
day 's work for one day of the week, and in no case shall
the hours of labor exceed fifty-six in a week. . . . The
first contention of plaintiff in error is that the statute
restricts the right to sell and buy labor, and therein
infringes the liberty of contract assured by article 14 of
the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
The contention is untenable expressed in this generality.
In MuUer v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, against a similar con-
tention, a statute of Oregon was sustained which pro-
hibited the employment of women in mechanical factories
or laundries working more than ten hours during any one
day with power, as in the Massachusetts statute, to appor-
tion the hours through the day.*'
§ 282. Freedom of contract not infringed by state law
forbidding the issuance of irredeemable orders in pay-
ment of labor. In Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Tay-
lor, 234 U. S. 224, it was held that freedom of contract was
510 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 282
not infringed by a Virginia statute forbidding any
person, corporation or firm, engaged in mining coal
or ore, or manufacturing iron or steel, or any other
kind of manufacturing, to issue, for the payment of
labor, any order not purporting to be redeemable for its
face value in the lawful money of the country. The Court
said : * * Of course we do not go behind the constructioo
given to the state law by the state courts. The abjections
that are urged here are that the statute interferes with
freedom of contract, and, more especially that it is class
legislation of a kind supposed to be inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment ; a West Virginia decision upon
a similar statute being cited to that effect. State v. Good-
will, 33 W. Va. 179. The former of these objections,
however, is disposed of by Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbi-
son, 183 U. S. 13, and Dayton Coal & I. Co. v. BartoD,
183U. S. 23.^'
§283. Freedom of contract not limited by a MisBOuri
statute against combinations. In International Har-
vester Co. V. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, it was held that a
statute of that state against combinations tending to
lessen competition in the importation, manufacture,
transportation, or sale of commodities, does not limit the
freedom of contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, even when its prohibitions are applied to a
combination that has benefited instead of injured the
public. The Court said: '*(1) The specification under
this head is that the Supreme Court found, it is con-
tended, benefit — not injury — to the public had resulted
from the alleged combination. Granting that this is not
an overstatement of the opinion, the answer is immediate.
It is too late in the day to assert against statutes which
forbid combinations of competing companies that a par-
ticular combination was induced by good intentions and
has had some good effect. Armour Packing Co. v. United
States, 209 U. S. 56, 62 ; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 226 U. S. 20, 49. The purpose of such
§ 284 FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 511
statutes is to secure competition and preclude combina-
tions which tend to defeat it. And such is explicitly the
purpose and policy of the Missouri statutes; and they
have been sustained by the Supreme Court. There is
nothing in the Constitution of the United States which
precludes a state from adopting and enforcing such
policy. To so decide would be stepping backwards. Car-
roll V. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401 ; Central Lumber
Co. V. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157. '^
§284. Freedom of contract denied by application of
nonforfeiture provisions of statute of one state so as to
invalidate policy loan agreement made in another. In
New York L. Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, it was held
that the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment was denied by the application of the
nonforfeiture provisions of a Missouri statute in such a
way as to invalidate a policy loan agreement made in
New York between a life insurance corporation of tliat
state and the beneficiary, residing in New Mexico, and
the settlement made in New York in accordance with such
agreement, and in harmony with its laws, although the
original contract was made in Missouri, which had
imposed as a condition of the license granted to the
insurance company to do business in the state, that it
should be subject to its laws just as if it were a corpora-
tion of its own creation. The Court said: **It is illus-
trated as regards the right to freedom of contract by the
ruling in AUgeyer v. Louisiaua, 165 U. S. 578, and it finds
expression in the decisions of this court affirmatively
establishing that a state may not consistently with due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, extend its
authority beyond its legitimate jurisdiction either by way
of the wrongful exertion of judicial power or the unwar-
ranted exercise of the taxing power. And an analysis
of the opinion of the court below makes it clear that its
ruling was rested not upon any doubt concerning the
obvious operation of the Constitution which we have
512 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 284
pointed out, but because it was deemed that the peculiar
facts and circumstances of this case took it out of the gen-
eral rule and caused it to be therefore a law unto itself.'^
The Court in rejecting that assumption said: **But when
this reasoning is analyzed, we think it affords no ground
whatever for taking this case out of the general rule and
making the distinction relied upon. This is so as the
proposition can not be maintained without holding that
because a state has power to license a foreign insurance
company to do business within its borders, and the author-
ity to regulate such business, therefore a state has power
to regulate the business of such company outside its
borders, and which would otherwise be beyond the state's
authority/'
§ 285. Freedom of contract denied by state law making
it a crime for an employer to impose a certain condition
on employee. In Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, it was
held, that the freedom of contract guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment was denied by a law of that state,
as construed and applied by its highest court, imposing
criminal punishment upon an employer or his agent for
having prescribed as a condition upon which one may
secure employment (terminable at will), under, or remain
in the service of such employer that the employee (free
to exercise a voluntary choice) shall enter into an agree-
ment not to become or remain a member of any labor
organization while so employed. After carefully analyz-
ing and comparing the judgment in Adair v. United
States, 208 U. S. 161, the Court said: *'When a man is
called upon to agree not to become or remain a member
of the union while working for a particular employer, he
is in effect only asked to deal openly and frankly with his
employer, so as not to retain the employment upon terms
to which the latter is not willing to agree. And the lib-
erty of making contracts does not include a liberty to
procure employment from an unwilling employer, or
without a fair understanding. Nor may the employer be
§ 285 FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 513
foreclosed by legislation from exercising the same free-
dom of choice that is the right of the employee. To ask
a man to agree^ in advance, to refrain from affiliation with
the nnion while retaining a certain position of employ-
menty is not to ask him to give np any part of his consti-
tutional freedom. He is free to decline the employment
on those terms, just as the employer may decline to offer
employment on any other: For 4t takes two to make a
bargain. ' Having accepted employment on those terms,
the man is still free to join the union when the period of
employment expires; or, if employment at will, then at
any time upon simply quitting the employment. And, if
bound by his own agreement to refrain from joining
during a stated period of employment, he is in no differ-
ent situation from that which is necessarily incident to
term contracts in general. For constitutional freedom of
contract does not mean that a party is to be as free after
making a contract as before ; he is not free to break it
without accountability. Freedom of contract, from the
very nature of the thing, can be enjoyed only by being
exercised ; and each particular exercise of it involves mak-
ing an engagement which, if fulfilled, prevents for the time
any inconsistent course of conduct. So much for the rea-
son of the matter, let us turn again to the adjudicated
cases. The decision in the Adair Case is in accord with
the almost unbroken current of authorities in the state
courts. . . . The right that plaintiff in error is now
seeking to maintain was held by the Supreme Court of
Kansas, in an earlier case [Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and
Tile Co. V. Perry, 69 Kan. 297] to be within the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore beyond
legislative interference. ... In five other states the
courts of last resort have had similar acts under con-
sideration, and in each instance have held them uncon-
stitutional.'* See State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; Gillespie
V. People, 188 HI. 176 ; State ex rel. Zilhner v. Kreutzberg,
114 Wis. 530; People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257; State
ex rel. Smith v. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155. Thus sustained,
I>ne Procefls— 33
514 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 285
both by reason and authority, the court in Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, held ^^that the Kansas act of March
13, 1903, as construed and applied so as to punish with
fine or imprisonment an employer or his agent for merely
prescribing, as a condition upon which one may secure
employment under or remain in the service of such
employer, that the employee shall enter into an agree-
ment not to become or remain a member of any labor
organization while so employed, is repugnant to the ^ due
process * clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and there-
fore void.*'
§ 286. Employment at the will of the parties does not
make it employment at the will of others. The statement
made in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 21, that its princi-
ples apply to an employment terminable at will, suggests
a reference to the later case of Truax v. Baich, 239 TJ. S.
33, involving the application of the equal protection of
the law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which
the Court said : * * That under an employment at will the
complainant could be discharged at any time, for any
reason or for no reason, the motive of the employer being
inunaterial. The conclusion, however, that is sought to be
drawn, is too broad. The fact that the employment is at
the will of the parties, re^spectively, does, not make it one
at the will of others. The employee has manifest interest
in the freedom of the employer to exercise his judgment
without illegal interference or compulsion and, by the
weight of authority, the unjustified interference of third
persons is actionable although the employment is at wiU.
Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 487 ; Berry v. Donovan,
188 Mass. 353 ; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L.
729, 743; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166; Lucke v.
Clothing Cutters, 77 Md. 396 ; London Guar. & Ace. Co. v.
Horn, 101 HI. App. 355; S. C, 206 111. 493; Chipley v.
Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206 ; Blumenthal v. Shaw, 23 C. C. A.
290; S. C, 77 Fed. Bep. 954. '* In this connection refer-
ence should be made to the very recent case of Larkin,
§ 286 FREEDOM OP CONTRACT 515
et al. V. Long, [1915] A. C. 814-846, at pp. 829, 830.
H. L. (1), in which it was said: ** Every person has a
right under the law as between himself and his fellow
subjects, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor
or his own capital, according to his own will. It follows
that every person is subject to the correlative duty aris-
ing therefrom, and is prohibited from any obstruction to
the fullest exercise of this right, which can be made com-
patible with the exercise of similar rights by others. But
it is equally true that the members of trade unions are
bound to respect the right of other workmen to work for
whom they please, on what terms and at what times they
please, so long as they do nothing illegal, and are also
bound to respect the right of an employer to undertake
any work he pleases to undertake, and to employ what
workmen he chooses, on whatever terms they both agree
to, unless there is something unlawful in his action. If,
therefore, any two or more members of a trade union,
whatever its rules may be, wilfully and knowingly com-
bine to injure an employer by inducing his workmen to
break their contracts with him, or not to enter into con-
tracts with him, resulting in damage to him, that is an
entirely different matter. That is an invasion of liberty
of action of others, and has no analogy to the action of the
defendant in the Mogul Case (1) ; for there, as Lord
Halsbury pointed out in Quinn v. Leathem (2), no legal
right has been interfered with, no coercion of mind or
will had been effected, all were left free to trade on what
terms they will, and nothing was done except in rival
trading which could be supposed to interfere with the
appellant's interest.'^ See also. South Wales Miners'
Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] A. C. 239;
H. L. (E) ; Howard v. Banner, decided in the Chancery
Division of the High Court, on June 4, 1901, and reported
in The Times Law Beports, Vol. XVII, p. 348 ; Quinn v.
Leathem (1901) 70 L. J. P. C. 76, 97. (s. c, 1901 A. C.
495.) 27 E. R. C. 66 Id. ed., 1908 Supplement; Lumley v.
Gye (1853) 2 E. & B. 216.
516 DUB PROCESS OF LAW S 287
§287. Freedom of contract not infringed by the so-
called Ohio ''run-of-mine'' or ''anti-screen" law. In
Bail and Biver Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, the Court
said : ^ ' The objection that the law is unconstitntional as
unduly abridging the freedom of contract in prescribing
the particular method of compensation to be paid by
employers to miners for the production of coal was made
in the case of McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, in which
this court sustained a law of the state of Arkansas,
requiring coal mined to be paid for according to the run-
of-mine system according to its weight when brought out
of the mine in cars. In that case the constitutional objec-
tions founded upon the right of contract which are made
here, were considered and disposed of. This court has so
often afiSrmed the right of the state, in the exercise of its
police power, to place reasonable restraints like that here
involved, upon the freedom of contract, that we need only
refer to some of the cases in passing. Schmidinger v.
Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co. v.
McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, and cases therein cited and
reviewed. '^
§288. Freedom of contract not infringed by certain
statutes regulating the employment of women. In Mil-
ler V. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, it was held that the California
statute of 1911, forbidding the employment of women in
certain designated establishments for more than eight
hours in one day, or forty-eight hours in one week, does
not, when applied to women employed in hotels, conflict
with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as an infringement of the freedom of contract guar-
anteed therein; The Court said: **A8 the liberty of con-
tract guaranteed by the Constitution is freedom from
arbitrary restraint, — not inomaunity from reasonable
regulation to safeguard the public interest, — ^the question
is whether the restrictions of the statute have reason-
able relation to a proper purpose. Chicago, B. & Q. B.
Co. V. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549; Erie B. Co. v. Williams,
§ 289 FREEDOM OP CONTRACT 517
233 U. S. 685 ; Coppage v, Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 18. Upon
this point, the recent decisions of this court upholding
other statutes limiting the hours of labor of women must
be regarded as decisive. ' ' It was likewise held in Bosley
V. McLaughlin, 236 XT. S. 385, that the freedom of con-
tract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment was not
infringed by the California statute of 1911, as amended
in 1913, forbidding a graduate woman pharmacist em-
ployed in a hospital to work more than eight hours in one
day, or forty-eight hours in one week; and forbidding
women student nurses in a hospital training school to
work more than eight hours in one day, or forty-eight
hours in one week. It was also held that the freedom of
contract in question was not impaired through the exten-
sion by the California statute of 1913 of the prohibi-
tions of the statute of 1911 to women employed in hospi-
tals, such as matrons, seamstresses, bookkeepers, office
assistants, and persons engaged in household work.
§289. Freedom of contract not infringed by Florida
statute imposing special license taxes on merchants using
profit sharing coupons and trading stamps. In Bast v.
Van Deman and Lewis, 240 XJ. S. 342, the Court said:
'* Having disposed of the other contentions of complain-
ants, we are brought to a consideration of the question
whether the statute of Florida offends the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
In other words, does the statute interfere with the busi-
ness liberty of complainants? Is it an illegal meddling
with a lawful calling and a deprivation of freedom of
contract? This is the contention, and it is attempted to
be supported by the assertion that the schemes detailed
in the bill are but a method of advertising and, as such
mere allurements to customers, not detrimental in any
way to the public health and 'morals, nor obstructive of
the public welfare ; but are a means of enterprise, mere
incidents of the business of complainants and as benefi-
cial to their customers as to them. . . . These con-
518 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 289
tentions have the support of a number of cases. They
are opposed by others, not nearly so numerous as the sup-
porting cases but marking a change of opinion. Both
sets of cases indicate by the statutes passed upon a per-
sistent legislative effort against the schemes under review
or some form of them, beginning in 1880 and repeated
from time to time until the statute in controversy was
passed in 1913. In such differences between judicial and
legislative opinion where should the choice bet . . .
Complainants allege that the license tax which the statute
imposes is of prohibitory character and assert that they
are exercising inviolable rights and privileges wMch
the excess of the tax prevents in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; they contend that hence the statute
is invalid. It is not certain from the allegations of the
bill that the tax is of the asserted character, but granting
it to be so we have shown that the business schemes
described in the bill are not protected from regulation or
prohibition by the Constitution of the United States.
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 ; Booth v. Illinois, 184
U. S. 425 ; Otis v. Parker, 187 U, S. 606 ; see also, Dobbins
V. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 238 ; Murphy v. California,
225 U. S. 623 ; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Charleston, 153
U. S. 692, 699; MoCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27;
Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60 ; Hammond Packing Co.
V. Montana, 233 U. S. 331.'^
CHAPTEB Xm
PBOPBBTY BIGHTS AS PBOTECTED BY DUE PBOCESS—
LIMITATIONS AND BEMEDIES
§ 290. Statutes of limitation regarded as rules of pro-
cedure. As statutes of limitation are generally regarded
as rules of procedure affecting not the right but the rem-
edy (Fullerton v. Bank of United States, 1 Pet. 604;
Townsend v. Jamison, 9 How. 407; Barrett v. Holmes,
102 U. S. 651 ; Michigan Ins. Co, v. Eldred, 130 U. S. 693 ;
Hill V. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 134 U. S. 515; McCul-
lough V. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102), they are not unconstitu-
tional either as denying due process of law or as impairing
the obligation of contracts when a reasonable time, the
nature and circumstances of the case being taken into
account, is allowed for the bringing of the action after the
passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect. In
Terry v. Anderson, 95 IT. S. 628, the Court said : ' ' The par-
ties to a contract have no more a vested interest in a par-
ticular limitation which has been fixed, than they have in
an unrestricted right to sue. They have no more a vested
interest in the time for the commencement of an action
then they have in the form of the action to be com-
menced; and as to the forms of action or modes of
remedy, it is well settled that the Legislature may change
them at its discretion provided adequate means of enforc-
ing the right remain. ... In all such cases, the question
is one of reasonableness, and we have, therefore, only to
consider whether the time allowed in this statute is,
under all the circumstances, reasonable. Of that the
Legislature is primarily the judge ; and we can not over-
rule the decision of that department of the government,
unless a palpable error has been committed. *' The sub-
519
520 DUE PB0CES3 OF LAW § 290
ject of limitations is within the control of the legislature
as a part of the lex fori; and it may increase or diminiah
the period of limitation for existing causes of action.
Great Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U. S. 329; Davis v.
MillS) 194 U. S. 451. Unless some special featare is
obnoxious to constitutional objections, general and spe-
cial laws of limitation are recognized and sustained as
founded on sound policy. Nash v. Fletcher, 44 Miss. 609 ;
Preston v. Louisville, 84 Ky. 118 ; Saloy v. Woods, 40 La.
Ann. 585 ; Perry v. Turner, 55 Mo. 418 ; Smith v. Cleve-
land, 17 Wis. 556; Madden v. Lancaster County, 65
Fed. 188.
§ 291. The constitational limitation of reasonableness.
Every state exercising the power to pass statutes of limi-
tation must do so subject to the fundamental condition
that a reasonable time shall be allowed for the exercise
of the right of action, whether existing or prospective,
after it comes within the prospective or present opera-
tion of the statute and before the bar becomes effective.
Gwin V. Brown, 21 App. Cas. (D. C.) 295; Central Bank
V. Solomon, 20 Ga. 408 ; Norris v. Tripp, 111 Iowa 115 ;
Auld V. Butcher, 2 Kan. 135; MacNichol v. Spence, 83
Me. 87 ; Gilbert v. Ackerman, 159 N. T. 118 ; Culbeth v.
Downing, 121 N. C. 205 ; Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1 ;
Peterson v. Delaware, 9 Kulp 552 ; Stoddard v. Owings,
42 S. C. 88 ; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596 ; Pereles v.
Watertown, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 10,980, 6 Biss. 79 ; Society
for Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 Fed. Cas. No.
13,156, 2 Gall 105 ; Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co.,
132 Fed. 434. The period of limitation fixed by the legis-
lature is always subject to judicial review and will be
declared unreasonable, and as such unconstitutional,
where it is so manifestly inadequate as to amount to a de-
nial of justice. Gwin v. Brown, 21 App. Cas. (D. C.) 295 ;
Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1 ; Pereles v. Watertown,
19 Fed. Cas. No. 10,980, 6 Biss. 79; Williams v. Port
Chester, 72 N. Y. App. Biv. 505, 76 N. Y. Supp. 631 ; Lam
§ 292 LIMITATIONS AND EBMEDIES 521
V. Powder River Live Stock Co., 132 Fed. 434 ; Cyc. of
L. and P. rd. 25, pp. 986-7. A statute shortening the period
of limitation is not within the constitutional power of the
legislature, unless a reasonable time, taking into con-
sideration the nature of the case, is allowed for the bring-
ing of a suit after the passage of the statute and before
the bar takes effect. Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90.
See also, McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662. An exist-
ing right of action can not be taken away by shortening
the period of limitation to a time which has expired
already. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596. The statute
is void, if the period fixed by it is unreasonably short, and
designed to defeat the remedy upon pre-existing con-
tracts which is a part of their obligation. Edwards v.
Kearzey, 96 TJ. S. 595. A statute is unreasonable and
obnoxious to the objection that it impairs the rights of
private property, if it bars a past right of action without
any provision for a period within which an action may
be brought. Hope v. Johnson, 2 Terg. 123 ; United States
v. Sampernac, 1 Hampst. 118; Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Ga.
350 ; Eathbone v. Bradford, 1 Ala. 312 ; Coosa River S.
Co. V. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120; Holcome v. Tracy, 2 Minn.
241; Cook v. Wood, 1 McCord L. 139; Beltzhoover v.
Yewell, 11 Gil. & J. 212 ; Cox v. Berry, 13 Ga. 306 ; Bill-
ings V. Hall, 7 Cal. 1; Blackford v. Pether, 1 Black. 36;
Griffin v. McKenzie, 7 Ga. 163 ; Ward v. Kelts, 12 Wend.
137 ; Eckstein v. Shoemer, 3 Meart. 15 ; Frey v. Kirk, 4
Gil. & J. 509; Hawkins v. Barney, 5 Pet. 458; Charles
Kiver Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 ; Satterlee v.
Matthewson, 16 Serg. & R. 169 ; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn.
474. See Ed. note Co-op. ed. Supreme Court Reports,
No. 34, p. 660. Subject to the foregoing exceptions such
statutes are valid; and, applying to the remedy merely,
their retroactive operation is no objection to them.
§ 292. When statutes of limitation may be retroactive.
The Federal Constitution does not deprive a state of the
right to enact retroactive laws divesting vested rights,
522 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 292
provided they do not impair contract obligations and are
not ex post facto. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88 ; Charles
Eiver Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Baltimore
& S. R. Co. V. Nesbit, 10 How. 395. Such laws may be
proper or necessary as relate back to a period ante-
cedent to their enactment, and which have the effect of
saving time from the statute of limitations or of excusing
acts which were unlawful when committed. Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386. * * A retroactive effect has accordingly
been given statutes providing a new mode of enforcing
claims against the state (Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690)
or county (Oilman v. Contra Costa County, 6 Cal. 676),
authorizing the issue of executions (Myers v. Moran, 113
N. Y. App. Div. 427) and attachments (Kuehn v. Paroni,
20 Nev. 203; Rouge v. Rouge, 114 Misc. (N. Y.) 421;
Swartz V. Lawrence, 12 Phila. 181) in cases where
they were not permitted before, authorizing a particular
procedure for the settlement of estates (Fitzhugh v. Fitz-
hugh, 6 B. Mon. 4), authorizing the foreclosure of mort-
gages in certain cases (Kennebec, etc., R. Co. v. Portland,
<»tc., R. Co., 59 Me. 9), relating to the enforcement of liens
(Orman v. Crystal River R. Co., 5 Colo. App. 493), regu-
lating the parties to an action for death by wrongful act
(Berry v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 52 Kan. 759), relating
to the remedy on bonds given by an insolvent petitioner
(State V. Burke, 2 Gill. (Md.) 79), relating to the limita-
tions of actions (Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153; Crooks
V. Crooks, 4 Grant Cp. (N. C.) 615; Notman v. Crooks,
10 N. C. Q. B. 105), relating to the extension of chattel
mortgages ( Aultman, etc., Mach. Co. v. Fish, 120 HI. App.
314), allowing recoupment of usurious interest (Bowen
V. Phillips, 55 Ind. 226), making compliance with certain
conditions a necessary prerequisite to the validity of cer-
tain defenses (Erskine v. Glidden, Me. [1886], 3 Atl.
651), and even to statutes relating to procedure in crim-
inal cases (State v. Maine, 16 Wis. 398). But any
generalization founded on the distinction between right
and remedy is attended with some danger because of the
§ 293 LIMITATIONS AND REMEDIES 523
difficulty of drawing the distinction accurately (Kent v.
Gray, 53 N. H. 576, 579) ; and where the remedy is taken
away altogether (Knight v. Lee, [1893] 1 Q. B. 41, 62
L. J. Q. B. 28), or is encumbered with conditions that
would render it useless or impracticable to pursue it
(Ball V. Anderson, 196 Pa, St. 86), where, under the guise
of making a change in the remedy a new right or obliga-
tion is created (Ladianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Kercheval,
16 Ind. 84; Plummer v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 152 Fed.
206; Dixen v. Winnipeg Electric St. R. Co., 11 Mani-
toba 528), or where the intention of the legislature to
give the statutes only prospective operation is dearly
expressed in the act (Crawford v. State, Minor (Ala.)
143; People v. Hays, 4 Cal. 127; Louisiana Citizens*
Bank v. Devnoodt, 25 La. Ann. 628; Fuller v. Grand
Rapids, 40 Mich. 395 ; Lovell v. Arnold, 2 Leigh 16 ; Sears
V. Mahoney, 66 Fed. 860), it will not be construed to effect
remedies and procedure as to causes of action answering
before its passage. '' Cyc of L. and P. Vol. 3, pp. 1213-14.
In Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, it was
held that a statute of that state was not lacking in due
process which forfeited to the state, for the benefit of
actual occupants in adverse possession, in case of failure
of the owner or claimant to list the lands and pay the
taxes therein for certain specified years, because the
effect was to cut down the period of limitation in which
actions could be brought by the holders of the title to
recover against adverse claimants.
§ 293. When exemption from suit, by the ending of the
completed statutory period, becomes a vested right.
Bearing in mind the generally recognized distinction
between the effect of a statute of limitations when it is
based on the possession of real or personal property and
when it defines a mere i)eriod of prescription for the
assertion of a right of action (Townsend v. Jamson,
9 How. 407), it may be said that when it is based on pos-
session it ripens into a title which is a vested right,
524 DUE PB0GE33 OF LAW § 293
because adverse possession for the period prescribed by
statute confers a title as perfect and complete as a grant
Such a vested right the legislature cannot defeat or take
away by subsequent legislation. Atkinson v. Dunlap,
50 Me. Ill; Bagg's App., 43 Pa. 512; Eyder v. Wilson,
41 N. J. L. 9 ; Sprechler v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432 ; Hoden
V. James, 11 Mass. 396; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; Wood-
man V. Fulton, 47 Miss. 682; Naught v. Oneal, Breese
(111.) 36; Gordner v. Stephens, 1 Heisk. 280; Parish v.
Edgar, 15 Wis. 532; Martin v. Martin, 35 Ala. 560;
Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533 ; Toltec Ranch Co. v.
Cook, 191 U. S. 532; Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 456; North-
em Pac. R. Co. V. Ely, 197 U. S. 1. A very different con-
dition of things exists when a statute is only a legislative
bar to a right of action, as for a debt, because the debt is
not paid by lapse of time, nor is there in equity any vested
right not to pay the debt, even after the statutory period
has barred the right of action. In explaining that dis-
tinction in Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, the Court said :
^^The English and American statutes of limitation have
in many cases the same effect, and, if there is any con-
flict of decisions on the subject, the weight of authority
is in favor of the proposition that, where one has had the
peaceable, undisturbed, open i>ossession of real or per-
sonal property, with an assertion of his ownership, for
the period which, under the law, would bar an action for
its recovery by the real owner, the former has acquired
a good title — a title superior to that of the latter, whose
neglect to avail himself of his legal rights has lost him
his title. This doctrine has been repeatedly asserted in
this court. Leffmgwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599; Croxall
V. Shererd, 5 Wall. 289 ; Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S.
583 ; Bicknell v. Comstock, 113 U. S. 152. It is the doc-
trine of the English courts, and has been often asserted
in the highest courts of the states of the "Union. It may
therefore, very well be held that in an action to recover
real or personal property where the question is as to the
removal of the bar of the statute of limitations by a legis-
§ 294 LIMITATIONS AND REMEDIES 529
lative act passed after the bar has become i>erfect) such
act deprives the party of his property without due process
of law. The reason is^ that, by the law in existence
before the repealing act, the property had become the^
defendant's. Both the legal title and the real ownership
had become vested in him, and to give the act the effect
of transferring this title to plaintiff would be to deprive
him of his property without due process of law.
But we are of opinion that to remove the bar which
the statute of limitations enables a debtor to interpose
to prevent the payment of his debt stands on very differ-
ent ground. A case aptly illustrating this difference in
the effect of the statute of limitations is found in 3 J. J.
Marshall's Ky. R. 364 (Smart v. Baiigh), in which the
opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Robertson, . . .
^ A debt barred by time is a sufficient consideration for a
new assumpsit. The statute of limitations only disquali-
fies the plaintiff to recover a debt by suit if the defendant
rely on time in his plea. It is a personal privilege,
accorded by law for reasons of public expediency; and
the privilege can only be asserted by plea. ' The distinc-
tion between the effect of statutes of limitation in vesting
rights to real and personal property and its operation as
a defense to contracts, is well stated in Jones v. Jones,
18 Ala. 248. See also, LangdelPs Equity Pleadings,
§§ 118, et sequitur/' Approved in Sharon v. Tucker,
144 U. S. 544 ; In re Burton, 29 Fed. 639 ; Hulbert v. Clark,
128 N. Y. 298.
§294. Montoyo v. Oonsales. In that case (232 U. S.
375), it was held that by **a peculiar statute,*' not **the
ordinary statute of limitation,'* under which ten years*
possession by a disseizor of a strip of a grant lying
between the Bio Grande and the foothills to the west,
under a deed purporting to convey the land from the
river westward to the ridge of Rio Puerco, and giving
title to the whole did not deprive the heirs of the original
grantee in the Alameda land grant of their property
626 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 294
without due process of law. The Court said: **It only
remains to consider whether there is anything in the Con-
stitution of the United States to prevent the statute from
.doing its work. We limit our inquiry to its operation in
the present case, and do not speculate as to whether other
cases could be put in which the letter of some part of the
law could not be sustained. As applied to the inter-
veners, the statute simply enacts that possession for ten
years of the front and cultivable portion of a strip under
a deed carrying the whole of it back to the ridge of the
Puerco shall give title to the whole. We can see no taking
of property without due process of law in this. A statute
of limitation may give title. Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook,
191 U. S. 532; Davis v. Mills, 194 U, S. 451, 456; United
States V. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S.
447. The disseizee has notice of the law and of the fact
that he is dispossessed, and that a deed to the disseizor
may purport to convey more than is fenced in. If he
chooses to wait ten years without bringing suit, he is not
in a position to complain of the consequences, — ^at least,
not when, as in the present case, the deeds do not purport
to convey more than a reasonable man probable would
have anticipated. See Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 201
U.S. 359.^'
§295. Sight of the legislature to change remedies.
Just as a state has the general and undoubted right to
enact statutes of limitation, it has the general and
undoubted right to change remedies. It may be stated in
general terms that there is no such thing as a vested
right in particular remedies. In Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, the Court said: **The forms of
administering justice, and the duties and i>owers of courts
as incident to the exercise of a branch of sovereign power,
must ever be subject to legislative will, and the jwwer
over them is inalienable, so as to bind subsequent legis-
latures.*' In this case it was held that a certain sum-
mary proceeding for the collection of debts given to the
S 296 LIMITATIONS AND BEMEDIES 527
Bank by the legislature of Maryland was not a part of
its corporate franchises, and was therefore subject to
repeal at the pleasure of the legislature. In reaching
that conclusion Mr. Justice Johnson, speaking for the
court, gave this famous definition of ^Mue process of
law,'* or the **law of the land,'* which has been ranked
with that given by Webster in the Dartmouth College
Case: **As to the words from Magna Carta, incorpo-
rated into the constitution of Maryland, after volumes
spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the
good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this :
that they were intended to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unre-
strained by the established principles of private rights
and distributive justice." And yet the undoubted right
of a legislature to change forms of action and modes of
procedure is like the right to enact statutes of limitations
subject to such serious qualifications as to make such
qualifications or exceptions as important as the rule
itself.
§296. Qualiflcations of the foregoing rule. While a
state may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding
in its courts, in relation to past as well as future con-
tracts (Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 ; Cook v. MoflFat,
5 How. 315) ; while it may modify existing remedies and
even substitute others without impairing the obligation
of the contract, if a sufficient remedy be left, or another
sufficient one be provided (Memphis v. United States,
97 U. S. 293; Tennessee ex rel. Bloomstein v. Sneed,
96 TJ. S. 69) ; while whatever belongs merely to the
remedy may be altered according to the will of the legis-
lature (Hill V. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 134 U. S. 515),
a state law so affecting the remedy which existed when a
contract was made as substantially to impair and lessen
the value of the contract is void as impairing its obliga-
tion. Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Seibert v.
Lewis, 122 XJ. S. 284. The obligation of a contract is
528 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 296
impaired whenever legislation lessens the efficiency <^
the means which, at the time of making a contract^ the
law provided for its enforcement as by postponing or
retarding such enforcement Louisiana ex rel. Banger v.
New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, cited in Louisiana v. Pitts-
burg, 105 U. S. 301 ; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 XJ. S. 750.
As a state can not enact a law acting directly upon the
terms of a contract, so it can not pass a law professing
only to regulate the remedy when in fact it impairs the
obligation of the contract. Grantly v, Ewing, 3 How. 707.
If a state statute impairs- th,e means provided by ftiw
for the enforcement of a contract at the time of its
making, it is unconstitutional and void. Louisiana ex reL
Nelso V. St. Martins Parish, 111 U. S. 716; Bamitz v.
Beverly, 163 U. S. 118. A statute which does not sup^y
an alternative remedy equally adequate and efficacious,
impairs the obligation of a contract in the constitutional
sense, if it prevents its enforcement, or materially
abridges the remedy for its enforcement which existed
when it was made. McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662.
If a change of remedy is made after a contract has been
executed, it can only be valid, when it substitutes an ade-
quate and sufficient remedy through which the contract
may be enforced, or where such remedy existed and
remained unaffected by the new law. King v. Missouri,
107 U. S. 221. The obligation of a contract is impaired
by any law that causes a deviation from its terms by
accelerating or delaying the period of performance it
prescribes, imposing conditions not expressed, or dis-
pensing with the performance of such as are expressed,
no matter how apparently immaterial their effect upon
the contract may be. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1. The
remedy provided by a state law when the contract is
executed can not be impaired by subsequent decisions of
courts any more than by subsequent statutes. United
States ex rel. Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575. It was
therefore held that a provision in the constitution of
Georgia, that no court should have jurisdiction to give
§ 296 LIMITATIONS AND REMEDIES 529
judgment on or enforce any debt the consideration of
which was a slave or the hire of the same was void as to
debts contracted prior to its adoption. White v. Hart,
13 Wall. 646. A statute of Virginia was held to be uncon-
stitutional as impairing the obligation of a contract,
which provided that, in an action for the enforcement of
any contract for the sale or hiring of property made
between January 1, 1862, and April 10, 1865, the court or
jury might adopt the fair value of the proi)erty sold, or
the fair rent or hire of the property hired, as the meas-
ure of the recovery instead of that fixed by the express
terms of the contract itself. EflSnger v. Kenney, 115
U. S. 566.
A state has however the right to fix the extent to which
mutual obligations may be set off against each other, and
the method of doing it, without impairing the obligation
of contracts, provided the rights of third parties are not
affected thereby. Blount v. Windley, 95 U. S. 173. See
also. National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co.,
226 U. S. 276; Pittsburg Steel Co. v. Baltimore Equitable
Soc, 226 U. S. 455. Parties are not deprived of vested
rights, and the obligation of contracts is not impaired
by a statute repeating usury laws, and destroying de-
fenses to existing contracts on the ground of usury.
Ewell V. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143. In Drehman v. Stifle,
8 Wall. 595, it was held that a statute was not invalid as
impairing the obligation of a contract even when its effect
was to take away the remedy in a proceeding of forcible
entry and detainer, where the ouster was effected by
military authority, because that remedy as provided by
the law of Missouri, under which the merits of the title
could not be inquired into, did not enter into the contract
between lessor and lessee, such contract providing that
the former shall keep the latter in lawful possession of
the leased premises during the lease. And so it was held
in Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, that the clause in
the constitution of West Virginia of 1872 providing that
the property of a citizen shall not be sold on a judgment
I>ae Process — 34
530 DUE PROCESS OP LAW S 296
for an act done during the civil war, did not violate the
obligation of a contract when the judgment was founded
on a tort committed as an act of public war ; that a judg-
ment in an action of tort is not protected by that pro-
vision of the Federal Constitution forbidding a state to
pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. In that
case the Court said : * * Prior to the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment the power to provide such remedies,
although they may have interfered with what were called
vested rights, seems to have been fully conceded. The
cases in which this has been decided in this court are
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Satterlee v. Matthewson,
2 Pet. 222 ; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88 ; and Freeborn v.
Smith, 2 Wall. 160. In the latter case, Mr. Justice Grier,
when the Congress of the United States had allowed an
appeal where the judgment would have otherwise been
final, used this language: *If the judgment below was
erroneous, the plaintiff in error had a moral right at
least to have it set aside, and the defendant is only claim-
ing a vested right in a wrong judgment.' And he thus
quotes the language of Chief Justice Parker, in Foster v.
Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245 : ^The truth is there is no sudi
a thing as a vested right to do wrong ; and a legislature,
which in its acts not expressly authorized by the consti-
tution, limits itself to correcting mistakes, and to pro-
viding remedies for the furtherance of justice, can not be
charged with violating its duty or exceeding its author-
ity.* Many other cases might be cited in which it was
held that retroactive statutes, when not of a criminal
character, though affecting the rights of parties in exist-
ence, are not forbidden by the Constitution of the United
States.'* Thus it appears that there is no deprivation of
due process of law when a universally recognized remedy
is applied retrospectively through a subsequent enact-
ment to rights not vested. A law is however unconstitu-
tional when given a retroactive effect, if it so changes
existing remedies as materially to impair the rights of
a party to the contract. Re City Bank of New Orleans,
§ 296 LIMITATIONS AND REMEDIES 531
3 How, 292. And in Grear v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, it was
held that a law denying to the owner of land a remedy to
recover its possession when withheld by a party, however
innocently, or to recover the profits of it, impairs his
rights in the property and is in violation of a contract
providing for the security of such rights.
CHAPTEB XIV
LIFE AND UBBBTY AS PBOTECTED BY DUB PBOCESS — ^PBOCEDUBE
IN CBIMINAL CASES IN FEDERAL OOUBTS
§ 297. No change in procednrei either under federal or
state laW| must work a denial of fundamental rights.
The declaration made in Backas v. Fort Street Union
Depot Co., 160 U. S. 557, that *' There is no vested right
in a mode of procedure. Each succeeding legislature may
establish a different one, provided only that in each are
preserved the essential elements of protection, ' *— embod-
ies a basic principle which underlies all Federal and state
legislation upon the subject The legislatures. Federal
and state, may make any changes however radical in
modes of procedure, provided always that such changes
do not work a denial of fundamental rights. In the words
of the court in Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 175 : * * The
state has full control over the procedure in its courts,
both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the quali-
fication that such procedure must not work a denial of
fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applica-
ble provisions of the Federal Constitution. Ex parte
Eeggel, 114 U. S. 642; Iowa Central Railway v. Iowa,
160 U. S. 389 ; Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad v. Chicago, 166
XJ. S. 226.*' Neither Congress nor the state legislature
can prescribe modes of procedure that deny due process ;
and in Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, the fact was empha-
sized that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
places the same limitation upon the Federal Government
as that of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the states.
In that case the Court said : * * The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it has been held, legitimately operates to extend to
the citizens and residents of the states the same protec-
532
§ 298 FEDERAL CRIMINAL PBOGEDUBE 533
tion against arbitrary state legislation affecting life,
liberty and property as is offered by the Fifth Amend-
ment against similar legislation by Congress; but that
the Federal courts ought not to interfere when what is
complained of amounts to the enforcement of the laws of
a state applicable to all persons in like circumstances and
conditions, and that the Federal courts should not inter-
fere unless there is some abuse of law amounting to
confiscation of property or a deprivation of personal
rights, such as existed in the case of Norwood v. Baker,
172 U.S. 269/'
§ 298. Due process clause of Fifth Amendment as re-
enforced by Amendments Six and Seven. The Fifth
Amendment provides that **No person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentation or indictment of a grand jury except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." The Sixth
Amendment provides that * * In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.'*
The Seventh Amendment provides that: **In suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
534 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 298
re-examined in any court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law. ' ' In Articles
of Amendment, V, VI, and VII are restated the guaran-
ties of due process of law, springing from chapter 39 of
the Great Charter, and from the English jury system,
grand and petit, as that system existed at the time of the
severance of the colonies from the mother country.
* * During the one hundred and forty-two years that inter-
vened between Cokeys death and the severance of the
English colonies in America from the mother country,
what may be called the ancient Constitution of England,
first clearly defined in Magna Carta, was transformed
into the modem Constitution through the Revolutions of
1640 and 1648. The reformed and invigorated constitu-
tional system that stands out after those revolutions was
a vastly wider and more complete fabric of liberty under
law than that existing in Coke 's time. Those revolutions
brought into being many new constitutional principles,
most of which passed into American law, of which Coke
never heard.*' Taylor, The Origin and Gbowth of thb
American Constitution, pp. 78-79. Subject to the limi-
tations contained in that enlarged statement, as embodied
in Articles of Amendment, V, VI, and VII, Congress must
legislate when dealing with the subject of procedure in
criminal cases, always mindful of the fact that no change
must be made in such procedure as will "work a denial of
fundamental right or conflict with the specific and appli-
cable provisions of the Federal Constitution. ' ' Promi-
nent among the leading oases expounding that branch of
the subject, heretofore reviewed in Part I, are Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 528; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81; j
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 101.
V
§ 299. Federal right to indictment by grand jury in
criminal cases — ^Informations. The purpose of the first
clause of the Fifth Amendment, providing that **no per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
§ 300 FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 535
of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces^ or in the militia^ wheu in actaai service in
time of war or public danger/' was to peipetuate the
grand jury as an instrument for the prosecution of serious
crimes in the courts of the United States. In Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516, the Court said: '*The saihe
words are contained in the Fifth Amendment. That
article makes specific and express provision for perpetu-
ating the institution of the grand jury so far as it relates
to prosecutions for the more aggravated crimes under
the laws of the United States. • • • The conclusion is
equally irresistible that when the same phrase was em-
ployed in the Fourteenth Amendment to restrain the
action of the states, it was in the same sense and with no
greater extent ; and that if in the adoption of that amend-
ment it had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the
institution of the grand jury in all the states, it would
have embodied, as did the Fifth, express declarations to
the effect.*' An infamous crime can not be punished
except upon presentment or indictment by a grand jury.
Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S. 348; United States v.
De Walt, 128 U. S. 393. The provision of the Fifth
Amendment is jurisdictional, and no Federal court can
try a prisoner without indictment or presentment in such
cases. Re Bain, 121 U. S. 1 ; Parkinson v. United States,
121 U. S. 281 ; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S.
228. For a definition of infamous crimes, see Parkinson
V. United States, 121 U. S. 281 ; Re Wilson, 114 U. S. 417.
Offenses of a lower grade may be prosecuted in the Fed-
eral courts by information. Nebraska ex rel. Wakely v.
Lockwood, 3 Wall. 236; Re Wilson, 114 U. S. 417; United
States V. Isham, 17 Wall. 496 ; United States v. Buzzo, 18
Wall. 125.
§ 300. Federal right to trial by petit jury. The term
**conMnon law'* as used in the Seventh Amendment, whicli
provides that **In suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
536 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 300
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon l8w/' is intended to embrace suits in which legal
rights are to be ascertained and determined, in contra-
distitiction to those in which equitable rights alone are
recognized and equitable remedies administered, or suits
of a mixed nature, such as proceedings in admiralty,
where public and maritime law are combined. Parsons v.
Bedford, 3 Pet. 433. All suits not in the equity or admir-
alty jurisdiction are ** suits at common law'* in which the
right to trial by jury is preserved. Knickerbocker Ins.
Co. V. Comstock, 16 Wall. 258. Under the prohibition of
the Seventh Amendment Federal courts can not re-ex-
amine facts tried by a jury except in the granting of a
new trial by the court in which the original issue was
tried, or on the award of a venire facias de novo by an
appellate court for some error of law which intervened
in the proceedings. Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436. An
act of Congress can not give the power to change the
constitutional rule that secures unanimity in finding a
verdict as an essential feature of trial by jury in common
law cases. Springville v. Thomas, 166 U. S. 707. The
. Federal constitution secures the right of trial by jury,
both in the civil and criminal cases, to the people of the
District of Columbia. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540;
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1. So far as it
secures the right to trial by jury the Seventh Amendment
applies to judicial proceedings in the territories of the
United States. Black v. Jackson, 177 U. S. 349. The
right of trial by jury was not, however, extended by the
Federal Constitution, of its own force, and without legis-
lation, to the people of the Philippine Islands, ceded to
the United States by Spain and not incorporated by con-
gressional action into the United States. Dorr v. United
States, 195 U. S. 138.
§ 301. Right to plead guaranteed by Fifth Amendment.
In Crain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625, it was expressly
§ 301 FEDERAL (TEIMINAL PEOCEDURE 637
held that due process requires that the defendant shall
plead or be ordered to plead, or in a proper case that a
plea of not guilty be filed for him, before his trial can
rightfully proceed. The Court said : * * In capital or other
infamous crimes an arraignment has always been re-
garded as a matter of substance. 'The arraignment of
the prisoner,' Lord Coke said, 4s to take order that he
appear and for the certainty of the person to hold up his
hand, and to plead a sufficient plea to the indictment or
other record. ' Co. Litt. 263a. ... It is true that the
constitution does not, in terms, declare that a person
accused of crime can not be tried until it be demanded
of him that he plead, or unless he pleads, to the indict-
ment. But it does forbid the deprivation of liberty with-
out due process of law ; and due process of law requires
that the accused plead, or be ordered to plead, or, in a
proper case, that a plea of not guilty be filed for him,
before his trial can rightfully proceed; and the record
of his conviction should show distinctly and not by infer-
ence merely that every step involved in due process of
law and essential to a valid trial was taken in the trial
court ; otherwise the judgment will be erroneous. ' '
In Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U. S. 199, it was held
that neither due process of law nor the right to trial by
jury was denied, contrary to the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution, because, after a demur-
rer to the indictment which had been entertained after a
plea of not guilty had been entered and not withdrawn was
overruled, the jury already impaneled and sworn, was
dismissed, and the accused was forthwith arraigned, and
required to plead, and this having been done, and both
sides again announcing themselves ready for trial, the
jury previously impaneled was sworn and the trial pro-
ceeded. The Court said : * * Whether or not, under the cir-
cumstances, it wa8^ a necessary formality to dismiss the
jury in order to enable the accused to be again arraigned
and plead, the action taken was clearly within the bounds
of sound judicial discretion. United States v. Perez, 9
Wheat. 579 ; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 85, 85. See
538 DUE PROCaSSS OP LAW § 301
United States v. Eiley, 5 Blatchf . 204, in which the facts
were in substance identical with those here presented."
§ 302. A person accrued of felony necessarily present
during entire trial — Privilege can not be waived. In
Hopt V. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, the Court said : *' We are of
opinion that it was not within the power of the accused or
his counsel to dispense with the statutory requirement as
to his personal presence at the trial. . . . The public
has an interest in his life and liberty. Neither can be
lawfully taken except in the mode prescribed by law. That
which the law makes essential in proceedings involving
the deprivation of life and liberty, can not be dispensed
with or affected by the consent of the accused ; much less
by his mere failure, when on trial and in custody, to
object to unauthorized methods. . . . the Legislature
has deemed it essential to the protection of one whose life
is involved in a prosecution for felony, that he shall be
personally present at the trial, that is at every stage of
the trial when his substantial rights may be affected by
the proceedings against him. If he be deprived of his
life or liberty without being so present, such deprivation
would be without that due process of law required by the
constitution.*' The right to be present during the trial
is confined however to presence in the trial court and
does not extend to an appellate court. The accused can
not complain when such a court, in affirming the judg-
ment of the court below, fixes the date of his execution in
accordance with law, that such date was fixed in his ab-
sence. Schwab V. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442; Fielden v.
Illinois, 143 U. S. 452. In affirming such doctrine in Lewis
V. United States, 146 U. S. 370, the Court said : ** A lead-
ing principle that pervades the entire law of criminal
procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be
done in the absence of the prisoner. While this rule has
at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been some-
what relaxed, yet in felonies it is not in the power of the
prisoner, either by himself or his counsel, to waive the
§ 302a FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 539
right to be personally present during the trial/' Then,
quoting from Hopt v. Utah, the Courii continued : * * The
prisoner is entitled to an impartial jury composed of per-
sons not disqualified by statute, and his life or liberty may
depend upon the aid which, by his personal presence, he
may give to counsel and to the courts and triers, in the
selection of jurors. The necessities of the defense may
not be met by the presence of his counsel only. For every
purpose, therefore, involved in the requirement that the
defendant shall be personally present at the trial, where
the indictment is for a felony, the trial commences at least
from the time when the work of impanelling the jury
begins.'' Tn Dowdell v. United States, 221 U. S. 331, Mr.
Justice Day said: **In Hopt v, Utah, 110 U! S. 574, this
court held that due process of law required the accused
to be present at every stage of the trial. ' ' In spealdng
of the necessity for the presence at every stage of the
trial of a defendant on trial for felony who is not at large
on bail, the Court in Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442,
said: **In cases of felony our courts, with substantial
accord, have regarded it as extending to every stage of tha
jury and the reception of the verdict, and as being
scarcely less important to the accused than the right of
trial itself. And with like accord they have regarded an
accused who is in custody and one who is charged with a
capital offense as incapable of waiving the right ; the one,
because his presence or absence is not within his own
control, and the other because, in addition to being usually
in custody, he is deemed to suffer the constraint naturally
incident to an apprehension of the awful penalty that
would follow conviction."
§ 302ft. Summary of rights of persons and property
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Here may be
conveniently summarized the rights of persons and prop-
erty guaranteed by the Federal Constitution : Freedom
of religious worship ; freedom of speech and of the press ;
right to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
540 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 3Q2a
ances ; right of the people peaceably to assemble (Amend-
ment 1) ; right of the people to keep and bear arms
(Amendment 2) ; freedom from quartering of soldiers in
time of peace without the consent of the owner of the
premises, or in time of war except in a manner prescribed
by law (Amendment 3) ; immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures, guaranteeing all citizens security
in their persons, houses and effects, no warrant to issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized (Amendment 4) ;
immunity from prosecution for « capital or otherwise in-
famous crime unless on an indictment or presentment of
a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces or in the militia when in actual service in time of
war or public danger; freedom from a second jeopardy
for same offense; freedom from being compelled in a
criminal prosecution to be a witness against one's self;
security in life, liberty and property unless when deprived
of the fiame by due process of law ; security of property
against appropriation by the Government, unless it be
for public use and with just compensation (Amend-
ment 5).
In criminal prosecutions: (a) the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and dis-
trict wherein the crime charged shall have been commit-
ted, which district must have been previously ascertained
by law; (b) notice of the nature and cause of every accu-
sation ; (c) compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
one's favor; (e) assistance of counsel for one's defense
(Amendment 6). Eight of trial by jury is guaranteed in
suits at common law where the value in controversy is in
excess of twenty dollars ; and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise re-examined than according to the rules of
the common law (Amendment 7). Freedom from ex-
cessive bail or fines or the infliction of cruel or unusual
punishments ( Amendment 8 ) . *
1 — For this summary the author is indebted to his son, Hannis Joseph
Taylor.
CHAPTER XV
LIFE AND UBBBTY AS PROTECTED BY DUB PB0C5ESS — PBOCEDUBE
IN CBIMINAL CASES IN STATE COUBTS
§ 303. How far the states may modify existing systems
of procedure in criminal cases. In the Slaughter House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, the Court, after recognizing the fact
that ** there is a citizenship of the United States and a
citizenship of a state which are distinct from each other,
and which depend upon different characteristics or cir-
cumstances in the individual,^* declared that ** privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the United States
. . . are placed by this clause ( Section 1 of Article
XIV) under the protection of the Federal Constitution,
and that the latter, whatever they may he, are not
intended to have any additional protection by this para-
graph of the amendment. If then there is a difference be-
tween the privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen
of the United States as such, . . . the latter must rest
for their security and protection where they have hereto-
fore rested ; for they are not embraced in this paragraph
of the amendment.'* Thus the conclusion was reached
that the privileges and immunities * * which belong to citi-
zens of the states as such, . . . are left to the state
governments for security and protection/' It follows
therefore that the rights belonging to a citizen of a state as
such, which are protected against state action by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are em-
braced in a much narrower circle than those protected
against the action of the Federal Government by the Fed-
eral Bill of Eights embodied in the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States. Those
amendments only limit the powers of the Federal Govem-
541
642 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 308
tuent, they do not limit the powers of the state in respect
to their own citizens. In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131,
it was contended ''that though originally the first ten
amendments were adopted as limitations on federal
power, yet in so far as they secure and recognize funda-
mental rights— common-law rights— ^f the man, they
make them privileges and immunities of the man as a
citizen of the United States, and cannot now be abridged
by a state under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other
words> while the ten amendments as limitations on power
only apply to the Federal Government, and not to the
states, yet in so far as they declare or recognize rights of
persons, these rights are theirs, as citizens of the United
States, and the Fourteenth Amendment as to such rights
limits state power, as the ten amendments had limited
federal power.'* In overruling that contention the Court
said : * ' That the first ten articles of amendments were not
intended to limit the powers of the state governments in
respect to their own people, but to operate on the Na-
tional Government alone, was decided more than a half
century ago, and that decision has been steadily adhered
to since. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247 ; Living-
ston V. Moore, Id. 469, 552; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 434;
Smith V. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 76 ; Withers v. Buckley,
20 How. 84, 91 ; Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475,
479 ; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321, 325 ; The
Justices V. Murray, 9 Wall. 274, 278 ; Edwards v. Elliott,
21 Wall 532, 557 ; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S- 90 ; United
States V. Cruikshank, Id. 542, 552 ; Pearson v. Yewdall,
95 U. S. 294, 296 ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,
101 ; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 140 U. S. 79 ; Presser v. Illinois,
106 U. S. 252, 265.*' It follows therefore that the states
may modify existing systems of procedure to any extent
in criminal cases, provided such modifications do not
**work a denial of fundamental rights,*' as such rights
exist within that narrow circle which the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment defines.
§ 304 STATE CRIMINAL PEOCEDUKE 543
§304. The struggle to leave the states untrammeled,
as far as possible, in the making of codes of criminal pro-
cedure. The powerful dissenting opinion delivered in
the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, hy Justice Field,
and concurred in by Chief Justice Chase and Justices
Bradley and Swayne, was a manifestation of a desire
upon the part of four great jurists to give the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a protection
against state action of the ''privileges and immunities"
belonging to citizens of a state as such, a much wider
operation than that given it by the majority of the court.
Justice Field said: ''The terms 'privileges and immuni-
ties ' are not new in the amendment ; they were in the Con-
stitution before the amendment was adopted. They are
found in the Second Section of the Fourth article which
declares that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
states' and they have been the subject of frequent con-
sideration in judicial decisions. . . . What the clause
in question did for the protection of the citizens of one
state against hostile and discriminatng legislation of
other states, the Fourteenth Amendment does for the pro-
tection of every citizen of the United States against hostile
and discriminaing legislation against him in favor of
others, whether they reside in the same or different states.
If under the Fourth Article of the Constitution, equality
of privileges and immunities is secured between citizens of
different states, under the Fourteenth Amendment the
same equality is secured between citizens of the United
States. . • . Now, what the clause in question does
for the protection of the citizens of one state against the
creation of monopolies in favor of other states, the Four-
teenth Amendment does for the protection of every citizen
of the United States against the creation of any monopoly
whatever.'' In the dissenting opinion delivered by Jus-
tice Harlan in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, that
great judge, as a continuation of struggle begun by the
minority in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, said :
544 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 304
'^The eourty in its consideration of the relative rights of
the United States and of the several states, holds, in
this case, that, without violating the Constitution of the
United States, a state can compel a person accused of
crime to testify against himself. In my judgment,
immunity from self-incriminations is protected against
hostile state action, not only by that clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment declaring that 'no state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States,'
but by the clause in the same amendment, 'nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law/ . • . At the
time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment immunity
from self-incrimination was one of the privileges of im-
munities belonging to citizens for the reason that the
Fifth Amendment, speaking in the name of the people of
the United States, had declared, in terms, that no person
* shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness
against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law/ ... I can not
support any judgment declaring that immunity from self-
incrimination is not one of the privUeges or immunities of
national citizenship, nor a part of the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment against hostile state
action. * ' Putting aside the merits of that great conten-
tion, which the future must determine, the fact remains
that the law of the land to-day is embodied in that nar-
rower construction of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment given by the majority of the court in
the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. From that time
the tendency of the court has been to leave the states
untrammeled, as far as possible, in the making of codes
of criminal procedure. Just how far the court has gone
in that direction can only be illustrated by reference to
particular cases.
§305. Right of a state to abolish grand juries. In
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, it was held that the
§ 305 STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 545
words **du« process of law^' in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment do not necessarily require an indictment by a grand
jury in a state prosecution for murder. After discussing
the statement made by Justice Miller in Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, that **It is not possible to hold that
a party has, without due process of law, been deprived of
his property, when, as regards the issues affecting it, he
has by the laws of the state a fair trial in a court of
justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable
to such a case," Mr. Justice Matthews said:
**We are to construe this phrase in the Fourteenth
Amendment by the usus loquendi of the Constitution
itself. The same words are contained in the Fifth Amend-
ment. That article makes specific and express provisions
for perpetuating the institution of the grand jury, so far
as relates to prosecutions of the more aggravated crimes
under the laws of the United States. . . • According
to a recognized canon of interpretation, especially ap-
plicable to formal and solemn instruments of constitu-
tional law, we are forbidden to assume, without clear,
reason to the contrary, that any part of this most impor-
tant amendment is superfluous. The natural and obvious
inference is, that in the sense of the Constitution, *due
process of law' was not meant or intended to include, ex
vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury
in any case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that
when the same phrase was employed in the Fourteenth
Amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was
used in the same sense and with no greater extent ; and
that if in the adoption of that amendment it had been part
of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of the grand
jury in all the states, it would have embodied, as did the
Fifteenth Amendment, express declarations to that effect.
Due process of law in the latter refers to that law of the
land which derives its authority from the legislative
powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of
the United States, exercised within the limits therein
prescribed, an<J interpreted according to the principles
Due Process — 35
546 DUB PROCESS OP LAW 1 305
of the common law. In the Fourteenth Amendment, by
parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land in each
state, which derives its authority from the inherent and
reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits
of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions, and the greatest security for which resides in the
right of the people to make their own laws, and alter
them at their pleasure. ... It follows that any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanc-
tioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discre-
tion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general
public good, which regards and preserves those principles
of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of
law.'*
§ 306. Right of the highest court of a state to dismiss
a writ of error in a criminal case. In Allen v. Georgia,
166 U. S. 138, the prisoner had been convicted in the state
» court of murder, and sued out a writ of error from the
Supreme Court of the state. On the day assigned for its
hearing it appeared that he had escaped from jail and
was a fugitive from justice. The court thereupon ordered
the writ of error dismissed, unless he should within sixty
days surrender himself or be recaptured, and when that
time passed without either happening, the writ was dis-
missed. He was afterwards recaptured, and resentenced
to death, whereupon he sued out a writ of error to this
court, assigning as error that the dismissal of his writ
by the Supreme Court of Georgia was a denial of due
process of law. This contention was denied, and in the
course of the opinion Mr. Justice Brown said :
** Without attempting to define exactly in what due
process of law consists, it is suflScient to say that, if the
Supreme Court of a state has acted in consonance with
constitutional laws of a state and its own procedure, it
could only be in very exceptional circumstances that this
court would feel justified in saying that, there had been
§ 307 STATE CRIMINAL PROOEDUKE 547
a failure of due legal process. We might ourselves have
pursued a different course in this case, but that is not the
test. The plaintiff in error must have been deprived of one
of those fundamental rights, the observance of which is
indispensable to the liberty of the citizen, to justify our
interference.
** We can not say that the dismissal of a writ of error is
not justified by' the abandonment of his case by the
plaintiff in the writ. By escaping from legal custody he
has, by the laws of most, if not all, of the states, committed
a distinct criminal offense ; and it seems but a slight pun-
ishment for such offense to hold that he has thereby
abandoned his right to prosecute a writ of error, sued out
to review his conviction.'*
§ 307. Right of a state to provide for a trial by a struck
jury. In Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, the ques-
tion was presented as to whether a trial by a struck jury
constituted due process of law. Dealing with this sub-
ject Mr. Justice Brewer said :
**The state has full control over the procedure in its
courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to
the qualification that such procedure must not work a
denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and
applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution. Ex
parte Eeggel, 114 U. S. 642 ; Iowa Central Railway v.
Iowa, 160 U. S. 389 ; Chicago, B. & Q, Railroad v. Chicago,
166 U. S. 226.
* * In providing for a trial by a struck jury, empanelled
in accordance with the provisions of the New Jersey stat-
ute, no fundamental right of the defendant is trespassed
upon. The manner of selection is one calculated to secure
an impartial jury and the purpose of criminal procedure
is not to enable the defendant to select jurors, but to
secure an impartial jury. . . • Due process and
equal protection of the laws are guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment, and this amendment operates to
restrict the powers of the state, and if trial by a struck
648 DUE PEOCESS OP LAW § 307
jury conflicts with either of these specific provisions it
can not be sustained. A perfectly satisfactory definition
of due process may perhaps not be easily stated. In
Hurtado v. California, 110 U, S. 516, supra, Mr. Justice
Matthews, after reviewing previous declarations, said:
*It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or
newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power,
in furtherance of the general public good, which regards
and preserves these principles of liberty and justice must
be held to be due process of law. ' In Leeper v. Texas,
139 U. S. 462, Chief Justice Fuller declares 'that law
in its regular course of administration through courts of
justice is due process, and when secured by the law of
the state all constitutional requirement is satisfied. ' With
any and all definitions, trial by a struck jury in the ntianner
prescribed must, when authorized by a statute valid under
the constitution of the state, be adjudged due process."
§ 308. Right of a state to authorlM a criminal trial by
a petit jury of eight. In Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581,
the court, following Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516,
held that the trial of a person accused as a criminal by a
petit jury of only eight persons instead of twelve, and
his subsequent imprisonment after conviction, do not de-
prive him of his liberty without due process of law.
Whether a trial, in criminal cases not capital shall be by
a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors, and
whether, in case of an infamous crime, a person shall be
only liable to be tried after presentment or indictment by
a grand jury, are questions properly to be determined by
the citizens of each state for themselves. The Court said :
'*The question is, as we believe, substantially answered
by the reasoning of the opinion in the Hurtado case, supra.
The distinct question was there presented whether it was
due process of law to prosecute a person charged with
murder by an information under the State Constitution
and law. It was held that it was, and that the Fourteenth
§ 308 STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 549
Amendment did not prohibit snch a procedure. In our
opinion the right to be exempt from prosecution for an
infamous crime, except upon a presentment by a grand
jury, is of the same nature as the right to a trial by a petit
jury of the number fixed by the common law. If the state
have the power to abolish the grand jury and the conse-
quent proceeding by indictment, the same course of reas-
oning which establishes that right will and does establish
the right to alter the number of the petit jury from that
provided by the common law. Many cases upon the sub-
ject since the Hurtado case was decided are to be found
gathered in Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 TJ. S. 262 ; Holden
V. Hardy, 169 TJ. S. 366, 384 ; Brown v. New Jersey, 175
XJ. S. 172 ; Bolhi V. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83.
** Trial by jury has never been affirmed to be a necessary
requisite of due process of law. In not one of the cases
cited and commented upon in the Hurtado case is a trial
by jury mentioned as a necessary part of such process.
. . . As was stated by Mr. Justice Brewer, in deliver-
ing the opinion of the court in Brown v. New Jersey,
175 XJ. S. 172, the state has full control over the procedure
in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only
to the qualification that such procedure must not work a
denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and
applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution. The
legislation in question is not, in our opinion, open to
either of these objections.**
In this case the Court also said: **It is claimed, how-
-ever, that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment the effect of the former amendments has been
thereby changed and greatly enlarged. It is now urged
in substance that all the provisions contained in the first
ten amendments, so far as they secure and recognize the
fundamental rights of the individual as against the exer-
cise of Federal power, are by virtue of this amendment
to be regarded as privileges and immunities of a citizen
of the United States, and therefore the states can not
provide for any procedure in state courts which could not
550 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 308
be followed in a Federal court because of the limitations
contained in those amendments. This was also the con-
tention made upon the argument in the Spies Case, 123
U. S. 151 ; but in the opinion of the court therein, which
was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, the question
was not decided because it was held that the case did not
require it. * ' After thus stating that momentous question
the court held that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment had not had the effect of making all
the provisions contained in the first ten amendments
operative in state courts, on the ground that the funda-
mental rights protected by them are, by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to be regarded as privileges and
immunities of citizens of. the United States.
§309. Exemption from compulsory self-incrimination
in state courts not a violation of the due process clause
of Fourteenth Amendment. In Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78, that conclusion was reached in a decision
that held that privileges and immunities, although funda-
mental, which do not arise out af the nature, and charac-
ter of the National Government, or are not specifically
protected by the Federal Constitution, are attributes of
state, and not of national citizenship ; that the first eight
amendments are restrictive only of national action, and
that while the Fourteenth Amendment limited state
action, it did not take up and protect citizens of the states
from action by the states as to all matters emnnerated in
the first eight amendments. In demonstrating that .com-
pulsory self-incrimination in a state tribunal was not a
denial of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court contended that, viewed historic-
ally, an exemption from such self-incrimination did not
form a part of the **law of the land'' prior to the separa-
tion of the colonies from the mother country, and, there-
fore, was not one of the fundamental rights, immunities
and privileges of a citizen of the United States. Speak-
ing through Justice Moody the court, in a ncytaWe
§ 309 STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 551
opinion, said: **What is due process of law may be
ascertained by an examination of those settled usages and
modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute
law of England before the emigration of our ancestors,
and shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and
political condition by having been acted on by them after
the settlement of this country. This test was adopted by
the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, in Mur-
ray V. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 280. . . .
The decisions of this court, though they are silent on
the precise question before us, ought to be searched to
discover if they present any analogies which are helpful
in its decision. The essential elements of due process of
law, already established by them, are singularly few,
though of wide application and deep significance. We are
not here confronted with the effect of due process in re-
straining substantive laws, as, for example, that which
forbids the taking of private property for public use with-
out compensation. We need notice now only those cases
which deal with the principles which must be observed in
the trial of criminal and civil causes. Due process re-
quires that the court which assumes to determine the
rights of parties shall have jurisdiction, Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34;
Old Wayne Life Association v. McDonough, 204 U. S.
8, and that there shall be notice and opportunity for hear-f
ing given the parties, Hovey v. Elliott, 167 TJ. S. 409;
Boiler V. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 ; and see Londoner v. Den-
ver, 210 U. S. 373. Subject to these two fundamental
conditions, which seem to be universally prescribed in all
systems of law established by civilized countries, this
court has up to this time sustained all state laws, statutory
or judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and
methods of trial, and held them to be consistent with due
process of law. • • •
Among the most notable of these decisions are those
sustaining the denial of jury trial both in civil and crim-
inal cases, the substitution of informations for indictments
552 DUE PROCESS OP LAW' § 309
by a grand jury, the enactment that the possession of
policy slips raises a presumption of illegality, and the
admission of the deposition of an absent witness in a
criminal case. The cases proceed npon the theory that,
given a conrt of justice which has jurisdiction, and acts,
not arbitrarily, but in conformity with a general law, upon
evidence, and after inquiry made with notice to the par-
ties affected and opportunity to be heard, then all the
requirements of due process, so far as it relates to pro-
cedure in court and methods of trial and character and
effect of evidence, are complied with. Thus it was said
in Iowa Central R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 393: *But it is
clear that the Fourteenth Amendment in no way under-
takes to control the power of the state to determine by
what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obliga-
tions be enforced, provided the method of procedure
adopted gives reasonable notice and affords fair oppor-
tunity to be heard before the issues are decided ; * and in
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Schmidt, 177 TJ. S.
230, 236 : * It is no longer open to contention that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States does not control mere forms
of procedure in state courts or regulate practice therein.
All its requirements are complied with, provided in the
proceedings which are claimed not to have been due proc-
ess of law the person condemned has had suflScient notice
and adequate opportunity has been afforded him to
defend.'^'
§ 310. Refusal to set aside a verdict, after the rendition
of which, one of the jurors became insane. In Jordan v.
Massachusetts, 225 XT. S. 167, in which the accused was
convicted by a jury and sentenced to death, one of the
jurors, after the verdict, became insane. The court then
refused to set aside the verdict after an inquiry, con-
ducted in accordance with the established procedure of
the state, had established, by a preponderance of evi-
dence and not beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juror
§ 310 STATE CRIMINAL PBOCEDURE 553
was of suflScient mental capacity during the trial to act
as such. In sustaining the conclusion of the court Justice
Lurton said: **That the procedure in this was in con-
formity with the constitution and law of Massachusetts
is determined by the judgment and opinion of the Supreme
Judicial Court. Subject to the requirement of due proc-
ess of law, the states are under no restriction as to the
method of procedure in the administration of pulMic
justice. That the court had jurisdiction and that there
was a full hearing upon the issue made by the suggestion
of the insanity of the juror is not questioned. 'Subject to
these two fundamental conditions, which seem to be uni-
versally prescribed in all systems of law, • . . this
court has, up to this time, sustained all state laws, statu-
tory or judicially declared, regulating procedure, evi-
dence, and methods of trial, and held them to be consistent
with due process of law.* Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U. S. 78. • • . Due process implies a tribunal both
impartial and mentally competent to afford a hearing.
But to say that due process is denied when a competent
state court refuses to set aside the verdict of a jury be-
cause the sanity of one of its members was established by
only a preponderance of evidence, would be to enforce
an exaction unknown to the precedents of the past, and
an interference with the discretion and power of the state
not justified by the demands of justice, nor recognized by
any definition of due process.
In criminal cases due process of law is not denied by a
state law which dispenses with a grand jury indictment
and permits prosecution upon information, nor by a law
which dispenses with the necessity of a jury of twelve,
or unanimity in the verdict. Indeed, the requirement of
due process does not deprive a state of the power to
dispense with jury trial altogether. Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U. S. 516 ; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 XT. S. 581. When
the essential elements of a court having jurisdiction in
which an opportunity for a hearing is afforded are pres-
ent, the power of a state over its methods of procedure is
554 DUE PROCESS OP LA^ § 310
substantially unrestricted by the due process clause of
the Constitution. ' '
§ 311. Due process not denied because no amdgmnent
or plea was had upon a second information. In Garland
V. Washington, 232 U. S. 642, it was held that the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
was not denied where there was a conviction upon a sec-
ond and amended information (after a prior conviction
under the original information had been set aside and a
new trial granted), because no arraigimient or plea was
had upon the second information, the accused, without
kaving made a specific objection on that account, being put
to trial just as if he had entered a formal plea of not
guilty. The Court said : * * It is apparent that the accused
was tried and convicted upon an information charging
an offense against the law ; that he had a jury trial, with
full opportunity to be heard, and that he was in fact de-
prived of no right or privilege in the making of his
defense, unless such deprivation arises from the fact that
he was not arraigned and required to plead to the second
information before trial. The object of arraignment
being to inform the accused of the charge against him
and obtain an answer from him, was fully subserved in
this case, for the accused had taken objections to the sec-
ond information and was put to trial before a jury upon
that information in all respects as though he had entered
a formal plea of not guilty. In this view, the Supreme
Court of Washington, following its former decisions,
held that the failure to enter the plea deprived the
accused of no substantial right, and that having failed
to make objection upon that ground before trial it was
waived and could not be subsequently taken. This ruling,
it is contended, deprived the plaintiff in error of his
liberty without due process of law within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
**Due process of law, this court has held, does not re-
quire the state to adopt any particular form of procedure,
S 811 STATE CRIMINAL PEOCEDURE 555
•
SO long as it appears that the accused has had sufficient
notice of the accusation and an adequate opportunity to
defend himself in the prosecution. Boger v. Peck, 199
U. S. 425, 435, and previous cases in this court there
cited. Tried by this test it cannot for a moment be main-
tained that the want of formal arraignment deprived the
accused of any substantial right or in any wise changed
the course of trial to his disadvantage. All requirements
of due process of law in criminal trials in a state, as laid
down in the repeated decisions of this court, were fully
met by the proceedings had against the accused in the
trial court. ... It is insisted, however, that this
court in the case of Grain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625,
held the contrary. In that case the question was specif-
ically made as to the necessity of a plea before trial, duly
entered of record. The learned Justice who spoke for
the majority of the court announced its conclusion approv-
ing a number of early cases in the state courts which had
held that such form of. arraignment entered of record
was essential to a legal trial, and holding that in a Fed-
eral court no valid trial could be had without the requisite
arraignment and plea, and that such must be shown by
the record of conviction. If a legal trial can not be had
without a plea to the indictment, duly entered of record
before trial, it would follow that such omission in the
present case requires a reversal of the judgment of con-
viction, because the prisoner has been deprived of due
process of law.''
Then, after declaring that **with improved methods of
procedure and greater privileges to the accused, any
reason for such strict adherence to the mere formalities
of trial would seem to have passed away,*' the Court said :
** Holding this view, notwithstanding our reluctance to
overrule former decisions of this court, we now are con-
strained to hold that the technical enforcement of formal
rights in criminal procedure sustained in the Grain case
is no longer required in the prosecution of offenses under
present systems of law, and so far as that case is not in
556 DUE PBOCESS OP LAW § 3U
accord with, the views herein expressed^ it is necessarily
overruled,*' And here reference may be appropriately
made to the following cases in which it was held that the
due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not involved in certain decisions by state courts
as to the entry of a nolle proseque to those counts in an
indictment of several courts upon which the jury could
not agree (Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131; as to
the failure of an indictment to charge a specific offense ;
Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692 ; Leeper v. Texas, 139
TJ. S. 462; In re Bobertson, 156 XJ. S. 183; Bergemann v.
Backer, 157 U. S. 655; Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 297;
Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126) ; as to a trial and con-
viction by a judge de facto of a court de jure, where the
sentence pronounced was valid (In re Manning, 139 TJ. S.
506) ; as to the existence of flaws in the indictment and
their waiver by the defendant (0*Neil v. Vermont, 144
XT. S. 323) ; as to the presence of an alien on a trial jury,
objection not having been made at the proper time under
the law of the state (Kohl v. Lehback, 160 U. S. 297) ; as to
the action of a state court in dismissing the appeal of the
accused on account of his escape from jail and failure to
surrender himself within a time prescribed by the court
(Allen V. Georgia, 166 TJ. S. 138) ; as to the action of an
appellate court in dismissing a writ of habeas corpus,
when the commitment was not void, the committing court
having jurisdiction (Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 TJ. S. 101) ;
as to a decision by a state court that certain acts consti-
tuted an offense indictable at common law (Howard v.
Fleming, 191 U. S. 126).
§312. Right of the accused to be present in a state
court at every stage of his trial. Whether the accused
has that right, as a part of the due process of law guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, has long been con-
sidered an unsettled question. In his able work on "Due
Process of Law,'' published in 1906, Professor McGehee
(p. 167) says: **We have no direct adjudication as to
§ 312 STATE CEIMINAIi PROCEDURE 557
whether the right of pleading or the right of the accused
to be present at the trial is guaranteed, as against the
states, by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment That author at p. 165 says: *^So, also,
under the same provision (Fifth Amendment), the right
of a person accused of felony to be present during the
whole of the trial in the trial court, is a substantive right
of which he can not be deprived without due process of
law, even with his consent, ' * citing Lewis v. United States,
146 U, S. 372. In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
2nd ed., 452, that great jurist says : **In cases of felony,
where the prisoner's life or liberty is imperiled, he has
the right to be present and must be present, during the
whole of the trial and until the final judgment. If he be
absent, either in prison or by escape, there is a want of
jurisdiction over the person, and the court cannot pro-
ceed with the trial, or receive the verdict, or pronounce
the final judgment/^ The right to try an accused person
in his absence is peculiarly a Boman law institution,
always held in abhorence by the English common law
which established the opposing principle as an integral
and necessary part of the system of trial by jury. In Bex
V. Ladsingham, Sir T. Baym, 193, it was said: ** *Tis
intended that no privy verdict can be given in criminal
cases which concern life, as felony, because the jury are
commanded to look upon the prisoner when they give their
verdict, and so the prisoner is to be there present at the
same time ; ' ' and American authorities emphasize the fact
that, **at the rendition of the verdict, the prisoner is
entitled to have the jury polled, so that each one shall
answer on Jhis own responsibility, face to face with the
prisoner, as to his guilt or innocence.*' Dunn v. Com.,
6 Pa. St. 384; Temple v. Com., 14 Bush (Ky.) 769; Nolan
V. State, 55 Ga. 522.
The Fifth Amendment does not guarantee to the ac-
cused, in express terms, the right to be present at every
stage of his trial ; there is not a word in that amendment
on the subject. The right of the accused to be present in
jK8 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 312
a Federal court at every stage of his trial is strictly a
creation of judge-made law; it is the result of the inter-
pretation of the Fifth Amendment given by the Supreme
Court in accordance with the rule laid down by Chief
Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch 470.
That great jurist determined in that case that whenever
it becomes necessary to interpret any part of our organic
law, which was borrowed from the mother coimtry, it. is
to be assumed that the f ramers of American constitutions
took it with the meaning attached to it in the land from
which it was drawn. And so when in Hopt v. Utah, 110
U. S. 574, the court speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan,
undertook to establish the right in question in Federal
courts as a part of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, it was said : * * *The natural life \ says Black-
stone, ^cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any
individual, neither by the person himself nor by any other
of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority.'
1 Bl. Com. 133. The public has an interest in his life and
liberty. Neither can be lawfully taken except in the mode
prescribed by law. That which the law makes essential
in proceedings involving the deprivation of life or Uberty
can not be dispensed with or affected by the consent of
the accused ; much less by his mere failure, when on trial
and in custody to object to unauthorized methods. The
great end of punishment is not the expiation or atonement
of the offense committed, but the prevention of future
offenses of the same kind. 4 Bl. Com. 11. . . . If he
(the accused) be deprived of his life or liberty without
being so present, such deprivation would be without that
due process of law required by the Constitution. * * While
in Schwab v. Berggren,* 143 U. S. 442, it was held that the
rule relating to the presence in court of the accused did
not require his presence at the time of the affirmance of
his conviction on appeal, the Court was careful to say
(p. 448) : **The personal presence of the accused, from
the beginning to the end of a trial for felony, involving
life or liberty, as well as at the time final judgment is
§ 812 STATE CEIMINAL PROCEDURE 559
rendered against him, may be, and must be assumed to
be, vital to the proper conduct of his defense, and can
not be dispensed with. * * The more complete statement on
that subject made in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U, S. 574, was
then quoted and approved. In* Lewis v. United States,
146 U. S. 370, it was again held, even with great emphasis,
that in cases of felony, it is not in the i)ower of the pris-
oner, either by himself or counsel, to waive the right to
be personally present at every stage of his trial ; and that
the record must show affirmatively that he was so present.
In Dowdell v. United States, 221 U. S. 331, the Court
said: *'In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, this court held
that due process of law required the accused to be present
at every stage of the trial. ' * In Diaz v. United States,
223 U. S. 442, the Court said: **In cases of felony our
courts, with substantial accord, have regarded it as ex-
tending to every stage of the trial, inclusive of the em-
panelling of the jury and the reception of the verdict, and
as being scarcely less important to the accused than the
right of trial itself. And with like accord they have re-
garded an accused who is in custody and one who is
charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the
righf In support of its assertion that in ** cases of fel-
ony our courts, with substantial accord, have regarded
it as extending to every stage of the trial,'* the Court
then says that **The reasoning upon which this rule of
decision rests is clearly indicated in Barton v. State, 67
Ga. 653, where it is said by the Supreme Court of Georgia :
* It is the right of the defendant in cases of felony, • . .
to be present at all stages of the trial, especially at the
rendition of the verdict ; and if he be in such custody and
confinement ... as not to be present unless sent for
and relieved by the court, the reception of the verdict dur-»
ing such compulsory absence is so illegal as to necessitate
the setting it aside . . . The principle thus ruled is
good sense aAd sound law ; because he can not exercise the
right to be present at the rendition of the verdict when
in jail, unless the officer of the court brings him into the
560 DUE PEOCBSS OP LAW § 312
court by its order/* The law as thus expounded by the
Supreme Court of Georgia is in perfect accord with like
decisions, too numerous for citation, rendered by the high-
est courts of Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis*
souri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
In the original title deed to the New World, represented
by James I's charter of April 10, 1606, it was provided
* * that all and every the persons being our subjects, which
shall dwell and inhabit within every or any of the said
several colonies and plantations, and every of their chil-
dren, which shall happen to be bom within any of the
limits and precincts of the said several colonies and plan-
tations, shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises, and
immunities, within any of our other dominions, to all
intents and purposes as if they had been abiding and
born within their own realm of England or any other of
our said dominions.*' Charters and Constitufions, part
II, pp. 1891-1892. We know that long before that charter
was issued, long before the first English settlements in
the New World were made, the general right in question
had become, by the law of the land, the birth-right of
every Englishman ** abiding and bom within their own
realm of England or any other of our said dominions."
Sir James F. Stephen, in his description of the procedure
in criminal trials, ** which took place between 1554 and
1637, '^ says: **When the case was considered ripe for
trial the prisoner was arraigned and the jury sworn,
after which the trial began by the speeches of the counsel
for the crown. ' ' Hist, of the Crim. Law, I, p. 325. From
* ' Coke upon Littleton, ' ' 227f , whose author died in 1634,
we learn: **But in criminal cases of life or member, the
jury can give no privy verdict, but they "must give it
openly in court.*'
From Dominus Rex v. Ladsingham, Sir T. Raym. 193
§ 312 STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 561
(1671), we learn that ** 'Tis intended that no privy ver-
dict can be given in criminal cases which concern life, as
felony, because the jury are commanded to look upon the
prisoner when they give their verdict, and so the prisoner
is to be there present at the same time/^ (1736-1766.)
From Bacon's Abridgement, Title ** Verdict,'' page
308, we learn that **It is in one book laid down, that a
privy verdict cannot be given in a case of life or member.
1 Inst. 227.
**In two other books it is laid down, that a privy verdict
cannot be given in a case of felony ; because the jury are
directed, and ought, in such case, to look upon the pris-
oner when they give their verdict. ' ' Eaym. 193, Eex v.
Ladsingham; 1 Ventr. 97.
From 2 Hale's Pleas of the Crown 300 (1739), we learn
that, **In a case of felony or treason the verdict must be
given in open court, and no privy verdict can be given.
Co. Lit. 227 b. Co. P. C. 110."
From 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 360 (1758), we
learn that "When the evidence on both sides is closed, and
indeed when any ^evidence hath been given, the jury can-
not be discharged (unless in cases of evident necessity)
till they have given in their verdict ; but are to consider
it, and deliver it in, with the same forms as upon civil
causes ; only they cannot, in a criminal case which touches
life or member, give a privy verdict. 2 Hal. P. C. 300.
2Hawk. P. C. 439."
From 1 Chitty Cr. L. 636, we learn: "Of the verdict.
The verdict, whatever may be its effect, must, in all
cases of felony and treason, be delivered in the presence
of the defendant, in open court, and cannot be either
privily given, or promulgated while he is absent. Co. Lit.
227 b.; 3 Inst. 110; Sir T. Eaym. 193; 2 Hale 300; Hawk,
p. 2, c. 47, s. 2 ; 4 Bla. Com. 360. Bac. Abr. verdicts, B.
Bum, J. Jurors, V. Williams, J. Juries, VH." In the
light of these precedents Who can doubt that the full-
fledged right in question was one of the most clearly de-
fined and generally recognized ** privileges and immuni-
Dne Process — 36
562 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 312
ties** vested, by the law of the land, in every citizen of
each of the original thirteen states at the time of their
severance from the mother country ; that in each of those
states it was, at that time (1776), regarded as an indis-
pensable element in due process of law. Upon no other
theory or assumption can be supported the line of deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States, headed
by Hopt V. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, in which it has been held
that, by intendment cmd implication the right in question
is imbedded in the due process law clause of the Fifth
Amendment, because in the English conception of due
process as reproduced in this country it is inherent. For
the same reason it is equally certain that it is inherent in
the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; and in Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S, 310, it was
solemnly declared, as it should have been: **The Four-
teenth Amendment, it has been held, legitimately operates
to extend to the citizens and residents of the states the
same protection against arbitrary state legislation affect-
ing life, liberty, and property as is offered by the Fifth
Amendment against similar legislation by Congress."
^Tiere then can room be found for doubt that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, when prop-
erly construed, protects the right of the accused to be
present in a state court at every stage of his trial against
state action, just as the corresponding clause in the Fifth
Amendment protects the same right against the action of
the Federal Government.
§ 313. Duty of an accused person to exhaust all of his
remedies in the state courts. It is well settled that while
the power to issue writs of habeas corpud to state courts,
which are proceeding in disregard of rights secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, exists,
the practice of exercising such power before the question
has been raised or determined in the state court is one
that ought not to be encouraged. In Cook v. Hart, 146
U. S. 183, the Court said : ** While the Federal courts have
§ 313 STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 563
the power and may discharge the accused in advance of
his trial, if he is restrained of his liberty in violation of
the Federal Constitution or laws, they are not bound to
exercise such power after a state court has finally acted
upon the case, but may, in their discretion, require the
accused to sue out his writ of error from the highest court
of the state, or even from the Supreme Court of the
United States/' See ateo. Ex parte Bozale, 117 U. S. 241 ;
Ex parte Fonda, 117 U, S. 516; Be Wood, 140 U. S.
278 ; Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183 ; Ee Frederich, 149 U. S.
70 ; New York v/Eno, 155 XJ. S. 89 ; Whitten v. Tomlinson,
160 U, S. 231. Under the principles of that case the Fed-
eral court should not issue the writ to the state court
before the latter has passed upon the point set up. In
Pepke V. Cronan, 155 U. S. 100, it was held that where
the validity of a sentence of a state court can be tested
by the supreme court of the state, or a writ of error from
the Supreme Court of the United States applied for, the
United States district court should not sustain a writ of
habeas corpus to discharge the person convicted. In
Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231, it was held that a
prisoner in custody under the authority of a state should
not, except in. a case of peculiar urgency, be discharged
by a court or judge of the United States upon a writ of
habeas corpus, in advance of any proceedings in the courts
of the state to test the validity of his arrest and detention.
In Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, dismissing a writ
issued before trial, it was held that the dismissal of a writ
of habeas corpus by the highest court of the state having
jurisdiction of the case is reviewable by the Supreme
Court of the United States on writ of error, if it denies
the prisoner any right specially set up and claimed by
him under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. See Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 ; Mar-
kuson V. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184 ; Minnesota v. Brundage,
180 U. S. 499. Unless fundamental rights specially se-
cured by the Federal Constitution are involved, the Fed-
eral courts will not interfere with the administration of
564 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 313
a state 's criminaHaw, by habeas corpus. Bogejrs v. Peck,
199 U. S. 425. In Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, the
right of a Federal court to determine the jurisdiction of
a state court in a criminal case by writ of habeas corpus
was recognized; and in Hunter v. Wood, 209 U. S. 205,
it was held that a railway ticket agent could be discharged
on habeas corpus (U. S. Be v. Stat. 753) from imprison-
ment under a conviction in a state court for disobeying
certain state legislation, as such agent was acting in
obedience to an order of a Federal circuit court, which
had enjoined, as repugnant to the Federal Constitution,
the enforcement by the state corporation commission and
the attorney general of state legislation reducing rates.
See also, Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420; Be Spencer,
228 U. S. 652; Frank v. Mangum, 237 XT. S. 309; Collins
V. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502; Henry v. Henkel, 238 U. S.
219.
§314. When habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
test the validity of a detention under state law. In
Shibuya Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U. S. 291, it was held that
a habeas corpus proceeding can not reach errors conmiit-
ted in a criminal case by a state court of competent juris-
diction, proceeding under statutes that do not conflict with
the Federal Constitution. In Minnesota v. Barber, 136
U. S. 313, it had been held that in such a proceeding the
court would discharge the petitioner when it ascertains
that the state statute for a violation of which he was con-
victed was unconstitutional. When a person is impris-
oned under a judgment of conviction of a state court,
which had jurisdiction to try the case, and jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, and did not lose sudi
jurisdiction during the trial. Federal courts have no right
to interfere by habeas corpus. Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S.
123. When a person has been convicted of first degree
murder in a state court, Federal courts will not release
upon habeas corpus on the theory that the court lost its
jurisdiction to proceed in the trial because it charged the
§ 314 STATE CRIMINAIi PROCEDURE 565
jury in accordance with the admission of counsel for the
accused; that the only question for their consideration
was the degree of murder of which the prisoner was
guilty. Valentina v. M wcer, 201 U. S. 131. In Be Chap-
man, 156 U. S. 211, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said: **In
the case before us, the question as to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has indeed
already been passed upon by that court and also by the
court of appeals, upon a demurrer to the indictment, but
the case has not gone to final judgment in either court,
and what the result of a trial may be cannot be assumed.
We are impressed with the conviction that the orderly
administration of justice will be better subserved by our
declining to exercise appellate jurisdiction in the mode
desired until the conclusion of the proceedings. If judg-
ment goes against petitioner and is affirmed by the court
of appeals and a writ of error lies, that is the proper and
better remedy for any cause of complaint he may have.
If, on the other hand, a writ or error does not lie to this
court, and the Supreme Court of the District was abso-
lutely without jurisdiction, the petitioner may then seek
his remedy through application for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. We discover no exceptional circumstances which
demand our interposition in advance of adjudication by
the courts of the district upon the merits of the case be-
fore them.*'
In Harlan v. McGourin, 218 TJ. S. 442, Mr. Justice Day
said : * * The learned counsel for the appellants rely upon
a number of cases which are said to warrant the court in
habeas corpus proceedings in examining the bill of excep-
tions with a view to determining such matters as are
herein presented. But an examination of these cases will
show that where collateral attacks have been sustained
through the medium of a writ of habeas corpus, the
grounds were such as attacked' the validity of the judg-
ments, and the objections sustained were such as rendered
the judgment not merely erroneous, but void. ... No
objection is made to the constitutionality of the statute or
566 DUB PSOCffiSS OP LAW § 314
the right and authority of the court to consider and de-
termine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
that purpose to weigh and determine the effect of the
testimony offered. The contention is that in the respects
pointed out the testimony wholly fails to support the
charge. The attack is thus not upon the jurisdiction and
authority of the court to proceed to investigate and deter-
mine the truth of the charge, but upon the sufficiency of
the evidence to show the guilt of the accused. This has
never been held to be within the province of a writ of
habeas corpus. Upon habeas corpus the court examines
only the power and authority of the court to act, not the
correctness of its conclusions. ' '
In Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420, Mr. Justice Mc-
Kenna said, in part: ** Having remitted him to a writ of
error as a remedy, it would be a contradiction of the
ruling, he not having availed himself of the remedy, to
permit him to prosecute habeas corpus. The ground of
the decision was that there was an orderly procedure pre-
scribed by law for him to pursue ; in other words, to set
up his defenses of fact and law, whether they attacked the
indictment for insufficiency or the validity of the law
under which it was found ; and, if the decision was against
him, test its correctness through the proper appellate
tribunals.'' In re Spencer, 228 U. S. 652, it was held that
where the petitioners failed to raise such questions either
when they were brought up for sentence, or on appeal to
an intermediate appellate court or by their unsuccessful
petition to the highest tribunal of the state to allow an
appeal to that court. Federal courts will not grant relief
by habeas corpus. In Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502,
the Court said: **It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the
doctrine, thoroughly established and recently restated,
that in habeas corpus proceedings we are confined to the
examination of fundamental and jurisdictional questions
and that the writ can not be employed a^ a substitute for
a writ of error. Frank v. Mangum, decided April 19,
1915, 237 U.S. 309.''
§ 315 STATE CRIMINAIi PROCEDURE 567
§315. The notable case of Frank v. Mflngnm That
case (237 U. S. 309), came on appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States from the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia to review a
decree of that court denying a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a prisoner in custody under a convic-
tion for murder in a superior court of that state. From
the opinion of the Supreme Court it appears that * * The
points raised by the appellant may be reduced to the
following :
(1) It is contended that the disorder in and about the
courtroom during the trial and up to and at the reception
of the verdict amounted to mob domination, that not only
the jury, but the presiding judge, succumbed to it, and
that this effect wrought a dissolution of the court, so that
the proceedings were coram non judice.
(2) That Frank ^s right to be present during the entire
trial until and at the return of the verdict was an essen-
tial part of the right of trial by jury, which could not be
waived either by himself or his counsel.
(3) That his presence was so essential to a proper
hearing that the reception of the verdict in his absence,
and in the absence of his counsel, without his consent or
authority, was a departure from the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, suflScient to
bring about a loss of jurisdiction of the trial court, and
to render the verdict and judgment absolute nullities.
(4) That the failure of Frank and his counsel, upon
the first motion for a new trial, to allege as a ground of
that motion the known fact of Frank *s absence at the
reception of the verdict, or to raise any jurisdictional
question based upon it did not deprive him of the right
to afterwards attack the judgment as a nullity as he did
in a motion to set aside the verdict.
(5) And that the ground upon which the Supreme
Court of Georgia rested its decision affirming the denial
of the latter motion, viz., that the objection based upon
Frank's absence when the verdict was rendered was
568 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 315
available on the motion for new trial, and under proper
practice ought to have been then taken, and because not
then taken could not be relied upon as a ground for setting
aside the verdict, was itself in conflict with the Constitu-
tion of the United States because equivalent in effect to
an ex post facto law, since, as is said, it departs from the
practice settled by previous decisions of the same court."
In the learned, luminous, masterful brief filed by appel-
lant *s counsel it was contended that **Not only was the
appellant deprived of due process of law, because he was,
by the action of the court, kept out of the courtroom when
the verdict was rendered, but the entire proceedings
became coram non judice, because of mob domination, to
which the presiding judge succumbed and which in effect
wrought a dissolution of the court; that **The right of
the prisoner to be present during the entire trial, includ-
ing the time of the rendition of the verdict, the polling of
the jury, and its discharge, is one which neither he nor
his counsel could waive or abjure ;*' that **In the present
case the Superior Court of Georgia had jurisdiction over
the appellant after his indictment and down to the later
stages of his trial. The verdict and all subsequent pro-
ceedings being nullities, he is entitled to his discharge
from the void judgment and to be relieved from the void
sentence of death. He does not, however, contend that he
can not be held for further trial under the indictment"
With the issues of law thus clearly defined, the court
held, among other things, (1) that only when the judg-
ment under which a prisoner is held is absolutely void for
want of jurisdiction in the court that pronounced it, either
because such jurisdiction was absent at the beginning,
or because it was lost during the course of the proceed-
ings, will a Federal court interfere by habeas corpus to
deliver a prisoner in custody under a conviction for crime
in a state court; (2) that when such an application for
habeas corpus is made to a Federal court the inquiry will
be so widened as to embrace not only the proceedings and
judgment in the state court in which the trial was had,
§ 316 STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 569
but the prooeedings in the appellate court of the state,
in order that, upon a review of both, it may be determined
whether upon the entire record there has been a depriva-
tion of life or liberty without due process of law, con-
trary to the due procQBS clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; (3) that there will be no Federal interference by
habeas oorpus with the administration of criminal law,
in a state court when it appears from the petition for the
writ that there existed at the trial disorder, hostile mani-
festations, and uproar, amounting to mob domination of
court and jury, where such assertions are but repetitions
of allegations the accused had the right to submit and did
submit, first to the trial court on motion for a new trial,
and afterwards in the state appellate court as grounds
for avoiding the consequences of the trial, and where both
courts, having considered such allegations successively
at times and places and under circumstances wholly apart
from the atmosphere of the trial, found the same to be
groundless except in a few particulars, regarded as
irregularities not harmful to defendant, and consequently
insuflScient in law to avoid the verdict; (4) that the prac-
tice recognized in the criminal procedure of Georgia
under which a prisoner on trial for murder may waive
his right to be present when the verdict is rendered, and
that such waiver may be given after, as well as before,
the event, and is to be inferred from the making of a
motion for a new trial upon other grounds alone, when
the facts respecting the reception of the verdict are within
the knowledge of the accused at the time of the making of
such motion, is not a denial of the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
§316. Dissmting opinion of Justices Holmes and
Hughes. Speaking for the minority, Mr. Justice Holmes
said : * * The trial began on July 28, 1913, at Atlanta, and
was carried on in a court packed with spectators and sur-
rounded by a crowd outside, all strongly hostile to the
petitioner. On Saturday, August 23, this hostility was
570 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 316
sufficient to lead the judge to confer in the presence of
the jury with the chief of police of Atlanta and the colonel
of the Fifth Georgia Begiment^ stationed in that city, both
of whom were known to the jury. On the same day, the
evidence seemingly having been closed, the public press,
apprehending danger, united in a request to the court that
the proceedings should not continue on that evening.
Thereupon the court adjourned until Monday morning.
On that morning, when the solicitor general entered the
court, he was greeted with applause, stamping of feet and
clapping of hands, and the judge, before beginning his
charge, had a private conversation with the petitioner's
counsel in which he expressed the opinion that there would
be ^probable danger of violence' if there should be an
acquittal or a disagreement, and that it would be safer for
not only the petitioner but his (tounsel to be absent from
court when the verdict was brought in. At the judge's
request they agreed that the petitioner and they should be
absent, and they kept their word. When the verdict was
rendered, and before more than one of the jurymen had
been polled, there was such a roar of applause that the
polling could not go on until order was restored. The
noise outside was such that it was difficult for the judge to
hear the answers of the jurors, although he was only 10
feet from them. . • . The argument for the appellee
in substance is that the trial was in a court of competent
jurisdiction, that it retains jurisdiction although, in fact,
it may be dominated by a mob, and that the rulings of the
state court as to the fact of such domination cannot be
reviewed. But the argument seems to us inconclusive.
. • • Upon allegations of this gravity in our opinion it
ought to be heard, whatever the decision of the state court
may have been, and it did not need to set forth contradic-
tory evidence, or matter of rebuttal, or to explain why the
motions for a new trial and to set aside the verdict were
overruled by the state court. There is no reason to fear
an impairment of the authority of the state to punish the
guilty. We do not think it impracticable in any part of
§ 316 STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 571
this cov/ntry to have trials free from outside control. But
to maintain this immunity it m^ay be necessary that the
supremacy of the law and of the Federal Constitution
should be vindicated in a case like this. It is our duty to
act upon them now, and to declare lynch law a^ little valid
when practised by a regularly drawn jury as when admin-
istered by one elected by a mob intent on death. . . •
Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of
the phrase * due process of law,' there can be do doubt that
it embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial,
with opportunity to be heard. Mob law does not become
due process of law by securing the assent of a terrorized
jury. We are not speaking of mere disorder, or mere
irregularities in procedure, but of a ease where the
processes of justice are actually subverted. . . . This
is not a matter for polite presumptions; we must look
facts in the face. Any judge who has sat with juries
knows that, in spite of forms, they are extremely likely
to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere. And
when we find the judgment of the expert on the sport,—
of the judge whose business it was to preserve not only
form, but substance, — ^to have been that if one juryman
yielded to the reasonable doubt that he himself later
expressed in court as the result of most anxious delibera-
tion, neither prisoner nor counsel would be safe from the
rage of the crowd, we think the presumption overwhelm-
ing that the jury responded to the passions of the mob.*'
For those weighty reasons the minority were * * of opin-
ion that the judgment should be reversed. The only
question before us is whether the petition shows on its
face that the writ of habeas corpus should be denied, or
whether the district court should have proceeded to try
the facts, . . . habeas corpus cuts through all forms
and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in
from the outside, not insubordination to the proceedings,
and although every form may have been preserved, opens
the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty
shell. ... In such a case, the Federal court has
572 DUB PEOCBSS OP LAW ^ § 316
jurisdiction to issue the writ. The fact that the state
court still has its general jurisdiction and is otherwise a
competent court does not make it impossible to find that
ajury has been subjected to intimidation in a particular
case. The loss of jurisdiction is not general, but particu-
lar, and proceeds from the control of a hostile influence.
When such a case is presented, it can not be said, in our
view, that the state court decision makes the matter res
judicatck The state acts when, by its agency it finds the
prisoner guilty and condemns him. We have held in a
civil case that it is no defense to the assertion of the
Federal right in the Federal court that the state has cor-
rective procedure of its own — that still less does such
procedure draw to itself the final determination of the
Federal question. Simon v. Southern B. Co., 236 U. S.
115. We see no reason for a less liberal rule in a matter
of life and death. When the decision of the question of
fact is so interwoven with the decision of the question of
constitutional right that the one necessarily involves the
other, the Federal court must examine the facts. Kansas
City Southern R. Co. v. C. H. Albers Commission Co.,
223 U. S. 573, 591 ; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Conley, March
8, 1915 (236 U. S. 605). Otherwise, the right will be a
barren one. . . • We therefore lay the suggestion
that the supreme court of the state has disposed of the
present question by its judgment on one side, along with
the question of the appellant's right to be present. //
the petition discloses facts that amount to a loss of juris-
diction in the trial court, jurisdiction could not he restored
hy any decision above. And notwithstanding the princi-
ple of comity and convenience (for in our opinion, it is
nothing more. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161,
168), that calls for a resort to the local appellate tribunal
before coming to the courts of the United States for a
writ of habeas corpus, when, as here, that resort has been
had in vain, the power to secure fundamental rights that
had existed at every stage becomes a duty and must be
put forth. * '
§ 317 STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 573
An extended statement has been given of this all-impor-
tant case because the fact whether or no the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to survive, as a
real and not a merely theoretical restraint upon the
power of the states to regulate procedure in criminal
cases, must be settled, during the next generation, by the
jurists who will be called upon to determine, in the light
of a wider experience, which of the two widely divergent
opinions in the Frank Case, 237 U. S. 309, shall finally
prevail as the constitutional law of the United States.
§ 317. Are there at present any enforceable restraints
upon the powers of a state to regulate its procedure in
criminal cases? That question is naturally suggested by
the following statement made by the court in the Frank
Case, 237 U. S. 309: **In fact, this court has sustained
the states in establishing a great variety of departures
from the common law procedure respecting jury trials.
Thus in Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 176, a stat-
ute providing for the trial of murder cases by struck jury
was sustained, notwithstanding it did not provide for
twenty peremptory challenges. Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S.
427, 435, while not a criminal case, involved the property
of a person alleged to be of unsound mind, and it was
held that an Alabama statute, tmder which the sheriff
determined that Mrs. Simon's health and safety would
be endangered by her presence at the trial of the ques-
tion of her sanity, so that while served with notice she
was detained in custody and not allowed to be present at
the hearing of the inquisition, did not deprive her of
property without due process of law. In Felts v. Murphy,
201 TJ. S. 123, 129, where the prisoner was convicted of
the crime of murder, and sentenced to imprisonment for
life, although he did not hear a word of the evidence
given upon the trial because of his almost total deafness,
his inability to hear being such that it required a person
to speak through an ear trumpet close to his ear in order
that such person should be beard by him, and the trial
574 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 317
court having failed to see to it that the testimony in the
case was repeated to him through his ear trumpet, this
Court said that this was ' at most an error, which did not
take away from the court its jurisdiction over the
subject-matter and over the person accused. ' In Twining
V. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 101, 111, it was held that the
exemption of a prisoner from compulsory self-incrimina-
tion in the state courts was not included in the guaranty
of due process of law contained in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 177,
where one of the jurors was subject to reasonable doubt
as to his sanity and the state court, pursuant to the local
law of criminal procedure, determined upon a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he was sane, the convic-
tion was affirmed. In Garland v. Washington, 232 U. S.
642, 645, it was held that the want of a formal arraign-
ment, treated by the state as depriving the accused of no
substantial right, as having been waived, and thereby
lost, did not amount to depriving defendant of his liberty
without due process of law.*' Proceeding in the same
vein the court might have said with still greater force
that in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, it was held
that a state has the right to abolish grand juries ; that in
Allen V. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138, it was held that the high-
est court of a state had the right to dismiss a writ of
error in a criminal case as a penalty, provided the
accused should within sixty days fail to surrender him-
self or be recaptured ; that in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S.
581, it was held that a state has the right to authorize a
criminal trial by a petit jury of eight.
In the light of these precedents the question recurs:
Are there at present any enforceable limitations in favor
of fundamental rights that actually restrain the power
of a state to regulate its procedure in criminal cases t If
there are such, they are enshrined in such general declara-
tions or definitions as the following: **It follows that
any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised
§ 317 STATE CRIMINAIi PROCEDURE 575
in the discretion of legislative power, in furtherance of
the general public good, which regards and preserves
those principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law/* Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S.
516; **That by the Fourteenth Amendment the powers of
states in dealing with crime within their borders are not
limited, except that no state can deprive particular per-
sons, or classes of persons, of equal and impartial justice
under the law ; that law in the regular course of admin-
istration through courts of justice is due process, and
when secured by the law of the state the constitutional
requirement is satisfied; and that due process is so
secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting
the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government unrestrained by the established principles
of private right and distributive justice. Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516, 535, and cases cited. * ' Leeper
v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462; ** Without attempting to define
exactly in what due process of law consists, it is suffi-
cient to say that, if the supreme court of a state has acted
in consonance with the constitutional laws of a state and
its own procedure it could only be in very exceptional
circumstances that this court would feel justified in say-
ing that there had been a failure of due legal process.
We might ourselves have pursued a different course in
this case, but that is not the test The plaintiff in error
must have been deprived of one of those fundamental
rights, the observance of which is indispensable to the
liberty of the citizen, to justify our interference. '* Allen
V. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138; **The state has full control
over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal
cases, subject only to the qualification that such proced-
ure must not work a denial of' fundamental rights or
conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the
Federal Constitution. Ex parte Beggel, 114 XT. S. 642 ;
Iowa Central Railway v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389 ; Chicago,
B. & Q. Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 ;'' Brown v.
New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172; ** Trial by jury has never
576 DUE PEOCBSS OP LAW § 317
been aflSrmed to be a necessary requisite of due process
of law. In not one of the cases cited and commented upon
in the Hurtado Case [110 U. S. 516], is a trial by jury
mentioned as a necessary part of such process/' Max-
well V. Dow, 176 U. S. 581; **we need notice now only
those cases which deal with the principles which must be
observed in the trial of criminal and civil causes. Due
process requires that the court which assumes to deter-
mine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction, Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733; Scott v. McNeal, 154
U. S. 34 ; Old Wayne Life Association v. McDonough, 204
U. S. 8, and that there shall be notice and opportunity
for hearing given the parties, Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S.
409 ; EoUer v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 ; and see Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U. S. 373. Subject to tiiese two fundamental
conditions, which seem to be universally prescribed in all
systems of law established by civilized countries, this
court has up to this time sustained all state laws, statu-
tory and judicially declared, regulating procedure, evi-
dence and methods of trial, and held them to be consistent
with due process of law,'* Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U. S. 78; **Li criminal cases due process of law is not
denied by a state law which dispenses with a grand jury
indictment, and permits prosecution upon information,
nor by a law which dispenses with the necessary jury of
twelve, or unanimity in the verdict. Indeed the require-
ment of due process does not deprive a state of the power
to dispense with jury trial altogether. Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 XT. S. 516 ; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581.
When the essential elements of a court having jurisdiction
in which an opportunity for a hearing is offered are pres-
ent, the power of a state over its methods of procedure is
substantially unrestricted by the due process clause of the
Constitution. Due process of law, this court has held, does
not require the state to adopt any particular form of
procedure, so long as it appears that the accused has had
sufficient notice of the accusation and an adequate oppor-
tunity to defend himself in the prosecution. Roger v.
§ 317 STATE CRIMINAL PEOCEDURE 577
Peck, 199 TT. S. 425, 435, and previous cases in this court
there cited. Tried by this test it can not for a moment
be maintained that the want of formal arraignment
deprived the accused of any substantial right or in any
wise changed the course of trial to his disadvantage/'
Garland v. Washington, 232 U. S. 642.
The question of questions that remains for final settle-
ment is this : Does the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee to the accused, as
against state power, the right to be present at every
stage of his trial, just as the corresponding clause of the
Fifth Amendment guarantees that right, as against Fed-
eral power. As demonstrated heretofore, every possible
argument, historical and logical, that can be urged in
favor of the one can be urged with equal force in favor
of the other. It should not be for a moment admitted
that what has been said as to fhat vital constitutional
right indirectly in the case of Frank, in which the writ
of habeas corpus was denied, is conclusive of a question
which can never be finally settled xmtil it comes up directly
for solemn argument and judgment, upon a writ of error
to the highest court of some state that has denied the
right. By the conclusion then reached the American
people will be informed whether the due process of law
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as a bulwark of
life and liberty against state power, is a barren theory
of a living fact.
Due ProeeM — 37
CHAPTER XVI
LIFB AND UBEBTY AS PBOTECTED BT DUE PBOCESS — ^PBOCBSD-
INGS FOB CONTEMPT — ^DISBABMENT OF ATTOBNETS
§318. Power to punish for contempt inherent in all
courts. In Ex parte Terry, 128 U- S, 289, the Court said:
**Nor can there be any dispute as to the powers of a
.circuit court of the United States to punish contempts of
its authority. In United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 34,
it was held that the Courts of the United States, from the
very nature of their institutions, possess the power to
fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, enforce the
observance of order, etc. In Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat.
204, 227, it was said that * courts of justice are imiversally
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with
power to impose silence, respect and decorum in their
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. ' So,
in Ex parte Bobinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510 : *The power to
punish for contempts is inherent in all courts ; its exist-
ence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments,
orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the
due administration of justice. The moment the courts of
the United States were called into existence and invested
with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed
of this power.' Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94;
Story, Const § 1774 ; Bac. Abr. Courts, E. And such is
the recognized doctrine in reference to the powers of the
courts of several states. *The summary power to commit
and punish for contempts tending to obstruct or degrade
the administration of justice,* the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts well said, in Cartwright's Case,
114 Mass. 230, 238, 4s inherent in courts of chancery and
578
§ 819 CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS— DISBARMENT 579
other superior courts as essential to the execution of
their powers and to the maintenance of their authority,
and is part of the law of the land, within the meaning of
Magna Carta and of the Twelfth Article of our Declarar
tion of Bights. ' The Declaration of Bights here referred
to was that which formed i>art of the Constitution of
Massachusetts, and contained the prohibition, inserted in
most American Constitutions, against depriving any per-
son of life, liberty, or estate, except by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land. * '
§ 319. Proceeding in its nature criminaL In Bessette
V. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, it was said that *^A
contempt proceeding is sui generis. It is criminal in its
nature, in that the party is charged with doing something
forbidden, and, if found guilty, is punished. Yet it may
be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and also
independently of any civil or criminal action. . . .
The purpose of contempt proceedings is to uphold the
power of the court, and also to secure to suitors therein
the rights by it awarded. As said in Be Chiles, 22 Wall.
157 (sub. nom. Texas v. White, 22 L. ed. 819, 823) : *The
exercise of this power has a twofold aspect, namely:
first the proper punishment of the guilty party for his
disrespect to the court or its order, and second, to compel
performance of some act or duty required of him by the
court, which he refuses to perform.' ... In Be
Debs, 158 XJ. S. 546, a case of habeas corpus brought to
review an order of the circuit court imprisoning for con-
tempt, we said : * In brief, a court enforcing obedience to
its orders by proceedings for contempt is not executing
the criminal laws of the land, but only securing to suitors
the rights which it has adjudged them entitled to. ' . . .
The thought underlying denial by this court of the right
of review by writ of error or appeal has not been that
there was something in contempt proceedings which ren-
dered them not properly open to review, but that they
were of a criminal nature, and no provision had been
580 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 319
made for a review of criminal cajses. That was true in
England as here." In New Orleans v. New York Mail
S. S. Co.| 20 Wall 387, it was held that a contempt of
court is a criminal offense. See to the same effect,
Ex parte Swan, 150 U. S. 637. In a oonunitment for con-
tempt, the adjudication is a conviction, and the commit-
ment an execution. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat 38.
And yet, after admitting that a proceeding for contempt
is in its nature criminal, in order to mark the degrees of
criminality, the line must be sharply drawn between
direct contempts committed in the presence of the court,
in which punishment may be imposed without hearing or
trial, and indirect or civil contempts, as they are some-
times called, in which the right to notice and hearing is
substantially protected, even in the absence of a statute
requiring a particular method of proceeding.
§ 320. What constitntes a direct contempt committed
in the presence of Court. Federal courts have the power
to punish, without indictment or trial by jury, such con-
tempts of their authority as are defined by U. S. Bev.
Stat. §725, Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289; Ex parte
Savin, 131 U. S. 267; Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U. S. 280. A
palpable contempt of the authority of the court occurs
when there is a direct disturbance, a breach of the peace
in open court Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289. The act
of March 2, 1831, limits the powers of Federal courts to
punish for contempts, to misbehavior in the presence of
or near the court. Ex parte Bobinson, 19 WalL 513. In
Ex parte Savin, 131 U. S. 267, it was held that when a
court is hi session, it is present in every part of the place
dedicated to its use and for the use of its officers, jurors
and witnesses.
§ 321. As the power to punish is inherent, trial by jury
is not required by * 'due process of law.' ' In Eitenbecker
V. District Court, 134 TJ. S. 31, the Court said ; ** Whether
an attachment for a contempt of court and the judgment
§ 321 CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS— DISBAEMENT 581
of the court punishing the party for such contempt, is iu
itself essentially a criminal proceeding or not, we do not
find it necessary to decide. We simply hold that, what-
ever its nature may be, it is an offense against i^he court
and against the administration of justice, for which
courts have always had the right to punish the party by
summary proceeding and without trial by jury ; and that
in that sense it is due process of law within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. We
do not suppose that that provision of the Constitution
was ever intended to interfere with or abolish the powers
of the courts in proceedings for contempts, whether this
contempt occurred in the course of a criminal proceeding
or a civil suit. ' ' In Interstate Conmierce Commission v.
Brimson, 154 U, S, 447, the Court said: ** Another sug-
gestion thrown out in argument against the validity of
the Twelfth section of the Interstate Commerce Act, in
the particular adverted to, is that the defendants are not
accorded a right of trial by jury. If, as we have endeav-
ored to show, this proceeding make a case or controversy
within the judicial power of the United States, the issue
whether the defendants are under a duty to answer the
questions propounded to them, and to produce the books,
papers, documents, etc., called for, is manifestly not one
for the determination of a jury. The issue presented is
not one of fact, but of law (exclusively. In such a case,
the defendant is no more entitled to a jury than is a*
defendant in a proceeding by mandamus to compel him,
as an officer, to perform a ministerial duty. Of course,
the question of punishing the defendants for contempt
could not arise before the Commission ; for in a judicial
sense, there is no such thing as contempt of a subordinate
administrative body. No question of contempt could
arise until the issue of law, in the circuit court, is deter-
mined adversely to the defendants and they refuse to
obey, not the order of the Commission, but the final order
of the court. And, in matters of contempt, a jury is not
required by * due process of law. * From the very nature
582 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 321
of their institution^ and that their lawful jadgments may
be respected and enf orced, the courts of the United States
possess the power to punish for contempt. And this
inherent power is recognized and enforced by a statute
expressly authorizing such courts to punish contempts of
their authority when manifested by disobedience of their
lawful writs, process, rules, decrees, or commands. Bev.
Stat. § 725 ; 1 Stat, at L. 83 ; Stat, at L. 487 ; United States
V. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat
204, 227; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510; Ex parte
Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 302, 303; Cartwright's Case, 114
Mass. 230, 238. Surely it cannot be supposed that the
question of contempt of the authority of a court of the
United States, committed by a disobedience of its orders,
is triable, of right, by jury.'*
§ 322. What conBtitutes an indirect or dvil contempt
A typical case of that character is Wiswall v. Sampson,
14 How. 52, in which it was held that any interference
with property in possession of a receiver, or prosecution
of an action against the receiver, without leave of the
court first obtained, is a contempt of court. In thaf case,
it was said : * * When a receiver has been appointed, his
possession is that of the court, and any attempt to dis-
turb it, without leave of the court first obtained will be a
contempt on the part of the person making it This was
held in Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves. 335, both with respect to
receivers and sequestrator. When, therefore, a party is
prejudiced by having a receiver put in his way, the course
has either been to give him leave to bring an ejectment,
or to permit him to be examined pro interesse surO. (IJ.
& W. 176, Brooks v. Greathed; 3 Daniel's Ch. Pr., 1984.) "
See also. Re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164. In Be Debs, 158 U. S.
564, in which it was held that to enforce obedience to
orders of courts through proceedings by contempt is not
to execute the criminal laws, but only to secure to suitors
the risrhts which the court has adjudged them to be enti-
tled to, it was said: **Nor is there in this any invasion
§ 322 CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS— DISBARMENT 583
of the constitutional right of trial by jury. We fully
agree with counsel that 4t matters not what form the
attempt to deny constitutional right may take. It is vain
and ineffectual, and must be so declared by the courts,'
and we reaffirm the declaration made for the court by
Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States, 116 U, S.
616, 636, that 4t is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be
obsta prindpiis. But the power of a court to make an
order carries with it the equal power to punish for a
disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as 'to the
question of disobedience has been, from time immemo-
rial, the special function of the court. ... To sub-
mit the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be
it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency. ' ' In Consolidated Ren-
dering Co. V. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, involving a pro-
ceeding for contempt, it was held that there was an oppor-
tunity for hearing, that satisfied the requirements of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, under
a Vermont statute, providing for the compulsory produc-
tion of books and papers of a corporation before a court
or grand jury, where the corporation has adequate oppor-
tunity to show cause before the court why it does not pro-
duce the same. See also. Wise v. Mills, 220 U. S. 549 ;
Wise V. Henkel, 220 U. S. 556 ; Wilson v. United States,
221 U. S. 361. In United States v. Shipp, 214 U. S. 386,
it was held that parties were guilty of a contempt of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and were subject to
summary punishment by it, who had participated in the
murder of a prisoner under sentence of death in a state
court, after appeal to the Supreme Court from an order
of a Federal circuit court denying relief by habeas corpus
had been allowed and the proceedings stayed. In Be
Merchants' Stock and Grain Co., 223 U. S. 639, it was
held that a judgment finding defendants guilty of con-
tempt was punitive instead of remedial, and reviewable
584 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 322
on writ of error without awaiting a final decree in a snit
in equity, where the contempt charged was for the viola-
tion of an interlocutory injunction previously granted in
a suit for the benefit of complainant, and ordering the
payment of specific fines, three-fourths of which were to
go to complainant ^^as compensation in part for the
expenses incurred in prosecuting these contempt proceed-
ings. ' ' In Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74, it was held
that as a judgment fining a party for contempt for dis-
obeying a subpoena diu)es tecum, ordering the production
before a grand jury of certain books and papers in his
possession, constituted a case of criminal contempt, it
was reviewable only by a writ of error. In Gompers v.
United States, 233 U. S. 604, it was held that an appeal
does not lie for the review of a judgment of fine and
imprisonment imposed in proceedings for an alleged
criminal contempt of an injunction; neither does a writ
of error lie from the Supreme Court of the United States
to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to
review a judgment rendered in an appeal from the
Supreme Court of the District in proceedings to punish
an alleged criminal contempt of an injunction.
In the Gompers case the Court said: ^^It is urged in
the first place that contempts can not be crimes, because
although punishable by imprisonment, and therefore, if
crimes, infamous, they are not within the protection of
the Constitution and the Amendments giving a right to
trial by jury, etc., to persons charged with such crimes.
But the provisions of the Constitution are not mathemat-
ical formulas having their essence in their form. They
are organic living institutions transplanted from English
soil. Their significance is vital, not formal; it is to be
gathered not simply by taldng the words and a dictionary,
but by considering their origin and the line of their
growth. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281, 282.
It does not follow that contempts of the class under con-
sideration are not crimes or rather, in the language of
the statute, offenses, because trial by jury as it has been
§ 323 CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS— DISBARMENT 585
gradually worked out and fought out has been thought
not to extend to them as a matter of constitutional right.
These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with
punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are
in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of
crimes as that word has been understood in English
speech. So truly are they crimes that it seems to be
proved that in the early law they were punished only by
the usual criminal procedure, 3 Transactions of the Boyal
Historical Society, U. S. p. 147 (1885), and that, at least
in England, it seems that they still may be and preferably
are tried in that way. See 7 Laws of England (Hals-
bury) 280, subdiv. Contempt of court (604)." It was
then held that criminal contempts are none the less crimes
within the meaning of U. S. Eev. Stat. § 1044, prescribing
a limitation of three years for criminal prosecutions,
because the constitutional right of trial by jury does not
apply to such contempts. The Court said: **Even if the
statute does not cover the case by its express words, as
we think it does, still in dealing with the punishment of
crime a rule should be laid down, if not by Congress, by
this courf
§ 323. Eight to notice and hearing in indirect or civil
contempts. While it clearly appears from the foregoing
cases that the right of trial by jury does not extend to
indirect or civil contempts ; and while it is true that, in
the absence of statute, no particular method of procedure
is required ; it may be affirmed that no judgment rendered
against a defendant in such a proceeding is valid, unless
the right to notice and hearing has been substantially
secured. When the contempt is not committed in the
presence of the court, and therefore outside of the pre-
siding judge's personal knowledge, the usual procedure
is a rule to show cause. In Ex parte Savin, 131 U. S. 267,
where the defendant was charged with an attempt, by
forbidden means, to influence or impede a witness from
testifying, **an order was made that the appellant be
586 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 323
cited to show cause before the District Court, at a speci-
fied hour, on the next day, why he should not be adjudged
guilty of contempt. On the succeeding day, the citation
having been duly served, the matter came on for hear-
ing, the respondent being represented by counsel. He
demanded of the prosecution * service of interrogatories/
That demand was refused by the court, and to that ruling
he excepted. ' * It was held that the demand for interroga-
tories was properly refused ; and that the trial court had
the right, in its discretion, to adopt such methods for the
determination of the question, in harmony with the rules
and principles of the common law, as obtained in the trial
of matters of contempt. See also to the same effect,
Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U. S. 580, — a proceeding in which a
fine and imprisonment were imposed upon parties for
contempt in violating the injunction of the court, — ^it
appearing that **on the 6th of July the court ordered the
issue of a preliminary injunction as prayed. On the 7th
of July, the writs were served on each of the defendants
in each proceeding by the sheriff of Plymouth County.
On the 24th of October, complaints were filed, alleging
that these plaintiffs in error had violated this injunction
by selling intoxicating liquors contrary to law and the
terms of the injunction served on them, and asking that
they be required to show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt of court. A rule was granted
accordingly, and the court having no personal knowledge
of the facts charged, ordered that a hearing be had at the
next term of the court, upon affidavits ; and on the 8th of
March, 1886, it being at a regular term of said District
Court, separate trials were had upon evidence in the form
of affidavits, by the court without a jury, upon which the
plaintiffs were found guilty of a violation of the writs of
injunction issued in said cause, and a sentence of fine and
imprisonment, as already stated, entered against them."
Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, said: ''So
that the proceeding by which the fine and imprisonment
imposed upon these parties for contempt in violating the
§ 323 CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS— DISBARMENT 587
injunction of the court regularly issued in a suit to which
they were parties, is due process of law and always has
been due process of law, and is the process or proceeding
by which courts have from time immemorial enforced the
execution of their orders and decrees, and can not be said
to deprive the parties of their liberty or property without
due process of law. ' '
A thorough review of this subject was made in Hovey
V. EUiott, 167 U, S. 409, in which it was held, (1) that due
process of law signifies the right of a person to be heard
in his defense; (2) that the power of a court to refuse to
one in contempt the right to defend in the principal case
on the merits is not included in the power of a court, to
deny a favor to such an one while in contempt; (3) that
a decree pro canfesso is void for lack of due proc-
ess when entered after striking defendant ^s answer from
the files as a punishment for his contempt in refusing to
obey an order of the court: In reaching those conclu-
sions the Court said : ** A denial to a party of the benefit
of a notice would be in effect to deny that he is entitled
to notice at all, and the sham and deceptive proceeding
had better be omitted altogether. It would be like saying
to a party, Appear and you shall be heard ; and when he
has appeared, saying, Tour appearance shall not be
recognized, and you shall not be heard. In the present
case, the district court not only in effect said this, but
immediately added a decree of condemnation, reciting
that the default of all persons had been duly entered. It
is difficult to speak of a decree thus rendered with modera-
tion ; it was in fact a mere arbitrary edict clothed in the
form of a judicial sentence. . . . The necessary
effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia was to decree that a portion of the
award made in favor of the defendant, in other words his
property, belonged to the complainants in the cause. The
decree therefore awarded the property of the defendant
to the complainant upon the hypothesis of fact that by
contract the defendant had transferred the right in or to
588 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 323
this property to the complainant. If the court had power
to do this, by denying the right to be heard to the defend-
ant, what plainer illustration could there be of taking
property of one and giving it to another without hearing
or without process of lawt If the power to violate the
fundamental constitutional safeguards securing prop-
erty exists, and if they may be with impunity set aside
by courts on the theory that they do not apply to proceed-
ings in contempt, why will they not also apply to proceed-
ings against the liberty of the subject! Why should not
a court in a criminal proceeding deny to the accused all
right to be heard on the theory that he is in contempt, and
sentence him to the full penalty of the lawt No distinc-
tion between the two cases can be pointed out. ' ' Distin-
guished in Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 594, in
which it was held that a suspension by the governor of a
railroad commissioner, under an act of the North Caro-
lina legislature, operating only until the next general
assembly could determine the question, was not wanting
in due process of law.
§ 324. Consequence of a lack of jurisdiction. A court
can not punish for any contempt of its unauthorized re-
quirements. If the command of a writ of mandamus is, in
whole or in part, beyond its power, the writ, or so much of
it as is in excess of jurisdiction is void. Be Bowland, 104
IT. S. 604. When a proceeding by habeas corpus in the dis-
trict court to restore the custody of a child to its parent is
void, an attempt to enforce its order by imprisonment for
contempt is void. Be Brovins, 136 U. S. 586. As the Fed-
eral Supreme Court has necessarily the jurisdiction to
decide whether or no a case is properly before it, want of
jurisdiction in the Federal circuit court of a petition for
habeas corpus, or in the Supreme Court itself of the
appeal from the order denying the writ, does not author-
ize persons to disregard without liability to process for
contempt, the order of the Supreme Court that **all pro-
oeedings against the appellant be stayed, and the custody
§ 325 CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS— DISBAEMENT 589
of said appellant be retained pending this appeal.''
When the War Department had no legal authority to
direct snch action^ disobedience of a decree of a state
court enforcing any further excavation of the ship canal
connecting Lake Washington with the tidal waters of
Puget sound can not be justified on the ground that the
acts charged as amounting to a contempt were done under
the orders of the officials of such Department claiming to
act in pursuance of and in accordance with acts of Con-
gress. Carlson v. Washington, 234 U. S. 103.
§ 326. Power to disbar attorneys inherent in all courts.
Just as the power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts, so the power to disbar attorneys is inherent in
all courts. In Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, Marshall,
C. J., said : **The power is one which ought to be exer-
cised with great caution, but which is, we think, inci-
dental to all courts, and is necessary for the preservation
of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession. * '
In Ex parte Bradley, 7 WalL 364, the courts after affirm-
ing the right to punish attorneys guilty of misbehavior
in the practice of their profession, held that the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia had no jurisdiction to
disbar an attorney for a contempt committed before
another court of the District. Ex parte TUlinghast,
4 Pet. 108. See also. Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9 ; Ran-
dall V. Brigham, 7 WalL 523 ; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
335. In Ex parte Bobinson, 19 Wall. 505, it was said that
**The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all
courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings, and the enforcement of the
judgments, orders and writs of the courts and, conse-
quently to the due administration of justice. . . .
This power is possessed by all courts which have author-
ity to admit attorneys to practice. But the power can
only be exercised when there has been such conduct on
the part of the parties complained of as shows them to
be unfit to be members of the profession. Parties are
590 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 325
admitted to the profession only upon satisfactory evi-
dence that they possess fair private character and suffi-
cient legal learning to conduct causes in court for suitors.
The order of admission is the judgment of the court that
they possess the requisite qualifications both in character
and learning. They beccnne by such admission, officers
of the court and, as said in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
378, *They hold their office during good behavior, and
can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity
to be heard has been afforded.* "
§ 326. An attorney can not be denied due process. Be-
cause an attorney holds his office during good behavior^
he can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court, after oppor-
tunity to be heard has been given him. As was said in
the case of Ex parte Bobinson, 19 Wall. 507: ** Before
a judgment disbarring an attorney is rendered, he should
have notice of the grounds of complaint against him and
ample opportunity of explanation and defense. This is
a rule of natural justice and should be equally followed
when proceedings are taken to deprive him of his right
to practice his profession, as when they are taken to reach
his real or personal property. And such has been the gen-
eral, if not the uniform practice of the courts of this
country and of England.** In Ex parte Wall, 107 TJ. S.
265, the Court, in disposing of the claim that a summary
proceeding to strike an attorney from the role without
indictment and trial by jury deprives him of due process
of law, said : ^ ^ But when such a case is shown to exist,
the courts ought not to hesitate, from sympathy for the
individual, to protect themselves from the scandal and
contempt and the public from prejudice, by removing
grossly improper persons from participation in the
administration of the laws. The power to do this is a
rightful one ; and when exercised in proper cases, is con-
tended, indeed, that a summary proceeding against an
§ 326, CONTEMPT PBOCEEDINQS— DISBARMENT 591
attorney to exclude him from the practice of his profes-
sion on acconnt of acts for which he may be indicted and
tried by a jury is a violation of the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution, which forbids the depriving of any per-
son of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. But the action of tiie court, in cases within its
jurisdiction, is due process of law. It is a mistaken idea
that due process of law requires a plenary suit and a trial
by jury in all cases where property or personal rights
are involved: . . . We have seenf that, in the present
case, due notice was given to the petitioner, and a trial
and hearing was had before the court, in the manner in
which proceedings against attorneys, when the question is
whether they should be struck oflf the roll, are always
conducted.
CHAPTER XVII
FIBST INTBBPBBTATION OF THE C5LAUSB
§ 327. The equal protection of the law danse a purely
American invention. Unlike the due process of law
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment it can not trace its
origin back to Magna Carta. It is an Americau prohibi-
tion against state action and therefore negative in its
operation. No state shall * * deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of tiie laws.'* In the
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, the Supreme Court
was called upon for the first time to give construction to
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Fed-
eral Constitution and declared that **An examination of
the history of the causes which led to the adoption of
those Amendments and of the Amendments themselves,
demonstrates that the main purpose of all the last three
amendments was the freedom of the African race, the
security and perpetuation of that freedom, and their pro-
tection from the oppressions of the white men, who had
formerly held them in slavery.'*
In construing the equal protection of the laws ' clause,
Mr. Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the court
said: **In the light of the history of these amendments,
and the pervading purpose of them, which we have
already discussed, it is not diflScult to give a meaning to
this clause. The existence of laws in the states where the
newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated
with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class,
was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such
laws are forbidden.
**If, however, the states did not conform their laws to
its requirements, then by the Fifth section of the article
595
CHAPTER XVn
FIBST INTEBPRETATION OF THE CLAUSE
§ 327. The equal protection of the law danse a purely
American invention. Unlike the dne process of law
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment it can not trace its
origin back to Magna Carta. It is an American prohibi-
tion against state action and therefore negative in its
operation. No state shall ' ' deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In the
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, the Supreme Cou^t
was called upon for the first time to give construction to
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Fed-
eral Constitution and declared that **An examination of
the history of the causes which led to the adoption of
those Amendments and of the Amendments themselves,
demonstrates that the main purpose of all the last three
amendments was the freedom of the African race, the
security and perpetuation of that freedom, and their pro-
tection from the oppressions of the white men, who had
formerly held them in slavery."
In construing the equal protection of the laws' clause,
Mr. Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the court
said: "In the light of the history of these amendments,
and the pervading purpose of them, which we have
already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to
this clause. The existence of laws in the states where the
newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated
with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class,
was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such
laws are forbidden.
**If, however, the states did not conform their laws to
its requirements, then by the Fifth section of the article
595
596 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 327
of amendment Congress was authorized to enforce it by
suitable legislation. We doubt very much whether any
action of a state not directed by way of discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this pro-
vision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that
emergencyi that a strong case would be necessary for its
application to any other. But as it is a state that is to
be dealt with, and not alone the validity of its laws, we
may safely leave that matter until Congress shall have
exercised its power, or some case of state oppression, by
denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed a
decision at our hands. We find no such case in the one
before us, and do not deem it necessary to go over the
argument again, as it may have relation to this particular
clause of the amendment." In conformity with this
interpretation the earlier cases brought to the Supreme
Court involving this particular clause in the amendment
related to the colored race, and to discriminations against
persons of that race, respecting their right to act as
jurors, and their right to be tried by juries composed in
part of persons of the same race. These cases were fol-
lowed by others which passed upon state statutes alleged
to discriminate against the negro.
§ 328. Denial to colored persons of the right to act as
jurors. The statute of West Virginia, which, in effect,
singles out and denies to colored citizens the right and
privilege of participating in the administration of the
law, as jurors, because of their color, though qualified in
all other respects, is, practically, a brand upon them
afiixed by the law, and is a discrimination against that
race forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment It is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws to the race thus
excluded since the construction of juries is a very essen-
tial part of the protection which the trial by jury is
intended to secure. The very idea of a jury is a body of
men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose
§ 329 FIRST INTERPRETATION 597
rights it is selected or sammoned to determine; that is,
of persons having the same legal status in society as that
which he holds. Where, as here, the state statute secures
to every white man the right of trial by jury selected
from and without discrimination against his race, and at
the same time permits or requires such discrimination
against the colored man because of his race, the latter is
not equally protected by law with the former. The words
of the amendment, although prohibitory, contain a neces-
sary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most
valuable to the colored race — ^the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as col-
ored—exemption from discrimination, imposed by public
authority, implying legal inferiority in civil society, les-
sening the security of their rights, and which are steps
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303.
§ 329. Equal protection of laws to colored race— Bight
to mixed juries. Section 641 of the Bevised Statutes,
which provides for the removal into the Federal Court of
any civil suit or prosecution *' commenced in any state-
court, for any cause whatsoever, against any person who
is denied or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of
the state, or in any part of the state where such suit or
prosecution is pending, any right secured to him by any
law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States,'' etc., examined in connection with sec-
tions 1977 and 1978, and the Court held, that the object
of these statutes, as of the Constitution which authorized
them, was to place the colored race, in respect to civil
rights, upon a level with whites. They made the rights
and responsibilities, civil and criminal, of the two races
exactly the same. The prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment have reference to state action exclusively,
and not to any action of private individuals. It is the
state which is prohibited from denying to any person
within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws
598 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 329
and, consequently, the statutes partially enumerating
what civil rights colored men shall enjoy equally with
white persons, founded as they are upon tiie amendment,
are intended for protection against state infringement of
these rights. Section 641 was also intended for their
protection against state action, and against that alone.
A state may act through different agencies, either by its
legislative, its executive or its judicial authorities, and
prohibitions of the amendment extend to all actions of
the state denying equal protection of the laws, whether
it be action by one of these agencies or by another. Con-
gress, by virtue of the Fifth section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, may enforce the prohibitions whenever they
are disregarded by either the legislative, the executive,
or the judicial department of the state. The mode of
enforcement is left to its discretion. It may secure the
right, that is, enforce its recognition, by removing the
case from a state court, in which it is denied, into a
Federal court, where it will be acknowledged. But the
Fourteenth Amendment is broader than the statute which
authorizes the removal. Section 641 does not apply to
all cases in which equal protection of the laws may be
denied to a defendant The removal authorized by the
statute is a removal before trial or final hearing. But the
violation of the constitutional provision, when made by
the judicial action of a state, may be, and generally will
be, after the trial or final hearing has commenced. It is
during the trial or final hearing the defendant is denied
equality of legal protection, and not until then. Nor can
he know until then that the equal protection of the laws
will not be extended to him. Certainly not until then can
he affirm that it has been denied. To such a case, that is,
to judicial infractions of the Constitutional Amendment
after the trial has commenced, section 641 has no applica-
bility. It was not intended to reach such cases. They
were left to the revisory power of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Therefore, the denial or inability to
enforce in the judicial tribunals of. a state, rights secured
§ 329 FIRST INTERPRETATION 599
to a defendant by any law providing for the equal civil
rights of all persons, citizens of the United States, of
which section 641 speaks, is primarily, if not exclusively,
a denial of such rights, or an inability to enforce them,
resulting from the constitution or laws of the state, rather
than a denial made manifest at the trial of the case. In
other words, the statute has reference to a legislative
denial or an inability resulting from it By express
requirement of the statute, the party must set forth,
under oath, the facts upon which he bases his claim to
have his case removed, not merely his belief that he can-
not enforce his rights at a subsequent stage of the pro-
ceedings. But, in the absence of constitutional or
legislative impediment, he cannot swear before his case
comes to trial, that his enjoyment of his civil rights is
denied to him.
The constitution and laws of Virginia do not exclude
colored persons from service on juries. The petition for
removal did not present a case for removal under the
641st section. The defendant moved in the state court
that the venire be so modified that one-third or some por-
tion of the jury should be composed of his own race. The
denial of this motion was not a denial of a right secured
to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of
citizens of the United States, or by any statute, or by the
Fourteenth Amendment. A mixed jury in a particular
case is not essential to the equal protection of the laws.
It is a right to which any colored man is entitled, that, in
the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or
property, there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no
discrimination against them, because of his color. But
that is a different thing from that which was claimed, as
of right, and denied in the state court, viz : a right to have
the jury composed in part of colored men. When a subor-
dinate officer of the state, in violation of state law, under-
takes to deprive an accused person of a right which the
statute law accords to him, as in the case at bar, it can
hardly be said that he is denied, or cannot enforce, *4n
600 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 329
the judicial tribunals of the state,*' the rights which
belong to him. In such a case it ought to be presumed
the court will redress the wrong. If the accused is
deprived of the right, the final and practical denial will
be in the judicial tribunal which tries the case, after the
trial has commenced. If, as in this case, the subordinate
officer whose duty it is to select jurors fails to discharge
that duty in the true spirit of the law ; if he excludes all
colored men solely because they are colored; or if the
sheriff to whom a venire is given, composed of both white
and colored citizens, neglects to summon the colored
jurors only because they are colored ; or if a clerk whose
duty it is to take the twelve names from the box rejects
all the colored jurors for the same reason, it can with no
propriety be said the defendant's right is denied by the
state and cannot be enforced in the judicial tribunals.
The court will correct the wrong, will quash the indict-
ment or the panel, or, if not, the error will be corrected
in a superior court. Such cases are not within the pro-
visions of section 641. Denials of equal rights in the
action of the judicial tribunals of the state are left to the
revisory powers of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U. S.
313.
§330. Exdnsion of juror on account of color. The
inhibition contained in the Fourteenth Amendment means
that no agency of the state, nor of the officers or agents
by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Whoever, by virtue of public position under a state gov-
ernment, deprives another of property, life or liberty,
without due process of law, or denies or takes away the
equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional
inhibition ; and as he acts in the name and for the state,
and is clothed with the state's power, his act is that of
the state. Otherwise the constitutional inhibition has no
meaning and the state has clothed one of its agents with
§ 330 FIRST INTERPRETATION 601
power to annul or evade it. The Constitutional Amend-
ment was ordained for a purpose. It was to secure equal
rights to all persons, and to insure to all persons the
enjoyment of such rights. Power was given to Congress
to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation.
Such legislation must act upon persons; not upon the
abstract thing denominated a state, but upon the persons
who are the agents of the state in the denial of the rights
which were intended to be secured. Such is the act of
March 1, 1875, and is fully authorized by the Constitu-
tion. The act of the defendant, in selecting jurors,
was a ministerial, not a judicial act ; and being charged
with the performance of that duty, although he derived
no authority from the state, he was bound, in the dis-
charge of his duties, to obey the Federal Constitution and
the laws passed in pursuance thereof. One great purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to raise the colored
race from that condition of inferiority and servitude in
which most of them had previously stood, into perfect
equality of civil rights with all other ]>ersons within the
jurisdiction of the states. It was intended to take away
all possibility of oppression by law because of race or
color. It is a limitation of the power of the state, and
an enlargement of the power of Congress. It is said
the selection of jurors for her courts and the adminis-
tration of her laws belongs to each state ; that they are
her rights. This is true in the general sense. But in
exercising her rights, a state cannot disregard the limi-
tations which the Federal Constitution has applied to her
power. Her rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can
she deny to the General Government the right to exercise
all its granted powers, though they may interfere with
the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those
powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every addi-
tion of power to the General Government involves a cor-
responding diminution of the governmental powers of the
states. It is carved out of them. Ex parte Common-
wealth of Virginia and Coles, 100 U. S. 339.
602 DUE PEOCESS OP LAW § 331
§ 331. Law exduding jurors on account of race or color.
The alleged exclusion from the grand jury that found,
and from the petit jury that was summoned to try this
indictment, of persons of the African race because of their
race, did not result from the Constitution or laws of the
state as expounded by its highest judicial tribunal ; and
consequently, the accused was not entitled to the removal
of the prosecution into the Circuit Court. Such exclusion
however if made by the jury commissioners without
authority derived from the constitution and laws of the
state, was a violation of the prisoner's rights under the
Constitution and laws of the United States which the
trial court was bound to redress ; and the remedy for any
failure in that respect is ultimately in the Supreme Court
upon writ of error to the state court.
The Fourteenth Amendment was designed primarily to
secure to the colored race, thereby invested with the
rights, privileges and responsibilities of citizenship, the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that, under the law, are
enjoyed by white persons ; that, while a state, consistently
with the purposes for which that amendment was adopted,
may establish qualifications for ^'urors, a denial to citizens
of the African race, because of their color, of the right
or privilege accorded to white persons, of participating
as jurors in the administration of justice, is a discrimi-
nation against the former inconsistent with the amend-
ment, and within the power of Congress by appropriate
legislation to prevent; that to compel a colored man to
submit to a trial before a jury drawn from a panel from
which was excluded, because of their color, every man
of his race, however well qualified by education and char-
acter to discharge the functions of jurors, was a denial
of the equal protection of the laws. Neal v. Delaware,
103 U. S. 370.
§ 332. Punishment of offense. The section of the code
of Alabama punishing adultery or fornication commit-
ted by a white person and a negro with each other more
§ 333 FIEST INTERPRETATION 603
severely than the same offense committed between per-
sons of the same race and color as punished by that code,
does not make a discrimination against the colored per-
son in the punishment designated, which conflicts with
the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting a
state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. The statute applies the
same punishment to both offenders, the white and the
black. The discrimination in the punishment is directed
against the offense designated, and not against the person
of any particular color or race. Equality of protection
under the laws implies not only accessibility by each one,
whatever his race, on the same terms with others, to the
courts of the country for the security of his person and
property, but that in the administration of criminal justice
he shall not be subjected, for the same offense, to any
greater or different punishment. There is in this law no
discrimination against either race. Pace v. Alabama, 106
U. S. 583.
§333. Setting aside panel of jurors-— Discriminating^
against citizens of African descent. It was not error for
the state court to overrule a motion to set aside a panel
of petit jurors made on the ground that only white cit-
izens were selected and summoned, when it was not dis-
tinctly shown that the oflScers, who selected the petit
jurors, excluded qualified citizens of African descent from
the panel because of their race or color. A grand jury
selected and formed upon the basis of excluding there-
from, because of their color, all citizens of the African
race, is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the laws passed by Congress for the enforcement of its
provisions. Where the statutes of Kentucky excluded
citizens of African descent from service on grand and
petit juries because of their race, it will be presumed that
prior to the time they were adjudged invalid, they were
followed by jury commissioners. Where citizens of
African descent have been wrongfully excluded from a
604 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 333
grand jaryy an indictment found by it should be set aside.
Bush V. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110.
§334. State statute requiring separate accommoda-
tions for white and colored persons in railway coaches.
A state statute providing for separate railway carriages
for the white and colored races by railway companies
carrying passengers in their coaches in the state, and the
assignment of passengers to the coaches according to
their race by conductors does not deprive a colored per-
son of any rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. The enforced separation of the
races, as applied to the internal commerce of the state,
neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the col-
ored man, deprives him of his property without due
process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of
the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. So far as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question
whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regu-
lation, and with respect to this there must necessarily
be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In
determining the question of reasonableness it is at lib-
erty to act with respect to the established usages, customs,
and traditions of the people, and with a view to the pro-
motion of their comfort, and the preservation of the pub-
lic peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, it
can not be said that a law which authorizes or even
requires the separation of the two races in public con-
veyances is unreasonable or more obnoxious to the
Fourteenth Amendment than the act of Congress requir-
ing separate schools for colored children in the District
of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not
seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts
of state legislatures. The underlying fallacy of the
plaintiff's argument consists in the assumption that the
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with the badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is
§ 335 FIRST INTERPRETATION 605
not by reason of anything f onnd in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it. The argument also assumes that social preju-
dice may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights
can not be secured to the negro except by an enforced com-
mingling of the two races. The Supreme Court refused
to accept this proposition, and declared, that if the two
races are to meet on terms of social equality, it must be
the result of natural aflSnity, a mutual appreciation of
each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individ-
uals. Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts
or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences,
and the attempt to do so can pnly result in accentuating
the difficulties of the situation* If the civil and political
rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to
the othBT civilly or politically. If one race be inferior
to the other sodally, the Constitution of the United
States cannot put them upon the same plane. Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537.
§ 335. Discrimination against colored children. A de-
cision by a state court denying an injunction against the
maintenance, by a board of education, of a high school for
white children, while failing to maintain one for colored
children also, for the reason that the funds were not
sufficient to maintain it in addition to needed primary
schools for colored children, does not constitute a denial
of the equal protection of the law or equal privileges of
citizens of the United States. The relief asked for was
an injunction that would either impair the efficiency of the
high school provided for the white children or compel the
board to close it. Such action would not give to colored
children additional opportunities for the education fur-
nished in high schools. The board had before it the
question whether it should maintain a high school for
about 60 colored children, or withhold the benefit of edu-
cation in primary schools from 300 children of the same
race. The evidence in the record does not permit the
606 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 335
conclusion that that decision waa made with any desire or
purpose on the part of the board to discriminate against
any of the colored school children of the county on account
of their race. The state court did not deem the acticm of
the board of education in suspending temporarily and
for economic reasons the high school for colored chil-
dren a sufficient reason why injunction should lie to
restrain from maintaining an existing high school for
white children. It rejected the suggestion that the board
proceeded in bad faith or had abused the discretion with
which it was invested by the statute under which it pro-
ceeded or had acted in hostility to the colored race. Un-
der the circumstances it cannot be said that this action
of the state court was, within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment, a denial by the state of the equal
protection of the laws. Gumming v. County Board of
Education, 175 U. S. 528.
§ 336. Negroes as grand jurors. A denial of the equal
protection of the laws is made by a ruling of a state
court upon motion to quash an indictment because of the
exclusion of negroes from the grand jury lists, by which
such motion, though but two printed octavo pages in
length, was struck from the files, under the color of local
practice for prolixity, because it contained an allegation
that certain provisions of the newly adopted state con-
stitution, claimed to have the eflfect of disfranchising
negroes because of their race, worked as a reason and
consideration in the minds of the jury commissioners for
their action. It is a necessary and well-settled rule that
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court to pro-
tect constitutional rights cannot be declined when it is
plain that the fair result of a decision is to deny the
rights. It is well known that the court will decide for
itself whether a contract was made as well as whether the
obligation of the contract has been impaired. On the
same ground there can be no doubt that if full faith and
credit were denied to a judgment rendered in another
§ 337 PmST INTERPRETATION 607
state upon a suggestion of a want of jurisdiction, without
evidence to warrant the finding, the court would enforce
the constitutional requirement. The result of the earlier
cases may be summed up in the words of the judgment
delivered by Mr. Justice Gray : * * Whenever, by any action
of a state, whether through its legislature, through its
courts, or through its executive or administrative officers,
all persons of the African race are excluded, solely be-
cause of their race or color, from serving as grand jurors
in the criminal prosecution of a person of the African
race, the equal protection of the laws is denied to him,
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States." Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S.
442 ; Eogers v. Alabama, 192 XJ. S. 226.
§337. Negroes as jurors. A discrimination against
negroes because of their race, in the selection of grand or
petit jurors, forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, is
not shown by verified written motions to quash respec-
tively the indictment and the panel of petit jurors, charg-
ing such discrimination, where no evidence was either
introduced or offered to establish the facts stated in the
motions. If upon the hearing of the motions the facts
stated therein had been established by affirmative proof,
or if the trial court had refused to admit evidence to
prove them, the Supreme Court would not have hesitated
to reverse the judgment. To exclude all persons of the
African race solely because of their race or color, to serve
as grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person
of the African race, denies to him the equal protection
of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the accused in each of his written motions
prayed the court to hear evidence thereon, it does not
appear that he introduced any evidence whatever to prove
discrimination against his race because of their color, or
made any actual offer of evidence in support of either
motion. The motions were not supported by any com-
petent evidence; consequently, they cannot be held to
608 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 337
have been erroneously denied. The absence of any proof
in the record is fatal to the charge of the accused that his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.
Martin v. Texas, 200 U, S. 316.
§ 338. Right of women to practice law in state courts.
The right to practice* law in the state courts is not a
privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States
within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment The power of a state to prescribe the
qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts,
is unaffected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Supreme Court cannot inquire into the reasonableness or
propriety of the rules it may prescribe. Mr. Justice
Miller in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court,
said: '^Unless we are wholly and radically mistaken in
the principles on which those cases (the Slaughter House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36) are decided, the right to control and
regulate the granting of license to practice law in the
courts of a state is one of those powers which are not
transferred for its protection to the Federal Government,
and its exercise is in no manner controlled by citizenship
of the United States in the party seeking such license."
Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130.
§ 339. The civil rights cases. Section 5 of the Four*
teenth Amendment provides: **The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article. ' ' The amendment was submitted to
the states by a resolution of Congress passed June 16,
1866, and was ratified according to a proclamation of the
Secretary of State dated July 28, 1868. By virtue of the
fifth section of the amendment. Congress, by act approved
March 1, 1875, 18 St. L. 335, entitled **An act to protect
citizens in their civil and legal rights,'' enacted **That
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of
§ 339 PmST INTERPRETATION 609
inns, public conveyances on land and water, theatres, and
other places of public amusement; subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law, and ap-
plicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regard-
less of any previous condition of servitude/' Severe
penalties were provided for denying the full and equal
privileges accorded by the law.
In the Civil Bights cases the court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment is prohibitory upon the states only,
and the legislation authorized to be adopted by Congress
for enforcing it is not direct legislation on the matters
respecting which the states are prohibited from making
or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but is
corrective legislation, such as may be necessary or proper
for counteracting and redressing the effect of such laws
or acts. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
declares that: **No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of cit-
izens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. * * It is state action of a par-
ticular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion
of individual rights is not the subject matter of the
amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nul-
lifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action
of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, or which injures them
in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or
which denies to any of themj the equal protection of the
laws. The last section of the amendftient invests Congress
with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation, to
adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects
of such prohibited state laws and state acts, and thus to
render them effectually null, void and innocuous. This
is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this
is the whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power
to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain
Due Process— 39
610 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 339
of state legislation ; but to provide modes of relief against
state legislation or state action, of the kind referred to.
It does not authorize Congress to create a code of munici-
pal law for the regulation of private rights ; but to provide
modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and
the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when
these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified
in the amendment. Positive rights and privileges are
undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment ; bat
they are secured by way of prohibition against state laws
and state proceedings affecting those rights and priv-
ileges, and by power given by Congress* to legislate for
the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect ; and
such legislation must, necessarily, be predicated upon such
supposed state laws or state proceedings, and be directed
to the correction of their operation and effect. Until
some state law has been passed or some state action
through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to
the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States
under, said amendment, nor any proceedings under such
legislation, can be called into activity ; for the prohibitions
of the amendment are against state laws and acts done
under state authority. Civil Eights Cases, 109 U. S- 3.
CHAPTER XVin
POWBB OP TAXATION
§ 340. Oonstitntionality of state tax laws. The right
of taxation is a fundamental and essential power of the
state without which it cannot properly perform its func-
tions. The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended as
a restriction on this power and very few laws impos-
ing taxes, when brought to the bar of the Supreme Court,
have been held invalid. Alleged discriminations have
been upheld on the ground that the state has the right to
classify the objects of taxation, provided the classification
is not arbitrary, unreas'onable, oppressive or capricious.
The Kentucky statute of 1882, to amend the charter of
the city of Louisville, so far as it authorized the cost of
the improvements of streets to be assessed against the
owners of lots and gave a lien thereon, is not in conflict
with section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, as amounting to a depriva-
tion of property without due process of law, and a denial
of the equal protection of the laws. Whenever the law
operates alike upon all persons and property, similarly
situated, equal protection cannot be said to be denied.
Unjust, unequal or arbitrary burdens are not authorized
to be imposed by the terms of the act, and opportunity is
given to every party interested to be heard in opposition
to the enforcement of the liability in the courts, which
are specially authorized to **make all corrections, rules,
and orders to do justice to all parties concerned. * * The
remedy for abuse is in the state courts ; for, in the lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Field in Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102
U. S. 691, **This court is not the harbor in which the peo-
ple of a city or county can find a refuge from ill-advised,
611
612 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 340
unequal, and oppressive state legislation/* Walston v.
Nevin, 128 U. S. 578.
§341. Tax on corporate securities. The provision in
the Fourteenth Amendment, that no state shall deny to
any person the equal protection of the laws, does not
prevent a state from adjusting its system of taxation in
all proper and reasonable ways, nor compel the states to
adopt an iron rule of equal taxation. The Fourteenth
Amendment intended only that equal protection and se-
curity should be given to all under like circumstances, and
that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are
laid upon others in the same calling and condition. The
method of assessing the tax in question, on the face value
of corporate securities in Pennsylvania, is not violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Levy-
ing a tax on the nominal or face value of bonds instead
of assessing it upon the actual value, does not violate the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids
a state to withhold from any person the equal protection
of the laws. There is no unjust discrimination against
any persons or corporations. The presumption is that
corporate securities are worth their face value. Be-
sides, the person holding them is not affected by the
tax unless he receives his interest from which the tax is
deducted. When the interest is not paid he pays no tax.
A state may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of
property from any taxation at all, such as churches,
libraries and the property of charitable institutions. It
may impose different specific taxes upon different trades
and professions, and may vary the rates of excise upon
various products; it may tax real estate and personal
property in a different manner; it may tax visible prop-
erty only, and not tax securities for payment of money; it
may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them.
All such regulations, and those of like character, so long
as they proceed within reasonable limits and general
usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature,
§ 342 POWER OF TAXATION 613
or the people of the state in framing their constitution.
But clear and hostile discriminations against particular
persons and classes, especially such as are of an unusual
character, unknown to the practice of our governments,
might be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition. It
would, however, the Court said, be impracticable and
unwise to attempt to lay down any general rule or defini-
tion on the subject, that would include all cases. BelPs
Gap Bailroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 TJ. S. 232.
§ 342. Tax on business of an express company. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a state from
adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reason-
able ways, nor the classification of property for taxation.
The Missouri act imposing a tax upon the business of
express companies is not repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment because it does not impose a like tax upon
railroad or steamboat companies which carry express
matter. The Supreme Court has repeatedly laid down
the doctrine that diversity of taxation, both with respect
to the amount imposed and the various species of prop-
erty selected either for bearing its burdens or for being
exempt from them, is not inconsistent with a perfect imi-
f ormity and equality of taxation in the proper sense of
those terms ; and that a system which imposes the same
tax upon every species of property, irrespective of its
nature or condition or class, will be destructive of the
principle of uniformity and equality in taxation and of
a just adaptation of property to its burdens. The act
cannot be considered as invidiously discriminating against
express companies in favor of other companies that may
carry express matter on certain other conditions or under
different circumstances. Bailroad and steamboat compa-
nies pay taxes on tangible property. Express companies
have no tangible property of any consequence subject to
taxation under the general laws. There is, therefore, no
way by which they can be taxed at all unless by a tax upon
their receipts for business transacted. This distinction
614 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 342
dearly places express companies in a separate class from
companies owning their own means of transportation.
They do not do business nnder the same conditions, or
under similar circumstances, and in the nature of things
belong to different classes. The legislature was justified
in the discrimination it has seen fit to impose, and the
act in question cannot be held violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339.
§ 343. State taxa4^ioii of express companies' property.
An express company is not denied the equal protection of
the laws by classifying it with railroad and telegraph
companies as subject to the unit *rule of taxation, which
estimates the value of the whole plant, though situated in
different states, as an entirety, for the purpose of deter-
mining the value of the property in one state. The policy
pursued in Ohio is to classify property for taxation, when
the nature of the property, or its use, or the nature of
the business engaged in, requires classification, in the
judgment of the legislature, in order to secure equality
of burden; and property of different sorts is classified
under various statutory provisions for the purposes of
assessment and taxation. The state constitution requires
all property to be taxed by a uniform rule and according
to its real value in money, and this law was upheld by
the supreme court of the state. The constitutional test
was held to be complied with, whatever the mode, if the
result of the assessment was that the property was as-
sessed at its true value in money. Applying the unit rule
to express companies does not deny to them the equal
protection of the laws. There is no attempt to tax prop-
erty having a situs outside of the state, but only to place
a just value on that within. The states through which
the companies operate ought not to be compelled to con-
tent themselves with a valuation of separate pieces of
property disconnected from the plant as an entirety, to the
proportionate part of which they extend protection, and
to the dividends of whose owners their citizens contribute.
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194.
§ 344 POWER OF TAXATION 615
§344. Legacy and inheritance taxes. Legacy and
inheritance taxes are constitutional. The equal protection
of the laws given by the Federal Constitution only re-
quires that the law shall have the attribute of equality of
operation^ which does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
their relations. Classes based on lineal and collateral
relationship to the testator or intestate, made by a stat-
ute taxing inheritances, depend on substantial distinc-
tions, and are not arbitrary. Exemptions from a statute
taxing inheritances do not render its operation unequal
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, A
collateral inheritance tax which does not impose a uni-
form rate, but classifies legacies to strangers to the blood
and imposes higher rates on the large^ sums, is not in
violation of the rule of equality of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution.
'^\rhat satisfies the equality of protection guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment has not been and probably
never can be precisely defined. It does not proHbit legis-
la tion which is limited, either in the objects to which it
is directed or by the territory within which it is to oper-
ate. It only requires the same means and methods to be
applied impartially to all the constituents of each class
created by the law, and that all persons subjected to such
legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances
and conditions, both in the privilege conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The rule prescribes no rigid equality
and permits to the discretion and wisdom of the state a
wide latitude as far as interference by the Supreme Court
is concerned. Nor with the policy of the law has it con-
cern. Hardship, impolicy, or injustice of state laws is
not necessarily an objection to their constitutional valid-
ity. In some circumstances the state may not tax A more
than B, but if A be of a different trade or profession than
B, it may. And in matters not of taxation, if A be a
different kind of corporation than B, it may subject A to
a different kind of responsibility to servants than B, to
616 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 344
a different measure of damages than B, and it permits
social legislation in all of its varieties. In other words^
the state may distinguish, select, and classify objects of
legislation, and necessarily this power must have a wide
range of discretion, but not without limitation. The
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to compel the
state to adopt an iron rule of equal protection. It may
exempt certain classes of property, may impose different
specific taxes upon different trades and professions, and
vary the rates of excise upon different products, so long
as the regulations proceed within reasonable limits and
general usage. The Federal Constitution imposes no re-
straints on the state in regard to unequal taxation. The
rule of equality permits many practical inequalities. In
a classification for governmental purposes there cannot
be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things.
There are three main classes in the Illinois statute, based
on lineal and collateral relationship, and strangers to the
blood and distant relatives. The third class is again
divided into four classes dependent upon the amount of
the estate received. The differences between the first
two classes are substantial, and ^ ' bear a just and proper
relation to the attempted classification. ' ' The tax is one
on the succession and not on property. The determination
of the amount of the exemptions is a legislative and not
a judicial function. The tax on legacies to strangers to
the blood of the interstate depends on the amount of the
legacy. There are four classes created, and manifestly
there is equality between the members of each class.
When the legacies differ in substantial extent, if the rate
increases, the benefit increases to greater degree. If there
is inequality it must be because the members of a class
are arbitrarily made such and burdened as such upon no
distinction justifying it. This is claimed. The tax is
not in proportion to the amount but varies with the
amounts arbitrarily fixed. One who is given a legacy of
$10,001 by the deduction of the tax receives $99.04 less
than one who is given a legacy of $10,000. This is not
§ 345 POWER OF TAXATION 617
contrary to the rule of equality of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which does not require exact equality of taxation.
It only requires that the law imposing it shall operate on
all alike under the same >circumstances. The tax is not
on money, it is on the right to inherit, and hence a condi-
tion of inheritance, and may be graded according to the
value of that inheritance. All license laws and all specific
taxes have in them an element of inequality, nevertheless
they are universally imposed ancj their legality has never
been questioned. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings
Bank, 170 U. S. 283.
§ 345. Penalty for nonpayment of taxes. A penalty of
50 per cent for nonpayment of taxes by a telegraph com-
pany, doing business in the state, which is imposed by
Indiana act of March 6, 1893, is not unconstitutional as
a denial to such company of the equal protection of the
law, or as an arbitrary classification, or as a deprivation
of property without due process of law. The necessity
of classifying the subjects of taxation in order to reach
uniform and just results, as far as possible, is not denied ;
nor that the infliction of penalties on delinquency is a
usual and legitimate mode of compelling the prompt pay-
ment of taxes. The supreme court of Indiana was of
opinion that by reason of the differences in the nature of
these companies and the uses to which their property was
devoted in the prosecution of their business from other
tax payers and their property and business, the legislature
was justified in placing them in a class by themselves and
subjecting them to the particular method of effecting col-
lection by means of penalties and suit for recovery of
judgment for the delinquent taxes with penalties added.
The amount of the penalty was a matter for the legis-
lature to determine in its discretion. The Supreme Court
was unable to discover any ground for holding that the
Federal Constitution was violated by the law, and agreed
in the view which thje supreme court of the state expressed
in the premises. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State
of Indiana, 165 U. S. 304.
618 DUB PROCESS OP LAW 1 346
§ 346. State tax law as to banks ooxurtitutioiiaL Lack
of uniformity in the result of a state tax law as to banks
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution as denying to any person the equal pro-
tection of the laws, — ^at least when the inequality comes
from the election of certain taxpayers to avail themselves
of privileges offered to all.
The lack of uniformity charged against the statute con-
sists not in the terms and conditions expressed in the
statute^ but only in the possible results of its operation.
Upon all bank shares, whether state or national, rest the
ordinary state tax of 4 mills. To every bank, state and
national, and all alike, is given the privilege of discharg-
ing all tax obligations by collecting from its stockholders
and paying 8 mills on the dollar upon the par value of its
stock. If the bank has a large surplus, and its stock is in
consequence worth five or six times its par value, naturally
it elects to collect and pay the 8 mills, and thus in fact it
pays at a less rate on the actual value of the property
than the bank without surplus, and whose stock is only
worth par. So it is possible, under the operation of the
law, that one bank may pay at a less rate upon the actual
value of its banking property than another ; but the banks
which do not make the election, whether state or national,
pay no more than the regular tax. The result of the
election under the circumstances is simply that those
electing pay less. But this lack of uniformity in the result
furnishes no ground of complaint under the Federal Con-
stitution. Indeed, the whole argument of a right under the
Federal Constitution to challenge a tax law on the ground
of inequality in the burdens resulting from the operation
of the law is put at rest by the decision in Bell's Gap E.
Co. V. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237. Merchants' and
Manufacturers' National Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167
U. S. 461.
§ 347. Taxation of mortgagee's interest in land. The
taxation of mortgaged real estate by taxing the mort-
§ 348 POWER OP TAXATION 619
gagee's interest therein to him, and the rest to the
mortgagor, is not a double taxation, nor does it make
such discrimination between mortgagors and mortgagees,
nor between resident and nonresident mortgagees, as to
deny the latter the equal protection of the laws. The
clear intent and effect of the statute is as f oUowb : The
personal obligation of the mortgagor to the mortgagee
is not taxed at all. The mortgage and the debt secured
thereby are taxed, as real estate, to the mortgagee, not
beyond their real cash value, and only so far as they
represent an interest in the real estate mortgaged. The
debt is not taxed separately, but only together with the
mortgage; and is considered as indebtedness within the
state for no other purpose than to enable the mortgagor
to deduct the amount thereof from the assessment upon
him, in the same manner as other indebtedness within
the state is deducted. And the mortgagee, as well as the
mortgagor, is entitled to have deducted from his own
assessment the amount of his indebtedness within the
state. The statute, which is drawn in question, expressly
forbids any taxation of the promissory note, or other
instrument of writing, which is the evidence of the debt
secured by the mortgage; and, with equal distinctness,
provides for the taxation as real estate, of the mortgage
interest in the land. Although the right which the mort-
gage transfers in the land covered thereby is not the
legal title, but only an equitable interest and by way of
security for the debt, it appears to be clear upon prin-
ciple, and in accordance with the weight of authority,
that this interest, like any other interest, legal or equi-
table, may be taxed to its owner (whether resident or
nonresident) in the state where the land is situated, with-
out contravening any provision of the Constitution of the
United States. Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah
County, 169 U. S. 421.
§ 348. Forfeiting lands for nonpayment of taxes. The
exemption by the Virginia constitution of tracts of land
620 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 348
of less than 1,000 acres, from a provision for forfeiture
of larger tracts by failure for five successive years to
have them charged on the land books with taxes due
thereon, does not constitute such a discrimination against
the owners of larger tracts as to deny them the equal pro-
tection of the laws. The evil intended to be remedied by
the constitution and laws of West Virginia was the per-
sistent failure of those who owned or claimed to own
large tracts of land, patented in the seventeenth century,
or early in the eighteenth century, to put them on the
land books, so that the extent and boundaries of such
tracts could be easily ascertained by the officers charged
with the duty of assessing and collecting taxes. Where the
tract was a small one, the probability was that it was actu-
ally occupied by someone, and its extent of boundary could
be readily ascertained for purposes of assessment and
taxation. It can be well understood why one policy could
be properly adopted as to large tracts which the necessi-
ties of the public revenue did not require to be prescribed
as to small tracts. Said Mr. Justice Harlan in speaking
for the court : * * The judiciary should be very reluctant
to interfere with the taxing systems of a state, and should
never do so unless that which the state attempts to do
is in palpable violation of the constitutional rights of the
owners of property. Under this view of our duty, we are
imwilling to hold that the provision referred to is repug-
nant to the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid-
ding a denial of the equal protection of the laws. ' ' King
V. MuUins, 171 U. S. 404.
§ 349. Discrimination in taxes as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws* A manufacturer engaged in the
business of refining sugar is not denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws because of the discrimination made by the
Louisiana constitution imposing a license tax upon manu-
facturers engaged in such business, but exempting from
the tax those who refine the products of their own plan-
tations. The act in question undoubtedly discriminates
§ 349 POWER OP TAXATION 621
in favor of a certain class of refiners, but this discrimi-
nation, if founded upon a reasonable distinction in prin-
ciple, is valid. Of course if such discrimination were
purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made to
depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious
opinions, political affiliations, or other considerations
having no possible connection with the duties of citizens
as taxpayers, such exemption would be pure favoritism,
and a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the
less favored classes. But from time out of mind it has
been the policy of this government, not only to classify
for purposes of taxation, but to exempt producers from
the taxation of the methods employed by them to put
their products upon the market. The right to sell is
clearly an incident of the right to manufacture or pro-
duce, and it is at least a question for the legislature to
determine whether anything done to prepare a product
most perfectly for the needs of the market shall not be
treated as an incident to its growth or production. The
act is not one exempting planters who use their sugar in
the manufacture of articles of a wholly different descrip-
tion, such as confectionery, preserves, or pastry, or such
as one which would exempt the farmer who devoted his
com or rye to the making of whisky, while other manu-
facturers of these articles were subjected to a tax. A
somewhat different question might arise in such case,
since none of these articles are the natural products of
the farm, — such products only becoming useful by being
co-mingled with other ingredients. Refined sugar, how-
ever, is the natural and ultimate product of the cane, and
the various steps taken to perfect such product are but
incidents to the original growth. Congress has repeat-
edly acted upon this principle in its revenue legislation.
See 3 Stat, at L. 205, chap. 40 ; 12 Stat, at L. 432, chap.
119. The Supreme Court has had repeated occasions to
sustain discriminations founded upon reasons much more
obscure than this. See cases cited. The constitution of
Louisiana classifies the refiners of sugar for the purposes
624 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 351
they have but one in the case of individuals, can not be
held to be a denial to the corporations of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, so long as the real estate of the indi-
vidual is, in fact, generally assessed at its full value. New
York ex rel. New York Clearing House Bldg. Co. v.
Barker, 179 U. S. 279.
§352. Succession taxes. The imposition of a tax,
under the New York inheritance-tax law, on the transfer,
under the will of a nonresident, on debts due the decedent
by residents of that state, does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U. S. 189.
§353. Inheritance tax. The equal protection of the
laws is not denied by the Blinois inheritance tax law be-
cause, under that statute as interpreted and enforced by
the state courts, certain life estates may be taxed when
the remainder is to lineal descendants of the decedent,
but not when the remainder is to collateral heirs or
strangers in blood. The constitutionality of the law was
passed upon in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank,
170 U. S. 283. The assignment of error in this case is
that the cfcissification of life tenants is arbitrary and un-
reasonable. As has been said classification must be
based on some reasonable ground. If the purpose is
within the legal powers of the legislature, and the classi-
fication made has relation to that purpose (excludes no
persons or objects that are affected by the purpose, in-
cludes all that are), logically speaking, it will be appro-
priate, legally speaking, a law based upon it will have
equality of operation. Complaint is made that the legis-
lature has discriminated against constituents of a certain
class, and applied different rules for the taxation of life
tenants. Life tenants, regarded simply as persons, may
be in legal contemplation the same; estate for life, re-
garded simply as estates with their attributes also in
legal contemplation, may be said to be the same, but that
§ 355 POWER OF TAXATION 625
is not all that is to be considered, nor is it determinative.
Eegard must be had for the power of the state over testate
and intestate dispositions of property, its power to create
and limit estates, and, as resulting, its power to impose
conditions upon their transfer or devolution. It is upon
this power that inheritance-tax laws are based. The
power can be exercised by distinguishing between the
lineal and collateral relatives to a testator. In the Ma-
goun case the amount of the tax depended upon him who
inamediately received; here the existence of the tax de-
pends upon him who ultimately receives. That can make
no difference with the power of the state. No discrimina-
tion being exercised in the creation of the class, equality
is observed. Crossing the lines of the classes created bv
the statute, discriminations may be exhibited, but withik
the classes there is equality. Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S.
97.
§ 354. Income tax on mining companies. Mining com-
panies and their stockhofders are not denied the equal
protection of the laws nor deprived of their property
>vithout due process of law, contrary to the Fifth Amend-
ment, by the income tax provisions of the tariff act of
October 3, 1913 (38 Stat, at L. 166, chap. 16) under which
the deduction permitted for depreciation arising from
depletion of ore deposits is limited to 5 per cent of the
gross value at the mine of the output during the year,
while' other individuals and corporations have the right
to deduct a fair and reasonable percentage for losses and
depreciation. No unconstitutional discrimination results
from the progressive rate feature of the income tax, be-
cause the surtax applies to individual incomes only, not
to corporate ones. Corporations are not unconstitution-
ally discriminated against because of the exemption which
the income tax provisions makes of individual incomes
bdow $4,000. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103.
§ 355. Tax on cigarette selling. The equal protection
of the laws is not denied a retail tobacco dealer by the
Dne Process — 40
626 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 355
tax imposed on cigarette selling by the Iowa code, because
sales by jobbers and wholesalers, in doing an interstate
business with customers outside of the state, are exempted
from its provisions. Reference is made to a series of well-
known cases arising under the anti-trust laws of the sev-
eral states, to the e£fect that laws against combinations in
trade must be uniform in their application as applied to
all persons within the same general class. These cases,
however, have but limited application to laws imposing
taxes, where the right of classification is held to permit
of discrimination between different trades and callings
when not obviously exercised in a spirit of prejudice or
favoritism. The distinction was recognized in Connolly
V. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540. It can scarcely
be doubted that if that case had dealt with the subject of
taxation, a discriminative tax upon producers of agri-
cultural products, either greater or less than that imposed
upon other manufacturers or producers, might have been
held valid without denying to either party the equal pro-
tection of the laws. There is a dear distinction in prin-
ciple between persons engaged in selling cigarettes gen-
erally or at retail, and those engaged in selling by
wholesale to customers without the state. They are two
entirely distinct occupations. One sells at retail, the
other at wholesale ; one to the public generally, and the
other to a particular class ; one within the state, the other
without. Why the legislature should have made the dis-
tinction is not entirely clear, but the section is not* open
to the objection of denying to the dealers in cigarettes
the equal protection of the laws. Cook v. Marshall
County, 196 U. S. 261.
§356. Taxation of corporate franchise. The Federal
Constitution does not forbid state taxation of the fran-
chise of a domestic corporation at a different rate than
is assessed upon the tangible property in the state. In-
equality in valuation for taxation of a franchise, as com-
pared with other taxable property, must be systematic
§ 367 POWER OP TAXATION 627
and intentional in order to justify a Federal court in
enjoining the apportionment and certification of the tax
to the several counties, where the assessment does not
appear to have been made on such a different scale of
values from that adopted elsewhere as to deny the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was the only ground invoked to sus-
tain the Federal jurisdiction. Looking first at the assess-
ment of the franchise, there is no such certainty that
it was made on a different scale of values from that
adopted elsewhere as would warrant an attack upon it
under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if otherwise that
attack could be maintained. But the supposed infringe-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment is the only ground on
which the railroad company could come into the circuit
court, and if that ground fails, and obviously fails, the
Supreme Court would be very cautious, at least, in inter-
fering with the state ^s administration of its taxes upon
other considerations which would not have given it juris-
diction. Coulter V. Louisville & Nashville E. Co., 196
U. S. 599.
§357. Taxation of street railways. A street railway
company is not denied the equal protection of the laws by
a municipal tax on its business at the rate of $100 per
mile or fraction of a mile of its trackage in the city streets
because a steam railway, making an extra charge for
local deliveries of freight brought over its road from out-
side the city, is not subject to this tax. The plaintiff con-
tends that a classification which distinguishes between an
ordinary street railway and a steam railroad making an
extra charge for local deliveries of freight brought over
its road from outside the city is contrary to the Four-
teenth Amendment and void. The state courts held that
this was a business tax, lawfully imposed, and that the
plaintiff did not stand like the steam railroad which is
subject to taxation by the state alone. The difference
between the two railroads is obvious, and warrants the
628 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 357
diversity in the mode of taxation. The steam railroad
may be assured to do the great and characteristic part of
its work outside the city^ while the plaintiff does its
work within the city. If the former escapes city taxation,
it does so only because its main business is not in the
city, and the state reserves it for itself. Savannah^ T. &
I. of H. E. Co. V. Savannah, 198 U. S. 392.
§358. Tax on special franchises. The redaction, on
account of annual payments **in the nature of a tax'* cov-
ered by existing agreements, which is made by New York
laws from the amount of the special franchise tax pro-
vided for by statute, does not render the statute invalid
either as denying the equal protection of the laws to street
railway companies who agreed to pay a lump sum for
their franchises, or as depriving such companies of their
property without due process of law. The exemption of
the subsurface street railway in New York city from the
operation of the special franchise tax does not make that
statute invalid, as denying the owners of the surface
street railways in that city the equal protection of the
laws, or as depriving them of their property without due
process of law. It is insisted that the special franchise
tax denies the relator the equal protection of the laws in
three separate and distinct aspects. (1) That it adds to
the obligations of their various contracts while preserving
all the burdens of those contracts; (2) That it provides
for the deduction of annual payments covered by existing
contracts from the amount of tax levied, by reason of
which deduction those who agreed to pay for their f ran-
chises lump sums or annual amounts less than the new
tax are discriminated against; (3) That it discriminates
against surface railways and subjects them to taxation,
while their competitors, operating under the surface of
many of the same streets, are to be exempted. To which
the court replied : (1) There had been no impairment of
contract obligations, and the fact that the companies for
so many years escaped the burden is their good fortune.
§ 359 POWER OF TAXATION 629
and in no manner discharges them from the ordinary
burdens of taxation which the present law imposes.
(2) The lump sum is so obviously a payment for the
franchise that it cannot be considered in any just sense
as possessing the nature of a tax. It is not even rental.
It is like money paid for a tract of land, — ^part of the pur-
chase price. Further, the whole matter of allowing a
reduction on account of that which is spoken of as **in
the nature of a tax,'' is a matter of grace on the part of
the legislature. The franchises were held subject to tax-
ation, and the fact that the state has consented that a
certain reduction shall, in some cases, be made, does not
entitle every holder of a franchise to a like reduction.
There is nothing in the Federal Constitution to pre-
vent a state from granting exemptions from taxation.
(3) There is a difference between surface and subsurface
street railways sufficient to justify a diversity in the
mode and extent of taxation. Citing Savannah, T. & I. of
H. E. Co. V. Savannah, 198 U. S. 392. New York ex rel.
Metropolitan Street E. Co. v. State Board of Tax Com'rs,
199 U. S. 1.
§ 359. Validity of state inheritance tax. Brothers and
sisters of a decedent may be subjected to the burden of
the inheritance tax imposed by the California act of 1893,
as amended, without denying them the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
although such legislation does not impose any tax on
such strangers to the blood as the wife or widow of a son
or the husband of a daughter of the deceased. The con-
tention that the act was repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, on this ^ound, reduces itself to and must
depend on the soundness of the argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment compels the states, in levying inher-
itance taxes, and, a fortiori, in regulating inheritances,
to conform to blood relationship. That is to say, in their
last analysis all the arguments depend upon the proposi-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment has taken away
630 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 359
from the states the power to regula;te the passage of
property by death or the burdens whidh may be imposed
resulting therefrom, because that amendment confines
the states absolutely, both as to the passage of such prop-
erty and as to the burdens imposed thereon, to the rule of
blood relationship. To state the proposition is to answer
it. A state may prefer near relatives by affinity to col-
lateral relatives. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
deprive a state of the power to regulate and burden the
right to inherit, but at the most can only be held to
restrain such an exercise of power as would exclude the
conception of judgment and discretion, and which would
be so obviously arbitrary and unreasonable as to be be-
yond the pale of governmental authority. Campbell v.
California, 200 U. S. 87.
§ 360. State inheritance tax. Successions which have
been finally closed and administered upon may be ex-
empted from the inheritance tax imposed by the Louis-
iana act of June 28, 1904, without rendering such statute
void as making an arbitrary classification which amounts
to a denial of the equal protection of the laws, where the
highest state court Inakes the validity of the tax depend
upon this classification by deciding that the state can tax
the property until it has passed out of the succession of
the testator. Successions which have been closed are
exempt from the tax, and a discrimination is claimed to
be made between heirs whose rights have become fixed
and vested on the same day. The classification is said to
be purely arbitrary. But the state supreme court made
the validity of the tax depend on the very fact which is
attacked as an improper basis of classification. The court
decided the property bequeathed was property the state
could tax, ** until it had passed out of the succession of
the testator.*' It was certainly not improper classifica-
tion to make the tax depend upon a fact without which it
would have been invalid. In other words, those who are
subject to be taxed cannot complain that they are denied
§ 360 POWER OF TAXATION 631
the equal protection of the laws because those who can
not legally be taxed are not taxed. Cahen v. Brewster,
203 U. S. 543.
The Illinois statute excluding foreign corporations from
the exemption from an inheritance tax in favor of prop-
erty devised for educational or religious uses, does not
abridge privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States or deny the equal protection of the laws. The
power of the state to classify objects of legislation and
discriminate between classes is not unconstitutionally ex-
ercised by legislation which exempts the religious and
educational institutions of the state from an inheritance
tax and subjects educational and religious institutions of
other states to the tax. Eegarding alone the purposes of
the institutions, no difference may be perceived between
them, but regarding the spheres of their exercise, and
benefits derived from their exercise, a difference is con-
spicuous. This benefit may have constituted the induce-
ment of the legislation. The controversies in this case
depend upon the power of the state over inheritances,
and the conditions she may put upon them in the exercise
of that power. In laying an inheritance tax the legis-
lature may consider the relation which the person or
corporation given the right of succession sustains to the
deceased, to the property, or to the state, and may regu-
late the amount of the tax to be required in view of such
relation, and in exercising this power may lay a tax on
the right of one class of persons or corporations to take,
and may deem it wise to impose no tax upon the right of
other classes of persons or corporations to take. A Fed-
eral court would hesitate indeed to put impediments on
this power or declare invalid any classification of persons
or corporations that had reasonable regard to the pur-
poses of the state and its legislation. And it cannot be
said that if a state exempt property bequeathed for char-
itable or educational purposes from taxation it is unrea-
sonable or arbitrary to require the charity to be exercised
or the education to be bestowed within her borders and
632 DUB PROCESS OP LAW 1 360
for her people, whether exercised through persons or
corporations. Board of Education v. Dlinois, 203 U. S.
553.
§361. Inheritance tax. The equal protection of the
laws is not denied by the imposition of the inheritance tax
provided for by the New York law upon certain bequests
of personalty by a nonresident decedent owning both real
and personal property within the state because, under
the statute as construed by the state courts, the tax could
not be collected if the only property belonging to the
decedent situated within the state was personalty.
Under the statute an inheritance tax may be collected
where the nonresident decedent owns both personal and
real property within the state of New York, and not where
the only property belonging to the decedent situate
within the state is personalty. But though the operation
of the statutes creates a difference, this, even if inten-
tional, is not of itself sufficient to invalidate the tax. The
power of the state in respect to the matter of taxation is
very broad, at least, so far as the Federal Constitution
is concerned. It may exempt certain property from taxa-
tion while all other is subjected thereto. It may tax one
class of property by one method of procedure and another
by a different method. * ' The right to make exemptions
is involved in the right to select the subjects of taxation
and apportion the public burdens among them, and may
consequently be understood to exist in the lawmaking
power wherever it has not in terms been taken away. To
some extent it must exist always, for the selection of sub-
jects of taxation is, of itself, an exemption of what is not
selected. ' ^ Indeed, it may be laid down as a general rule
that mere inequalities or exemptions in the matter of
state taxation are not forbidden by the Federal Consti-
tution. Beers v. Glynn, 211 U. S. 477.
§362. State taxation of meat-packing houses. The
equal protection of the laws is not denied a foreign meat-
§ 363 POWEE OF TAXATION 633
packing house by the tax imposed on its local business
under the North Carolina statute taxing '* every meat-
packing house doing business in this state, ' ' although at
the point where such local business is carried on, persons
selling meat-packing house products, but not doing a
meat-packing house business either in North Carolina or
elsewhere, are not subjected to the tax. The classification
of meat-packing houses cannot be said to be an arbitrary
selection or not to rest on reasonable grounds, and the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to prevent a
state from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper
and reasonable ways, or, through the undoubted power
of classification, to impose different taxes upon different
trades and professions. By the act under consideration
the tax is levied upon every packing house doing business
in the state, which includes by its terms both domestic and
foreign meat-packing houses. It appears that where
plaintiff in error does business certain persons sell, both
by wholesale and retail, packing-house products, and yet
are not subjected to this tax, but also that those parties
are not doing, either in North Carolina or elsewhere, a
packing-house business. The statute cannot be said to
deny the equal protection of the laws to meat-packing
houses because houses packing vegetables and the like
are not included in the same classification, and subject
to the same tax. When the state exerts its power to tax
it is not bound to tax all pursuits or all property that
may be legitimately taxed for governmental purposes.
Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226.
§363. Discrunination in taxing liquor sellers. The
statutes of Texas do not deny to liquor sellers the equal
protection of the laws because producers or manufac-
turers of domestic wines are exempt while such wines are
in their hands, from the tax imposed and the bond re-
quired by preceding article regulating the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors. So far as appears there is no natural
distinction of classes among liquor sellers, — one class sell-
634 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 363
ing their own domestic wines alone, another selling all
intoxicants except domestic wines. Whatever other ob-
jections there may be to the laws, they do not deny the
equal protection of the laws by forbidding, without justi-
fication, to one what they permit to another class. One
slight qualification is necessary to what has been said.
There is granted to the producers and manufacturers of
wine from grapes grown in Texas an immunity in respect
of that wine which is not granted to other sellers of the
same wine. To that extent, but to that extent alone,
favor is shown to a class. But this is not the class dis-
crimination put forward and insisted upon. The attack
is not mainly upon the distinction between producers and
other sellers of domestic wine, but upon that between
those producers and the sellers of other wine. The latter
is not a true class distinction. Whether there is a differ-
ence in the scope of the state 's general power to legislate
and its power to tax or not, the former does not need an
extended defense so far as the Fourteenth Amendment
alone is concerned. Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446.
§ 364. Validity of stock tranrfer tax. The New York
law imposing a tax on corporate stock is not invalid under
the Fourteenth Amendment, as making an arbitrary dis-
crimination in favor of sales of other kinds of personal
property, such as corporate bonds. This objection to a
tax must be approached iwith the greatest caution. The
general expressions of the amendment must not be allowed
to upset familiar and long-established methods and proc-
esses by a formal elaboration of rules which its words
do not import. Stamp acts necessarily are confined to
certain classes of transactions, and to classes which, con-
sidered economically or from the legal or other possible
points of view, are not very different from other classes
that escape. Stamp taxes must be levied upon things
that can be conveniently taxed. It is easy to say that
justice and equality cannot be measured by the conven-
ience of the taxing power. Yet economists do not con-
§ 366 POWER OP TAXATION 635
demn stamp acts, neither does the Constitution. There
is no discrimination in separating sales of stock from
sales of other kinds of personal property. A fortiori
do they warrant a tas on sales which is no^ intended to
discrimmate against or to discourage them, but simply to
collect a revenue for the benefit of the whole community
in a convenient way. New York ex reL Hatch v. Bear-
don, 204 U. S. 152.
§ 365. Taxation of spirits in bond. The equal protec-
tion of the laws is not denied by the taxation of distilled
spirits in bonded warehouses in the state, provided by
the Kentucky statute, under which the warehouseman is
made liable to pay the tax, and is given a lien on the
property for the amount paid. It is contended that the
power of the Federal Government over the spirits and the
distillery, and its custody of them, is exclusive of the
exercise of any other power whatever, and that such
custody has the effect to withdraw, in legal contemplation,
the property from the jurisdiction of the state, though
it is actually present in the state, making it, indeed, as
though it were outside of the territorial limits of the state.
And it is hence concluded that plaintiff in error by the
law of Kentucky is made to pay taxes on property belong-
ing to another person outside of the jurisdiction of the
state, and is thus denied the equal protection of the laws.
The state however disclaims any purpose of collecting
the taxes so long as the spirits are in the custody or
under the lien of the Federal Government. The distinc-
tion made by the taxing power of the state between dis-
tilled spirits in bond and other property does not
constitute a discrimination condemned by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power of the state to classify persons
and property in its legislation is well established and the
power is not transcended by the statute under review.
Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U. S. 340.
§366. Taxing wholesale dealers in oils. The Texas
law imposing an occupation tax upon wholesale dealers
636 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 366
in oils does not deny them the equal protection of the
lawSy although no similar tax is exacted from wholesale
dealers in other articles of merchandise, such as sugar,
bacon, coal, and iron. The tax in question is conceded to
be an occupation tax simply. It was imposed under the
authority of the state constitution providing that the
legislature may impose occupation taxes. It is not ques-
tioned that the state may classify occupations for pur-
poses of taxation. In its discretion it may tax all, or it
may tax one or some, taking care to accord to all in the
same class equality of rights. Except as restrained by
its own constitution or by the Constitution of the United
States, the state of Texas, by its legislature, has full
power to prescribe any system of taxation which, in its
judgment, is best or necessary for its people and govern-
ment; that, so far as the power of the United States is
concerned, the state has the right, by any rule it deems
proper, to classify persons or businesses for the purposes
of taxation, subject to the condition that such classifica-
tion shall not be in violation of the Constitution of the
United States ; that the requirements by the state, that
all wholesale dealers in specified articles shall pay a tax
of a given amount on their occupation, without exacting
a similar tax on the occupation of wholesale dealers in
other articles, cannot, on the face of the statute or by
reason of any facts within the judicial knowledge of the
court, be held, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to deprive the taxpayer of his property
without due process of law, or to deny him the equal pro-
tection of the laws; and that the Federal court cannot
interfere with the enforcement of the statute simply
because it may disapprove its terms, or question the
wisdom of its enactment, or because it cannot be sure as
to the precise reasons inducing the state to enact it.
Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114.
§ 367. Occupation tax. The Kentucky statute impos-
ing a license or occupation tax on the business of com-
§ 368 POWER OF TAXATION 637
ponndingy rectifying, adulterating, or blending distilled
spirits, is not invalid as denying the equal protection of
the laws, because no such tax is exacted from either resi-
dent or nonresident distillers who neither rectify, com-
pound, adulterate, nor blend their products, nor from
rectifiers and blenders of other states and countries who
vend in the state untaxed Rectified or blended spirits, in
direct competition with the spirits of local rectifiers or
blenders. This is a license tax imposed upon the doing
of a particular business plainly subject to the regulating
power of the state. The question involved is one of classi-
fication of subjects, trades, or pursuits, for the purpose
of taxation and concerns the power of the state to exer-
cise discretion in the methods, subjects, and rates of
taxation. Fundamental to the very existence of the gov-
ernmental power of the states as is this function of taxa-
tion, it is nevertheless subject to the beneficent restriction
that it shall not be so exercised as to deny to any the
equal protection of the law. But this restriction does not
compel the adoption of ' ' an iron rule of equal taxation, ' '
nor prevent variety in methods of taxation, or discretion
in the selection of subjects, or classification for purposes
• of taxation of either properties, businesses, trades, call-
ings, or occupations. A very wide discretion must be con-
ceded to the legislative power of the state in the classifi-
cation of trades, callings, businesses, or occupations
which may be subjected to special forms of regulation or
taxation through an excise or license tax. If the selection
or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and
rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference
or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the
law. Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563.
§ 368, Forfeiture for nonpayment of taxes. The pro-
visions for the forfeiture of land titles to the state for
failure to list and pay taxes thereon for certain specified
years, made by Kentucky act of March 15, 1906, art. 3,
does not deny the equal protection of the laws because,
638 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 368
in the application of such statute it can only meet condi-
tions such as are embraced within the law in a part of the
counties of the state. Landowners who did not acquire
their title until after the delinquencies had occurred can-
not claim to have been denied the equal protection of the
laws by the application to them of the provisions of said
law, for the forfeiture of such lands to the state, because
of the failure of the owners to list lands for taxation and
pay the taxes thereon for certain specified years. In such
cases the doctrine of innocent purchasers does not apply.
The Supreme Court has frequently held that the state
may classify the subjects of taxation, as long as all per-
sons similarly situated are treated alike. Michigan G. B.
Co. V. Powers, 201 U. S. 245. This law applies with
equal force to all who are in a condition to come within
its terms. Kentucky Union Co. v, Kentucky, 219 U. S.
140. I
§ 369. Classification— Taxes — Sales for future deliyery.
The Missouri statute is not invalid, as denying the equal
protection of the laws, which singles out the keeping of
a place where corporate stocks and bonds, and grains,
provisions, and other commodities are bought and sold,
but not paid for or delivered at the time, as a proper
business for the imposition of a stamp tax upon such
sales. There is no force in the objection that the classifi-
cation as shown by the statute, is arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. The same methods and means are applied
equally to all of the same class. In the opinion of the
state supreme court, the law -clearly embraces every
class, whether it be corporation, association, either volun-
tary or otherwise, partnership, or person which furnishes
a place for dealing in sales of stocks, bonds, etc, upon
margins or otherwise, where the same are not at the time
actually paid for and delivered, and embraces all classes
who may deal in such places so furnished. . . . The
business which is treated of by the statute is fully recog-
nized as a business separate and distinct from all other
§ 370 POWEE OP TAXATION 639
classes. . • . So far as the class of persons to whom
the law is made applicable, whether natural or artificial,
the statute embraces the entire class, and is not subject
to the objection that it singles out a part of a legal class
upon which the license or stamp tax is imposed, and
exempts others of the same class. • . . The selection
of the business calling and the class pursuing such call-
ing were proper and appropriately selected by the legis-
lature of the state in dealing with that subject. Broad-
nax V. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285.
§370. Excise tax on corporations. There is such a
substantial difference between the carrying on of business
by corporations and the same business when conducted
by a private firm or individual as would justify— even
were the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution applicable — ^the excise imposed by
the act of August 5, 1909 (36 Sta. at L. 11, 112, chap. 6,
• XT. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, pp. 659, 844), § 38, upon
the carrying on of business in a corporate or quasi cor-
porate capacity. The thing taxed is not the mere dealing
in merchandise, in which the actual transactions may be
the same, whether conducted by individuals or corpora-
tions, but the tax is laid upon the privileges which exist
in conducting business with the advantages which exist
in the corporate capacity of those taxed, and which are
not enjoyed by private firms or individuals. These
advantages are obvious, and have led to the formation of
such companies in nearly all branches of trade. The con-
tinuity of the business, without interruption by death or
dissolution, the transfer of property interests by the dis-
position of shares of stock, the advantages of business
controlled and managed by corporate directors, the gen-
eral absence of individual liability, these and other things
inhere in the advantages of business thus conducted,
which do not exist when the same business is conducted
by private individuals or partnerships. It is this dis-
tinctive privilege which is the subject of taxation, not the
640 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 370
mere buying or seUing or handling of goods, which may
be the same, whether done by corporations or individ-
uals, riint V- Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107.
§371. Tax on transfers inter vivos. The New York
statute authorizing a tax measured by the value of the
property, when property is transferred by deed intended
to take effect upon the death of the grantor, is one in the
nature of an excise tax on the transfer, and is not void
as denying the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, because lacking in the
elements of uniformity and equality required in the
assessment of property taxes. . • . Subjecting to the
tax a transfer of property by deed intended to take effect
at the death of the grantor, without taxing transfers
intended to take effect upon the death of some person
other than the grantor, or upon the happening of a cer-
tain or contingent event, does not involve such a discrim-
ination AS to deny the equal protection of the laws.
Children of a decedent, who, because of their relationship
are assessed at the lowest rate fixed by the law imposing
a tax when property is transferred by deed intended to
take effect at the death of the grantor, cannot urge that
such statute operates to deny the equal protection of the
laws because transfers to collaterals and strangers in
blood are taxed a higher rate. There can be no arbitrary
or unreasonable discrimination. But when there is a dif-
ference, it need not be great or conspicuous in order to
warrant classification. So far as the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is concerned, that state could put transfers intended
to take effect at the death of the grantor in a class with
transfers by descent, will, of gifts in contemplation of
the death of the donor, without, at the same time, taxing
transfers intended to take effect on the death of some
person other than the grantor, or on the happening of a
certain or contingent event. It is now well settled that
the state may impose a graduated tax in this class of
cases. Keeney v. New York, 222 XT. S. 525.
§ 373 POWER OF TAXATION 641
§372. Discrimination in license tax. The Montana
statute exempting steam laundries and women engaged
in the laundry business, where not more than two women
are employed, from the license tax imposed upon the laun-
dry business, does not deny the equal protection of the
laws to a man operating a hand laundry. A state does
not deny the equal protection of the laws merely by
adjusting its revenue laws and taxing system in such a
way as to favor certain industries or forms of industry.
It may make discriminations, if founded on distinctions
which cannot be pronounced unreasonable and purely
arbitrary. If a state sees fit to encourage steam laun-
dries and discourage hand laundries, that is its own
affair. And if, again, it finds a ground of distinction in
sex, that is not without precedent. If Montana deems it
advisable to put a lighter burden upon women than upon
men with regard to an employment commonly regarded
as more appropriate for the former, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not interfere by creating a fictitious
equality where there is a real difference. The particular
points at which that difference shall be emphasized by
legislation are largely in the power of the state. Quong
Wing V. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59.
§373. Grading municipal license fees for theaters.
Grading a municipal license fee for theaters according to
the price asked for the highest priced seats other than
box seats, rather than according to revenue, is not so pal-
pably arbitrary as to offend against the guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the equal protection of the
laws. A classification based on the distinction the theater
itself makes is not artificial, and must have some relation
to the success and ultimate profit of the business. There
is natural relation between the price of admission and
revenue, some advantage, certainly, that determines the
choice. The distinction obtains in every large city of the
country. The reason for it must therefore be substan-
tial ; and if it be so universal in the practice of the busi-
Bne ProceMh— 41
642 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 373
ness, it would seem not unreasonable if it be adopted as
the baais of governmental action. If the action of gov-
ernment have such a basis it cannot be declared to be so
palpably arbitrary as to be repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . This is the test of its validity.
• • • To be able to find fault with a law is not to dem-
onstrate its invalidity. It may seem unjust and oppres-
sive, yet be free from judicial interference. The
problems of government are practical ones and may
justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, —
illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criti-
cism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not
always discernible ; the wisdom of any choice may be dis-
puted or condemned. Mere errors of judgment are not
subject to judicial review. It is only its palpably arbi-
trary exercises which can be declared void under the
Fourteenth Amendment; and such judgment cannot be
pronounced of the ordinance in controversy. Metropolis
Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61.
§374. Taxation of deposits in national banks. The
tax imposed under a Vermont statute upon interest-
bearing deposits in national banks does not deny the
equal protection of the laws to depositors in such banks,
because depositors in state banking institutions are
exempted from taxation on their deposits up to $2,000,
such institutions paying a franchise tax upon the average
amount of deposits after deducting deposits in excess of
$2,000, upon which the depositors are taxable locally, nor
because of the exemptions which such statute makes in
favor of municipalities, corporations organized solely for
charitable, educational, or religious purposes, and various
corporations otherwise taxed, nor because persons whose
deposits do not bear interest in excess of 2 per cent per
annum are also exempted. In exercising its authority
to tax property within its jurisdiction, the state is not
limited to one method. It has a broad range of discre-
tion in classifying subjects of taxation and in employing
§ 375 POWER OF TAXATION 643
different methods for different sorts of property. The
Federal statute does not prescribe a rule with respect to
the taxation of depositors' credits on national banks.
State taxation of such property must not be unjustly dis-
criminatory, and the statute in question is not open to
that objection. The exemptions in the statute in favor
of municipalities and certain corporations of a quasi-
public character it was maidfestly within the power of
the state to allow. Similarly, with respect to persons
whose deposits did not bear interest exceeding 2 per cent
per annum, the legislature took this method of recog-
nizing a practical difference between deposit accounts of
the ordinary commercial sort and those which partook,
generally speaking, of the character of savings accounts.
It cannot be said that the classification adopted was
purely arbitrary or beyond the power of the state. Clem-
ent National Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120.
§ 375. Taxation of mineral rights. The assessment for
taxing purposes of mineral rights where they have been
separately conveyed and are owned by persons other than
the owners of the surface estates, without any corre-
sponding deduction from the assessments against the
surface owners, does not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as discriminating against the owners of the mineral
rights so assessed, where it does not appear that mineral
rights known to exist were consciously relieved from
taxation if they belonged to the owners of the surface.
Usually real estate is taxed as a unit; but as different
elements of the land are capable of being severed and
separately owned, the statute may authorize a separate
assessment against the owners of the severed parts.
Accordingly, if the title has been severed, land may be
taxed to one, timber to another, or land to one and coal to
another. The state court held that such was the law of
Texas, in view of the general language of the statute
defining real estate as including not only the land itself,
but the buildings on the land and the minerals under the
644 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 375
land. There was therefore nothing discriminatory in tax-
ing the owner of the mineral right that which had been
sold to him, and separately assessing the owner of the
surface with what remained. If the latter was over-
assessed it affords no defense to the owner of the mineral
rights. Downman v. Texas, 231 U. S. 353.
§ 376. Taxation of savings banks. Requiring savings
banks to include in the computation of their assets for
taxation notes secured by mortgages upon Minnesota real
estate upon- which the registration tax has been paid, as
is done by Minnesota Laws, 1907, chap. 328, which at the
same time relieves mortgages upon such real estate when
otherwise owned from all taxation except the registra-
tion tax cannot be deemed to contravene the equal pro-
tection of the law's clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in view of the privileges respecting taxation enjoyed by
savings banks under Minnesota Laws, 1905, chap. 839,
accorded to no other person or corporation subject to
taxation. If there is no unconstitutional discrimination
against savings banks it is imnecessary to inquire
whether the act discriminates against other banks and
trust companies. There were reasonable grounds for the
discrimination so far as savings banks were concerned,
and therefore the plaintiff in error had not been deprived
of the equal protection of the laws. Farmers & M. Sav-
ings Bank v. Minnesota, 232 XJ. S. 516.
§ 377. Discrimination against oleomargarind in license
tax. A license tax of 1 cent per pound sold for carrying
on the business of selling oleomargarine does not deny
the equal protection of the laws because it puts oleomar-
garine in a class by itself, and discriminates between it
and butter, although the tax is pronounced or assumed
by the state to be a revenue measure. Apart from inter-
ference with commerce among the states, a state may
restrict the manufacture of oleomargarine in a way in
which it does not hamper that of butter. It may even
§ 379 POWiK OF TAXATION 645
prohibit the manufacture altogether. It may express
and carry out its policy as well in a revenue as in a police
law. See McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 62, 63.
Hammond Packing Co. y. Montana, 233 U. S. 331.
§ 378. Excise tax imposed on gross eaniings of rail-
way companies. Railway companies doing business in
Ohio are not arbitrarily discriminated against, contrary
to the uniformity and equality provisions of the state con-
stitution, of the equal protection of the law's clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, by 102 Ohio Laws, 224,
because it does not include all other public utilities carry-
ing on business within the state, or because those public
utilities which it does include are not all taxed at the same
rate. It cannot be said that this classification rests upon
no reasonable and sufficient basis of distinction. Ohio
River & W. B. Co. v. Dittey, 232 U. S. 576.
§379. Discrimination in license tax. The Alabama
statute exempting merchants selling sewing machines at
their regularly established places of business from the
license or occupation tax imposed by the state upon the
business of selling or delivering sewing machines, does
not deny the equal protection of the laws, as making an
arbitrary discrimination. It was objected to the statute
that there is no sufficient ground for a distinction, with
respect to taxing the occupation, between the business of
selling sewing machines from a regularly established
store, and the business of selling them from a delivery
wagon. But there is an evident difference, in the mode
of doing business, between the local tradesman and the
itinerant dealer, and the court was unable to say that the
distinction made between them for purposes of taxation
was arbitrarily made. In such matters the states neces-
sarily enjoy a, wide range of discretion, and it would
require a clear case to justify the courts in striking down
a law that is uniformly applicable to all persons pursuing
a given occupation, on the ground that persons engaged
646 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 379
in other occapations more or less like it ought to be simi-
larly taxed. This is not such a case. Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304.
§380. State taxation of memberships in an incor-
porated chamber of commerce. State taxation of mem-
berships in an incorporated chamber of commerce is not
repugnant to the Federal Constitution as double taxation
because the property of the corporation has been fully
taxed, since such memberships are property, distinct
from the assets of the corporation. The taxation of mem-
berships in an incorporated chamber of commerce does
not deny the members the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, because of the
exemption from taxation of such organizations as the
''Associated Press, lodges, fraternal orders, churches,
etc. ' ' Bogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U. S. 621.
§381. Assessment for public improvements. A mu-
nicipal ordinance that, in creating the taxing district
under which, under the city charter, three-fourths of the
cost of paving a street is to be assessed according to area,
established a boundary line that, after running for some
distance on a line not 100 feet back from the street,
jumped to nearly 500 feet when it encountered an undi-
vided tract, and that on the opposite side of the street
was 150 or 240 feet away, violates the U. S. Constitution,
Fourteenth Amendment, where such differences were not
based upon any consideration of difference in benefits
conferred, but were established mechanically, in obedience
to the criteria that the charter directed to be applied.
The ordinance following the orders of the charter is bad
upon its face as distributing a local tax in grossly unequal
proportions, not because of special considerations ap-
plicable to the parcels taxed, but in blind obedience to a
rule that requires the result. And it cannot be said that
the ordinance as a whole may be regarded as an indi-
vidual exception under a rule that promises justice in aU
§ 382 POWER OF TAXATION 647
ordinary cases. Gast Bealty & Investment Company v.
Schneider Granite Company, 240 U. S. 55, Ditto, 240
U. S. 60.
§ 382. Trading stamps and premium coupons, discrimi-
nations agfainst not in violation of equal protection clause.
There is such a difference between the selling of goods
accompanied by coupons, profit-sharing certificates, or
other evidences of indebtedness or liability redeemable
in premiums, and the selling of goods without such
inducements to purchasers, that the imposition upon the
former business of an additional license tax for each
place in each and every county in which said business is
conducted, as is done by Florida laws, does not oflFend
against the equal protection of the law 's clause. The dif-
ference between a business where coupons are used, even
regarding their use as a means of advertising, and a
business where they are not used, is pronounced. A dis-
tinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,
and the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must be assumed. It makes no differ-
ence that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed
by argument and opinion of serious strength. It is not
within the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such
contrariety. The legislature **may make discriminations
if founded on distinctions that we cannot pronounce,
unreasonable and purely arbitrary.'^ Qoung Wing v.
Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 62.
The penalties of $1,000 fine, or six months' imprison-
ment, prescribed by the Florida law, for violation of its
provisions against the sale without payment of the speci-
fied license fee, of merchandise accompanied by coupons,
profit-sharing certificates, or other evidences of indebt-
edness, or other liability redeemable in premiums, are not
so severe as to intimidate against a contest of the validity
of such statute, and thus deny the equal protection of the
laws. East v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342.
648 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 382
The imposition under the law of the state of Washing-
ton, of an annual license tax of $6,000 upon merchants
using stamps, tickets or coupons redeemable in cash or
merchandise, is not repugnant to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution, as an attempted arbitrary
classification, whether such stamps are prepared or
redeemed by the merchant issuing them or by a third
party with whom the merchant has a contract for their
use. The classification in this case was sustained, as in
numerous other cases cited, because within the power of
the legislature over the subject-matter, and it being the
conception of the legislature that the regulation and
restriction were in the interest of the public welfare.
Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369. Pitney v. Washington,
240 U. S. 387.
§382a. State tazatioQ of consolidated railway oom-
pany. The state of Alabama, in imposing the annual
franchise tax exacted from domestic corporations upon a
consolidated railway corporation existing by virtue of the
consolidation under concurrent acts of the states of Ten-
nessee, Mississippi, and Alabama, of three independent
and distinct railroad corporations, created by, and for-
merly operated solely within the respective states named,
and in measuring such tax by the entire capital sto(& of
the consolidated corporation instead of measuring it by
the amount of capital employed in the state, as is done
in the case of foreign corporations, violated neither the
due process, commerce, or equal protection clauses of the
Federal Constitution, where the Alabama consolidation
statute expressly provided that the consolidated corpora-
tion shall in all respects be subject to the laws of the state
as a domestic corporation. The railroads comprising this
consolidation entered upon it with the Alabama statute
before them and under its conditions, and, subject to con-
stitutional objections as to its enforcement, they cannot
be heard to complain of the terms under which they vol-
untarily invoked and received the grant of corporate
§ 382a POWER OP TAXATION 649
existence from the state of Alabama. The company is
not deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The
state imposes the franchise tax equally npon all of its
corporations, consolidated or otherwise. The fact that a
wholly intrastate corporation may own no property out-
side of the state, while the consolidated company does,
presents no case of arbitrary classification. In both cases
the franchise tax is based upon a percentage of the capital
stock. There is no denial of equal protection of the laws
because a state may impose a different rate of taxation
upon a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing
business within the state than it applies to its own corpo-
rations upon the franchise which the state grants in
creating them. Kansas City, M. & B. B. Co. v. Stiles,
242 U. S. 111.
CHAPTER XIX
CONTBOL OF BAILB0AD8
§ 383. Legislative control over railroad fare and rates.
The right of the state to regulate railroads, except so
far as such regulation would interfere with commerce
between the states and with foreign countries, has not
been impaired by the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Because they are public service cor-
porations they are subject to legislative control and the
amendment does not prohibit the states from singling
out railroad corporations for the purpose of imposing on
them rules and regulations not applied to other corporar
tions or to individuals. The Illinois statute of 1874
to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for
the transportation of freight and passengers on the dif-
ferent railroads of the state is not void as being
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to
that of the state. The statute divides the railroads of the
state into classes, according to business, and establishes
a maximum of rates for each of the classes. It operates
uniformly on each class, and this is all the Constitution
requires. The Supreme Court of the state in the case of
McAunich v. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa 343, in speaking of legis-
lation as to classes, said: ** These laws are general and
uniform, not because they operate upon every person in
the state, for they do not, but because every person who
is brought within the relation and circumstances provided
for is affected by the law. They are general and uniform
in their operation upon all persons in the like situation,
and the fact of their being general and uniform is not
affected by the number of persons within the scope of
their operation.'* This act does not grant to any rail-
650
§ 384 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 651
road company privileges or immunities which, upon the
same terms, do not equally belong to every other railroad
company. Whenever a company comes into any class, it
has all the ** privileges and immunities** that havel^een
granted by the statute to any other company in that class.
It is very clear that a uniform rate of charges for all
railroad companies in the state might operate unjustly
upon some. It was proper, therefore, to provide in some
way for an adaptation of the rates to the circumstances
of the different roads ; and the General Assembly, in the
exercise of its legislative discretion, has seen fit to do
this by a system of classification. ** Whether this was the
best that could have been done, * * said the Supreme Court,
*'is not for us to decide. Our province is only to deter-
mine whether it could be done at all, and under any cir-
cumstances. If it could, the legislature must decide for
itself, subject to no control from us, whether the common
good requires that it should be done. ' * Chicago, B. and
Q. E. E. Co. V. Cutts, 94 U. S. 155, 183.
§384. City ordinance as to railroad. A municipal
ordinance prohibiting the use of the engines of a railroad
company on a certain street in said city, does not impair
the vested rights of the company under its charter, nor
deprive the company of its property without due process
of law, nor deny the company the equal protection of the
laws. Because this company is alone named in the ordi-
nance, the ordinance is not special only, and, therefore,
invalid where no other person or corporation has the
right to run locomotives on said street. On this account,
the ordinance, while apparently limited in its operation,
is in effect general, as it applies to all who can do what
is prohibited. Other railroad companies may occupy
other streets and use locomotives there ; but other streets
may not be situated like Broad Street, neither may there
be the same reasons why steam transportation should be
excluded from them. All laws should be general in their
operation, but all places within the same city do not
652 DUE PROCESS OF LAW % 384
necessarily require the same local regulation. While
locomotives may with very great propriety be excluded
from one street, or even from one part of a street, it
would be sometimes unreasonable to exclude them from
alL It is the special duty of the city authorities to make
the necessary discrimination in this particular. Bich-
mond, F. and P. R. E. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521.
§385. Valuation and taxation of railroad property.
Under the constitution of Kentucky there is nothing to
forbid the classification of property for purposes of taxa-
tion, and the valuation of different classes by different
methods. Railroad property, owing to its inherent
nature, may form a separate class, for purposes of valua-
tion and taxation. If the mode of valuation is due process
of law, its difference in some details from the mode of
valuing other descriptions and classes of property does
not operate as a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. The discrimination against railroad companies and
their property, which is the subject of complaint as being
unjust and unconstitutional, arises from the fact that, in
the legislation of Kentucky on the subject, railroad prop-
erty, though called real estate, is classed by itself as dis-
tinct from other real estate, such as farms and city lots,
and subjected to different means and methods for ascer-
taining their value for purposes of taxation, and differing
as well from those applied to the property of corpora-
tions chartered for other purposes such as bridge, mining,
street railway, manufacturing, gas, and water companies.
These latter report to the auditor the total cash value of
their property, and pay into the treasury as a tax, upon
each one hundred dollars of its value, a sum equal to th«
tax collected upon the same value of real estate; and
their reports and valuations are treated as complete and
perfect assessments, not subject to revision by any board
or court, and conclusive upon the taxing officers. The
constitution of Kentucky does not require taxes to be
levied by a uniform method, upon all descriptions of prop-
§ 386 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 653
eiiy. It is a matter of legislative discretion^ and there is
nothing to forbid the classification of property for pur-
poses of taxation and the valuation of different classes
by different methods. The rule of equality only requires
that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all
persons in similar circumstances. The right to classify
railroad property as a separate class for purposes of
taxation grows out of the inherent nature of the property
and the discretion vested by the constitution of the state
in its legislature, and necessarily involves the rights on
its party to devise and carry into effect a distinct scheme,
with different tribunals, in the proceeding to value it.
The mode of valuing railroad property for taxation under
this statute is due process of law, and that being the case,
the details in which it differs from the mode of valuing
other descriptions and classes of property cannot be con-
sidered as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Cincinnati, N. 0. and T. P. B. E. Co. v. Kentucky, 115
U. S. 321.
§386. Liability to employee for negligence of fellow
servant imder Iowa statute. While an employee of a
railroad company was engaged in the removal of a lamp
bracket from a car, standing upon a side track, he was
thrown from a ladder, and injured by a car and locomo-
tive being run upon a side track, through the opening of
a switch. He recovered judgment for $15,000. Upon the
trial and upon a writ of error in the Supreme Court of
the United States it was insisted by the railroad company
that the employee was guilty of negligence which con-
tributed to his injury, in not observing the approaching
engine and car, and that the statute of Iowa permitting a
recovery in such a case was in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides
that no state shall "deny to any person, within its juris-
diction, the equal protection of the laws,*' and that the
railroad company was not guilty of negligence. The
defendant in error insisted that the switchman, the fire-
654 DUB PROCESS OP LAW 1 386
man npon the engine^ and the engineer were all guilty of
negligence. These questions were presented by excep-
tions to certain instructions given and refused, and the
Supreme Court being equally divided upon the ques-
tions, the judgment below stood a£Birmed. Chicago and
Northwestern B. Co. v. McLaughlin, 119 U. S. 566.
§ 387. Liabilities of railroad companies to employees.
The law of Kansas making a railroad company liable to
an employee for the negligence or mismanagement of
other employees or agents of the same company is not in
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it
deprives the company of its property without due process
of law and denies to it the equal protection of the laws.
Legislation which is special in its character is not obnox-
ious to the last clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if
all persons subject to it are treated alike, under similar
circumstances and conditions, in respect both of the privi-
leges conferred and the liabilities imposed. The objec-
tion that the law deprives railroad companies of the equal
protection of the laws seems to rest upon the theory that
legislation which is special in its character is necessarily
within the constitutional inhibition; but nothing can be
further from the fact. . . . The greater part of all
legislation is special, either in the objects sought to be
attained by it or in the extent of its application. When
legislation applies to particular bodies or associations,
imposing upon them additional liabilities, it is not open
to the objection that it denies to them the equal protec-
tion of the laws, if all persons brought under its influence
are treated alike under the same conditions. The haz-
ardous business of operating a railway would seem to call
for special legislation with respect to railroad corpora-
tions, having for its object the protection of their employ-
ees as well as the safety of the public The business of
other corporations is not subject to similar dangers to
their employees, and no objections, therefore, can be
made to the legislation on the ground of its making an
§ 388 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 655
nnjiist discrimination. It meets a particular necessity,
and all railroad corporations are, without distinction,
made subject to the same liabilities. Missouri Padfic B.
Co. V. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 ; Minneapolis & St. L. E. Co.
V. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210.
§388. Liability of railroad company for omission to
fence its road. A law which provides that a railway cor-
poration which neglects to pay for stock injured or killed
for want of a fence on the side of its road shall be liable
for double the value of the stock killed or of the damages,
is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. The equal protection
clause does undoubtedly prohibit discriminating and par-
tial legislation by any state in favor of particular persons
as against others in like condition. Equality of protec-
tion implies not merely equal accessibility to the courts
for the prevention or redress of wrongs and the enforce-
ment of rights, but equal exemption with others in like
condition from charges and liabilities of every kind. But
this clause does not limit, nor was it designed to limit, the
subjects upon which the police power of the state may be
exerted. The state can now, as before, prescribe regula-
tions for the health, good order and safety of society, and
adopt such measures as will advance its interests and
prosperity. To accomplish this end special legislation
must be resorted to in numerous cases, providing against
accidents, disease and danger in the varied forms in
which they may come. The nature and extent of such
legislation will necessarily depend upon the judgment of
the legislature as to the security needed by society.
When the calling, profession or business of parties is
unattended with danger to others, little legislation will
be necessary respecting it. Thus, in the purchase and
sale of most articles of general use, persons must be left
to exercise their own good sense and judgment, but when
the calling or profession or business is attended with
danger, or requires a certain degree of scientific knowl-
656 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 388
edge upon which others must rely^ then legislation prop-
erly steps in to impose conditions npon its exercise. The
concluding clause of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment simply requires that such legislation shall
treat alike all persons brought under subjection to it
. . . The equal protection of the law is idforded when
this is accomplished. From the adjudications it is evi-
dent that the Fourteenth Amendment does not limit the
subjects in relation to which the police power of the state
may be exercised for the protection of its citizens. That
this power should be applied to railroad companies i»
reasonable and just. The statute of Iowa placed an abso-
lute liability upon them for injuries to cattle committed
in the operation of their roads by reason of the want of
proper guards against accidents. If, therefore, the com-
pany omits those means, the omission may weU be
regarded as evidence of such culpable negligence as to
justify punitive damages where injury is committed ; and
if punitive damages in such cases may be given, the legis-
lature may prescribe the extent to which juries may go
in awarding them. Minneapolis and St. L. By. Co. v.
Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26.
§389. Reasonableness of railroad rates. By the second
section of the act of the state of Minnesota, approved
March 7, 1887, to regulate common carriers, it was pro-
vided that all charges made by a common carrier for the
transportation of passengers or property shall be equal
and reasonable. Under this provision, the carrier has a
right to make equal and reasonable charges for such
transportation. In the present case, the return alleged
that the rate of charge fixed by the Commission provided
by the law was not equal or reasonable, and the supreme
court held that the statute deprived the company of the
right to show that judicially. The question of the rea-
sonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a
railroad company, involving as it does the element of
reasonableness both as regards the company and as
§ 390 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 657
regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial
investigation, requiring due process of law for its deter-
mination. If the company is deprived of the power of
charging reasonable rates for the use of its property, and
such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investi-
gation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful
use of its property, and thus, in substance and effect, of
the property itself, without due process of law, and in
violation of the Constitution of the United States ; and in
so far as it is thus deprived, while other' persons are per-
mitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested
capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection
of the laws. Chicago, M. & St. P. B. Co. v. Minnesota,
134 U. S. 418.
§390. Aflsessixig railroadB to meet expenses of state
railroad comnussion. The South Carolina railroad law
of 1882, authorizing assessment and tax upon railroad
companies to meet the expenses and salaries of the state
railroad commissioners, is not in conflict with the Four-
teenth Amendment. Requiring that the burden of a
service deemed essential to the public, in consequence of
the existence of the railroad corporations and exercise
of privileges obtained at their request, should be borne
by the corporations in relation to whom the service is
rendered, and to whom it is useful, is neither denying to
them the equal protection bf the laws nor making any
unjust discrimination against them, all railroad corpora-
tions in the state being treated alike in this respect. If
the tax were levied to pay for services in no way con-
nected with the railroads, whilst railroad corporations
were at the same time subjected to taxation upon their
property equally with other corporations for such ex-
penses, and other corporations were not taxed therefor,
there would be just ground of complaint of unlawful dis-
crimination against the railroad corporations, and of
their not receiving the equal protection of the laws. But
there is nothing of this nature in the tax in question.
Due Proeoes — 12
658 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 390
The railroad commissioners are charged with a variety
of duties in connection with railroads, the performance
of which is of great importance in the regulation of those
instruments of transportation. It is evident that their
duties, when properly discharged, must be in the highest
degree beneficial to the public* That the state has the
power to prescribe the regulations mentioned there is no
question. Railroads are the recipients of special privi-
leges from the state, to be exercised in the interest of the
public, and assuming those obligations, their business is
deemed affected with a public use, and to the extent of
that use is subject to legislative regulation. The mode
or manner of regulation is a matter of legislative discre-
tion. When exercised through commissioners, their serv-
ices are for the benefit of the railroad corporations as well
as of the public Both are served by the required supervi-
sion over the roads and means of transportation, and
there seems to be no sound reason why the compensation
of the commissioners in such case should not be met by the
corporations, the operations of whose roads and the exer-
cise of whose franchises are supervised. In exacting this
there is no encroachment upon the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Eequiring that the burden of a service deemed
essential to the public, in consequence of the existence of
the corporations and the exercise of privileges obtained
at their request, should be borne by the corporations in
relation to whom the service is rendered, and to whom it
is useful, is neither denying to the corporations the equal
protection of the laws nor making any unjust discrimina-
tion against them. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes,
142 U. S. 386.
§391. Taxation of railroads — ^Law of Oeorgia. The
law of Georgia providing a system of taxation of railroad
property in each of the counties of the state through
which said railroads run, and for other purposes, does
not violate that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States which declares that
§ 391 CONTROL OP RAILROADS 659
**no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.** A railroad company
has not any constitutional right to have its transitory
property assessed for taxation in the county in which is
its principal office; the distribution, among the several
counties, of such property, for taxation, is not such a dis-
crimination against the railroad as denies to it the equal
protection of the laws. The mode of distribution of the
unlocated or transitory personal property of a railroad
company, for the purpose of taxation, is a matter of
regulation by the state legislature, which in no way
involves a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
objection raised against the statute was that the act in
question discriminated against the railroad company in
not taxing its unlocated or intangible personal property
at the place of the railroad company *s domicil or princi-
pal office, while the intangible personal property of all
other persons is taxed in and by the county in which the
owner resides and has his domicil. Changing the situs
of such unlocated property of a railroad company, and
distributing it to the counties through which the road
extended, in no way violated the rule of uniformity
or discriminated against the railroad company. . . .
There was no claim that the rate of taxation levied by
any county on the assessed value of the property within
its limits was greater than on other property; nor was
the valuation different from that placed upon other prop-
erty. Plaintiff in error had no constitutional right to
have its rolling stock, and other unlocated personal prop-
erty, taxed in the county where it had its principal office,
and giving such property a different situs, by distributing
it among the counties through which the road extended,
was no unjust discrimination and violated no constitu-
tional rights. Distributing such property proportion-
ately between the counties traversed by the road, it
thereby became subject to the same rate of taxation as
other property in the respective counties. This involved
no inequality, and no failure to extend to the plaintiff in
660 DUB PROCESS OP LAW S 391
error the equal protection of the laws. Columbus South-
ern R. Co. V. Wright, 151 U. S. 470.
§392. Requiring railroad companies to bear entire
expense of abolishing grade crossings. The inhibitions
of the Constitution of the United States upon the impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts, or the deprivation of
property without due process of law or of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, by the states, are not violated by the
legitimate exercise of legislative power in securing the
public safety, health and morals. There is no unjust dis-
crimination and no denial of the equal protection of the
laws in regulationsr applicable to all railroad corporations
alike ; nor is there necessarily any denial nor an infringe-
ment of the obligation of contracts in the imposition upon
them in particular instances of the entire expense of the
performance of acts required in the public interest. The
statute in question is directed to the extinction of grade
crossings as a menace to public safety, and is therefore
within the exercise of the police power of the state. It
was argued that the existing grades of railroad crossings
were legally established, in accordance with the then
wishes of the people, but, with the increase in population,
crossings formerly safe had become no longer so; that
the highways were chiefly for the benefit of the local
public, and it was the duty of fhe local municipal corpora-
tion to keep them safe ; that this law applied to railroad
corporations treatment never accorded to other citizens
in allowing the imposition of the entire expense of change
of grade, both costs and damages, irrespective of benefits,
on those companies, and in that respect, and in the exemp-
tion of the town from its just share of the burden, denied
to them the equal protection of the laws. The Supreme
Court of the state held that as railroad crossings are in
the nature of nuisances, the legislature had a right to
cause them to be abated, and to require either party
to pay the whole or any portion of the expense. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that railroad cor-
§ 393 CONTROL OP RAILBOADS 661
potations are subject to legislative control in all respects
necessary to protect the public against danger, injustice,
and oppression ; that the state has the power to exercise
this control through boards of oommissioners ; that there
is no unjust discrimination and no denial of the equal
protection of the laws in regulations applicable to all rail-
road corporations alike. New York & N. E. E. Co. v.
Town of Bristol, 151 U. S. 556.
§ 393. Remedy for property injured by conBtruction of
a railroad A judgment of a state court construing a
provision of the constitution of the dtate which gives a .
remedy for property injured by the conBtruction of a
to the individual, forbids legislation, in whatever form it
railroad, as not extending the remedy to embrace prop-
erty injured by the lawful operation of the railroad does
not deprive the plaintiff of property without due process
of law, or deny him the equal protection of the law. The
contention that plaintiff in error was denied the equal
protection of the laws is based on the allegation that those
suitors whose property abutted on Filbert street where
the elevated road actually occupies the territory of the
street, were allowed by the state courts to recover dam-
ages for the injury thus occasioned to their property,
while the plaintiff, and those in like case, whose property
abutted on Filbert street where it was not occupied by thQ
railroad structure, which was erected on the opposite side
of the street on land belonging to the railroad company,
were not permitted to recover. The diversity of result
in the two classes of cases is supposed to show that equal
protection of the laws was not afforded to the unsuccess-
ful litigants. It appears that one Duncan, whose property
abutted on Filbert street, where that street was occupied
by the elevated railroad in question, was permitted by
the state courts to recover for damages suffered by
having been deprived of access to and free use of Filbert
street. The Supreme Court was unable to see any merit
in the contention that the Supreme Court of the state, in
662 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 393
distinguishing between the case of those who, like
Duncan, were shut off from access to and use of the street
by the construction thereon of the elevated railroad, and
the case of those who suffered, not from the construction
of the railroad on the street on which their property
abutted, but from the injuries consequential on the opera-
tion of the railroad, as situated on defendant's own
property, thereby deprived the plaintiff qf the equal pro-
tection of the laws. The two classes of complainants
differed in the -critical particular that one class suffered
direct and immediate damage from the construction of
■
the railroad in such a way as to exclude them from the
use of their accustomed highway, and the other class
suffered damages which were consequential on the use by
the defendant company of its own property. The ques-
tion thus raised is within .the case of Bowman v. Lewis,
101 U. S. 22. Also citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68,
and Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27. It does not appear
that plaintiff in error has been denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws. Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153
U. S. 380.
§394. Unjust and unreasonable railroad rates. The
fixing and enforcement by a railroad conmiission of
unjust and unreasonable rates for transportation by rail-
r.oad companies is an unconstitutional denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The equal protection of the laws
which, by the Fourteenth Amendment, no state can deny
may be enacted, by which the property of one individual
is without compensation wrested from him for the benefit
of another, or of the public. This, as has been often
observed, is a government of law, and not a government
oFmen, and it must never be forgotten that under such a
government, with its constitutional limitations and guar-
antees, the forms of law and the machinery of govern-
ment, with all their reach and power, must in their actual
workings stop on the hither side of the unnecessary and
uncompensated taking or destruction of any private
§ 395 CONTROL OP RAILROADS 663
property, legally acquired and legally held. Beagan v.
Fanners Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362.
§ 395. Kansas law as to liability of railroads for per-
sonal injuries. The statute of Kansas making every rail-
road company in the state liable for damages to its
employees from the negligence of its agents or of
co-employees, does not discriminate against a railroad
corporation irrespective of the character of the employ-
ment, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment,
when applied to a person injured while he was engaged
in loading timbers on a car for transportation over such
railroad, although his general employment on the road
was that of a bridge carpenter. A carpenter, employed
by a railroad company, engaged at the time of the acci-
dent causing the injury to him, in loading timbers on a
car for transportation on the railroad, is an employee,
within the Kansas statute making railroads liable for
damages done to employees in consequence of the negli-
gence of other employees. The validity of this statute
was sustained in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Mackey, 127
U. S. 205, in which the court held, in answer to the con-
tention that such a law was within the prohibition of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that legislation which was
special in its character was not necessarily within the
constitutional inhibition, if the same rule was applied
under the same circumstances and conditions; that the
hazardous character of the business of operating a rail-
road seemed to call for special legislation with respect
to railroad corporations, having for its object the protec-
tion of their employees as well as the safety of the public ;
that the business of other corporations was not subject
to similar dangers to their employees, and that such
legislation could not be objected to on the ground of
making an unjust discrimination since it met a particular
necessity and all railroad corporations were, without dis-
tinction, made subject to the same liabilities. The state
Supreme Court found upon the facts that, although the
664 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 395
plaintiff's general employment was that of a bridge car-
penter, he was engaged at the time the accident occurred,
not in building a bridge but in loading timbers on a car
for transportation over the line of defendant's road.
The Court said: **The mere fact that the plaintiff's
regular employment was as a bridge carpenter does not
affect the case, nor does it matter that the road was newly
constructed) or whether it was in regular operation or
not. The injury happened to the plaintiff while he was
engaged in labor directly connected with the operation
of the road, and the statute applies/' The Supreme
Court of the United States concurred in this view. Chi-
cago, K. & W. R. Co. V. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209.
§396. Statute requiring heating of railroad cars by
stoves. The exclusion of railroads less than 50 miles in
length from the operation of a state law prohibiting
stoves or furnaces inside of or suspended from passenger
cars, on other than mixed trains, does not deny to other
railroads the equal protection of the laws. No doubt the
main object of the statute was to provide for the safety
of passengers traveling on what are commonly called
trunk or through lines, connecting distant or populous
parts of the country, and on which the perils incident to
traveling are greater than on short, local lines. A road
only 50 miles in length would seldom have a sleeping car
attached to its trains ; and passengers traveling on roads
of that kind do not have the apprehension ordinarily felt
by passengers on trains regularly carrying sleeping cars
or having many passenger coaches, on account of the
burning of cars in case of their derailment or in case of
collision. In any event, there is no such discrimination
against companies having more than 50 miles of road as
to justify the contention that there has been a denial to
the companies named in the act of the equal protection of
the laws. The statute is uniform in its operation upon
all companies doing business in the state of the class to
which it is made applicable. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co. V. State of New York, 165 XT. S. 628.
§ 398 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 665
§ 397. Damages for runnixig railroad across street. It
was contended that a railroad company was denied the
equal protection of the laws in that by the final judgment
individual property owners were awarded, as compensa-
tion for contiguous property appropriated to the public
use by the same proceeding, the value of their land taken,
while only nominal compensation was given to the com-
pany— ^the value of the land, simply as land, across which
the street was opened, not being taken into account. The
contention is without merit. Compensation was awarded
to individual owners upon the basis of the value of the
property actually taken, having regard to the uses for
which it was best adapted and the purposes for which it
was held and used and was likely always to be used.
Compensation was awarded to. the railroad company upon
the basis of the thing actually appropriated by the
public — the use of the company's right of way for a street
crossing, having regard to the purposes for which the
land in question was acquired and held and was always
likely to be held. In the case of individual owners,
they were deprived of the entire use and enjoyment of
their property, while the railroad company was left in
the possession and use of its property for the purposes
for which it was being used and for which it was best
adapted, subject only to the right of the public to have a
street across it. In this there was no denial of the equal
protection of the laws, unless it be that the public cannot
have a street across the tracks of a railroad company,
except upon the condition precedent that it shall condemn
and acquire the absolute ownership of the land, leaving
untouched the right of the company to cross it with its
tracks. The equal protection of the laws does not impose
such a burden upon the people of a city within the limits
of which a railroad company has been permitted to lay
its tracks. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U. S. 226.
§398. State law establishing railroad rates — ^When
void. A railroad corporation is a person within the
666 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 398
Fourteenth Amendment forbidding a state to deprive any
person of property without due process of law, or to deny
any person the equal protection of the laws. A state law
or regulations made thereunder, establishing rates for
transportation by railroads that will deprive the carrier
of just compensation, is repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment as depriving the carrier of his property
without due process of law, and denying to it the equal
protection of the lews. The Nebraska law of 1893, to
regulate railroads, classifying freights, fixing rates, etc.,
is repugnant to the United States Constitution and void
as prohibiting railroads in that state from receiving rea-
sonable and just compensation, and depriving them of
property without due process of law and of the equal pro-
tection of the laws. By the Fourteenth Amendment it is
provided that no state shall deprive any person of prop-
erty without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
What amounts to deprivation of property without due
process of law, or what is a denial of the equal protection
of the laws, is often difficult to determine, especially
where the question relates to the property of a quasi-
public corporation and the extent to which it may be sub-
jected to public control. The Supreme Court has said
that while a state has power to fix the charges by railroad
companies for the transportation of persons and prop-
erty within its own jurisdiction, unless restrained by
valid contract, or unless what is done amounts to a regu-
lation of foreign or interstate commerce, such power is
not without limit. It cannot do that which in law
amounts to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation or without due process of law.
In Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S.
418, 458, it was said : **If the company is deprived of the
power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its
property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence
of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived
of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance
§ 399 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 667
and effect, of the property itself, without due process of
law and in violation of the Constitution of the United
States ; and in so far as it is thus deprived, while other
persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon
their invested capital, the company is deprived of the
equal protection of the laws/' Smyth v. Ames, 169
U. S. 466.
§ 399. State act as to railroad compaxiies pajring their
employees. The Arkansas act of 1889 requiring railroad
companies to pay their employees when discharged their
unpaid wages then earned, without deduction, or that
such wages should continue at the same rate until paid,
not to exceed sixty days, does not deny to such companies
the equal protection of the laws. The plaintiff in error
was an Arkansas corporation and the statute was upheld
as a valid exercise of the power to amend charters
reserved under the state constitution. In respect to the
provision that the unpaid wages then earned at the
contract rate were to become due and payable on the ces-
sation of the employment, *' without abatement or deduc-
tion, *' the Court held that that did not ** require the
corporation to pay the employee all the wages to which
he would have been entitled had he fully performed his
contract up to the time of his discharge, notwithstanding
he had failed to do so, and had damaged the corpora-
tion thereby, '* but it meant *Hhat the unpaid wages
earned at the contract fate at the time of the discharge
shall be paid without discount on account of the payment
thereof before the time they were payable according to
the terms of the contract of employment*' It was con-
tended that as to railroads organized prior to its x>assage
the act was void because in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Corporations are the creations of the state,
endowed with such faculties as the state bestows and
subject to such conditions as the state imposes, and if the
power to modify their charters is reserved, that reserva-
tion is a part of the contract, and no change within the
668 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 399
legitimate exercise of the power can be said to impair its
obligation; and as this amendment rested on reasons
deduced from the peculiar character of the business of
the corporations affected and the public nature of their
functions, and applied to all alike, the equal protection of
the laws was not denied. St Louis, I. M. & S. B. Co. v.
Paul, 173 U. S. 404.
§400. Fires set by railroad locomotives. The equal
protection of the laws, which is guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution, does not forbid
classification. The fact of inequality produced by classi-
fication does not determine its constitutionality. The
Kansas statute which provides that in an action against
a railroad company for damages by fire caused by operat-
ing the railroad, the plaintiff need only establish the fact
that the fire complained of was caused by operating the
railroad and the amount of his damages, and that such
proof shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the
part of the railroad, and that the plaintiff, if he recover,
shall also be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, — ^is not
in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment as denying
the equal protection of the laws to such company, and is
valid. The purpose of the statute is not to compel the
payment of debts, but to secure the utmost care on the
part of railroad companies to prevent the escape of fire
from their moving trains. This case is distinguished
from Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe By. Co. v. Ellis, 165
U. S. 140, where a somewhat similar statute was held
invalid. The power of classification has been upheld
whenever such classification proceeds upon any differ-
ence which has a reasonable relation to the object sought
to be accomplished. It is a maxim of constitutional law
that a legislature is presumed to have acted within con-
stitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the facts, and
with the purpose of promoting the interests of the people
as a whole, and courts will not lightly hold that an act
duly passed by the legislature was one in the enactment
§ 401 CONTROL OP RAILROADS 669
of which it had transcended its power. On the otiier
handy it is also true that the equal protection guaranteed
by the Constitution forbids the legislature to select a
person, natural or artificial, and impose upon him or it
burdens and liabilities which are not cast upon others
similarly situated. It cannot pick out one individual, or
one corporation, and enact that whenever he or it is sued
the judgment shall be for double damages, or subject to
an attorney fee in favor of the plaintiff, when no other
individual or corporation is subjected to the same rule.
Neither can it make a classification of individuals or cor-
porations which is purely arbitrary, and impose upon
such class special burdens and liabilities. Even wht^re
the selection is not obviously unreasonable and arbitrary,
if the discrimination is based upon matters which have
no relation to the object sought to be accomplished, the
same conclusion of unconstitutionality is affirmed. The
objection that this legislation is special and unequal can-
not be sustained. The dangerous element employed and
the hazards to persons and property arising from the run-
ning of trains and the operation of railroads, justify
such a law. The fact that all persons and corporations
brought under its influence are subjected to the same
duties and liabilities disposes of the objections raised.
Atehison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Matthews, 174
U. S. 96.
§ 401. Statute changing fellow servant rule in case of
railroad employees. A statute making a railroad com-
pany liable to an employe injured by the negligent act of
a fellow servant is not unconstitutional as a denial to
such corporation of the equal protection of the laws, since
there are peculiar hazards in the operation of a railroad.
The state supreme court held the act valid as to railroad
corporations, whether or not it might be sustained as to
other corporations. Considering the act as applying to
railroad corporations only, it cannot be regarded as in
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. This was an
670 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 401
Indiana statute and 'it was upheld by virtue of prior
decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining similar stat-
utes in Kansas^ Ohio and Iowa. See cases cited. Tullis
V. Lake Erie & Western R. Co., 175 U. S. 348.
§402. Exceptions to ordinance regfolating speed of
trains by dty. The exception of a dummy railroad oper-
ated by steam, or of an electric railroad, f^-om an ordi-
nance limiting the speed of railroads within a city, does
not make an arbitrary and unreasonable classification in
denial of the equal protection of the laws. It is contended
that the ordinance is in conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment in that it denies the equal protection of the
laws. The contention could not be sustained if there were
nothing in the record beyond the mere words of the ordi-
nance, because it is obvious on a moment 's reflection that
the tracks of different railroads may traverse the limits
of a city under circumstances so essentially dissimilar
as to justify separate regulations. One may pass through
crowded and much traveled streets, while others may pass
through remote sections of the city where there is little
danger. One track may be fenced and another may not.
Under those circumstances a difference of regulation as
to the matter of speed would be perfectly legitimate, and
the classification could not be considered arbitrary or
unreasonable. All that is necessary to uphold the ordi-
nance is that there is a difference, and that existing it is
for the city council to determine whether separate regu-
lations should be applied between the two. Given the fact
of a difference, it is a part of the legislative power to de-
termine what difference there shall be in the prescribed
regulations. Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 684.
§403. Assessment of railroad property for omitted
taxes. Railroad companies are not denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws by Florida laws requiring the comp-
troller to assess the taxes for 1879, 1880 and 1881 upon
such railroad property as had escaped taxation for such
§ 403 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 671
years, without providing for the assessment of taxes for
those years on other property not previously assessed
therefor, general legislation having provided that rail-
road property should be assessed by the comptroller and
real estate by the county treasurer. The single question
for consideration is whether there is anything in the
Federal Constitution which forbids a state to reach back-
ward and collect taxes from certain kinds of property
which were not at the time collected through lack of stat-
utory provisions therefor, or in consequence of a mis-
understanding of the law, or from negligence of admin-
istrative officials, without also making provision for
collecting taxes for the same years on other property.
There was no new levy of taxes, but the case is one in
which, general levies having been made for the years
named, certain property which ought to have paid taxes
under them — and thus have contributed its share of the
expenses of the state — failed to do so, and the effort is to
compel that property to discharge its obligation. The
objection is not that the property ought not during these
years to have paid its proportion of the taxes, but that
it ought not now to be compelled to pay such proportion,
because certain other property was similarly situated, and
no effort is made to compel payment from it. The fault,
it fault there be, is one of omission rather than of com-
mission. The act of the legislature is not a mandate to
a single officer, charged with the duty of assessing all
property, to assess certain property, and to omit to assess
the rest ; but the general legislation having provided that
railroad property should be assessed by the comptroller
and real estate by county assessors, the act simply
directed the comptroller to discharge the duties of assess-
ment as to the property committed to his care, and omit-
ted any direction to the county assessors. This omission,
it is contended, makes the law unconstitutional. In other
words, the legislature may not pass an act directing one
officer to discharge his duty unless it couples therewith a
direction to other officers charged with kindred duty to
672 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 403
perform theirs. If the state of Florida had deemed it for
the best jinterest of its people to encourage the building
of railroads by exempting their property from taxation,
such exemption could not have been adjudged in conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment, even though thereby
the burden of taxation upon /other property in the state
was largely increased. And, conversely, if the state had
subjected railroads to taxation, while exempting some
other class of property, it would be difficult to find any-
thing in the Fourteenth Amendment to overthrow its
action. Florida Central & P. B. Co. v. Reynolds, 183
U. S. 471.
§ 404. Charging more for shorter than for longer haul.
The laws of Kentucky which prohibit railroad companies
from charging more for a shorter than for a longer haul,
except by permission of the railroad commission in spe-
cial cases after investigation, does not deny to them the
equal protection of the laws. The evil sought to be pre-
vented was the use of public highways in such a manner
as to prefer, by difference of rates, one locality to an-
other ; and the remedy adopted by the state was to declare
such preferences illegal, and to prohibit any person, cor-
poration, or common carrier from resorting to them.
That remedy included in its scope every one, without
distinction, whose calling, public in its character, gave
an opportunity to do the mischief which the state desired
to prevent. The practical inefficiency of this remedy to
reach the desired end, and the resulting injury to the wel-
fare of both the producers and the consumers of an article
like coal, when brought into competition with coal brought
from without the state, are strongly urged ; but however
well-founded such objections may be, they go to the wis-
dom and policy of the enactment, not to its validity in a
Federal point of view. The people of Kentucky, if it can
be shown that their laws are defective in their concep-
tion or operation, have the remedy in their own hands.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 XT. S. 503.
§ 405 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 673
§ 405. Validity of order requiring' safety appliances at
grade crossings. Neither due process of law nor the
equal protection of the laws is denied a street railway
company by an order of the commissioner of railroads
made and issued under a Michigan statute requiring such
street railway company to pay one-half of the expense
of constructing and maintaining safety appliances at a
grade crossing of a steam railroad which was not built
until after the street railway had been constructed. It
is contended that a street railway company has a differ-
ent relation to a street than that which a steam railroad
has ; that the former * * acquires a right to use the same in
common with other members of the traveling public, and
is not an additional burden upon the street, but is merely
an adaptation of the highway to a particular means of
travel, and does not constitute an additional servitude.
A railroad is, on the other hand, an additional servitude,
and if it is built across a highway it must do all things
necessary to render the highway, for all its legitimate
uses, as safe as it was before the railroad was built across
it, or would be if such railroad were not built across it at
all/' Massachusetts C. R. Co. v. Boston, C. & F. R. Co.,
121 Mass. 124. It may be that this difference is recognized
as to abutting property owners or crossing railroads, but
it can not be recognized as limiting or affecting the power
of the state to regulate the management of the roads in
view of the danger of their operation to the public.
Whether electricity be the motive power, or steam be the
motive power, there is enough danger in the operation of
either to justify regulation. The record in this case
shows that there are thirty-eight daily passenger trains
crossing Clark avenue, and that the cars of the plaintiff
in error pass every few minutes. It is manifest, as the
supreme court of the state observed, that the crossing **is
a place of unusual danger, not only to the passengers
in steam cars, but also to the passengers in the electric
cars,'' and that the danger is caused by both. In sucR
situation the city is surely not powerless to act, nor before
Bue Process— 43
674 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 405
acting must it ascertain the exact quantum of damage
caused by each road^ and by that standard assign the
cost of protecting the public. It is also objected to the
order that it denies the equal protection of the laws. The
argument to support this contention is an extension of
that which claims that the use of the street by the plain-
tiff in error *4s merely an adaptation of the highway to
the particular means of travel.'' And it is deduced that
an electric street railway has an equality of rights with
ordinary vehicles. There is evidently a difference be-
tween ordinary vehicles and cars propelled by electricity,
which may be recognized by the state in the exercise of
its police power. Detroit, Ft. W. & B. I. R. Co. v. Osborn,
189 U. S. 383.
§406. DiscriTniiiating against railway companies. The
Texas statute imposing upon railway companies alone the
penalty therein given to contiguous landowners for allow-
ing Johnson grass or Russian thistle to mature and go to
seed, does not deny such railway companies the equal
protection of the laws. It is admitted that Johnson grass
is a menace to crops, that it is propagated only by seed,
and that a general regulation of it for the protection of
farming would be valid. It is said that this particular
subjection of railway companies to a liability not imposed
on other owners of land on which Johnson grass may
grow is so arbitrary as to amount to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. With regard to the manner in
which such a question should be approached, it is obvious
that the legislature is the only judge of the policy of a
proposed discrimination. The principle* is similar to that
which is established with regard to a decision of Congress
that certain means are necessary and proper to carry
out one of its express powers. M'Culloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316. When a state legislature has declared that,
in its opinion, policy requires a certain measure, its action
should not be disturbed by the courts under the Four-
teenth Amendment, unless they can see clearly that there
§ 407 CONTBOL OF EAILBOADS 675
is no fair reason for the law that would not require with
equal force its extension to others whom it leaves un-
touched. Mr. Justice Holmes in delivering the opinion
of the court said they felt unable to say that the law may
not have been justified by local conditions. It would have
been more obviously fair to extend the regulations at least
to highways. But it may have been found that the seed
of Johnson grass is dropped from the cars in such quan-
tities as to cause special trouble. It may be that the
neglected strips occupied by railroads afford a ground
where noxious weeds especially flourish, and that whereas
self-interest leads the owners of farms to keep down
pests, the railroad companies have done nothing in a
matter that concerns their neighbors only. Other reasons
may be imagined. Great constitutional provisions must
be administered with caution. Some play must be allowed
for the joints of the machine, and it must be remembered
that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as
the courts. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267.
§407. Legislative abrogation of fellow servant rule.
The equal protection of the laws is not denied by con-
struing the proviso excepting cases of injuries sustained
by railway employees ** while engaged in the construction
of a new road or any part thereof not open to public travel
or use,'' from the provisions of the Minnesota statute
abrogating the fellow servant rule, as only exempting
incomplete railroads, and therefore as not excepting from
the operation of the statute an accident on a narrow-
gauge track on which dump cars were run by a mining
company for the purpose of stripping the earth from the
surface of its mine. The state court held that the act
was confined to the dangers peculiar to railroads, and did
not discriminate against railroads merely as such. It
read the proviso as only exempting incomplete roads,
marking the time when the statute should take effect, and
not as confining it to roads intended for public traveL
676 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 407
Some time must be fixed when the law shall begin to
operate, and the time when the road is finished is a nat-
ural and proper time. There may be unavoidable and
exceptional dangers before the track is finished and while
cars are being run over it for construction purposes, and
the legislature might think it proper that the servant
should take the risk of these even if the negligence of a
fellow servant co-operated, just as he takes the risk of
the known peculiar dangers when he sets about repairing
the efifects of an accident. The fact that there may also
be dangers like those on the finished road does not prevent
the legislature from considering the situation as a whole
and keeping the old rule on practical grounds until the
exceptional risks come to an end. There is no objection
to legislation being confined to a peculiar and well-defined
class of perils, and it is not necessary that they should
be perils which are shared by the public, if they concern
the body of citizens engaged in a particular work. In
concluding the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Holmes
said: **The whole case is put on the proviso, and the
argument with regard to that is merely one of the many
attempts to impart an overmathematical nicety to the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. *' Minnesota
Iron Co. V. Kline, 199 U. S. 593.
§ 408. Imposing expense on railway company for drain-
ing private lands. The equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution is not denied to a
railway company by requiring it to stand the entire
expense of removing and rebuilding its bridge and cul-
vert, made necessary by the proposed widening and deep-
ening of the channel of a creek by drainage commissioners
acting under the authority of the Illinois farm drainage
act, to effect the drainage of low lands. The case is this :
A public corporation, charged by law with the duty of
causing a large body of lands, principally swamp and
slough lands, to be drained and made capable of culti-
vation, has, under direct legislative authority, adopted
§ 409 CONTROL OF EAILROlDS 677
a reasonable and suitable plan to accomplish that object.
That plan requires the enlarging and deepening of the
channel of a natural water course running through the
district, which is the only natural outlet or way of drain-
age of the lands of the district, — the best and only prac-
tical mode by which the lands can be made tillable. But
that plan cannot be carried out unless the timbers and
stones in the creek — placed there by the railway company,
when it constructed the foundation for its present bridge
— are removed. The timber and stone referred to cannot,
however, be removed without destroying the foundations
of the present bridge and rendering it necessary to con-
struct another bridge with an opening underneath wide
enough to permit a channel sufficient to carry oflf the
waters of the creek as increased in volume under the
drainage system adopted by the commissioners. The
object of the statute is to drain large bodies of land so
as to make them fit for human habitation and cultivation.
The regulations adopted by the drainage commissioners
have a real, direct, and obvious relation to the public
objects sought to be accomplished by them; and in no
sense are they arbitrary or unreasonable. The rights
acquired by the railway are subordinate to the rights of
the public. The duty of the company was to maintain an
opening under the bridge that would be adequate and
effectual for such an increase in the volume of water as
might result from lawful, reasonable regulations estab-
lished by appropriate public authority from time to time
for the drainage on either side of the creek. Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co. V. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U. S. 561.
§409. Classifying railway mail clerks with railway
employees. Restricting railway mail clerks and others
whose employment in and about a railroad subjects them
to greater peril than passengers in the strict sense, to
such right of action against the railway company for
injuries received in the course of their employment as a
railway employee would have under like circumstances,
678 DljB PROCESS OP LAW § 409
is a reasonable classification which sustains the provision
of the Pennsylvania statute making such classification, as
against the objection that such statute denies the equal
protection of the laws. The court declared that the prop-
osition that the statute denied the equal protection of
the laws because it ^^capriciously, arbitrarily, and unnat-
urally,'* by the classification made, deprived railway mail
clerks of the rights of passengers, which they might have
enjoyed if the statute had not been enacted, is without
merit The classification made by the statute does not
alone embrace railway mail clerks, but places in a class
by themselves such clerks and others whose employment
in and about a railroad subjects them to greater peril
than passengers in the strictest sense. This general dif-
ference makes it impossible to say, within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the legislature of
Pennsylvania, in classifying passengers in the strict sense
in one class and those who are subject to greater risks,
including railway mail clerks, in another, acted so arbi-
trarily as to violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Martin v. Pittsburg & Lake
Erie B. Co., 203 U. S. 284.
§410. Excessive penalties for violation of the pro-
visions of a statute. A statute providing for the estab-
lishment of rates for railroad transportation without
giving the corporation an opportunity to be heard, which
fixes penalties for disobedience of its provisions by fines
so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate
the corporations and their officers from resorting to the
courts to test the validity of the rates, is unconstitutional,
as depriving the corporations of the equal protection of
the laws. The company is only allowed a hearing upon
the claim of the unconstitutionality of the acts and orders
in question, at the risk, if mistaken, of being subjected to
such enormous penalties, resulting in the possible confis-
cation of its whole property, that rather than take such
risks the company would obey the laws, although such
§ 410 CONTROL OP RAILROADS 679
obedience might also result in the end (thongh by a slower
process) in snch confiscation. It would be difficulty if not
impossible for the company to obtain officers, agents or
employees willing to carry on its affairs except in obedi-
ence to the acts and orders in question. The company
itself would also, in case of disobedience, be liable to
the unmense fines provided for in violating orders of the
commission. The company^ in order to test the validity
of the acts, must find some agent or employee to disobey
them at the risk stated. The necessary effect and result
of such legislation must be to preclude a resort to the
courts (either state or Federal) for the purpose of test-
ing its validity. The officers and employees could not be
expected to disobey any of the provisions of the acts or
orders at the risk of such fines and penalties being im-
posed upon them, in case the court should decide that the
law was valid. The result would be a denial of any hear-
ing to the company. In the case of the establishment of
certain rates without any hearing, the validity of such
rates necessarily depends upon whether they are high
enough to permit some return upon the investment, and
an inquiry as to that fact is a proper subject of judicial
investigation. If it turns out that the rates are too low
for that purpose, then they are illegal. To impose upon
a party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial
decision of such a question (no prior hearing having ever
been given) only upon the condition that, if unsuccessful,
he must suffer imprisonment and pay fines, as provided
in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the
courts, and thus prevent any hearing upon the question
whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low,
and therefore invalid. Laws imposing enormous fines
and possible imprisonment as a result of an unsuccessful
effort to test the validity of the laws themselves, are un-
constitutional on their face, without regard to the ques-
tion of the insufficiency of such rates. Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123.
680 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 411
§ 411. Classification of railway employees. The Indi-
ana statute modifying the fellow servant rule as to rail-
way employees, does not offend against the equal
protection of the laws clause of the Federal Constitution
because construed as applying to all employees doing
work essential to enable the carrying on of railway oper-
ations, and not as limited to those engaged in or about
the movement of trains, but such general classification
of railway employees is a proper exercise of the police
power. The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended
to and does not strip the states of the power to exercise
their lawful police authority. The equal protection of the
law clause does not restrain the normal exercise of gov-
ernmental power, but only abuse in the exertion of sucb
authority, therefore that clause is not offended against
simply because, as the result of the exercise of the power
to classify, some inequality may be occasioned. A wide
scope of legislative discretion may be exerted in classi-
fying without conflicting with the constitutional provision.
It was competent for the law-making power of a state,
without offending against the equal protection clause, to
classify railroad employees because of the hazard attached
to their vocation, and a statute doing this need not be
confined to employees who were engaged in and about the
mere movement of trains, but could also validly include
other employees doing work essential to be done to enable
the carrying on of railroad operations. Louisville & N.
B. Co. V. Melton, 218 U. S. 36.
§412. Statute creating presumption of negligence.
The Mississippi Code abrogating the fellow servant rule
as to railway employees does not offend against the equal
protection of the laws clause of the Federal Constitution
because construed as applying to the foreman of a section
crew charged with keeping the track in repair. Neither
the equal protection of the laws nor due process of law
is denied by the provision of the same law under which,
in actions against railway companies for damages done
§ 413 CONTROL OP RAILEOADS 681
to persons or property, proof of injury inflicted by the
running of the locomotives or cars is made prima facie
evidence of negligence. It was contended that although
a classification of railway employees may be justified from
general considerations based upon the hazardous charac-
ter of the occupation, such classification becomes arbi-
trary and a denial of the equal protection of the law the
moment it is found to embrace employees not exposed to
hazards peculiar to railway operation. This contention
was held without merit. The case in hand illustrates the
fact that such employees, though not directly engaged in
the management of trains, are nevertheless within the
general line of hazard inherent in the railway business.
The deceased was the foreman of a section crew. His
business was to keep the track in repair. He stood by the
side of the track to let a train pass by; a derailment
occurred, and a car fell upon him and crushed out his
life. The only legal effect of the presumption of liability
created by the statute is to cast upon the railroad com-
pany the duty of producing some evidence to the contrary.
When that is done the inference is at an end, and the
question of negligence is one for the jury, upon all of the
evidence. The statute does not therefore deny the equal
protection of the law, because it creates a presumption of
liability, since its operation is only to supply an inference
of liability in the absence of other evidence contradict-
ing such inference. If a legislative provision not unrea-
sonable in itself, prescribing a rule of evidence, in either
criminal or civil cases, does not shut out from the party
affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in
his defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue, there
is no ground for holding that due process of law has been
denied him, or the equal protection of the law. Mobile,
J. & K. C. R. Co. V. Tumipseed, 219 U. S. 35.
§ 413. Requiring full train crew. The Arkansas stat-
ute excluding railroads less than 50 miles in length from
the operation of the law prescribing a minimum of three
682 DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1 413
brakemen for freight trains of more than twenty-five
cars, does not deny to other railroads the eqnal protection
of the laws. The main object of the statute was to pro-
vide for the safety of passengers travelling on so-called
trunk lines, connecting distant or populous parts of the
country, and on which the perils of travelling are greater
than on short, local lines. As suggested in argument, a
road only 50 miles in length would seldom have a sleeping
car attached to its trains; and passengers travelling
on roads of that kind do not have the apprehension ordi-
narily felt by passengers on trains regularly carrying
sleeping cars or having many passenger coaches, on ac-
count of the burning of cars in case of their derailment
or in case of collision. There is no such discrimination
a^inst companies having more than 50 miles of road
as to justify the contention that there has been a denial
to the companies named in the act of the equal protection
of the laws. The statute is uniform in its operation upon
all railroad companies doing business in the state of the
class to which it is made applicable. The state was under
an obligation to establish such regulations as were neces-
sary or reasonable for the safety of all engaged in busi-
ness or domiciled within its limits. Beyond doubt,
passengers on interstate carriers while within Arkansas
are as fully entitled to the benefits of valid local lawi
enacted for the public safety as are citizens of the stat<»
Local statutes directed to such an end have their source
in the power of the state, never surrendered, of caring
for the public safety of all within its jurisdiction; and
the validity under the Constitution of the United States
of such statutes is not to be questioned in a Federal court
unless they are clearly inconsistent with some power
granted to the general government, or with some right
secured by that instrument, or unless they are purely
arbitrary in their nature. Under the evidence, there is
admittedly some room for controversy as to whether the
statute is or was necessary ; but it cannot be said that it
is so unreasonable as to justify the court in adjudging
§ 415 CONTROL OP RAILROADS 683
that it is merely an arbitrary exercise of power, and not
germane to the objects which evidently the state legis-
lature had in view. It is a means employed by the state
to accomplish an object which it is entitled to accomplish,
and such means, even if deemed unwise, are not to be con-
demned or disregarded by the courts, if they have a real
relation to that object. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Ar-
kansas, 219 U. S. 453.
§ 414. Requiring full switching crew— Excessive pen-
The exemptions in favor of railways less than
100 miles in length, made by a state statute forbidding
railway companies with yards or terminals in cities of
the state to conduct switching operations across public
crossings in cities of the first or second class, with a
switching crew of less than one engineer, a fireman, a
foreman, and three helpers, does not render the statute
repugnant to the Fourtenth Amendment as denying the
equal protection of the laws to a railway company coming
within its provisions, although certain terminid compa-
nies which do switching for connecting trunk lines, being
less than 100 miles in length, are not covered by the stat-
ute, and one of such companies may do switching over
some of the same crossings that the railway company in
question does. The distinction seems arbitrary if regard
is had only to its letter, but there may have been con-
siderations which determined it, and the record does not
show the contrary. It is impossible for legislation to be
all-comprehensive, and there may be practical groupings
of objects which will as a whole fairly present a class of
itself, although there may be exceptions in which the evil
aimed at is deemed not so flagrant. St. Louis, I. M. & S.
Ry. Co. V. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518.
§415. Classification of railway employees — ^Railway
relief. An unconstitutional discrimination is not made
by amending Iowa Code, § 2071, which defined the liabil-
ity of railway corporations for injuries resulting from
684 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 415
negligence or mismanagement in the nse and operation
of their railways, so that a railway company, when sued
on such liability, may not raise the defense that a recovery
is barred by the acceptance of benefits under a contract
of membership in its relief department, although this pro-
vision of the amendatory act applies only to those em-
ployees who were embraced within the provisions of the
original statute, and to the enforcement of the particular
liabilities which that statute defined, and the benefits of
such statute were confined to those engaged in the haz-
ardous business of operating railroads. The limitation to
a particular class of employees of railroad corporations
is based upon the decisions of the state court that the
benefits of the original statute were confined to those who
were engaged in the hazardous business of operating rail-
roads. This is claimed to be an invalid discrimination,
and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. It was,
however, entirely competent for the legislature, in enact-
ing the prohibition, for the purpose of securing the en-
forcement of the liability it had defined, to limit it to
those cases in which the liability arose. As the purpose
of the amendment was to supplement the original statute,
the classification was properly the same. With respect
to subsequent transactions, the amendment must be re-
garded as having the same validity as it would have had
if it had formed a part of th^ earlier enactment. No
criticism on the ground of discrimination can successfully
be addressed to the amendatory act which would not like-
wise impeach the statute in its earlier form. The pro-
priety of the classification of the original statute has been
considered and upheld by the Supreme Court. Chicago,
B. & Q. B. Co. V. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549.
§ 416. Abolishing fellow servant rule. The Arkansas
statute abolishing the fellow servant rule as to corpora-
tions operating railroads within the state does not den^
such a corporation the equal protection of the laws be-
cause the statute does not apply to individual employers.
§ 417 CONTROL OP RAILROADS 685
Whether the distinction merely between corporations and
partnerships and individuals, is competent for a legis-
lature to make, under its power of classifying objects, the
Supreme Court said it was not called upon to decide. The
distinction made by the statute is broader. The distinc-
tion (among others) it makes is between railroads oper-
ating in the state and individuals, and such distinction
has been maintained as not offending the Constitution
of the United States. Aluminum Co. v. Ramsey, 222 U. S.
251.
§417. Federal employers' liability act. The imposi-
tion of the liability created by the employers ' liability act
of April 22, 1908, upon interstate carriers by railroad
only, and for the benefit of all their employees engaged
in interstate commerce, although some are not subjected
to the peculiar hazards incident to the operation of trains,
or to hazards that differ from those to which other em-
ployees in such commerce not within the act are exposed,
does not invalidate the statute under the due-process-of-
law clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution, on the ground that it makes an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification,— even assuming that that
clause is equivalent to the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment securing the equal protection of the laws.
Even if it be assumed that the due-process-of-law clause
of the Fifth Amendment is equivalent to the * * equal pro-
tection of the laws ' ' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it does not take from Congress the power to classify, nor
does it condemn exertions of that power merely because
they occasion some inequalities. On the contrary, it ad-
mits of the exercise of a wide discretion in classifying
according to general, rather than minute distinctions,
and condemns what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
Tested by these standards, this classification is not objec-
tionable. Like classifications of railroad carriers and
employees for like purposes, when assailed under the
686 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 417
equal protection clause, have been sustained by repeated
decisions of the Supreme Court. Mondou v. New York,
N, H. & H. B, Co., 223 U. S. 1.
§418. Comparative n^ligence in injuries to railway
employees. Bailway companies are not denied the equal
protection of the laws, nor are their privileges and immu-
nities as citizens of the United States abridged, by the
Nebraska statute under which the contributory negligence
of' a railway employee injured while engaged in train
service will not bar a recovery from the company, where
his negligence was slight, and that of the company gross
in comparison, the damages being diminished in propor-
tion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
injured employee. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
upheld the power of a state to impose upon a railway
company liability to an employee engaged in train service
for an injury inflicted through the negligence of another
employee in the same service. Obviously, the same rea-
sons which justified a departure from the common-law
rule in respect to the negligence of a fellow servant also
justify a similar departure in regard to the effect of con-
tributory negligence as applied to railway employees.
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Caatle, 224 U. S. 541.
§419. Modifying fellow servant rule. The Indiana
statute modifying the fellow servant rule as to railway
employees, cannot be deemed to contravene the equal pro-
tection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because on its face it applies to any railway employee,
where, as construed by the highest court of the state, it
cannot be invoked by any class of railway employees not
engaged in some branch of service where they are sub-
jected to the hazards incident to the movement of trains
or engines. In repeated decisions the Indiana supreme
court has construed the act as one which cannot be invoked
by any class of railroad employees not engaged in some
branch of service where they are subjected to the hazards
§ 420 CONTROL OF EAILEOADS 687
incident to the movement of trains or engines, and held
that, as thus limited, the act is valid. As thus construed
and upheld by the highest court of Indiana, the act does
not contravene the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. But the Supreme Court did not inti-
mate that the act, if construed as applicable to all
employees of a railroad company, would be in contraven-
tion of that clause. Chicago, L & L. B. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U. S. 559.
§420. Classification of railroads for rate regulation.
The West Virginia statute exempting any railroad in the
state under 50 miles in length, and not a part of, or under
the control, management, or operation of, any other rail-
road over 50 miles in length, operated wholly or in part
in the state, from the operation of the law fixing the maxi-
mum fare for passengers on railroads at 2 cents per mile,
does not deny the equal protection of the laws, where as
construed by the state courts, a railway under 50 miles
in length, controlled by a railway of greater length, will
be taken out of the exception only when connected and
operated with the longer line. The exception in favor of
electric lines and street railways, in the same statute, does
not deny the equal protection of the laws. It cannot be-
said that the classification of the act is unreasonable or
arbitrary. The principles covering the decision of a ques-
tion of this sort have been frequently stated. The exemp-
tion of *' electric lines and street railways*' rests upon
reasonable and familiar distinctions, long recognized as
proper in railroad legislation. The suggestion that own-
ership or control of one railroad by another, when they
are not connected and operated together, nor susceptible
of such connection and operation, makes them one within
the meaning of the act, is contrary to the spirit and beyond
the scope thereof. Such an interpretation is not within
its reason or purpose, and therefore not within its mean-
ing. The legislature must be regarded as having passed
the act, in view of existing conditions and methods of rail-
688 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 420
road operation, and with the intent that it should operate
in harmony with the spirit and general principles of exist-
ing railroad rate legislation, except in so far as the con-
trary is expressed in terms or by necessary implication.
Intent to change the settled policy of the state as embodied
in the act of 1873, concerning the Aitity of a railroad for
the purposes of the act, must rest upon something more,
in an amendatory act, than mere inference, surmise, or
unnecessary implication. Chesapeake & O. B. Co- v.
Conley, 230 U. S. 513.
§ 421. Judicial review of rate regulation. The failure
of the Kentucky act of March 10, 1900, to provide for
any appeal to any court from the final order of the state
railroad commission fixing maximum freight rates under
the authority of that statute, or for a judicial review
of the reasonableness of the prescribed rates before
they become effective, does not invalidate such statute
as operating to deprive the carrier of his property with-
out due process of law, or to deny to it the equal pro-
tection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, where the statute does not — ^unless by its separable
penal provisions — deny the carrier the right of access to
the courts for the purpose of determining any matter
which would be the appropriate subject of judicial
inquiry. If the commission establishes rates which are so
low as to be confiscatory an appropriate mode of obtain-
ing relief is by bill in equity to restrain the enforcement
of the order. Presumably the courts of the state, as well
as the Federal courts, would be open to the carrier for
this purpose. If it were assumed that the severity of the
penalties attached to disobedience of the order would be
open to objection as operating to deprive the carrier of
a fair opportunity to contest the validity of the commis-
sion's action, still, the penal provisions would be sep-
arable, and the force of the remaining portion of the
statute would not be impaired. Louisville & Nashville
E. Co. V. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298.
§ 424 CONTROL OP RAILROADS 689
§ 422. Requiring carrier to accept reshipments in cars
of other carrier. The equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is not denied to a
railway carrier by an order of a state railroad conmiission
requiring it to accept without unloading and reloading
into its own cars reshipments of coal in carload lots when
tendered in the cars of other railway companies. The
requirement was a reasonable one. It cannot be said that
the carrier had a constitutional right to burden trade by
insisting that the commodities should be unloaded and
reloaded in its own equipment. Upon this point the case
of Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287,
is decisive. There is no essential difference, so far as the
power of the state is concerned between the order in this
case and one compelling the carrier to make track con-
nections, and to receive cars from connecting roads, in
order that reasonably adequate facilities for traflSc may
be provided. See cases cited. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co. V. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334.
§423. Requiring electric headlights on locomotives.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be said to be infringed by the provi-
sions of Georgia Pub. Laws, 1908, pp. 50, 51, requiring
railway locomotives running on the main line to be
equipped with electric headlights, merely because the act
may not apply to receivers operating railways, in view
of the temporary and special character of receivers ^ man-
agement. The exceptions in favor of tram roads, mill
roads, and roads engaged principally in lumber or log-
ging transportation do not render the statute repugnant
to the Fourteenth Amendment. As to these it is impos-
sible to say that the differences with respect to operation
and traffic conditions do not present a reasonable basis
for classification. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia,
234 U. S. 280.
§424. Excessive penalties. A state statute under
which enormous penalties are imposed upon a railway
Due Process — 44
690 DUE PEOCESS OP LAW § 424
company for violating lawful administrative orders of the
state railroad commission is void under the Fourteenth
Amendment, although such orders are made after full
hearing before the commission, if access to the courts
to test the constitutional validity of the commission's
orders is denied, or if the right of review actually given
is one of which the carrier may avail itself only at the
risk of having to pay such penalties if the order is f oxmd
to be valid. Under the Constitution penalties cannot be
collected if they operate to deter an interested party from
testing the validity of legislative rates or orders legisla-
tive in their nature. Their legality is not apparent on the
face of such orders, but depends upon a showing of extrin-
sic facts. A statute, therefore, which imposes heavy pen-
alties for violation of conmiands on an unascertained
quality is, in its nature, somewhat akin to an ex post facto
law, since it punishes for an act done when the legality
of the conmiand has not been authoritatively determined.
Liability to a penalty for violation of such orders, before
their validity has been determined, would put the party
affected in a position where he himself must, at his own
risk, pass upon the question. He must either obey what
may finally be held to be a void order, or disobey what
may ultimately be held to be a lawful order. If a statute
could constitutionally impose heavy penalties for viola-
tion of commands of such disputable and imcertain legal-
ity, the result inevitably would be that the carrier would
yield to void orders, rather than risk the enormous cumu-
lative of confiscatory punishment that might be un-
posed, if they should thereafter be declared to be valid.
Where provision is made for judicial review of such
administrative orders, the only question left for determi-
nation is, whether, in the view of such right, a heavy
penalty can be collected for the violation of an order not
known to be valid at the date of the disobedience sought
to be punished. There seems to be no room to doubt the
power of the state to impose a punishment heavy enough
to secure obedience to such orders after they have been
§ 425 CONTROL OF RAILROADS 691
found to be lawful; nor to impose a penalty for acts of
disobedience, committed after the carrier had ample op-
portunity to test the validity of administrative orders and
failed to do so. Where after reasonable notice of the
making of an administrative order, the carrier failed to
resort to the safe, adequate, and available remedy by
which it could test in the courts the validity of such order,
and preferred to make its defense by attacking the valid-
ity of the order when sued for the penalty, which may be
any amount, up to $5,000 a day, it is subject to the
penalty when that defense proved to be unsuccessful,
without being denied the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution. Wadley Southern Ey. Co. v. Georgia,
235 U. S. 651.
§425. Taxation of foreign railway company. There
is no denial of the equal protection of the laws, or of due
process of law, in the imposition upon a foreign railway
company, imder Arkansas Laws 1899, No. 112, in addi-
tion to the general property tax on the property of foreign
corporations within the state, of an annual franchise tax
for the privilege of transacting intrastate business in
corporate form, fixed solely by reference to the property
of the corporation that is within the state and used in
business within the state, and excluding any imposition
upon, or interference with, interstate commerce, where
the classification of corporations adopted by that statute
is not unreasonable, and corporations of the class to which
the company belongs are not discriminated against in
favor of domestic corporations. The tax is not in any
wise based upon the receipts of the railroad company
from interstate commerce, either taken alone or in con-
nection with the receipts from its intrastate business.
The tax is measured by reference to property situated
wholly within the confines of the state. The state may
in addition to the imposition of an ordinary property tax
upon an instrumentality of interstate or international
692 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 425
commerce, impose a franchise tax ascertained by refer-
ence to the property of the corporation within the state,
including that employed in interstate commerce, if
amounting to no more than would be legitimate as an
ordinary tax upon the property, valued with reference
to the use in which it is employed. Nothing in the Four-
teenth Amendment imposes any ironclad rule upon the
states with respect to their internal taxation, or prevents
them from imposing double taxation, or any other form
of unequal taxation, so long as the inequality is not based
upon arbitrary distinctions. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v.
Arkansas ex rel. Norwood, 235 U. S. 350.
§ 426. Discrimination between carrier and shipper as
to attorneys' fees in demurrage cases makes law invalid.
The Kansas ** reciprocal*' or ** mutual demurrage*' stat-
ute provided that a railway company failing to furnish
cars upon proper application to shippers of freight is
liable to the shipper for all actual damage suffered, for
a penalty of five dollars per day for each car not so sup-
plied, and for a reasonable attorney fee. Shippers who
fail to load cars within forty-eight hours after they are
placed at their disposal are subject to a like penalty of
five dollars a day for each car not used and for the actual
damages the railroad company may sustain by reason of
the failure of the shipper to use said cars, but are not
made liable for attorney fees. Such legislation is prop-
erly to be regarded as a police regulation, but a police
regulation is like any other law subject to the equal pro-
tection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. The constitutional guaranty
entitles all persons and corporations within the jurisdic-
tion of the state to the protection of equal laws, in this as
in other departments of legislation. It does not prevent
classification but does require that classification shall be
reasonable not arbitrary and that it shall rest upon dis-
tinctions having a fair and substantial relation to the
object sought to be accomplished by the legislation. The
§ 427 CONTEOL OF EAILROADS 693
statute clearly recognizes that either party may be
obliged to sue the other in order to recover the penalty
for damages, or both. No reason is suggested and none
occurs to the court, the opinion reads, why the railroad
company, when plaintiff in such an action, will not require
the services of an attorney as well as the shipper when
he is plaintiff. There is nothing in the nature of the
cause of action that renders the burden of preparation
more onerous, as a rule, to the shipper when he is plain-
tiff than to the company when it is plaintiff. There is
nothing discernible, therefore, in the purposes of the
legislation — ^which are to require the prompt furnishing
of cars for use, and the prompt use of cars when fur-
nished, and to redress a disregard of either of these re-
quirements by suit when necessary— to give ground for
a distinction granting attorney's fees to the shipper when
he sues, and denying attorney's fees to the company
when it sues. The statute while recognizing the existence
of a special burden in the litigation which may grow out
of the statute allows compensation for it in favor of one
class of litigants but does not allow like compensation to
the other class when subject to the like burden. This is
a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Atchison, T. & S. P.
Railway Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56.
§427. Requiring railroads to provide drainage for
water contrary to common law rule. The state of Mis-
souri enacted a law making it the duty of railroads in the
state to cause to be constructed and maintained suitable
openings across and through the right of way and road-
bed of such railroad, and suitable ditches and drains along
each side of the roadbed of such railroad, to connect with
ditches, drains, or water courses, so as to afford sufl5cient
outlet to drain and carry off the water, including surface
water, along such railroad, whenever the draining of such
water has been obstructed or rendered necessary by the
construction of such railroad. A penalty was provided
694 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 427
for the violation of the statute. The commoa law mle
prevails in the state that surface water is a common enemy
against which every landowner may protect himself as
best he may. The Federal Supreme Court rejected the
contention that the statute denied the plaintiff in error
the equal protection of the laws as quite unsubstantial
Bailroad embankments^ the opinion reads, stretching un-
broken across tracts of land that are liable to injury from
surface waters, differ so materially from other artificial
constructions and improvements to which the doctrine of
the ^^ common enemy*' applies, that there is very plainly
a substantial ground for classification with respect to the
object of the legislation. The statute applies alike to cor-
porations, companies, and persons owning or operating
railroads that are so constructed as to obstruct the flow
of drainage and surface waters, and the statute was held
unexceptionable in that regard. Chicago & Alton Bail-
road Co. V. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67.
§ 427a. Requiring railway company to remove noxiou
weeds. The requirement of Indiana Act of March 6, 1889,
that railway companies cut down and destroy noxious
weeds **on lands occupied by them,'' under penalty of
$25, recoverable by **any person feeling himself
aggrieved'' by the company's neglect or refusal, will not
be held to offend against the equal protection of the law
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, where the statute has as yet been given no
broader construction by the state courts than one which
permits a single recovery by a contiguous landowner be-
cause of a railway company's failure to cut and destroy
weeds on its right of way. The court refused to antici-
pate a construction of the statute not yet given, and which
may never be given, and on that anticipation hold the
statute invalid, and re-expressed the propriety of waiting,
when a state statute is attacked for unconstitutionality,
until the state court has given it a construction which may
justify the attack. The validity of the statute was upheld
§ 427a CONTROL OF RAILROADS 695
under the doctrine of Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May,
194 U. S. 267, The court expressed no opinion concern-
ing the consequences if a broader construction should be
accepted by the state court. Chicago, T. H. & S. E. R.
Co. V. Anderson, 242 U. S. 283.
CHAPTER XX
CONTBOL OF DOMBSTIC ANV FOBEIQN COBPOBATIONS
§428. State control of corporations. Domestic cor-
porations are the creatures of the state; and the state
has the clear right to regulate its own creations. The
power of classification upheld by the Supreme Court ad-
mits of discriminations between domestic corporations
and also between foreign corporations. Foreign corpora-
tions are admitted to a state on such conditions as each
state may prescribe, provided always that such discrimi-
nation does not interfere with any transaction by such
corporations of interstate or foreign conmierce. The
Illinois statutes of 1869 and 1874, in regard to insurance
companies, do not impair the obligation of any contract
which the Chicago Life Insurance Company had with the
state, nor deny it the equal protection of the law, nor
deprive it of property without due process of law, nor
impair the obligation of the contracts which the company
has made with its creditors and policy holders. The act
of 1869 does not contain any regulation respecting the
affairs of any corporation of Illinois which is not reason-
able in its character, or which is not promotive of the
interests of all concerned in its management It only
guards against mismanagement and misconduct; its re-
quirements constitute reasonable regulations of the busi-
ness of such local corporations; it does not impair the
obligation of any contract which the company has with
the state ; the conditions imposed upon the rights of the
company to continue the issuing of policies are neither
arbitrary nor oppressive. The same general observa-
tions apply to the act of 1874, which, recognizing the
contract right of the company to carry on business as a
696
§ 429 DOMESTIC AND POEEIQN CORPORATIONS 697
c(t)rporation, does not, by a legislative decree merely,
based upon the ex parte representations of public officers,
assume to withdraw that right. There is no denial of the
equal protection of the laws, nor any deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law ; for that statute author-
izes a public officer to bring the company before a judicial
tribunal, which, after full opportunity for defense, may
determine whether it is insolvent, or its condition such as
to render its continuance in business hazardous to the
insured or to the public, or whether it has exceeded its
corporate powers, or violated the rules, restrictions or
conditions prescribed by law; grounds which, if estab-
lished, constitute sufficient reason why the corporate
franchises and privileges granted by the state should no
longer be enjoyed, Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Needles,
113 U. S. 574.
§ 429. Statute applicable to fire insurance only. A fire
insurance company is not denied the equal protection of
the laws by a statute applicable to fire insurance only,
which makes the entire amount of the insurance payable
in case of total loss, except as reduced by depreciation
of the property after it was insured. Mr. Justice Mc-
Kenna in delivering the opinion of the court said : * * It
is not necessary to state the reasoning upon which classi-
fication by legislation is based or justified. This court
has had many occasions to do so, and only lately reviewed
the subject in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank,
170 XJ. S. 283. We said in that case that * the state may
distinguish, select and classify objects of legislation, and
necessarily the power must have a wide range of discre-
tion.* And this because of the functions of legislation
and the purposes to which it is addressed. Classification
for such purposes is not invalid because not depending on
scientific or marked differences in things or persons or
in their relations. It suffices if it is practical, and is not
reviewable unless palpably arbitrary. The classification
of the Missouri statute is certainly not arbitrary. We
698 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 429
see many differences between fire insurance and other
insurance^ both to the insurer and the insured, — differ-
ences in the elements insured against and the possible
relation of the parties to them, producing consequences
which may justify, if not demand, different legislative
treatment Of course it is not for us to debate the policy
of any particular treatment ; and the freedom of discre-
tion which we have said the state has is exhibited by
analogous, if not exact, examples to the Missouri statute
in Missouri P. Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U- S- 205, and
in Minneapolis & St. L. Railway v. Beckwith, 129 U. S.
26. '^ Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557.
§ 430. Statute as to effect of false answers by applicant
for life insurance. The power of the legislature to define
the public policy of the state in respect to life insurance,
and to impose conditions on the transaction of business
by life insurance companies within the state, is exercised
without violation of the Federal Constitution by the Ohio
statutes providing that an answer by an applicant shall
not bar recovery on the policy unless clearly proved to
be wilfully false and fraudulently made and also mate-
rial, and that it induced the company to issue the policT',
and that the agent of the insurer had no knowledge of
the falsity or fraud of such answer. It was for the legis-
lature of Ohio to define the public policy of that state in
respect of life insurance, and to impose such conditions
on the transaction of business by life insurance compa-
nies within the state as was deemed best. Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller, in delivering the opinion of the court,
said: '*We do not perceive any arbitrary classification
or unlawful discrimination in this legislation, but, at all
events, we cannot say that the Federal Constitution has
been violated in the exercise in this regard by the state of
its undoubted power over corporations. ' ' John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Warren, 181 U. S. 73.
§431. State regulation of foreign corporations. A for-
eign corporation engaged in booking theatrical companies
§ 432 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 699
and vaudeville acts for theatre owners in consideration of
a weekly booking fee and a commission on the actors'
salaries may, consistently with the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution, be required to file a copy of
its charter with the secretary of state, conformably to a
local statute, as a condition precedent to its right to sue
upon a contract made in its conduct of such business.
Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S. 560.
§432. State anti-trust laws. A discrimination in favor
of agricultural products or live stock in the hands of the
producer or raiser, made by the Illinois trust act exempt-
ing them from the provisions which prohibit a recovery
of the price of articles sold by any trust or combination
formed in restraint of trade or competition in violation of
that act, renders it repugnant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, in respect to the equal protection of the laws. What
may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the
laws is a question not always easily determined, as the
decisions of the Supreme Court and of the highest courts
of the states will show. It is sometimes difficult to show
that a state enactment, having its source in a power not
controverted, infringes rights protected by the national
Constitution. No rule can be formulated that will cover
every case. Upon this general question the Supreme
Court has said that the guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws means '*that no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and under like circumstances. These principles ap-
plied to this case condemn the statute of Illinois. Under
that statute all except producers of agricultural com-
modities and producers of live stock, who combine their
capital, skill or acts, for any of the purposes named in
the act may be punished as criminals, while agriculturists
and live-stock raisers in respect of their products or live
stock in hand, are exempted from the operation of the
statute, and may combine and do that which, if done by
700 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 432
others would be a crime against the state notwithstand-
ing all are in the same general class^ that is, they are all
alike engaged in domestic trade which is of right open to
ally subject to such regulations, applicable alike to all in
like conditions, as the state may legally prescribe. To
declare that some of the persons engaged in domestic
trade or commerce shall be deemed criminals if they
violate the regulations prescribed by the state for the
purpose of protecting the public against illegal combina-
tions formed to destroy competition and to control prices,
and that others of the same class shall not be bound to
regard these regulations, but may combine their capital,
skill or acts to destroy competition and to control prices
for their special benefit is so manifestly a denial of the
equal protection of the laws that the act is clearly repug-
nant to the Constitution. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U. S. 540,
§ 433. Discrimination against dealers in articles mann-
factured from produce of another state. The Tennessee
merchant tax imposed on a corporation dealing only in
goods manufactured from the produce of other states,
makes no unconstitutional discrimination, because of the
provision of the state constitution that **no article manu-
factured of the produce of this state shall be taxed other-
wise than to pay inspection fees, ' ' where the highest court
of the state has held that this provision refers only to a
direct levy of taxation upon articles manufactured from
the produce of the state and that the merchants ' tax ap-
plies equally to all merchants. The argument is made
that under the facts found by the court below it was erro-
neously held that the steel company because of the busi-
ness it carried on in the state of Tennessee was a merchant
within the statutes, and the power to review this question,
it is insisted, should be exercised because the question is
Federal in its nature. The contention is without merit.
As the levy of the merchants' tax violated no Federal
right, the mere determination of who were merchants
§ 434 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 701
within the state involved no Federal qnestion. The con-
struction of the state law being conclusive and embracing
all persons doing a like business with the steel company,
it follows that there was no discrimination. American
Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500.
§ 434. Validity of Texas anti-trust law. The construc-
tion given by the state courts to the Texas act of May
25, 1899, as removing the discriminatory features of prior
anti-trust laws, is conclusive on the Federal Supreme
Court in determining, on writ of error to the state court,
whether such statute denies the equal protection of the
laws. A foreign corporation whose license to do business
in the state is sought to be forfeited by a suit brought
under the anti-trust laws of the state cannot claim to be
denied the equal protection of the laws, where the dis-
criminatory features of the prior anti-trust laws have
been removed by a subsequent act, although they may still
remain in the revised statutes of the state and in the penal
code, under which certain excepted classes are exempted
from indictment and punishment, while the corporation
may be subject to both. The contention of the corpora-
tion is that the statutes of the state discriminate against
it; in other words, deny it the equal protection of the
law, by forbidding it from doing what they permit others
to do in similar circumstances, — ^punish its acts and ex-
empt from punishment the same acts when done by others.
The courts of the state are the tribunals appointed to
administer the statutes and interpret them, in other
words, declare the meaning of the statutes, and if in
declaring it they make the statutes discriminatory, then
may the statutes become unconstitutional. The state
court held that the subaequent act did not continue the
unconstitutional provisions of prior acts, merely because
it was declared to be cumulative, and the law was held
constitutional because it did not contain the discriminat-
ing features of the prior laws. Under the laws of Texas,
therefore, combinations of the kind described in the van-
702 DDE PROCESS OP LAW § 434
0U8 anti-trast laws, whether by agricaltnrists or organized
laborers or others, are forbidden and penalized, and the
oil company is not discriminated against. It is claimed
that the inequalities of prior anti-trust acts still remain
in the revised statutes of the state and in the penal code.
The case at bar however is not a criminal prosecution.
It involves only the anti-trust laws and their prohibitions
and penalties, and in them, by the last enactment, there
is no inequality of operation. National Cotton Oil Go.
v. Texas, 197 U. S. 115.
§435. Appointing state auditor to accept service on
corporation. The West Virginia statute requiring every
foreign and nonresident domestic corporation to appoint
the state auditor to accept service of process, and exact-
ing an annual fee of $10 for his services, does not deny the
equal protection of the laws to a domestic corporation
whose principal office and works are outside the state.
The state had the clear right to regulate its own creations^
and a fortiori, foreign corporations permitted to trans-
act business within its borders. In this instance it put
all nonresident domestic corporations, which elected to
have their places of business and works outside of the
state, and all foreign corporations coming into the state,
on the same footing in respect of the service of process,
and the law operated on all these alike. Such a classifi-
cation was reasonable and not open to constitutional
objection. The requirement of the payment of $10 to
the auditor for the use of the state does not amount to a
taking of property without due process, and is not an
unjust discrimination. St Mary's Franco-American
Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia, 203 U. S. 183.
§436. Unequal assessment of franchises and other
property of certain corporations. Assessing the fran-
chises and other property of certain corporations at a
different rate and by a different method from that em-
ployed for other corporations of the same class for the
§ 437 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 703
same year, which results in enormous disparity and dis-
criminatioUy denies the due process of law and equal
protection of the laws protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against impairment by a state. A state board
of equalization, when making an assessment pursuant to
the supposed command of a writ of mandamus represents
the state, — ^there being no method of reviewing its decision
except by judicial proceedings for relief from the assess-
ment, and is subject to the limitations of the amendment.
The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are not
confined to the action of the state through legislature, or
through the executive or judicial authority. Those pro-
visions relate to and cover all the instrumentalities by
which the state acts. It is made entirely clear that the
board of equalization did not equalize the assessments
in the cases of these corporations, the effect of which was
that they were levied upon a different principle or fol-
lowed a different method from that adopted in the case
of other like corporations whose property the board had
assessed for the same year. This was the action of the
state through the board. The most important function
of the board, that of equalizing assessments, in order to
carry out the provisions of the constitution of the state
in levying a tax by valuation * * so that every person shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its
property, '' was iil this instance omitted and ignored.
This action resulted in an illegal discrimination which,
under these facts, was the action of the state through the
board. Eaymond v. Chicago Edison Co., 207 U. S. 20.
§ 437. Requiring corporations alone to produce books
and papers. The Vermont statute under which corpora-
tions alone may be compelled to produce before a court or
grand jury material books and papers in their custody or
control does not deny to them the equal protection of the
laws secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. There is no
improper classification in this regard. It is stated by the
state court that prior to the passage of this act there was
704 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 437
no adequate provision for compelling the production of
books and papers by a corporation, and it was held that
the statute was designed for requiring the corporation
itself, as the responsible owner and custodian, to pro-
duce the documentary evidence mentioned therein, with-
out the necessity of calling upon bookkeepers, managers,
or other servants who may, or may not, in fact, have
custody or control thereof at the time notice to produce
is given, and to place upon the corporation the responsi-
bility of seeing that such evidence called for, if in its
control, is produced. There is ample justification for the
classification made by the statute. Consolidated Bender-
ing Co. V. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541.
§438. State regulation of telegraph companies. The
equal protection of the laws is not denied telegraph com-
panies and the persons with whom it does business by a
state statute under which, as construed by the state
courts, a telegraph company can not limit its liability for
its negligent failure to deliver a telegram addressed to
a person in another state, although express companies
and other common carriers may, by contract, limit their
liability in this respect. The power of the state to regu-
late public service corporations, both as to power and
the extent of the power, is well established. The claim of
unjust discrimination is answered by Orient Ins. Co. v.
Daggs, 172 U. S. 557. Western; Union Telegraph Co. v.
Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406.
§ 439. Local assessments on state tide lands. Lessees
of state tide lands are not denied the equal protection of
the laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, by state
statutes authorizing the assessment of such leaseholds
for local improvements specially benefiting them, and the
inclusion of them within local improvement districts. In
private contracts in the absence of a covenant or condi-
tion to the contrary, it is an implied covenant in every
lease that the lessor shall pay all taxes and assessments
§ 440 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 705
levied on the leased land during the term. In ordinary
cases the whole property is taxed, and which party shall
bear the burden is not a matter of public concern. But
when the state makes the lease, the supposed obligation
would be an obligation not to tax, — ^a restriction of public
import not lightly to be imposed. It is urged that to deny
the state's obligation discriminates unconstitutionally
against this class of lessees, since all others are free from
the burden. Whether landlord or tenant shall pay a tax
is a matter of private arrangement, and the practice one
way or the other has no bearing on the matter. The
argument from inequality really works the other way. If
these leaseholds are not taxable, they are a favored class
of property; for ordinarily leaseholds are taxed even if
they are lumped and included in the value of the fee.
When an interest in land, whether freehold or for years,
is severed from the public domain and put into private
hands, the natural implication is that it goes there with
the ordinary incidents of privajte property, and therefore
IB subject to being taxed. Trimble v. Seattle, 231
U. S. 683.
§440. Exempting farmers' mntnal insurance compa-
nies from statute regulating fire insurance rates. The
Kansas statute regulating fire insurance rates exempting
farmers' mutual insurance companies organized and
doing business under the laws of the state, and insuring
only farm property, does not render such statute invalid
as to other insurance companies, as denying the equal
protection of the laws. A discrimination is valid if not
arbitrary, and arbitrary in the legislative sense, that is,
outside of that wide discretion which a legislature may
exercise. A legislative classification may rest on narrow
distinctions. Legislation is addressed to evils as they
may appear, and even degrees of evil may determine its
exercise. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union Co. Nat'l Bank, 202
U. S. 623. There are certainly differences between stock
companies and mutual companies, and a recognition of
Due Procewi — 45
706 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 440
the differences cannot be said to be outside of the con-
stitutional power of the legislature. Orient Ins. Co. v.
Daggs, 172 U. S. 557. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,
233 U. S. 389.
§ 441. Forfeitiure of charter of corporation for failure
to file affidavit of innocence not required of individuals.
The charter of a Missouri corporation was forfeited by
the supreme court of the state for failure of its officers to
file with the proper state officer the affidavit prescribed
by a statute of the state setting forth the nonparticipa-
tion of the corporation in any pool, trust, agreement,
combination, etc., under penalty of forfeiture of the char-
ter, or certificate of incorporation, even though the com-
pany may never have entered into any such pool, trust,
conspiracy or combination. It was insisted on behalf of
the corporation that to require an affidavit of innocence
by the managing officers of corporations is an unjust dis-
crimination against them, and hence repugnant to the
equal protection provision, because individuals, partner-
ships, and associations of individuals, although equally
within the statute against monopolies are not required to
make similar exculpatory affidavits. The question, the
court states, is whether, for the purpose of such a dis-
closure as is required by the law in question, corporations
may be placed in one class and individuals in another.
The answer is declared to be not at all difficult. Corpora-
tions may not arbitrarily be selected in order to be sub-
jected to a burden to which individuals would as appro-
priately be subject. Classification must be reasonable;
that is to say, it must be based upon some real and sub-
stantial distinction having a just relation to the legisla-
tive object in view. When questions arise of alleged con-
flict with constitutional requirements, every reasonable
intendment is in favor of the validity of the legislation
under attack. Corporations, unlike individuals, derive
their very right to exist from the laws of the state ; they
have perpetual succession ; and they act only by agents,
§ 442 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 707
and often under circumstances where the agency is not
manifest The legislature may reasonably have con-
cluded that^ for these and other reasons, corporations are
peculiarly apt instruments for establishing and effectuat-
ing those trusts and combinations against which the pro-
hibition of the statute is directed, that their business
affiliations are not so easily discovered and traced as
those of individuals, and that there was therefore a
peculiar necessity and fitness in annually requiring from
each corporation a solemn assurance of its nonparticipa-
tion in the prohibited practices. The act is, in this
respect, fairly within the wide range of discretion that
the states enjoy in the matter of classification. Mal-
linckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri ex rel Jones, 238
U. S. 41.
§ 442. License tax on foreign corporation. The Penn-
sylvania revenue act of 1879 is not in conflict with the
clause of the Federal Constitution vesting in Congress
the power to regulate commerce; nor with the clause
declaring that the citizens of each state are entitled to
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states; nor with the clause in Ihe Fourteenth Amend-
ment declaring that no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The inhibition of the amendment, that no state shall
deprive any person within its jurisdiction of the equal
protection of the laws, was designed to prevent any per-
son or class of persons from being singled out as a special
subject for discriminating and hostile legislation. Under
the designation of persons there is no doubt that a pri-
vate corporation is included. The equal protection of the
law which these bodies may claim is only such as is
accorded to similar associations within the jurisdiction
of the state. The plaintiff in error is not a corporation
within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania. The office it
hires is within such jurisdiction, and on condition that it
pays the required license tax it can claim the same pro-
708 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 442
tection in the use of the office that any other corporation
having a similar office may daim. It would then have the
equal protection of the law so far as it had anything
within the jurisdiction of the state, and the constitutional
amendment requires nothing more. The state is not pro-
hibited from discriminating in the privileges it may
grant to foreign corporations as a condition of their
doing business or hiring offices within its limits, provided
always such discrimination does not interfere with any
transaction by such corporations of interstate or foreign
commerce. It is not every corporation, lawful in the state
of its creation, that other states may be willing to admit
within their jurisdiction or consent that it have offices in
them. And even where the business of a foreign corpora-
tion is not unlawful in other states the latter may wish
to limit the number of such corporations, or to subject
their business to such control as would be in accordance
with the policy of governing domestic corporations of a
similar character. The states may, therefore, require for
the admission within their limits of the corporations of
other states, or of any number of them, such conditions
as they may choose, without acting in conflict with the
concluding provision of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pembina Con. Silver Mining, etc, Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181.
§ 443. State restrictions on foreign oorporationB. Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
declaring that no state shall ^Meny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,*^ does
not prohibit a state from imposing such conditions upon
foreign corporations as it may choose, as a condition of
their admission within its limits.'' See also, Philadel-
phia F. Ass'n V. New York, 119 U. S. 110. Norfolk &
Western R: Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 136
U. S. 114.
§ 444. Tax on capital of a corporation. The equal pro-
tection of the laws is not denied to a foreign corporation
§ 445 DOMESTIC AND POBEIGN CORPORATIONS 709
«
which manufactures goods in other states and sends them
into the state for sale, by a tax on the amount of capital
employed by it within the state, because of an exemption
of corporations which are wholly engaged in manuf actur-
ing within the state, when the statute makes no discrim-
ination between foreign and domestic corporations. It
is contended that all corporations which manufacture
their goods wholly in other states and send them for sale
in New York are discriminated against in favor of such
corporations, whether foreign or domestic, as manuf ac
ture their goods within the state of New York. If the
object of the law was to impose a tax upon products of
other states while exempting similar domestic goods from
taxation, there might be room to contend that such a dis-
tinction was constitutionally objectionable as tending to
affect or regulate commerce between the states. But,
obviously, such is not the purpose of this legislation.
. . . The tax is prescribed as well for New York cor-
porations as for those of other states. The exemption in
favor of manufacturing or mining corporations wholly
engaged in carrying on manufacture or mining ores
within the state is not restricted to New York corpora-
tions, but includes corporations of other states as well,
when wholly engaged in manufacturing within the state.
So it is apparent that there is no purpose disclosed in the
statute either* to distinguish between New York corpora-
tions and those of other states to the detriment of the
latter, or to subject property out of the state to taxation.
People ex rel. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Roberts, 171
U. S. 658.
§445. Oorporation, when not within jurisdiction of
state. A corporation not created by the laws of a state,
nor doing business in that state under conditions that
subject it to process from the courts of that state, is not
within the jurisdiction of that state, within the meaning
of the constitutional provision that no state * * shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
710 DUB PROCESS OP LAW %445
of the laws.'' The Tennessee statute of March 19, 1877,
80 far as it subordinates the daims of private business
corporations of other states, who are creditors of a cor-
poration doing business in that state under that statute,
to the claims against the latter corporation of creditors
residing in Tennessee, is not a '^denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws,^' secured by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution to persons within the
jurisdiction of the state. A Virginia corporation no(
doing business in Tennessee was denied the right to par-
ticipate upon terms of equality with Tennessee creditors
in the distribution of particular assets of another foreign
corporation doing business in that state. It is clear the
Virginia corporation cannot rely upon the clause declar-
ing that no state shall *'deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.^' That pro-
hibition manifestly relates only to the denial by the state
of the equal protection of the laws to persons ** within its
jurisdiction. '' The prohibition against the deprivation
of property without due process of law is not qualified by
the words ** within its jurisdiction, '^ while those words
are found in the succeeding clause relating to the equal
protection of the laws. The Supreme Court declared it
could not assume that those words were inserted without
any object, nor was it at liberty to eliminate them from
the Constitution and to interpret the daifte in question
as if they were not found in that instrument It is safe
to say that a corporation not created by Tennessee, nor
doing business there under conditions that subjected it
to process issuing from the courts of Tennessee at the
instance of suitors, is not, under the above clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, within the jurisdiction of that
state. The Virginia corporation does not appear to have
been doing business in Tennessee under any statute that
would bring it directly under the jurisdiction of the courts
of the state. Nor did it come within the jurisdiction of
Tennessee, within the meaning of the amendment, simply
by presenting its claim in the state court and thereby
§ 446 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 711
becoming a party to the cause. Under any other inter-
pretation the Fourteenth Amendment would be given a
scope not contemplated by its f ramers or by the people,
nor justified by its language. The court held that the
statute, 80 far as it subordinates the claims of private
business corporations not within the jurisdiction of the
state of Tennessee (although such private corporations
may be creditors of a corporation doing business in tiie
state under the authority of that statute), to the claims
against the latter corporation of creditors residing in
Tennessee, is not a denial of the ** equal protection of the
laws ' ' secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to persons
within the jurisdiction of the state, however unjust such
a regulation may be deemed. Blake v. McClung, 172
U. S. 239.
§ 446. Right to attach nonresident's property. A ter-
ritorial statute permitting attachment against a non-
resident without a bond, while requiring the bond for
attachment against a resident does not constitute a denial
to the nonresident of the equal protection of the laws or
of due process of law. The elementary proposition is not
denied that for the purposes of the remedy by attach-
ment, the legislative authority of a state or territory
may classify residents in one class and nonresidents in
another, but it is insisted that where nonresidents **are
not capable of separate identification from residents by
any facts or circumstances other than that they are non-
residents— that is, when the fact of nonresidence is their
only distinguishing feature — ^that laws of a state or terri-
tory cannot treat them to their prejudice upon that fact
as a basis of classification. ' ' When the exception, thus
stated, is put in juxtaposition with the concession that
there is such a difference between the residents of a state
or territory and nonresidents as to justify their being
placed into distinct classes for the purpose of the process
of attachment, it becomes at once clear that the excep-
tion to the rule, which the argument attempts to make, is
712 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 446
but a denial, by indirection^ of the legislative power to
classify which it is avowed the exception does not ques-
tion. The argument in substance is that where a bond is
required as a. prerequisite to the issue of an attachment
against a resident, an unlawful discrimination is pro-
duced by permitting process of attachment against a non-
resident without giving a like bond. But the difference
between exacting a bond in the one case and not in the
other is nothing like as great as that which arises from
allowing process of attachment against a nonresident and
not permitting such process against a resident in any
case. That the distinction between a resident and a non-
resident is so broad as to authorize a classification, in
accordance with the suggestion just made, is conceded,
and if it were not, is obvious. The power to grant the
remedy in the one case and to deny it in the other, of
necessity embraces the right to impose upon the one a
condition not required in the other. Central Loan &
Trust Co. V. Campbell Commission Co., 173 U. S. 84.
§ 447. Discrimination against nonresident creditors of
foreign corporations. A preference in favor of resident
creditors of a foreign corporation over a nonresident
mortgagee whose mortgage is not registered when their
debts are created, when such preference is not given
them over a resident mortgagee, constitutes an illegal
discrimination against the nonresident. The fact that
there are no resident mortgagees in a particular case does
not make the question of discrimination between non-
resident and resident by a statute a merely abstract or
moot question, so as to preclude a decision against the
validity of the statute, if it makes a discrimination
against nonresident mortgagees with respect to sharing
in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent foreign
corporation. A nonresident mortgagee is not within the
jurisdiction of the state merely because he has a mort-
gage on property therein, so as to be deprived of the
equal protection of the laws in violation of the Four-
§ 448 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 713
teenth Amendment by denying him the right to partici-
pate on terms of equality in the distribution of the assets
of an insolvent foreign corporation. The contest was
between creditors of a Virginia corporation doing busi-
ness at the time of its insolvency in the state of Tennes-
see, who are nonresidents of the state, both those who are
unsecured, as well as those who are secured by mort-
gages upon the property of the company in that state,
and creditors of the company who are residents of the
state. A nonresident unsecured creditor has the right to
share in the distribution of the assets of the insolvent
foreign corporation upon the same level as like creditors
of the company who are residents of the state of Ten-
nessee, and the decree below denied him that right in vio-
lation of the guarantee of the equal protection of the
laws. Sully v. American National Bank, 178 U. S. 289.
§ 448. Taxation of nonresident stockholders. No un-
constitutional discrimination against nonresident stock-
holders in domestic corporations is made by the Con-
necticut public act providing for the assessment of such
stock at its market value, with no deduction on account
of real estate held by the corporation, although provision
for such deduction in assessing resident stockholders is
made by a statute of the state, since nonresident stock-
holders pay no local taxes, but simply contribute so much
to the general expenses of the state, while the resident
stockholders pay no tax to the state, but only to the
municipality in which they reside. The stock of the non-
resident stockholder is assessed at its market value, with-
out any deduction on account of real estate held by the
corporation. The stock of the resident stockholder is
assessed at its market value, less the proportionate value
of all real estate held by the corporation upon which it
has already paid a tax. As thus stated there would
appear to be a wrongful discrimination, and that the non-
resident stockholder was subjected to a larger burden of
taxation than the resident stockholder, by reason of the
714 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 448
direct command of the statute to include the real estate
in the valuation in the one case and to exclude it in the
other. But this apparent discrimination against the non-
resident disappears when the system of taxation prevail-
ing in Connecticut is considered. The state dealing with
the question of the taxation of the shares of stock in a
local corporation, found two classes ; one, shares held by
residents, and the other, those held by nonresidents. It
was believed that a resident in a city or town, enjoying
all the benefits of local government, should be taxed for
the expenses of that government upon all the property he
possessed, whether that property consisted in part or in
whole of shares of stock. On the other hand, the non-
resident, enjoying little or none of the benefits of local
government, was exempted from taxation on account of
the expenses of such local government. At the same time
it was not right that he should escape all contributions to
the support of the state which created and protected the
corporation and the property of all its stockholders, and
so a tax was cast upon the nonresident for the expenses
of the state. The resident is not called upon to pay any
of the expenses of the state, but only his proportional
share of those of the municipality. The nonresident is
called upon to pay no share of the expenses of the munici-
pality, but only to contribute to the support of the state.
. . . The legislature aimed to apportion fairly the
burden of taxes between the resident and the nonresident
stockholder. It is enough that the state has secured a
reasonably fair distribution of burdens, and that no inten-
tional discrimination has been made against nonresidents.
The Supreme Court has frequently held that mere
inequality in the results of a state tax is not sufficient to
invalidate it. Absolute equality in taxation can never be
attained. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Connecticut, 185
U. S. 364.
§449. Taxation of stock of foreign railroads. The
equal protection of the laws is not denied by the pro-
§ 449 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 715
visions of the Alabama statute for the taxation of rail-
road stock, because of the exemption of stock in domestic
railroads and in others that list substantially all their
property for taxation. The argument for the plaintiff in
error is that if foreign stock is treated for purposes of
taxation as present by fiction in the domicil, it must be
treated as present al^o for purposes of protection; that
the tax is a tax on values, and that net values of similar
articles must be treated alike. It would seem more logical
to go further and deny the right to tax on fiction at all,
and therefore deny the right to tax foreign stocks. The
argument does not go to that extent, and, limited as it is,
the proposition that the plaintiff in error is denied the
equal protection of the laws is wholly without force.
A state may tax stock in some domestic corporations and
leave stock in others untaxed on the ground that it taxes
the property and franchises of the latter to an amount
that imposes indirectly a proportional burden on the
stock. When it comes to corporations formed and having
their property and business elsewhere, the state must tax
the stock held within the state if it is to tax anything,
assuming the right to tax stock in foreign corporations
to be conceded. If it does tax that stock it may take into
account that the property and franchise of the corpora-
tion are untaxed, on the same ground that it might do the
same thing with a domestic corporation. The real griev-
ance in a case like this is that, more than probably, they
are taxed elsewhere. With that the state of Alabama is
not concerned. No doubt it would be a great advantage
to the country and to the individual states if principles
of taxation could be agreed upon which did not conflict
with each other, and a common scheme could be adopted
by which taxation of substantially the same property in
two jurisdictions could be avoided. But the Constitution
of the United States does not go so far. If property is
untaxed by the laws of the state of Alabama then for the
purposes of its laws the property is not taxed at all.
Stock, the property of the plaintiff in error, is taxed
716 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 449
beeanse it is within the jurisdiction of the state. There
is no inconsistency in the state 's recognizing at the same
time that the property of the corporation, that which
gives the plaintiff's stock its valne, is taxed or untaxed,
as the case may be. There is no inconsistency in recog-
nizing that it is untaxed because it cannot be reached.
Shares of stock may be within a state, and the property
of the corporation outside it. A large latitude is allowed
to the state for classification upon any reasonable basis.
Kidd V. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730.
§460. State taxation of local managers of foreign
packing houses. The equal protection of the laws is not
denied a managing agent of a nonresident meat-packing
house by the imposition, under a GFeorgia statute of a
license tax on the domestic business conducted by him,
since such act applies to managing agents of both domes-
tic and foreign houses. There is no discrimination in
favor of the agents of domestic houses, and, while it may
be suspected that the act was primarily intended to apply
to agents of ultra state houses, there is no discrimination
upon the face of the act, and none, so far as the record
shows, upon its practical administration. As has been
frequently held, the state has the right to classify occupa-
tions and to impose different taxes upon different occupa-
tions. Such has been constantly the practice of Congress
under the internal revenue law. What the necessity is
for such tax, and upon what occupations it shall be
imposed, as well as the amount of the imposition, are
exclusively within the control of the state legislature.
Sa long as there is no discrimination against citizens of
other states, the amount and the necessity of the tax are
not open to criticism in the Federal Supreme Court
Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60.
§ 451. Excluding foreign corporation. The equal pro-
tection of the laws is not denied by a state statute, passed
in the exercise of its power over foreign corporations,
§ 452 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 717
incorporating a local benevolent society with the same
name as that of a voluntary state association whose char-
ter had been withdrawn by the foreign corporation that
issued ity and conferring upon such society thk exclusive
right of granting subcharters in the state. No doubt a
law specially directed against a foreign corporation might
be unconstitutional^ for instance, as depriving it of its
property without due process of law. But when the
so-called property consists merely in the value that there
might be in extending its business or membership into a
state, that property, it hardly needs to be said, depends
upon the consent of the state to let the corporation come
into the state. A state has the right to exclude a for-
eign corporation and to forbid its constituting branches
within its limits. ... As it had the right before the
corporation got in, so it had the right to turn it out after
it got in. ... It follows that the state could impose
the more limited restriction that simply forbade the
granting of charters to subordinate branches. It is con-
tended that the restrictions upon the foreign corporation
which flow from the charter granted to the domestic cor-
poration amount to the denial of the equal protection of
the laws to a person within its jurisdiction. But the
power of the state as to foreign corporations does not
depend upon their being outside of its jurisdiction. . • •
Those within the jurisdiction, in such sense as they can
ever be said to be within it, do not acquire a right not to
be turned out except by general laws. A single corpora-
tion might be expelled by a special act, and equally could
be restricted in the same way. National Council v. State
Council, 203 U. S. 151.
§452. Notice to nonresidents— Validity of tax sales.
Nonresident owners of land within the levee district cre-
ated by the Arkansas act of February 15, 1893, are not
denied the equal protection of the laws or the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States because
§ 11 of that act, as amended in 1895, while requiring per-
718 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 452
sonal service of smmnons upon resident owners or occu-
pants for at least twenty days before rendering a decree
of sale for unpaid levee taxes, provides for constructive
service hf publication upon nonresident owners of only
four weeks. The court held there was no doubt of the
power of the state so to discriminate. Personal service
upon nonresidents is not always within the state 's power.
Its process is limited by its boundaries. Constructive
service is at times a necessary recourse. The land stands
accountable to the demands of the state, and the owners
are charged with the laws affecting it and the manner by
which those demands may be enforced. This accounta-
bility of the land and the knowledge the owners must be
presumed to have had of the laws affecting it is an answer
to the contention of the insufficiency of service. . . .
Certainly it was not so insufficient that it can be said that
a difference in the time allowed for such service was not
the equivalent of that allowed to resident owners. Bal-
lard V. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241.
§453. Discrimination between residents and nonresi-
dents. The distinction between resident and nonresident
owners of abutting property in the act of May 19, 1896,
creating a drainage system for the District of Columbia,
in that the coercion of the law as to making connections
with a sewer is by criminal punishment in the case of resi-
dents, whereas, against nonresident owners, the District
does the work in case of their neglect, and assesses the
cost against the property as a tax, does not invalidate the
statute for discrimination, even assuming that Congress
is forbidden to enact discriminating legislation. Whether
Congress is expressly or impliedly prohibited to dis-
criminate in its legislation, the prohibition cannot be
stricter or more extensive than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is upon the states. It has been repeatedly decided
that the amendment does not take from the states the
power of classification, and that such classification need
not be either logically appropriate or scientifically acca-
§ 453 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 719
rate. The problems which are met in the government of
human beings are different from those involved in the
examination of the objects of the physical world, and
assigning them to their proper associates. A wide range
of discretion, therefore, is necessary in legislation to
make it practical, and the courts cannot be made a refuge
from ill-advised, unjust, or oppressive laws. The act in
controversy makes a distinction in its provisions between
resident and nonresident lot owners, but this is a proper
basis for classification. Eegarded abstractly as lot own-
ers, no legal difference may be observed between resi-
dents and nonresidents; but, regarded in their relation
to their respective lots under regulating laws, the limita-
tions upon jurisdiction, and the power to reach one and
not the other, important differences immediately appear.
The law treats all resident owners alike and all non-
residents alike. It is contended that nonresident lot own-
ers are not treated the same as resident owners in like
situation, because against resident owners the coercion
of the law is by criminal punishment, while against non-
resident owners the remedy is by civil proceedings. The
District does the work that the nonresident owners
neglect, and charges the expense thereof on their prop-
erty. This is a distinction, a discrimination, it may be
called, but it has even more justification than that sus-
tained in Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U. S.
618. The statute under consideration in the case at bar
enjoins a duty on both resident and nonresident lot own-
ers,— ^a duty necessary to be followed to preserve the
health of the city. There is a difference only in the
manner of enforcing it, — a difference arising from the
different situation of the lot owners, and therefore com-
petent for Congress to regard in its legislation. In other
words, under the circumstances presented by the record,
the distinction between residents and nonresidents is a
proper basis for classification. It might not be under
other circumstances. District of Columbia v. Brooke,
214 U. S. 138.
720 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 454
§454. Taxing shares of foreign corporations. The
Indiana statute taxing shares of foreign corporations
when owned by inhabitants of the state does not deny the
owner the equal protection of the laws because, in the
case of domestic corporations, it is the property, and not
the shares, which is taxed. This case is practically dis-
posed of by Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, where the
real matter of complaint, that the property of the cor-
poration presumably is taxed in Tennessee, is answered.
• . • Objection is made that the statute works a dis-
crimination against stock in corporations of otiher states,
contrary to principles often recognized. The most
serious aspect of this objection is that the statutes of
Indiana do not make allowance if a foreign corporation
has property taxed within the state. The plaintiffs in
error did not show that this was their case, and therefore
they could not complain on that ground. The principle
of substantial equality of taxation is not violated in tiiis
case. Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S. 390.
§ 455. Excise tax on foreign corporations. A foreign
corporation which has paid all the local taxes theretofortf
assessed against it, and has a leasehold for storerooms in
the state, is not denied the equal protection of the laws by
the exaction under the authority of Massachusetts Pub.
Stat. 1909, chap. 490, of an excise tax upon the privilege
of doing business within the state, although domestic cor-
porations may be favored under the statute. This case
is distinguished from Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400, in that there was no acquisition of permanent
property such as was shown in the Greene case. There
is no question of the continued authority of the state to
tax a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing busi-
ness within its borders, which authority the state pos-
sesses so long as it does not violate rights secured by the
Federal Constitution. Even if domestic corporations are
favored the statute is not invalid for no limitation upon
the power of a state to exdude foreign corporations
§ 456 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 721
requires identical taxes in all cases upon domestic and
foreign corporations. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 231 U. S. 68.
§456. Franchise tax on foreign corporation. A for-
eign railway corporation which has come into the state
in compliance with its laws, and has therein acquired
property of a fixed and permanent nature, upon which it
has paid all taxes levied by the state, is a person within
the jurisdiction of the state, and as such, is protected by
the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, against the imposition, under 1 Alabama
Code 1907, §§ 2391-2400, of an additional franchise tax
for the privilege of doing business within the state, where
no such tax is imposed upon domestic corporations car-
rying on a precisely similar business. The equal protec-
tion of the laws means subjection to equal laws, applying
alike to all in the same situation. That a corporation is a
person, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is no longer open to discussion. It was argued on
behalf of the state that the imposition of special taxes
upon foreign corporations for the privilege of doing busi-
ness within the state is sufficient to justify the tax com-
plained of, because such tax imposed is different, in that
the one imposed on the domestic corporation is for the
privilege of being a corporation, whereas the one on the
foreign corporation is for the privilege of such corpora-
tion to do business within the state. While reasonable
classification is permitted, without doing violence to the
equal protection of the laws, such classification must be
based upon some real and substantial distinction, bearing
a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to
which such classification is imposed; and classification
cannot be arbitrarily made without any substantial basis.
Arbitrary selection cannot be justified by calling it classi-
fication. Both domestic and foreign railway corporations
do the same business in character and kind, and under fhe
statute in question a foreign corporation may be taxed
Due Proceas— 46
722 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 456
many thousands of dollars for the privilege of doing,
within the state, exactly the same business as the domes-
tic corporation is permitted to do by a tax upon its privi-
lege, amounting to only a few hundred dollars. To tax
the foreign corporation for carrying on business luider
the circumstances shown, by a different and much more
onerous rule than is used in taxing domestic corporations
for the same privilege, is a denial of the equal protection
of the laws and does violence to the Federal Constitution.
Southern Ey. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400.
§457. Excluding foreign insurance company. A for-
eign life insurance company which has less than one-
fourth of its reserve on South Carolina policies invested
in South Carolina securities, and has not indicated any
purpose or intention of acquiring more of such securities,
is not denied the equal protection of the laws, contrary to
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
because the state insurance commissioner, in the exercise
of his discretion under South Carolina act March 8, 1910,
§ 13, to determine which applicants for tiie privilege of
doing business in the state shall deposit an approved bond
and which shall deposit approved securities, has refused
to accept the bond of a surety company tendered with the
insurance company *s application for a license, unless it
shall invest at least one-fourth of its reserve on South
Carolina policies in South Carolina securities, although
he may have accepted a surety company 's bond tendered
with the application of another foreign life insurance
company which had not invested in South Carolina securi-
ties that percentage of its reserve on South Carolina
policies, where the latter company had real estate mort-
gage loans in the state duly approved and awaiting invest-
ment, considerably in excess of that amount. It is within
the power of a state, so long as it does not impose on a
foreign life insurance company as a condition of doing
business within the state any deprivation of rights
socured to it under the Federal Constitution, to determine
§ 457 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 723
for itself the conditions under which such foreign cor-
poration could do business within the state. This deci-
sion has often been affirmed by the decisions of the
Supreme Court, and the insurance company, being within
that class of corporations not doing an interstate busi-
ness, the state might, in the exercise of its lawful author-
ity, exclude it from doing business within the state, so
long as no rights conferred by the Constitution and laws
of the United States were destroyed or abridged. The
equal protection of the laws, as the Supreme Court has
frequently decided, means subjection to equal laws apply-
ing alike to all in the same situation, or, as expressed by
Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court in Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31, equal protection of the laws
means **that there shall be no arbitrary deprivation of
life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but
that equal protection and security should be given to all
under like circumstances, in the enjoyment of their per-
sonal and civil rights. . . . That no greater burdens
should be laid upon any one than are laid upon others in
the same calling and condition. * ' What the equal protec-
tion of the law requires is equality of burdens upon those
in like situation or condition. It has always been held
consistent with this general requirement to permit the
states to classify the subjects of legislation, and make dif-
ferences of regulation where substantial differences of
condition exist. The company whose application was
accepted had made large loans within the state which
would not only bring property into the state, which might
be reached through the local courts, but would evidence
a purpose in the company to remain in the state in a per-
manent way, — a fact which was entitled to significance in
determining the matter of licensing the company to do
business. The only question which concerned the court
was whether this conduct of the state authority was so
arbitrary and discriminatory in its character as to
amount to a deprivation of the equal protection of the
laws, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.
724 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 457
The actios of the state insurance commissioner was held
to have heen hased upon real and substantial differences,
and was not that merely arbitrary classification which
the Supreme Court has condemned because of the Four-
teenth Amendment. South Carolina ex reL Phoenix
Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63.
CHAPTER XXI
r
THE POWEB OF CLASSIFICATION
§458. Discrimination between agricultural and other
lands in statute of annexation to city. The equal protec-
tion of the laws means the protection of equal laws, but
this equality of protection is not violated by classifica-
tion provided equal protection is afforded the members
of each class. The power of the state to classify the
objects of legislation is very broad. It is a matter of
legislative discretion, and such classification will be
upheld if it bears a reasonable relation to a proper object
sought to be accomplished, even if it may appear unwise
or unjust. The courts will not interfere with such classi-
fication unless the distinctions made are clearly arbitrary.
A discrimination between agricultural lands and other
lands in respect to the right of a city to annex them is not
in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws, as it is within the
power of the state to classify objects of legislation. This
is necessarily a broad power, and one which the Supreme
Court has so many times defined and illustrated the limits
upon it, that further definition would seem impossible,
and any new instance of its application not without exact
or analogous example in some decided case. The rule of
the Constitution leaves to the discretion and wisdom of
the state a wide latitude as far as interference by the
Supreme Court is concerned. It is not a substitute for
municipal law ; it does not invest power in that court to
correct the impolicy and injustice of state laws, and the
equality it prescribes is not for persons merely as such,
but according to their relations. In some circumstances
it may not tax A more than B, but if A be of a different
725
726 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 458
trade or profession than B, it may. And in matters not
of taxation, if A be a different kind of corporation than
B, it may subject A to a different rule of responsibility to
servants than B. In the case at bar the distinction is
between tracts of agricultural lands in a certain relation
to cities and lands used for other purposes in such rela-
tion. The distinction is justified by the principle of the
cases decided. That principle leaves to the state the
adaptation of its laws to its conditions. Within the lati-
tude which local government must be allowed the distinc-
tion here made is not arbitrary, and infringes no provi-
sion of the Constitution of the United States. Clark v.
Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114.
§459. Eegistration law diBcriminating between citi-
zens. A registration law applicable to cities having more
than 300,000 inhabitants being held valid by the highest
court of the state of Missouri, under the state constitu-
tion, does not deny to citizens residing in the only city
of the state which has a population of 300,000 the equal
protection of the laws, although it may be thought to be
less effectual in protecting the right of voting than the
statute applicable to other cities. The law in question
was applicable only to the city of St. Louis, and the con-
tention that it denied to the citizens of that city the equal
protection of the laws must in the last analysis rest upon
the assumption that under the constitution of Missouri
but one registration law can be enacted applicable to
cities having a population in excess of 100,000 inhabi-
tants, whatever the maximum number of inhabitants may
be, and, that as a natural consequence the citizens of
St. Louis cannot be classified separately. The answer is
that the law in question has been declared to be valid
under the constitution of the state. The general right to
vote in the state of Missouri is primarily derived from
the state, and the elective franchise, if one of the funda-
mental privileges and immunities of the citizens of
St. Louis, as citizens of Missouri and of the United States,
§ 460 POWER OF CLASSIFICATION 727
is clearly such franchise '*as regulated and established
by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be
exercised/' The power to classify cities with reference
to their population having been exercised in conformity
with the constitution of the state, the circumstance that
the registration law in force in the city of St. Louis was
made to differ in essential particulars from that which
regulates the conduct of elections in other cities in the
state of Missouri does not in itself deny to the citizens of
St. Louis the equal protection of the laws. Nor did the
exercise by the general assembly of Missouri of the dis-
cretion vested in it by law give rise to a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Mason v. Missouri ex rel. McCaffery,
179 U. S. 328.
§ 460. Classification of elevators and warehouses. The
classification of elevators and warehouses on a railroad
right of way or depot ground and other lands used in
connection with the railway at stations and sidings other
than at terminal points, as required by the Minnesota
laws requiring a license for such elevators and ware-
houses, does not deny to the proprietors the equal protec-
tion of the laws because a license is not required for eleva-
tors and warehouses differently situated. As the statute
applies to all of the class defined in the 1st section, it is
not invalid by reason of its nonapplication to those who
own or operate elevators not situated on the right of way
of a railroad. The right of way of a railroad is so closely
connected with the operation of the railroad company
that its use may be so regulated by the state as to promote
the ends for which the corporation was created, and thus
subserve the interests of the general public without inter-
fering unreasonably with the company 's management of
its property. If in the judgment of the state it was neces-
sary for the public interests, or beneficial to the public,
that elevators and warehouses of the kinds described
should be operated only under a license and under such
728 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 460
regulations as may be rightfully prescribed, it would be
going very far to hold that such a classification was so
unreasonable as to justify the court in adjudging that the
requirement of a license was void as denying the equal
protection of the laws. No such judgment could be prop-
erly rendered unless the classification was merely arbi-
trary or was devoid of those elements that are inherent
in the distinction implied in classification. It does not
appear that the requirement of a license was not based
upon some reasonable ground, — some difference that
bears a proper relation to the classification made by the
statute. The statute is not repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States. W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota ex
rel. Railroad & W. Com., 180. U. S. 452.
§ 461. Classification of merchants. An ordinance im-
posing a license tax upon the merchants of a city, by
which they are divided into classes according to the
amount of their sales, each class including all wh(^e sales
range between a certain minimum and maximum amount,
does not violate the equality clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, although the result is to make persons in
different classes pay different rates, and to make persons
in the same class pay at a different ratio if the amounts
of their sales differ. Classification by amount came up
for consideration in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings
Bank, 170 U. S. 283, and was sustained. That case
involved the power of a state to tax inheritances, and to
grade the taxes by the amount of the legacy. The law of
Illinois was charged with inequality of operation because
of the classes it created. It was asserted, as in the case
at bar, that the classes were formed upon arbitrary dif-
ferences, and the provisions which fixed the tax upon
legacies to strangers to the blood of the intestate were
vigorously assailed. Manifestly, there was inequality
between the members of different classes, and that was
conceded in the opinion, but as manifestly there was
equality between the members of each class, and that
§ 462 POWER OF CLASSIFICATION 729
equality was held to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States ; and the reason-
ing by which that conclusion was supported is applicable
to the case at bar. Plaintiff in error contended that the
tax in the case at bar was a tax on property, not on the
privilege to do business, because the final incidence of
the tax is on the merchant, and is paid by him. But every
tax has its final incidence on some individual. That
effect, therefore, cannot be urged to destroy well-recog-
nized distinctions. The tax is a tax on the privilege of
doing business, regulated by the amount of the sales, and
is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
Clark V. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329.
§ 462. Discrimination against nonproducing vendors of
milk. Nonproducing vendors of milk are not denied the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment because they are not given the privi-
lege accorded to producing vendors of exempting them-
selves from actions or penalties for violations of the pro-
visions of the New York agricultural law to prevent the
sale of adulterated milk by showing that the milk sold or
offered for sale by them is in the same condition as when
it left the herd of the producer. It has been decided many
times that a state may classify persons and objects for
the purposes of legislation. The purpose of the law is to
secure to the population, adult and infant, milk attaining
a certain standard of purity and strength. All other milk
is declared to be ** unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulter-
ated, or unwholesome. ' ' Not only the final purpose of
the law must be considered, but the means of its adminis-
tration,— ^the ways it may be defeated. . . . Legisla-
tion to be pr^tical and eflScient, must regard this special
purpose as well as the ultimate purpose. . . . The
ultimate purpose is that wholesome milk shall reach the
consumer, and it is the conception of the law that milk
below a certain strength is not wholesome, but a differ-
ence is made between milk naturally deficient and milk
730 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 462
made so by dilution. To prevent tampering between the
producer and consumer the law is framed and its penal-
ties adjusted. As the standard established can be proved
in the hands of a producing vendor, he is exempt from the
penalty ; as it cannot certainly be proved in the hands of
other vendors so as to prevent evasions of the law, such
vendors are not exempt. ... In the one case the
source of the milk can be known and the tests of the stat-
ute applied; in the other case this would be impossible,
except in few instances. It does not appear that any par-
ticular hardship results. St, John v. New York, 201
U. S. 633.
§ 463. Eequiring labels on mixed paints to show ingre-
dients. The equal protection of the laws is not denied to
manufacturers and sellers of mixed paints containing
other ingredients than pure linseed oil, pure carbonate
of lead, oxid of zinc, turpentine, Japan dryer, and pure
colors, by a state statute which makes the manufacture
and sale of such paints a misdemeanor unless the label
shows the constituent ingredients and the quantity, and
amount of each, because the manufacture and sale of
mixed paints containing only the ingredients specified in
the statute, and, possibly, of all paste paints, are free
from such consequence of condition. The statute was
passed to prevent the adulteration of articles or to pro-
vide for the publication of their ingredients. That both
purposes are within the competency of the state can
hardly be denied. The Supreme Court has declared many
times, and illustrated the declaration, that classification
must have relation to the purpose of the legislature. But
logical appropriateness of the inclusion or exclusion of
objects or persons is not required. A classification may
not be merely arbitrary, but necessarily there must be
great freedom of discretion, even though it result in '411-
advised, unequal, and oppressive legislation. '* Mobile
Co. V. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. And this necessarily on
account of the complex problems which are presented to
§ 464 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 731
the government. Evils must be met as they arise and
according to the manner in which they arise. The right
remedy may not always be apparent. Any interference,
indeed, may be asserted to be evil, may result in evil.
Exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedies are not
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the crude-
ness nor the impolicy nor even the injustice of state laws
redressed by it. Legislation which regulates business
may well make distinctions depend upon the degrees of
evil without being arbitrary or unreasonable. Legis-
latures have the constitutional power to make unwise
classifications. The legislature of North Dakota may
have met the evils which exist as best it could, and there
is a strong presumption that it did. It would be limiting
the power of the state too much to say that a judgment
exercised under such circumstances must be condemned
as denying the equal protection of the laws. Heath &
MUligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338.
§ 464. Classification of coal mines by number of men
employed. The Arkansas statute exempting coal mines
not employing ten or more men from its operation, under
which miners employed at quantity rates are prevented
from contracting for wages upon the basis of screened
coal instead of the weight of the coal as originally pro-
duced in the mine, does not render such statute invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying the equal
protection of the laws. This case is closely analogous to
one that was before the Supreme Court in the case of
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, wherein
an inspection law of the state was argued to be clearly
unconstitutional by reason of its limitation to mines
where more than five men are employed at any one time,
and in that case, as in this, it was contended that the
classification was arbitrary, and unreasonable, — that
there was no just reason for the discrimination. The
court held that was a species of classification which the
legislature is at liberty to adopt; provided it be not
732 DUE PROCESS OP LAW §464
wholly arbitrary or nnreasonabley and that there was
clearly reasonable foundation for the discrimination
exercised. So in this case, there is no attempt at imjnst
or unreasonable discrimination. The law is alike applica-
ble to all mines in the state employing more than ten men
under ground. It may be presumed to practically regu-
late the industry when conducted on any considerable
scale. It cannot be said there was no reason for exempt-
ing from its provisions mines so small as to be in the
experimental or formative state, and affecting but few
men, and not requiring regulation in. the interest of the
public health, safety, or welfare. . . . The law is not
so palpably in violation of the constitutional rights
involved as to require a reversal of the judgment of the
supreme court of the state, which afltaned its validity.
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539.
§465. Olassification between corporations and indi-
viduals— ^Oompulsory production of testimony. The pos-
sible invalidity as to individuals of the provisions of the
Arkansas statute penalizing the doing of business within
the state by members of a trust or combination to control
prices, does not render such J>rovisions invalid as to cor-
porations, as denying the equal protection of the laws.
The remedy given by the Arkansas anti-trust act to
secure the attendance of witnesses before a conmiission,
and the production of books and papers in a proceeding
under that act, does not deny the equal protection of the
laws because it applies only to books and papers outside
the state, or because, properly construed, it may be con-
fined to corporations and joint stock associations, and not
extended to individuals. The interpretation which the
court below gave to the statute was that it did not purport
to forbid or aflSx penalties to acts done beyond the state,
but that it simply forbade a corporation from continuing
to do business within the state after it had done, either
within or outside of the state, the acts complained of.
As the state possessed the plenary power to exclude a
.S 465 POWER OF CLASSIFICATION 733
foreign corporation from doing business within its
borders^ it follows that, if the state exerted such unques-
tioned power from a consideration of acts done in an-
other jurisdiction, the motive for the exertion of the
lawful power did not operate to destroy the right to call
the power into play. This being true, it follows that, as
the power of the state to prevent a foreign corporation
from continuing to do business is but the correlative of its
authority to prevent such corporation from coming into
the state, unless, by the act of admission, some contract
right in favor of the corporation arose, it follows that
the prohibition is against continuing to do business in the
state because of acts done beyond the state was none
the less a valid exertion of power as to a subject within
the jurisdiction of the state. While the acts done out of the
state may have been the originating cause for refusing
admission to come into the state, or to revoke such per-
mission previously given, that fact is immaterial in this
inquiry, since the power and not the motive is the test to
be resorted to for the purpose of determining the con-
stitutionality of the legislative action. Although it be
conceded that the provisions of the statute cannot, con-
sistently with constitutional limitations, be applied to
individuals, such concession would not cause the act to
amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The difference between the extent of the power which the
state may exert over the doing of business within the
state by an individual and that which it can exercise as
to corporations furnishes a distinction authorizing a
classification between the two. The contention that the
section of the statute requiring the production of books
and papers outside of the state denies the equal protec-
tion of the laws is not open, since it has been conclusively
settled that, without denying the equal protection of the
laws, regulations may be based upon the fact that per-
sons or property dealt with are not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the regulating authority. Even if, as con-
tended, the remedy given by the act for the production of
734 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 465
books and papers and the examination of witnesses is
confined to corporations and joint stock companies, and
does not extend to individuals, that fact is not a denial of
the equal protection of the laws. The wider scope of the
power which the state possesses over corporations and
joint stock associations in and of itself affords a ground
for the classification adopted. It rests upon the visitorial
power which the state has the right to exercise over a
corporation subject to its control. Hammond Packing
Co. V. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322.
§466. Discrimination in building regulations. The
Massachusetts statutes do not deny the equal protection
of the laws to an owner of property in the residential
section of Boston by the discrimination or classification
made between the commercial and residential sections of
that city by limiting the height of buildings in the com-
mercial district to 125 feet, and in the residential district
to from 80 to 100 feet. The statutes have been passed
under the exercise of the so-called police power, and they
must have some fair tendency to accomplish, or aid in the
accomplishment of, some purpose for which the legis-
lature may use the power. If the statutes are not of that
kind, then their passage cannot be justified under that
power. If the means employed, pursuant to the statute,
have no real, substantial relation to a public object which
government can accomplish, if the statutes are arbitrary
and unreasonable, and beyond the necessities of the case,
the courts will declare their invalidity. In delivering the
opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Peckham said: **This
court, in cases of this kind, feels the greatest relnc-
tance in interfering with the well-considered judgments
of the courts of a state whose people are to be aflFected by
the operation of the law. The highest court of the state
in which statutes of the kind under consideration are
passed is more familiar with the particular causes which
led to their passage (although they may be of a public
nature) and with the general situation surrounding the
§ 467 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 735
subject-matter of the legislation than this court can pos-
sibly be. We do not, of course, intend to say that, under
such circumstances the judgment of the state court upon
the question will be regarded as conclusive, but simply
that it is entitled to the very greatest respect, and will
only be interfered with, in cases of this kind, where the
decision is, in our judgment, plainly wrong. In this case
the supreme judicial court of the state holds the legisla-
tion valid, and that there is a fair reason for the dis-
crimination between the height of buildings in the resi-
dential as compared with the commercial districts. That
court has also held that regulations in regard to the
height of buildings, and in regard to their mode of con-
struction in cities, made by legislative enactments for the
safety, comfort, or convenience of the people, and for the
benefit of property owners generally, are valid. We con-
cur in that view, assuming, of course, that the height and
conditions provided for can be plainly seen to be not
unreasonable or inappropriate.'* Welch v. Swasey, 214
U. S. 91.
§ 467. Registration of physicians. The Maryland code
providing for the registration of physicians, exempt-
ing those physicians who were then practicing in the
state, and had so practiced prior to January 1, 1908, and
could prove by affidavit that within one year of said date
they had treated at least twelve persons in their profes-
sional capacity, is not such an unreasonable and arbi-
trary classification as renders the statute invalid, as deny-
ing the equal protection of the laws, but is within the
discretion vested in the legislature in exercising the
police power. Resident physicians or assistant physi-
cians at hospitals, and students on hospital or dispensary
duty or in the office of physicians, physicians and sur-
geons from other states, or residing on the borders of a
neighboring state, Army and Navy surgeons, chiropo-
dists, midwives, and masseurs, could be exempted from
the provisions of that article for the registration of
736 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 467
physicians, without rendering the statute invalid as deny-
ing the equal protection of the laws, A consideration of
the exceptions to the law makes it manifest that they are
not without reason. Before a law of this kind can be
declared violative of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
unreasonable classification of the subjects of such legis-
lation because of the omission of certain classes, the court
must be able to say that there is ''no fair reason for the
law that would not require with equal force its extension
to others whom it leaves untouched/' The selection of
the exempted classes was within 'the legislative power,
subject only to the restriction that it be not arbitrary or
oppressive, and apply equally to all persons similarly
situated. The conduct of hospitals may be regulated by
such laws or municipal regulations as might not reach
the general practitioner of medicine. The Supreme Court
said it could not say that these exceptions were so wholly
arbitrary and have such slight relation to the objects to
be attained by the law as to require the courts to strike
them down as a denial of the equal protection of the laws,
within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. Watson
v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173.
§468. Exempting banks and trust companies and bona
fide mortgages from state usury law. The Connecticut
statute exempting banks and trust companies and bona
fide mortgages from the operation of the law prohibiting
the exaction of more than 15 per cent interest on loans,
or accepting a note for a greater amount than that actu-
ally loaned, with intent to evade this provision, does not
render such statute repugnant to the equal protection of
the laws clause of the Federal Constitution, but such
classification has a reasonable basis. The general assem-
bly, in respect to the matter of usury, had the right to
deal with different classes of money lenders or money
borrowers in a different way, provided there was appar-
ently nothing unreasonable in creating such distinctions,
and all the members of each class were treated in the
§ 470 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 737
same manner. The classification complained of has a rea -
sonable basis, and the exemption of national banks, etc.,
was not a mere arbitrary selection. Hunter v. Mutual
Eeserve Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573.
§ 469. Greating bank depositors' guaranty fund. An
unconstitutional discrimination does not result from the
preference of ordinary depositors over other creditors,
given by a state statute creating a bank depositors ' guar-
anty fund for the purpose of securing the full repayment
of deposits in case of the insolvency of any bank contrib-
uting to the fund. This is the Kansas bank depositors'
guaranty law and the case of Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
219 U. S. 104, is decisive except so far as the Kansas law
shows certain minor differences from that of Oklahoma.
The most important of these is that contribution to the
fund is not absolutely required. But if the law might
compel the contribution it may try to bring about the
same result by the creation of motives less compulsory
than command and of disadvantages in holding aloof less
peremptory than an inunediate stop. Assaria State Bank
V. DoUey, 219 U. S. 121.
§ 470. Licensing private bankers. The possibility that
the comptroller may refuse a license to a private banker
upon his arbitrary whim does not invalidate, as denying
the equal protection of the laws, the requirement of the
New York statute that a license from that oflScial be
obtained by individuals or partnerships desiring to
engage in that business. ... No unconstitutional
discrimination is made by exempting those private bank-
ers in whose business the average amount of each sum
received is not less than $500, and those who give a bond
in a specified sum, from the requirement of the statute
that a license from the comptroller be obtained by indi-
viduals or partnerships desiring to engage in the busi-
ness of receiving deposits of money for safekeeping, or
for the purpose of transmission to another, or for any
Due ProcesB — 47
N
738 DUB PROCESS OF LAW { 470
other purpose. One form at least, of the business aimed
at^ and on the face of the bill, that carried on by plaintiff,
is a branch of the banking business. Furthermore, it is
a business largely done with poor and ignorant inmii-
grants, especially on their first arrival here, . . .
Experience has shown that the protection of such depos-
itors against fraud, which is the purpose running through
the statute, i» especially needed by at least that class of
them with whom the persons hit by the statute largely
deal. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, estab-
lishes that the state may regulate the banking business,
and may take strong measures to render it secure. It
also establishes that the plaintiff has no such constitu-
tional right to carry it on at will as to raise him above
state laws not manifestly unfit to accomplish the sup-
posed end, greatly in excess of the need, or arbitrary and
capricious in discrimination. The quasi-paternal rela-
tions shown to exist between those following the plain-
tiff's calling and the newly arrived immigrants justifies
a supervision more paternal than is needed in ordinary
affairs. Whether the court thinks them wise or not, such
laws are within the scope of discretion which belongs to
legislatures, and which it is usual for them to exert
Engel V. O'MaUey, 219 U. S. 128.
§471. Penaliiring insurance company connected with
tariff association. An insurance company connected
with a tariff association which fixes rates is not denied
the equal protection of the laws by the Alabama law
under which the insured or beneficiary in a policy issued
by such company may recover, in addition to the actual
loss or damage, 25 i)er cent of the amount of such actnai
loss or damage, since such statute places upon an equality
ia every respect all insurers which, at the time of issuing
the insurance or subsequently, and before trial, were in
any way connected with any other persons, associations,
or corporations which acted together in fixing insurance
rates. The statute applies only to associations or cor-
§ 472 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 739
porations that unite in fixing the rates of insurance to be
charged by each constituent member of the combination.
Looking at the evil to be remedied, that was such a classi-
fication as the state could legally make. It is neither
imreasonable nor arbitrary within the rule that a dassifi*
cation must rest upon some difference indicating * * a rea-
sonable and just relation to the act in respect of which
the classification is proposed. ' ' The legislature naturally
directed its enactment against insurance companies or
corporations which, before or at the time of trial, were
found to be members of an insurance tariff association
that fixed rates. All insurance companies, persons or
corporations engaged in the business of insurance, which
acted together in fixing rates, are placed by the statute
upon an equality in every respect, and therefore it can-
not rightfully be contended that the plaintiff in error is
denied the equal protection of the laws. Statutes that
apply equally to all of the same class and under like con-
ditions cannot be held to deny the equal protection of the
laws ; for, as the Supreme Court has held, **the equal pro-
tection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws" to all under like circumstances. German Alliance
Ins. Co. V. Hale, 219 u! S. 307.
§ 472. Prohibiting waste of mineral waters. The sub-
stantial difference in point of harmful result, which, so
far as the case as made shows, may exist, affords a rea-
sonable basis, under the equal-protection-of-the-laws
clause of the Federal Constitution, for the exemption of
pumping from wells not penetrating the rock, and such
pumping as is done for other purposes than collecting
and vending, as a separate commodity, the carbonic acid
gas contained in mineral waters, from the operations of
the provisions of the New York Laws, 1908, chap. 429,
prohibiting the pumping or artificially drawing of un-
natural quantities of mineral waters from a common
underground source of supply, and wasting them to the
injury and impairment of other proprietors. Making
740 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 472
the engaging in pnmping mineral waters from wells
bored or drilled into the rock for the purpose of collecting
and vending as a separate commodity the carbonic acid
gas contained therein prima facie evidence of the com-
mon underground source of supply and of injury to other
proprietors, as is done by the same statute, forbidding
the pumping of the waters imder such conditions, does
not render the statute invalid, as infringing upon the
guarantees in the Federal Constitution of due process of
law and the equal protection of the law. The contention
that a classification is arbitrary, and consequently denies
the equal protection of the laws to those whom it affects,
must be tested by the following rules, as shown by re-
peated decisions of the Supreme Court: 1. The equal-
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the state the power to classify in the adoption
of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope
of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is
purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reason-
able basis does not offend against that clause merely
because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or be-
cause in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When
the classification in such a law is called in question, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sus-
tain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time
the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who
assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reason-
able basis, but is essentially arbitrary. Lindsley v. Nat-
ural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61.
§ 473. Advertising wagons on city streets. The eqnal
protection of the laws is not denied to a stage coach com-
pany by a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of
advertising trucks, vans or wagons in the city streets,
because * * ordinary business wagons ' ' when * * engaged in
the usual business or regular work of the owner, and not
§ 474 POWEE OP CLASSIFICATION 741
used merely or mainly for advertising, ' ' are expressly
permitted to exhibit * ' business notices, * ' nor because ad-
vertising is allowed on the stairs of the elevated railways
and on elevated structures. It is argued that the ordi-
nance **thus creates a favored subclass of vehicles which
are permitted to display advertisements. ' * The state, and
the city acting with the authority of the state, have the
power to classify the objects of legislation. The distinc-
tion between business wagons and those used for adver-
tising purposes has a proper relation to the purposes of
the ordinance, and is not an illegal discrimination. The
same comment may be made as to the charge that the
ordinance discriminates between two classes of passenger
carriers having charter rights to use the streets. It is
also within the power of classification which the city pos-
sesses to allow advertising on the stairways of the ele-
vated railways and on elevated structures. Fifth Ave.
Coach Co. V. New York, 221 U. S. 467.
§474. Unclaimed savings bank deposits. Savings
banks are not unconstitutionally discriminated against by
making applicable to them alone the provisions of the
Massachusetts law that deposits that have remained inac-
tive and unclaimed for thirty years, where the claimant
is unknown or the depositor cannot be found, shall be
paid to the treasurer and receiver general, to be held by
him as trustee for the true owner or his legal repre-
sentatives. There is nothing unreasonable or discrim-
inatory in making the act applicable only to abandoned
deposits in a savings bank. The classification is reason-
able. Deposits in savings banks are made in expectation
that they may remain much longer uncalled for than is
usual in deposits in other banks. This fact makes sav-
ings deposits all the more likely to be forgotten and
abandoned. And as the depositors are often wage earn-
ers, moving from place to place, there are special reasons
for intervening to protect their interest in this class of
property in banks as to which the state's supervisory
742 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 474
power is constantly exercisecL Provident Institation for
Savings v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660.
§475. Begulatixig asaigninents of f utare eaningB. The
Massachusetts statute exempting national banks, and
banks under the supervision of the bank commissioner,
and certain loan companies, from the provisions of tiie
law making invalid against the employer assignments of,
or orders f or^ wages to be earned in the future, unless
recorded, accepted in writing by the emptoyer, and accom-
panied by the written consent of the wife of the employee,
does not deny the equal protection of the laws to an
assignee not falling within one of the excepted classes.
Classification need not be scientific nor logically appro-
priate, and if not palpably arbitrary, and is uniform
within the class, it is within such discretion. The legisla-
tion imder review was directed at certain evils which had
arisen, and the legislature, qpnsidering them and from
whence they arose, might have thought or discerned that
they could not or would not arise from a greater freedom
to the institutions mentioned than to individuals. This
was the view that the supreme judicial court took. The
court said that the legislature might have decided that
the dangers which the statute was intended to prevent
would not exist in any considerable degree in loans made
by institutions which were under the supervision of the
bank commissioners, and ** believed rightly that the busi-
ness done by them would not need regulation in the inter-
est of employees or employers.*' But even if some
degree of evil which the statute was intended to prevent
could be ascribed to loans made by the exempted institu-
tions, their exemption would not make the law unconsti-
tutional. Legislation may recognize degrees of evil
without being arbitrary, unreasonable, or in conflict with
the equal-protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225.
§ 476. Municipal liability for damage by mob. A city
is not denied the equal protection of the laws by the Sli-
§ 477 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 743
nois statute imposio^ upon it a liability for damage to
property within its linaits, caused by a mob or riot, be-
cause when property damaged under like circumstances
is situated in a village or other incorporated town, the
liability is imposed upon the county instead of upon such
village or town. The classification is not an unreasonable
one. A city is presumptively the more populous and bet-
ter organized community. As such it may well be singled
out and made exclusively responsible for the consequence
of riots and mobs to property therein. The county, which
includes the city and other incorporated subdivisions, is,
not unreasonably, made liable to all sufferers whose prop-
erty is not within the limits of a city. The power of the
state to impose liabUity for damage and injury to prop-
erty from riots and mobs includes the power to make a
classification of the subordinate municipalities upon which
the responsibility may be imposed. It is a matter for the
exercise of legislative discretion, and equal protection of
the law is not denied where the classification is not so
unreasonable and extravagant as to be a mere arbitrary
mandate. Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S- 313.
§ 477. Regulating cancellation of land contracts. The
equal protection of the laws is not denied to the vendor
in an executory contract made and to be performed within
the state for the sale of land in another state by applying,
in an action against him for damages for his refusal to
perform, the provisions of the Minnesota statute that a
vendor in a contract for the sale of land shall have no
right to cancel, terminate, or declare a forfeiture of the
contract except upon thirty days' written notice to the
vendee, who shall have that time in which to perform,
since the vendor is not treated differently from any other
seller of land in his situation. The contract is controlled
by the law of the state where the contract was made and
not by the law of the state where the land was situated.
Discrimination is not made out by saying that resident
owners of Minnesota land are given a right to foreclose
744 DXJE PROCESS OP LAW § 477
their contracts, and that residents of Minnesota owning
land in other states are not given the same right, even if
this were true. The plaintiff in error is not treated differ-
ently from any other seller of land in his situation. That
is the test of the application of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution of the United States. Selover, Bates
& Co, v, Walsh, 226 U. S. 112.
§ 478. Discrimination in fee for auction license. The
discrimination between the district of Honolulu and other
districts in the amount of the fee imposed by the Ha-
waiian statute, for a license to make sales at auction,
which is $600 in the district of Honolulu, and $15 for each
other taxation district, is not so arbitrary or unreason-
able as to render the statute unconstitutional, as denying
the equal protection of the laws. It was the province of
the legislature to decide upon the amount of the fees
which should be charged. It must be assumed that in
so deciding it took into account varying conditions in the
respective localities; as, for example, in the amount of
business transacted and in the corresponding value of
such licenses. The court could not say that the differ-
ence was unreasonable or that the statute was unequal or
arbitrarv in its operation. Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S.
184.
§479. Prohibiting unfair competition. The South
Dakota statute punishing the selling of goods at a lower
rate in one place than in another, for the purpose of
destroying the competition of any regular established
dealer in such commodity, or to prevent the competition
of any person who in good faith, intends and attempts
to become such dealer, does not deny the equal protection
of the laws because it affects only those selling' goods in
two or more places in the state, nor because the protec-
tion of the statute is not extended to those making only
a transitory incursion into the business. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit legislation special in char-
§ 480 POWEE OP CLASSIFICATION 745
acter. It does not prevent a state from carrying out a
policy that cannot be pronounced purely arbitrary, by
taxation or by penal laws. If a class is deemed to present
a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to
prevent, the Fourteenth Amendment allows it to be dealt
with, although otherwise and merely logically not dis-
tinguishable from others not embraced in the law. Mr.
Justice Holmes in announcing the opinion of the court,
said: **We must assume that the legislature of South
Dakota considered that people selling in two places made
the prohibited use of their opportunities, and that such
use was harmful, although the usual efforts of competi-
tors were desired. It might have been argued to the
legislature with more force than it can be to us that
recoupment in one place of losses in another is merely
an instance of financial ability to compete. If the legis-
lature thought that that particular manifestation of abil-
ity usually came from great corporations whose power it
deemed excessive and for that reason did more harm than
good in their state, and that there was no other case of
frequent occurrence where the same could be said, we
cannot review their economics or their facts. That the
law embodies a widespread conviction appears from the
decisions in other states," quoting Nebraska, Minnesota
and Iowa cases. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota,
226 U. S. 157.
§480. Municipal license tax based on classification.
There is no want of due process of law, nor any denial of
the equal protection of the laws, in the scheme of a
municipal ordinance for licensing occupations, which de-
fines the occupations to be subjected to the tax, and pre-
scribes a maximum and minimum limitation as to the
amount of the tax, dependent upon the classification into
thirteen classes, which is primarily to be made by the
finance committee of the common council after notice and
hearing, an appeal to the full council from the final action
of the committee being permissible. There is no reason
746 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 480
under the Fourteenth Amendment why the state may not
delegate to either the council of the city or to a board
appointed for that purpose the power to divide such occu-
pations or privileges into classes or subclasses, and pre-
scribe the tax to be paid by the members of eadi such
class. In order to render the classification illegal, the
party assailing it must show that the business discrimi-
nated against is precisely the same as that included in
the class which is alleged to be favored. The plaintiff
elected not to avail himself of the remedy and right to
be heard given by the ordinance. Under such circum-
stances he is not warranted in resorting to the extraordi-
nary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to arrest an
administrative error susceptible to correction by an ap-
peal to the council. Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477.
§ 481. Municipal waterworks competition. The prop-
erty of a private waterworks company is not taken con-
trary to the Fourteenth Amendment by the municipal
construction of a competing plant, where there is no con-
tract immunity from such competition, although the
waterworks company may be forbidden by the local law to
divert its property to other uses, and will be called upon
to pay taxes to help its rival to success. If, when the
plaintiff built, the constitution of the state authorized
cities to build waterworks as well after works had been
built there by private persons as before, the plaintiff took
the risk of what might happen. An appeal to the Four-
teenth Amendment to protect property from a congenital
defect must be in vain. There is no pretense that there
is any express promise to private adventurers that they
shall not encounter subsequent municipal competition.
So strictly are private persons confined to the letter of
their express grant that a contract by a city not to grant
to any person or corporation the same privileges that it
had given to the plaintiff was held not to preclude the city
itself from building waterworks of its own. As there is
no contract the plaintiff stands legally in the same posi-
§ 483 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 747
tion as if the constitution had given express warning of
what the city might do. It is left to depend upon the
sense of justice that the city may show. Madera Water-
works V. Madera, 228 U. S. 454.
§ 482. Forbidding sale of food preservatives contain-
ing boric add. The sale of food preservatives contain-
ing boric acid may be forbidden, as is done' by the
Illinois statute, as construed by the state courts, without
denying the equal protection of the laws. The question
is whether the classification made by the legislature can
be said to be without any reasonable basis. The legis-
lature is entitled to estimate degrees of evil, and to adjust
its legislation according to the exigency found to exist.
Applying familiar principle, it cannot be said that the
legislature exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion
in classification when it enacted the prohibition in ques-
tion relating to foods and compounds sold as food pre-
servatives. Price V. Illinois, 238 IT. S. 446.
§ 483. Classification of telephone companies for taxa-
tion. The Michigan statute exempting the property of
telephone companies whose gross receipts for the year
do not exceed $500 from an ad valorem tax, does not
render the statute invalid as denying the equal protection
of the laws, where, under the classification made by the
statute, the companies taxed are mainly those organized
for profit, while the untaxed enterprises are mainly not
profit making, but mutual or co-operative. The power of
classification for the purposes of taxation is a vital prin-
ciple, giving to government freedom to meet its exigen-
cies, not binding its action" by rigid formulas, but
apportioning its burdens, and permitting it to make those
** discriminations which the best interests of society re-
quire.** The statute is not arbitrary, it has a reasonable
basis resting on a real distinction. It is not a dis-
tinction based on mere size only, nor upon the mere
amount of business done. There is a difference in the
748 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 483
dois^ of the business and its results; a difference in
the relation to the public. The non-taxed companies
are subsidiary to the taxed companies, — ^patrons in a
sense of the taxed companies. The use of the untaxed
property is predominately private, while the use of the
taxed property is correspondingly public; the exempt
property is used for the personal convenience of the
owners, while the taxed property represents commercial
investment for profit-making purposes. The property
exempted is only a trifling portion of the whole, the
cost of assessing and collecting in this class would be
disproportionate to the amount which would be realized,
the untaxed property is in the incipient or development
stage, while the taxed property is in the fully developed
form. All were differences which could appeal to the
legislature and determine a difference of treatment. The
basis of classification was that of earnings. That some
small portion of the co-operative companies will be taxed
and some small portion of the profit-making companies
will be exempt does not impeach the basis of classification.
Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322.
§484. State anti-trust laws. The Missouri anti-tmst
laws against combinations to lessen competition and regu-
late prices confining to manufacturers and vendors of
articles the prohibitions of the statute, while permitting
such combinations among purchasers, does not render
the legislation repugnant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as denying the equal protection of the laws. Ex-
cluding combinations of wage earners from statutory
prohibitions against combinations to lessen competition
and regulate prices, as construed by the state courts
of Missouri, does not deny the equal protection of
the laws. The statute was attacked as unconstitutional
because it was claimed to arbitrarily discriminate between
persons making or selling products and commodities and
persons selling labor and service of all kinds, between
the makers and sellers of products and commodities and
§ 485 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 749
the purchasers thereof. Both objections invoke a consid-
eration of the power of classification which may be ex-
erted in the legislation of the state. That power has very
broad range. A classification is not invalid because of
simple inequality, it may depend upon degrees of evil
without being arbitrary or unreasonable. Whether the
Missouri statute should have set its condenmation on
restraints generally, prohibiting combined action for any
purpose and to everybody, or confined it as the statute
does to manufacturers and vendors of articles, and per-
mitting it to the purchasers of such articles ; prohibiting
it to sellers of commodities and permitting it to sellers
of services, was a matter of legislative judgment ; and it
cannot be said that the distinctions made are palpably
arbitrary, which is the condition of judicial review. The
question presented is the power of the legislature, not
the policy of the exercise of the power. To be able to find
fault witii such policy, is not to establish the invalidity of
the law based upon it International Harvester Co. of
America v. Missouri, ex rel. Atty. Gen., 234 TJ. S. 199.
§ 485. Redemption of store orders in money. A stat-
ute forbidding persons, firms or corporations engaged in
mining and manufacturing to issue orders for the pay-
ment of labor not purporting to be payable in money, as
is done in Virginia act of February 13, 1888, amending
and re-enacting Laws 1887, chap. 391, § 3, is not invalid as
class legislation denying the equal protection of the laws.
While there are differences of opinion as to the degree
and kind of discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions that
a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it
presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is
not to be upset by thinking up and enumerating other
instances to which it might have been applied equally well.
The suggestion that others besides mining and manufac-
turing companies may keep shops and pay their work-
men with orders on themselves for merchandise is not
7S0 DUE PROCESS OF LAW §485
enough to overthrow a law that muBt be preBtimed to be
deemed by the legislature coextensive with the practical
need. Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 334 U. S.
224.
§ 486. Abolishing Oreek letter fraternities in state nni-
versities. The state of Mississippi enacted a law
abolishing Greek letter fraternities and societies and
prohibiting their existence in the State University and
in all other educational institutions supported in whole
or in part by the state. Provision was made for the
enforcement of the statute by the trustees and faculties
of the institutions by rules and punishments^ and for the
removal of any trustee or member of a faculty for failure
or refusal to enforce the law. The board of trustees of
the State University adopted an order which recited that
the board desired it to be understood that the statute was
**not to be construed to apply to students already entered,
and who conducted themselves with that decorum always
expected of Southern gentlemen.*' This order was as-
sailed as denying the equal protection of the laws because
a discrimination between those who were, at the time the
statute was enacted, students in the university, and those
who were not on that date members of the student body,
and who might desire to be admitted as such. To this
suggestion the court replied that it is an obvious principle
of construction, and sometimes of justice, that laws are
not to be construed retrospectively. The trustees of the
State University regarded and followed that principle
and did not apply the law to students already in the
tmiversity, admonishing them however that their honor
would be regarded as pledged not to abuse the right or
the indulgence. The distinction, whether based on a
right or an indulgence, and whether required by the stat-
ute or accorded by the trustees, was held to be an obvious
and rational one and not a denial of the equal protection
of the law.
The statute was also assailed as an obstruction to the
§ 487 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 751
•
pursuit of happiness, a deprivation of property and prop-
erty rights, and of the privileges and immunities guar-
anteed by the Constitution of fhe United States. These
objections are all subject to one test; — ^namely, whether
the right to attend the state university is an absolute or
conditional right, whether the public educational institu-
tions of the state are so far under the control of the
legislature that it may impose what the supreme court of
the state calls ** disciplinary regulations/' The supreme
court of the state held that the legislature was in control
of the colleges and universities of the state with the right
to legislate for their welfare and to enact measures for
their discipline and when the legislature had done that it
was not subject to any control by the courts. The condi-
tion upon which the state offered free instruction in its
university that its students renounce affiliation with a
society which the state considers inimical to discipline
finds no prohibition in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Waugh V. Board of Trustees, 237 U. S. 589.
§487. Requiring washhouses for coal miners. Neither
due process of law nor the equal protection of the laws
is denied by the provisions of the Indiana statute requir-
ing the owners and operators of coal mines, collieries, or
other places where laborers employed are surrounded by,
or affected by, similar conditions as employees in coal
mines, to provide suitable washhouses or washrooms for
their employees upon the request in writing of twenty or
more of such employees, or in case there are not so many
employed, upon the written request of one-third of the
employees ; but such statute is a proper exercise of the
police power in the interest of the public health. The
legislature having the power, in the interest of the public
health, to regulate the conditions upon which coal mining
may be conducted, it cannot be limited by moments of
time and differences of situation, by the distinction be-
tween what a legislature may require for the safety and
protection of a miner while actually in service below
752 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 487
ground, and that which may be required when he has
ceased or has not commenced his labors. The legislative
judgment may be determined by all of the conditions and
their influence. The conditions to which a miner parses
or returns from are very different from those which an
employee in work above ground passes to or returns
from, and the conditions of actual service in the cases
are very different, and it cannot be judicially said that a
judgment which makes such differences a basis of classi-
fication is arbitrarily exercised ; certainly in view of the
wide discretion the Supreme Court of the United States
has recognized, and necessarily has recognized in legis-
lation to classify its objects. It is, however, further ob-
jected that the law discriminates because it may be applied
to one mine, and not to another, all other conditions being
the same but the desire of the miners,— indeed, discrimi-
nates upon a distinction more arbitrary than that, upon
the desire of twenty in one mine as against a lesser num-
ber, nineteen, it may be, in another. The objection is the
usual ground of attack upon a distinction based on degree
and where the distinction depends upon a difference in
numbers, and is answered in McLean v. Arkansas, 211
U. S. 539. Nor was the law open to objection because it
could not be put in operation by any power which the
state government possessed, but was enforceable only
upon the demand or election of a limited number of em-
ployees in the coal mining business. The choice of man-
ner was, under the circumstances, for the legislature to
determine, and its choice was legal. Booth v. Indiana,
237 U. S. 391.
§ 488. Discrimination between county and city in dis-
position of tax penalties. No substantial Federal ques-
tion which will support a writ of error from the Federal
Supreme Court to a state court is presented by the con-
tention that taxpayers of a county, who reside outside
of cities of the first class, are deprived of their property
wrthout due process of law and are denied the equal pro-
§ 489 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 753
tection of the laws by state legislation under which, as
construed by the state court, a county must reimburse a
city of the first class within such county for the amount
by which the taxes collected for the city are reduced by
rebates granted for prompt payment, and at the same
time must pay over to the city the amount collected as
penalties for delay in the payment of taxes levied by the
city, while in the cases of taxes levied by cities of the sec-
ond and third class and by townships and school districts
the rebates are charged to the county and the penalties
credited to it. It is manifest that the statute assailed was
enacted by the state in regulation of its municipalities,
and the power to do this is very broad. Counties, cities
and towns exist only for the convenient administration
of the government, and are instruments of the state, cre-
ated to carry out its will. This power of creation and
control may be exercised in many ways and may give
rise to actual or asserted inequalities. It has been exer-
cised to enlarge or contract the boundaries of municipal
corporations, invest them with special powers, divide and
apportion their property. It would be difficult to define
the restrictions upon this power of control and keep it
efficient. This Kansas statute does not transcend the
limitations. Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U. S. 14.
§ 489. Discrimination against aliens. The discrimina-
tion against aliens lawfully resident in the state, which
is produced by the provisions of Arizona act of Decem-
ber 14, 1914, that every employer of more than five
workers at any one time, * * regardless of kind or class of
work or sex of workers shall employ not less than 80 per
cent qualified electors or native-bom citizens of the United
States or some sub-division thereof,'* renders the stat-
ute invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, as denying
the equal protection of the laws, and such statute cannot
be justified as an exercise of the i>ower of the state to
make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote
the health, safety, morals, and welfare of those within
Due Process — 48
754 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 489
its jurisdiction. The equal protection claase of the
amendment is universal in its application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to race,
color or nationality ; ^ ' and the equal protection of the laws
is a pledge of the protection of equal laws/' The dis-
crimination defined by the act does not pertain to the
regulation or distribution of the public domain, or of
the conunon property or resources of the people of the
state, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its cit-
izens as against both aliens and the citizens of other
states. A statute was upheld restricting to the citizens
of Virginia the right to plant oysters in one of its rivers
upon the ground that the regulation related to the com-
mon property of the citizens of the state. An analogous
principle was involved in a Pennsylvania case where the
discrimination against aliens upheld by the court had for
its object the protection of wild game within the state,
with respect to which it was said that the state could
exercise its preserving power for the benefit of its own
citizen if it pleased. The case is not within these deci-
sions, or within those relating to the devolution of real
property, neither is the act limited to persons who are
engaged on public work or receive the benefits of public
money. The discrimination involved is imposed upon the
conduct of ordinary private enterprise. It covers the
entire field of industry with the exception of enterprises
that are relatively very small. The purpose of the act is
frankly revealed in its title, and is aimed at the employ-
ment of aliens, as such. The power of the state to make
reasonable classifications does not go so far as to make
it possible for the state to deny to lawful inhabitants,
because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means
of earning a livelihood. The right to work for a living
in the common occupations of the conmiunity is of the
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity
that it was the purpose of the amendment to secure. The
act is in hostility to the exclusive Federal authority to
admit or exclude aliens. Denying to aliens the oppor-
§ 490 POWEB OP CLASSIFICATION 755
timity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to
the state would be equivalent to denying them entrance
and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where
they cannot work. It is no defense that by the act the
employer in any line of business who employs more than
five workers may employ aliens to the extent of 20 per
cent of his employees. If the 20 per cent restriction is
maintainable, the state undoubtedly has the power, if it
sees fit, to make the percentage less. It has been fre-
quently held that the legislature may recognize degrees
of evil and adapt its legislation accordingly; but under-
lying the classification is the authority to deal with that
at which the legislation is aimed. No special public inter-
est with respect to any particular business is shown that
could possibly be deemed to support the enactment, for,
as has been said, it relates to every sort. The discrimi-
nation is against aliens as such in competition with cit-
izens in the described range of enterprises, and clearly
falls under the condemnation of the fundamental law.
Truax v. Eaich, 239 U. S. 33.
§ 490. Discrimination against foreign labor on public
works. Property is not taken without due process of
law, nor is the equal protection of the laws denied, con-
trary to the Fourteenth Amendment, by the provisions of
the New York law that only citizens of the United States
may be employed in the construction of public works by
or for the state or a municipality, and that in such em-
ployment citizens of New York state must be given pref-
erence.
The case was decided on the principle laid down in
Atkin V. Kansas, 191 TJ. S. 207, where it was held that
**it belongs to the state, as the guardian of its people, and
having control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions
upon which it will permit public work to be done in its
behalf, or on behalf of its municipalities." Heim v.
McCall, 239 TJ. S. 175 ; Crane v. New York, 239 TJ. S. 195.
756 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 491
§491. Begulatiiig ixmkeeper's duty in case of fire. The
Nebraska statute singling out hotels having more than
fifty rooms as proper subjects for regulations respecting
the duty of hotel keepers towards guests and inmates in
case of fire, and not applying to keepers of hotels having
a less number of rooms, does not discriminate against
the former and is not repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment as denying the equal protection of the laws.
See the cases cited. Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426.
§492. Forbidding brickmaking in designated area.
Prohibiting by municipal ordinance the manufacture of
brick within a designated area cannot be said to deny the
equal protection of the laws to the owner of a brickyard
within the prohibited district, where the record does not
show that brickyards in other localities within the munici-
pality where the same conditions exist are not regulated
or prohibited, or that other objectionable businesses are
permitted within the same district. The petitioner makes
his attack upon the law depend upon disputable consider-
ations of classification and upon a comparison of condi-
tions of which there is no means of judicial determination,
and upon which, nevertheless, the court was asked to
reverse legislative action exercised upon matters of which
the city has control. There is no allegation or proof of
other objectionable businesses being permitted within the
district, and a speculation of their establishment or con-
duct at some future time is too remote. It may be that
brickyards in other localities within the city where the
same conditions exist are not regulated or prohibited, but
it does not follow that they will not be. That petitioner's
business was the first in time to be prohibited does not
make its prohibition unlawful. Mr. Justice McKenna in
delivering the opinion of the court said : * * It may be that
something else than prohibition may have satisfied the
conditions. Of this, however, we have no means of deter-
mining, and besides, we cannot declare invalid the exer-
tion of a power which the city undoubtedly has because of
§494 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 757
a charge that it does not exactly accommodate the con-
ditionSy or that some other exercise would have been better
or less harsh. We must accord good faith to the city in
the absence of a clear showing to the contrary and an
honest exercise of judgment upon the circumstances which
induced its action. ' * Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S.
394.
§493. Workmen's compensation act. The equal pro-
tection of the laws is not denied by construing the Wash-
ington workmen's compensation act (Wash. Laws 1911,
chap. 74), as taking away any existing right, under Eem-
ington & Ballinger's Code, §§ 183, 194, to maintain an
a^i^tion for the wrongful act of an employee, not only as
against the employer, but as against any third person by
whose negligence the death may have been caused, where
the employee sustained the fatal injury while engaged
about his ordinary duties at his employer's plant. North-
ern Pacific Eailway Company v. Meese, 239 U. S. 614.
§ 494. Abating smoke nuisance. So far as the Federal
Constitution is concerned, a state may, by itself or through
authorized municipalities, declare the emission of dense
smoke in cities or populous neighborhoods to be a nuisance
and subject to restraint as such, and the harshness of
such legislation or its effect upon business interests, short
of a merely arbitrary enactment, are not valid constitn-
tional objections, nor is there any valid Federal consti-
tutional objection in the fact that the regulation may
require the discontinuance of the use of property, or
subject the occupant to large expenses in complying with
the terms of the law or ordinance. The ordinance is not
open to attack because of arbitrary classification. It ap-
plies equally to all coming within its terms, and the fact
that other businesses might have been included does not
make such arbitrary classification as annuls the legisla-
tion. Nor does it make classification illegal because cer-
tain cities are included and others omitted in the statute.
Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 TJ. S. 486.
I
758 DUE PEOCESS OF LAW 5 495
§496. Begnlating net weight of packages of lard.
Sii]gling out lard from other food products, as is done by
the prohibition of North Dakota Laws 1911, page 355,
against the sale of lard otherwise than in bulk unless put
up in 1, 3 or 5-pound packages, net weight, or some mul-
tiple of these numbers, does not make the statute repug-
nant to the Fourteenth Amendment as denying the equal
protection of the laws. Plaintiff in error claims that the
law * * arbitrarily and without reasonable ground therefor
singles out lard from all food products'' which are sold
in packages, such as 'Sprints of butter, packages of coffee,
boxes of crackers, and the endless number of other prod-
ucts sold in package form are not included^ and no natural
and reasonable ground for excluding them and in singling
out lard has been suggested." The range of discretion
that a state possesses in classifying objects of legislation
has been fully discussed. The power may be determined
by degrees of evil, or exercised in cases where detriment
is specially experienced. The law of Dakota does not
exceed this power. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240
U. S. 510.
§496. Olascdflcation denying equal protection of the
laws, because arbitrary and creating presumption of
guilt. Defining the business of sugar refining as that of
**any concern that buys and refines raw or other sugar
exclusively, or that refines raw or other sugar from
sugar taken in toll, or that buys or refines more raw or
other sugar than the aggregate of the sugar produced by
it from cane grown and purchased by it," as is done by
§ 15 of Louisiana Acts 1915, No. 10, which subjects to
drastic regulation the business of sugar refining, renders
the statute repugnant to the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as producing a classification
which, if it does not confine itself to one particular con-
cern, is at least arbitrary beyond possible justice.
A state cannot, consistently with the equal protection
of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, create,
§ 496 POWER OP CLASSIFICATION 759
as is attempted by Louisiana Acts 1915, No. 10, a pre-
sumption of participation in a forbidden monopoly or
combination from the systematic payment in Louisiana by
a person engaged in sugar refining within the state of a
less price for sugar than he pays in any other state, nor
a presumption that the closing or keeping idle of a sugar
refinery for more than one year was for the purpose of
violating that statute or the laws against monopolies.
The statute bristles with severities that touch the plain-
tiff alone, and raises many questions that would have to
be answered before it could be sustained. It is a classifi-
cation which, if it does not confine itself to the plaintiff,
at least is arbitrary beyond possible justice, and creates
presumptions and special powers against it that can have
no foundation except the intent to destroy. As to the
classification, if a powerful rival of the plaintiff should
do no refining within the state, it might systematically
pay a less price for sugar in Louisiana than it paid else-
where with none of the consequences attached to doing so
in the plaintiff *s case. So of any one who purchases but
does not refine. So of any concern that does not buy and
refine more sugar * * than the aggregate of the sugar pro-
duced by it from cane grown and purchased by it,*^ as
easily might happen with a combination of planters. The
legislature may go a good way in raising presumptions
or in changing the burden of proof, but there are limits.
The presumption created here has no relation in experi-
ence to general facts. It has no foundation except with
tacit reference to the plaintiff. But it is not within the
province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty
or presumptively guilty of a crime. McFarland v. Amer-
ican Sugar Eefining Co., 241 U. S. 79.
CHAPTER XXTT
THE POLICE POWEB
§497. Police power of state — ^Public laundries and
washhouses. The equal protection of the laws clause
was not intended to limit nor does it limit the police power
of the state. The state has the right to legislate for the
health and general welfare of the people, and snch legis-
lation will be upheld unless arbitrary and unreasonable.
No general definition of the police power has been at-
tempted by the Supreme Court, each case being decided
on its own state of facts, but the power of the state over
the health, welfare, safety and general good of its citizens
finds no restriction in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco, pro-
hibiting the carrying on of public laundries and wash
houses within certain prescribed limits of the city and
county, from ten o'clock at night until six o'clock in the
morning, is purely a police regulation, within the compe-
tency of any municipality, possessed of the ordinary
powers, to make. A federal tribunal cannot supervise
such regulations ; any correction of the action of munici-
pal bodies in such matters can come only from state legis-
lation or state tribunals. The Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution is not designed to inter-
fere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its
** police power,'' to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, peace, morals, education and good order of the
people. It may be a necessary measure of precaution in
a city composed largely of wooden buildings like San,
Francisco, that occupations, in which fires are constantly
required, should cease after certain hours at night until
the following morning ; and of the necessity of such regu-
760
§ 497 POLICE POWER 761
lations the municipal bodies are the exclusive judges.
The same authority which directs the cessation of labor
must necessarily prescribe the limits within which it shall
be enforced. There is no invidious discrimination against
anyone within the prescribed limits by such regulations.
There is none in the regulation under consideration. The
specification of the limits within which the business can
not be carried on without the certificates of the health
oflScer and board of fire wardens is merely a designation
of the portion of the city in which the precautionary
measures against fire and to secure proper drainage must
be taken for the public health and safety. It is not legis-
lation discriminating against anyone. All persons en-
gaged in the same business within it are treated alike;
are subject to the same restrictions and are entitled to the
same privileges under similar conditions. That is the
plain intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, that equal
protection and security should be given to all under like
circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil
rights ; that all persons should be equally entitled to pur-
sue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property;
that they should have like access to the courts of the coun-
try for the protection of their persons and property, the
prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcements
of contracts ; that no impediment should be interposed to
the pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pur-
suits by others under like circumstances ; that no greater
burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others
in the same calling and condition, and that in the admin-
istration of criminal justice no different or higher pun-
ishment should be imposed upon one than such as is
prescribed to all for like offenses. Class legislation, dis-
criminating against some and favoring others is prohib-
ited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public
purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere
of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situ-
ated, is not within the amendment. Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U. S. 27.
762 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 498
§498. Oity ordinances as to public lauulrieSi when
valid. The ordinance of the city and county of San Fran-
cisco which declares that no person owning or employed
in a public laundry or public wash house within the pre-
scribed limitSi shall wash or iron clothes between the
hours of ten in the evening and six in the morning, or
upon any portion of Sunday, is not void on the ground
that it is not within the police power of the city and
county. Such section is not void on the ground that
it discriminates between those engaged in the laundry
business and those engaged in other classes of business,
or between the different classes of persons engaged in the
laundry business. There is no force in the objection, that
an unwarrantable discrimination is made against persons
engaged in the laundry business, because persons in other
kinds of business are not required to cease from their
labors during the same hours at night. There may be
no risks attached to the business of others, certainly not
as great as where fires are constantly required to carry
them on. The specific regulations for one kind of busi-
ness, which may be necessary for the protection of the
public, can never be the just ground of complaint because
like restrictions are not imposed upon other business of
a different kind. The discriminations which are open to
objection are those where persons engaged in the same
business are subjected to different restrictions, or are
held entitled to different privileges under the same con-
ditions. It is only then, that the discrimination can be
said to impair the equal right which all can claim in the
enforcement of the law. Objection was also made that
the ordinance discriminated between different classes en-
gaged in the laundry business itself. The branches of
the laundry which are outside of the prohibition of the
ordinance, are outside because there is not the danger
from them that would arise from the continuous fires
required in washing ; and it is not discriminating legisla-
tion in any invidious sense, that branches of the same
business from which danger is apprehended are prohib-
S 499 POLICE POWER 763
ited during certain hours of the night, whilst other
branches involving no such danger are permitted. Hing
V. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703.
§499. Drainage law of New Jersey not imconstita-
tional. The statute of New Jersey providing for the
drainage of any tract of low or marshy land within the
state, upon proceedings instituted by at least five owners
of separate lots of land included in the tract, and not
objected to by the owners of the greater part of the tract,
and for the assessment by commissioners, after notice and
hearing, of the expenses upon all the owners, does not
deprive them of their property without due process of the
laws, nor deny to them the equal protection of the laws,
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gen-
eral laws authorizing the drainage of tracts of swamp and
low lands, by commissioners appointed upon proceedings
instituted by some of the owners of the lands, and the
assessment of the whole expense of the work upon all the
lands within the tract in question, have long existed in
the state of New Jersey, and have been sustained and
acted on by her courts as a just and constitutional exer-
cise of the power of the legislature to establish regulations
by which adjoining lands, held by various owners in sev-
eralty, and in the improvement of which all have a com-
mon interest, but which, by reason of the peculiar natural
condition of the whole tract, cannot be improved or
enjoyed by any of theni without the concurrence of all,
may be reclaimed and made useful to all at their joint
expense. As the statute is applicable to dll lands of the
same kind, and as no person can be assessed under it for
the expense of drainage without notice and opportunity
to be heard, the plaintiffs in error have neither been de-
nied the equal protection of the laws, nor been deprived
of their property without due process of law, within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S.
606.
764 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 500
§ 500. Regulation of laundry business. The order of
the city and county of San Francisco, providing that it
should be unlawful for any person to engage in the laun-
dry business within the corporate limits '* without having
first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors,
except the same be located in a building constructed
either of brick or stone/* does not prescribe a rule and
conditions for the regulation of the use of laundry prop-
erty, to which all similarly situated may conform; but it
confers a naked arbitrary power upon the board to give
or withhold consent, and makes all engaged in the busi-
ness the tenants at will as to their means of living, under
the board of supervisors. Though a law be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is administered
by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibiten of
the Constitution. The power given to the board of super-
visors is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense
of that term, but is granted to their mere will. It is purely
arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance nor re-
straint. The ordinance drawn in question in these cases
is of a very different character from those upheld in
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, and in Soon Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U. S. 703. It divides the owners or occu-
piers of wooden buildings into two classes, not having
respect to their personal character and qualifications for
the business, nor the situation and nature and adaptation
of the buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary
line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to
pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of
the supervisors, and on the other those from whom that
consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure. The
cases present the ordinance in actual operation, and the
facts shown establish an administration directed so ex-
clusively against a particular class of persons as to war-
rant and require the conclusion that whatever may have
§ 501 POLICE POWER 765
been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are
applied by the pnblic authorities charged with their ad-
ministration, and thus representing the state itself, with
a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a prac-
tical denial by the state of that equal protection of the
laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other
persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In these cases no reason whatever,
except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why the
petitioners should not be permitted to carry on, in the
accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupa-
tion, on which they depend for a livelihood. The only
persons thus discriminated against are Chinese subjects.
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason
for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that
no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and
nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in
the eye of the law is not justified. The discrimination is
therefore illegal, and the public administration which en-
forces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution. Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.
§ 501. Oleomargarine law. A statute which is a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power of the state, for the
protection of the health of the people, and for the preven-
tion of fraud, is not inconsistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. That amendment was not designed to inter-
fere with the exercise of the police power by the states.
Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine, or imitation
butter, involves such danger to the public health as to
require its entire suppression, rather than its regulation
in such manner as to permit the manufacture and sale of
articles of that class that do not contain noxious ingredi-
ents, is a question of fact and of public policy, which
belongs to the legislative department to determine. The
legislative determination of such question is conclusive
upon the courts, unless it appears upon the face of the
766 DUB PROCESS OP DAW § 501
statute, or from facts of which the courts must take judi-
cial cognizaucey that the statute infringes rights secured
hy the fundamental law. Although legislation on this sub^
ject may be unwise^ or unnecessarily oppressive to those
manufacturing or selling wholesome oleomargarine as an
article of food, yet the courts cannot .interfere without
usurping powers committed to another department of
government ; the appeal must be to the legislature or to
the ballot box, not to the judiciary. The objection that
the statute is repugnant to the clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbidding the denial by the state to any
person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of
the laws is untenable. The statute places under the same
restrictions, and subjects to like penalties and burdens,
all who manufacture, or sell, or offer for sale, or keep in
possession to sell, the articles embraced by its prohibi-
tions; thus recognizing and preserving the principle of
equality among those engaged in the same business. This
case, in its important aspects, is governed by the prin-
ciples announced in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 IT. S. 623.
Powell V. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678.
§ 502. Wlien servitude attaches to lands. Where by
the state law lands bordering upon a navigable river are
subject to a servitude in favor of the public, whereby
such portions thereof as are necessary for the purpose
of making levees may be taken without compensation,
such servitude attaches to lands whose titles are derived
from the United States. The subject-matter of such
rights and regulations falls within the control of the
states ; and the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution are satisfied if, in such
cases, the state law, with its benefits and its obligations,
is impartially administered. A citizen of another state,
who, as respects his property in a state, has received the
same measure of right as that awarded to its citizens, has
not been deprived of his property without due process of
law, or been deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
§ 503 POLICE POWEB 767
The ground upon which the state le^latnre and judicial
authorities base their action is found in the doctrine ex-
isting in the territory of Louisiana before its purchase by
the United States and continuing to the present time, that
lands abutting on the rivers and bayous are subject to a
servitude in favor of the public, whereby such portions
thereof as are necessary for the purpose of making and
repairing public levees may be taken, in pursuance of
law, without compensation* This doctrine is said to have
been derived from the Code Napoleon, articles 649 and
650. The servitude is also explicitly expressed in the
civil code of the state. The decisions of the Supreme
Court hold that lands situate within a state, but whose
title is derived from the United States, are subject to the
same local regulations admitted to be applicable to lands
held by grant from the state. This disposes of the prop-
osition that the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
extend to and override public rights, existing in the form
of servitudes or easements, held by the courts of a state
to be valid under the constitution and laws of such state.
Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452.
§503. Utah statute as to damages by cattle. The Utah
statute which makes any person who drives a herd of
cattle, sheep, goats, or swine over a public highway con-
structed on a hillside, liable for all damages done by such
animals in destroying the banks or rolliug rocks into or
upon such highway, does not deny the equal protection of
the laws nor deprive of property without due process of
law. Such statute simply creates a conclusive presump-
tion of negligence from a particular state of facts, which
is within the province of the legislature. A statute gen-
eral in its application to all persons under like circum-
stances, and not an arbitrary exercise of power, does not
deny to the defendant the equal protection of the laws ;
nor, if it provides for the ascertainment of liability by
judicial proceedings, does it deprive him of property
without due process of law. The clause of the Fourteenth
768 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 503
Amendment referred to was undoubtedly intended to
prohibit an arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty or
arbitrary spoliation of property. But it does not Umit,
nor was it designed to limit, the subjects upon which the
police power of a state may be lawfully exerted. Em-
braced within the police power of a state are the estab-
lishment, maintenance, and control of public highways.
The legislation in question would clearly seem, therefore,
to come within the narrowest definition of the police
power, and be properly classed as a reasonable regulation
incident to the right to establish and maintain such high-
ways. The statute is analogous in principle to the one
upheld in St Louis & S. F. E. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1.
The statute was manifestly not designed to impose a lia-
bility upon the owners of herds for damage occasioned
by the mere passage of a drove of animals over a hillside
road. If these herds were kept in the road, the banks
would not be caved or rocks rolled into the traveled
way. The damage contemplated must therefore be occa-
sioned by animals going outside the beaten roadway. In
effect, the legislature declared that the passage of droves
or herds of animals over a hillside highway was so likely,
if great precautions were not observed, to result in dam-
age to the road, that where this damage followed such
driving, there ought to be no controversy over the exist-
ence or nonexistence of negligence, but that there should
be an absolute legal presumption to that effect resultmg
from the fact of having driven the herd. It was obviously
the province of the state legislature to provide the nature
and extent of the legal presumption to be deduced from a
given state of facts, and the creation by law of such pre-
sumptions is after all but an illustration of the power to
classify. Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180.
§ 504. Requiring five towns to maintain a bridge and
highway. The equal protection of the laws is not denied
because five towns are put into a class by themselves,
organized into a single municipal corporation, and sep-
§ 605 POLICE POWER 769
arated from other towns in the state by being subjected
to different control in respect to highways. The conten-
tion of plaintiff in error overlooks the fact that the regu-
lation of municipal corporations is a matter peculiarly
within the domain of state control ; that the state is not
compelled by the Federal Constitution to grant to all its
municipal corporations the same territorial extent, or
the same duties and powers. A municipal corporation is,
so far as its purely municipal relations are concerned,
simply an agency of the state for conducting the affairs
of government, and as such it is subject to the control of
the legislature. That body may place one part of the
state under one municipal organization and another part
of the state under another organization of an entirely
different character. These are matters of a purely local
nature, in respect to which the Federal Constitution does
not limit the power of the state. ** Whether territory
shall be governed for local purposes by a county, a city,
or a township organization is one of the most usual and
ordinary subjects of state legislation.'* Kelly v. Pitts-
burgh, 104 XJ. S. 78, 81. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S.
304.
§ 505. Ordinance as to license for sale of cigarettes.
An ordinance giving the mayor power to determine
whether a person applying for a license to sell cigarettes
has good character and reputation and is a suitable per-
son to be intrusted with their sale, but requiring him to
grant a license to every person fulfilling these conditions,
does not vest in him any arbitrary power to grant or
refuse a license, in violation of the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, either in regard to the clause
requiring due process of law, or in that requiring equal
protection of the laws. Plaintiff in error claims that he
has been denied the equal protection of the laws, because
in other kinds of business, where licenses are granted to
persons engaged in any trade or occupation, no member
thereof is ^'singled out and subjected to the absolute
Dne Proee8»— 49
770 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 505
supervision of an irresponsible magistrate while his
neighbor is protected in his right by the customary safe-
guards of the law. ' ' The case principally relied upon by
the plaintiff in error, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
does not support his contention. The ordinance in ques-
tion does not grant to the mayor arbitrary power such as
is described in the foregoing laundry case. The license
is to be issued if the mayor is satisfied that the person
applying is of good character and reputation and a suit-
able person to be intrusted with the sale of cigarettes.
The mayor is bound to grant a license to every person
fulfilling these conditions, and thus the fact of fitness is
submitted to the judgment of the officer, and it calls for
the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature by him.
It is for the state to say whether selling cigarettes is the
kind of business which ought to be licensed, and an ordi-
nance providing reasonable conditions upon the perform-
ance of which a license may be granted to deal in and sell
cigarettes, does not violate any provision of the Federal
Constitution. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183.
§506. Validity of state statute restricting sale and
manufacture of oleomargarine. The equal protection of
the laws is not denied an Ohio corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of oleomargarine within the state
of Ohio, by the statutes of that state forbidding the
manufacture or sale of any oleomargarine which con-
tains any coloring matter, although by the Ohio statutes
harmless coloring may be used in butter. The proposition
is that, as by the Ohio statutes harmless coloring matter
is permitted to be used in butter, the effect of prohibiting
the use of such harmless ingredients in oleomargarine is
to deny the manufacturer of oleomargarine of the equal
protection of the laws, and to take from him his property
without due process of law. The supreme court of the
state, however, having before it the evidence introduced
upon the issues of fact made in the pleadings, held that
oleomargarine was an article which might be easily man-
§ 507 POLICE POWER 771
ufactured so as to be hurtful, and thus result in fraud
upon and injury to the public, and that the prohibition of
the use of coloring matter in oleomargarine was a reason-
able police regulation tending to insure the public against
fraud and injury. The purpose of the legislature in per-
mitting the use of harmless coloring matter in butter, and
requiring that oleomargarine be sold in its natural state,
was declared not to be for the purpose of discriminating
in favor of butter, but to provide a ready means by which
the public might know that an article offered for sale was
butter, and not oleomargarine. It cannot be said, as a
mere matter of judicial inference, that such regulations
for such purpose were a mere arbitrary interference with
rights of property, denying the equal protection of the
laws, or that they amounted to a taking of property
without due process of law. It follows that the legislature
of Ohio had the lawful power to enact the regulations.
Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Attorney General,
183 U. S. 238.
§ 507. Validity of mining inspection law. The classi-
fication of coal mines which is made by the Illinois laws,
by which coal mines where not more than five men are
employed at any one time are exempted from the opera-
tion of the act providing for the appointment of state
mine inspectors, whose fees should be paid by the owners
of the mines, iij not arbitrary or unreasonable. The dis-
cretion confided to the state mine inspectors by the act,
to determine the number of times each mine shall be
inspected, and to regulate the charges therefor, does not
make the act repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment
where it requires that at least four inspections annually
shall be made by each inspector of each mine in his dis-
trict, and that his fees shall be dependent upon the length
of time consumed and the expenses necessarily incurred,
and for each inspection shall not be less than $6 nor more
than $10, and provides a regular salary for each inspector,
which is neither increased nor diminished by the num-
772 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 507
ber of inspections or the amount paid therefor. It is
quite evident that a mine which is operated by only &ve
men could hardly have passed the experimental stage, or
that precautions necessary in the operation of coal mines
of ordinary magnitude would be required in such cases.
There was clearly reasonable foundation for a discrimi-
nation here. In enacting a law with regard to the inspec-
tion of mines the court saw no objection in case the
legislature finds it impractical to classify the mines for
the purposes of inspection, to commit that power to a
body of experts who are not only experienced in the oper-
ation of mines, but are acquainted with the details neces-
sary to be known to make a reasonable classification,
although it may affect the amount of fees to be paid by
the mine owners. With regard to the inspection fees, not
less than $6 nor more than $10, for each inspection, Mr.
Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the court,
said: ''It appears, then, first, that the state inspector
receives a regular salary, neither increased nor dimin-
ished by the number of inspections or the amount paid
for each inspection; and, second, that he receives such
salary directly from the bureau of labor statistics, and
not from the fees paid to him therefor. As his compen-
sation is dependent neither upon the number of his visits
nor upon the amount of his fees, it is difficult to see how
he would gain by multiplying one or magnifying the
other. We know of no reason why the legislature should
deprive itself of the best determinable evidence of the
facts it seeks to make determinative of these two ques-
tions. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 tJ. S. 203.
§508. Live-stock quarantine. The privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states are not denied
by the provisions of the Colorado statute for the protec-
tion of domestic cattle against the communication of dis-
ease by cattle from other states, where the statute is
equally applicable to citizens of all states. No discrimi-
nation is shown. No privileges are granted to citizens of
§ 509 POLICE POWER 773
Colorado that are denied to citizens of other states. Cit-
ing Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 222. Eeid v. Colorado,
187 U. S. 137.
§ 509. Sale of stocks on margiiL The California state
constitution avoiding all contracts for the sale of shares
of corporate stock on margin, does not deny the equal
protection of the laws, because this provision strikes at
some, and not all, objects of possible speculation. The
state constitution provides: '*A11 contracts for the sales
of shares of the capital stock of any corporation or asso-
ciation, on margin, or to be delivered at a future day, shall
be void.'* There was some suggestion that these words
might be narrowed by construction to contracts not con-
templating a bona fide acquisition of the stock, but
intended to cover only a wager or contemplated settle-
ment of differences, but the state supreme court did not
uphold th6 law on that basis. The objection urged against
the provision in its literal sense is that this prohibition
of all sales on margin bears no reasonable relation to the
evil sought to be cured, and therefore falls within the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment guarante^ing
the liberty of contract and that it unjustifiably discrimi-
nates against property of that class while other familiar
objects of speculation, such as cotton or grain, are not
touched, thus depriving persons of the equal protection
of the laws. Even if the provision should seem not to
have been justified by the circumstances locally existing
in California at the time when it was passed, it is shown
by its adoption to have expressed a deep-seated conviction
on the part of the people concerned as to what that policy
required. Such a deep-seated conviction is entitled to
great respect. If the state thinks that an admitted evil
cannot be prevented except by prohibiting a calling or
transaction not in itself necessarily objectionable, the
courts cannot interfere, unless, in looking at the substance
of the matter, they can see that it * 4s a clear, unmistak-
able infringement of rights secured by the fundamental
774 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 509
law. * * It cannot be said that there might not be condi-
tions of public delirium in which at least a temporary
prohibition of sales on margins would be a salutary thing.
There is no doubt that purchases on margin may be and
frequently are used as a means of gambling for a great
gain or a loss of all one has. It is said that in California,
when the constitution was adopted, the whole people were
buying mining stocks in this way with the result of
infinite disaster. Inserting the provision in the constitu-
tion showed the conviction of the people at large that
prohibition was a proper means of stopping the evU.
With regard to the objection that this provision strikes
at only some, not all, of the objects of possible specula-
tion, it is enough to say, remarked Mr. Justice Holmes
in delivering the opinion of the court, that probably in
California the evil sought to be stopped was confined hi
the main to stocks in corporations. California is a min-
ing state, and mines offer the most striking temptation to
people in a hurry to get rich. Mines generally are repre-
sented by stocks. If stopping the purchase and sale of
stocks on margin would stop the gambling which it was
desired to prevent, it was proper for the people of Cali-
fornia to go no farther in what they forbade. The
circumstances disclose a reasonable ground for the clas-
sification, and treating stocks of corporations as a class
subject to special restrictions was not unjust discrimina-
tion or the denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Otis & Gassman v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606. ^
§ 510. Eight-hour law. The Kansas statute making it
a criminal offense for a contractor for a public work or
his employees to permit or require an employee to per-
form labor upon the work in excess of eight hours each
day, does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws. The entire argument against the law attaches too
little consequence to the relation existing between a state
and its municipal corporations. Such corporations are
the creatures — ^mere political subdivisions — of the state,
§ 511 POLICE POWER 775
for the purpose of exercising a part of its powers. They
may exert only such powers as are expressly granted to
them, or such as may be necessarily implied from those
granted. What they lawfully do of a public character is
done under the sanction of the state. They are, in every
essential sense, only auxiliaries of the state for the pur-
poses of local government. They may be created or
destroyed. They are mere tenants at will of the legis-
lature. The work was of a public and not of a private
character. It belongs to the state, as the guardian and
trustee for its people, and having control of its affairs,
to prescribe the conditions upon which it will permit pub-
lic work to be done on its behalf, or on behalf of its
municipalities. No court has authority to review its
action in that respect. Regulations on this subject sug-
gest only considerations of public policy. And with such
considerations the courts have no concern. The rule of
conduct prescribed by the statute applies alike to all
who contract to do work on behalf either of the state or
of its municipal subdivisions, and alike to all employed
to perform labor on such work, and does not deny to de-
fendant or his employee the equal protection of the laws.
Atkin V. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207.
§511. Oompnlsory vaccinatioxi. Lack of any excep-
tion in favor of adults certified by a registered physician
to be unfit subjects for vaccination does not render invalid
the Massachusetts statutes authorizing compulsory vacci-
nation by local boards of health, as denying the equal
protection of the laws, although an exception in favor of
children in like condition is made by the act, since the
statute is equally applicable to all adults. There are obvi-
ously reasons why regulations may be appropriate for
adults which could not be safely applied to persons of
tender years. Whatever may be thought of the expe-
diency of this statute, it cannot be afl5rmed to be, beyond
question, in palpable conflict with the constitution. Nor,
in view of the methods employed to stamp out the disease
776 DUB PBOCESS OP LAW § 5U
of smallpox, can anyone confidently assert that the means
employed by the state to that end have no real or substan-
tial relation to the protection of the public health and the
public safety. Such an assertion would not be consistent
with the experience of this and other countries whose
authorities have dealt with the disease of smallpox. And
the principle of vaccination as a means to prevent the
spread of smallpox has been enforced in many states by
statutes making vaccination a condition of their right to
enter or remain in public schools. Jacobson v. Massar
chusetts, 197 U. S. 11.
§ 512. Hmiicipal ordinance against visiting barricaded
gambling rooms. Discrimination against Chinese per-
sons in the administration of a municipal ordinance mak-
ing it unlawful either to exhibit gambling implements in
a barred or barricaded house or room or to visit such a
house or room where gambling instruments are exhibited
is not sufSciently shown to enable the Supreme Court of
the United States to declare such ordinance void, as deny-
ing the equal protection of the laws, in reviewing the
refusal of a state court to grant habeas corpus to one
convicted of a violation of the ordinance, by a stipulation
between the parties, recited in the order discharging the
writ, that the facts are as set forth in the petition, where
such petition merely avers that the ordinance is enforced
^'solely and exclusively against persons of the Chinese
race, and not otherwise," and contains no allegation that
the conditions and practices against which the ordinance
is directed do not exist exclusively among the Chinese,
or that there are other offenders, as to whom it is not
enforced. There is a misunderstanding among counsel
as to what was intended by the stipulation. Counsel for
defendant in error contends it was not intended to admit
a discrimination in the administration of the law, but to
submit the case on such facts as would test and cause a
review of Be Ah Cheung, 136 CaL 678, 69 Pac. 492. This
seems to be supported by the order of the court taken as
1 514 POLICE POWBB 777
a whole. The case at bar is concerned with gambling, to
suppress which is recognized as a proper exercise of
governmental authority, and one which would have no
incentive in race or class prejudice or administration, in
race or class discrimination. The case does not come
within the ruUng in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 373.
No latitude of intention should be indulged in a case like
this. There should be certainty to every inteni The law
is attacked on the ground that it is made discriminatory
by the manner of its administration. This is a matter of
proof, and the proof is not satisfactory. Ah Sin v. Witt-
man, 198 U. S. 500.
§513. Municipal regulation of milk business. Singling
out the milk business in the city of New York as a proper
subject for regulation does not deny the equal protection
of the laws, where all milk dealers in the city are equally
affected by such regulation. It is primarily for the state
to select the kinds of business which shall be the subject
of regulation, and if the business affected is one which
may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no
valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed
upon other businesses of a different kind. New York
ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552.
§ 514. Laws to prevent dealing in futures. The North
Carolina statute enacted to prevent dealing in futures,
which makes an exemption in favor of those engaged in
the business of manufacturing or wholesale merchan-
dising, does not make that act void, as repugnant to the
equal protection of the law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, where the section in question is interpreted
by the highest state court simply as a declaration that the
courts shall not so construe the act as to prevent persons
thus engaged from buying and selling for future delivery
the necessary commodities required in their ordinary
business, and not as relieving them from the operation of
the provisions of the 1st section of that act prohibiting
778 DUE PROCESS OP LAW S 514
the carrying on of a '* bucket shop*' business, or from the
prohibitions of the state law concerning the making of
gambling contracts for future delivery. The alleged
repugnancy of the law to the equality clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is sought to be sustained upon two
grounds : first, because those engaged in manufacturing
or wholesale merchandising are permitted to commit
without offense acts which the law makes criminal when
done by any other person ; and secondly, because, even if
the section does not effect such a result, it nevertheless
operates to produce an unlawful inequality, since it cre-
ates a prima facie presumptioja of guUt from the proof of
certain acts as against all persons but those engaged in
manufacturing and wholesale merchandising. As to the
first proposition the state supreme court expressly held
the statute did not create such discrimination. The stat-
ute does not prevent all purchases or sales for future
delivery, but only such dealings as are in the nature of
gambling or wagering contracts. As to the second propo-
sition, it is not open on this record. The state courts
held that a state might under the police power, without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment, create presump-
tions of guilt as to some classes of persons which would
not be applicable to the same acts when done by other
classes. The defendant was indicted for carrying on a
*' bucket shop*' business. The legislature had unques-
tionable power to make such business indictable. If part
of the law were void, because not applying to all pur-
chases upon ''margin,** this would in no wise invalidate
that part of the statute which forbids carrying on the
business of running a ' ' bucket shop. * * Gatewood v. North
Carolina, 203 U. S. 531.
§ 515. Restrictions on sheep grazing. The Idaho stat-
ute under which damages may be recovered from one who
permits his sheep to graze on the public domain within
two miles of a dwelling house, is not an arbitrary and
unreasonable discrimination against the sheep industry,
§ 516 POLICE POWER 779
prohibited by the guaranty in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the equal protection of the laws. The police
power of the state is not confined to the suppression of
what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary. It extends
to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state
as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people.
The statute complained of was a deliberate enactment,
made necessary by and addressed to the conditions which
existed. It was not the purpose oi* effect of the statute
to make discriminations between sheep owners and own-
ers of other kinds of stock, but to secure equality of
enjoyment and use of the public domain to settlers and
cattle owners with sheep owners. To hold the statute
imconstitutional would, it was said, make of the lands of
the state ' ' one immense sheep pasture. " It is a matter
of common observation and experience that sheep eat
the herbage closer to the ground than cattle or horses
do, and their hoofs being sharp, they devastate and kill
the growing vegetation wherever they graze for any con-
siderable time. The industry of raising cattle in the state
had been largely destroyed by large bands of sheep.
Cattle will not graze nor thrive upon lands where sheep
are grazed to any great extent. The conditions which
existed in the state vindicate the statute from the accusa-
tion of being an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimina-
tion against the sheep industry. Bacon v. Waller, 204
U. S. 311.
§ 516. Regulating admission to places of public amuse-
ment. The lessee in possession of a race course is not
denied the equal protection of the laws by a state Statute
under which it is compelled to recognize its own tickets
of admission in the hands of persons who are not, at the
time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in con-
duct, or of lewd and immoral character, where the statute
is applicable alike to all persons, corporations, . or asso-
ciations conducting places of public amusement or enter-
tainment. The contention that the statute is unconstitu-
780 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 516
tional as denyii)^ to the defendant the equal protection of
the laws is without merit, for the statute is applicable
alike to alL The statute is only a regulation of places of
public entertainment and amusement upon terms of equal
and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket It is only
a regulation^ as applied to the plaintiff in error, com-
pelling it to perform its own contract as evidenced by
tickets of admission and sold to parties wishing to attend
its race course. • . . It is neither an arbitrary exer-
tion of the state 's inherited or governmental power, nor
a violation of any right secured by the Constitution of the
United States. Western Turf Association v. Qreenberg,
204 U. S. 359.
§517. State protection of the national flag. The excep-
tion in favor of newspapers, periodicals, books, pam-
phlets, etc., on which shall be printed representations
of the national flag, disconnected from any advertising,
which is made by Nebraska act of July 3, 1903, prohibit-
ing the use of representations of the national flag for
advertising articles of merchandise, does not make such
statute repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, as
denying the equal protection of the laws. These excep-
tions, it is insisted, make an arbitrary classification of
persons, which, in legal effect, denies to one class the
equal protection of the laws. ... It is well settled
that, when prescribing a rule of conduct for persons or
corporations, a state may, consistently with the Four-
teenth Amendment, make a classification among its people
based ''upon some reasonable ground, — some difference
which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted
classification, and is not a mere arbitrary selection.'' No
one can be said to have the right, secured by the Consti-
tution, to use the country's flag merely for purposes of
advertising articles of merchandise. If everyone was
entitled to use it for such purposes, tfien, perhaps, the
state could not discriminate among those who so used it
It is for the state to say how far it would go by way of
§ 518 POLICE POWER 781
legislation for the protection of the flag against improper
use, — taking care, in such legislation, not to make undue
discrimination against a part of its people. All are alike
forbidden to use the flag as an advertisement. It is easy
to see how a representation of the flag may be wholly dis-
connected from an advertisement, and be used upon a
newspaper, periodical, book, etc., in such way as not to
arouse a feeling of indignation nor offend the sentiments
and feelings of those who reverence it The classification
made by the state cannot be regarded as unreasonable or
arbitrary, or as bringing the statute under condemna-
tion as denying the equal protection of the laws. It can-
not be said the statute has no reasonable connection with
the common good and was not promotive of the peace,
order, and well-being of the people. Halter v. Nebraska,
205 U. S. 34.
§518. Lnposing responsibility on mine owners for
defaults of certain employees. The selection of mine
owners as a class upon which to impose responsibility for
the defaults of certain employees who are required by the
Illinois mining act of April 18, 1899, to be selected from
those holding licenses issued by the state mining boards
created by that act, does not render such legislation
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment as denying the
equal protection of the laws. The object of the act is to
protect the health and persons of men employed in the
mines of the state while they are in the mines. The act
requires the exerdse of greater precaution and care on
the part of the mine owner for the safety of the miners
than was required by the common law. To hold that he
may shift his liability to an employee who holds the cer-
tificate of the state mining board is to lessen his responsi-
bility and defeat in great part the beneficent purposes of
the act. To hold him liable for a wilful violation of the
act, or a wilful failure to comply with its provisions on
the part of his exandner or manager, is to give force and
effect to the statute according to the intent of its makers,
782 DUE PSOCESS OF LAW § 518
and to prolong the lives and promote the safety and well-
being of the miners. Duties are imposed upon the mine
owner, customarily performed for him by certain employ-
ees,— duties which substantially relate to the famishing
of a reasonably safe place for the worionen, . • . The
subject was one peculiarly within the police power of the
state. Even although the liability imposed upon the mine
owner to respond in damages for the wilful failure of the
mine manager and mine examiner to comply with the
requirements of the statute was not in harmony with the
principles of the common law applicable to the relation
of master and servant, it being competent for the state
to change and modify those principles in accord with its
conceptions of public policy, it cannot be inferred that the
selection of mine owners as a class upon which to impose
the liability in question was purely arbitrary and with-
out reason. This view adequately disposes of the conten-
tion that, by the statute, the mine owner was denied the
equal protection of the laws. Wilmington Star Mining
Co. V. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60.
§ 519. State regulation of the sale of patented articles.
The Arkansas statute exempting merchants and dealers
who sell patented things in the usual course of business
from the requirement that a negotiable instrument taken
in payment of a patented article show on its face for
what it was given or be void, does not render such statute
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, as denying the
equal protection of the laws. The validity of this statute
of Arkansas was afiSrmed by the Supreme Court in Woods
V. Carl, 203 U. S. 358, and the validity of statutes of a
somewhat similar nature was affirmed in Allen v. Biley,
203 U. S. 347. It was sought to avoid the authority of
the decision of the court on the statute by asserting that
nothing was therein decided except the validity of the
Ist section of the act, and that the validity of the act when
considered in connection with the 4th section was not
argued or decided. The 4th section reads as follows:
§ 519 POLICE POWER 783
**This act shall not apply to merchants and dealers who
sell patented things in the usual course of business. ' ' The
exception contained in this section does not render the
statute invalid. The plain purpose of the whole statute
is to create and enforce a proper police regulation. Its
passage showed that the legislature was of opinion that
fraud and imposition were frequent in the sale of prop-
erty of- this nature, except in the cases mentioned in § 4,
and that the temptations to false representations in
regard to the virtues and value of the article sold were
also frequently yielded to. When the sale of the article
was effected by such representations, and a note given
for the amount of the sale, a transfer of the note to a
bona fide purchaser for value before its maturity pre-
vented the vendee from showing the fraud by which the
sale had been accomplished. In order to reach such a
transaction and to permit the vendee to show the fraud,
the statute was passed. It was doubtless thought that
merchants and dealers, as mentioned in the statute, while
dealing with the patented things in the manner stated,
would not be so likely to make representations or engage
in a fraud to effect a sale, as those covered by the statute.
The various itinerant venders of patented articles, whose
fluency of speech and carelessness regarding the truth of
their representations might almost be said to have become
proverbial, were, of course^ in the mind of the legislature,
and were included in this legislation. Cases may be imag-
ined where this general classification separating mer-
chants and dealers from the rest of the people might be
regarded as not suflSciently comprehensive. It is because
such imaginary and unforeseen cases are so rare and
exceptional as to have been overlooked that the general
classification ought not to be rendered invalid. In such
case there is really no substantial denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws within the meaning of the amendment.
A legislature ought not to be required to provide for
every imaginable and exceptional case at the risk of hav-
ing its legislation declared void, so long as there is no
784 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 519
substantial and fair ground to say that the statute makes
an unreasonable and unfounded general classification^
and thereby denies to any person the equal protection of
the laws. In a classification for govenunental purposes
there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons
and things. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County National
Bank, 207 U. S. 25L
§ 520. Prohibiting diverting water beyond state. The
New Jersey statute imder which a riparian owner mar
be prevented from diverting the waters of a stream of the
state into any other state, for use therein, denies neither
due process of law nor the equal protection of the laws.
It is recognized that the state, as quasi-sovereign and
representing the interests of the pubUc, has a standing in
court to protect the atmosphere, the water, and the for-
ests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or
dissent of the private owners of the land most inmiedi-
ately concerned. Few public interests are more obvious,
indisputable, and independent of particular theory than
the interest of the public of a state to maintain the rivers
that are wholly within it substantially imdiminished,
except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the
public welfare may permit for the purpose of turning
them to a more perfect use. . . . The private prop-
erty of riparian owners cannot have deeper roots than
the public interest. It is quite beyond any rational view
of riparian rights, that an agreement, of no matter what
private owners, could sanction the diversion of an impor-
tant stream outside the boundaries of the state in which
it flows. The private right to appropriate is subject not
only to the rights of the lower owners, but to the initial
limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of
the great foundations of public welfare and health. What
the state has it may keep and give no one a reason for its
will. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S.
349.
§ 521 POLICE POWER 785
§ 52L Regulating sales in bulk. The Connecticut stat-
ute avoiding as against creditors, sales by retail dealers
of their entire stock at a single transaction, and not in
the regular course of business, unless notice of the inten-
tion to make such sale be recorded seven days before its
consummation, does not deny the equal protection of the
laws, but is a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. A state has the right under the police power to
regulate the manner of disposing of a stock in trade out-
side of the regular course of business, by methods which
if uncontrolled are often resorted to for the consumma-
tion of fraud, to the injury of innocent creditors. A
retail dealer who owes no debts may lawfully sell his
entire stock without giving the required notice. One who
is indebted may make a valid sale without such notice, by
paying his debts, even after the sale is made. Insolvent
and fraudulent vendors are those who will be chiefly
affected by the act, and it is for the protection of credi-
tors against sales by them of their entire stock at a single
transaction, and not in the regular course of business, that
its provisions are aimed. It is of course possible that an
honest and solvent retail dealer might, in consequence of
the required notice before the sale, lose an opportunity of
selling his business, or suffer some loss from the delay of
a sale, occasioned by the giving of such notice. But a
* * possible application to extreme cases ' ' is not the test of
the reasonableness of public rules and regulations.
Because the conditions apply only to retail dealers, it is
urged that the necessary effect of the statute is, as to such
dealers, to give rise to a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. The contention is without merit. The court
below, in its opinion, pointed out that the statute did not
cause sales which were made without compliance with its
requirements to be absolutely void, but made them simply
voidable, at the instance of those who were creditors at
the time the sales were made. The unsoundness of the
contention is additionally shown by the number of cases
in state courts of last resort, sustaining statutes of a
Due Process — ^50
786 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 521
similar nature. Twenty states^ as well as the Federal
government in the District of Columbia^ have similar
statutes, some with more stringent provisions, and all
aimed at the suppression of an evil that is thus shown to
be almost universal. As the statute makes a classificar
tion based upon a reasonable distinction, and one which
has been generally applied in the exertion of the police
power over the subject, there is no foundation for the
proposition that the result of the enforcement of the stat-
ute will be to deny the equal protection of the laws.
Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489.
§522. Prahibiting drumming on carriers' premise.
The Arkansas act could single out hotels, lodging houses,
eating houses, bath houses, physicians, masseurs, sur-
geons, or other medical practitioners, as the business and
professions to which should be made applicable the pro-
visions of the statute forbidding the drunumng or solicita-
tion of business or patronage on railway trains and prem-
ises of common carriers, without making such statute
invalid, as denying the equal protection of the laws to the
business and professions mentioned. The state supreme
court in passing on the case said : ' ' The legislature, in
framing this statute, met a condition which existed, and
not an imaginary or improbable one. The class of drum-
mers or solicitors mentioned in the act are doubtless the
only ones who ply their vocation to any extent on railroad
trains. It is rare that the commercial drunmier finds
opportunity to meet customers and solicit trade on trains,
therefore the lawmakers deemed it unnecessary to legis-
late against an occasional act of that kind." Williams
V. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79.
§523. Regulating sale of explosives. The exception in
favor of existing contracts, contained in the Kansas stat-
ute making it criminal to sell or deliver black powder for
use in any coal mines in the state except in original sealed
packages containing 12 ^^ pounds of powder, does not
§ 525 POLICE POWBB 787
make such statute repugnant to the Federal Constitution,
as denying the equal protection of the laws. The pur-
pose of the statute is to provide for the safety of coal
mining operations, and if it may be said that whatever
danger can come from packages of powder will come
from them regardless of the date of the contract under
which they may be delivered, there are nevertheless other
considerations to be taken into account. The statute is
criminal. A retrospective operation of it was to be
avoided, — ^might, indeed, be illegal At any rate, it was
a matter properly to be considered by the legislature in
distinguishing between contracts made before the pas-
sage of the law and those made after its passage. The
former might not be numerous, their evil would be tempo-
rary ; and certainly legislation which makes acts criminal
which are done after they are forbidden, and assigns no
penalties to acts done in pursuance of obligations legally
incurred, is not arbitrary classification, and a classifica-
tion which is not arbitrary is not repugnant to the Con-
stitution of the United States. Williams v. Walsh, 222
U. S. 415.
§524 Prohibiting billiard or pool rooms. A municipal
ordinance prohibiting the keeping of billiard or pool
table3 for hire or publia use does not deny the equal pro-
tection of the laws because hotel keepers are permitted to
maintain a billiard or pool room in which their regular
and registered guests may play. Ordinances prohibiting
the keeping of billiard halls have many times been sus-
tained by the courts. If there is no reasonable basis for
making a distinction, as is here done, between hotels with
twenty-five rooms, and those with twenty-four rooms or
less, the plaintiff in error was not in a position to com-
plain, because not being the owner of a hotel of the
smaller sort, he did not suffer from the alleged dis-
crimination. Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623.
§ 525. Regulation of junk dealers. A New York stat-
ute does not deny to junk dealers the equal protection of
788 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 525
the laws, which law as construed by the highest court of
the state, makes it a criminal offense for a dealer in or
collector of junk, metals, or secondhand materials, to buy
or receive any stolen wire, cable, copper, lead, solder,
iron or brass used by or belonging to a railroad, tele-
phone, telegraph, gas, or electric light company, without
making diligent inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the person selling or delivering it has a legal
right to do so. The argument that the classification in
this case is arbitrary, because pladng junk dealers in a
class by themselves, needs no answer beyond a reference
to the well-known fact, alluded to by the New York court
of appeals in its opinion, that junk dealers provide an
important market for stolen merchandise of the kinds
mentioned, and that because of their experience they are
peculiarly fitted to detect whether property offered is
stolen. The state court said as follows: ''The legisla-
ture is presumed to have been familiar with current his-
tory and the decisions of the courts, which show that
property of a certain kind, such as copper, brass, iron,
etc., is frequently stolen from railroad, telegraph, and
similar corporations, which cannot adequately protect it
because it is scattered through the country along exten-
sive lines of transportation or communication, and which
is exposed to view and caption by the evil-minded, who
find their best market in the shops of certain junk
dealers. '' This expression is sufficient defense to any
criticism based upon alleged illogical and arbitrary dis-
tinctions against junk dealers. Rosenthal v. New York,
226 U. S. 260.
§526. Requiring connection with sewer vytstem. An
ordinance adopted under legislative authority by an
inland town containing less than 6,000 inhabitants, by
which the owners of property abutting upon any street
along which sewer mains had been laid were required to
install water closets in their houses, and connect the same
with the main sewer pipe within thirty days of the pas-
§ 527 POLICE POWER 789
sage of the ordinance, under penalty of fine and imprison-
ment for noncompjiiancey is a valid exercise of the police
power, and does not, although* affording no notice or
opportunity to be heard, deny either due process of law
or the equal protection of the laws. It is the commonest
exercise of the police power of a state or city to provide
for a system of sewers, and to compel property owners
to connect therewith. And this duty may be enforced by
criminal penalties. It may be that an arbitrary exercise
of the power could be restrained, but it would have to be
palpably so to justify a court with interfering with so
salutary a power and one so necessary to the public
health. Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U. S. 303.
§527. Milk ordinance requiring tuberculin test for
dairy cattle. Milk drawn from cows outside the city is
not unconstitutionally discriminated against by a munici-
pal ordinance prohibiting its shipment into the city unless
the cows shall first have been subjected to the tuberculin
test and an ofScial certificate of their freedom from
tuberculosis or other contagious diseases filed with the
health ofiScer, while the regulations relative to cows
within the city forbid the sale of milk from sick or dis-
eased cows, and contemplate inspection by the health
ofiScer, and the application by him of any known test to
determine whether the animal inspected is afflicted with
tuberculosis, and the removal by him of any diseased
animal to a place where it will not spread infection.
Inspection and care, therefore, can be applied to the ani-
mals within the city, and also to the milk drawn from
such animals. It cannot be applied to animals kept Out-
side of the city. It could only be applied to the milk
drawn from such animals, which would be practically
impossible. This is a sufficient basis for separate legis-
lation relating to milk shipped into the city. The differ-
ent situations of the animals require different regula-
tions. The requirements are not unreasonable ; they are
properly adaptive to the conditions. They are not dis-
790 DUE PBOCESS OP LAW § 527
criminatory ; they have proper relation to the pnrpose to
be accomplished. That purpose and the necessity for it
cannot be questioned in the court of last resort. Adams v.
Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572.
§528. Ooardinj^ open shafts. The Illinois statute
requiring the indosure by a substantial barrier of shafts
or openings in the floors of a building in the course of
construction through which is operated an elevator or
hoist for the purpose of lifting materials to be used in
such construction, does not deny the equal protection of
the laws because the act does not require other unen-
closed openings in the buildings or outside hoists to be
guarded, nor because it distinguishes in § 6 between build-
ings in cities and buildings in villages, and makes a dis-
tinction in § § 2 and 3 between houses used exclusively for
private residences and other structures as to the strength
of the supports for joists. It was contended that danger
was the test, and the classification of the statute, not
having relation to its purpose, was arbitrary. There
may be degrees of danger and a difference in degree may
justify classification. The question is one for the legis-
lature to decide, informed, no doubt, by experience, of
conditions, and fortified by presumptions of legality, and
confirmed, besides, by the opinion of the supreme court
of the state. The legislation cannot be judged by abstract
or theoretical comparisons. . . . It must be presumed
that it was induced by actual experience. The legislative
judgment even if disputable or crude is not subject to
judicial review. The crudities or even injustice of state
laws are not redressed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The law may not be the best that can be drawn, and might
have been more complete if it had gone further, but plain-
tiff in error is not discriminated against. All in its situa-
tion are treated alike. What the statute enjoins, it
enjoins not only of plaintiff in error, but of all similarly
situated. What it does not enjoin, plaintiff in error can-
not complain of. The distinction made by other sections
§ 530 POLICE POWER 791
are within the power of classification which the legisla-
ture possesses. Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Fraley,
228 U. S. 680.
§ 529. Regulating entries in coal mines. The Indiana
statute singling out bituminous coal mines and omitting
block coal mines when requiring entries to be made of
not less than a prescribed width does not deny the equal
protection of the laws. The equal protection of the laws
requires laws of like application to all similarly situated ;
but in selecting some classes and leaving out others the
legislature, while it keeps within this principle, is, and
may be, allowed wide discretion. ... It is the prov-
ince of the legislature to make the laws, and of the courts
to enforce them. The legislature is permitted to make a
reasonable classification, and before a court can inter-
fere with the exercise of its judgment, it must be able to
say * ' that there is no fair reason for the law that would
not require with equal force its extension to others whom
it leaves untouched. * ' There is a great difference in the
production and number of mines between what are called
the block veins of coal and the bituminous veins of coal
existing in the state, and also the different depths at
which coal is mined in the strata of block and bituminous
coal. Eeviewing all these differences, with the relative
output, relative number of mines and persons employed,
the courts were unable to say that the application of. the
law to bituminous coal mines and the omission of block
coal mines was such arbitrary discrimination as to render
the act unconstitutional. The supreme court of the state
said, *'to doubt its constitutionality is to resolve in favor
of its constitutionality. * ' Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26.
§530. Municipal water supply. A charter amend-
ment dealing with the municipal construction, acquisi-
tion, maintenance, and operation of a water plant, with
special reference to the acquisition of the existing pri-
vately owned waterworks system, does not deny the equal
792 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 530
protection of the laws to the waterworks company whose
franchise has expired, because it leaves all other public
utilities to be dealt with under general charter provisions
and cuts off all opportunity to obtain future franchises to
occupy and use the city streets for the purpose of supply-
ing water to the city and its inhabitants^ while leaving full
opportunity to obtain such franchises for other purposes,
such as supplying light, heat, power, transportation, or
telephone service. The equal protection clause is directed
against arbitrary discrimination ; that is, such as is with-
out any reasonable basis. It does not prevent a city from
applying the scheme of municipal ownership and main-
tenance to one public utility without applying it to all;
nor does it prevent a city, owning and maintaining a
municipal water plant, from refusing to grant franchises
which will bring privately owned plants into competition
with its own. There is nothing unequal in this in the
sense of that clause. Denver v. New York Trust Co.,
229 U. S. 123.
§ 631. Employment of minors in hasardous occnpationB.
The Dlinois statute prohibiting the employment of chil-
dren under the age of sixteen years in hazardous occupa-
tions, does not contravene the guaranty in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the equal protection of the laws. The
classification established by the statute was clearly within
the legislative power. Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. v. Bean-
champ, 231 U. S. 320.
§532. Prohibiting possession of firearms by alien. The
legislative assumption that unnaturalized foreign-bom
residents are peculiarly a source of danger to wild life
cannot be said to be so unwarranted as to invalidate,
as denying the equal protection of the laws, the provisions
of Pennsylvania Laws 1909, No. 261, p. 466, prohibiting
the killing of any wild bird or animal by any such foreign-
born person except in defense of person or property, and
**to that end** making it unlawful for any such person to
§ 533 POLICE POWER 793
own or be possessed of a shotgun or rifle. If the lawful
object of the statute, the protection of wild life, warrants
the discrimination against the alien, the means adopted
for making it effective also might be adopted. The pos-
session of rifles and shotguns is not necessary for other
purposes not within the statute. It is so peculiarly appro-
priated to the forbidden use that if such a use may be
denied to this class, the possession of the instruments
desired chiefly for that end also may be. The prohibition
does not extend to weapons such as pistols that may be
supposed to be needed occasionally for self-defense. The
discrimination undoubtedly presents a more diflScult ques-
tion. A state may classify with reference to the evil to
be prevented, and if the class discriminated against is or
reasonably might be considered to define those from
whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be
picked out. A lack of abstract synunetry does not mat-
ter. The question is a practical one, dependent upon
experience. It is not enough to invalidate the law that
others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a
ipatter of fact, it is found that the danger is character-
istic of the class named. That is a question of local expe-
rience, and a reviewing court should be very slow to
declare that the state legislature was wrong in its facts.
The Supreme Court declared it had no such knowledge
of local conditions as to be able to say that it was mani-
festly wrong. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 134.
§533. Prohibiting sales by itinerant vendors. The
Louisiana statute prohibiting the sale by itinerant ven-
dors of **any drug, nostrum, ointment, or application of
any kind intended for the treatment of disease or injury,'*
does not violate the equal protection or due process of
law clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, although the
sale of such articles by other persons is permitted. That
the state had authority to pass such statute is made mani-
fest by the previous ruling in Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S.
296, and the authorities there cited. The power which the
794 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 533
state government possessed to classify and regulate itin-
erant vendors or peddlers, exerted in the statute here con-
sideredy is cumulatively sustained and made, if possible,
more obviously lawful by the fact that the regulation in
question deals with the selling by itinerant vendors or
peddlers of drugs or medicinal compounds, — objects
plainly within the power of government to regulate.
Baocus V. Louisiana, 232 TJ. S. 334.
§ 634. Prescription. The equal protection of the laws
is not denied by confining to Spanish and Mexican grants
the provisions of New Mexico Comp. Laws, 1865, chap. 73,
§ 1 Comp. Laws, 1897, § 2937, under which ten years' pos-
session of land under a deed purporting to convey a fee
simple gives title in fee to the quantity of land specified
in the deed if, during the ten years, no claim by suit in
law or equity, effectually prosecuted, shall have been set
up. There very well may have been grounds for the dis-
crimination in favor of Spanish and Mexican grants in the
history of those grants and the greater probability of an
attempt to revive stale claims, as is explained by the
supreme court of New Mexico. Montoya v. Gonzales,
232 U. S. 375.
§ 535. Regulation of livery stables. A municipal ordi-
nance passed under authority delegated by the legisla-
ture is a state law within the meaning of the Federal Con-
stitution; and any enactment, from whatever source
originating, to which the state gives the force of law, is
a statute of the state within the meaning of the Judicial
Code, § 237, which confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court. It is clearly within the police power of the state
to regulate livery stables, and to that end to declare that
in particular circumstances and in particular localities a
livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in
law, provided this power is not exerted arbitrarily, or
with unjust discrimination, so as to infringe upon rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The general
§ 536 POLICE POWEB 795
subject of the regulation of livery stables, with respect
to their location and the manner in which they are to be
conducted in a thickly populated city, is well within the
range of the power of the state to legislate for the health
and general welfare of the people. While such regula-
tions are subject to judicial scrutiny, yet a considerable
latitude of discretion must be accorded to the lawmaking
power; and so long as the regulation in question is not
shown to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and
operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situated in
the particular district, the district itself not appearing to
have been arbitrarily selected, it cannot be judicially
declared that there is a deprivation of property without
due process of law, or a denial of the equal protection of
the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Beinman v. Little Bock, 237 U. S. 171.
§ 536. Workmen's compensation law. Employers hav-
ing five or more employees are not denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws because their failure to comply with
the terms of the Ohio workmen's compensation act
(1 Page & Adams Anno. Gen, Code (Ohio) §§1464
et seq.) by paying into a state insurance fund, thereby
created, the premiums required by that act, deprives them
in negligence suits of the defenses of contributory
negligence, assumed risk, and the negligence of fellow
servants, while those employing four or less employees
are still privileged to make either or all of these defenses.
The main argument against the law was based on the
alleged discrimination between establishments employing
five and those employing a less number of employees.
The Supreme Court has many times affirmed the general
proposition that it is not the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the equal protection clause to take from
the state the right and power to classify the subjects of
legislation. It is only when such attempted classification
is arbitrary and unreasonable that the court can declare
it beyond the legislative authority. Lindsley v. Natural
796 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 536
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. That a law may work
hardship and ineqnality is not enough. Many valid laws,
from the generality of their application, necessarily do
that, and the legislature must be allowed a wide field of
choice in determining the subject-matter of its laws, what
shall come within them, and what shall be excluded.
Classification of industries with reference to police regu-
lations have been sustained in the Supreme Court. Con-
solidated Coal Co. V. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203. In that case
an inspection law of the state was sustained which applied
only to coal mines employing five or more men at one
time. This case was cited with approval in McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, where a law regulating the pay-
ment of wages in coal mines in Arkansas was sustained
though made applicable only in mines where not less than
ten miners were employed. The state has the right to
pass police regulations based upon differences in num-
bers, and the judgment of the state, fixing the dividing
line, if fairly and reasonably exercised, makes the law.
The classification in this case was not of that arbitrary
and unreasonable nature which denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws. Jeffry Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571.
§ 537. Eight-hour law for women employed in hotels.
A California statute including hotels among the specified
establishments in which women must not be employed
more than eight hours in one day, or forty-eight hours in
one week, does not render the statute invalid as dis-
criminatory, although the classification may, to some
extent, be based upon the nature of the employer's busi-
ness, rather than the character of the employee's work.
Exempting women employed in harvesting, curing, can-
ning, or drying any variety of perishable fruit or vegeta-
ble, from the operation of the same statute does not
render the statute invalid as unreasonably disciimina-
tory. The state may forbid women employed in hotels
from working more than eight hours in one day, or forty-
eight hours in one week, without imposing a similar
S 637 POLICE POWEB 797
restriction upon those employed in boarding honses, lodg-
ing houses, etCy or upon such classes of women employees
as stenographers, clerks, and assistants employed by
the professional classes, and domestic servants. The
Supreme Court had upheld state laws limiting the work-
ing hours of women in certain establishments to ten hours
a day, or fifty-four hours a week, and declared it was
manifestly impossible in this case to say that the statute
of California providing for an eight hour day, or a maxi-
mum forty-eight hours a week took the case out of the
domain of legislative discretion. Not that the limitation
of the hours of labor for women might not be pushed to
a wholly indefensible extreme, but there was no ground
for the conclusion here that the limit of the reasonable
exertion of protective authority had been overstepped.
As to the objections to the act urged upon the ground of
unreasonable discrimination, the legislature is not
debarred from classifying according to general considera-
tions and with regard to prevailing conditions; other-
wise, there could be no legislative power to classify. It
is always possible by analysis to discover inequalities as
to some persons or things embraced within any specified
class. A classification based simply on a general descrip-
tion would bring within the class widely differing indi-
vidual instances. The legislature may take these differ-
ences into account and make practical groupings which
will fairly present a separate class. Such groupings may
be made with respect to the general nature of the busi-
ness in which the work is performed, where the distinc-
tion based on the nature of the business is not an unrea-
sonable one. The court was not able to perceive any
reason why the state's power to limit hours of labor
might be upheld with respect to women in a millinery
establishment, and denied as to chambermaid in a hotel.
The objections to the exemptions of the statute ignore the
well-established principle that the legislature is not
bound, in order to support the constitutional validity of
its regulation, to extend it to all cases which it might
798 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 537
possibly reach. If the law hits an evil where it is most
felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it mi^ht have been applied. Miller v.
WUson, 236 U. S. 373.
§538. Classification of women employees — ^Honn of
labor. The state may forbid women employed in hos-
pitals to work more than eight hours in one day, or forty-
eight hours in one week, without imposing a similar
restriction upon women employed in similar employments
elsewhere. Exempting graduate nurses in hospitals from
the operation of a statute forbidding the employment of
women in certain specified establishments for more than
eight hours in one day, or forty-eight hours in one week,
does not render the statute invalid as unreasonably dis-
criminatory, although such prohibition applies to student
nurses in hospital training schools, to experienced nurses,
to graduate women pharmacists and other hospital em-
ployees, such as matrons, seamstresses, bookkeepers,
office assistants, and those engaged in household work. It
may be that the difference in qualifications between a
graduate nurse and an ** experienced nurse*' is a differ-
ence of technical education only, but that difference exists
and is not to be brushed aside. It is one of which the
legislature could take cognizance. Not only so, but as
such nurses act as overseers of wards or assistants to
surgeons and physicians, it would be manifestly proper
for the legislature to recognize an exigency with respect
to their employment making it advisable to take them out
of the general prohibition. With regard to the graduate
pharmacist, while she had "Been graduated from a course
of training for her chosen vocation, it is a different voca-
tion. The work is not the same. There is no relation to
the supervision of the wards, and putting mere matters
of expediency aside, there is no basis for concluding that
the legislature was without power to treat the difference
as a ground of classification. Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236
U. S. 385.
§ 539 POLICE POWER 799
§ 639. Control of liquor traffic. An ordinance of the
city and county of San Francisco, which regulates the
issuing of a license to sell liquors and wines in quantities
less than one quart, and which provides that any one sell-
ing without a license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
does not deny the equal protection of the laws, nor
abridge the privileges and immunities of a citizen, con-
trary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. Plaintiff in error relied on Yick
Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, but that case was essen-
tially different from this case, the ordinance there held
invalid vesting uncontrolled discretion in the board of
supervisors with reference to a business harmless in itself
and useful to the community ; and the discretion appear-
ing to have been exercised for the express purpose of
depriving the petitioner of a privilege that was extended
to others. In the present case the business is not one that
any person is permitted to carry on without a license, but
one that may be entirely prohibited or subjected to such
restrictions as the governing authority of the city may
prescribe. Discretionary authority was given the police
commissioners to issue or refuse a license, and their
refusal to grant is not a matter of judicial review, as it
violates no principle of Federal law, it appearing that
such discretion was not exercised arbitrarily. Crowley v.
Christensen, 137 U. S. 86.
The Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to inter-
fere with the power of the state to protect the lives, lib-
erty, and property of its citizens, and to protect their
health, morals, education, and good order. It was not
intended to compel the state to adopt an iron rule of
equality as to taxation, nor to prevent the classification
of property for taxation at different rates, nor to pro-
hibit legislation in that regard, special, whether in the
extent to which it operates or the objects sought to be
obtained by it. It is enough that there is no discrimina-
tion in favor of one as against another of the same class.
When a state statute affects all persons in the state
800 DUE PBOCESS OP LAW § 539
engaged in the sale of liquors in exactly the same manner
and degree, it is not in violation of the United States
Constitution. Whether considered as imposing restric-
tions upon the sale in the exercise of the police power of
the state, or as levying taxes upon occupations under
authority of the legislature in that behalf, petitioner was
not arbitrarily deprived of his property nor denied the
equal protection of the laws. Repeated decisions of the
Supreme Court have determined that such legislation is
not in violation of the Constitution. Giozza v. Tieman,
148 U. S. 657.
The exemption of sales of intoxicating liquors by the
manufacturer at the manufactory in quantities of 1 gallon
or more, which is made by the Ohio law, known as the
Dow law, being applicable to such sales made at any
manufactory in the state, without regard to the residence,
citizenship, or domicile of the person, copartnership or
corporation which owns the plant, does not constitute an
illegal discrimination against a foreign corporation which
has its manufactory in another state. The exemption is
not confined to Ohio corporations or copartnerships, but
extends as well to foreign corporations whose place of
manufacturing is within the state of Ohio; and, likewise,
the tax is imposed on Ohio corporations which manufac-
ture goods in other states, and establish places for their
sales within the state of Ohio, or which, manufacturing
within the state, establish places within the state distinct
from the manufactory, where their liquors are sold and
delivered. There appears no intention on the part of the
state legislature to make a hostile discrimination against
foreign corporations. It was for the legislature to deter-
mine the form of the liquor traffic that required to be
regulated as a source of evil. It in a measure drew a line
between a distillery and a brewery on one hand and a
saloon on the other. There is nothing unreal in the dis-
tinction. The judgment and opinion of the court in effect
held, though there was no specific reference thereto, that
the statute complained of did not deny the equal proteo-
§ 539 POLICE POWER 801 *
tion of the laws. Eeymann Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179
U. S. 445.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion is not violated in the provisions of the Texas local
option law, which makes a majority vote which make the
prohibition of the liquor traflSc in a county or precinct a
bar to the resubmission of the question to the voters of
any political subdivision thereof until after prohibition
has been defeated at a subsequent election in the entire
county or precinct, while the failure to carry prohibition
in a county ifi no bar to the immediate resubmission of the
question to the voters of its political subdivisions, and the
corresponding failure in town or city is no bar to the
immediate resubmission of the question to the voters of
the larger territory. The statute discriminates in favor
of those who vote for prohibition; and the argument is
that since the legislature was not authorized to pass a pro-
hibitory law, but was required to leave the question to a
local vote, it necessarily created a pure democracy to that
extent, and therefore could not interfere with the equal-
ity of the voters in their right to propose or carry a law.
Mr. Justice Holmes in delivering the opinion of the court
said: **Many questions would have to be answered
before so speculative a piece of ratiocination could be
followed. But we think it may be dealt with in short
space, so far as is necessary to decide this case." The
question is that of the power of the state as a whole.
The state has the power to prohibit the sale of intoxicat-
ing liquors altogether, if it sees fit (Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U. S. 623), and that being so it has power to prohibit
it conditionally. It does not infringe the Constitution by
giving those in favor of the sale a chance which it might
have denied. The state has absolute power over the sub-
ject. It does not abridge that power by adopting the form
of reference to a local vote. ... It may favor pro-
hibition to just such degree as it chooses, and to that end
may let in a local vote upon the subject as much or as
little as it may please. There is no such overmastering
Due Proceas — ^51
802 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 539
consideration of expediency attaching everywhere and
always to the form of voting, still less is there any such
principle to be drawn from the Fourteenth Amendment,
as requires the two sides of a vote on prohibition to be
treated with equal favor by the state, the subject-matter
of the vote being wholly within the state's control
Bippey v, Texas, 193 U. S. 504.
A state local option law does not deny a retail liquor
dealer the equal protection of the laws because it excepts
from its operation druggists, manufacturers, persons
who give away liquors in their private dwellings, and
railway corporations dispensing liquors in dining and
buffet cars under state license. The equal protection of
the laws is not denied by a state local option law under
which the traffic in intoxicating liquors may be made a
crime in certain territory and permitted elsewhere. An
objection that the equal protection of the laws is denied
to alleged violators of a state local option law because
the selection of the jurors for the trial of such offenses
is not restricted, as in other cases, to the district in which
they are committed, cannot be raised in advance of the
trial. The exceptions to the statute constitute the
inequalities upon whidi plaintiff in error attacks the law.
He is not one of the excepted classes. He is a retail
dealer in liquor. If, between his occupation and the
excepted occupation, there is such difference as to justify
a difference of legislation, necessarily he cannot com-
plain ; and the Supreme Court thought there was a mani-
fest difference. It was further urged that to make an
act a crime in certain territory and permit it outside of
such territory is to deny to the citizens of the state the
equal operation of the criminal laws ; and this he charges
against, and makes a ground of objection to, the Ohio
statute. This objection goes to the power of the state to
pass a local option law; which is not an open question.
The Supreme Court held in Cronin v. Adams, 192 TJ. S.
108, affirming prior cases, that the sale of liquor by retail
may be absolutely prohibited by a state. That being so
§ 540 POLICE POWER 803
the power to prohibit it conditionally was asserted, and
the local option law of the state of Texas was sustained.
Rippey V, Texas, 193 U. S. 504. Plaintiff objects to the
method of selection of jurors, provided by the law. He
had, however, not yet been tried, and he cannot complain
on this score until he is made to suffer. Ohio ex rel.
Lloyd V. DoUison, 194 U. S. 445.
The Michigan local option law permitting the sale of
intoxicating liquors by druggists for medicinal, art, scien-
tific, and mechanical purposes, while forbidding its sale
by merchants, does not deny the equal protection of the
laws. The contention that this is an unlawful discrimina-
tion is answered by Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 ; Rippey
V. Texas, 193 U. S. 504 ; Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison,
194 U. S. 447. Those cases show that the state may pro-
hibit the sale of liquor absolutely or conditionally; may
prohibit the sale as a beverage, and permit the sale for
medicinal and like purposes ; that it may prohibit the sale
by merchants and permit the sale by licensed druggists.
Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 700.
§ 5^. Imposing attorneys' fees and penalties. A state
statute imposing an attorney *s fee not to exceed $10, in
addition to costs, upon raUroad corporations omitting to
pay certain claims within a certain time after presenta-
tion, which applies to no other corporations or individuals
is unconstitutional as denying to them the equal protec-
tion of the laws. Corporations are citizens within the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; and a state
has no more power to deny to them the equal protection
of the law than it has to individual citizens. Classifica-
tion to relieve a law from the charge of a denial of equal
protection cannot be made arbitrarily, but must be based
upon some difference which bears a proper and just rela-
tion to the attempted classification. The single question
involved is the constitutionality of the act allowing attor-
neys* fees. Only against railroad companies is such
exaction made, and only in certain cases. Considering
804 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 540
the statute as a whole, it is simply one imposing a penalty
upon railroad corporations for a failure to pay certain
detiS. No individuals are thus punished, and no other
corporations. They are not treated as other debtors, or
equally with other debtors. They do not stand equal
before the law. They do not receive its equal protection.
There might be no impropriety in giving to every sno-
cessf ul suitor attorneys ' fees, but before a distinction is
made between debtors and one be punished for a failure
to pay his debts, while another is permitted to become in
like manner delinquent without any punishment, there
must be some difference in the obligation to i>ay, some
reason why the duty of payment is more imperative in
the one instance than in the other. The penalty is not
imposed on all corporations, but only upon railroads.
Any classification of such corporations for the imposi-
tion of special duties peculiar to the business in which
they are engaged, is a just classification, and not one
within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment.
All the cases sustaining such classification proceed upon
the theory of a special duty resting upon railroad cor-
porations by reason of the business in which they are
engaged. It is all done in the exercise of the police power
of the state. But a mere statute to compel the payment
of indebtedness does not come within the scope of police
regulations. The hazardous business of railroading car-
ries with it no special necessity for the prompt payment
of debts. Neither can the statute be sustained as a proper
means of enforcing the payment of small debts and pre-
venting any unnecessary litigation in respect to them,
because it does not impose the penalty in all cases where
the amount in controversy is within the limit named m
the statute. The statute arbitrarily singles out one class
of debtors and punishes it for a failure to perform duties
which are equally obligatory upon all debtors. Arbitrary
selection can never be justified by calling it classification.
The equal protection demanded by the Fourteenth
A^mendment forbids this. In all cases it must be made to
§ 540 POLICE POWER 805
appear not only that a classification has been made bat
that it is one based upon some reasonable ground — ^some
difference which bears a just and proper relation to the
attempted classification — ^and is not a mere arbitrary-
selection. Tested by these principles the statute in con-
troversy cannot be sustained. Gulf, Colorado & Santa
Fe R. Co. V. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150.
The equal protection of the laws is not denied to life
or health insurance companies by the provisions of the
Texas statute imposing on such companies, upon failing
to pay a loss within the time specified in the policy, after
demand therefor, a liability to the holder of the policy,
in addition to the amount of the loss, of 12 per cent dam-
ages and reasonable attorneys' fees, although such obli-
gation is not imposed upon other classes of insurance
companies or associations, such as fire, marine and inland
insurance companies, and on mutual benefit and relief
organizations doing business through lodges and mutual
relief benevolent associations. The contention is that the
classification is so arbitrary, so destitute of reasonable
basis, as to be obnoxious to constitutional objecjtion. It,
is apparent that this particular liability amounted to one
of the conditions on which life and health insurance com-
panies were permitted to do business in Texas, and the
power of the state in the matter of the imposition of con-
ditions on its own and foreign corporations has been
repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court. Even if
this condition did not apply the statute is not open to
constitutional objection. Citing Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co. V. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96. The ground for placing
life and health insurance companies in a different class
from fire, marine and inland insurance companies is
obvious, and putting them in a different class from mutual
benefit and relief associations doing business through
lodges, and benevolent associations of the character men-
tioned in the Texas statutes, is not an arbitrary classifi-
cation, but rests on sufficient reason. The legislature evi-
dently intended to distinguish between life and health
806 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 540
insurance companies engaged in business for profit (and
it is not necessary to refine as to the distribution of such
profits) and lodges and associations of a mutual benefit
or benevolent character, having in mind also the neces-
sity of the prompt payment of the insurance money in
very many cases, in order to provide the means of living
of which the beneficiaries had been deprived by the death
of the insured. Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Met-
tier, 185 U. S. 308.
The Texas statute authorizing the recovery of damages
and attorneys' fees for failure by life and health insur-
ance companies to pay losses is not repugnant to the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws, made by
the Federal Constitution. Plaintiff in error urges the
unconstitutionality of the Texas statute in such cases not-
withstanding the decision of the court in Fidelity Mut.
L. Ass *n V. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308. It is insisted, however,
that to justify a recovery of the statutory damages
demand of payment of the policy before suit was neces-
sary, notwithstanding the denial of liability by the com-
,pany. This contention was sustained by the Texas court,
but it was held that demand could be made after suit and
set up by an amended petition as an original suit. The
Supreme Court adopted this construction of the state
statute. Iowa Life Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 187 U. S. 335.
The equal protection of the laws is not denied insur-
ance companies by the provisions of the Nebraska statute
allowing a reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff in case
of the unsuccessful defense by an insurance company of a
suit on a policy of insurance covering real property which
has been totally destroyed by the causes insured against.
The statute is assailed as repugnant to the equality clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it arbitrarily sub-
jects insurance companies to the liability for attorneys'
fees when other defendants in other classes of cases are
not so subjected ; that it imposes no such burden on the
plaintiff when the suit is successfully defended; and,
because the statute arbitrarily distinguishes between
§ 540 POLICE POWER 807
insurance policies on real property and policies on other
kinds of property. Each and all of these objections must
rest on the assumption that contracts of insurance,
generically considered, do not possess such distinctive
attributes as to justify their classification separate from
other contracts, and that contracts of insurance, as
between themselves, may not be classified separately
depending upon the nature of the insurance, the char-
acter of the property covered, and the extent of the loss
which may have supervened. But the unsoundness of
these propositions is settled by the previous adjudications
of the Supreme Court in Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs,
172 TJ. S. 557; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Warren, 181 TJ. S. 73 ; Fidelity Mutual Life Association
V. Mettler, 185 TJ. S. 308. In all three of these cases it
was held that insurance companies were so distinct as to
justify legislative classification apart from other con-
tracts or to authorize a classification of insurance con-
tracts so as to subject one character of such contracts
when put in one dass to one rule and other varieties of
such contracts when placed in another class to a differ-
ent rule. The only claimed distinction between the cases
previously decided and the present one is that in this case
the classification is made to depend, not alone upon the
general character of the contract, but upon the kind of
property insured and the extent of the loss. But as the
rule settled by the previous cases is that contracts of
insurance from their very nature are susceptible of clas-
sification, not only apart from other contracts, but from
each other, it must follow, as the lesser is included in the
greater, that the character of the property insured and
the extent of the loss afford reasons for subclassification.
It is argued, however, that no reason could have existed
for classifying losses on real estate separately from losses
on other property. The distinction between real and per-
sonal property has in all systems of law constantly given
rise to different regulations concerning such property.
The difference of relation between the parties in case of
808 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 540
a total loss and of a partial loss, needs but to be suggested.
In the one case there is ground for a reasonable differ-
ence of opinion in adjusting the payment under the policy.
In the other the amount being fixed, the question of legal
liability under the policy would be, as a rule, the only
matter for consideration. It is obvious that the total
destruction of real estate covered by insurance neces-
sarily concerns the homes of many of the people of the
state. If, in regulating and classifying insurance con-
tracts, the legislature took the foregoing considerations
into view and provided for them, it cannot be said that in
doing so it acted arbitrarily and wholly without reason.
Farmers* and Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S.
301.
§ 541. Attorneys' fees to successful plaintiff in man-
damus proceedings. Damages for attorneys' fees for
services rendered to the successful plaintiff in mandamus
proceedings may be awarded under the authority of Kan-
sas General Statute, 1909, § 6319, without denying to the
defendant the equal protection of the laws, although no
reciprocal right in case of success is given to defendant,
and no such right is given to litigants generally. It is
not open to controversy that the Fourteenth Amendment
was not intended to deprive the states of their power to
establish and regulate judicial proceedings, and that its
provisions therefore only restrain acts which so transcend
the limits of classification as to cause them to conflict with
the fundamental conceptions of just and equal legislation.
It cannot be said that there is not such a distinction be-
tween the extraordinary proceeding by mandamus and
the ordinary judicial proceedings as affords a ground for
legislating differently concerning the two. A distinction
must obtain between that which is ordinary and usual
and that which is extraordinary and unusual, between the
duty to perform a ministerial act concerning which there
is room neither for the e^f erdse of judgment nor discre-
tion, and the right, on the other hand, to bring into play
§ 542 POLICE POWER 809
judgment and discretion as prerequisites to the perform-
ance of an act of a different character, and the distinction
which justifies the classification made by the statute also
answers the argument that the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated because the
allowance of attorneys ' fees was not reciprocal. Missouri
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee, 234 U. S. 459.
§542. Certain penalties imposed on common carriers
for failure to settle claims. Common carriers are not
denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, by the provisions of the South
Carolina statute requiring them to adjust and pay every
claim for loss and damage to an intrastate shipment
within forty days after the filing of a claim, under penalty
of $50 for each failure or refusal, where there can be no
award of a penalty under the statute unless there is a
recovery of the full amount claimed. The power of classi-
fication is conceded, but this will not uphold one that is
purely arbitrary. There must be some substantial foun-
dation and basis therefor. It is asserted that this is
merely legislation to compel carriers to pay their debts
within a given time, by an unreasonable penalty for any
delay, while no one else is so punished, and that there is
no excuse for such distinction. While the principles upon
which classifications may rightfully be made are clear and
easily stated, yet the application of those principles to the
different cases is often attended with much difficulty.
This is not an act leveled against corporations alone, but
includes all common carriers. The classification is based
solely upon the nature of the business, that being of a
public character. The matter to be adjusted is one pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of the carrier. It receives
the goods and has them in its custody until the car-
riage is completed. It knows what is received and what
is delivered. It knows what injury was done during
the shipment, and how it was done. It may be stated as
a general rule that an act which puts in one class all
810 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 542
engaged in business of a spedal and public character,
requires of them the performance of a duty which they
can do better and more quickly than others, and imposes
a not exorbitant penalty for a failure to perform that
duty within a reasonable time, cannot be adjudged uncon-
stitutional as a purely arbitrary classification. Mr. Jus-
tice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court in this
case, said : ' ' While in this case the penalty may be large
as compared with the value of the shipment, yet it must
be remembered that small shipments are the ones which
especially need the protection of penal statutes like this.
If a large amount is in controversy, the claimant can
afford to litigate. But he cannot well do so when there is
but a trifle of a dollar or two in dispute, and yet justice
requires that his claim be adjusted and paid with reason-
able promptness. Further, it must be remembered that
the purpose of this legislation is not primarily to enforce
the collection of debts, but to compel the performance of
duties which the carrier assumes when it enters upon the
discharge of its public function. We know there are
limits beyond which penalties may not go even in cases
where classification is legitimate ; but we are not prepared
to hold that the amount of penalty imposed is so great,
or the length of time within which the adjustment and
payment are to be made is so short, that the act impos-
ing the penalty and fixing the time is beyond the power
of the state. *' Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207
U. S. 73.
The Mississippi statute imposing a penalty of $25 for
the failure to settle a daim for damages to an intrastate
shipment betwen two points on the carrier's line within
sixty days from the giving of notice of the daim, where,
upon the trial, the actual damages were assessed at the
sum stated in the notice, denies the carrier neither due
process of law nor the equal protection of the laws. As
applied by the state court the statute is repugnant neither
to the due process of law nor equal protection clause of
the constitution, but on the contrary, merely provides a
§ 542 POLICE POWER 8H
reasonable incentive for the prompt settlement without
snity of just demands of a class admitting of special
legislative treatment. Yazoo & M. V. E. Co. v. Jackson
Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217.
The Arkansas statute singling out railway companies
and subjecting them to the payment of double damages
and attorneys ' fees in case of their refusal to pay for the
killing of live stock within thirty days after the owner 's
demand, when litigants in general are subject to the same
burden, does not deprive the railway companies of the
equal protection of the laws. This case is distinguished
from St. Louis, L M. & S. R. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354,
in that here the prior demand was fully established in
the suit following the refusal to pay. The question was
determined in Seaboard Air Line B. Co. v. Seegers, 207
U. S. 73, and Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar
Co., 226 U. S. 217, sustaining South Carolina and Missis-
sippi statutes. Kansas City Southern B. Co. v. Anderson,
233 U. S. 325.
There is no denial of the equal protection of the laws,
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment in the provisions
of Texas Laws, 1909, p. 93, for the allowance of a reason-
able attorney's fee of not over $20 to the successful plain-
tiff in a suit in which an attorney is actually employed
upon a claim not exceeding $200, against * * any person or
corporation doing business in this state, for personal
services rendered, or for labor done, or for material
furnished, or for overcharges on freight or express, or
for any claim for lost or damaged freight, or for stock
killed or injured by such person or corporation, its agents
or employees,*' where such claim is not paid within thirty
days after demand, and the recovery is for the full amount
claimed, since this statute makes no classification of
debtors, and the kind of claims included cover a wide
range, and do not appear to have been grouped for the
purpose of bearing against any class or classes of citizens
or corporations. This is a police regulation designed to
promote the prompt payment of small but well-founded
812 DUE PROCESS OP LAW § 542
daimsi and to discourage unnecessary litigation in respect
to them, and being of general application is not repugnant
to either the *' equal protection *' or the **due process"
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere fact
that by the statute attorney fees are allowed to successful
plaintiffs only, does not involve a denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, if the classification is otherwise reason-
able. Missouri, K. & T. Ey. Co. of Texas v. Cade, 233
U. S. 642; Missouri, K. & T. By. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S.
412.
§ 643. Excessiye penalties. A penalty of from $300 to
$600, imposed by the so-called Ohio **run of mine,** or
** anti-screen** law (104 Ohio Laws, 181), under which
coal miners, whose compensation is fixed on the basis of
ton or other weight, must be paid according to the total
of all the coal contained in the mine car in which it has
been removed from the mine, provided that no greater
percentage of dirt and impurities shaU be contained
therein than that ascertained to be unavoidable by the,
state industrial commission, whose orders are subject to
review, is not so great as to render the statute open to
the objection that it denies the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, by preventing a resort to the courts
to test the constitutionality of the law. Rail & River Coal
Co. V. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338.
§ 544. Statute regulating charges. The New York act
of 1888, as to elevators, is constitutional, as an exercise
of the police power of the state; it is not a regulation
of interstate commerce, and does not deprive the elevator
owners of the equal protection of the laws. The law
regulated the fees for elevating and discharging grain
by elevators. It was contended that the statute violates
the Fourteenth Amendment because it takes from the
elevator owners the equal protection of the laws, in that
it applies only to places which have 130,000 population or
§ 544 POUCE POWER 813
more, and does not apply to places which have less than
130,000, and thus operates against elevator owners in
the larger cities of the state. The law operates equally
on all elevator owners in places having 130,000 population
or more ; and they are not deprived of the equal protection
of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Budd V. State of New York, 143 U. S, 517.
The law of North Dakota regulating grain warehouses
and the weighing and handling of grain, is not unconstitu-
tional because it is applicable to the entire state, which
is agricultural and is not restricted to large cities. The
legislature of North Dakota, in regulating by a general
law, the business and charges of public warehousemen
engaged in elevating and storing grain for profit, does
not deny to plaintiff in error the equal protection of the
laws nor deprive him of his property without due process
of law. It was contended that the findings in Munn v.
niinois, 94 U. S. 113, and in Budd v. New York, 143 U. S.
617, were based upon facts so different from this case as
to call for an opposite conclusion of law. The operation
of the Illinois and New York statutes is restricted to the
city of Chicago in the one case, and to the cities of Buf-
falo, New York and Brooklyn in the other, while the North
Dakota statute is applicable to the territory of the entire
state, but such considerations are obviously addressed to
the legislative discretion. They are matters for those who
make and not for those who interpret the laws. When it
is once admitted, as it was admitted in this case, that it
is competent for the legislative power to control the busi-
ness of elevating and storing grain, whether carried on
by individuals or associations, in cities of one size and in
some circumstances, it follows that such power may be
legally exerted over the same business when carried on
in smaller cities and in other circumstances. That might
not be wise legislation which provided the same regula-
tions in every case, but it is not for the court to revise
the wisdom or expediency of the law. Brass v. State of
North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391.
814 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 544
A turnpike company is not deprived of the eqnal pro-
tection of the laws merely because it is not allowed to
charge as high rates as are allowed to other companies
differently located, but it can only demand the right to
receive such compensation as will be just both to itself
and to the public under all the circumstances of the case.
The circumstances of each turnpike company must deter-
mine the rates of toll to be properly allowed for its use.
Justice to the public and to stockholders may require, in
respect of one road^ rates different from those prescribed
for other roads. Bates on one r(^d may be reasonable
and just to all concerned, while the same rates would be
exorbitant on another road. The utmost that any corpo-
ration, operating a public highway, can rightfully demand
at the hands of the legislature when exerting its general
powers is that it receives what, under all the circtun-
stances, is such compensation for the use of its property
as will be just both to it and to the public If the rates
prescribed for the defendant in this case were manifestly
much lower — ^taking them as a whole — that the legislature
has, by general law, prescribed for other corporations
whose circumstances and location are not unlike those
of the defendant, a different question would be presented.
No question of that kind is properly presented by the
pleadings, and there is no ground for holding that the act
in question denies to the defendant the equal protection
of the laws. Covington & L. Turnpike Co. v. Sandford,
164 U. S. 578.
§ 545. Statute limiting charges of stock-yards compa-
nies. A stock-yards company is denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws by the Kansas statute which limits the
amount of the charges to be made by that corporation,
without limiting the charges to be made by other similar
corporations doing a smaller amount of business, and
without any reference to the character or value of the
services rendered, although the statute is general in its
terms and is made applicable to any corporation doing
S 545 POMCB POWER 815
business of a certain amonnt, and notwithstanding the
fact that hj virtue of the great amount of business done
by- the corporation affected by the statute it may make a
reasonable income, since the statute makes a direct and
positive discrimination between persons engaged in the
same class of business, and bases it simply upon the quan-
tity of business which each may do. Tested by the rule
laid down in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, the state has
the power to make reasonable regulation of the charges
rendered by the stock-yards company. While not a com-
mon carrier, nor yet engaged in any distinctly public
employment,, it is doing a work in which the public has
an interest, and therefore must be considered #ts subject
to governmental regulation. The question is to what ex-
tent may this regulation go, and is it the same in both
these classes of cases. After citing a number of cases,
the Court concluded: ^^As to those individuals and cor-
porations who have devoted their property to a use in
which the public has an interest, although not engaged
in a work of a confessedly public character, there has
been no further ruling than that the state may prescribe
and enforce reasonable charges. What shall be the test
of reasonableness in those charges is absolutely undis-
closed. *' But such regulations shall not operate to de-
prive one of the ordinary privileges of others engaged in
mercantile business. The state's regulations of his
charges is not to be measured by the aggregate of his
profits, determined by the volume of business, but by
the question whether any particular charge to an indi-
vidual dealing with him is, considering the service ren-
dered, an unreasonable exaction. Not what he makes out
of his volume of business, but whether in each particular
transaction the charge is an unreasonable exaction for
the services rendered. The legislature may not deny him
reasonable compensation for each service rendered, and
may not interfere simply because out of the multitude of
his transactions the amount of his profits is large. The
question is always, not. What does he make as the aggre-
816 DUE PROCESS OP LATV § 545
gate of his profits 1 but, What is the value of the services
which he renders to the one seeking and receiving such
services? The statute provides cumulative penalties for
violation of its terms which become so enormous that a
single day's violation of the statute might exhaust the
entire value of the property of the company in satisfac-
tion of the penalties incurred. In this situation of the
case, the Court said, we are brought face to face with a
question which legislation of other states is presenting.
Do the laws secure to an individual an equal protection
when he is allowed to come into court and make his claim
or defense subject to the condition that, upon a failure
to make good that claim or dejFense, the penalty for such
failure either appropriates all his property, or subjects
him to extravagant and unreasonable loss. Clearly such
a law is tantamount to a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. Notwithstanding the legislative right of classi-
fication of industries and occupations, it must be remem-
bered that the equal protection of the laws is guaranteed,
and that such equal protection is denied when upon one
of two parties engaged in the same kind of business and
under the same conditions burdens are cast which are not
cast upon the other. If once the door is opened to the
affirmance of the proposition that a state may regulate
one who does much business, while not regulating another
who does the same but less business, then all significance
in the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
lost. This statute is a positive and direct discrimination
between persons engaged in the same class of business,
and based simply upon the quantity of business which each
may do. If such legislation does not deny the equal pro-
tection of the laws it is difficult to conceive what legislation
would. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yard Co. et al., 183
U. S. 79.
§546. Municipal regulation of teleph(me rates. Mu-
nicipal regulation of the rates which a telephone company
may charge, on a lower scale than those prescribed for i
§ 546s POLICE POWER 817
competitor, does not necessarily deny the equal protection
of the laws, since such competitor may bring its patrons
into communication with a larger number of persons,
dwelling in a more widely-extended territory, and may
render much more valuable service. Appellant contends
that it was denied the equal protection of the laws be-
cause, contemporaneously with the fixing of rates for it,
different rates were fixed for another telephone company
doing business within the city. Whether the rates pre-
scribed by the ordinance discriminated against the com-
plainant and deprived it of the equal protection of the
laws, is not made clear. Whether the two companies oper-
ated in the same territory, or afforded equal facilities for
communication, or rendered the same services, does not
appear. For aught that appears a just ground for classi-
fication may have existed. Every presumption should be
indulged in favor of the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion. It is a well-settled rule of constitutional exposition
that, if a statute may or may not be, according to circum-
stances, within the limits of constitutional authority, the
existence of the circumstances necessary to support it will
be presumed. Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles,
211 U. S. 265.
§ 546a. Regulating private detectives. Municipal ordi-
nances which subject the business of a private detective
or detective agency to police supervision, and provide
that no person shall carry on such business without first
being recommended by the board of police commissioners
and taking the oath of a city detective and giving a bond,
do not offend against the due process of law and equal
protection of the laws clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This case is easily within the principle of the police
power of the state. It would be very commonplace to say
that the exercise of police is one of the necessary activi-
ties of government, and all that pertains to it may be sub-
jected to surveillance as a precaution against perversion.
This ordinance does no more. It provides in effect that
Due Process — 52
818 DUB PROCESS OP LAW § 546a
all who engage in the business of a private detective or
detective agency shall have the sanction of the state, have
the stamp of the state as to fitness and character, take an
oath to the state for faithful execution of its dnties, and
give a bond for their sanction. This the state may do
against its own citizens and may do against a citizen of
any other state. Lehon v. Atlanta, 242 U. S. 53.
§5461). R^fulating percentage of butter fat in ice
cream. State statutes which prohibit the sale as ^4ce
cream" of a product containing less than a fixed percent-
age of butter fat do not take property without due process
of law nor deny the equal protection of the laws — ^the par-
ticular percentages fixed not being so exacting as to be in
themselves unreasonable, — although the ice cream of com-
merce is not iced or frozen cream, but is a frozen confec-
tion, varying in composition, and under some formulas
may be made without either cream or milk. The legisla-
ture may well have found in these facts persuasive evi-
dence that the public welfare required the prohibition
enacted. The facts show that, in the absence of legisla-
tive regulation, the ordinary purchaser at retail does not
and cannot know exactly wh^t he is getting when he pur-
chases ice cream. He presumably believes that cream or
at least rich milk is among the important ingredients ; and
he may make his purchase with a knowledge that butter
fat is the principal food value in cream or milk. Laws
designed to prevent persons from being misled in respect
to the weight, measurement, quality, or ingredients of an
article of general consumption are a common exercise of
the police power. The legislature defines the standard
article or fixes some of its characteristics ; and it may con-
clude that fraud or mistake can be effectively prevented
only by prohibiting the sale of the article under the trade-
name, if it fails to meet the requirements of the standard
set. Laws prohibiting the sale of milk or cream contain-
ing less than fixed percentages of butter fat present a
familiar instance of such legislation. The Supreme Court
§ 546c POLICE POWER 819
has frequently sustained the validity of similar prohibi-
tions. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, Crowl v. Penn-
sylvania, 242 U. S. 153.
§546c. State regulation of motor vehicles. Nonresi-
dent automobile owners are not denied rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, be-
cause the New Jersey Automobile Law (N. J. Laws 1908,
p. 613) in addition to providing for the registration of
automobiles aiid the licensing of drivers, requires a non-
resident owner to appoint the secretary of state as his
agent upon whom process may be served **in any action
or legal proceeding caused by the operation of his regis-
tered motor vehicle within this state against such
owner. *' The absence from the law of any reciprocal pro-
vision by which nonresidents whose cars are duly regis-
tered in their home state are given for a limited period
free use of the highways in return for similar privileges
granted to residents of New Jersey, does not involve an
unconstitutional discrimination against nonresidents
where the annual fees prescribed are not so large as to be
unreasonable, and wh^e any resident owner would be
subjected to the full annual charge for the use of the high-
ways for any period, however brief. The fact that the
fees collected under the law exceed the amount required
to defray the expense of maintaining the regulation and
inspection department, which excess, under the law, is to
be applied to the maintenance of improved highways,
does not render the law invalid as to nonresidents, as vio-
lating the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160.
CHAPTER XXm
PBOCEDUBE IN STATE COUBTS
§ 547. Different courts in the same state. The power
of the state over procedure in its own courts was not
intended to be restricted or interfered with by the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court has uniformly
so declared when the question has been presented to it
The equality clause prohibiting any state from denjring
the equal protection of the laws, contemplates the protec-
tion of persons against unjust discrimination by a state ;
it has no reference to territorial or municipal arrange-
ments made for different portions of state. It was not
intended to prevent a state from arranging and parcel-
ing out the jurisdiction of its several courts as it sees fit,
either as to territorial limits, subject-matter or amount,
or the finality of their several judgments or decrees.
Each state has full power to make political subdivisions
of its territory for municipal purposes and to regulate
their government, including the constitution of courts,
and the extent of their jurisdiction. A state may, if it
pleases, establish one system of law in one portion of its
territory, and another system in another; provided,
always, that it does not encroach ui>on the proper juris-
diction of the United States, and does not abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
nor deprive any person of his rights without due process
of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws in the same district. By the
constitution and laws of Missouri, a court called the Si
Louis Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction in cer-
tain cases, of all appeals from the drcuit courts in St.
Louis and some adjoining counties; and the Supreme
820 '
§ 548 PEOCEbURE IN STATE COURTS 821
Court has jnrisdiotion of appeals in like cases from the
circuit courts of the remaining counties of the state. This
adjustment of appellate jurisdiction is not forbidden by
anything contained in the Fourteenth Amendment The
last restriction, as to the equal protection of the laws, is
not violated by any diversity in the jurisdiction of the
several courts as to subject-matter, amount or finality of
decision, if all persons within the territorial limits of
their respective jurisdictions have an equal right, in like
cases and under like circumstances, to resort to them for
redress. It means that no person onslass of persons shall
be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in the same place or
linder like circumstances. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not profess to secure to all persons in the United
States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies.
Each state prescribes its own modes of judicial proceed-
ing. If diversities of laws and judicial proceedings may
exist in the several states without violating the equality
clause of the Fourteenth. Amendment, there is no valid
reason why there may not be such diversities in different
parts of the same state. Bowman v. Lewis. 101 U. S. 22.
§548. Tax titles. The grantee in a tax deed cannot
claim to have been denied due process of law or the equal
protection of the laws by the Michigan statute requiring
the giving of notice to the original owners in order to cut
off the right of redemption, on the theory that, by the
proceedings under the tax laws, the state acquired an ab-
solute title, whidi it conveyed by the tax deed, and that the
statute operated to devest such title and transfer it to
another, where the highest state court holds that, what-
ever title the state held, it sold only an interest which was
subject to redemption. It is contended that, by the pro-
ceedings under the tax laws, the state acquired the abso-
lute title to the lands, and conveyed that title to plaintiff
in error, and that the aim of the statute is to devest such
title and transfer it to another; and therefore it is further
822 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 548
cont^ided that property is taken without dne process o!
law, and that the laws are nneqnal in their operation. If
the title was taken subject to redemption, it cannot be
said to be devested without due process of law if redemp-
tion was exercised according to law. And how redemption
should be exercised, and how it could be cut off depended
upon the provisions of the statute ; and therefore the best
answer to the assumption of the plaintiff in error, that
he acquired an indefeasible title, is the answer given by
the supreme court of the state, whose province it is to
pronounce the meaning of the statutes of the state without
question by the Supreme Court of the United States.
That court said, that whatever the title which the state
held, it sold an interest in the lands which were liable to
be devested. Busch v. Duncan Land & Mining Co., 211
U. S. 526.
§549. Number of peremptory challenges in criminal
oases. The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit
legislation which is limited in the objects to which it is
directed, or by the territory within which it is to operate.
It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legis-
lation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the
liabilities imposed. The power of the legislature of a
state to prescribe the number of peremptory challenges in
criminal cases is limited only by the necessity of having
an impartial jury. The number of such challenges is a
matter of legislative discretion, and may vary according
to the condition of different communities and the difBcul-
ties in each of securing intelligent and impartial jurors.
The accused is entitled to an impartial jury, and if such
a jury is obtained from those who remain, his constitu-
tional right is maintained. The provision of the revised
statutes of Missouri allowing the state, in capital cases,
fifteen peremptory challenges in cities of over 100,000
inhabitants, instead of eight as in other parts of the state,
is a valid exercise of legislative discretion. To prescribe
§ 550 PROCEDURE IN STATE COURTS 823
whatever will tend to secure the impartiality of jurors
in criminal cases is not only within the competency of the
legislature, but is among its highest duties. Such impar-
tiality requires not only freedom from any bias against
the accused, but also from any prejudice against the
prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are
to be evenly held. Experience has shown that one of the
most effective means to free the jury box from men unfit
to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge.
The nmnber of such challenges must necessarily depend
upon the discretion of the legislature and is limited only
by the necessity of having an impartial jury. In the large
cities there is such a mixed i)opulation; there is such a
tendency of the criminal classes to resort to them, and
such an unfortunate disposition on the part of business
men to escape from jury duty, that it requires special care
on the part of the government to secure there competent
and impartial jurors. To that end it may be a wise pro-
ceeding on the part of the legislature to enlarge the num-
ber of peremptory challenges in criminal cases tried in
those cities. The accused cannot complain if he is still
tried by an impartial jury. He can demand nothing more.
Allowing the state 15 peremptory challenges in capital
cases tried in cities containing a population of over 100,-
000 inhabitants is simply providing against the difficulty
of securing, in such cases, an impartial jury in cities of
that size, which does not exist in other portions of the
state. So far from defeating, it may furnish the neces-
sary means of giving that equal protection of the laws to
all persons, which the amendment declares shall not be
denied to any one within its jurisdiction. Hayes v. Mis-
souri, 120 U. S. 68.
§550. Laws operating on all alike. By the Fourteenth
Amendment the powers of states in dealing with crime
within their borders are not limited, except that no state
can deprive particular persons, or classes of persons, of
equal and impartial justice under the law. Mr. Chief
824 DUE PBOOESS OF LAW § 550
Justice Fuller, in delivering the opinion of the court, said :
** We find nothing special, partial or arbitrary or in viola-
tion of fundamental principles in the criminal laws of
the state of Texas involved, and we perceive no ground
for holding that the proceedings complained of, which
were had in the ordinary administration of those laws,
amounted to a denial by the state of due process of law
to these parties, or of some right secured to them by the
Constitution of the United States. Leeper v. Texas, 139
U. S. 462.
§ 651. Error in charge to jury. A substantial error in
the charge to the jury in a criminal case in a state court
does not deprive the prisoner of the equal protection of
the laws or of due process or abridge his immunities,
within the Fourteenth Amendment. A writ of error to
review the judgment of the highest tribunal, of a state
cannot be maintained in the absence of a federal question
giving jurisdiction. It was not within the province of
the Supreme Court to pass upon any of the questions
sought to be presented, as they fall entirely within the
scope of the exercise of the powers of the state. Davis v.
Texas, 139 U. S. 651.
§ 552. Refusal to amend record in criminal case. The
refusal of the supreme court of Illinois to amend the
record in a criminal case so as to show that the accused
was not present in person or by counsel in that court, at
the time it affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and
fixed the day for carrying that judgment into execution,
was not a denial to him of the equal protection of the
laws. The law of Illinois as declared by its highest court,
that amendments of the record of a court, in derogation of
its final judgment, are not permitted after the term at
which the judgment was rendered, is applicable to all
persons within the juriscjiction of the state, and its en-
forcement against the plaintiff in error is not a denial
to him by the state of the equal protection of the laws*
§ 553 PROCEDURE IN STATE COURTS 825
The supreme court of Illinois held that under the prac-
tice in that state a motion to amend a final judgment, in
derogation of that judgment, made at a term subsequent
to that at which final judgment was rendered, and after
the case had passed beyond the power of the state court
to stay, by its order, the execution of the judgment, clearly
comes too late. Had the plaintiffs in error and their
counsel been actually present in court when the judgment
of affirmance was entered, the law allowed them to then
say or do nothing which by any possibility could have
benefited plaintiffs in error. They were, after judgment
was entered, entitled only to move for a rehearing, and
this could only be done on printed petition; but thirty
days were allowed in which to prepare it. . No right se-
cured to the plaintiff in error by the Constitution of the
United States, was violated by the refusal of the supreme
court of Illinois to allow the proposed amendment of its
record. The Supreme Court of the United States takes,
as is its duty, the law of Illinois to be as declared by its
highest court, that amendments of the record of a court,
in derogation of its final judgment, are not permitted in
that state after the expiration of the term at which the
judgment was rendered. That law is applicable to all
persons within the jurisdiction of the state, and its en-
forcement against the plaintiff in error cannot, therefore,
be said to be a denial to him by the state of the equal
protection of the laws. Fielden v. State of Illinois, 143
U.S. 452.
§ 553. Power of state to make classifications. Because
to the ordinary taxpayer there is allowed not merely one
hearing before the county officials, but also a right of ap-
peal with a second hearing before the state board, while
only the one hearing before the latter board is given to
railroad companies in respect to their property, the latter
are not therefore denied the equal protection of the laws.
The power of a state to make classifications in judicial
or administrative proceedings carries with it the right to
826 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 553
make such a classification as will give to parties belonging
to one class two hearings before their rights are finally
determined, and to parties belonging to a different class
only a single hearing. Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. B. Co.
V. Backus, 154 U. S. 421.
§654. Sufficiency of indictment. Where the state court
has decided that the state statute making an indictment
for murder sufficient which charges that the defendant wil-
fully, feloniously and of his malice aforethought killed
and murdered, without charging the manner or means by
which the death was caused, does not add to nor change
the crime, as defined at common law, and that a conviction
thereunder violates no right or privilege of the accused,
the Supreme Court of the United States will not hold that
the statute denies to accused the equal protection of the
laws or due process of law as prescribed by the Federal
Constitution. Whether the indictment sufficiently charged
the crime of murder in the first degree was for the state
courts to determine. In view of the decisions in Graves
V. State, 45 N. J. L. 203, 347, 358, 46 Am. Bep. 778, and
Davis V. Utah Territory, 151 U. S. 262, 266 declaring the
meaning and scope of the statutes under which the ac-
cused was prosecuted, it cannot be held that he was pro-
ceeded against under an indictment based upon statutes
denying to him the equal protection of the laws, or that
were inconsistent with due process of law, as prescribed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bergemann v. Backer,
157 U. S. 655.
§555. Severer punishment for subsequent offenses. A
person by being punished more severely for the second
offense is not denied the equal protection of the laws. A
state may provide that persons who have before been
convicted of crime may suffer severer punishment for
subsequent offenses than for a first offense against a law.
Similar provisions have been contained in state statutes
for many years and they have been xmif ormly sustained
§ 556 PROCEDURE IN STATE COURTS 827
by the courts. The increased severity of the punishment
for the subsequent offense is not a punishment for the
same offense for the second time, but a severer punish-
ment for the subsequant offense, to deter those so inclined
from the further commission of crime. The general
doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment, in respect to the
administration of criminal justice, requires that no differ-
ent or higher punishment shall be imposed on one than is
imposed on all for like offenses, but it was not designed to
interfere with the power of the state to protect the lives,
liberty, or property of its citizens, nor with the exercise
of that i)ower in administering the process provided by
the law of the state. And the state may undoubtedly pro-
vide that persons who have before been convicted of crime
may suffer severer punishment for subsequent offenses
than for a first offense against the law, and that a differ-
ent punishment for the same offense may be inflicted
under particular circumstances, provided it is dealt out
to all alike who are similarly situated. Moore v. State
of Missouri, 159 XJ. S. 673.
§556. Denial of right of review— Alien juror. The
denial by a state court of the right to review in an appel-
late court in a criminal case constitutes no violation of the
Constitution of the United States. That one of the jurors
in a criminal case was an alien, although cause of chal-
lenge, is not a denial of due process of law or of the equal
protection of the laws to the person convicted. The laws
of New Jersey require that jurors in a criminal case shall
be citizens of the state, but that no exception to any such
juror on account of his citizenship, or any other legal
disability, shall be allowed after he has been sworn or
affirmed. The record does not show whether the question
of the alleged disability of the juror was or was not raised
in the state court. The plaintiff in error claimed that if
an alien sat upon the jury the common law right of trial
by jury had been invaded. The Supreme Court declared
that this contention in itself could not be sustained as
828 DUB PROCESS OF LAW § 556
involving an infraction of the Constitution of the United
States. Whether the point had been properly brought to
the attention of the state courts^ or not, it did not appear,
in any view, that petitioner had beeij denied due process of
law or that protection of the laws accorded to all others
similarly situated. Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 TJ. S. 293.
§ 667. Adjudging a prosecutor to be liable for costs.
Equal protection of the laws is not denied to any person
by a statute which is applicable to all persons under like
circumstances, and does not subject the individual to an
arbitrary exercise of power. A state statute providing
that a prosecutor shall be liable for the costs and subject
to imprisonment in default of their payment, when the
jury finds that he instituted a prosecution without prob-
able cause and from nmlicious motives, applicable to aU
persons under like circumstances, does not subject the
individual to an arbitrary exercise of power, and does not
deny him the equal protection of the laws. Lowe v. State
of Kansas, 163 TJ. S. 81.
§ 568. Payment before possession in condemnation pro-
ceedings. When the state courts have construed a state
statute as prescribing one form of procedure, their subse-
quent adjudication that such construction is wrong, and
that the statute really provides a different mode of pro-
cedure, can not be set aside in the Federal courts as an un-
just discrimination, or a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. The omission to give further instructions to a
jury, which were not asked, is not a denial of due process
of law or of the equal protection of the laws. There is no
vested right in a mode of procedure. Each succeeding leg-
islature may establish a different one, providing only that
in each is preserved the essential elements of protection.
The fact that one construction has been placed upon a stat-
ute by the highest court of the state does not make that
construction beyond change. If the courts made a different
ruling, still, whatever may be thought of the propriety
§ 560 PBOCEDXJRB IN STATE COUETS 829
of STich a change of construction, there is in it nothing to
justify the Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of
the state court, and denying the correctness or validity
of the last ruling. If tiie last ruling was held by the
supreme court of the state warranted by the statutes, it
does not appear that any right possessed under the Con-
stitution of the United States has been violated. Where
the courts of the state have construed a statute as pre-
scribing one form of procedure, and parties have acted
under that construction, and then subsequently the same
court has held that the statute was theretofore miscon-
strued and really provided a different mode of procedure,
this laat adjudication cannot be set aside in the Federal
courts on the ground of an unjust discrimination or a
denial of the equal protection of the laws. A. Bachus, Jr.
& Sons V. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557.
§ 559. When equal protection of the laws not denied.
Equal protection of the laws is not denied by a law or
course of procedure which would have been applied to any
other person in the state under similar circumstances and
conditions. The right to the equal protection of the laws
was certainly not denied, for it is apparent that the same
law or course of procedure which was applied to the
plaintiff would have been applied to any other person in
the state, under similar circumstances and conditions;
and there was nothing in the record on which to base an
inference to the contrary. Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S.
101.
§ 560. Abridging the right of trial by jury. The equal
protection of the laws is not denied by a state statute
abridging the right of trial by jury in the courts of a
city, without making a similar provision for the counties
of the state. One contention was that the constitution of
Maryland abridged the right of trial by jury in the courts
of Baltimore city without making a similar provision for
the counties of the state, and that this denies to litigants
830 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 560
of the city the equal protection of the laws. This was
held not tenable, citing Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S* 22 ;
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68. Ghappell Chemical &
Fertilizer Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co., 172 U. S. 474.
§ 661. Oonstitntionality of struck jury law. A statute
allowing an accused person only five peremptory dral-
lenges in a case where a struck jury has been ordered,
while twenty peremptory challenges are allowed in a
trial before an ordinary jury, does not constitute a denial
of the equal protection of the laws, where the same num-
ber of challenges is permitted in all cases in which a struck
jury is ordered. The state has full control over the pro-
ceedings in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases,
subject only to the qualification that such procedure must
not work a denial of fundamental rights, or conflict with
specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Consti-
tution. The state is not tied down by any provision of
the Federal Constitution to the practice and procedure
which existed at the common law. Subject to the limita-
tions heretofore named it may avail itself of the wisdom
gathered by the experience of the century to make such
changes as may be necessary. A state may make different
arrangements for trials under different circumstances of
even the same class of offenses. Citing Missouri v. Lewis,
101 U. S. 22, and Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68. It is
true that here there is no territorial distribution, but
in all cases in which a struck jury is ordered, the same
number of challenges is permitted, as similarly in all
cases in which the trial is by an ordinary jury. Either
party, state or defendant, may apply for a struck jury,
and the matter is one which is determined by the court in
the exercise of a sound discretion. There is no mere
arbitrary power in this respect, any more than in the
granting or refusing of a continuance. That in any given
case the discretion of the court in awarding a trial by a
struck jury was improperly exercised may perhaps pre-
sent a matter for consideration or appeal, but it amounts
to nothing more. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172.
§ 564 PROCEDURE IN STATE COURTS 831
§562. Additioiial pimishment on third conviction. The
equal protection of the laws is not denied hy a statute
imposing a heavier penalty upon a person convicted of a
felony if he has twice before been sentenced for crime to
three years ' imprisonment or more. It is within the dis-
cretion of the legislature of the state to treat former
imprisonment in another state as having the like effect
as imprisonment in Massachusetts, to show that the man
is an habitual criminal. The allegation of previous con-
victions is not a distinct charge of crime, but is necessary
to bring the case within the statute, and goes to the pun-
ishment only. The statute, imposing a punishment on
none but future crimes, is not ex post facto. It affects
alike all persons similarly situated, and therefore does
not deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws.
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 TJ. S. 311.
§ 563. Oriminal law— Appeal by state. The allowance
of an appeal to the state from the coijrt of one district,
but not from another district of the state in the case of the
grant of a new trial to an accused person, is not a denial
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The state has control of its
own legislation as to the cases in which it will permit ap-
peals in its own behalf in its courts. Citing Missouri v.
Lewis, 101 XT. S. 23, and subsequent ca^ses. Mallett v.
North Carolina, 181 TJ. S. 589.
§ 564. Difference in term of sentence for imprisonment.
The equal protection of the laws is not denied to two or
three persons convicted of conspiracy to defraud, because
their sentence was for ten years imprisonment, while that
of their codef endant was for but seven years. The deci-
sion in the opinion of the highest state court, in reviewing
conviction of crime, of questions respecting due process
of law, the equal protection of the laws, and cruel and
unusual punishment, will not confer jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court of the TTnited States of a writ of error to
832 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 564
the state court, in the absence of any claim to protection
under the Federal Constitution made therein. Doubtless
there were sufficient reasons for giving to one of the con-
spirators a less term than the others. ^^At any rate/'
said the Supreme Court, '^ there is no such inequality
as will justify us in setting aside the judgment against the
two.'' Howard V. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126.
§ 565. Presumption of guilt from possession of gam-
bling paraphemaliBr— Effect of exception in favor of
public oflScem. Due process of law is not denied by the
provision of the New York penal code, which makes pos-
session of the record of chances or slips in the game of
policy, or the possession of any paper, print, or writing
commonly used in playing or promoting that game prima
facie evidence of ^^ possession thereof knowingly" in vio-
lation of the section making the knowing possession
thereof a crime. The exception of public officers from
the terms of said provision does not render the section
unconstitutional, since this provision manifestly is for
the purpose of excluding the presumption raised by pos-
session, where such docmnents are seized and are in the
custody of officers of the law. This was the construction
given to the act by the New York courts, and is the only
one consistent with its purposes. Adams v. New York,
192 U. S. 585.
§ 566. Ohange of venue for local prejudice. The pro-
vision made by the Ohio revised statutes for a change of
venue for local prejudice, where the opposite party is a
corporation with more than fifty stockholders, having
its principal office or transacting its principal business in
the county in which the action is pending, without con-
ferring an equivalent right on the corporation, does not
violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws, where in both forums equality of law governs
and equality of administration prevails. The proposition
to which the case reduces itself is this : That although the
§ 567 PROCEDURE IN STATE COURTS 833
protection of equal laws equally administered has been
enjoyed, nevertheless there has been a denial of the equal
protection of the laws within the purview of the Four-
teenth Amendment, only because the state has allowed
one person to seek one forum and has not allowed another
person, asserted to be in the same class, to seek the same
forum, although as to both persons the law has afforded
a forum in which the same and equal laws are applicable
and administered. But it is fundamental rights which
the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards, and not the mere
forum which the state may see proper to designate for
the enforcement aud protection of such rights. Given,
therefore, a condition where fundamental rights are
equally protected and preserved, it is impossible to say
that the rights which are thus protected and preserved
have been denied because the state has deemed best to
provide for a trial in one forum or another. It is not,
under any view, the mere tribunal into which a person
is authorized to proceed by a state which determines
whether the equal protection of the law has been afforded,
but whether in the tribunals which the state has provided
equal laws prevail. Cincinnati Street B. Co. v. Snell,
193 U. S. 30.
§567. Local regulations for the selection of jurors.
Litigants and persons accused of crime in Wayne county,
Michigan, are not denied the equal protection of the laws
by the statute, under which the jury lists are made up
and returned by a board of jury commissioners appointed
by the governor with the consent of the senate, and may
include persons whose names do not appear on the assess-
ment roll, while, by the general laws of the state, the
officers authorized to make and return the jury lists are
elected by the people in their several townships and in
city wards, and the jurors must be of those who are
assessed on the assessment roll. The names of persons
to be returned for the Wayne county jury lists need not
appear on the assessment rolls. This difference between
Due Procesa— 53
834 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW § 567
the general law relating to jury trials and the special law
relating to Wayne county, it is said, constitutes a discrim-
ination against the people of that county, and amounts to
a denial to them of the equal protection of the laws. This
view is fully met and shown not to be sound by tiie judg-
ment in Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis), 101 U* S.
22, 31. Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U. S. 325.
§668. Error of trial oonrt in disdiarging a juror. The
decision of the Kentucky court of appeals that a reversal
of a conviction for the error, if any, committed by the
trial court in discharging a juror, was precluded by the
Kentucky criminal code, § 281, does not deny the accused
the equal protection of the laws secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment, if such was the construction given
that section by prior cases, and no discriminating appli-
cation against him was made. The court, in its construc-
tion' of § 281, followed the construction established by
prior cases, and did not make a discriminating applica-
tion of that section against plaintiff. He was, therefore,
not deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Howard
V. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164.
§569. Indeterminate sentence act. A person sentenced
under the Michigan indeterminate sentence act after hav-
ing been twice before convicted of felony is not impris-
oned without due process of law nor denied the equal
protection of the laws because he is deprived by that act
of the privilege therein accorded to other convicts at the
end of the minimum term of the sentence to make applica-
tion for parole, although the statute gives no hearing
upon the question of prior conviction. The Fourteenth
Amendment was not intended to, and does not, limit the
powers of a state in dealing with crime committed within
its own borders or with the punishment thereof, although
no state can deprive particular persons or classes of per-
sons of equal and impartial justice under the law. The
act in question provides for the granting of a favor to
i 570 PROCEDXJRB IN STATE COURTS 835
persons convicted of crime who are confined in a state
prison. The state may attach such conditions to the ap-
plication for or to the granting of the favor as it may
deem proper, or it may in its discretion, exclude such
classes of persons from participation in the favor as may
to it seem fit. If the state choose to grant this privilege
to make application to the governor for a discharge upon
parole in the case of one class of criminals and deny it to
others, such, for instance, as those who have twice been
convicted of a felony, it is a question of state policy ex-
clusively for the state to decide, as is also the procedure
to ascertain the fact, as well as the kind or amount of evi-
dence upon which to base its determination. It is not
bound to give the convict a hearing upon the question of
prior conviction, and a failure to give it violates no pro-
vision of the Federal Constitution. Ughbanks v. Arm-
strong, 208 IT. S. 481.
*
§570. Discrimination in matter of grand jury. A per-
son indicted for a crime committed after the grand jury
was impaneled is not denied the equar protection of the
laws because he is precluded from raising the objection
that two of the grand jurors were over the age of 65
years fixed by the New Jersey laws 1876, "p. 360, under
which objections on that ground must be made before the
jury is sworn, where the object sought to be attained by
the statute, according to the view adopted by the state
court, was to make the grand jury a more efficient instru-
ment of justice, and not to benefit any particular defend-
ant or class of defendants. It was contended that this
provision, as applied by the courts of the state, separates
criminals into classes; to wit, those who are accused
before the finding of the indictment, and those who are
accused afterwards; giving to the first a privilege of
challenge which is denied to the second ; and that there is
no substantial reason for the classification. The purpose
of the statute was the furtherance of the due and efficient
administration of justice for the protection of those
836 DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 570
against whom crimes might be committed, as well as those
who might be charged with the commission of such crimes.
The object sought to be attained by the disabilities ex-
pressed by the statute was to secure an efficient and
representative body of citizens to take part in the due
administration of the law for the benefit of all who were
entitled to its protection, and not specially or even
primarily for the benefit of those who were charged with
its violation. In view of the purpose of the statute is
the classification justified, are the persons constituting
the classes in different relations to the purpose of the law.
It is obvious that they are, and the law neither offers nor
withholds substantial rights. It constitutes one of its
instrumentalities of persons having certain qualifications
which cannot affect essentially the charge against, or the
defense of, any defendant* It is the conception of the
state that a grand jury so constituted would be more
efficient in the administration of justice than one not so
constituted, but that there would be counteracting disad-
vantages if the right of challenge should be extended
beyond the date of the impanelment of the jury. It was
competent for the state to so provide. Lang v. New Jer-
sey, 209 U. S. 467.
§571. Difference o7 procedure against corporations.
Corporations are not denied the equal protection of the
laws because corporate violators of the Tennessee anti-
trust act of March 16, 1903, may be proceeded against by
bill in equity on relation of the attorney general, while
natural persons offending against its provisions cannot
be tried without a preliminary investigation by a grand
jury, and indictment or presentment, and a trial by jury,
with the right to an acquittal unless their guilt is estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt; and to the benefit of
a statute of limitations of one year. The law of Tennes-
see sees fit to seek to prevent a certain kind of conduct
To prevent it the threat of fine and imprisonment is likely
to be efficient for men, while the latter is impossible and
§ 573 PROCEDURE IN STATE COXJRTS 837
the former less serious to corporations. On the other
hand, the threat of extinction or ouster is not monstrouSi
and yet is likely to achieve the result with corporations,
while it would be extravagant as applied to meiL Hence,
this difference is justifiable. Standard Oil Co. v. Tennes-
see ex rel. Gates, 217 U. S. 413.
§ 572. Appeal by government in criminal case. Con-
gress could, by the act of March 2, 1907, authorize the
government to bring up a criminal case from a Federal
Circuit Court to the Supreme Court when a demurrer to
an indictment has been sustained, although the same priv-
ilege is denied the accused when the indictment is sus-
tained,— even assuming that the United States is bound
to afford the equal protection of the laws to persons within
its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has decided that the
right of appeal is not essential to due process of law.
Even if the explicit clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
forbidding a state to deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of its laws, can be said to
apply to the United States, it can have no broader mean-
ing when so applied, than when applied to the states.
Even assuming that Congress may not discriminate in
its legislation, it certainly has the power of classification,
and the act in question is well within such power. United
States V. Heinze, 218 U. S. 532.
§ 573. Classification of prisoners committing assaults.
Singling out convicts serving life sentences in a state
prison as proper subjects for the imposition of the death
penalty, as is done by the California penal code, in case
they shall, with malice aforethought, commit an assault
upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or
instrument, or by any means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury does not deny such life prisoners the
equal protection of the laws. The contention is to be
tested by considering whether there is a basis for the
classification made by the statute. The classification of
838 DUB PBOCESS OP LAW § 573
the statute in question is not arbitrary, but is based upon
valid reasons and distinctions. ^^The ^life-termers,' as
has been said, while within the prison walls, constitute a
class by themselves, — ^a class recognized as such by
penologists the world over. Their situation is legalljr
different. Their civic death is perpetual.'' Manifestly
there could be no extension of the term of imprisonment
as a punishment for crimes they might commit, and what-
ever other punishment should be imposed was for the
legislature to determine. The power of classification
which the lawmaking power possesses has been illustrated
by many cases. They demonstrate that the legislature of
California did not transcend its power in the enactment
of this statute. Finley v. California, 222 U. S. 28.
§574. Quo warranto. A foreign corporation ousted
and fined $50,000 in civil quo warranto proceedings in
the highest court of a state, for misuser of its license to
do business in the state, cannot claim to have been denied
the equal protection of the laws because corporations
prosecuted in the inferior state courts for identicaUy the
same acts, in violation of the state anti-trust acl^ are
entitled to a trial by jury, and, if convicted, can be ousted
of their franchises and subjected to a fine not exceeding
$100 per day during the time the combination continued
in effect. Proceedings by information in the nature of
quo warranto differ in form and consequence from a
prosecution by indictment for violation of a criminal stat-
ute. In the one, the state proceeds for a violation of the
company's private contract; in the other, it prosecutes
for a violation of public law. The corporation may be
deprived of its franchise for nonuser, — ^a mere failure
to act It may also be deprived of its charter for that
which, though innocent in itself, is beyond the power con-
ferred upon it as an artificial person. If, however, the
act of misuser is not only ultra vires but criminal, there
is no merger of the civil liability in the criminal offense.
Separate proceedings may be instituted,— one to secure
§ 575 PEOCEDUBB IN STATE COURTS 839
the civil judgment, and the other to enforce the criminal
law. Both eases may involve a consideration of the same
facts ; and evidence warranting a judgment of ouster may
be sufficient to sustain a convictiDn for crime. A judg-
ment may in one case sometimes be a bar to the other; but
neither remedy is exclusive. The double liability, in dvil
and criminal proceedings, finds its counterpart in many
instances ; as, for example, where an attorney is disbarred
or ousted of his right to practice in the court because of
conduct for which he may likewise be prosecuted and
fined. Plaintiffs in error cannot complain that they were
denied the equal protection of the law, because in the civil
proceeding tiiey were not tried in the manner, and sub-
jected to the judgment, appropriate in^ criminal cases.
Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri ex rel. Hadley, 224 U. S. 270.
§ 575. Punishing habitual criminals. Bringing a con-
vict after judgment before the court of another county in
a separate proceeding instituted conformably to West
Virginia statute, chap. 165, § § 1-5, by information charg-
ing him with prior convictions which were not alleged in
the indictment on which he was last tried and convicted,
and, on the finding of the jury that he was the former
convict, sentencing him to the additional punishment
which chap. 152, § § 23, 24, in such cases prescribes, does
not deny him the equal protection of the laws because of
the difiference in procedure between the case where the
fact of former conviction is alleged in the indictment and
determined by the jury on the trial of the charge of
crime, and the case where it is charged in the informa-
tion, and determined by a jury in a proceeding thereby
instituted. The statute in question applies to all those
** convicted of an offense, and sentenced to confinement
therefor in the penitentiary," who previously have been
sentenced to a like punishment. The fact of such sen-
tence, indicating the gravity of the offense, affords a
reasonable basis for classification. Those who have been
so sentenced once before, and those so sentenced twice
840 DUB PBOCESS OP LAW § 575
before, are subjected, respectively, to the same measure
of increased punishment, but in all cases before the in-
creased punishment can be inflicted, there must be a
conviction on the new charge ; the former conviction must
be shown, and there must be a finding by a jury, if the
fact is contested, of the identity of the defendant with
the former convict. The distinction, upon which the
denial of the equal protection of the laws is based, has
regard simply to the difference in procedure between the
case where the fact of former conviction is alleged in
the indictment, and determined by the jury on the trial of
the charge of the second offense, and the case where the
fact of the former conviction is perhaps subsequently
discovered, and is charged in an information and deter-
mined by a jury in a proceeding thereby specially insti-
tuted for that purpose. This cannot be said to give rise
to a substantial difference in right, or to any inequality
within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616.
§576. Attachment of property of nonresident. The
attachment, conformably to local law, at the instance of
a foreign creditor, of bonds of a foreign corporation, for
the debt of their nonresident owner, does not deny such
owner either the equal protection of the laws or the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, where such bonds had been deposited with a cus-
todian in the state, under the directions of the state court,
in the exercise of admittedly lawful powers, and could not
be removed therefrom without obtaining the authority of
thp state court, — an authority which was unaffected by
the fact that the bonds were registered in the names of
the attachment debtor ^s minor children, since they were
so registered solely because of the previous action of the
state court. De Beam v. Safe Deposit & T. Co., 233
U. S. 24.
§577. Bight to preliminary examination in criminal
prosecutions in Blanila. Denying to an inhabitant of
§ 578 PROCEDURE IN STATE COURTS 841
Manila the right to a preliminary examination which is
accorded to all other persons in the Philippine Islands, as
is done by the provision of the Philippine Conmiission act
No. 612, § 2, that in cases triable only in the court of first
instance in the city of Manila, the accused shall not be
entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any
case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investi-
gation of the facts, shall have presented an information
against him in proper form, does not contravene the pro-
hibition of the Philippine bill of rights (act July 1, 1902,
§ 5), against the denial of the equal protection of the
laws. It was long ago decided that the guaranty of the
equal protection does not require territorial uniformity.
Ocampo V. United States, 234 U. S. 91.
§ 578. Raising federal question on second trial. The
protection of the due process of law and the equal pro-
tection of the law clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
first invoked by the tender of amended answers after
the case had been remanded to the trial court by the high-
est state court for a new trial, is not denied by the aflSrm-
ance in the highest state court on a second appeal of the
ruling of the trial court, refusing to permit the filing of
such amended answers, where the highest state court in
effect held that the facts upon which the Federal rights
were based had been concluded by the former decision,
which was the law of the case, and that to permit a re-
litigation of tfiese facts because the result reached was
alleged to violate constitutional provisions would reopen
that which the court held had been settled by the decision
on the first appeal, in which no infraction of Federal
right was duly set up as required to lay the foundation
for review. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Higdon, 234 U. S.
592.
The equal protection of the laws is not denied to a per-
son sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment for the
crime of perjury, under the authority of the Califomia
penal code, which makes perjury punishable by imprison-
842 DUE PBOCESS OF LAW { 578
ment in the state prison for not less than one nor more
than fourteen years, although five years' imprisonm^t
may be the average maximum penalty for other felonies
denounced by the California laws, some of whioh may be
of greater gravity and of more injurious consequences
than perjury. To establish appropriate penalties for the
commission of crime and to confer upon judicial tribunals
a discretion respecting the punishment to be inflicted in
particular cases, within limits fixed by the law maldiig
power, are functions peculiarly belonging to the several
states ; and there is nothing to support the contention that
the sentence imposed in this case violates the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment either in depriving appel-
lant of his liberty without due process of law, or in deny-
ing to him the equal protection of the laws. It is hardly
necessary to say, says the opinion, that the comparative
gravity of criminal ofiFenses, and whether their conse-
quences are more or less injurious, are matters for the
state itself to determine. Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S.
502.
TABLE OF CASES
{BXrSBBNOBS ABS TO PAOXS]
A. Backofl Jr. ft Sons ▼. Fort
Street Uidon Depot Ck>., 169
U. S. 557 391, 829
Abilene Nat. Bank ▼. DoUey, 228
U. S. 1 473
Ableman ▼. Booth, 21 How. 523 75
Adair ▼. United States, 208 U. S.
161 150, 185, 493, 496, 497, 512
Adams ▼. Milwaukee, 228 U. S.
572 402, 431, 790
Adams v. New York, 192 U. S.
585 131, 160, 306, 832
Adams Express Go. v. Ohio State
Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 341, 614
Ah Cheung, In re, 136 Gal. 678,
69 Pae. 492 776
Ah Sin y. Wittman, 198 U. S. 500
428, 494, 777
Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 tJ. S.
194 495
Alexander, The, 60 Fed. 914 404
Allen ▼. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138
473, 546, 556, 575
Allen V. Pullman's Palace Gar
Co., 191 U. S. 171 341
Allen ▼. Biley, 203 U. S. 347 782
Allge^er v. Louisiana, 165 XT. S.
578 488, 492, 494, 496, 497, 511
Aluminum Go. v. Bamsey, 222 U.
S. 251 685
Alvre^ y Sanchez ▼. United
States, 216 U. S. 167 466
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1
Pet. 511 119
American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219
U. S. 47 402, 472
American lithographic Co. ▼.
Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603 167
American Befrigerator Transit
Co. ▼. Hall, 174 U. 8. 70 345
American School of Magnetic
Healing ▼. McAnnultj, 187 U.
S. 94 135
American Steel ft Wire C6. ▼.
Speed, 192 U. S. 500 701
American Sugar Befining Co. ▼.
Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 622
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204
578, 582
Anderson v. Forty-two Broadway
Co., 239 U. S. 69 180
Angel y. Smith, 9 Yes. 335 582
Angle y. Chicago, St* Paul, etc.,
Bailway, 151 U. S. 1 41, 261
Appleby y. Builalo, 221 U. 8.
524 391
Arizona & New Mexico By. y.
Clark, 235 U. S. 669 318
Armour Packing Co. y. Lacy, 200
U. S. 226 633
Armour Packing Co. y. United
States, 209 U. S. 56 510
Armour & Co. y. North Dakota,
240 U. S. 510 432, 758
Amett y. Beade, 220 U. S. 311 455
Arrowsmith y. Harmoning, 118
U. S. 194 263
Ashley y. Byan, 153 U. S. 436 434
Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219
U. S. 121 402, 737
Atchison, T. & S. F. B. Co. y.
Denver & N. O. B. Co., 110
U. S. 667 410
843
844
TABLE OF CASES
I
Atehison, T. ft 8. F. R. Go. ▼.
Matthews, 174 U. 8. 96 605, 669
AtehiBon, T» ft 8. F. B. Co. ▼.
VoBbnrg, 238 U. 8. 56 693
Atherton ▼. Atherton, 181 U. 8.
155 326, 327, 330, 332
Atkin y. Kanus, 191 U. 6. 207
755, 775
Atlunson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. Ill 524
Atlantie Coast Line B. Co. ▼.
Georgia, 234 U. 8. 280 689
Atlantie Coaat line B. Co. v.
Bivenide Mills, 219 U. S. 1^6
160, 161, 500, 504
Atlantie ft P. Tel. Co. ▼. Pliiladel-
phia, 190 U. 8. 160 341
Attorney General v. WilliamSy
174 Mass. 476 379
Anffmordt ▼. Hedden, 137 U. 8.
310 870
Auld V. Buteher, 2 Kan. 135 520
Aultman, etc., Maeh. Co. ▼. Fish,
120 lU. App. 314 522
B
BaeeoB ▼. Looisianay 282 XT. 8.
334 794
Backus ▼. Fort Street Union
Depot Co., 169 U. 8. 557
216, 218, 220, 458, 532
Bacon ▼. Hooker, 17t Mass. 335 348
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. 8. 311
420, 779
Bagg 's Appeal, 43 Pa. St. 512 524
Bagg's Case, 11 Coke 99a, 100
17, 251
Bain, In re, 121 U. 8. 1 535
Ball v. Anderson, 196 Pa. 8t. 86 523
Ballard ▼. Hunter, 204 U. 8. 241
291, 718
Baltic Min. Co. v. Massachusetts,
231 U. 8. 68 480, 721
Baltimore ft O. B. Co. ▼. Hos-
tetter, 240 U. 8. 620 314
Baltimore ft O. B. Co. ▼. Inter-
state Commerce Comnussioni
221 U. 8. 612 504
AKI TO PAOIS]
Baltimore ft 8. B. Co. v. Nesbit,
10 How. 395 452, 522
Bank of Columbia ▼. Okelj, 4
Wheat 235 276, 280, 297, 526
Bank of Commerce v. New York
City, 2 Black 732 340
Bannon v. United States, 156 U.
8. 464 78
Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 327
Barbier ▼. Connolly, 113 U. 8. 27
39, 263, 281, 398, 662, 723, 761
Bamita ▼. Beverly, 163 U. &
118 528
Barrett ▼. Barrett^ 120 N. C
127 457
Barrett v. Holmes, 102 U. 8.
651 519
Barrett ▼. Indiana, 229 U. 8. 26
402, 479, 791
Barrington ▼. Missouri, 205 U. 8.
483 154, 165
Barron ▼. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243
25, 56, 60, 99, 154, 165, 452, 542
Bartameyer v. Iowa, 18 Wait
129 257
Barton v. Morris, 15 Ohio 408 457
Barton ▼. SUte, 67 Ga. 653 559
Bates ft G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U.
8. 106 135, 205
Bauman v. Boss, 167 U. 8. 548
88, 106, 162, 210, 220,
221, 291, 355, 357, 375, 378, 467
Bayard y. Singleton, 1 N. C. 42 18
Beavers y. Henkel, 194 U. 8. 73 133
Bedford y. United States, 192 U.
8. 217 127, 215
Bedford Quarries B. Co. y. Chi-
cago, I. ft L. B. Co., 175 Ind.
303 476
Beers y. Glynn, 211 U. 8. 477 632
Bell y. Bell, 181 U. 8. 175 325, 326
Bell's Gap B. Co. y. Pennayl-
yania, 134 U. S. 232 280, 285,
305, 352, 367, 368, 374, 613, 618
Bellingham Bay ft B. C. B. Co.
▼. New Whatcom, 172 U. 8. 314
287, 292, 366
TABLE OF CASES
845
[BinEBENCIS
Bdoit ▼. Morgan^ 7 Wall. 624 452
Beltzhoover ▼. UeweU, 11 GiL &
J. 212 521
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U. S.
655 556, 826
Bemheimer ▼. Converse, 206 U. 8.
516 313
Beny ▼. Donovan, 188 Mass.
353 514
Beny v. Kansas City, etc., B. Co.,
52 Kan. 759 522
Bessette v. People, 193 HI. 334 494
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194
U. S. 324 579
Bicknell v. Comstoek, 113 U. 8.
152 524
Billings V. Hall, 7 Cal. 1 521
Billings V. Illinois, 188 U. 8.
97 625
Billings V. United 8tates, 232 U.
8. 261 171
Bissell ▼. Jeffersonville, 24 How.
296 452
Black V. Jackson, 177 U. 8. 349
124, 536
Blackford v. Pother, 1 Black
36 521
Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. 8.
189 , 348, 349, 624
Blake v. McClung, 172 U. 8. 239
313, 711
Blinn v. Nelson, 222 XT. 8. 1 471
Blonnt V. Windley, 95 U. 8.
173 529
Blnm V. Nelson, 222 U. 8. 1 313
Blnmenthal v. 8haw, 77 Fed. '
954 514
Board of Education v. Illinois,
203 U. 8. 553 632
Bolleb V. Brimfield, 120 U. 8.
759 457
Bollman, Ex parte, 4 Cranch 75,
94 578
Bolln V. Nebraska, 176 U. 8. 83 549
Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 114 16
Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 118a 249
ABX TO PAGXS]
Bonnemot v. Gill, 167 Mass.
338 323
Booth V. Illinois, 184 U. 8. 425
427, 428, 494, 508, 518
Booth V. Indiana, 237 U. 8. 391 752
Booth V. Woodborg, 32 Conn.
128 356
Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. 8.
385 517, 798
Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,
97 U. 8. 25 405
Boston Chamber of Commerce v.
Boston, 217 tJ. 8. 189 389
Bothwell V. Bingham County, 237
U. 8. 642 342
Bowen v. Phillips, 55 Ind. 226 522
Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U. 8. 22
41, 262, 272, 662, 821
Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay
252 18, 447
Bown V. Walling, 204 U. 8. 320 420
Boyd V. United 8tates, 116 U. 8.
616 79, 583
BraceviUe Coal Co. v. People, 147
HI. 66 491
Bradley, Ex parte, 7 Wall. 364 589
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 589
Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U. 8.
1 453
Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. 8.
477 746
Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 WalL
130 608
Brand v. Union Elevated B. Co.,
238 U. 8. 586 393
Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U. 8.
284 158
Brass v. 8tate of North Dakota,
153 U. 8. 391 813
Brass v. 8toe8er, 153 U. 8. 391 409
Breese v. United States, 226 U.
8. 1 164
Brennan v. United Hatters, 73
N. J. L. 729 514
Bridges v. GAiBn, 33 Ga. 113 347
Brinton v. 8eevers, 12 Iowa 389 457
846
TABLE OF CASES
[REmSNOIS A&l TO PAGXS]
Briseoe ▼. Bodolpli, 221 U. a 547
161, 292, 334, 467
Broftdnu ▼. IQMOori, 219 U. B.
285 504, 639
Bromon ▼. Einsl^, 1 How. 311 527
Bronaon ▼. Bodflt, 7 WaU. 229
71, 72
BrooUyn ▼. Stns L. Ins. Co., 99
U. 8. 362 319
Brooks ▼. GTMthod, 1 J. * W.
176 582
BroTinf, In f, 136 U. 8. 586 588
Brown, In re, 185 U. 8. 662 473
Brown v. Obm 'rs, 50 Miss. 468 273
Brown v. HonfUm, 114 U. 8.
622 345
Brown ▼. MazylMid, 12 Wheat.
419 344
Brawn ▼. New Jereej, 175 U. 8.
17» 61, 90, 154, 165,
459, 532, 547, 549, 573, 575, 830
Bnfim ▼. Walker, 161 U. 8. 591
61, 96, 145
Brown-Pormaii Co. ▼. Kentnekj,
217 U. a 563 637
Bnuhaber ▼. Union PaeUe B. B.
Co., 240 U. a 1 181
Buekner ▼. Finley, 2 Pet. 586 332
Budd V. 8tate of New York, 143
U. a 517 813
Budd '■ Case, 117 N. T. 27 409
Burr, Ex parte, 9 Wheat 529 589
Burr's Case, 4 Craneh App^z
470 21
Barton, In re, 29 Fed. 639 525
Bush ▼• Eentoekj, 107 U. 8.
110 604
Bushnell V. Lsland, 164 XT. 8.
684 135
Butchers' Union, ete., C6. ▼. Cres-
cent Citj, ote^ Co., HI U. a
746 491
Buttfleld ▼. Stranahaa, 192 U. 8.
470 128, 290, 458
Cachute ▼. State, 50 ICss. 169 165
Cahen ▼. Brewster, 203 U. 8.
543 6.n
Cain v. Com. Pub. Co., 232 U. a
134 318
Calder ▼. BuU, 3 DaU. 386
208, 453, 522, 530
CaldweU v. Texas, 137 U. a 692
280, 297, 556
Caledonian Coal Co. ▼. Baker, 196
U. 8. 432 320
California Reduction Co. v. Sani-
tary Beduetion Works, 199 U.
a 306 400, 407
Callan y. Wilson, 127 U. 8. 540
24Q, 500, 536
Calvin's Case, 7 Op. Bep. 1
118, 232
Camfield ▼. United States, 167 U.
a 618 440
Campbell v. CaUfomU, 200 U. 8.
87 630
Campbell ▼. Holt, 115 U. 8. 620
403, 524
Canal Appraisers v. People, ^7
Wend. 604 75, 214
Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio,
183 U. a 238 771
Capital Traction Co. ▼. Hof, 174
U. a 1 124, 240, 536
Carlson ▼. Washington, 234 U. 8.
103 589
Carpenter v. PennsylTania, 17
How. 463 452
Carpenter ▼• Teadon, 158 Fed.
766 424
Carroll ▼. Greenwich Ins. Co., 109
U. 8. 401 172, 243, 495, 507, 511
Carson ▼. Sewer Com'rs, 182 U.
a 398 292
Carter ▼. Texas, 177 U. 8. 442 607
Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230
578, 582
Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U.
a 396 360, 489
TABLE OF CASES
847
[BIFIBINOIB
GasteUo y. MeConnico, 168 U. S.
674 262
Oentral Bank v. Solomon, 20 Ga.
408 620
Central Loan & Tnut Go. ▼.
Campbell Commiafiion Co., 173
U. 8. 84 712
Central Lmnber Co. ▼• South
Dakota, 226 U. S. 157
402, 506, 511, 745
Central of Georgia B. Co. ▼.
Wright, 207 U. S. 127
290, 294, 296
Chadwick ▼. Kelly, 187 U. S.
540 358, 361
Chae Chan Ping y. United States,
130 U. S. 581 92, 137, 234
Ghaloner y. Sherman, 242 U. S.
455 288
Chapman, In re, 156 U. S. 211 565
Chapman y. Goodnow, 12^ U. S.
540 265
Chapman y. State, 104 Cal. 690 522
Chappell y. United States, 160 U.
a 499 211, 212, 220
Chappell Chemical ft Fertilizer
Co. y. Sulphur Mines Co., 172
U. S. 474 830
Charles Biyer Bridge y. Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet 420
208, 451, 521, 522
Charlotte^ C. & A. B. Co. y.
Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386 355, 658
Cheely y. Clayton, 110 U. 8. 701
327, 332
Cheeyer y. Wilson, 9 WalL 108
326, 327
Cherokee Nation y. Southern
Kansas B. Co., 135 U. S. 641
208, 212, 216, 218, 221
Chesapeake ft O. B. Co. y. Conlej,
230 U. S. 513 688
Chestnut y. Shane, 16 Ohio 599 457
Chicago y. Sturgee, 222 U. S. 313
469, 743
Chicago, B. ft N. R Co. y. Porter,
43 Minn. 527 476
AXE TO PAGIS]
Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. y. Bab-
cock, 204 U. S. 685 341
Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. y. Chi-
cago, 166 U. 8. 226
90, 139, 880,
384, 391, 467, 532, 547, 575, 665
Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. y. Cram,
228 U. S. 70 402
Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. y. Catts,
94 U. 8. 155 651
Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. y. Illi-
nois, 200 U. 8. 561
148, 387, 419, 467, 677
Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. y. Mc-
Guire, 219 U. S. 549 437,
502, 504, 506, 508, 516, 517, 684
Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. y.
Nebraska, 170 U. 8. 57 291, 403
Chicago, B. ft Q. B. Co. y. People,
212 m. 103 388
Chicago Dock ft Canal Co. y.
Fraley, 228 U. 8. 680 791
Chicago, I. ft L. B. Co. y. Hackett,
228 U. S. 559 687
Chicago, E. ft W. B. Co. y. Pon-
tius, 157 U. 8. 209 664
Chicago Life Ins. Co. y. Needles,
113 U. S. 574 697
Chicago, M. ft St. P. B. Co. y.
Iowa, 233 U. 8. 334 689
Chicago, M. ft St. P. B. Cd. y.
Kennedy, 232 U. 8. 628 477
Chicago, M. ft St P. B. Co. y.
Minneapolis, 232 U. 8. 430
393, 477
Chicago, M. ft St P. B. Co. y.
Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418
290, 411, 413, 474, 657, 666 ,
Chicago, M. ft St. P. B. Co. y.
Polt, 232 U. 8. 165 477
Chicago, M. ft St. P. B. Co. y.
Wisconsin, 238 U. 8. 491 482
Chicago B. Co. y. Iowa, 4 U. 8.
155 306
Chicago, B. I. ft P. B. Co. y.
Arkansas, 219 U. 8. 453 439, 683
848
TABLE OF CASES
I
Chieftgo, T. H. ft S. E. B. Ck>. ▼.
AnderaoDy 242 U. 8. 283 695
dhicago ft A. B. Co. y. Tran-
barger, 238 U. 8. 67
180, 458, 694
Chicago ft G. T. B. Co. v. Well-
man, 143 U. 8. 339 412
Chicago ft N. W. B. Co. ▼. Mc-
Laughlin, 119 U. 8. 566 654
Chicago ft N. W. B. Co. y. More-
houae, 112 Wis. 1 393
Chicago, etc, B. Co. y. Chicago,
166 XT. 8. 238 378
Chicago, etc.,'B. Co. y. Dey, 35
Fed. 866 414
Chicago, etc., B. Co. y. Minne-
sota, 134 U. 8. 418 415
Chicago, etc., B. Co. y. Wellman,
143 U. 8. 339 412
CUles, In re, 22 WalL 157 579
Chin Bak Kan y. United States,
186 U. 8. 193 137, 234, 236
Chin Yow y. United States, 208
U. 8. 8 168
Chinese Exclusion Case, 139 U.
8. 581, 600 112
Chipley y. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206 514
Choate y. Trapp, 224 U. 8. 665
181, 403, 455
Choctaw ft Gulf B. R y. Harrison,
235 U. 8. 298 357
Christmas y. Bussell, 5 Wall.
290 333
Chj Lung y. Freeman, 92 U. 8.
275 257
Cincinnati, I. ft W. B. Co. y.
ConnersyiUe, 218 U. 8. 336 466
Cincinnati, N. O. ft T. P. B. Co.
y. Interstate Com. Commiss.,
162 U. 8. 184 411
(^dnnati, N. O. ft T. P. B. Co.
y. Kentucky, 115 U. 8. 321 653
Cincinnati Packet Co. y. Bay, 200
U. 8. 179 347
Cincinnati Street B. Co. y. Snell,
193 U. 8. 30 833
ABB TO PA0I8]
Citizens' Say. ft L. Aas^ ▼.
Topeka, 20 WalL 655
352, 354, 383
Citizens' Telephone Co. y. Foller,
229 U. 8. 322 748
City Bank of New Orleans, In re,
3 How. 292 530
Ciyil Bights Cases, 109 U. S. 3
242, 267, 610
Clark y. Kansas City, 176 U. &
114 726
Clark y. Nash, 198 U. 8. 361
385, 390, 392, 426, 463
Clark y. TitosyiUe, 184 U. 8.
329 729
Clark y. Wells, 203 U. &. 164 320
Clement Nat. Bank ▼. Vermont,
231 U. a 120 290, 295, 643
Cleyeland, C, C. ft St L. B. Co.
y. Porter, 210 U. 8. 177
s 195, 392
Cliquot's Champagne, 3 WalL
114 94
Coates y. New York, 7 Cow.
585 424
Coe y. Armour Fertilizer Works,
237 U. 8. 413 295
Coe y. Errol, 116 U. 8. 517 345
CoffeyyiUe Vitrified Brick ft Tile
Co. y. Perry, 69 Kan. 297 513
Cole y. LaGrange, 113 U. 8. 1 211
Collector y. Day, 11 WalL 113 340
Colling y. Kansas City Stock
Yards Co., 183 U. 8. 79 414
CoUins y. Johnston, 237 U. 8.
502 564, 566, 842
Columbia Heights Bealty Co. y.
Budolph, 217 U. S. 547 162, 467
Columbus Southern B. Co. y.
Wright, 151 U. 8. 470 660
Commercial Mut. Accident Co. y.
Dayis, 213 U. 8. 245 317
Commercial ft B. Bank y. Sto-
comb, 14 Pet. 60 316
Com. y. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 397, 400
Com. y. Baltimore ft O. B. Co.,
145 U. 8. 263 410
TABLE OP CASES
849
[RiriBENOIS
Com. ▼. Gaton, 4 Gall (Va.) 5
18, 255, 339, 446
Com. y. Dana, 2 Met. 329 132
Com. y. Gaming Implements, 119
Mass. 332 404
Com. y. McArthor, 152 Mass.
522 430
Com. y. MeCaffertj, 145 Mass.
384 426
Com. of Virginia, Ex parte, 100
U. B. 313 600
Com. of Virginia ft Coles, Ex
parte, 100 U. S. 339 601
Connecticut Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. y. Spratley, 172 U.
8. 602 343
Connolly y. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,
184 U. S. 540 626, 700
Consolidated Coal Co. y. Illinois,
185 U. 8. 203 731, 772, 796
Consolidated Bendering Co. y.
Vermont, 207 U. 8. 541 583, 704
Cook y. Hart, 146 U. 8. 183
562, 563
Cook y. Marshall County, 196 U.
8. 261 626
Cook y. Moffat, 5 How. 315
;27
Cook y. Wood, 1 McCord L. 139 521
Cooper y. Bejnolds, 10 Wall. 308
314, 317, 319
Cooper y. The Wandworth Board
of Works, 14 C. B. N. 8. 180 294
Coosa Biyer 8. Co. y. Barclay,
30 Ala. 120 521
Copin y. Adamson, L. B., 9 Ex.
345 311
Coppage y. Kansas, 236 U. 8. 1
402, 435, 512, 514, 517
Corfield y. Coryell, Fed. Gas. No.
3,230 36
Cornell Steamboat Co. y. 8ohmer,
235 U. 8. 549 341, 342, 346
Corry y. Baltimore, 196 U. 8.
466 348
Getting y. Kansas City Stock
Yards Co., 183 U. 8. 79
414, 416, 816
Due Process — 54
ABX TO PA<ns]
Coulter y. Louisyille & Nashville
B. Co., 196 U. 8. 599 627
Counselman y. Hitchcock, 142 U.
8. 547 84, 96, 145
Courch y. Jeffries, 4 Burr. 2460 445
Covington & L. Turnpike Boad
Co. y. Sandford, 164 U. 8. 578
241, 412, 413, 814
Cox y. Berry, 13 Ga. 306 521
Cox y. Texas, 202 U. 8. 446 634
Grain y. United States, 162 U. 8.
625 536, 655
Crandall y. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35
38, 230
Crane v. New York, 239 U. 8.
195 755
Crawford v. State, Minor (Ala.)
143 523
Creighton v. Kerr, 20 Wall. 8 317
Creighton v. Pragg, 21 Gal. 115 476
Cronin y. Adams, 192 U. 8. 108 802
Crooks y. Crooks, 4 Grant Gh. (U.
C.) 615 522
Cross y. North Carolina, 132 U.
8. 131 556
Grossman v. Luman, 192 IT. 8.
189 431
Growl y. Pennsylvania, 242 U. 8.
153 819
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. 8.
86 799
Croxall v. Shererd, 5 WalL 289 524
Grozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktien-
gesellschaft, 224 U. 8. 290 221
Cuddy, Ex parte, 131 IT. 8. 280
580, 586
Culbeth y. Downing, 121 N. G.
205 520
Gumming v. County Board of
Education, 175 IT. 8. 528 606
Gummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
277, 323 303
Cunnius v. Beading School Dist.,
198 U. 8. 458 289, 323, 402
Curtiss v. Georgetown ft A. Turn-
pike Co., 6 Granch 233 88, 220
Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Ga. 350 521
850
TABLE OF CASES
Duif orth ▼. QeorgU, 75 Oa. 614 164
D'Arey ▼. Ketchum, 11 How.
165 308, 332
DArnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S.
390 720
Dartmouth College Oaae, 4 Wheat.
518 58, 60, 275, 284, 300
Dartmouth College ▼. Woodward,
4 Wheat 518 452
Davidson ▼. New Orleans, 06 U.
8. 97 9, 15,
19, 24, 42, 49, 50, 185, 249,
272, 285, 303, 357, 368, 369,
375, 376, 382, 386, 462, 542, 545
Davis ▼. Mills, 194 U. 8. 451
520, 524, 526
Davis ▼. Texas, 139 U. S. 651 824
Davis ▼. Utah Territory, 151 U. 8.
262 826
Dayton Coal ft I. Co. ▼. Barton,
183 U. 8. 23 510
De Beam ▼. Safe Deposit k T.
Co., 233 U. 8. 24 840
Debs, In re, 158 U. 8. 564 579, 582
DeCamp v. Hibemia Undergronnd
R. Co., 47 N. J. L. 43 476
Delaware, L. ft W. B. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 198 U. 8. 341
342, 487
Delaware, L. ft W. B. Co. v.
Pnblie UtiUties, 85 N. J. L.
28 483
Delaware, L. ft W. B. Co. v.
United States, 231 U. 8. 363 170
De Lima v. BidweU, 182 U. 8. 1 120
Dennj v. Bennett, 128 U. 8. 489 451
Denver v. New York Trust Co.,
229 U. 8. 123 792
Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. 8. 492
354, 383
Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. 8. 399
292, 360
Detroit, Ft W. ft B. I. B. Co. v.
Osbom, 189 U. 8. 383 674
1
Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U 8.
193 341, 369
Diamond Match Co. ▼• Ontonagon,
188 U. 8. 82 346
Dias V. United Stotes, 233 U. a
442 539, 559
Diekerson ▼. Colgrove, 100 U. 8.
583 524
Dietrich V. Murdoch, 42 Mo. 279 476
District of Columbia v. Brooke,
214 U. & 138 292, 430, 465, 719
District of Columbia v. Lynch-
burg Invest Corporationi 236
U. a 692 221
Dizen v. Winnipeg Electric St.
B. Co., 11 Manitoba 528 523
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U* 8.
223 518
Dodge V. Brady, 240 U. a 122 182
Dodge V. Osbom, 240 U. a 118 182
Dollar Sav. Bank v. United
Stotes, 19 WalL 240 367
Donald v. Chicago, B. ft Q. B.
Co., 93 Iowa 284 603
Doran v. Kennedy, 237 U. a
362 335
Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216 376
Dorr V. United States, 195 U. a
138 125, 536
Dow V. Beidehnan, 125 U. a
680 306
Dowdell V. United States, 221 U.
8. 325 127, 539, 559
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. a 244
120, 238
Downman v. Texas, 231 U. 8.
353 644
Dred Scott Csse, 19 How. 393
25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 227, 228
Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 508
452, 529
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. 8. 71
109, 298, 538
Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. a
377 38
Dunn V. Com., 6 Pa. St. 384 557
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 56
TABLE OF CASES
851
[BSriBlNOIS ABX TO PAQIS]
£
Earnshaw ▼. United States, 146
U. S. 60 371
Eberle ▼. Miehigan, 232 U. 8.
700 803
EeksteiiL ▼. Bhoemery 3 Meart.
15 521
Edwards ▼. EDiott, 21 WalL 532
61, 542
Edwards v. Keaney, 96 U. S.
595 521
EiBnger ▼. Kennej, 115 U. S.
566 529
Egan ▼. Hart, 165 U. 8. 188 403
Eight-Hour-Law Case (Wilson)
y. New ft Ferris, Beceivers, 182
Eitenbecker ▼. District Court, 134
U. 8. 81 580
Ekia ▼. United States, 142 U. 8.
651 92, 205
Eldridge ▼. TreseTant, 160 U. S.
452 148, 767
Elgin ▼• Eaton, 83 HL 535
390, 475
Elk ▼. Wilkins, 112 U. 8. 94 231
Elliot ▼. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328 333
Embree v. Kansas City Bead
Bist, 240 U. 8. 242 461
Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. 8.
296 793
Empire Twp. ▼. Darlington, 101
U. S. 87 319
Engel ▼. CMalley, 219 U. 8. 128
402, 738
English ▼. Bichardson, 224 U. 8.
680 403, 455
Ensign ▼. Pennqrlyania, 227 U.
8. 592 165
Entiek ▼. Carrington, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1029 79
Equitable life Society y. Penn-
sylvania, 238 U. 8. 143
342, 343, 357
Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. 8. 684 670
Erie B. Co. ▼. Williams, 233 U.
8. 685 517
Erskine v. Glidden, Me. [1886],
3 Atl. 651 522
Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.
8. 678 209
-Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. 8. 148
292, 390, 404, 475
Eubank v. Bichmond, 226 U. 8.
137 402, 437
Ewell ▼. DaggSy 108 U. 8. 143
452, 529
Ewing ▼. City of Leavenworth,
226 U. 8. 464 347
F
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. ▼.
Bradley, 164 U. 8. 112
216, 291, 295, 353,
355, 357, 375, 382, 386, 392, 452
Fargo V. Hart, 193 U. 8. 490 342
Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co.
y. Dobney, 189 U. 8. 301 808
Farmers' & Merchants' Sayings
Bank ▼. Minnesota, 232 U. 8.
516 644
Farrell v. West Chicago Park
Commissioners, 181 U. 8. 404 360
Fay ▼. Crozier, £17 U. 8. 455 304
Fayerweather y. Bitch, 195 U. S.
276 139
Felts y. Murphy, 201 U. 8. 123
147, 564, 573
Fertiliser Co. y. Sulphur Mines
Co., 172 U. 8. 474 830
Fidelity Mutual Life Association
y. Mettler, 185 U. 8. 308 806, 807
Field y. Barber Asphalt Paying
Co., 194 U. 8. 618 719
Fielden y. State of Illinois, 143
U. 8. 452 538, 825
Fifth Aye. Coach Co. y. City of
New York, 221 U. 8. 467
426, 741
Finch ▼, York County, 19 Neb.
50 • 347
Finley ▼. California, 222 U. 8.
28 838
862
TABLE OF CASES
[
Fiaeher y. Bt Looia, 104 U. 8.
370 , 400
Fisher t. MeOirr, 1 Qraj 26 404
Piskd, £z parte, 113 U. 8. 713 94
Fitts T. McGhee, 172 U. 8. 516 663
Fitzhngh t. Fitzhn^i 6 B.
Hon. 4 522
Fleming t. Page, 9 How. 603 237
Fletcher t. Peek, 6 Graneh 87
208, 255, 454
Flint T. Stone, Tracj Co., 220
U. 8. 107 171, 343, 640
Florida Central 4k P. B. Co. t.
Beynolda, 183 XT. 8. 471 672
Fok Tung To y. United 8Utet,
185 n. 8. 296 137, 234
Fonda, Ex parte, 117 U. 8. 516 563
Fong Tne Ting y. U. 8., 149 U.
8. 698 92, 115, 137, 142, 168, 234
Foppino y. 8peed, 199 U. 8.
501 494
Forbell t. New Yotk^ i64 N. Y.
522 468
Ft. Leayenworth B. Co. t. Lowe,
114 n. 8. 525 211
Foster y. Essex Bank, 16 Mass.
245 530
Fox y. Ohio, 6 How. 410
56, 61, 542
Frank's Case, 237 U. 8. 309 573
Frank y. Mangum, 237 IT. 8. 309
564, 566, 567
Frederieh, In re, 149 V, 8. 70 563
Freeborn y. Smith, 2 Wall. 160 530
Freeland y. Williams, 131 U. 8.
405 280, 529
Freeman y. Alderson, 119 U. 8.
185 320
French y. Barber Asphalt Pay.
Co., 181 n. 8. 324 357, 360, 489
Frey y. Kirk, 4 GU. & J. 509 521
Frisbie y. United States, 157 U.
S. 160 164
Frisbie y. Wmtney, 9 Wall. 187 454
Fuller y. Grand Bapids, 40 Mich.
395 523
AEB TO PAOK]
Fnllerton y. Bank of United
States, 1 Pet 604 519
G. k C. Merriam Ob. y. Saal-
field, 241 U. 8. 22 314
Gallup y. Schmidt, 183 U. 8. 301,
307 870
Galyeston, H. 4k 8. A. R Co. t.
Texas, 210 U. 8. 217 357, 480
Galyeston, H. 4k 8. A. B. Oo. y.
Wallace, 223 U. a 481 161
Gardner y. Michigan, 199 U. 8.
325 407, 834
Gardner t. Kewborg, 2 Johns.
Ch. 162 56, 207, 210
Garfield y. United States, 211 U.
8. 249 472
Garland, Ex parte, 4 Wall. 378 590
Garland y. Washington, 232 U.
& 642 554, 574, 577
Garrison t. New York, 21 Wall
196 378
Gast Bealtj 4k Inyestment Co. y.
Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.
8. 55 461, 488, 647
Gatewood t. North Carolina, 203
U. 8. 531 778
Gayieres y. United States, 220 U.
8. 338 127
Geer y. Connecticut, 161 U. 8.
531 405
Georgia y. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U. S. 230 428
Georgia Bailroad & Banking Co.
y. Smith, 128 U. 8. 174 411
German ABiance Ins. Co. y. Hale,
219 U. S. 307 739
German Alliance Ins. Co. y.
Lewis, 233 U. 8. 389
402, 409, 706
Gibbons y. Ogden^ 9 Wheat. 1 184
Gibson y. United States, 166 U.
8. 269 127, 147, 214, 387
Gilbert y. Aekerman, 159 N. T.
118 520
TABLE OF CASES
853
[BSnCEINOIS
GiDespid y. People, 188 HI. 176 513
Gilman ▼. Contra Costa County,
6 Cal. 676 522
Gilman ▼. Philadelphia, 3 WaU.
713 420
Gilmore ▼. Shnter, 1 Vent 330,
2 Show. 16, 2 Ley. 227, T.
Jones 108, 2 MocL 310 445
Giozsa y. Tiernan, 148 U. 8. 657
281, 305, 800
Glasgow y. Mojer, 225 U. 8. 420
564, 566
Glidden y. Harrington, 189 U. 8.
255 366
Godfrey y. Terry, 97 U. 8. 171 315
Goldey y. Morning News, 156 XT.
8. 518 318
Gompers y. United States, 233 IJ.
8. 604 584
Goodrich y. Detroit, 184 IT. 8.
432 292
Gordner y. Stephens, 1 Heisk.
280 524
Gorman y. McArdle, 67 Hun 484,
22 N. Y. Supp. 479 476
Grade y. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 699 316
Grafton ▼. United States, 206 U.
8. 333 126
Graham y. West Virginia, 224 U.
8. 616 840
Grand Trunk By. Co. of Canada
y. Michigan Bailroad Commis-
sion, 231 U.<6. 457
176, 179, 393, 477
Grannis y. Ordean, 234 U. 8. 385
314, 316, 319
Grant y. United States, 227 U.
8. 74 163, 584
Granily y. Ewing, 3 How. 707 528
Grayes y. State, 45 N. J. L. 203 826
Grear y. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 531
Great Northern B^ Co. y. Min-
nesota, 238 U. 8. 340 484
Great Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy,
162 U. 8. 329 520
Green y. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1
451, 528
TO PAGI8]
Greene y. Briggs, Fed. Cas. No.
5,764, 1 Curtis 311 64
Greene y. Henkd, 183 U. 8. 249 134
Greenleaf Lumber Co. y. Gktfrison,
237 U. 8. 851 177, 209, 211, 216
Greer y. Connecticut, 161 U. 8.
519 422, 479
Grenada Lumber Co. y. Missis-
sippi, 217 U. 8. 433 499
Grey y. Mobile Trade Co., 55 Ala.
388 476
Grifin y. McEenzie, 7 Ga. 163 521
Griffin y. Mizon, 38 Miss. 424 362
Griffith y. Frazier, 8 Cranch 9 333
Gritts y. Fisher, 224 U. 8. 640
403,455
Gross y. United States Mortg.
Co., 108 U. 8. 477 458
Groyer & B. Sewing Mach. Co. y.
Badcliffe, 137 U. 8. 287 319
Gulf, C. & 8. F. B. Co. y. Ellis,
165 U. 8. 150 668, 805
Gundling y. Chicago, 177 U. 8.
183 494, 770
Gwin y. Brown, 21 App. Cas. (D.
C.) 295 520
Hadacheck y. Los Angeles, 239
U. 8. 394 437, 757
Haddock y. Haddock, 201 U. 8.
562 320, 329, 330
Hagar y. Bedamation Dist. No.
108, 111 U 8. 701
280, 291, 354, 355, 357,
365, 366, 368, 369, 375, 383, 472
Hairston y. Danyille & W. B. Co.,
208 U. 8. 598 476
Hale y. Henkd, 201 U. 8. 43 144
Hall y. Be Cuir, 95 U. 8. 487 409
Hallinger y. Dayis, 146 U. 8.
314 260
Halter y. Nebraska, 205 U. 8. 34 781
Hamilton y. Brown, 161 U. 8. 256
289, 333
864
TABLE OF CASES
[
HamiUon QaaUght 4k C6kiB Go. y.
Hamilton, 146 U. & 258 474
HamiltOB Mfg. Oo. t. Maanehu-
■etto, 6 WaU. 632 341
Hammond Paddng Go. t. Arkan*
•aa, 212 U. 8. 322 734
Hammond Packing Go. t. Hon-
tanay 233 V. 8. 331 518, 645
Hanl^ T. Donogl»i6y 116 U.
8. 4 332
Hannibal 4k 8t J. B. Go. t.
Hnaen, 95 U. 8. 470 420
Hanorer Nat Bank y. Mojaea,
186 n. & 181 107, 289
Harknaaa t. Hyde, 98 U. & 476
317, 318
Harlan y. MeGoorin, 218 V. 8.
442 164, 565
Harrington y. Berkahire, 22 Pick.
263 391, 475
Harria y. Hardeman, 14 How.
334 314
HasaeU y. Wileox, 130 n. 8. 493 313
Haatlnga y. Hang, 85 Mich. 87 404
Hayiaton y. Danyille ft W. B. Go.,
208 U. & 598 393
Hawaii y. Mankiehi, 190 U. 8.
197 116, 122
Hawkins y. Barney, 5 Pet 458 521
Hawthorn y. Natural Garbonie
Qas. Go., 194 N. Y. 326 468
Hayes y. Ifiasonri, 120 U. 8. 68
662, 823, 830
Head y. Amoskeag M. Go., 113
n. & 26 214
Health Bept y. Trinity Ghvreh,
145 N. Y. 32 400
Healy y. New Haven, 49 Gonn.
394 390, 476
Healy Lumber Go. y. Morris, 33
Wash. 490 379
Heath ft Milligan Mfg. Go. y.
Worst, 207 U. 8. 338 731
Heike y. United 8tates, 227 U. 8.
131 166
Hoim ▼. McGall, 239 XT. 8. 175 755
All TO PAflIB]
Heine y. Levee Gommiasiotners,
19 WalL 655, 660 373
Helena Waterworks Go. y. Helena,
195 U. & 383 474
Henderson y. Mayor, etc, of New
York, 92 U. 8. 259 257
Henderson Bridge Go. y. Hender-
son, 173 XT. 8. 592 356, 384
Hendrick y. Maryland, 235 XT. 8.
610 341
Henry y. Henkel, 238 XT. 8. 219 564
Hepburn y. Griswold, 8 WaU. 603
n, 73
Herbert y. Bieknell, 263 XT. a 70
173, 314, 316, 319
Herbert y. Grawford, 228 XT. 8.
204 334
Heyman y. Hays, 236 XT. 8. 178
341, 342
Hibben y. 8mith, 191 XT. 8. 310
35, 242, 258, 291, 361, 532, 562
Hill y. Merchants' Mut. Lu. Go.,
134 XT. 8. 515 519, 527
HUton y. Guyot, 159 U. 8. 113
313, 318, 333
Hilton y. Merrit, 110 U. 8. 97 370
Hing y. Barbier y. Gonnolly, 113
U. 8. 27 764
Hing y. Growlej, 113 U. 8. 703 763
Hoden y. James, 11 Mass. 396 524
Hodge y. Muscatine Gounty, 196
U. 8. 2ff6 367, 370
Hodgson y. Vennont,*168 XT. 8.
262 549
Hoke y. Henderson, 4 Bev. N. G.
15 64
Holbrook y. Finney, 4 Mass. 568
457
Holcome y. Tracy, 2 Minn. 241 521
Holden y. Hardy, 169 XT. 8. 366
262, 266, 282, 402, 497, 549
HollingBworth y Barbour, 4 Pet.
466 314
Holly Biyer Qoal Go. y. Howell,
36 W. Va. 486 362
Holmes y. Hunt, 122 Mass. 505 94
TABLE OF CASES
855
[BXriBBNOXS
Holmes y. Walton, 9 N. J. L. 44
18, 446
Holt y. United States, 218 U. S.
245 159
Home Ins. Co. y. New York, 134
U. 8. 594 305
Home Telephone ft Telegraph Co.
y. Los Angeles, 211 XT. S. 265
290, 295, 817
Hooker y. Los Angeles, 188 U. 8.
314 288, 385
Hooker y. New Hayen k North-
ampton Co., 14 Conn. 146 75, 214
Hope y. Johnscm, 2 Yerg. 123 521
Hopt y. Utah, 110 U. 8. 574
538, 539, 558, 559, 562
Hot Springs B. Co. y. Williamson,
136 U. 8. 121 218
Houek y. Little Biyer Drainage
Dist., 239 U. 8. 254 461, 488, 489
House y. Mayes, 219 U. 8. 270 503
Hoyey y. Elliott, 167 U. 8. 409
101, 296, 313, 472, 551, 576, 587
Howard y. Fleming, 191 U. 8. 126
556, 832
Howard y. Eentnckj, 200 U. 8.
164 834
Hudson County Water Co. y. Mc-
Carter, 209 U. 8. 349 421, 784
Hnlbert y. Clark, 128 N. Y. 298 525
Huling y. Kaw Valley R. & Im-
proyement Co., 130 U. 8. 559
219, 365
Hunt y. Hunt, 97 U. 8. 444 450
Hunter y. Mutual Beserye Life
Ins. Co., 218 U. 8. 573 320, 737
Hunter y. Wood, 209 U. 8. 205 564
Huntington y. Atbull, 146 U. 8.
657 287
Hurtado y. California, 110 U. 8.
516
12, 15, 19, 22, 25, 37, 43, 127,
202, 243, 245, 253, 269, 271,
273, 277, 282, 297, 458, 534,
535, 544, 548, 553, 574, 575, 576
Hutchinson lee Cream Co. y.
Iowa, 242 U. 8. 153 431, 819
ABX TO PAOIS]
Hutchinson y. Valdosta, 227 U. 8.
303 402, 430, 789
Indianapolis, etc., B^ Co. y. Eer^
eheyal, 16 Ind. 84 523
International Harvester Co. y.
Missouri, 234 U. 8. 199
437, 510, 749
Interstate Amusement Co. y. Al-
bert, 239 U. 8. 560 699
Interstate Commerce Commission
y. Brimson, 154 U. 8. 447 581
Interstate Commerce Commission
y. Illinois C B. Co., 215 U. 8.
452 291, 498
Interstate ConsoL 8t. B^ Co. y.
Massachusetts, 207 U. 8. 79 84
Iowa C. B. Co. y. Iowa, 160 U. 8.
389 90, 263,
288, 313, 472, 532, 547, 552, 575
Iowa Life Ins. Co. y. Lewis, 187
U. 8. 335 806
Jackson y. United States, 230 U.
8. 1 215
Jacob y. Boberts, 223 U. 8. 261
^ 314, 315, 319
Jacobs, In re, 98 N. Y. 98 491, 494
Jacobson y. Massachusetts, 197
U. 8. 11 156, 402, 431, 449, 776
Japanese Immigrant Case (Ya-
mataya y. Fisher), 189 U. 8.
86 114, 137, 204, 234, 235
Jeffry Mfg. Co. y. Blagg, 235 U.
8. 571 796
Johannessen y. United States, 225
U. 8. 227 334
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. y. Warren, 181 U. 8. 73
698, 807
Johnson y. Chicago k P. Eleyator
Co., 119 U. 8. 388 289
Johnson y. Sayre, 158 U. 8. 109 95
856
TABLE OF CASES
[
Jones T. Andrews, 10 WalL 327 317
Jones T. Brim, 165 U. 8. 180
441,768
Jones T. Jones, 18 AUl 248 525
Jones' Heirs t. Peny, 10 Yerg.
59 64
Joplin y. Southwest Missouri
Ught Co., 191 U. a 150, 156
474
Jordan ▼. Lewis, 14 East 306 132
Jordan y. Maasaehusetts, 225 U.
8. 167 652, 674
Justices y. Murray, The, 9 Wall.
2,74, 278 542
Kane y. New Jers^, 242 U. S.
160 819
Kansas y. Colorado, 185 U. S.
125 422
Kansas City M. ft B. B. Go. y.
StUes, 242 U. S. Ill 343, 649
Kansas City S. B. Co. y. Ander-
son, 233 U. 8. 325 477, 811
Kansas City 8. B. Co. y. C. H.
Albers Commission Co., 223 TJ.
8. 573 572
Kauifman y. Woolers, 138 U. 8.
285 290
Kaukauna Water Power Co. y.
Green Bay & M. Canal Co.,
142 U. 8. 254 87, 221
Kearney, Ex parte, 7 Wheat 38 580
Keek y. United States, 172 U. 8.
446 233
Keeney y. New York, 222 XT. 8.
525 640
Kehrer y. Stewart, 197 XT. 8.
60 518, 716
Keizo y. Henry, 211 U. 8. 146 164
Kelly y. Pittsburgh, 104 U. 8.
78 452, 542, 769
Kelly y. Bhoades, 188 U. 8. 1 346
Kemmler, In re, 136 IT. 8. 436
38, 260, 269, 281, 380
ABM TO FAOXS]
Kendall y. United States, 12 Pet
524 299
Kennard y. Iiouiaiana, 92 U. 8.
480 272, 278
Kennebee, ete., B. Co. y. Port-
land, ete., B. Co., 59 Me. 9 522
Kent y. Gray, 38 N. H. 576 523
Kentucky Bailroad Tax Cases,
115 U. 8. 321 293, 305, 369
Kentucky Union Co. y. Kentucky,
219 U. 8. 140
290^ 313, 364, 472, 523, 638
Keokee Consolidated Co^e Co. y.
Taylor, 234 U. 8. 224 509, 750
Kepner y. United States, 195 U.
8. 100 125, 126
Keprer y. Stewart, 197 U. 8. 60 341
Kidd y. Alabama, 188 U. 8.
730 716, 720
Kidd y. Pearson, 128 U. 8. 1
404, 494, 803
Kidd, Dater & Price Co. y. Mus-
selman Grocer Co., 217 U. 8.
461 402, 424
Kilboum y. Thompson, 103 U. 8.
168 299
Kimmish y. Ball, 129 U. 8. 217 773
Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St
411 424
King y. Cross, 175 U. 8. 396 322
King y. Missonri, 107 U. 8. 221 528
King y. Mullins, 171 U. 8. 404
362, 363, 620
King y. Portland, 184 U. 8. 61
358, 361, 384
King y. West Virginia, 216 U.
8. 92 363, 364
Kirtland y. Hotchkiss, 100 U. 8.
491 261
Knickerbocker Ins. Co. y. Com-
stock, 16 Wall. 258 536
Knight y. Lee, [1893] 1 Q. B. 41,
62 L. J. Q. B. 28 523
KnowHon y. Moore, 178 U. 8.
41 171
Knox y. Summers, 3 Craneh 496 316
TABLE OF CASES
857
t
Knoxville Iron Co. y. Harbison,
183 U. S. 13 498, 510
Kohl y. Lehback, 160 U. S. 297
556, 828
Kohl y. United States, 91 U. S.
367 75, 207, 211, 212, 220, 378
Kryder y. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171 292
Knehn y. Paroni, 20 Ney. 203 522
Lacey, Ex parte, 108 Gal. 326 400
LaeUand y. North Missouri B.
B. Co., 31 Mo. 180 75, 214
Lafayette Ins. Co. t. French, 18
How. 404 308
Laing y. Bigney, 160 U. S. 531 327
Lake Shore ft M. S. B. Co. y.
Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 402, 420
Lake Shore A M. 8. B. Co. y.
Smith, 173 U. 8. 687
412, 414, 483, 484
Lam y. Powder Biyer Liye Stoek
Co., 132 Fed. 434 520
Landes y. Brant, 10 How. 348 318
Lang y. New Jersey, 209 U. S.
467 836
Lange, Ex parte, 18 Wall^ 175 110
Lankford y. Platte Iron Works
Co., 235 U. S. 461 433
Larkm y. Long, [1915] A. C.
814 515
Laurel Hill Cemetery t. San
Francisco, 216 U. S. 358
402, 423, 431
Laurg y. Bigney, 160 U. S. 531 290
Lawton y. Steele, 152 IJ. S. 133
398, 479, 518
Leagnd ▼. Texas, 184 U. 8. 156
452, 458, 459
Leepor t. Texas, 139 U. S. 462
263, 269,
297, 305, 381, 548, 556, 575, 824
LefflngweU y. Warren, 2 Black
599 354, 383, 524
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall.
457 73
AXE TO PAOIS]
Legatt y. Tollenrey, 14 East 302 132
Lehigh Valley B. B. y. Pennsyl-
yania, 145 U. 8. 192 347
Lehon t. Atlaiftay 242 U. 8. 53
438, 818
Leigh T. Green, 193 XT. 8. 79 289
Leloup y. Port of Mobile, 127 U.
8. 640 341
Lem Moon Sing y. United States,
158 U. 8. 538
115, 137, 143, 204, 234, 236
Lemieux y. Young, 211 U. S.
489 424, 508, 786
Lent y. TiUson, 140 U. 8. 316 366
Leyasser y. Washburn, 11 Gratt.
572 362
Levy y. Fits^atrick, 15 Pet. 167 315
Lewis ▼. Luckett, 221 U. 8. 554 323
Lewis T. United States, 146 U. 8.
370 538, 557, 559
Lewis y. Webb, 3 Me. 326 524
L 'Hote y. New Orleans, 177 U. 8.
587 402, 494
License Cases, 5 How. 504 399
Lincoln y. Power, 151 U. 8. 436 536
Lindsley y. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U. S. 61
467, 505, 507, 740, 795
Ling Su Fan y. United States,
218 U. 8. 302 402, 422
Linhan, In re, 72 Cal. 114 400
Liyerpool ft L. & G. Ins. Co. y.
Board of Assessors, 221 U. 8.
346 349
Liyingston y. Moore, 7 Pet. 469
299, 542
Loan Ass'n y. Topeka, 20 WaU.
655 273
Lx>chner y. New York, 198 U. 8.
45 402, 421, 493, 494, 496
Logan y. United States, 144 U.
S. 263 38, 110
London 's Case, 8 Coke 125a 16, 251
London Guarantee ft Accident Co.
y. Horn, 101 HI. App. 355 514
Londoner y. Denyer, 210 U. 8.
373 292, 294, 551, 576
TABLE OF CASES
I
LoM Wolf T. Hiiebeoek, 187
U. B. 663 111
Long Island Wnter Snpplj Co. y.
BrooklTn, 166 U. 8. 685
88, 219, 220
LottgyMT T. Toolnn, 209 U. 8.
414 290, 293, 313
liOon Hong t. Crowl^, 113 U. 8.
703 494
Lomuui T. Benton, 8 Ifieh. 18 104
Lottorj Omo, 188 U. a 321 184,494
Louitinnn t. Jnmoly 107 U. 8.
750 451, 628
Loaisimnn t. New Orleans, 102
U. 8. 203 628
Louisiana t. Pittsborg, 106 U. 8.
301 528
Loaisiana t. 8t. Ifartins Parish,
111 U. 8. 716 528
Loaisiana Citixens' Bank t. DeT-
noodt, 26 La. Ann. 628 523
Looisville k Jefferson Ferry Go.
y. Kentucky, 188 U. 8. 385
342, 487
Lonisyille 4k N. B. Go. y. Barber
Asphalt Pay. Go., 197 U. 8.
430 357, 489
Lonisyille ft N. B. Go. y. Garrett,
231 U. 8. 298 688
Lonisyille k N. B. Go. y. Higdon,
234 U. 8. 592 841
Lonisyille ft N. B. Go. y. Ken-
tucky, 161 U. 8. 677 399, 434
LouisyiHe ft N. B. Go. y. Ken*
tacky, 183 U. 8. 503
175, 306, 415, 672
Lonisyille ft N. B. Go. y. Melton,
218 V. 8. 36 680
Louisyille ft N. B. Go. y. Mottley,
219 U. 8. 467 501
Lonisyille ft N. B. Go. y. 8chmidt,
177 U. 8. 230 288, 289, 290, 552
LouisVilte ft N. B. Go. y. 8cott,
133 Ky. 724 501
Loois^lle ft N. B. Gb. y. 8tock
Yards, 212 U. 8. 132 176, 296
AMM TO PAOBB]
Lonisyille ft N. B. Go. y. Cnited
8tates, 238 U. 8. 1 179
Loyato y. New Mezieo, 242 U. 8.
199 537
Loye y. Beeorder's Gonrt Judge,
128 Mich. 545 400
Loyejoy y. United 8tates, 128 U.
8. 171 86
Loyell y. Arnold, 2 Leigh 16 S23
Low Wah 8aey y. Backns, 225 U.
8. 460, 468 168
Lowe y. Kansas, 163 U. 8. 81
13, 44, 534
Lowe y. State of Kansas^ 163
U. 8. 81 828
Lucke y. Clothing Gutters, 77 Md.
396 514
Lumley y. Gye, (1853) 2 E. ft B.
216 515
Lynah Gase, 188 U. 8. 446 215
Lynde y. Lynde, 181 U. 8. 183
289, 326, 327
McAllister y. Henkel, 201 U. a
90 145
McAunich y. B. B. Go., 20 Iowa
343 650
McGandlish y. Gom., 76 Va.
1002 404
McGardle, Ex parte, 6 Wall. 318 69
McGardle, Ex parte, 7 WalL 506 70
McGanghey y. Lyall, 224 U. 8.
558 313
MeGlnre y. Maitland, 24 W. Va.
561 368
MoGray y. United States, 195 U.
8. 27 140, 171, 172, 518, 645
McGulloeh y. Maryland, 4 Wheat
421 312, 340, 352, 371, 674
McCuUough y. Virginia, 172 U. 8.
102 519
McDonald y. Massachusetts, 180
U. 8. 311 831
McEhnoyle y. Cohen, 13 Pet 312,
324 332
TABLE OP CASES
859
[BXnBBBMCIS
McFaddin t. Evans-Snjder-Bnel
Co., 185 U. 8. 605 457
MeFarland ▼. American Sugar
Befining Co., 241 U. 8. 79 579
McGaliej ▼. Virginia, 135 U. 8.
662 521, 528
McGoyem y. New York, 229 IT.
S. 363 292, 391, 392
Mackin t. United States, 117 TJ.
S. 348 78, 535
McLean ▼. Arkansaa, 211 TJ. 8.
539
430, 436, 497, 516, 732, 752, 796
MacLeod ▼. United States, 229
U. 8. 416 127
McMiUen y. Anderson, 95 U. 8.
37 357, 362, 368, 370
MacNichol v. Spence, 83 Me. 87 520
Madden y. Lancaster County, 65
Fed. 188 520
Madera Waterworks y. Madera,
228 U. 8. 454 473, 747
Magoun y. Illinois Trust & Say-
ings Bank, 170 U. 8. 283
607, 617, 624, 697, 728
Magruder y. Brury, 235 U. 8.
106 334
Maine y. Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co.,
109 Iowa 260 503
Mallett y. North Carolina, 181
U. 8. 589 831
Mallinekrodt Chemical Works y.
Missouri, 238 U. 8. 41 707
Maniganlt y. Springs, 199 U. 8.
473 215, 386, 399
Manning, In re, 139 U. 8. 506 556
Marbury y. Madison, 1 Cranch
137 255
Marchant y. Pennsylyania B. Co.,
153 U. 8. 380 662
Markuson y. Boucher, 175 U. 8.
184 563
Marshall y. McDaniel, 12 Bush
378 362
Marshall Field k Co. y. Clark,
143 U. 8. 643 130
ABX TO PAcris]
Martin y. District of Columbia,
205 U. 8. 135 162, 467, 489
Martin y. Martin, 36 Ala. 560 524
Mairtin y. Pittsburg A L. £.
B. Co., 203 U. 8. 284 458, 678
Martin y. Texas, 200 U. 8. 316 608
Martin y. Waddell's Lessee, 16
Pet. 410 252, 338, 396
Marye y. Baltimore k Ohio B. B.
Co., 127 U. 8. 123 346
Mason y. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231 314
Mason y. Missouri, 179 U* 8.
328 727
Massachusetts C. B. Co. y. Bos-
ton, C. 4k F. B. Co., 121 Mass.
124 673
Mattingly y. District of Colum-
bia, 97 U. S. 687, 692 357, 875
Maxwell y. Dow, 176 U. 8. 581
23, 247, 548, 553, 574, 676
Mechanical App. Co. y. Castleoian,
215 U. 8. 437 318
Memphis y. United States, 97 U.
8. 293 627
Mercelis y. Wilson, 236 U. 8.
579 319
Merchants' Bank y. Pennsyl-
yania, 167 U. 8. 461 366
Merchants' Stock ft Grain Co.,
In re, 223 U. 8. 639 583
Merchants' ft Manufacturers'
National Bank y. Pennsylyania,
167 U. S. 461 618
Meriwether y. Garrett, 102 U. 8.
472 373, 376
Metropolis Theater Co. y. Chi-
cago, 228 U. 8. 61 642
Mexican C. B. Co. y. Pinkney,
149 U. S. 194 314, 317
Michigan C. R Co. y. Powers,
201 U. S. 246 638
Michigan Ins. Co. y. Eldred, 130
U. 8. 693 619
Michigan Trust Co. y. Ferrj, 228
U. 8. 346 314, 323
Miedreich y. Lauenstein, 232 U.
8. 236 314, 315, 319
860
TABLE OF CASES
[BimSNCBB
ICiller T. New York, 15 WalL
498 483
Miller t. Btrahl, 239 U. 8. 426
437, 756
Miller ▼. Union Mill Co., 45
WaBh. 199 476
MiUer y. United SUtee, 11 WalL
268 73
Miller t. Wileon, 236 U. S. 373
516, 798
MiHigan, Ex parte, 4 WalL 2
56, 57, 65
Mills y. Durjee, 7 Graneh 481 318
Milwaukee Elec. B. ft L. Ck>. y.
Railroad Ckunmieaion, 238 U. 8.
174 419
Minneapolis E. B. y. Minnesota,
134 U. 8. 467 413
Minneapolis ft 8t. L. B. Co. y.
Beekwitfa, 129 U. 8. 26
240, 656, 698
Minneapolis ft 8t. L. B. Go. y.
Herrick, 127 U. 8. 210 502, 655
Minneapolis ft 8t. L. B. Go. y.
Minnesota, 193 U. 8. 53 402
Minnesota t. Barber, 136 U. 8.
313 564
Minnesota y. Brondage, 180 U. 8.
499 563
Minnesota Iron Go. y. Kline, 199
U. 8. 593 676
Minot y. Philadelphia, W. ft B.
B. B. Go., 18 Wall. 206 374
Mississippi ft Bom Biyer Boom
Go. y. Patterson, 98 U. 8. 403
215, 216, 221
Missouri y. Lewis (Bowman y.
Lewis), 101 U. 8. 22
247, 830, 831, 834
Missouri, K ft T. B. Go. y.
Harris, 234 U. 8. 412 478, 812
Missouri, K. ft T. B. Go. y. May,
194 U. 8. 267 675, 695
Missouri, K. ft T. Bj. Go. of
Texas y. Gade, 233 U. 8. 642 812
Missouri P. B. Go. y. Castle, 224
U. 8. 541 402, 686
ABB TO PAOBS]
Missouri P. B. Co. y. Larabee,
234 U. 8. 459 808
Missouri P. B. Go. y. Mackey,
127 U. 8. 205
502, 507, 655, 663, 698
Missouri P. B. Go. y. Nebraska, 164
U. 8. 403 484
Missouri P. B. Go. y. Tucker, 230
U. 8. 340 474
Mitchell y. Harmony, 13 How.
115 56
Mobile County y. Kimball, 102
U. 8. 691 354, 357, 611, 730
Mobile, J. ft K. G. B. Co. y.
Tumipseed, 219 U. 8. 35 681
Mobile Transp. Co. y. Mobile, 187
U. 8. 479 456
Mobile ft O. R Co. y. Tennessee,
153 U. 8. 486 287, 349, 374
Mondou y. New York, N. H. ft
H. B. Co., 223 U. 8. 1 504, 686
Monongahela Bridge Co. y.
United 8tates, 216 U. 8. 177
215, 291
Monongahela Nay. Co. y. United
8tates, 148 U. 8. 312
90, 136, 171, 184, 210, 217
Montana Go. y. 8t. Louis Min.,
etc., Co., 152 U. 8. 160 214
Montoya y. Gomsales, 232 U. 8.
375 173, 481, 525, 794
Moore y. Illinois, 14 How. 13 56
Moore y. 8tate of Missouri, 159
U. 8. 673 827
Moran, In re, 203 U. 8. 96 145
Moran y. Dunphy, 177 Mass.
485 514
Morf ord y. Muger, 8 Iowa 82 355
Morgan's 8team8hip Co. y.
Board of Health, 118 U. B.
467 409
Morgan's 8team8hip Go. y.
Louisiana, 118 U. 8. 455 402
Morley y. Lake 8hore ft M. 8.
B. Co., 146 U. 8. 162 403, 468
Mugler y. Kansas, 123 U. a
623 404, 406, 508, 766, 801
TABLE OP CASES
861
[BIIVBBNOBB
MuDer y. Oregon^ 208 U. S. 412
402, 421, 509
Monger v. EansaB, 123 U. S.
623 494
Mmm Case, 16 Am. Law Beg.
N. 8. 539 408
Mmm y. Illinois, 94 U. 8. 113
407, 409, 448, 452, 458, 813, 815
Murphy y. California, 225 U. 8.
623 402, 427, 429, 518, 787
Murphy y. Charleston, 96 U. 8.
432 451
Jlurray y. Hoboken Land ft Im-
proyement Co., 18 How. 272
9, 24, 43, 56, 62, 64, 115, 135,
, 187, 193, 202, 203, 204, 205,
206, 243, 272, 277, 278, 371, 551
Murray y. Wilson Distilling Co.,
212 U. 8. 578 434
Mutual Loan Co. y. Martell, 222
U. 8. 225 431, 742
Myers y. Moran, 113 N. Y. App.
Diy. 427 522
Myles 8alt Co. y. Iberia & 8t.
Mary Drainage Disl, 239 U.
8. 478 460, 488
Myles Salt Co. y. Schneider Gran-
ite Co., 240 V. 8. 55 461
N
Nash y. Fletcher, 44 Miss. 609 520
Nash y. United States, 229 U. 8.
373 437
National Cotton Oil Co. y. Texas,
197 n. & 115 494, 702
National Council y. State Council,
203 U. 8. 151 717
Na:tional Exch. Bank y. Wiley,
195 U. 8. 257 289, 313, 317
National Safe Deposit Co. y.
Stead, 232 U. 8. 58 480
Nafional Surety Co. y. Architec-
tural Decorating Co., 226 U.
8. 276 529
Naught y. Oneal, Breese (HI.)
36 524
ARK TO PAOIS]
Neal y. Delaware, 103 U. 8. 370
257, 293, 602
Nebraska y. Lockwood, 3 WalL
236 535
Neilson y. Kilgore, 145 U. 8.
487 456
Nelson y. United States, 201 U.
8. 92 145
Nesmith y. Sheldon, 7 How. 812
354, 382
New Orleans y. Duncan, 2 La.
Ann. 186 373
New Orleans y. New Orleans
Water Works Co., 142 U. 8.
79 403
New Orleans y. New York Mail
8. 8. Co., 20 WalL 387 580
New Orleans y. Stempel, 175 U.
8. 309 349
New Orleans City & L. B^ Co.
y. New Orleans, 143 U. 8.
192 350 '
New Orleans Gaslight Co. y.
Drainage Commission, 197 U.
8. 453 . 148, 431, 467
New Orleans Gaslight Co. y.
Louisiana Light A Heat Prod.
ft Mfg. Co., 115 U. 8. 650 219
New Orleans Water Works Co.
y. New Orleans, 164 U. 8. 471
313, 333
New York y. Barker, 179 U. 8.
279 624
New York v. Eno, 155 U. 8.
89 563
New York y. Hesterberg, 211 U.
8. 31 402, 428, 479
New York y. Beardon, 204 U.
8. 152 635
New York y. Sage, 239 U. 8. 57 391
New York y. State Board of
Tax Commissioners, 199 U.
8. 1 350, 629
New York ▼. Van De Carr, 199
U. 8. 552 777
New York L. Ins. Co. y. Dun-
% levy, 241 U. 8. 518 914
f^
862
TABLE OF GASES
I
New York L. Ins. Go. t. Head,
234 U. 8. 149 511
New York, N. H. ft H. B. Co. y.
Offleld, 77 Gonn. 419 463
New York, N. H. ft H. B. Go. ▼.
Bute of New York, 165 U. 8.
628 664
New York ft N. E. B. Co. ▼.
Bristol, 151 U. 8. 556 467, 661
Niagmra Falls, eto., B. Co., 108
N. Y. 376 217
Nielsen, In re, 131 U. S. 176 131
Nishimnra Ekiu ▼. United States,
142 U. 8. 651, 659
115, 137, 142, 234
Noble Bute Bank t. Haskell, 219
U. 8. 104
389, 402, 425, 434, 737, 738
Nolan y. State, 55 Oa. 522 577
Norfolk ft W. B. Co. y. Common-
wealth of Pennsylyania, 136
U. 8. 114 708
Norfolk ft W. B. Co. y. Oonley,
236 U. 8. 605 572
Norfolk ft W. B. Co. y. Dixie
Tobacco Co., 228 U. 8. 593 160
Norris y. Tripp, 111 Iowa 115 520
North American Cold Storage Co.
y. Chicago, 211 V. 8. 306 290, 295
Northern P. B. Co. y. Dakota,
236 U. 8. 585 485
Northern P. R Co. v. Ely, 197 U.
8. 1 ' • 524
Northern P. B. Co. y. Meese,
239 V. 8. 614 757
Northern P. R Co. y. North
Dakota, 216 U. 8. 579 417
Northern P. B. Co. v. North
Dakota, 236 XT. 8. 585 419, 484
Northern P. B. Co. v. Smith, 171
U. 8. 270 216
Northern P. B. Co. y. Townsend,
190 U. 8. 267 217
Northern Transp. Co. y. Chicago,
99 XT. 8. 635 148, 214, 467
Northwestern Fertilising Co. y.
Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659 406
AU TO PAflBS]
Northwestern Lanndry y. Des
Moines, 239 U. 8. 486 438, 757
Norwood y. Baker, 172 U. 8. 269
105, 106, 107,
355, 358, 360, 361, 375, 378, 533
Notnuui y. Crooks, 10 U. G. Q.
B. 105
Ocampo y. United States, 234 U.
S. 91 127, 841
Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. y.
Stranahan, 214 U. & 320
156, 295
Ochoa y. Hemandes, 230 V. 8.
139 168, 238, 283, 291, 472
Offield y. New York, N. H. ft H.
B. Co., 203 V. 8. 372 392, 463
Ogden y. Sannders, 12 Wheat.
213 94
Ohio y. Dollison, 194 IT. 8. 445 803
Ohio Biyer ft W. R Co. y. Dittey,
232 U. 8. 576 480, 645
CEeefe y. United States, 240
U. 8. 294 419
Old Wayne Mut. L. Ass'n y. Me-
Donongh, 204 U. 8. 8
289, 313, 551, 576
Olsen y. Smith,' 195 U. 8. 333 468
Omaha y. Omaha Water Co., 218
U. 8. 180 433
O 'Neil y. Northern Colorado Irrig.
Co., 242 U. S. 20 458
CNeil y. Vermont, 144 U. E
323 61, 556
O'Neill y. Learner, 239 U. a
244 460
Ontario Land Co. y. Yordy, 212
U. a 152 290, 313
CBeilly de Gamara y. Brooke,
209 U. a 45 466
Orient Ins. Co. y. Board of As-
sessors, 221 U. 8. 358 349
Orient Ins. Co. y. Daggs, 172 ^U.
8. 557 507, 698, 704, 706, W,
TABLE OF CASES
863
[BinBBNOBB
Orifl^ T. Hedden, 165 U. 8. 228 370
Ormaa t. GiyBtal Biver B. Co.,
5 Oolo. Ai^p. 493 523
Orr ▼. Gilman, 183 U. 8. 278 380
Osborn v. Bank of United 8tat68y
9 Wheat 738 299
Osborne ▼. lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1 520
OtiB T. Parker, 187 U. 8. 606
128, 494, 518, 774
Ozan Lumber Co. y. Union Go.
Natl Bank, 202 U. 8. 623 705
Ozan Lnmber Go. ▼. Union
County National Bank, 207 U.
8. 251 784
Paee ▼. Alabama, 106 U. 8.
583 603
Paeiile Exp. Co. ▼. 8eibert, 142
U. 8. 339 305, 614
Paeiiic Mail 8. 8. Co. t. Joliife,
2 WalL 450 476
Padiie Whaling Co. t. Smith ft
States, 187 U. 8. 447 182
Palmer ▼. MeMahon, 133 U. 8.
669 370, 373
Parish y. Coast Cedar Co., 133
N. C. 478 362
Parish y. Edgar, 15 WUl 532 524
Parkinson y. United States, 121
U. 8. 281 535
Parsons y. Bedford, 3 Pet 433 536
Parsons y. District of Columbia,
170 U. 8. 45
88, 106, 292, 357, 361
Passayant y. United States, 148
U. 8. 214 290, 370, 371
Patsone y. Penns^lyania, 232 U.
8. 138 479, 793
Paul y. Virginia, 8 WaU. 181 321
Paulsen y. Portland, 149 U. 8.
30 291, 357, 365, 366, 370
Peabodj y. United States, 231 U.
8. 530 215
Pearsall y. Great Northern B.
Co., 161 U. S. 673 454
ABX TO PAOSS]
Pearson y. YewdaD, 95 U. 8. 294,
296 542
Pellow y. Boberts, 13 How. 472,
476 94
Pembina ConsoL Silyer Min., etc.,
Co. y. Penivylyania, 125 U. 8.
181 708
Penhallow y. Doane, 3 DalL 54 316
Pennie y. Beis, 132 U. a 464
403, 456
Pennoyer y. Neif, 95 U. 8. 714
41, 279, 282, 309, 311, 312,
313, 319, 320, 326, 486, 551, 576
Pennsylyania y. Wheeling ft B.
Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 299
Pennsylyania Co. y. U. 8., 236
U. S. 318 175, 179
Pennsylyania Lumbennen's Mu-
tual Fire Ins. Co. y. Meyer,
197 U. 8. 407, 415 343
Pennsylyania B. Co. y. Miller,
132 U. 8. 75 214, 458
People y. Adams, 176 N. T. 351 132
People y. Beattie, 96 N. Y. App.
Diy. 383 494
People y. Blackwell, 27 CaL 65 165
People y. Broo^yn, 4 N. Y. 419 373
People y. Pitch, 148 N. Y. 78 373
People y. Hays, 4 Gal. 127 523
People y. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257 513
People y. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377 491
People y. New York Carbonie
Acid Qas Co., 196 N. Yl 421 468
People y. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48 490
People y. Boberts, 171 U. S. 658 709
People y. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594 430
People y. Westchester County, 4
Barb. 64 391, 475
Peoria Oas ft Electrie Co^ y.
Peoria, 200 U. 8. 48 416
Pepke y. Cronan, 155 U. S. 100 563
Pereles y. Watertown, 19 Fed.
Gas. No. 10,980, 6 Biss. 79 520
Perkins y. Pendleton, 90 Me.
166 514
Perry y. Turner, 55 Mo. 418 520
864
TABLE OF OASES
[
Pervear t. Com., 5 WalL 475
61, 542
Peterson y. Delaware, 9 Kiilp
552 520
Philadelphia Go. t. Stimson, 223
U. 8. e05 177, 178
Philadelphia Fire Abs'il ▼• New
York, 119 U. S. 110 241, 708
Philadelphia, W. & B. B. Oo. t.
Trumble, 10 WalL 367 314
Phoenix F. 4k M. Ins. Go. t. Ten-
nessee, 161 U. 8. 174 350
Phoenix R Co. ▼. Landis, 231 U.
8. 578 174
Pitnej T. Washington, 240 U. 8.
387 648
Pittsbnrg Steel Co. t. Baltimore
Equitable 8oe., 226 U. 8. 456 629
Pittsburgh, C, C. ft St. L. B.
Co. T. Backus, 154 U. 8. 421
290, 205, 826
Pittsburgh, C, C. ft St. L. B.
Co. T. MitcheD, 91 N. E. 735 501
Pittsburgh Coal Co. t. Bates, 156
U. 8. 577 345
Pittsburgh, etc., B. ▼. Board of
PubUc Works, 172 U. 8. 32
182, 370
Planters Bank t. Sharp, 6 How.
301 527
Plessj y. Ferguson, 163 U. 8.
637 605
Plummer y. Northern Pae. R Co.,
152 Fed. 206 523
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsyl-
yania, 232 U. S. 631 314, 402, 432
Poindezter y. Greenhow, 114 U.
8. 270 454
Polk y. Mutual Beserye Fund L.
Ass'n, 207 U. 8. 310 464
Pollock y. Farmers' Loan, etc.,
Co., 157 U. 8. 429 340
Postal Telegraph Co. y. Charles-
ton, 153 U. 8. 692 518
Pound y. Turck, 97 U. 8. 459
209, 420
«0 PAOIBl
Powell y. PennflylyBsiay 127 U. a
678 401, 766
Prentis y. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 211 U. 8. 210 417
Pressor y. Illinois, 116 U. a 252
37, 269, 542
Preston ▼. Looisyille, 84 Ky.
118 520
Price y. Illinois, 238 U. a 446 747
Priest y. Board Trustees Las
Vegas, 232 U. S. 604 315, 324
Proyidence Bank y. Billings, 4
Pet 514 350
Proyident Institution for Safings
T. Jersey City, 113 U. 8. 506 '
358, 494
Proyident Institution for Sayings
y. Malone, 221 U. 8. 660
469, 742
Proyident Sayings Life Assur-
ance Society y. Kentucky, 239
XT. a 103 487
Public Clearing House y. Coyne,
194 U. S. 497 134, 204, 291
Pullman Co. y. Knott, 235 XT. 8.
23 341, 343
Pullman's Palace Car Co. y.
Pennsylyania, 141 U. 8. 18
341, 342, 346, 348
Pumpelly y. Oreen Bay ft M.
Canal Co., 13 WalL 166
74, 128, 210, 213, 217
Purity Extract ft Tonic Co. y.
Lynch, 226 U. 8. 192
402, 428, 431, 479
Quarles, In re, 158 IT. a 532 38
Quincy y. Kennard, 151 Mass.
563 400
Quinn y. Leathon, (1901) 70 L.
J. P. C. 76 515
Quong Wing y. Kirkendall, 223
U. 8. 59 507, 641, 647
TABLE OP CASES
865
[BEFSBINOBS
B
Bail ft BiTer Coal Go. ▼. Taple,
236 U. 8. 338 436, 516, 812
Bailroad Go. t. Colleetor, 100 U.
8. 595 341
Bailroad Conunission Cases, 116
U. 8. 307 411
Bailroad Tax Cases, 8 Bkwj. 238 48
Bailroad Commission y. Cumber-
land Telephone ft Telegraph
Co., 212 U. 8. 414 417
Bainej v. United 8tate8, 232 XT.
&. 310 173, 404
Baleigh, etc., B. Co. v. Davis,
2 Dey. ft B. L. 451 209
Bandall y. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523 589
Bandall y. Krieger, 23 Wall. 137
455, 456, 458
Bassmussen y. United States, 197
U. 8. 516 123
Bast y. Van Deman ft Lewis, 240
U. 8. 342 440, 517, 647
Bathbone y. Bradford, 1 Ala.
312 521
Bavertj y. Fridge, 3 McLean
230 457
Bawlins y. Georgia, 201 U. 8.
638 146
Baymond y. Chicago Edison Co.,
207 U. 8. 20 703
Beagan y. Farmers' Loan ft
Trust Co., 154 U. 8. 362
401, 412, 414, 415, 663
Beayes y. Ainsworth, 219 U. 8.
296 291
Bees y. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107,
113 295, 375
Beetz y. Michigan, 188 U. 8. 505
282, 290, 401
Beggel, Ex parte, 114 U. 8. 642
90, 532, 547, 575
Begina y. Bjle, 9 M. ft W. 227 194
Beid y. Colorado, 187 U. 8. 137 773
Beinman y. Little Bock, 237 U. 8.
171 795
Beitler v. Harris, 223 U. 8. 437 292
Due Process — 55 .
AKS TO PAGXS]
Benegar y. United States, 97 C.
C. A. 172, 172 Fed. 646 165
Bex y. Collingridge, 3 Price 280 197
Bex y. Hopper, (1816) 3 Price
40 197
Bex y. Homblower, 11 Price 29 194
Bex y. Ladsingham, 8ir T.
Baym, 193 557, 560, 561
Bex y. Lambton, 5 Price 421 197
Bex y. Bandell, 5 Price 376 197
Beymann Brewing Co. y. Brister,
179 U. 8. 445 801
Bhode Island y. Massachusetts,
12 Pet 657 316
Bichards y. Washington Termi-
nal Co., 233 U. 8. 546 215, 292
Bichmond y. Southern Bell Tel-
^h. ft Teleg. Co., 174 U. 8.
761 218
Bichmond, F. ft P. B. Co. y.
Louisa B. Co., 13 How. 71 219
Bichmond, F. ft P. B. Co. y. Bich-
mond, 96 U. 8. 521 357, 652
Bideout y. Knox, 148 Mass. 368 440
Bidgewaj y. West, 60 Ind. 371 404
Biley y. Massachusetts, 232 U.
S. 671 509
Bippej y. Texas, 193 U. 8. 504
802, 803
Biyerside Mills y. Menefee, 237
U. 8. 189 334
Biyerside ft Dan Biyer Cotton
Mills y. Menefee, 237 U. 8. 180
319, 485
Bobertson, In re, 156 U. 8. 183 556
Bobertson y. Baldwin, 165 U. 8.
275, 281, 282 584
Bobinson, Ex parte, 19 Wall. 505
578, 580, 582, 589, 590
Bobinson y. State, 33 Ark. 180 165
Bogers y. Alabama, 192 U. 8.
226 607
Bogers y. Hennepin County, 239
U. 8. 621 646
Bogers y. Peck, 199 U. 8. 425
555, 564, 576
866
TABLE OP CASES
[HEFZRKMCES
Boiler y. Holly, 176 U. S. 398
287, 296, 322, 472, 551, 576
Rose ▼. Himelj, 4 Cranch 241 333
Bosenthal t. New York, 226 U.
S. 260 507, 788
Ross ▼. Stewart, 227 IT. S. 530 290
BothsehUd y. Knight, 184 U. S.
334 289, 322
Rouge y. Ronge, 114 Miac. (N.
T.) 421 522
Rowe y. Granite Bridge Oo., 21
Pick. 344 75, 214
Rowland, In re, 104 U. S. 604 588
Rozale, Ex parte, 117 U. 8. 241 563
RuBch y. Dunean Land ft Mining
Co., 211 U. 8. 526 822
Ryan y. Brown, 18 Mich. 195 104
Byder y. Wilson, 41 N. J. L. 9 524
8
St. Clair y. Cox, 106 U. 8. 350
320, 486
St John y. New York, 201 U. 8.
633 730
St Joseph Township y. Bogers,
16 Wall. 663 4o2, 457
St. Louis, I. M. ft 8. B. Co. y.
Arkansas, 240 U. 8. 518 683
8t. Louis, I. M. ft 8. B. Co. y.
Paul, 173 U. 8. 404 494, 668
St Louis, I. M. ft 8. B. Co. y.
Petty, 57 Ark. 359 478
St. Louis, L M. ft 8. B. Co. y.
Wynne, 224 U. 8. 354
470> 477, 811
St. Louis S. W. B. Co. y. Ar-
kansas, 235 U. 8. 350 692
St. Louis ft Iron Mountain By. y.
Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518 439
St. Louis ft 8. F. B. Co. y. Mc-
Bride, 141 U. 8. 127 316, 317
St. Louis ft 8. T. B. Co. y. Mat-
thews, 165 U. 8. 1 440, 768
St. Louis, etc., B. Co. y. Gill, 156 **
U. 8. 649 412, 413, 415
ARK TO PAOXS]
St. Mary's Franco- American Pe-
troleum Co. 7. West Virginia,
203 U. 8. 183 289, 702
Saloy y. Woods, 40 La. Ann. 585 52G
San Diego Land ft Town Co. y.
Jasper, 189 U. 8. 439 418
San Diego Land ft Town Co. y.
National City, 174 TJ. S. 739
290, 412, 413, 414
San Mateo County C^ase, 116 U.
8. 13» 32
Santa Clara Go. y. Southern
Pacific Bailroad, 118 XT. &
394 240
Santiago y. Nogneras, 214 U. S.
260 315
Satterlee y. Matthewson, 2 Pet
380 451, 458, 530
Satterlee y. Matthewson, 16 Serg.
ft B. 169 521
Sauer v. New York, 206 U. 8. 536
458, 462
Savannah y. Hancock, 9^ Mo. 54 379
Savannah, T. ft I. of H. B. Co. y.
Savannah, 198 IT. S. 392 628, 629
Savin, Ex parte, 131 IT. S. 267
580, 585
Savings ft Loan Society y. Mult-
nomah County, 169 U. 8. 421
348, 619
Sayward y. Denny, 158 U. S.
180 305
Schniedinger y. Chicago, 226 TJ.
8. 578
402, 429, 432, 437, 505, 516
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,*
7 Cranch 136 30S
Schwab y. Berggren, 143 IT. 6.
442 538, 558
Scott y. McNeal, 154 U. 8. 34
41,
282, 286, 313, 320, 333, 551, 576
Scranton y. Wheeler, 179 U. S.
141 103, 148, 179, 209, 215, 387
fieaboard Air Line By. y. Florida,
203 U. 8. 261 417
TABLE OP CASES
867
[betesenges
Seaboard Air Line B7. Go. v.
Seegers, 207 U. S. 73
471, 810, 811
Searl v. Lake Ooiinty School Diet.
N. 2, 133 U. S. 553 211, 218, 378
Sears ▼. Oottrell, 5 Mich. 251 304
Sears ▼. Mahoney, 66 Fed. 860 523
Seattle ▼. Kelleher, 195 U. S.
351 358, 361
Secombe, Ex parte, 19 How. 9 589
Secombe v. Milwaukee & St. P.
B. Co., 23 Wall. 108 88, 220
Security Trust Co. v. Lexington,
203 U. S. 323 296
Seibert ▼. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284 527
Selig V. Hamilton, 234 XJ. S. 653 314
Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh,
226 U. S. 112 744
Seven Cases ▼. U. S., 239 U. S.
510 181
Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533
524, 525
Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361
354, 382
Shelton v. Piatt, 139 TJ. S. 591 182
Shelton ▼. Tiffin, 6 How. 163 315
Shelvin-Carpenter Co. v. Minne-
sota, 218 U. S. 57 402
Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. S.
553 138
Sherman ▼. Smith, 1 Black 587 425
Shibuya Jugiro v. Brush, 140 XJ.
S. 291 564
Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 324 482
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 148
Shoemaker v. United States, 147
TJ. S. 282
87, 88, 211, 213, 216, 220, 375
Shriver v. Lynn, 2 How. 43 433
Shumate ▼. Herman, 181 U. S.
402 360
Sim's Lessee ▼. Irvine, 3 DaU.
425 454
Simmons v. U. S., 142 U. S. 148 85
Simon v. Craft, 182 TJ. S. 427
288, 289, 313, 573
ARE TO PAGES]
Simon v. Southern B. Co., 236 TJ.
S. 115 316, 319, 321, 334, 572
Simpson v. Shepard, 230 TJ. S.
352 418
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.
Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 646
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 TJ. S. 700
409, 483
Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N. J.
L. 129 210
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 TJ. S. 1 330
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall.
36 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 47,
228, 231, 244, 259, 267, 380,
448, 492, 541, 543, 544, 595, 608
Smart v. Baugh, 3 J. J. Mar-
shall's Ey. B. 364 525
Smeltzer v. St. Louis & S. P. B.
Co., 158 Fed. 649 501
Smith, In re, 104 Iowa 199 368
Smith ▼. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556 520
Smith V. Hitchcock, 226 TJ. S.
53 295
Smith V. Maryland, 18 How. 71
61, 542
Smith V. Texas, 233 TJ. S. 630 508
Smyth ▼. Ames, 169 TJ. S. 466
241, 412, 413, 414, 667
Society for Propagation of Gos-
pel V. Wheeler, 22 Fed. Gas.
No. 13, 2 Gall 105 520
Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109
Mass. 1, 21 424
Sohn V. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596
520, 521
Soliah V. Heskin, 222 TJ. S. 522
292, 313, 470
Somersett's Case, 20 How. St. Tr.
79 26
Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 TJ. S.
703 257, 263, 764
Soper y. Lawrence Bros. Co., 201
TJ. S. 359 472, 526
South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 TJ.
S. 4 148
South Carolina v. McMaster, 237
U. S. 63 484, 724
868
TABLE OF CASES
[
South Carolina ▼. United States,
199 U. S. 437 143
South Wales Miners' Federation
V. Glamorgan Goal Ck>., [1905]
A. G. 239 515
Southern P. B. Go. ▼. Board of
Bailroad Com 'rs, 78 Fed. 261 414
Southern B. Go. y. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 507, 720, 722
Southwestern Oil Co. ▼. Texas,
217 U. S. 114 636
Spencer, In re, 228 U. S. 652
564, 566
Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. «
345 292,
355, 366, 361, 365, 370, 373, 375
Spies V. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131
61, 81, 154, 165, 542, 550
Spokane Falls ft N. B. Co. ▼.
Zeigler, 167 U. S. 65 219
Spreehler ▼. Wakeley, 11 Wis.
432 624
Springer v. United Statesi 102 IT.
S. 586 371
Springville v. Thomas, 166 U. S.
707 124, 536
Standard Oil Co. ▼. Missouri, 224
U. S. 270 839
Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee,
217 U. S. 413 837
Standard Oil Co. ▼. United States,
221 U. S. 1 319
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 226 U. S. 20,
49 610
Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin
ft K. Biver Canal ft Irrig. Co.,
192 U. S. 201 483
Stanton ▼. Baltic Mining Co., 240
U. S. 103 625
State ▼. Bordeaux, 93 N. C. 560 165
State y. Burke, 2 Gill (Md.) 79 522
State y. Campbell, 64 N. H.
402 400
State y. Ooppage, 87 Kan. 752 435
State y. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155 513
State y. Gaines, 86 N. C. 632 165
AKX TO PAOBS]
State ▼. Goodwin, 33 W. Va.
179 510
State y. Julow, 129 Mo. 163 513
State y. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis.
530 513
State ▼. kaine, 16 Wis. 398 522
State ▼. Newark, 27 N. J. L. 185 457
State y. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415 358
State y. Parkhurst, 9 N. J. L.
444 446
State y. Pitnej, 80 Wash. 699 440
State y. Bailroad Commission,
140 Wis. 157 482
State y. Stewart, 59 Vt 273 490
State Bank y. Cooper, 2 Yerg.
599 64
State Bank y. Snoop, 16 How.
369 349
State Bailroad Tax Cases, 92 U.
S. 575 293, 305, 348, 373
State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds
Case, 15 Wall. 300
341, 347, 348, 370
State Trust Co. y. Kansas Citj
P. ft G. B. Co., 115 Fed. 367 476
Stearns y. Minnesota, 179 U. S.
223 482
Stephens y. Marshall, 3 Pinnej
(Wis.) 203 476
Steyens y. Prop, of Middlesex
Can., 12 Mass. 466 75, 214
Stewart y. Kansas City, 239 U.
S. 14 753
Stine y. Bennett, 13 Minn^ 153 522
Stockton y. Baltimore ft N. Y. B.
Co., 32 Fed. Bep. 9 208
Stoddard y. Owings, 42 8. C. 88 520
Stone y. Farmers ' Loan ft T. Co.,
116 U. 8. 335 409
Stone y. Mississippi, 101 U. 8.
814 406, 450, 494
Stone y. Southern Illinois ft M
Bridge Co., 206 U. 8. 267 219
Stoutenburgh y. H^nnick, 129 U.
S. 141 89
Strauder y. West Virginia, 100
U. 8. 303 597
TABLE OP CASES
869
. [BIFEBXNCBS
StrauBs V. Fozworth, 231 U. S.
162 314
Street ▼. United States, 133 XJ. S.
299 457
Streitwolf v. Streitwolf , 181 U. 8.
179 325
Strickley v. Highland B07 Gold
Min. Co., 200 U. 8. 527
389, 390, 392, 426, 463
Stuart ▼. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183,
188 292, 295
Sturges ▼. Growninfield, 4 Wheat.
122 450
Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v.
Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320
314, 792
Sully V. American National Bank,
178 U. S. 289 713
Summons v. United States, 142
U. S. 148 110
Swan, Ex parte, 150 U. S. 637 580
Swartz y. Lawrence, 12 Phila.
181 522
Sweet y. Bechel, 159 U. S. 380
136, 218
Sweringen y. United States, 161
U. S. 446 233
Talton y. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376 99
Tang Ton y. Edsell, 223 U. S.
673 168
Tanner y. Little, 240 U. S. 369
440, 648
Tappan y. Merchants Nat. Bank,
19 Wall. 490 348
Taylor y. Porter, 4 Hill 146 64
Temple y. Com.^ 14 Bush (Ky.)
769 557
Tennessee y. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69 527
Tennessee y. Whiteworth, 117 U.
S. 129 342
Terry, Ex parte, 128 U. S. 289
334, 578, 580, 582
Terry y. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628
472, 473, 519
ABE TO PAGES]
Texas y. White, 22 L. ed. 819,
823 579
Texas & P. B. Co. y. Beesley, 56
Tex. Ciy. App. 245 n446
Texas & P. B. Co. y. Interstate
Com. Commiss., 162 U. S. 197 410
Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. y.
United States, 237 U. S. 19 340
Thompson y. Kentucky, 209 U. S.
340 635
Thompson y. Lee County, 3 Wall.
327 457
Thompson y. Perrine, 103 U. S.
806 457
Thompson y. Thompson, 226 U. S.
551 330, 334
Thompson y. United States, 155
U. S. 274 111
Thompson y. Utah, 170 U. 8.
343 124
Thompson y. Whitman, 18 Wall.
457 333
Thorington y. Montgomery, 147
U. 8. 490 89
Thorpe v. Butland B. B., 27 Vt.
150 397, 400
Tiaco y. Forbes, 228 U. 8. 549 127
Tide Water Co. y. Coster, 18 N.
J. Eq. 518 358
Tiger y. Western Inyestment Co.,
221 U. 8. 286 181
Tillinghast, Ex parte, 4 Pet.
108 589
Tinsley y. Anderson, 171 U. 8.
101 556, 563, 829
Toltec Banch Co. y. Cook, 191 U.
8. 532 524, 526
Tonawanda y. Lyon, 181 U. 8.
389 360, 361
Townsend y. Jemison, 9 How. 407
519, 523
Toyota y. Hawaii, 226 U. 8.
184 744
Trayelers' Insurance Co. y. Con-
necticut, 185 U. 8. 364 714
Treat y. White, 181 U. 8. 264 141
Trevett y. Weeden, 18
870
TABLE OP CASES
[EKmXNCKS
Trimble ▼. Seattle^ 231 XJ. 8.
683 705
Trono ▼. United States, 199 U.
8. 621 126
Truax ▼. Baich, 239 U. 8. 33
514, 755
Tucker ▼. Fergoeon, 22 Wall. 527
350, 374
TuUia ▼. Lake Erie ft Western
R Co., 175 U. 8. 348 670
Tomer ▼. New York, 168 U. 8.
90 472, 473, 521
Turner ▼. Sawyer, 150 U. 8. 578 315
Turpin ▼• Lemon, 187 U. 8. 51
365, 368
Twining t. New Jersey, 211 U. 8.
78 10, 13, 23, 38,
44, 61, 153, 165, 172, 203, 243,
247, 534, 543, 550, 553, 574, 576
Twitchell ▼. Com., 7 WalL 321 542
Twitehell ▼. Pennsylvania, 7
Wall. 325 61
Tyler, In re, 149 U. 8. 164 582
Tyler ▼. Befrees, 11 Wall. 331 333
Ughbanks ▼. Armstrong, 208 U.
8. 481 835
Ulmer ▼. Lime Bock B. Co., 98
Me. 579 476
Union Bridge Co. t. United
States, 204 U. 8. 364
147, 171, 179, 215
Union Lime Co. ▼. Chicago A N.
W. B. Co., 233 U. 8. 211 392, 476
Union Befrigerator Transit Co.
▼. Kentucky, 199 U. 8. 194
342, 487
United States t. Alexander, 148
U. S. 187 214
United States v. Atchison, T. &
8. F. B. Co., 234 U. 8. 476
174, 418
United States v. Baltimore Elec-
tric Bailroad Co., 17 WalL 322 340
United States y. Baugh, 4 Hughes
501 77
iJA TO PAOBS]
United States ▼. Bennett, 232 U.
8. 299 173
United States v. Block, 4 Sawy.
211 77
United States ▼. Burr, 4 Craneh
470 553
United States ▼. Butler, 1 Hughes
457, 461, Fed. Cas. No. 14 164
United States ▼. Buzzo, 18 WalL
125 535
United States v. Chandler-Dun-
bar Co., 229 U. 8. 53
177, 178, 179, 526
United States ▼. Cruikshank, 92
U. 8. 542 38, 39,
61, 259, 267, 269, 380, 381, 542
United States ▼. Delaware ft H.
Co., 213 U. a 366 155, 170
United States v. De Walt, 128 U.
8. 393 535
United States v. Erie B. Co., 106
U. 8. 327 347
United States ▼. Field, 21
Blatchf . 330 77
United States v. Fisher, 222 U.
8. 204 292, 472
United Statee v. Gettysburg Elec-
tric B. Co., 160 U. 8. 668 211, 213
United States ▼. Heinszen, 206
U. 8. 370 149, 290
United States v. Heinze, 218 U.
8. 532 837
United States ▼. Hudson, 7
Craneh 32 578, 582
United States ▼. Hvoelef, 237 U.
8. 1 340
United States v. Isham, 17 Wall.
496 535
United States ▼. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U. 8. 505 184
United States y. Jones, 109 U.
8. 513 88, 208, 216, 217, 220, 221
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.
S. 253 142, 204, 235, 237
United States ▼. Lane, 232 U. a
598 291
TABLE OF CASES
871
[BXnBBXKOXS
United States y. Lee, 106 U. 8.
196 206
United States v. Ljnah, 188 U. S.
445 113, 128, 214
United States v. McEee, 4 DilL
1, 9 Fed. C^. No. 15 164
United States v. Marigold, 9 How.
560 62
United States v. Maxwell, 3 Dill.
275 77
United States ▼. Merchants & M,
TrafBc Ass 'n, 242 U. 8. 178 419
United States v. Miller, 3 Hughes
553 77
United States v. Morse, 218 U. S.
493 334
United States v. Muscatine, 8
WaU. 575 528
United States ▼. New Orleans, 98
U. S. 381 376
United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat.
579 56, 109, 110, 538
United States v. Philadelphia &
B. B. Co., 123 U. S. 113 86, 367
United States ▼. Bichart, 188 U.
S. 438 340
United States ▼. Bilej, 5 Blatchf .
204 538
United States v. Bussell, 13 Wall.
623 136
United States ▼. St. Louis Termi-
nal, 234 U. S. 383 176
United States v. Sampemac, 1
Hampst. 118 521
United States ▼. Shepard, 1 Abb.
U. S. 431 77
United States v. Shipp, 214 U.
S. 386 583
United States v. Sing Tuck, 194
U. S. 161
137, 142, 143, 234, 235, 237, 572
United States v. Terminal B. B.
Ass'n, 224 U. S. 383 176
United States y. Waddell, 112 U.
S. 76 38
United States y. Walker, 109 U.
S. 258 264, 333
ABB TO PAGES]
United States y. Williams, 194
U. S. 279 136, 168, 233
Tnited States y. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U. S. 649 34, 231, 233
United States y. Yates, 6 Fed.
861 77
United States y. Zueker, 161 U.
S. 481 168
United States Exp. Go. y. Min-
nesota, 223 U. S. 335 480
Urquhart y. Brown, 205 U. 8.
179 564
Yalentina y. Mercer, 201 U. S.
131 565
Van Allen y. Assessors, 3 WalL
590 340
Yandalia Bailroad Co. y. Public
Service Commission, 242 U. S.
255 292
Van Home y. Dorranee, 2 Dall.
304 304
Van Bensselaer y. Keamej, 11
How. 297 354, 382
Van Bocklin y. Tennessee, 117 U.
8. 151 340
Van Zandt y. Waddel, 2 Terg.
260 64
Vicksburg & M. B. Co. y. Putnam,
118 U. 8. 545 86
Virginia, Ex parte, 100 U. 8. 339
257, 269
Virginia y. Biyes, 100 U. 8. 313 269
Voight y. Detroit, 184 U. 8. 115
292, 361, 370
W
Wabash, St. L. & P. B. Co. y.
Illinois, 118 U. 8. 564 409
Wadley Southern By. Co. y.
Georgia, 235 U. 8. 651 691
Wagner y. Leser, 239 U. 8. 207
459, 461
Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. 8.
302 305
872
TABLE OP CASES
[BXFIBINCXS
Walden t. Craig, 14 Pet. 147 315
Walker ▼. Bauvinet, 92 U. 8. 90
37, 272, 542
WaU, Ex parte, 107 TJ. 8. 265
279, 590
Walston V. Nevin, 128 U. 8. 578
357, 612
Ward ▼. Kelta, 12 Wend. 137 521
Ward V. Maryland, 12 WaU. 418 340
Washer v. BuIUtt Co., 110 U. 8.
564 355
Waahington ▼. Fairehild, 224 U.
8. 510 290, 484
Washington-Virginia B. Co. ▼.
Beal Estate Trust *Co., 238 IT.
8. 185 316
Water Power Cases, 148 Wis.
124 482
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. t. Deselms,
212 U. 8. 159 402
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. t. Texas,
212 U. 8. 86 402
Watkins y. Holman, 16 Pet. 25 299
Watson T. Maryland, 218 XJ. 8.
173 290, 736
Watson ▼. Mercer, 8 Pet 88
451, 452, 522, 530
Wangh ▼. Board of Trustees, 237
U. 8. 589 486, 751
Wayman v. 8outhard, 10 Wheat.
1 299
Webber v. Pere Marquette Boom
Co., 2 Mich, 636 104
Webster ▼. Cooper, 14 How.
488 354, 382
Webster v. Pargo, 181 U. 8. 394
162, 360, 467
Weightman ▼. Clark, 103 TJ. 8.
256 468
Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. 474 521
Welch V. 8wa8ey, 214 U. 8. 91
402, 464, 735
Wells ▼. 8ayannah, 181 U. 8.
531 X 350
West V. Louisiana, 194 U. 8. 263 459
AXX TO PAOXS]
West Chicago 8treet B. Co. t.
Illinois, 201 U. 8. 506
148, 265, 389
West Biver Bridge Co. v. Dix,
6 How. 507 56, 211, 219
Western Life Indemnity Co. ▼.
Bupp, 235 U. 8. 261 314
Western Turf Association t.
Greenberg, 204 TJ. 8. 359 780
Western Union Tel. Co. ▼. At-
torney-General, 125 TJ. 8. 530 342
Western Union Tel. Co. ▼. Com-
mercial Milling Co., 218 U. 8.
406 500, 704
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania B. Co., 195 U. 8. 570 219
Western Union TeL Co. ▼. State
of Indiana, 165 U. 8. 304 617
Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. T.
202 476
Weston ▼. Charleston, 2 Pet. 466 340
Wetmore v. Karricl^ 205 U. &
141 264, 288, 313
Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 176
U. 8. 650 292
Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. 8.
245 473
Wheeler ▼. New York, N. H- &
H. B. Co., 178 U. 8. 321 384
Wheeler ▼. United States, 226 U.
8. 478 164
White V. Hart, 13 WalL 646 529
Whitfield ▼. Aetna L. Ins. Co.,
205 U. 8. 489 420
Whitten y. Tomlinson, 160 U. 8.
231 563
Wight V. Davidson, 181 U. 8.
371 104, 138, 162, 360, 467
WOd V. SarpeU, 10 Gratt. 405 362
Wildes V. Attorney-General for
Trinidad, 3 Moore, P. C. 200 197
Wilkinson ▼. Leland, 2 Pet. 627
211, 457
Willard v. Presburg, 14 WalL
676 356
Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. 8.
79 786
TABLE OF CASES
873
[BKFXRENOES ARB *rO PAGES]
Winiams y. Eggleston, 170 XT. S.
304 291, 374, 769
Williams v. Pear, 179 U. S. 270 622
Williams v. JohnBon, 239 U. S.
414 181
WiUiams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 79 452
Williams ▼. Parker, 188 IT. 8.
491 379
Williams v. Port Chester, 72 N.
T. App. Div. 505, 76 N. T.
Supp. 631 520
Williams ▼. Talladega, 226 U. 8.
404, 416 480
Williams ▼. Walsh, 222 U. S.
415 787
Williamson v. Berry, 8 How.
495 333
Willoughbj ▼• Chicago, 235 U. S.
45 357, 361, 404, 455
Wilmington Star Mining Co. ▼.
Fulton, 205 U. S. 60 782
Wilmington & W. B. Co. ▼. Als-
brook, 146 TJ. S. 279 350
Wilson, Ex parte, 114 TJ. S. 417
62, 76, 77, 78
Wilson V. Iseminger, 185 XT. 8.
55 473
Wilson V. Lambert, 168 tJ. 8.
611 88, 211, 356
Wilson V. N6W & Penis, Re-
ceivers, 182
Wilson y. North Carolina, 169 U.
8. 594 588
Wilson y. 8eligman, 144 U. 8. 41
314, 320
Wilson y. Standerfer, 184 IT. 8.
399 288
Wilson y. United States, 221 U.
8. 361 162, 164, 583
Wilson Cypress Co. y. Del Poyo,
236 U. 8. 635 342
Wily y. Sinkler, 179 U. 8. 58 38
Windsor y. McVeigh, 93 U. 8.
274 264, 312, 321, 333
Winn, In re, 213 U. 8. 458 317
Winnebago, The, 205 .TJ. 8. 354 423
Winston y. Winston, 189 TJ. 8.
507 325
Wisconsin Central Bailroad Co. y.
Price County, 133 U. 8. 496 340
Wisconsin, M. & P. B. Co. y.
Jacobson, 179 TJ. 8. 287 689
Wise y. Henkel, 220 TJ. 8. 556 583
Wise y. Mills, 220 U. 8. 549 583
Wiswall y. Sampson, 14 How.
52 582
Withers y. Buckley, 20 How. 84
64, 542
W. W. Cargill Co. y. Minnesota
(ex rel. Bailroad A W. Com.),
180 TJ. 8. 452 728
Wong Wing v. TJnited States, 163
TJ. 8. 228
97, 137, 168, 234, 240, 635
Wood, In re, 140 U. 8. 278 663
Wood V. Chesborough, 228 TJ. S.
672 265
Woodman y. Pulton, 47 Miss.
682 524
Woods y. Carl, 203 TJ. 8. 358 782
Wormley v. District of Columbia,
181 U. 8. 402 360
Wright V. Central of Georgia By.,
236 TJ. 8. 674 342
Wright y. Louisyille & Nashville
R B., 236 U. 8. 690 343
Wright v. Minnesota Mut. L. Ins.
Co., 193 TJ. 8. 657 464
Wurts y. Hoagland, 114 TJ. 8.
606 357, 763
Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.
T. 378 274
Yarbrough, Ex parte, 110 TJ. 8.
651 38
Yazoo & M. Yal. B. Co. y. Jack-
son Vinegar Co., 226 TJ. 8.
217 478, 811
874
TABLE OP CASES
[bxvbmnoes
Yazoo ft M. VaL IBL Go. ▼.
Tbomas, 132 U. 8. 174 350
Tesler v. Harbor Lone Gommifl-
Bioners, 146 U. S. 646 86
Tick Wo ▼. HopkinBi 118 IT. 8.
356 48, 92, 240, 256,
263, 401, 449, 765, 770, 777, 799
Yo«t ▼. Dallas Goon^, 236 U. 8.
60 357
ABS TO PAOXS]
Young, Ex parte, 209 U. 8. 123
417, 474, 679
Young's Gase v. Virginia, 101 Ya.
853 491
Zakonaite ▼• Wolf, 226 U. 8.
272 167
INDEX
[BIRRINCXS iJA TO PAGIS]
ABTJTTINO OWNEBS,
building restrictions^ nnconstitiitional exercise of police power, 427.
sewerSy compelling abutting owners to connect property with sewer,
discrimination between residents and nonresidents, validity of
statute, 718.
due process not denied, vested rights, 465.
state taxation, power to tax, legislature may act directly or may
delegate functions, 356.
taking property for public use, compensation required by Due
Process Clause, 358.
vested rights, consequential damages, claim of abutting owners to
compensation, protection by due process, 475.
ACCOUNTS,
due process of law, definition, case involving distress warrant issued
to recover balance due account, 62.
ACTIONS AND DEFENSES,
limitation statutes, exemption from suit as vested right, ending of
statutory period of limitations, 523.
nature, due process not denied by passage of limitation statute,
contracts not impaired, 519.
police power, life insurance, exclusion of suicide as defense in action
on policy, 420.
state regulations of foreign corporations, theaters, equal protection
not denied, 698.
ADJOINING LAND OWNERS,
police power, statute regulating barrier pillars between adjoining
coal properties, due process not denied, 432.
ADMIRALTY,
jury. Federal right to trial by petit jury, 535.
875
876 INDEX
[URRINCIS AEX TO PAOIS]
ADULTERATION,
Federal eoiutitatioiiy Fifth Amendmenti Due Process ClauMy eon-
stitntionality of oleomargarine tax, 140.
regulation of foreign eommeree, limitation of power by Doe
Proeesi Claaae, 128.
food, prohibition of sale of preserTatives containing boric acid, eqoil
protection not denied, 747.
milky sale of adnlterated milk, discrimination against nonprodncing
▼endoTi, equal protection not denied, 729.
paint, statute requiring labels on mixed paints to show ingredients,
equal protection not denied, 730.
ADULTEBT,
punishment of o^Tenses, discrimination. Equal Protection of the Law
Clause, 602.
ADVEB8E POSSESSION,
limitation statutes, due process not denied bj limitation acts, 525.
exemption from suit as vested right, ending of statutory period
of limitations, 523.
statute declaring ten years' possession to give title, due process not
denied, 481.
equal protection not denied, 794.
ADVERTISEMENTS,
contracts, freedom of contract, license tax on merchants using profit
sharing coupons and trading stamps, freedom not infringed, 517.
national flag, state protection, equal protection not denied, 780.
vehicles, prohibition of advertising wagons on eitj streets, equal pro-
tection not denied, 740.
due process not denied, 426.
AGENTS,
due process, jurisdiction, nonresident persons, 318.
nonresident corporations, 319.
taxation, license tax on emigrant agents, equal protection of the law,
622.
vested rights, foreign corporations, money judgment rendered upon
service on resident director, denial of due process, 485.
AORICULTURE,
corporations, state anti-trust laws, discrimination in favor of agricul*
tural products, equal protection denied, 699.
ALIENS,
constitution of parent state, right of colonists to participate in, 116.
INDEX 877
[bsfbbincss are to pages]
ALIENS — continued.
criminal law, appeal, denial of right of review, alien juror, due process
and equal protection not denied, 827.
no arraignment or plea on second information, alien on jury,
due process not denied, 554.
Deportation Act of 1903 excluding diseased aliens. Due Process Clause,
156.
alien practicing prostitution after entry, 167.
application of Due Process Clause, deportation after entry, Japa-
nese Immigrant Case, 114.
right of sovereign to deport foreigners already domiciled. Fifth
Amendment, construction, 92.
Due Process Clause, Chinese exclusion cases, conclusiveness of decision
of executive officer, 142.
denial of due process to aliens, Chinese exclusion, 97.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, identical construction, 243.
limitation on power to exclude alien anarchists, 136.
removal of restrictions as to aUotments, property of Indians not
taken, 181.
rights of aliens, resident and nonresident, 233.
Supreme Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, 257.
employment, discrimination against aliens, equal protection denied, 753.
public improvements, discrimination against foreign labor, due
process and equal protection not denied, 755.
firearms, prohibition of possession of, equal protection not denied, 792.
Fourteenth Amendment, purpose. Congress as protecting and enforcing
body, 266.
scope of section, definition of citizenship, 228.
game, prohibition of killing of birds or animals by unnaturalized
foreign-bom residents, due process not denied, 479.
Indians, Creek freedmen entitied to due process, vested rights, 472.
interstate citizenship, creation by Articles of Confederation, 225.
development by second Federal constitution, 225.
laundries, regulation of business, ordinances, classification, equal pro-
tection denied, 764.
municipal corporations, ordinances, prohibiting visiting barricaded
gambling rooms, equal protection not denied, 776.
national citizenship, chapter V, 225.
absence of, emphasis by Dred Scott Case, 25.
creation by Fourteenth Amendment to Federal constitution, 29.
definition in Slaughter House Cases, 228.
existence, inquiry in Dred Scott Case, 227.
protection against state action, 244.
protection of Fourteenth Amendment to Federal constitution, 35.
question of birth, definition of citizenship, 231.
878 INDEX
[RXrXEINCXS ARE TO PAQXS]
ALIENS — continued.
taxation, license tax on emi^ant agents, equal proteetion of the
law, 622.
witnesses, self-incrimination, exemption not fundamental n^t of
national citizenship, 153.
AMUSEMENTS,
see Thxatkbs and Shows.
ANIMALS,
damages by cattle, statute imposing liability, equal protection and due
process not denied, 767.
police power, fixing of certain absolute liabilities, due process not
denied, 440.
ordinance as to milk, tuberculin test, due process not denied, 431.
quarantine, prevention of disease, equal protection not denied, 772.
railroads, double liability and attorney's fee, imposed for killing of
live stock, due process denied, 470.
double damages for refusal to pay daim^ equal protection not
denied, 811.
exaction without denial of due process, 477.
fences, liability of railroad for omission to fence railroad, double
damages, equal protection not denied, 655.
sheep, restrictions on sheep grazing, equal protection not denied, 778.
stock-yards companies, statute limiting charges, equal protection denied,
814.
taxation of tangible personal property, 344.
APPEAL AND ERROR,
criminal law, allowance of appeal by government, equal protection not
denied, 837.
aUowance of appeal from certain courts by state, equal protection
not denied, 831.
denial of right of review, alien juror, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 827.
dismissal of writ of error, power of highest court of state, 546.
preliminary examination, right to, prosecution in Manila, 841.
punishment, difference in term of sentence for imprisonment, eoual
protection not denied, 831.
record, refusal of Supreme Court to amend record, equal protection
not. denied, 824.
Due Process Clause, Fifth Amendment, relation to res judicata, 139.
taking private property. Federal supervision, necessity of clear
' statement of case in trial court, 385.
instructions, substantial error in charga to jury, due process and equal
protection not denied, 824.
INDEX 879
[BETEBENCES ABE TO PAGES]
APPEAL AND ERROR— continued.
jurisdiction, different courts in same state, power of state to establish^
Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict, 820.
jury, discharge, error of trial court, equal protection not denied, 834.
writ or error, contempt, what constitutes, indirect or civil contempt,
582.
criminal law, habeas corpus as proper remedy to test Taliditj of
detention under state law, 564.
remedies in state courts, duty of accused to exhaust all
remedies, 562.
due process, fundamental requisites, notice, 286.
APPEARANCE,
due process, jurisdiction, curing lack of notice or service of process
hy appearance, 316.
ARREST,
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, construction, case involving
military commission, 69.
construction in case involving military trial and service, triumph
of legality, 65.
indictment as evidence of probable cause, 133.
Magna Carta, guaranties given to nation, chapter 39 of charter, 4.
later versions of the Great Charter, 6.
rebirth of the Great Charter in 1628, 7.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
interstate citizenship created by Articles of Confederation, 225.
development by second Federal constitution, 225.
ASSAULT,
convicts, classification of prisoners committing assaults, equal protec-
tion not denied, 837.
slaves, absence of national citizenship, emphasis by Dred Scott Case, 25.
ASSIGNMENTS,
master and servant, assignments of future earnings, regulations, exemp-
tion of banks, equal protection not denied, 742.
ASSOCIATIONS,
vested rights, reorganization of co-operative association without con-
sent of members, power of state, 464.
ATTACHMENT,
property of nonresidents, bonds attached, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 840.
statute not requiring bond for attachment, equal protection not
denied, 711.
880 INDEX
[kiveexncss aax to pages]
ATTORNEYS,
criminal law, presence of accused at trial and rendition of verdieti
habeas corpus, 567, 569.
disbarment, attorney cannot be denied due processj^ 590.
power to disbar inherent in all courts, 589.
protection of life and liberty by due process, contempt proceed-
ings, disbarment of attorneys, chapter XVI, 578.
due process, jurisdiction, nonresident persons, 318.
notice, curing lack of notice or sendee of process by appearance,
316.
women, right to practice law in state courts, Equal Protection of the
Law Clause, 608.
AUCTIONS,
licenses, discrimination in fee, equal protection not denied, 744.
AUTOMOBILES,
state regulation, service of process on nonresidents, Talidity of statute,
819.
B
BAKERIES,
contracts, freedom of contract, definition, regulation of employees, 496.
freedom subject to sovereign powers of state, regulation of
employees, 493.
police power, limitation on hours of labor for women, due process not
infringed, 421.
BANKRUPTCY,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, denial of due process, Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 not invalid, 107.
BANKS,
assets of safe deposit companies, vested rights, prohibition of removal,
due process not denied, 480.
depositors' guaranty fimd, constitutional exercise of police power as
to depositors' fund, 433.
creation as valid exercise of police power, 425.
equal protection not denied, 737.
public use, ascertainment by ultimate and not by proximate
effect, 389.
deposits in savings banks unclaimed, state control, bank not deprived
of due process, 469.
equal protection not denied, 741.
license to private bankers, right to refuse, equal protection not denied,
737.
INDEX 881
[BXrEBEKGES AKE TO PAGES]
BANK8— continued.
master and servant, assignments of future earnings, regulaUons, exemp-
tion of banks, equal protection not denied, 742.
taxation, deposits in national banks, tax on, equal protection not denied,
642.
savings banks, tax on, equal protection not denied, 644.
fltate taxation, exemptions, strict construction of exemptions, 349.
law as to banks, equal protection, constitutionality of statute,
618.
limitations on taxing power, nature and extent, exemption of
governmental agencies, 339.
personal property, taxation of intangible personal property,
347.
purpose, taxation must be for public purpose, 352.
usury, exemption of banks, trust companies and bona fide mortgages,
equal protection not denied, 736.
BILL OP RIGHTS,
see Magna Carta.
Amendment to Federal constitution, first eight articles, 19.
vested rights, formula in Declaration of Independence, life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness, 448.
witnesses, self-incrimination, exemption in bills of rights and state
constitutions, 10.
BILUABDS,
see Pool BooiiS.
BILLS AND NOTES,
state taxation, personal property, nonresidents, taxation of intangible
personal property, 347.
warrant of attorney, due process, fundamental requisites, notice, 289.
BILLS OF LADING,
see Gabbiibs.
BOARDS OF TRADE,
contracts, freedom of contract, state regulations of boards of trade,
freedom not interfered with, 503.
BONDS,
attachment, property of nonresidents, statute not requiring bond,
equal protection not denied, 711.
foreign corporations, exclusion of insurance company, power of state,
noncompliance with conditions, equal protection not denied, 722.
insurance, requirements as to investments in state by foreign companies,
due process not denied, 484.
Due Process — 56
882 INDEX
[rktersnces are to paobs]
BONDS — continued.
taxation, corporate securities, Equal Protection of the Law Clause, 612.
liquor sellers, discrimination, equal protection not denied, 633.
personal property, taxation of intangible personal property, 347.
purpose, taxation must be for public purpose, 352,
spirits in bond, equal protection not denied, 635.
BREAD,
see Food.
BRICK YARDS,
police power, ordinance prohibiting brick yards in certain portions of
city, due process not denied, 437.
equal protection not denied, 756.
BRIDGES,
alteration in bridges over waterways, limitation on power of Secre-
tary of War, Due Process Clause, Fifth Amendment, 147.
classification of municipal corporations, requiring certain towns to
maintain bridge and highway, equal protection not denied, 768.
eminent domain, taking private property, kind of property which maj
be taken, 218.
vested rights, railroad property burdened by construction of bridge
over highway, due process not denied, 466.
BROKERS,
contracts, freedom of contract, state regulations of boards of trade,
freedom not interfered with, 503.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS,
discrimination in regulations, equal protection not denied, 734.
elevators, statute requiring barriers of shafts, equal protection not
denied, 790.
eminent domain, due process, duty of state to guarantee protection
to life, liberty and property, 379.
laundries, regulation of business, ordinances, classification, equal pro-
tection denied, 764.
municipal corporations, prohibition of brickmaking in designated area,
equal protection not denied, 756.
police power, unconstitutional exercise of police power, 427.
vested rights, property classifications, power of state, discrimination,
464.
BUSINESS,
see PROPERTT.
BUTTER,
see Food.
INDEX 883
[RBFE££NGES are TO PAGES]
C
CANCELLATION OP INSTRUMENTS,
contracts for sale of land, statute regulating cancellation, equal pro-
tection not denied, 743.
CAEMACK AMENDMENT,
see Interstate Commsbge.
CABRIEBS,
bills of lading, interstate commerce, Carmack Amendment of 1906 does
not deny due process, 160.
commissions regulating carriers, due process, fundamental requisites,
notice, 290.
connecting carriers, shipments, requiring carrier to accept reshipments
in cars of other carriers, equal protection not denied, 689.
contracts, freedom of contract, guaranty of Fifth Amendment, no
denial by Carmack Amendment of 1906 to Interstate Commerce
Act, 500.
demurrage cases, discrimination between carrier and shipper as to
attorneys' fees, statute rendered invalid, 692.
employees, Eight-Hour-Law Case, validity of statute, 182.
Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, freedom of contract not
interfered with, 504.
Hepburn Act of 1906, commodities clause, Due Process Clause, 155.
prohibition in Hepburn Act of transportation from market to mine,
Due Process Clause, 170.
interstate commerce. Act of 1887 as amended by Act of 1910 held
valid, 174.
limitation upon power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce, relative rights of employer and employee, 150.
order to extend facilities to connecting carriers. Due Process
Clause, 179.
passengers, heating of railroad cars, statute excluding certain railways,
equal protection not denied, 664.
separate accommodations for white and colored persons in railway
coaches, statute requiring, equal protection, 604.
civil rights cases, 608.
payment of claims, imposition of penalties for failure to pay, equal
protection not denied, 809.
statute imposing attorneys' fees and penalties for failure to pay,
equal protection denied, 803.
police power. Interstate Commerce Act, and common law, 410.
property or business of public interest, 407.
rates, classification of railways for regulation, equal protection not
denied, 687.
excessive penalties, due process denied by imposition, 474.
oqual protection denied, 678.
884 INDEX
[EBIVBXNOIS ABl TO PAGIS]
OABRIEBS— continued,
rates — continued.
judicial review of regulationB, statute failing to provide for, due
proeeas and equal protection not denied, 688.
legislative control, railway fare and rates, effect of Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 050.
prohibiting charging more for shorter than for longer haul, equal
protection not denied, 672.
reasonableness of rates, delegation of legislative power, 411.
denial of due process and equal protection, 656.
due process, recent eases, 416.
elements involved, 413*
statute establishing rates, inTalidity, denial of due process and
equal protection, 665.
unjust and unreasonable rates, fixing by commission, equal pro-
tection not denied, 662.
vested rights, maximum intrastate rates, confiscation and denial
of due process, 484.
sleeping cars, prohibition of letting down of unoccupied upper berth,
due process denied, 483.
soliciting of business on carriers' premises, prohibition of, equal pro-
tection not denied, 786.
spur track for public use, initial cost maj be imposed upon single
industry, due process not denied, 476.
taxation, state taxation of express companies^ property, equal pro-
tection, 614.
terminal facilities, interstate commerce, order to receive and transport
freighti Due Process Clause, 175.
CEMETERIES,
police power, prohibition of burial within city limits, due process not
denied, 423.
CHAMBER OP COMMERCE,
taxation, membership in incorporated chamber of commerce, equal
protection not denied, 646.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES,
limitation statutes, right to enact retroacti^^e laws, vested rights, 522.
CHINESE EXCLUSION,
see Alikns.
CIGARETTES,
see TOBAOOO.
CITIZENSHIP,
see Alixns.
INDEX 885
[bxfesxnobs are to pagbs]
CIVIL RIGHTS,
carriers, statute requiring separate accommodations for white and
colored persons in railway coaches, equal protection, 604.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause purely American invention, 595.
jury, effect of Equal Protection of the Law Clause, colored persons,
right to mixed juries, 597.
denial to colored persons of right to act as jurors, 596.
discrimination against citizens of African descent, setting aside
jury panel, 603.
exclusion of juror on account of color, 600.
grand jury, negroes as grand jurors, 606.
negroes as jurors, discrimination, 607.
statutes excluding jurors on account of race or color, 602.
punishment of offenses, discrimination. Equal Protection of the Law
Clause, 602.
schools, discrimination against colored children. Equal Protection of
the Law Clause, 605.
COIN,
see MoNZT.
COLLEGES AND ACADEMIES,
see Schools.
COMBINATIONS AND MONOPOLIES,
anti-trust laws, statute permitting combinations among purchasers,
equal protection not denied, 748.
contracts, freedom of contract, condemnation of trade agreement
between retail lumber dealers, freedom not abridged, 499.
• punishment of selling of goods at lower rate in one place than
in another, freedom not abridged, 506.
right of state to regulate combinations and monopolies, 494.
statute against combinations, freedom not limited, 510.
corporations, classification between corporations and individuals, com-
pulsory production of testimony, equal protection not denied, 732.
forfeiture of charter, failure to file af&davit of innocence not
required of individuals, anti-trust law, equal protection not
denied, 706.
procedure against corporations, difference in mode of procedure,
anti-trust law, equal protection not denied, 836.
state anti-trust laws, discrimination, equal protection denied, 699.
validity, removal of discriminatory features, 701.
equal protection, arbitrary classification, creation of presumption of
guilt, equal protection denied, 758.
foreign corporations, quo warranto proceedings to oust, violation of
anti-trust laws, equal protection not denied, 838.
886 INDEX
[HXnUNOBS ABX TO PAOIS]
OOBIBINATION AND MONOPOLIES---eoiiti]iaed.
interstate eommeree, order to reeeiye and transport freight, Dae
Process dattse, 175.
police power, property or business of public interest, 407.
witnesses, self-incrimination, immunity based on Act of 1903, Anti-
Trust Act, 166.
OOMITT,
due process, jurisdiction, judgments, collateral attack on judgments,
332.
nonresident persons, 318.
OOMMEBCE,
see iNTnSTATB Oomioebos.
COMMON LAW,
jury, Federal right to trial by petit jury, 535.
Magna Carta, chapter 39 in American law, wider scope of chapter, 15.
police power, Interstate Commerce Act and common law, 410.
railways, statute requiring railroads to provide drainage contrary to
common law rule, equal protection not denied, 693.
COBiPENSATION,
see Eminbnt Doicaik, Worxmsn's Coicpknsation Act.
COMPETITION,
see COMBINATIONB AND MONOPOLIXB, SALBS,
CONFISCATION,
see PaoPKRTT.
CONFLICT OF LAWS,
contracts, freedom of contract, insurance, nonforfeiture proTisions of
statute, loan agreement inyalidated, freedom denied, 511.
due process, jurisdiction, divorce proceedings, not in rem or in per-
sonam, 323.
CONSPIRACY,
contracts, freedom of contract, condemnation of trade agreement
between retail lumber dealers, freedom not abridged, 499.
limitation upon power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
relative rights of employer and employee, Due Process Clause,
150.
punishment, difference in term of sentence for imprisonment, equal
protection not denied, 831.
INDEX 887
[SErERENCES ARE TO FAGES]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
see Dub Peocess or Law, Equal Pboteotion or the Law, Magna
Gabta.
see also specific topies, sncli as Aliens, Contracts, Criminal Law,
Eminent Domain, Game, Interstate Commerce, Police Power,
Property, Taxation, etc.
Amendments to Federal constitution, first eight articles, 19.
limitations on Federal power, 60, 82.
text of Fifth Amendment, 55.
constitutional limitations an American invention, taxation, 338.
construction, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Due Process Clause,
identical construction, 243.
Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Gause, protection of national
citizenship against state action, 244.
limitation statutes, constitutional limitation of reasonableness, 520.
CONTEMPT,
chapter XVI, 578.
attorneys, disbarment of, power to disbar inherent in all courts, 589.
direct contempt conmiitted in presence of court, what constitutes, 580.
indirect or civil contempt, what constitutes, 582.
proceedings criminal in nature, 579.
punishment, consequences of lack of jurisdiction, 588.
power to punish inherent in all courts, 578.
right to notice and hearing, indirect or civil contempt, 585.
trial by jury not required by Due Process Clause since power to
punish is inherent, 580.
witnesses, self-incrimination, privilege invoked by officer of corpora-
tion, 162.
CONTRACTS,
freedom of contract, chapter XII, 490.
condemnation of trade agreement between retail lumber dealers,
freedom not abridged, 499.
crime for person to act as railway conductor without certain qual-
ifications, freedom not abridged, 508.
definition, 496.
Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, freedom not interfered
with, 504.
guaranty of Fifth Amendment, no denial by Carmack Amend-
ment of 1^06 to Interstate Commerce Act, 500.
insurance, nonforfeiture provisions of statute, loan agreement in-
validated, freedom denied, 511.
licenses tax on merchants using profit sharing coupons and trad-
ing stamps, freedom not infringed, 517.
master and servant, employment at will of parties not employ-
ment at will of others, 514.
888 INDEX
[bxfesxncxs abs to fagis]
CX)NTBACT8— continued.
freedom of contract — continued.
freedom not infringed bj statutes regulating employment of
women^ 516.
imposition bjr employer of certain conditions on employee as
crime, freedom denied, 512.
prohibition of issuance of irredeemable orders, in payment of
labor, freedom not infringed, 509.
Ten-Hour Law, forbidding employment of children or women,
freedom not infringed, 509.
mines, freedom not infringed by ''run-of-mine,'' or ''anti-screen"
law, as to compensation of miners, 516.
state law preventing miners from contracting for wages on
certain basis, freedom not infringed, 497.
ordinance regulating size of loaves of bread, freedom not inter-
fered with, 505.
punishment of selling of goods at lower rate in one place than
in another, freedom not abridged, 506.
purchase of certain materials by junk dealers as crime, freedom
not abridged, 507.
regulation of distribution of railroad coal cars, freedom not
destroyed, 498.
right of state to regulate combinations and monopolies, 494.
state regulations of boards of trade, freedom not interfered with,
503.
statute against combinations, freedom not limited, 510.
statute defining liability of railways for injuries, freedom not
infringed, 502.
subject to sovereign powers of state, 493.
impairment of contracts, vested rights, chapter XI, 443.
allowance of passage of retrospective state legislation, necessity
of Fourteenth Amendment, 452.
clause limited to vested rights that arise out of it, 450.
corporations, state control of corporations, 696.
limitation statutes, constitutional limitation of reasonableness, 520.
nature, due process not denied by passage, contracts not im-
paired, 519.
right to enact retroactive laws, vested rights, 521.
remedies, change of remedies, power of legislature, qualifications,
527.
state law prohibited, 449. '
taxation, railroads, imposition of entire cost of abolishing grade
crossings, validity, 660.
tax on special .franchises, equal protection not denied to
street raUway companies, 628.
INDEX 889
[bxfebznoxs abb to paoxs]
CX)NTBACTS— continued.
impairment of contracts— eontinued.
vested rights, formula in Declaration of Independence, life, liberty •
and pursuit of happiness, 448.
Fourteenth Amendment, effect of, prohibition of arbitrary
interference with rights, 452.
'' liberty, '^ definition in Federal law, 491.
definition in state law, 490.
police power, Interstate Conmierce Act, and common law, 410.
limitations, enjoyment of property limited, 405.
statute inflicting penalties on employer where certain conditions
are imposed on employee, denial of due process, 435.
railways, wages of employees, statute as to time of payment, equal
protection not denied, 667.
state tide lands, assessment of leaseholds for local improvements, equal
protection not denied, 704.
taxation of intangible personal property, 347.
telegraph companies, state regulations, prohibiting limiting of, liability
for negligence, equal protection not denied, 704.
COBPOBATIONS,
actions, change of venue, local prejudice, equal protection not denied,
832.
anti-trust laws, discrimination, equal protection denied, 699.
validity, removal of discriminatory features, 701.
charter, forfeiture of charter, failure to file affidavit of innocence not
required of individuals, anti-trust law, equal protection not
denied, 706.
vested rights, alteration of charters without taking property of
corporation, due process not denied, 482.
classification between corporations and individuals, compulsory pro-
duction of testimony, equal protection not denied, 732.
statute applicable to fire insurance companies only, equal protection
not denied, 697.
consolidation, annual franchise tax on consolidated railway company,
statute not invalid, 648.
due process, jurisdiction, nonresident corporations, 319.
equal protection, control of foreign and domestic corporations, chap-
ter XX, 696.
evidence, statute requiring corporations alone to produce books and
papers, equal protection not denied, 703.
Federal constitution. Fourteenth Amendment, corporation as person
within the meaning of Section 1, 240.
foreign corporations, see title, Fobxion Corporations.
insurance, see title, Insuraxcx.
master and servant, wages, prohibition of orders for payment of labor
not redeemable in money, equal protection not denied, 749.
890 INDEX
[ftSnBXNOBS AKS TO PAGES]
OOBPOBATIONS-Hsontinaed.
names, exclusion of foreign company having same name as domestifi
company, equal proteetion not denied, 716.
nonresidents, state taxation of intangible personal property, 347.
officers, Federal eonstitatioUf Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination,
privilege invoked bj officer of corporation, 162.
procedure against corporations, difference in mode of procedure, anti-
trust law, equal protection not denied, 836.
process, statute appointing state auditor to accept service of process,
equal proteetion not denied, 702.
railways, wages of employees, statute as to time of payment, equal pro-
tection not denied, 667.
state control of corporations, 696.
stocks, sale on margin, statute prohibiting, equal protection not denied,
773.
taxation, classification, sales for future delivery, equal proteetion
not denied, 638.
taxation, annual franchise tax on eonsolidated railway corjwration,
statute imposing, due process not denied, 343.
Corporation Tax Act limiting deductions held not invalid, due
process, 180.
deposits in national banks, tax on, equal protection not denied, 642.
discrimination against dealers, articles manufactured from prod-
uce of another state, not discrimination, 700.
equal protection of the law, tax on corporations, 623.
excise tax on corporations, nature, 639.
franchises, tax on, equal protection, 626.
unequal assessment of franchises and other property, denial
of due process and equal protection, 702.
income tax on mining companies, equal proteetion and due process
not denied, 625.
legacy and inheritance taxes, equal protection, 615.
membership in incorporated chamber of commerce, equal proteetion
not denied, 646.
nonresident stockholders, equal protection not denied, 713.
property situated in several states, power of state to tax, 342.
securities, tax on. Equal Protection of the Law Clause, 612.
stock transfer tax, validity, 634.
vested rights, condemnation of outstanding shares of owner of stock
without denial of due process, 463.
insurance, requirements as to investments in state by foreign
companies, due process not denied, 484.
reorganization of co-operative association without consent of mem-
bers, power of state, 464.
INDEX 891
[bxfkbinces akx to pagks]
COSTS,
insurance, payment of claims, statute imposing attorneys' fees and
penalties, failure to pay, equal protection denied, 805.
malicious prosecution, statute rendering prosecutor liable for costs,
equal protection not denied, 828.
mandamus, allowance of attorneys' fees to successful plaintiff, equal
protection not denied, 808.
railroads, payment of claims, statute imposing attorneys' fees and
penalties, failure to pay, equal protection denied, 803.
demurrage cases, discrimination between carrier and shipper as
to attorneys ' fees, statute rendered invalid, 692.
double liability and attorney's fee imposed for killing of live
stock, due process denied, 470.
exaction without denial of due process, 477.
COUNTERFEITING,
former jeopardy. Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, construction,
offense of counterfeiting involved, 61.
COUNTIES,
jury, selection, local regulations, equal protection not denied, 833.
taxation, penalties, discrimination between county and city in dis-
position of penalties, due process and equal protection not denied,
752.
COUETS,
attorneys, disbarment, power to disbar inherent in all courts, 589.
contempt, direct contempt committed in presence of court, wliat con-
stitutes, 580.
indirect or civil contempt, what constitutes, 582.
proceedings criminal in nature, 579.
punishment, consequences of lack of jurisdiction, 588.
power to punish inherent in all courts, 578.
trial by jury not required by Due Process Clause since power
to punish is inherent, 580.
criminal law, appeal by state, allowance of appeal from certain courts,
equal protection not denied, 831.
rights of accused, presence at trial and rendition of verdict,
habeas corpus, 567, 569.
decisions, Federal constitution. Fourteenth Amendment, due process,
Supreme Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, 264.
different courts in same state, power of state to establish, Fourteenth
Amendment does not restrict, 820.
due process, construction by state courts to be considered^ 382.
fundamental requisites, notice, 286.
892 INDEX
[EmftBNCKS ABS TO PAOIS]
OOUBTS— continued.
due procesa — continued.
jurifldietlon, necessity of competent tribunal and notice, 312.
nonresident corporationS| jurisdiction, 319.
nonresident persons, jurisdiction, 318.
service of process, necessity, validity of judgment, 314.
etate taxation. Federal supervision, right to review, necessity
that taxation be spoliation, 384.
Supreme Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, 257.
taking private property. Federal supervision, necessity of dear
statement of ease ia trial eourt, 385.
eminent domain, compensation for taking property, question a judicial
one, necessity of eompetent tribunal, 219.
procedure, decision of state eourt as to different procedure, pay-
ment of eompeneation, equal protection not denied, 828.
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, limitation to judicial as well
as legislative power of Federal government, 101.
Fourteenth Amendment, purpose. Congress as protecting and
enforcing body, 268.
Federal courts, life and liberty as protected by due process, procedure
in criminal cases in Federal courts, chapter XIY, 532.
procedure in criminal cases in state courts, chapter XV, 541.
right to review state action, 380.
Supreme Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, 263.
Federal power of eminent domain, review, 377.
procedure, change of procedure, change under either Federal or state
law must not deny fundamental rights, 532.
procedure in state courts, equal protection, chapter XXIII, 820.
railways, rates, judicial review of regulations, statute failing to pro-
vide for, due process and equal protection not denied, 688.
remedies, change of remedies, power of legislature, qualifications, 527.
session, what constitutes, 580.
state courts, criminal law, habeas corpus as proper remedy to test
validity of detention under state law, 564.
procedure, exemption from self-incrimination in state courts,
due process not denied, 550.
remedies in state courts, duty of accused to exhaust all rem-
edies, 562.
trial, right of accused to be present in state court, 556.
Supreme Court, criminal law, appeals, dismissal of writ of error,
power of highest court of state, 546.
vested rights, contracts, impairment of obligation, contract clause
limited to vested rights that arise out of it, 450.
venue, change of venue, local prejudice, equal protection not denied,
832.
witnesses, . immunity of witnesses, under Interstate Commerce Act of
1893, application to state and Federal courts, 96.
INDEX 893
[RiraUBNGXS AKX TO PAGXS]
CRIMINAL LAW,
appeals, allowance of appeal to gOYemmenty equal protection not
denied, 837.
allowance of appeal to state from certain courts, equal protection
not denied, 831.
denial of right of review, alien juror, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 827.
dismissal of writ of error, power of highest court of state, 546.
record, refusal of supreme court to amend record, equal protec-
tion not denied, 824.
assault, classification of prisoners committing assaults^ equal protection
not denied, 837.
contempt, proceedings criminal in nature, 579.
punishment, trial bj jury not required bj Due Process Clause,
since power to punish is inherent, 580.
right to notice and hearing, indirect or civil contempt, obstruction
of justice, 585.
what constitutes, indirect or civil contempt, 582.
contracts, freedom of contract, crime for person to act as railway
conductor without certain qualifications, freedom not abridged,
508.
master and servant, imposition by employer of certain conditions
on employee as crime, freedom denied, 512.
corporations, procedure against corporations, difference in mode of
procedure, anti-trust law, equal protection not denied, 836.
purchase of certain materials by junk dealers as crime, freedom
not abridged, 507.
due process, extension to Philippine Islands, Fifth Amendment, 125.
fundamental requisites, generality and equality of laws, 297.
guaranty in American law, 256.
jurisdiction, divorce proceedings, not in rem or in personam, 323.
limitation upon power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce, relative rights of employer and employee, 150.
rights of aliens, resident and nonresident, 233.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, colored race, right to mixed juries,
597.
punishment of offenses, discrimination, 602.
evidence, admission of evidence illegally obtained, due process, 131.
indictment as evidence of probable cause. Federal constitution.
Fifth Amendment, 133.
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, application to courts of Cher-
okee Nation, constitution does not apply, 99.
construction of Fifth Amendment, indictment for infamous crime,
76.
persons subject to military law, 95.
questions of state procedure not embraced, 89.
right of judge to discharge jury during trial, right to express
opinion on facts, 85.
894 INDEX
[REFERKNCSS ABl TO PAOIS]
CRIMINAL LAW— continued.
Federal eonstitution — continued.
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, jury of twelve men, right of
trial bj, incorporation of Alaska with United States, 123.
limitation of Fifth Amendment to judicial as well as legislative
power of Federal government, 101.
Federal procedure, right to plead, guaranty by Fifth Amendment, due
process, 536.
summary of rights of persons and property, guaranties of Federal
constitution, 539.
former jeopardy plea, defenses, Federal constitution. Fifth Amend-
ment, 158.
Titth. Amendment, construction, offense of counterfeiting involved,
61.
grand jury, abolition, power of state, 544.
selection, discrimination, equal protection not denied, 835.
habeas corpus as proper remedy to test validity of detention under
state law, 564.
indictment, attorneys, disbarment, attorney cannot be denied due
process, 590.
conviction without indictment, prisoner compelled to testify
against himself. Fifth Amendment, 145.
Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, protection of national
citizenship against state action, 244.
indictment by grand jury in body not required, Fifth Amend-
ment, 164.
no arraignment or plea on second information, due process not
denied, 554.
procedure, powers of state, query as to existence of restraints
upon powers, 573.
sufficiency of indictment for murder, manner of death not alleged,
due process and equal protection not denied, 826.
instructions, substantial error in charge to jury, due process and equal
protection not denied, 824.
junk dealers, regulation, prohibition of purchase of certain articles,
equal protection not denied, 787.
jurisdiction to review judgment of highest court of state in criminal
case, first ten amendments as limitations upon Federal govern-
ment, 82.
jury, discharge, error of trial court, equal protection not denied, 834.
petit jury. Federal right to trial by, 535.
petit jury of eight, right of state to authorize, 548.
selection, local regulations, equal protection not denied, 833.
statute as to number of peremptory challenges, equal protection
not denied, 822.
struck jury law, validity, 830.
trial by struck jury, right of state to provide, due process, 547.
INDEX 895
[RiraUBNdS AKX TO PAGIS]
CRIMINAL LAW— continued.
life and liberty as protected by due process, procedure in criminal
cases in Federal courts, chapter XIV, 532.
procedure in criminal cases in state courts, chapter XV, 541.
limitation statutes, right to enact retroactive laws, vested rights, 522.
municipal corporations, ordinances, prohibiting visiting barricaded
gambling rooms, equal protection not denied, 776.
preliminary examination, right to, prosecution in Manila, 841.
presence of accused at trial, necessity, accusation of felony, privilege
not to be waived, 538.
rights of accused, trial and rendition of verdict, habeas corpus,
567, 569.
presumptions, equal protection, arbitrary classification, creation of
presumption of guilt, equal protection denied, 758.
gambling, presumption of guilt from possession of gambling par-
aphernalia, exception in favor of public officers, due proc-
ess not denied, 832.
procedure, change of procedure. Due Process Clause of Fifth Amend-
ment, re-enforced by Sixth and Seventh Amendments, 533.
exemption from self-incrimination in state courts, due process not
denied, 550.
indictment by grand jury, Federal right to indictment, informa-
tion, 534.
modification of procedure, power of state, 541.
struggle to leave power of states untrammeled, 543.
powers of state, query as to existence of restraints upon powers,
573.
punishment, additional punishment on third conviction, equal protec-
tion not denied, 831.
difference in term of sentence for imprisonment, equal protec-
tion not denied, 831.
extent, power of court, due process and equal protection not
denied, 841.
habitual criminals, equal protection not denied, 839.
imposition of more severe punishment for subsequent offenses,
equal protection not denied, 826.
Indeterminate Sentence Act, due process and equal protection not
denied, 834.
remedies in state courts, duty of accused to exhaust all remedies, 562.
searches and seizures, Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, kinship
with Fourth Amendment, 79.
sewers, compelling abutting owners to connect property with sewer,
discrimination between residents and nonresidents, validity of
statute, 718.
statutes operating on all alike, equal protection necessary, 823.
896 INDEX
[edveinoks au to pagis]
GRIMIKAL LAW-— eontinued.
statutes, validitjr, Federal constitatioii, Fourteenth Amendment, pur-
pose, Congress as protecting and enforcing bodj, 260.
trial, right of accused to be present in state court, 556.
verdict, refusal to set aside verdict, insanity of juror, 552.
witnesses, immunity of witnesses under Interstate Commerce Act of
1893, application to state and Federal courts, 96.
self-incrimination, construction in favor of refusal to testier, Fifth
Amendment, 84.
conviction without indictment, prisoner eompdled to testify
against himself, 145.
crime committed within military reservation, Fifth Amend-
ment, 159.
effect of statutory immunity upon constitutional protection,
Fifth Amendment, 144.
immunity based on Act of 1903, Anti-Trust Act, 166.
CROPS,
protection against weeds, discrimination against railways, penalties
imposed for allowing weeds, equal protection not denied, 674.
CUSTOMS AND USAGES,
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, carriers, statute requiring sep-
arate accommodations for white and colored persons in railway
coaches, 604.
vested rights, property not to be taken from one man and given to
another contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure, due
process, 472.
DAMAGES,
see Penaltixs and FoaFEiTCJBXs.
animals, damages by cattle, statute imposing liability, equal proteetioB
and due process not denied, 767.
improvements, consequential damages, claim of abutting owners to
compensation, protection by due process, 475.
municipal corporations, mobs and riots, statute imposing liability
for damages, equal protection not denied, 742.
railways, employees, injuries, statute as to comparative negligence,
equal protection not denied, 686*.
fences, liability of railroad for omission to fence railroad, double
damages, equal protection not denied, 655.
fire caused by locomotives, liability for damages, equal protection
not denied, 668.
killing of live stock, railroad subjected to double liability and
attorney's fee, due process denied, 470.
equal protection not denied, 811.
INDEX 897
[uriBENCIS A&S TO PAOXS]
DAMAGES— continued
railways — continued.
payment of claims, imposition of penalties for failure to pay,
equal protection not denied, 809.
vested rights, double liability for failure to pay damages within
certain time, due process denied, 477.
DAMS,
eminent domain, taking private property, what constitutes, flooding of
land not a taking, 386.
DEAD BODIES,
see Gbhetekibs.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT,
limitation statutes, right to enact retroactive laws, vested rights, 522.
DEFINITIONS,
citizenship, definition of. Federal constitution. Fourteenth Amendment,
228.
compensation defined, eminent domain, equivalent under Fifth Amend-
ment, 91.
contempt, direct contempt committed in presence of court, what con-
stitutes, 580.
indirect or civil contempt, what constitutes, 582.
deportation, right of sovereign to deport foreigners already domiciled.
Fifth Amendment, construction, 93.
"due process of law" clause defined, constitution. Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 41.
case involving distress warrant, due process of law, definition, 62.
common heritage of all states, 270.
difficulties in way of complete and authoritative definition of due
process, rule of inclusive and exclusive, 284.
District of Columbia, meaning of phrase, 104.
fundamental requisites, generality and equality of laws, 297.
hearing, 292.
jurisdiction, 307.
notable attempts to define due process, 274.
review of cases and criticism of decisions, 187.
Webster's famous definition, 58.
eminent domain, power, definition, power vested in all states. Federal
as well as single, 207.
state definitions of public use to be respected, due process, 385.
taking private property, what constitutes, no taking for public
use, 387.
"equal protection of the law'' clause defined, constitution, Fourteentl)
Amendment, 45.
Due Process — 57
898 INDEX
[BimiNCES ABM TO FAfilS]
DEFINITIONS— eontiiraed.
f elonj defined, indietment for inf amons crime. Fifth Amendmenty eon-
■truction, 78.
freedom of contract, definition, 496, 512.
"liberty" as defined in Federal law, 491.
definition in state law, 490.
national citizensliip, definition in Slanghter House Gases, 228.
question of birth, definition of citisenahip, 231.
police power, definitions hj American jurists and text writers, 397.
equal protection, regulations of public laundries and washhooses,
760.
session of court, what constitutes, 580.
Tested rights, growth in England of idea, 443.
what constitutes, 453.
DEPORTATION,
see Aluns.
DEPOSITIONS,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, construction, questions of
state procedure not embraced, 89.
DEPOSITS,
see Banks.
DETECnVES,
police power, ordinance subjecting priyate detectives to police 8npe^
Tision, due process not denied, 438.
equal protection not denied, 817.
DISCBIMINATION,
see EQUAL Protbotion ow tok Law Clause.
DISOBDEBLY CONDUCT,
amusements, regulation of admission to places of public amusement,
equal protection not denied, 779.
DISTRESS,
due process of law, definition, case involving distress warrant, 62.
DIVORCE,
due process, jurisdiction, divorce proceedings not in rem or in personam,
323.
DOMICILE,
aliens, construction of Fifth Amendment, right of sovereign to deport
foreigners alreadj domiciled, 92.
INDEX 899
[mEXNOXS ABS TO PAGIB]
DOMICILE — continued.
attachment, property of nonresident, bonds attaehed, due prQceaa and
equal protection not denied, 840.
statute not requiring bond for attachment, equal protection not
denied, 711.
corporations, taxation of nonresident stockholders, equal protection
not denied, 713.
tax on shares of foreign corporations owned bj residents, equal
protection not denied, 720.
foreign corporations, discrimination against nonresident creditors, equal
protection denied, 712.
motor yehides, state regulation, service of process on nonresidents,
validity of statute, 819.
nonresidents, due process, jurisdiction, nonresident corporations, 319.
nonresident persons, 318.
notice, curing lack of notice or service of process by appear-
ance, 316.
proceedings in rem, 321.
state taxation, due process, notice and hearing in tax proceedings,
370.
personal property, taxation of intangible personal property,
347.
povrer to tax, property within state jurisdiction, 341.
sewers, compelling abutting owners to connect property with sewer,
discrimination between residents and nonresidents, validity of
etatute, 718.
DOWEB,
vested rights, rights below standard of vested rights, 456.
what constitutes, 455.
DBAINAGE,
see Bkwxrs.
assessment of expenses, notice, due process and equal protection not
denied, 763.
validity of tax sales, notice to nonresidents, equal protection not
denied, 717.
due process, fundamental requisites, notice, 291.
vested rights, all laws impairing vested rights within scope of
due process, 459.
arbitrary assertion of power, burdens imposed without advan-
tages, confiscation and denial of due process, 488.
corporations, condemnation of outstanding shares of owner
of stock without denial of due process, 463.
taxation, township compelled to collect taxes for drain, due
process not denied, 470.
900 INDEX
[UEmiKOlS ABM TO PAOBB]
DRAINAGE— continued,
dae process — continued.
taxing districts, creation bj legislature bj arbitrary action,
denial of due process, 488.
easements, state lands on navigable rivers, servitude in favor of publie,
effect of Fourteenth Amendment, 766.
eminent domain. Fifth Amendment, land taken to improve naviga-
tion, liability for, 113.
state definitions of public use to be respected, due process, 385.
statute compelling railroad to provide means for passing water
under embankments, 180.
taking private property, what constitutes, 387.
flooding of land not a taking, 386.
police power, extent, promotion of public convenience, 419.
railways, imposition of expense of drainage on railways, equal protec-
tion not denied, 676.
statute requiring railroads to provide drainage contrary to eom-
mon law rule, equal protection not denied, 693.
DBUG8 AND DRUGGISTS,
act as to Food and Drugs, misbranding. Fifth Amendment, Due Process
Clause, 181.
itinerant vendors, prohibition of sale of drugs by, due process and equal
protection not denied, 793.
local option law, prohibition of sale of intoxicating liquors, equal pro-
tection not denied, 801.
master and servant, Eight-Hour Law, women employed, validity of stat-
utes, 798.
freedom of contract not infringed by statutes regulating employ-
ment of women, 516.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
adverse possession, statute declaring ten years' possession to give
title, due process not denied, 481.
aliens, application of Due Process Clause*, deportation after entry,
Japanese Immigrant Case, 114.
rights of aliens, resident and nonresident, 233.
animals, damages by cattle, . statute imposing liability, equal protec-
tion not denied, 767.
assets of safe deposit companies, prohibition of removal, due process
not denied, 480.
attachment, property of nonresident, bonds attached, due process and
equal protection not denied, 840.
attorneys, disbarment, attorney cannot be denied due process, 590.
banks, police power, guaranty fund, constitutional exercise of police
power as to depositors' fund, 433.
creation of fund as valid exercise of poUee power^ 425.
INDEX 901
[betsbsnces ark to paoxs]
DUE PROCESS OF LAW— continued.
cigarettes, license for sale, ordinances, due process and equal protec-
tion not denied, 769.
common heritage of all states, 270.
consequential damages, claim of abutting owners to eompensationi
protection by due process, 475.
contempt, punishment, trial hy jury not required by Due Process
Clause since power to punish is inherent, 580.
right to notice and hearing, indirect or civil contempt, 585.
contracts, freedom of contract, definition, 496.
guaranty of Fifth Amendment, no denial of freedom by Carmack
Ajnendment of 1906 to Interstate Commerce Act, 500.
impairment of contracts, allowance of passage of retrospective
state legislation, necessity of Fourteenth Amendment, 452.
impairment of obligation by state law prohibited, 449.
contract clause limited to vested rights that arise out of it,
450.
master and servant, imposition by employer of certain conditions
on employee as crime, freedom denied, 512.
state law preventing miners from contracting for wages on
certain basis, freedom not infringed, 497.
punishment of selling of goods at lower rate in one place than in
another, freedom not abridged, 506.
purchase of certain materials by junk dealers as crime, freedom
not abridged, 507.
right of state to regulate combinations and monopolies, 494.
state regulations of boards of trade, freedom not interfered with,
503.
statute defining liability of railways for injuries, freedom not
infringed, 502.
subjection to sovereign powers of state, 493.
corporations, alteration of charters without taking property of cor-
poration, due process not denied, 482.
condemnation of outstanding shares of owner of stock without
denial of due process, 463.
process, statute appointing state auditor to accept service of
process, equal protection not denied, 702.
reorganization of co-operative association without consent of
members, power of state, 464.
state control of corporations, 696.
taxation, unequal assessment of franchises and other property,
denial of due process and equal protection, 702.
criminal law, accusation of felony, necessity of presence of accused,
privilege not to be waived, 538.
appeal, denial of right of review, alien juror, due process and
equal protection not denied, 827.
902 INDEX
[BIVSBIN018 AU TO FAOIS]
DUE PB0CE88 OF LAW— eontinaecL
erimiiud law— eontinaed.
exemption from aelf •incrimination in state eonrts, due process
not denied, 550.
indictment, sufficienej of indictment for murder, manner of deatii
not alleged, due process and equal protection not denied,
826.
modification of procedure, power of state, 541.
BO arraignment or plea on second information, due process not
denied, 554.
preliminarj examination, right to, prosecution i]> Manila, 841.
procedure, powers of state, query as to existence of restraints upon
powers, 573.
punishment, extent, power of court, due process and equal protec-
tion not denied, 841.
indeterminate sentence act, due process and* equal protection
not denied, 834.
statutes operating on all alike, equal protection necessary, 823.
trial, right of accused to be present in state court, 556.
presence at trial and rendition of yerdict, habeas corpus, 567,
560.
▼erdict, refusal to set aside irerdict, insanity of juror, 552.
definition, case involying distress warrant, 62.
difiiculties in way of complete and authoritative definition, rule
of indusiTe and exelusiye, 284.
meaning ot phrase, District of Columbia, 104.
notable attempts to define due process, 274.
Webster's famous definition, 58.
review of cases and criticism of decisions, 187.
deposits in savings banks, unclaimed for thirty years, state control,
bank not deprived of due process, 469.
double liability for failure to pay damages within ceiitain time, due
process denied, 477.
drainage, assessment of expenses after notice, due process and equal
protection not denied, 763.
township compelled to collect taxes for drain, due process not
denied, 470.
easements, state lands on navigable rivers, servitude in favor of public,
effect of Fourteenth Amendment, 766.
eminent domain, compensation for taking property, necessity, 217.
duty of state to guarantee protection to life, liberty and property,
379.
Federal power of eminent domain and due process, 207.
Federal power of eminent domain, review, 377.
matter to be excluded, in determining compensation proceeding to
recover for decline in market value, 393.
power of eminent domain, limitation by Due Process Clause, 209.
INDEX 903
[edvexnois abs to paois]
DUB PBOCESS OF LAW— <5ontiimed.
eminent domain— continued
public use, ascertainment by ultimate and not by proximate effect,
389.
state power of eminent domain, due process, Federal superyision,
377.
inherent power of states, 378.
necessity of clear statement of case in trial court, Federal
superrision, 385.
state definitions of public use to be respected, due process, 385.
substance and not form to be considered. Federal supervision,
380.
taking private property, due process, mistake of law, 391.
extension of spur track for benefit of single industry, taking
not unlawful, 392.
locating harbor lines. Fifth Amendment, construction, 86.
what constitutes, flooding of land not a taking, 386.
English constitutional system, Blaekstone as true guide instead of Coke,
11.
exposition. Coke as misleading expounder of the Great Charter, 8.
Federal constitution, amendments, text of Fifth Amendment, 55.
due process of law as embodied in Fifth Amendment, 21.
right to due process in unincorporated territory, 237.
Federal power of eminent domain, and due process, chapter IV, 207.
Federal procedure, right to plead, guaranty by Fifth Amendment, due
process, 536.
Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, Act as to Food and Drugs,
misbranding, 181.
Act of 1903 excluding diseased aliens, 156.
admission of evidence illegally obtained, 131.
alien practicing prostitution after entry, 167.
appeal to Commissioner of Internal Revenue after payment of
taxes, 182.
assessments for benefits in City of Washington, 161.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 not invalid, denial of due process, 107.
Chinese exclusion cases, conclusiveness of decision of executive
officer, 142.
construction, confiscation of property, 73.
legal tender cases, 71.
right of sovereign to deport foreigners already domiciled, 92.
Corporation Tax Act, limiting deductions held not invalid, 180.
Eight-Hour-Law Case, validity of statute, 182.
estoppel to contest constitutionality, availability of defense against
promoters of public improvements, 138.
excise tax based on gross tonnage upon use of foreign built pleas-
ure yachts, 171.
extension of due process to Philippine Islands, 125.
901 INDEX
[bivsbincxs ark to pagis]
DUE PB0CES8 OF LAW— eontmued.
Fifth Amendment— eontinued.
former jeopardj, effect of Due Process GkLase, 109.
Hepburn Act of 1906, commodities clause^ 155.
interstate commerce. Act of 1887 as amended by Act of 1910 held
valid, 174.
Oarmack Amendment of 1906 does not deny due process, 160.
order to extend facilities to connecting carriers, 179.
order to receive and transport freight, 175.
judgment by default, summons left at residence of defendant, 173.
limitation on Federal power to tax dispensing agents of state, 143.
limitation on power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
relative rights of employer and employee, 150.
limitation on power of Secretary of War, alterations in bridges
over waterways, 147.
limitation on power to exclude alien anarchists, 136.
limitation on power to regulate mails, 134.
limitation to judicial as weU as legislative power of Federal gov-
ernment, 101.
not limitation on taxing power, income tax, 181.
oleomargarine tax, constitutionality, 140.
prohibition in Hepburn Act of transportation from market to mine,
170.
property of Indians not taken, removal of restrictions as to allot-
ments, 181.
property taken by militaxy governor of Porto Bieo without notice
or hearing, 168.
regulation of foreign conmieree, limitation of power by Due Process
Clause, 128.
relation to res judicata, 139.
review of eases and criticism of decisions, 186.
rights of importers under Philippine Act of 1906, 149.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Due Process Clause, identical con-
struction, 243.
foreign corporations, jurisdiction, foreign corporation not doing bus-
ness in state is not within jurisdiction of state, equal protection,
709.
money judgment rendered upon service on resident director, denial
of due process, 485.
names, exclusion of foreign company having same name as
domestic company, equal protection not denied, 716.
Fourteenth Amendment, corporation as person within the meaning
of Section 1, 240.
judicial rule of inclusion and exclusion as to deprivation of due
process and denial of equal protection, 49.
meaning of "due process of law" clause, 41.
protection against unlawful or unequal exercise of state power, 24L
INDEX 905
[references ABE TO PAGES]
DUE PROCESS OF LAW— continued.
Fourteenth Amendments-continued.
protection of national citizenship against state action, 244.
purpose, Congress as protecting and enforcing body, 266.
Supreme Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, 257.
fundamental requisites of due process, generality and equality of laws,
297.
hearing, 292.
kind of hearing necessary, 295.
notice, 286.
gambling, presumption of guilt from possession of gambling para-
phernalia, exception in favor of public oficers, due process not
denied, 832.
game, prohibition of killing of birds or animals by unnaturalized for-
eign-bom residents, due process not denied, 479«
grand jury, abolition, power of state, 544.
guaranty of due process, chapter VI, 249.
American law, 251.
English law, 249.
scope of guaranty, 249.
ice cream, statute regulating percentage of butter fat, due process
and equal protection not denied, 818.
Indians, Creek freedmen entitled to due process, 472.
instructions, substantial error in charge to jury, due process and equal
protection not denied, 824.
insurance, requirements as to investments in state by foreign com-
panies, due process not denied, 484.
itinerant vendors, prohibition of sale by, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 793.
jurisdiction, chapter VII, 312.
divorce proceedings not in rem or in personam, 323.
fundamental requisite of due process, 307.
judgments, collateral attack on judgment, 332.
necessity of competent tribunal and notice, 312.
nonresident corporations, 319.
nonresident persons, 318.
notice, curing lack of notice or service of process by appearance,
316.
proceedings in rem, 321.
review of judgment of highest court of state in criminal case, first
ten amendments as limitations upon Federal government, 82.
jury, criminal trial, petit jury of eight, right of state to authorize, 548.
trial by struck jury, right of state to provide, due process, 547.
"liberty" as defined in Federal law, 491.
defined in state law, 490.
life and liberty as protected by due process, procedure in criminal eases
in Federal courts, chapter XIV, $32.
criminal cases in state courts, chapter XV, 541.
906 INDEX
[RBTEBINCXS ARS to FAGI8]
DUE PB00E88 OF LAW— ^ontmned.
limitation statatM, advene poeaeseion, due proeeee cot denied bj limita-
tion aet| 525.
exemption from suit as vested right, ending of statutory period
of limitations, 523.
nature, due process not denied hj passage, contracts not impaired,
519.
right to enact retroactive laws, vested rights, 521.
ICagna Carta, chapter 39 and amendments, 443.
chapter 39 as reproduced in first state constitutions, 14.
chapter 39 in American law, wider soepe of chapter, 15.
constmctioB, error of Coke's construction, change of principles
in bills of rights, 12.
guaranties given to nation, chapter 39 of charter, 4.
master and^ servant, regulations, requiring waahhouses for coal miners,
due process and equal protection not denied, 751.
mineral waters, prohibition of waste, due process and equal protection
not denied, 739.
mnnicipal corporations, annexation of land, discrimination between
agricultural and other lands, due procees and equal protection
not denied, 725.
liability for damages caused by mobs, due process not denied, 469.
licenses, occupations, classification, due process and equal protec-
tion not denied, 745.
ordinances, milk, tuberculin test, due process not denied, 431.
prohibiting advertising trucks or vans, due process not denied,
426.
prohibiting billiard or pool rooms, due process not denied, 427.
prohibiting brick yards in certain portions of city, due process
not denied, 437.
regulating size of loaves of bread, due process not denied, 429.
regulation of livery stables, due process and equal protection
not denied, 794.
regulation of private detectives, police supervision, due process
and equal protection not denied, 817.
due process not denied, 438.
requiring water-closets under certain conditions, due process
not denied, 430.
property of private water company, taking by municipal corpora-
tion, due process not denied, 473.
national citizenship, creation by Fourteenth Amendment to Federal
constitution, 29.
protection of Fourteenth Amendment to Federal constitution, 35.
oleomargarine, statute restricting sale and manufacture, validity, 770.
origin and growth of due process, 1.
penalties, due procees denied by imposition of excessive penalties, 474.
INDEX 907
[BXnEENOIS ARS TO PAOIS]
DUE PBOCfESS OF LAW— contmued«
police power and due process^ chapter X, 395.
carriers, reasonableness of rates, delegation- of legislative power,
411.
elements inTolyed in determining reasonableness of rates, 413.
extent, promotion of public eonyenience, 419.
fixing of certain absolute liabilities, due process not denied, 440.
license tax on profit sharing coupons and trading stamps, due
process not denied, 440.
limitation on hours of labor of women, due process not infringed,
421.
limitations, reasonableness as limitation, 401.
Tested rights as limitation, 403.
mines, " run-of -mine " or "anti-screen" law, statute as to com-
pensation of miners, due process not denied, 436.
prevention of diversion of waters, due process not denied, 421.
prohibition of burial within city limits, due process not denied,
423.
prohibition of exportation of Philippine coin, 422.
prohibition of sale of ice cream, lack of certain percentage of
butter fat, due process not denied, 431.
prohibition of sale of malt liquor, due process not denied, 428.
right of forfeiture, 404.
sales in bulk, due process not denied, 424.
smoke, legislation declaring emission of dense smoke a nuisance,
due process not denied, 438.
statute inflicting penalties on employer where certain conditions
are imposed on emplojee, denial of due process, 435.
statute regulating barrier pillars between adjoining coal proper-
ties, due process not denied, 432.
statute requiring hotel keepers to give notice to guests in case of
fire, due process not denied, 437.
procedure, change of procedure, change either under Federal or state
law must not deny fundamental rights, 532.
Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment re-enforced bj Sixth and
Seventh Amendments, 533.
right of state to regulate its procedure, 458.
• process, necessity to validity of judgment, 314.
property classifications, power of state, discrimination, 464.
property of absentees, right of state to take away, not denial of due
process, 471.
property rights as protected by due process, limitations and remedies,
chapter XUI, 519.
vested rights and their impairment, chapter XI, 443.
protection of life and liberty by due process, contempt proceedings,
disbarment of attorneys, chapter XVI, 578.
908 INDEX
[BmUCNClS A&S TO PAQXS]
DUE PBOCE88 OF LAW— eontmued.
proteetion of property rights, freedom of contract, chapter XII, 490.
pnblie improvements, discrimination against foreign labor, due process
and equal protection not denied, 755.
railways, construction, remedy for property injured by construction,
due process and equal protection not denied, 661.
double liability and attorney 's fee, killing of live stock, due proeess
denied, 470.
Federal Employers' Liability Act, due process and equal proteetion
not denied, 685.
fellow servant act, statute creating presumption of negligence,
equal protection and due process not denied, 680.
order requiring safety appliance at grade crossings, validity, due
process and equal protection not denied, 673.
payment of claims, imposition of penalties for failure to pay, equal
protection not denied, 809.
exaction without denial of due process, 477.
property burdened by construction of bridge over highway, due
process not denied, 466.
rates, judicial review of regulations, statute failing to provide
for, due process and equal protection not denied, 688.
maximum intrastate rates, confiscation and denial of due
process, 484.
reasonableness, denial of due process and equal protection, 656.
recent cases, 416.
statute establishing rates, invalidity, denial of due process
and equal protection, 665.
sleeping cars, prohibition of letting down of unoccupied upper
berth, due process denied, 483.
spur track for public use, initial cost may be imposed upon single
industry, due process not denied, 476.
statute requiring full switching crews, due process not denied, 439.
taxation, foreign companies, due process and equal proteetion not
denied, 691.
vested rights, ordinance prohibiting engines on certain streets,
due process and equal protection not denied, 651.
remedies, change of remedies, power of legislature, 526.
schools, requirements of members of Greek letter fraternity, due process
not denied, 486.
sewers, ordinance requiring abutting owners to coimect property with
sewer, due proeess and equal protection not denied, 465, 788.
state statutes and constitutions, construction by state courts to be con-
sidered, 382.
street extension proceedings, amounts awarded as damages, property
not taken without compensation, 467.
INDEX 909
[BXnBINOXS A&S TO PAOXS]
DUE PROCESS OF LAW— continued.
tax titles, etatute as to notice to original owners to cut off redemption,
due process and equal protection not denied, 821.
taxation, collection of taxes, sununary proceedings, 361.
consolidated railway company, annual franchise tax on, statute not
invalid, 648.
income tax on mining companies, equal protection and due process
not denied, 625.
penalties, discrimination between county and city in disposition of
penalties, due process and equal protection not denied,
752.
penalty for nonpayment of taxes, equal protection and due process,
617.
railroads, imposition of entire cost of abolishing grade crossings,
vaUdity, 660.
state power of taxation and due process, chapter VIII, 336.
exemptions, strict construction of exemptions, 349.
Federal supervision, right to review, necessity that taxation be
spoliation, 384.
notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 364.
power to tax, legislature may act directly or may delegate
functions, 356.
residuum of taxing power, 376.
property within state jurisdiction, 341.
purpose, taxation must be for public purpose, 352.
statute imposing annual franchise tax on consolidated railway
corporation, due process not denied, 343.
taking property for public use, compensation required by Due
Process Clause, 358.
tax on gross earnings of railroads, not confiscation, 480.
trial by jury, national citizenship, protection of Fourteenth Amendment
to Federal constitution, 35.
usage, property not to be taken from one man and given to another
contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure, due process,
472.
vested rights, all laws impairing vested rights within scope of due
process, 459.
arbitrary assertion of power, burdens imposed without advantages,
confiscation and denial of due process, 488.
confiscation of ofiSce without compensation, power of Congress, 466.
development of idea, advancement by constitutional limitations on
legislative power, 445.
effect of Fourteenth Amendment, prohibition of arbitrary interfer-
enee with rights, 452.
Fifth Amendment developing idea of vested rights, 451.
910 INDEX
[mEXNOlS AXE TO PAOBS]
DUB PB0CE8S OP LAW— continued,
vested rights— eontiinied.
formula in Beelaratloii of Independence, life, libertj and pnrniit
of hnppineesy 448.
growth in England of idea, 443.
impairment, redress nnder Dne Process Clause, application of role
of inclusion and exclusion, 461.
legitimate modification of rights of abutting owner, dne process,
402.
poUey of legislation, no vested rights in general rules of law or
policj, 458.
protection bj Doe Process Clause, repeal of remedj, 390.
right of state to enact curative legislation, 457.
rights below standard of vested rights, 456.
taxation without jurisdiction, denial of due process, 487.
taxing districts, creation bj legislature bj arbitrary action, denial
of due process, 488.
what constitutes, 453.
water, restraint on land owner drawing unnatural quantities of mineral
water from common source of supplj, due process not denied, 467.
statute prohibiting diversion of water beyond state by riparian
owner, dne process and equal protection not denied, 784.
E
EASEMENTS,
eminent domain, riparian owner deprived of access to navigable
stream, Fifth Amendment, construction, 103.
taking private property, kind of property which may be taken, 218.
state lands on navigable rivers, servitude in favor of public, effect of
Fourteenth Amendment) 766.
vested rights, legitimate modification of rights of abutting owner, due
process, 462.
ELECTIONS,
registration law, discrimination between citisens, equal protection not
denied, 726.
ELEVATED RAILWAYS,
adTcrtisement, prohibition of advertising, equal protection not denied,
740.
eminent domain, compensation, matters to be excluded in determining
compensation, proceeding to recover for decline in market value,
393.
vested rights, legitimate modification of rights of abutting owner, due
process, 462.
INDEX 911
[BmSBXNOES ASS TO PAGSS]
ELBVATOKS,
see Wasshousbs.
eminent domain, right of eminent domain, Fifth Amendment, con-
struction, 74.
regulation of charges, validity of statute, 812.
statute requiring barriers of shafts, equal protection not denied, 790.
EMIGBANTS,
see Aliens.
EMINENT DOMAIN,
compensation for taldng property, matters to be excluded, proceeding
to recover for decline in market value, 393.
necessity, 217.
question a judicial one, necessity of competent tribunal, 219.
rule for ascertaining value, 391.
contracts, freedom of contract subject to sovereign powers of state, 493.
due process, definition, difficulties in way of complete and authoritative
definition, rule of inclusive and exclusive, 284.
Fifth Amendment, Federal constitution, 21.
fundamental requisites, hearing, kind of hearing necessary, 295.
state statutes and constitutions, construction by state courts to
be considered, 382.
due process in District of Columbia, meaning of phrase, 104.
equivalent of eminent domain, Fifth Amendment, construction, 90.
Federal power of eminent domain and due process, chapter IV, 207.
review, 377.
Fifth Amendment, early cases construing, 56.
land taken to improve navigation, liability for, 113.
text of Fifth Amendment, 55.
Fourteenth Amendment, right to review state action, 380.
laches, right of Ck)ngress to legislate against, 221.
power as vested in Federal government paramount, 208.
power of eminent domain, definition, power vested in all states. Federal
as well as single, 207.
District of Ck)lumbia, 87.
limitation by Due Process Clause, 209.
taking must be for public use, '211.
procedure, decision of state court as to different procedure, payment
of compensation, equal protection not denied, 828.
property, vested rights, protection by Due Process Clause, repeal of
remedy, 390,
public use, ascertainment by ultimate and not by proximate effect, 389.
right of legislature to determine what is public use, 212.
state definitions of public use to be respected, due process, 385.
railways, construction of railroad across street, damages, equal protec-
tion not denied, 665.
remedy for property injured by construction, due process and equal
protection not denied, 661.
912 INDEX
[HSraUENCZS ARX TO PAGBS]
EMINENT DOMAIN— continued.
state power of eminent domain, due process, Federal supervision, 377.
neceasitj of clear statement of case in trial court, 385.
substance and not form to be considered, 380.
due process, dutj of state to guarantee protection to life, liberty
and properly, 379.
inherent power of states, 378.
state taxation, compensation required by Due Process Clause, taking
property for public use, 358.
purpose, taxation must be fur public purpose, 352.
taking of private property.
confiscation of property, Fifth Amendment, construction, 73.
construction of revetments, injury to riparian rights, 127.
Due Process Clause, limitation on power of Secretary of War,
alterations in bridges over waterways, 147.
mistake of law, 391.
property of Indians not taken, removal of restrictions as to
allotments, 181.
review of cases and criticism of decisions, 187.
Eight-Hour-Law Case, validity of statute. Fifth Amendment, 182.
estoppel to contest constitutionality, availability of defense against
promoters of public improvements, 138.
extension of spur track for benefit of single industry, taking not
unlawful, 392.
Fifth Amendment, construction, right of eminent domidn, 74.
kind of property which may be taken, 218.
legal tender cases. Fifth Amendment, construction, 71.
locating harbor lines. Fifth Amendment construction, 86.
navigable waters, taking private property, power of Congress, 177.
necessity justifying taking, 215.
police power, carriers, reasonableness of rates, due process, recent
cases, 416.
limitations, enjoyment of property limited, 405.
railways, statute establishing rates, invalidity, denial of due process
and equal protection, 665.
riparian owner deprived of access to navigable stream. Fifth
Amendment, construction, 103.
statute compelling railroad to provide means for passing water
under embankments, 180.
street extension proceedings, amounts awarded as damages, prop-
erty not taken without compensation, 467.
vested rights. Fifth Amendment developing idea of vested rights,
451.
what constitutes taking, 213.
flooding of land not a taking, 386.
no taking for public use, 387.
INDEX 913
[BXFSRENCES ABE TO PAOBS]
EMINENT DOMAIN— continued.
Tested rights, all laws impairing vested righte within scope of due
process, 459.
growth in England of idea, 443.
EQTTAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW,
see Due Pbooess of Law, Magna Cabta.
see also specific topics, such as Advebtisembnts, Animals, Cabbiebs,
GOBPOBATiONs, Cbiminal Law, Dbainaoe, Fqbeign Cobpoba-
TIONS, JUBY, MASTEB AND SeBVANT, RAILWAYS, TAXATION, etc.
clause purely American invention, 595.
control of foreign and domestic corporations, chapter XX, 606.
due process, fundamental requisites, generality and equality of laws, 306.
first interpretation of clause, chapter XYII, 595.
Fourteenth Amendment, judicial rule of inclusion and exclusion as to
deprivation of due process and denial of equal protection, 49.
meaning of "equal protection of the law" clause, 45.
EQUALITY,
reign of law, Angevin period, reign of Henry II, 1.
EQUITY,
jury. Federal right to trial by petit jury, 535.
ESTATES OF DECEDENTS,
inheritance taxes, see Taxation.
limitation statutes, right to enact retroactive laws, vested rights, 522.
vested rights, property of absentees, right of state to take away, not
denial of due process, 471.
rights below standard or vested rights, 456.
ESTOPPEL, \
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, estoppel to
contest constitutionality, availability of defense against promot-
ers of public improvements, 138.
EVIDENCE,
see Witnesses.
books and papers, production, see Pboduction or Books and Papbbs.
corporations, classification between corporations and individuals, com-
pulsory production of testimony, equal protection not denied, 732.
due process, admission of evidence illegally obtained, 131.
presumptions, arbitrary classification, creation of presumption of guilt,
equal protection denied, 758.
gambling, presumption of guilt from possession of gambling para-
phernalia, exception in favor of public officers, due process
not denied, 832.
railways, fellow servant act, statute creating presumption of negli-
gence, equal protection and due process not denied, 680.
Due Process — 58
914 INDEX
[BBTBINGn AU TO PAOIS]
EXEHPTIONB,
limitatioii statutes, ezemptioii from rait as vested right, ending of
statotorj period of limitations, 523.
loeal option law, prohibition of sale of intoxicating liquors, equal pro-
tection not denied, 801.
mnnieipal corporations, ordinances, regulation of sale of intoxicating
liquors, lleenses, equal protection not denied, 799.
phjticians, registration, exemption of practicing phjsicianft, equal pro-
tection not denied, 735.
taxation, corporations, taxation of nonresident stockholders, equal pro-
tection not denied, 713.
deposits in national banlcs, tax on, equal protection not denied, 642.
foreign corporation, tax on capital of, equal protection not denied,
7oa.
inheritance tax on bequests of personalty, validity, equal protection
not denied, 032.
legacy and inheritance taxes, equal protection, 615.
state taxation, exemptions, strict construction of exemptions, 349.
power to tax, residuum of taxing power, 371.
tax on corporate securities. Equal Protection of the Law Clause,
018.
vested rights, what constitutes, 455.
telephone companies, classification for taxation, exemption of certain
property, equal protection not denied, 747.
usury, exemption of banks, trust companies and bona fide mortgages,
equal protection not denied, 730.
vested rights, policy of legislation, no vested rights in general rules of
law or policy, 458.
witnesses, self-incrimination, exemption not fundamental right of
national citiienship, 153.
EXPLOSIVES,
regulation of sale, equal protection not denied, 780.
EXPRESS OOBCPANIES,
taxation, state taxation of express companies' property, equal protec-
tion, 013, 014.
P
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT,
due process and equal protection not denied, 085.
freedom of contract not interfered with, 504.
FENCES,
see Railways.
FERRIES,
police power, property or business of public interest, 407.
INDEX 915
[BinEKXNOlS ABX TO PACOBB]
FEBTIIIZEB,
manufaetnre, police power, limitatioiis, enjoyment of property limited,
405. ^
FIFTH AMENDMENT,
Bee Dux Pkocxss of -Law.
Act as to Food and Drugs, misbranding, Due Process Clause, 181.
admission of evidence illegally obtained, due process, 131.
aliens. Act of 1903 excluding diseased aliens. Due Process Clause, 156.
alien practicing prostitution after entry, 167.
assessments for benefits in City of Washington, Due Process Clause, 161.
due process limitation on power to exclude alien anarchists, 136.
attorneys, disbarment, attorney cannot be denied due process, 590.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 not invalid, denial of due process, 107.
Bridges, Due Process Clause, limitation on power of Secretary of War,
alterations in bridges over waterways, 147.
Chinese exclusion, Fifth Amendment, denial of due process of law to
aliens, 97.
conclusiveness of decision of executive oficer, due process, 142.
constitution of parent state, right of colonists to participate in, 116.
construction of Fifth Amendment, 55, chapter II, 71, chapter III, 101.
aliens, right of sovereign to deport foreigners already domiciled, 92.
case involving military trial and service, triumph of legality, 65.
early eases construing, 56.
eminent domain, equivalent under Fifth Amendment, 90.
right of eminent domain, 74.
right of eminent domain in District of Columbia, 87.
identical construction. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 243.
jury, right of judge to discharge jury during trial, right to express
opinion on facts, 85.
kinship with Fourth Amendment, 79.
legal tender cases, 71.
questions of state procedure not embraced, 89.
waters, riparian owner deprived of access to navigable stream,
103.
witnesses, construction in favor of refusal to testify, 84.
contracts, freedom of contract, Federal Employers' Liability Act of
1908, freedom not interfered with, 504.
guaranty of Fifth Amendment, no denial by Oarmack Amendment
of 1906 to Interstate Commerce Act, 500.
impairment, allowance of passage of retrospective state legislation,
necessity of Fourteenth Amendment, 452.
conviction without indictment, prisoner compelled to testify against
himself, 145.
Corporation Tax Act, limiting deductions held not invalid. Due Procew
Clause, 180.
916 INDEX
[BinEKXNCIS ABX TO PAOBS]
FIFTH AMENDMENT— «ontinaed.
criminal law, proeednrei powerB of ttate^ query as to ezistenee ot re-
straints upon powers, 573. ^
indictment as evidence of probable cause, 133.
indictment by grand jury in body not required, 164.
indictment for infamous crime, 76.
trial, right of accused to be present in state court, 556.
due process of law, definition, case involring distress warrant, 62.
notable attempts to define due process, 274.
due process in District of Columbia, meaning of phrase, 104.
relation to res judicata, 139.
review of cases and criticism of decisions, 186.
Eight-HourLaw Oase, validity of statute, 182.
eminent domain, power of, limitation by Due Process Clause, 209.
taking of property, construction of revetments, injury to ripariao
rights, 127.
statute compelling railroad to provide means for passing water
under embankments, 180.
estoppel to contest constitutionality, availability of defense against
promoters of public improvement^ due process, 138.
excise tax based on gross tonnage upon use of foreign buHt pleaanre
yachts, due process, 171.
Federal constitution, first eight amendments, limitations on Federal
powers, 60.
Federal power of eminent domain, review, 377.
Federal procedure, right to plead, guaranty by Fifth Amendment, due
process, 536.
foreign commerce, regulation of, limitation of power by Due Process
Clause, 128.
former jeopardy, effect of Due Process Clause, 109.
Fifth Amendment, former jeopardy plea, 158.
Indians, application of Fifth Amendment to courts of Cherokee Nation,
constitution does not apply, 99.
power of Congress not limited. 111.
property of Indians not taken by, removal of restrictions as to
allotments, due process, 181.
interstate commerce, Act of 1887 as amended by Act of 1910 held
vaUd, 174.
Carmack Amendment of 1906 does not deny due process, 160.
Hepburn Act of 1906, commodities clause, due process, 155.
immunity of witnesses, under Interstate Commerce Act of 1893,
application to state and Federal courts, 96.
limitation upon power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce, relative rights of employer and employee, Doe
Process Clause, 150.
order to extend facilities to connecting carriers, 179.
INDEX 917
[retzrences abb to pages]
FIFTH AMENDMENT-Hsontinued.
interstate commerce — continued.
order to receive and transport freight, 175.
prohibition in Hepburn Act of transportation from market to mine,
due process; 170.
judgment hy default, summons left at residence of defendant, due
process, 173.
jury of twelve men, right of trial by, incorporation of Alaska with
United States, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 123.
"liberty" as defined in Federal law, 491.
limitation to judicial as well as legislative power of Federal govern-
ment, 101.
mails, due process as limitation on power to regulate, 134.
navigable waters, taking private property, power of Congress, 177.
oleomargarine tax, constitutionality of, Due Process Clause, 140.
Philippine Act of 1906, rights of importers under Due Process Clause,
149.
extension of due process to Philippine Islands, 125.
procedure, change of procedure, change under either Federal or state
law must not deny fundamental rights, 532.
Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment re-enforced by Sixth
and Seventh Amendments, 533.
indictment by grand jury, Federal right to indictment, information,
534.
property taken by military governor of Porto Bico without notice or
hearing, due process, 168.
railways. Federal Employers' Liability Act, due process and equal
protection not denied, 685.
taxation, appeal to Commissioner of Internal Revenue after payment
of taxes, Due Process Clause, 182.
Due Process Clause, limitation on Federal power to tax dispensing
agents of state, 143.
not limitation on taxing power, income tax, 181.
income tax on mining companies, equal protection and due process
not denied, 625.
text and construction, chapter I, 55.
vested rights, confiscation of office without compensation, power of
Congress, 466.
Fifth Amendment developing idea of vested rights, 451.
impairment, redress under Due Process Clause, application of rule
of inclusion and exclusion, 461.
railroad property burdened by construction of bridge over highway,
due process not denied, 466.
witnesses, self-incrimination, crime committed within military reserva-
tion, 159.
effect of statutory immunity upon constitutional protection, 144.
exemption not fundamental right of national citizenship, 153.
918 INDEX
[BSmiKCXB AKX TO PAOSS]
FIFTH AlCENDMENT— eontinued.
witnoasoB continaed.
immunity baaed on Aet of 1903, Anti-Trutt Aet» 168.
privilege invoked bj oiBeer of eorporation, 162.
•tftte need not aeeord proteetioni 165.
FIBE,
innkeepen, regulation of dntj in ease of tie, eqoal protection not
denied, 756.
•tatate requiring hotel keepers to give notice to gnests in ease of
fire, due process not denied, 437.
municipal corporations, ordinances as to public laundries, validitj, 762.
police power, equal protection, regulations of public laundries and i?ash-
houses, 760.
fixing of certain absolute liabilities, due process not denied, 440.
railwajs, fire caused bj locomotiyes, liability for damages, equal protec-
tion not denied, 668.
Tested rights, double liability for failure to pay damages within
certain time, due process denied, 477.
FIB8T AMENDMENT,
Federal procedure, summary of rights of persons and property, guar-
anties of Federal constitution, 530.
FLAGS,
national flag, state protection, equal protection not denied, 780.
FOOD,
bread, ordinance regulating sise of loaves of bread, due process not
denied, 429.
freedom of contract not interfered with, 505.
ice cream, statute regulating percentage of butter fat, due proeess and
equal protection not denied, 431, 818.
lard, regulation of net weight of packages, equal protection not denied,
758. .
malt liquor, prohibition of sale of, due process not denied, 428.
meat-packing houses, tax on, equal protection not denied, 632.
milk business, municipal regulation, equal protection not denied, 777.
ordinance requiring tuberculin test for dairy cattle, equal protection
not denied, 789.
due process not denied, 431.
sale of adulterated milk, discrimination against nonprodudng ven-
dors, equal protection not denied, 729.
oleomargarine, regulation of sale, equal protection not denied, 644, 765.
statute restricting sale and manufacture, validity, 770.
preservatives containing boric acid, prohibition of sale of, equal pro-
tection not denied, 747.
INDEX 919
[bxtibenoxs akx to paois]
FOBEIGN OOBPOBATIONS,
admiflflioiiy state restrictioiiB, eqaal protectioii| 708.
clasaification between eorporationa and individuals, eompulsoTx produc
tion of testimonyi equal protection not denied, 732.
creditors, discrimination against nonresident creditors, equal protection
denied, 712.
equal protection, control of foreign and domestle corporations, chapter
XX, 696.
excise tax on foreign corporation, equal protection not denied, 720.
exclusion of insurance company, power of state, noncompliance with
conditions, equal protection not denied, 722.
jurisdiction, foreign corporation not doing business in state is not
within jurisdiction of state, equal protection, 709.
nonresident corporations, 319.
license tax on foreign corporation, validity equal protection not denied,
707.
names, exclusion of foreign company having same name as domestic
company, equal protection not denied, 716.
process, money judgment rendered upon service on resident director,
denial of due process, 485.
statute appointing state auditbr to accept service of process, equal
protection not denied, 702.
quo warranto proceedings to oust, violation of anti-trust laws, equal
protection not denied, 838.
railways, tax on foreign companies, due process and equal protection
not denied, 691.
tax on stock, equal protection not denied, 714.
state control of corporations, 696.
theaters, equal protection not denied, 698.
taxation, capital of foreign corporation taxed, equal protection not
denied, 708.
franchise of foreign company, equal protection denied, 721.
local managers of foreign packing houses, equal protection not
denied, 716.
shares of foreign corporations owned by residents, equal protection
not denied, 720.
state inheritance tax, validity, equal protection not denied, classifi-
cation, 630.
FOBPEITITRES,
see PxNAi/ms and FoairirnRBs.
FOBMEB ADJUDICATION,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, relation
to res judicata, 139.
police power, carriers, reasonableness of rates, due process, recent cases,
416.
920 INDEX
[bbfbeenoxs au to paobs]
FOBMEB JEOPABDY,
criminal law, no arraignment or plea on second inf ormatioiiy doe proces
not denied, 554.
Federal procedure, aummary of rights of persons and property, guaran-
tiee of Federal constitution, 539.
Fifth Amendment, eonstmetion, offense of counterfeiting involved, 61.
early eases construing, 66.
right of judge to discharge jury during trial, right to ezpress
opinion on facts, 85.
due process, extension to Philippine Islands, 125.
effect of Due Process Clause, 109.
former jeopardy plea, 158.
vested rights. Fifth Amendment developing idea of vested rights, 451.
FORNICATION,
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, punishment of offenses, diserimi-
nation, 602.
FOUBTEENTH AMENDMENT,
see Dux Pbogssb or Law, Equal Pbotbotio)i of ths Law, Fifth
Amxnduxmt; see also specific topics, such as Attorkkys, Car-
BiKRS, FiRX, Jury, Municipal Cobporatioks, Bailways, etc
anti-trust laws, discrimination, equal protection denied, 699.
statute permitting combinations among purchasers, equal protec-
tion not denied, 748.
banks, guaranty fund, creation as valid exercise of police x^nrer, 425,
433.
bread, due process not denied, police power, ordinance regulating size of
loaves, 429.
brick yards in certain portions of ci^, ordinance prohibiting, due
process not denied, 437.
burial within city limits, prohibition of, due process not denied, 423.
contempt, punishment, trial by jury not required by Due Process Clause,
since power to punish is inherent, 580.
what constitutes, indirect or civil contempt, 582.
contracts, freedom of contract, definition, 496.
Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, freedom not interfered
with, 504.
impairment, allowance of passage of retrospective state legisla-
tion, necessity of Fourteenth Amendment, 452.
insurance, nonforfeiture provisiona of statute, loan agreement in-
validated, freedom denied, 511.
license tax on merchants using profit sharing coupons and trading
stamps, freedom not infringed, 517.
master and servant, employment at will of parties not employment
at will of others, 514.
freedom not infringed by statutes regulating employment of
women, 516.
INDEX 921
[befebekges are to pages]
POUBTEENTH AMENDMENT— continued,
contracte — eontinued.
imposition hy employer of certain conditions on employee as
crime, freedom denied, 512.
prohibition of issuance of irredeemable orders in payment of
labor, freedom not infringed, 509.
Ten-Hour Law, forbidding employment of children or women,
freedom not infringed, 509.
punishment of selling of goods at lower rate in one place than
in another, freedom not abridged, "506.
purchase of certain materials by junk dealers as crime, freedom
not abridged, 507.
right of state to regulate combinations and monopolies, 494.
statute against combinations, freedom not limited, 510.
state law preventing miners from contracting for wages on certain
basis, freedom not infringed, 497.
statute defining liability of railways for injuries, freedom not
infringed, 502.
trade agreement between retail lumber dealers, condemnation of,
freedom not abridged, 499.
corporation as person within the meaning of section one, 240.
corporations, condemnation of outstanding shares of owner of stock
without denial of due process, 463.
evidence, statute requiring corporations alone to produce books and
papers, equal protection not denied, 703.
reorganization of oo-operatave association without consent of
members, power of state, 464.
taxation, unequal assessment of franchises and other property,
denial of due process and equal protection, 702.
courts, different courts in same state, power of state to establish, Pour-
teenth Amendment does not restrict, 820.
criminal law, modification of procedure, power of state, 541.
query as to existence of restraints upon powers, 573.
struggle to leave power of states untrammeled, 543.
no arraignment or plea on second information, due process not
denied, 554.
punishment of offenses, discrimination, 602.
right of accused to be present in state court, 556.
trial and rendition of verdict, habeas corpus, 567, 569.
witnesses, exemption from self-incrimination in state courts, due
process not denied, 550.
detectives, ordinance subjecting to police supervision, due process not
denied, 438.
elections, registration law, discrimination between citizens, equal protec-
tion not denied, 726.
eminent domain, compensation, matter to be excluded, proceeding to
recover for decline in market value, 393.
922 INDEX
[bbfbeencis axi to paois]
POXTRTEENTH AMENDMENT— continued,
eminent domain— -contmned.
Pedend power of eminent domain, review, 377.
public nee, ascertainment bj ultimate and not bj proximate effect,
389.
«
state power of eminent domain, Federal eapervision, dne process,
substance and not form to be considered, 380.
taking private property, extension of spur track for benefit of
single industry, taking not unlawful, 392.
no taking for public use, 387.
what constitutes, flooding of land not a taking, 386.
foreign corporations, admission, state restrictions, equal protection, 708.
creditors, discrimination against nonresident crediti^s, equal pro-
tection denied, 712.
jurisdiction, foreign corporation not doing business in state is not
within jurisdiction of state, equal protection, 7091
game, prohibition of killing of birds or animals by unnaturaliied for-
eign-bom residents, due process not denied, 479*
grand jury, abolition, power of state, 544.
jury, criminal trial, petit jury of eight, right of state to authorize, 548.
trial by struck jury, right of state to provide, due process, 547.
laundries and washhouses, police power of state, equal proteetaon, reg-
ulations, 760.
«'Uberty" as defined in Federal Uw, 491.
license tax on foreign corporation, validity, equal protection not denied,
707*
license tax on profit sharing coupons and trading stamps, due process
not denied, 440.
licenses, occupations, classification, due process and equal protection
not denied, 745.
classification of merchants, equal protection not denied, 728.
malt liquor, prohibition of sale of, due process not denied, 428.
master and servant, assignments of filture eamingSj^ regulations, exemp-
tion of banks, equal protection not denied, 742.
discrimination against aliens, equal protection denied, 753.
. police power, statute inflicting penalties on employer where certain
conditions are imposed on employee, denial of due process,
435.
wages, prohibition of orders for payment of labor not redeemable
in money, equal protection not denied, 749.
milk, sale of adulterated milk, discrimination against nonprodnciAg
vendors, equal protection not denied, 729.
ordinance as to milk, tuberculin test, due process not denied, 431.
mineral waters, prohibition of waste, due process and equal protection
not denied, 739.
INDEX 923
[BSriRlNOKS ABX TO FACOBB]
FOUBTEENTH AMENDMENT— continued.
mines, dassifieation of coal mines by nmnber of men employed, stat-
ute as to wages of employees, equal protection not denied, 731.
"run-of-mine" or "anti-screen" law, statute as to compensation
of miners, due process not denied, 436.
national citizenship, definition in Slaughter House Cases, 228.
paint, statute requiring labels on mixed paints to show ingredients,
equal protection not denied, 730.
penalties, due process denied by imposition of ezcessiye penalties, 474.
physicians, registration, exemption of practicing physicians, equal pro-
tection not denied, 735.
police power, delegation to municipalities, 400.
right of forfeiture, 404.
procedure, change of procedure, change of under either Federal or
state law must not deny fundamental rights, 532.
indictment by grand jury. Federal right to indictment, informa-
tion, 534.
property of private water company taking by municipal corporation,
due process not denied, 473.
property, vested rights, protection by Due Process Clause, repeal of
remedy, 390.
protection against unlawful or unequal exercise of state power, 241.
purpose. Congress as protecting and enforcing body, 266.
railways, crime for person to act as railway conductor without certain
qualifications, freedom of contract not abridged, 508.
discrimination between carrier and shipper as to attorneys' fees,
statute rendered invalid, 692.
double liability and attorney's fee for killing of livo stock, due
process denied, 470.
employees,
fellow servant act, classification of railway employees, equal
protection not denied, 680.
liability of railroads for personal injuries caused by neg-
ligence, validity, 663.
liability to employee for negligence, equal protection not
denied, 653, 654.
modification as to railway employees, equal protection not
denied, 686.
statute abrogating fellow servant rule, equal protection
not denied, 669, 675.
injuries, classifying railway mail clerks with railway em-
ployees, equal protection not denied, 677.
statute requiring full switching crews, due process not denied,
439.
equal protection not denied, 683.
wages of employees, statute as to time of payment, equal pro-
tection not denied, 667.
924 INDEX
[UEFEEXNCES AXB TO PAOIS]
F0I7BTEEMTH AMENDMENT— continued,
rftilways — continued.
exeeatiye penalties for violation of orden of state commiBrion,
iuTaUditj, 689.
Federal Employers' Liability Act, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 685.
fences, liability of railroad for omission to fence railroad, doable
damages, equal protection not denied, 655.
Are caused by locomotiyes, liability for damages, equal proteetioii
not denied, 668.
property burdened by construction of bridge over bigliway, doe
process not denied, 466.
rates, judicial review of regulations, statute failing to provide for,
due process and equal protection not denied, 688.
reasonableness of rates, due process, recent cases, 416.
statute establishing rates, invalidity, denial of due proeees
and equal protection, 665.
unjust and unreasonable rates, fixing by commiaaion, equal
protection not denied, 662.
regulations, ordinance as to speed of trains, exceptions, equal pro-
tection not denied, 670.
requiring electric headlights on locomotives, equal proteetioo
not denied, 689.
shipments, requiring carrier to accept reshipments in ears of other
carriers, equal protection not denied, 689.
taxation, assessment of omitted property, equal protection not
denied, 670.
assessment to meet expenses of state railroad eommissioB,
vaUdity, 657.
tax on foreign companies, due process and equal protection
not denied, 691.
weeds, discrimination against railways, penalties imposed for allow-
ing weeds, equal protection not denied, 674.
, statute requiring railways to remove noxious weeds, equal pro-
tection not denied, 694.
sales, police power, sales in bulk, due process not denied, 424.
prohibition of unfair competition, sale at lower price in one place,
equal protection not denied, 744.
scope of section, definition of dtizenship, 228.
sewers, compelling abutting owners to connect property with sewer,
discrimination between residents and nonresidents, validity of
statute, 718.
due process not denied, 465.
smoke, legislation declaring emission of dense smoke a nuisance, doe
process not denied, 438.
state action, right to review, 380.
INDEX 925
[BSrEBENCXS ABE TO PAGXS]
POUBTEENTH AMENDMENT— continued,
taxation, banks, state tax law as to, equal protection, constitutionality
of statue, 618.
business of express company, tax on, Equal Protection of the Law
Clause, 613.
collection of taxes, summary proceedings, 361.
corporate franchises, tax on, equal protection, 626.
corporate securities, tax on. Equal Protection of the Law Clause^
612.
discrimination in license tax, equal protection not denied, 641.
due process, notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 368.
excise tax on corporations, nature, 639.
excise tax on gross earnings of railway companies, equal protection
not denied, 645.
exemptions, strict construction of exemptions, 349.
liquor sellers, tax on, discrimination, equal protection not denied,
633.
meat-packing houseSi tax on, equal protection not denied, 632.
mineral rights, tax on, equal protection not denied, 643.
municipal license fees for theaters, grading fee according to
receipts, equal protection not denied, 641.
nonpayment of taxes, forfeiture of land, equal protection* 619.
public improvements, assessments, ordinance held invalid, 646.
railroads, tax on property in each county, equal protection not
denied, 658.
savings banks, tax on, equal protection not denied, 644.
state inheritance tax, validity, equal protection not denied, 629, 630.
state tax laws, constitutionality, 611.
state tax on gross earnings of railroads, not confiscation, 480.
stock transfer tax, validity, 634.
succession taxes, New York inheritance-tax law does not violate
Fourteenth Amendment, 624.
taxation without jurisdiction, denial of due process, 487.
taxing districts, creation by legislature by arbitrary action, denial
of due process, 488.
transfers inter vivos, tax on, equal protection not denied, 640.
wholesale dealers in oil, equal protection not denied by occupation
tax, 635.
vested rights, all laws impairing vested rights within scope of due
process, 459.
arbitrary assertion of power, burdens imposed without advantages,
confiscation and denial of due process, 488.
double liability for failure to pay damages within certain time,
due process denied, 477.
effect of Fourteenth Amendment, prohibition of arbitrary inter-
ference with rights, 452.
926 INDEX
[BBTBINGn AU TO FAOEa]
FOUBTEENTH AMENDMENT— continued.
Yetted riglit»-^eontinaed.
fonnnU in Dedaration of Independenee, life, liberty and ponuit
of bappiness, 448.
impainnenty redreM under Due Proeess Claneei application of rule
of ineluaion and exeluaion, 461. *
poUej of legislation, no vested rigbts in general rules of law or
policy, 458.
water eompanies, municipal corporations, establisbment of competing
plant by ci^, Fourteentb Amendment not violated, 746.
water, police power, prevention of diversion of waters, due process not
denied, 421.
restraint on land owner drawing unnatural quantities of mineral
water from common source of supply, due process not
denied, 467.
FOUBTH AMENDMENT,
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, kinsbip with Fourtb Amend-
ment, 79.
FRANCHISES,
municipal corporations, construction and acquisition of waterworks
system, francbise of waterworks company ezpiriiig, equal protec-
tion not denied, 791.
police power, property or business of public interest, 407.
taking private property. Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, con-
struction, eminent domain, equivalent under Fifth Amendment,
90.
kind of property vdiicb may be taken, 218.
taxation, consolidated railway company, annual francbise tax on,
statute not invalid, 648.
doe process not denied, 343.
corporate property situated in several states, power to tax, 342.
excise tax on corporations, nature, 639.
exemptions, strict construction of exemptions, 349.
foreign companies, due process and equal protection not denied,
691, 721.
foreign railroads, tax on stock, equal protection not denied, 714.
tax on corporate franchises, equal protection, 626.
tax on special franchises, equal protection not denied to street
railway companies, 628.
unequal assessment of franchises and other property, denial of doe
process and equal protection, 702.
FBATEBNAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES,
see INSTTBANOX.
INDEX 927
[BXnmiNOBS ABM TO PAGBS]
FBATEBNITIESy
see Schools.
FRAUD,
corporations, inBorance, statute as to effect of false answers hj appli-
cant for life insurance, equal protection not denied, 698.
foreign commerce, regulation of limitation of power by Due Process
Clause, 128.
oleomargarine tax, constitutionality. Fifth Amendment, Due Process
Clause, 140.
police power, prohibition of sale of malt liquor, due process not denied, '
428.
sales in bulk, regulation, record of notice to sell, equal protection not
denied, 785.
O
GAMBLING,
evidence, admission of evidence iUegally obtained, due process, 131.
presumption of guilt from possession of gambling paraphernalia,
exception in f ayor of public officers, due process not denied,
832.
futures, statute preventing dealing in futures, equal protection not
denied, 777.
municipal corporations, ordinances, prohibiting visiting barricaded
gambling rooms, equal protection not denied, 776.
policy games, due process, fundamental requisites, generality and
equality of laws, 306
GAME,
aliens, prohibition of possession of firearms, equal protection not denied,
792.
prohibition of killing of birds or animals by unnaturalized foreign-
bom residents, due process not denied, 479.
police power, right of forfeiture, 404.
GABNI8HMENT,
due process, jurisdiction of process, necessity, validity of judgment,
315.
GAS COMPANIES,
rates, police power, reasonableness of rates, due process, recent cases,
416.
GIFTS,
taxation, tax on transfers inter vivos, equal protection not denied, 640.
928 INDEX
[RXTEBENCBS AKl TO PAOIS]
GBAND JTJBYy
abolition, power of Bta,te, 544.
amendment to Federal conBtitution, text of Fifth Amendment, 55.
books and papers, production, contempt, what constitutes, indireet or
civil contempt, 682.
conviction without indictment, prisoner compelled to testify against
himself, 145.
criminal procedure, powers of state, queiy as to existence of restraints
upon powers, 573.
due process of law, as embodied in Fifth Amendment, 21.
denial of due process of law to aliens, Chinese exclusion, 97.
extension to Philippine Islands, 125.
meaning of "due process of law" clause, 41.
right to due process in unincorporated territoiy, 237.
Fifth Amendment, construction, confiscation of property, 73.
indictment for infamous crime, 76.
Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, protection of national
citizenship against state action, 35, 244.
Indians, Fifth Amendment, application to courts of Cherokee Nation,
constitution does not apply, 99.
indictment as evidence of probable cause, Fifth Amendment, 133.
indictment by grand jury. Federal right to indictment, information,
534.
indictment by grand juty in body not required, Fifth Amendment, 164.
negroes as grand jurors. Equal Protection of the Law Clause, 606, 607.
discrimination against citizens of African descent, setting aside
jury panel, 603.
selection, discrimination, equal protection not denied, 835.
self-incrimination, privilege invoked by officer of corporation, 162.
GUABDIAN AND WABD,
due process, jurisdiction, proceedings in rem, 32L
HABEAS COBPUS,
constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, meaning of ''due process of law"
clause, 41.
criminal law, habeas corpus as proper remedy to test validity of deten-
tion under state law, 564.
remedies in state courts, duty of accused to exhaust all remedies,
562.
HABBOBS,
state taxation, purpose, taxation must be for public purpose, 352.
taking private property, construction of, Fifth Amendment, locating
harbor lines, 86.
navigable waters, power of Congress, Fifth Amendment, 177.
INDEX 929
[UFEBINCBS ABB TO PAOSS]
HEALTH,
aliens. Act of 1903 ezeluding diseased aliens, Fifth Amendment, Due
Process Clause, 156.
animals, quarantine, prevention of disease, equal protection not denied,
772.
compulsory yaccination, equal protection not denied, 775.
master and servant, regulations, requiring washhouses for coal miners,
due process and equal protection not denied, 751.
limitation on hours of labor of women, due process not infringed,
421.
milk, ordinance requiring tuberculin test for dairy cattle, equal pro-
tection not denied, 789.
due process not denied, 431.
municipal corporations, ordinances as to public laundries, validity, 762.
equal protection, regulations of public laundries and washhouses,
760.
X>olice power, definitions by -American jurists and text writers, 397.
delegation to municipalities, 400.
extent, promotion of public convenience, 419.
limitations, enjoyment of property limited, 405.
sewers, requiring abutting owners to connect property with sewer, due
process and equal protection not denied, 465, 788.
discrimination between residents and nonresidents, validity of
statute, 718.
smoke, legislation declaring emission of dense smoke a nuisance, due
process sot denied, 438.
water^osets, ordinances requiring, under certain conditions, due process
not denied, 430.
HEABING,
see Nonoi and Hxabino.
HEPBUEN ACT,
see INTBBSTATE COlClCXSOS.
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS,
advertisements, prohibition of advertising wagons on city streets, equal
protection not denied, 740.
due process not denied, 426.
animals, damages by cattie, statute imposing liability, equal protection
not denied, 767.
bridges, classification of municipal corporations, requiring certain towns
to maintain bridge and highway, equal protection not denied,
768.
extension proceedings, amounts awarded as damages, property not taken
without compensation, 467.
Due Process — 59
930 INDEX
[rirbxncxs abb to paqis]
HIGHWAYS AND STBEETS-H^ontinned.
grade, vested rightoi consequential damages, claim of abutting owners
to compensation, protection bj due process, 475.
improvements, Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, due process in
District of Columbia, meaning of phrase, 104.
property, vested rights, protection hj Due Process Clause, repeal of
remedy, 31K).
railways, construction of railroad across street, damages, equal pro-
tection not denied, 665.
order requiring safety appliance at grade crossings, validity, due
process and equal protection not denied, 673.
property burdened by construction of bridge over highway, due
process not denied, 466.
taxation, imposition of entire cost of abolishing grade crossings,
vaUdity, 660.
vested rights, ordinance prohibiting engines on certain streets,
due process and equal protection not denied, 651.
taxation, state taxation, power to tax, legislature may act direetlj
or may delegate functions, 356.
residuum of taxing power, 374.
taking property for public use, compensation required by Due
Process Clause, 358.
state tax laws, constitutionality, 611.
turnpike companies, regulation of charges, equal protection not denied,
814.
vested rights, legitimate modification of rights of abutting owner, due
process, 462.
HOMICIDE,
conviction without indictment, prisoner compelled to testify against
himself, 145.
due process, extension to Philippine Islands, 125.
former jeopardy plea, 158.
Indians, Fifth Amendment, application to courts of Cherokee Nation,
constitution does not apply, 99.
indictment, sufficiency of indictment for murder, manner of death not
alleged, due process and equal protection not denied, 826.
self-incrimination, crime committed within military reservation, Fiftk
Amendment, 159.
HOSPITALS,
Eight-Hour Law, women employed, validity of statutes, 798.
master and servant, contracts, freedom not infringed by statutes roga*
lating employment of women, 516.
HOTELS,
see INNKKXPSBS.
INDEX 931
[BmBXNOBS ABB TO PAOBS]
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
community property. Tested rights, what constitutes, 455.
due process, jurisdiction, divorce proceedings, not in rem or in per-
sonam, 323.
service of process, necessity, validity of judgment, 315.
vested rights, rights below standard of vested rights, 456.
ICE CREAM,
see Food.
IMMIGBATION,
see ALIENS*
INDIANS,
allotments, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, property of Indians
not taken by removal of restrictions as to allotments, 181.
vested rights, what constitutes, 455.
Fifth Amendment, application to courts of Cherokee Nation, constitu-
tion does not apply, 99.
power of Congress not limited, 111.
vested rights, Creek freedom entitled to due process, 472.
INFANTS,
Federal constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, due process, Supreme
Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, 263.
master and servant, Ten-Hour Law forbidding employment of children
or women, freedom of contract not infringed, 509.
prohibition of employment of minors, hazardous occupations, equal
protection not denied, 792.
sale of property, due process, jurisdiction, judgments, collateral attack
on judgments, 334.
INHEBITANCE TAXES,
see Taxation.
INJUNCTION,
Due Process Clause, appeal to Commissioner of Internal Revenue after
payment of taxes, 182.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, schools, discrimination against
colored children, 605.
violation, contempt, right to notice and hearing, indirect or civil con-
tempt, 585.
INNKEEPERS,
carriers, prohibition of soliciting of business on carriers' premises,
equal protection not denied, 786.
master and servant, freedom of contract not infringed by statutes
regulating employment of women, 516.
932 INDEX
[tmBBNOBB ABS TO PAOIS]
INNKEEPEBS— eontimied.
municipal eorporations, ordinanees, prohibition of billiard or pool
rooms, equal protection not denied, 787.
police power, property or business of public interest, 407.
statute requiring hotel keepers to give notice to guests in case of
fire, due process not denied, 437.
equal protection not denied, 756.
INSANE PEBS0N8,
criminal law, Terdicty refusal to set aside verdict, inaanitj of juror,
552.
due process, jurisdiction, proceedings in rem, 321.
fundamental requisites, notice, issue of Innaey, 288.
INSOLVENCY,
banks, creation of depositors' guaranty fund, equal protection not
denied, 737.
foreign corporations, creditors, discrimination against nonresideDt
creditors, equal protection denied, 712.
sales in bulk, regiilation, record of notice to sell, equal protection not
denied, 785.
INSTBUCnONS TO JUBIES,
eminent domain, procedure, decision of state court as to different
procedure, pajment of compensation, equal protection not denied,
828.
error, substantial error in charge to jurj, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 824.
right of judge to discharge juty during trial, right to express opinion
on facts. Fifth Amendmenty construction, 85.
INSUBANGE,
company connected with tariff association, penalty imposed, equal pro-
tection not denied, 738.
defenses, life insurance, exclusion of suicide as defense in action on
policy, 420.
false answers by applicant for life insuraneOi statute as to effect of,
equal protection not denied, 698.
fanners' mutual insurance companies, exemption from statute regulat-
ing fire insurance rates, equal protection not denied, 705.
foreign corporations, exclusion of insurance company, power of state,
noncompliance with conditions, equal protection not denied, 722.
names, exclusion of foreign company haying same name as domestic
company, mutual benefit societies, equal protection not de-
nied, 716.
requirements as to investments in state by foreign companies,
due process not denied, 484.
INDEX ) 933
[bxfibxngbs abx to PAOIS]
TN8TTBANCB — eontinued.
nonforfeitare proyisions of statnte, loan agreement invalidated, free-
dom of contract denied, 511.
payment of daime, statute imposing attorneys' fees and penalties,
failure to pay, equal protection denied, 805.
reorganization of co-operative association without consent of members,
power of state, 464.
state control of corporations, 696.
statute applicable to fire insurance companies only, equal protection
not denied, 697.
INTEENAL BEVENUE,
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, limitation
on Federal power to tax dispensing agents of state, 143.
INTEBSTATE COMMEBGE,
Act as to Food and Drugs, misbranding, Fifth Amendment, due process,
181.
Oarmack Amendment of 1906 does not deny due process, 160.
freedom of contract not denied by Carmack Amendment of 1906,
500.
carriers, reasonableness of rates, police power, due process, recent
cases, 416.
corporation as person within the meaning of Section 1, Fourteenth
Amendment, 240.
Eight-Hour-Law Case, validity of statute. Fifth Amendment, 182.
elevators, regulation of charges, validity of statute, 812.
eminent domain, equivalent under Fifth Amendment, 90.
land taken to improve navigation, liability for. Fifth Amendment,
113.
riparian owner deprived of access to navigable stream. Fifth
Amendment, construction, 103.
Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, freedom of contract, not
interfered with, 504.
•foreign commerce, regulation of, limitation of power by Due Process
Clause, 128.
foreign corporations, license tax, validity, equal protection not denied,
707.
Hepburn Act of 1906, commodities clause. Fifth Amendment, Due
Process Clause, 155.
prohibition in Hepburn Act of transportation from market to
mine. Due Process Clause, 170.
Interstate Commerce Act and common law, police power, 410.
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 as amended by Act of 1910 held valid,
Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, 174.
934 INDEX
[bdsbinozs aub to paoes]
/ INTEBOTATE OOMMEBCE-Hsontmned.
limitation on power of Secretary of War, Fifth Amendment, Dne
Process danse, alterations in bridges over waterways, 147.
Umitation npon power of Ck>ngre88 to regulate interstate emnmeree,
Fifth Amendment, Dae Process Clause, relatiTe ri^ts of em-
ployer and employee, 150.
order to extend fadlitiee to connecting carriers, Fifth Amendment,
Dne Process Clause, 179.
order to receive and transport freight. Fifth Amendment, Due Process
Clause, 175.
police power, origin of state police power, English origin, 395.
proceedings of commission, contempt, punishment, trial by jxaj not
required by Due Process Clause since power to punish is in-
herent, 580.
railroads, coal cars, regulation of distribution, freedom of contract
not destroyed, 498.
legislatiye control, railway fare and rates, effect of Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 850.
taxation, tax on foreign companies, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 691.
taxation, capital of foreign corporation, tax on, equal protection not
denied, 708.
consolidated railway company, annual franchise tax on, statute
not invalid, 648.
state taxation. Federal power to regulate interstate commerce, un-
limited power, 340.
vested rights, state tax on gross earnings of railroads, not con-
fiscation, 480.
witnesses, self-incrimination, Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment,
kinship with Fourth Amendment, 79.
immunity of witnesses, under Interstate Commerce Act of 1893,
application to state and Federal courts, 96.
INTOXICATING LIQUOBS,
injunction violated, contempt, right to notice and hearing, indirect or
civil contempt, 585.
local option law, prohibition of sale of intoxicating liquors, equal pro-
tection not denied, 801.
municipal corporations, ordinances, regulation of sale of intoxicating
liquors, licenses, equal protection not denied, 799.
police power, limitations, enjoyment of property limited, 405.
prohibition of sale of malt liquor, due process not denied, 428.
right of forfeiture, 404.
taxation, limitation on Federal power to tax dispensing agents of state,
Due Process Clause, 143.
INDEX 935
[RITEBBNCES ABl TO PAOBS]
INTOXICATING LIQUOES— continued,
taxation— continued.
occupation tax, diatillers, equal protection not denied, 636.
spirits in bond, tax on, equal protection not denied, 635.
tax on liquor sellers, discrimination, equal protection not denied,
633.
IRRIGATION,
state power of eminent domain, state definitions of public use to be
respected, due process, 385.
Tested rights, all laws impairing vested rights within scope of due
process, 459.
'J
JAILS,
see PSNITBNTIABISS.
JIM GBOW CASS,
see CIVIL Bights.
JOINT TENANCY,
surrivorshipy rights below standard or vested rights, 456.
JUDGES,
right of judge to discharge jury during trial, right to express opinion
on facts, Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, construction,
85.
terms of office, Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, constitution of
parent state, right of colonists to participate in, 116.
JT7BGMENTS,
amendment, criminal law, appeal, refusal of Supreme Court to amend
record, equal protection not denied, 824.
default, judgment by, summons left at residence of defendant, Federal
constitution. Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, 173.
due process, fundamental requisites, notice, 288.
jurisdiction, collateral attack on judgments, 332.
necessity of competent tribunal and notice, 312.
nonresident persons, 318.
service of process, necessity, validity of judgment, 314.
notable attempts to define due process, 282.
Supreme Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, 264.
execution, limitation statutes, right to enact retroactive laws, vested
rights, 522.
Magna Carta, chapter 39 in American law, wider scope of chapter, 15.
X guaranties given to nation, chapter 39 of charter, 5.
936 INDEX
[BXnmiNCU ABB TO PAGB8]
JTJDOMENT&— «oiitiiined.
remedies, change of remedies, power of legislature^ qualificatLoiiSy 527.
repeal of statute, Federal eonstitutiony Fifth Amendment^ constmcUon,
ease involTing military eommission, 69.
tazationy due proeess, notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 369.
vested rights, foreign corporations, money^ judgment rendered upon
service on resident director, denial of due process, 485.
mnnieipalitj's liability for damages caused by mobs, due proeess
not denied, 469.
JXJBISDIOnON,
contempt, pxuishment, consequences of lack of jurisdiction, 588.
courts, different courts in same state, power of state to establish,
Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict, 820.
criminal law, habeas corpus as proper remedy to test validity of de-
tention under state law, 564.
jurisdiction to review judgment of highest court of state in crim-
inal case, first ten amendments as limitations upon Federal
government, 82.
remedies in state courts, duty of accused to exhaust all remedies,
562.
witnesses, exemption from self-incrimination in state courts, due
process not denied, 550.
due process and jurisdiction, chapter VII, 312.
collateral attack on judgments, 332.
divorce proceedings not In rem or in personam, 323.
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, conflict of state law with state
constitution, jurisdiction of Federal courts, 64.
construction as to right of eminent domain, 74.
eonstruction in case involving militaiy trial and service, triumph
of legality, 65.
foreign corporation not doing business in state is not within jurisdic-
tion of state, equal protection, 709.
fundamental requisites of due process, jurisdiction, 307.
notice, 286.
necessity of competent tribunal and notice, 312.
nonresident corporations, jurisdiction, 319.
nonresident persons, jurisdiction, 318.
notice, curing lack of notice or service of process by appearance,
316.
proceedings in rem, jurisdiction, 321.
service of process, necessity, validity of judgment, 314. .
remedies, change of remedies, power of legislature, qualifications, 527.
vested rights, taxation without jurisdiction, denial of due process, 487.
INDEX 937
[bifxbencxs abx to paoss]
JTJBT,
see Grand Jury.
eriminal law, aeciuation of felony, neceesitj of presence of accused,
privilege not to be waived, 538.
appeal, denial of right of review, alien juror, due process and
equal protection not denied, 827.
arraignment or plea on second information not allowed, alien on
jury, due process not denied, 654.
petit jury of eight, right of state to authorize, 548.
procedure, powers of state, query as to existence of restraints
upon powers, 573.
statute as to number of peremptory challenges, equal protection
not denied, 822.
verdict, refusal to set aside verdict, insanity of juror, 552.
discharge, error of trial court, equal protection not denied, 834.
former jeopardy, effect of Due Process Clause, Federal constitu-
tion, Fifth Amendment, 109.
right of judge to discharge jury during trial, right to express
' opinion on facts, Fifth Amendment, construction, 85.
eminent domain, compensation for taking property, questioa a judicial
one, necessity of competent tribunal, 219.
Fifth Amendment, construction, right of eminent domain in Dis-
trict of Columbia, 87.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, colored race, right to mixed juries,
597.
denial to colored persons of right to act as jurors, 596.
discrimination against citizens of African descent, setting aside
jury panel, 603.
exclusion of juror on account of color, 600.
negroes as jurors, discrimination, 607.
statute excluding jurors on account of race or color, 602.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, purely American invention, 595.
Federal right to trial by petit juiy, 535.
selection, local regulations, equal protection not denied, 833.
struck jury law, validity, 830.
trial by jury, amendment to Federal constitution, text of Fifth Amend-
ment, 55.
attorneys, disbarment, attorney cannot be denied due process, 590.
constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, meaning of ''due process of
law" clause, 41.
contempt, punishment, trial by jury not required by Due Process
Clause, since power to punish is inherent, 580.
right to notice and hearing, indirect or civil contempt, 585.
criminal law, rights of accused, trial and rendition of verdict,
habeas corpus, 567, 569.
938 INDEX
[rxtebencu au to pages]
JUBY — continued.
trial by juiy — continued.
due proeeas, common heritage of all states, 270.
due process of law as embodied in Fifth Amendment, 21.
notable attempts to define due process, 279.
right to due process in unincorporated territory, 237.
vested rights, Fifth Amendment developing idea of vested
rights, 451.
eminent domain, due process, duty of state to guarantee protec-
tion to life, liberty and property, 379.
Federal procedure, summary of rights of persona and property,
guaranties of Federal eonstitntion, 539.
Fifth Amendment, construction in case involving military trial and
service, triumph of legality, 65.
denial of due process of law to aliens, Chinese exclusion, 97.
due process, admission of evidence illegally obtained, 131.
alien practicing prostitution after entry, 167.
extension to Philippine Islands, 125.
review of cases and criticism of decisions, 198.
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, jury of twelve men, right of trial
by, incorporation of Alaska with United States, 123.
Magna Carta, chapter 39 in American law, wider scope of chap-
ter, 15.
guaranties given to nation, chapter 39 of charter, 4.
statute abridging right of trial by jury, equal protection not
denied, 829.
trial by struck juiy, right of state to provide, due process, 547.
LACHES,
eminent domain, right of Congress to legislate against, 221.
LANDLOBB AND TENANT,
foreign corporations, excise tax, lease of foreign corporation, equal
protection not denied, 720.
leases, amusements, regulation of admission to places of public amuse-
ment, equal protection not denied, 779.
state tide lands, assessment of leaseholds for local improvements, equal
protection not denied, 704.
LARD,
see Food.
LAUNDBIES,
Due Process Clause, guaranty in American law, 256.
INDEX 939
[BmBXNOlS ABB TO PAGBS]
LAUNDBIES — continued.
regulation of businessi ordinances, classification, equal protection denied|
764.'
equal protection, regulations of public laundries and washhouses,
760.
police power, limitation on hours of labor of women, due process
not infringed, 421.
validity of ordinances as to public laundries, 762.
taxation, discrimination in license tax, equal protection not denied,
641.
LAW,
reign of law, Angevin period, reign of Henry II, 1.
LEGACIES,
inheritance taxes, see Taxation.
LEGAL TENDEB,
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, construction, legal tender
cases, 71.
LICENSES,
.attorneys, right of women to practice law in state courts. Equal Pro-
tection of the Law Clause, 608.
auctions, discrimination in fee, equal protection not denied, 744.
baiics, license to private bankers, right to refuse, equal protection not
denied, 737.
cigarettes, license for sale, ordinances, due process and equal j^rotee-
tion not denied, 625, 769.
classification, sales for future delivery, equal protection not denied,
638.
corporations, discrimination against dealers, articles manufactured
from produce of another state, not discrimination, 700.
discrimination in license tax, equal protection not denied, 641.
denial of equal protection, 620.
due process, notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 366.
emigrant agents, tax on, equal protection of the law, 622.
foreign corporations, license tax on foreign corporation, validity, equal
protection not denied, 707.
foreign packing houses, tax on local managers, equal protection not
denied, 716.
intoxicating liquors, ordinances, regulation of sale, equal protection not
denied, 799.
distillers, occupation tax, equal protection not denied, 636.
tax on liquor sellers, discrimination, equal protection not denied,
633.
940 INDEX
[■syniNois AUB «o piois]
UCBN8E8— eontimied.
miBMi mapiaytm, ftatate imposing responnbility for defaults of eertain
employaei, equal proteetion not denied, 781.
nnmieipal eorporatioiis, lieenee tazes, ordinaneee, elamriflcation of mer-
ehants, equal proteetion not denied, 728.
oeenpatione, clawriflfationy due proceu and equal proteetion not
denied, 745.
oleomargarine tax, eonstitiitioaalitjri Fifth Amendment, Due Prooeai
Glaiiae, 140.
diierimination againat oleomargarine, equal protection not denied,
644.
pereonal propertj, taxation of Vu^ble personal property, 344.
■moke, legislation declaring emission of dense smoke a nnisanee, due
process not denied, 438.
theaters, municipal license fees, grading fee according to reeeipts, eqnal
protection not denied, 641.
trading stamps, discrimination against trading stamps and premhmi
coupons, equal proteetion not denied, 647.
Ueense tax on profit sharing coupons and trading stamps, due
process not denied, 440.
freedom of contract, not infringed, 517.
vested rights, taxation without jurisdiction, denial of due process, 487.
warehouses, classification of elevators and warehouses, equal proteetion
not denied, 727.
wholesale dealers in oil, equal protection not denied by occupation tax,
685.
LIENS,
see MxoHANios' Lzinb.
enforcement, limitation statutes, right to enact retroactiye laws. Tested
rights, 522.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OP,
adverse possession, due process not denied by limitation act, 525.
equal protection not denied, 794.
constitutional limitation of reasonableness, 520.
eminent domain, laches, right of Congress to legislate against, 221.
exemption from suit as vested right, ending of statutory period of
limitations, 523.
nature, due process not denied by passage, contracts not impaired, 519.
property rights as protected by due process, limitations and remedies,
chapter XIII, 519.
right to enact retroactive laws, vested rights, 521.
vested rights, property not to be taken from one and given to another
contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure, due proeees,
472.
INDEX 941
[bxtirsncxs abx to paoes]
UVBET STABLES,
municipal corporations, ordinances, regulation of livery stables, due
process and equal protection not denied, 794.
LOANS,
contracts, freedom of contract, insurance, nonforfeiture proidsions of
statute, loan agreement invalidated, freedom denied, 511.
LOTTERY,
evidence, admission of evidence illegally obtained, Federal constitu-
tion, Fifth Amendment, due process, 131.
LUMBEB,
contracts, condemnation of trade agreement between retail lumber
dealers, freedom of contract not abridged, 499.
punishment of selling of goods at lower rate in one place than
in another, freedom of contract not abridged, 506.
M
MAGNA CASTA,
chapter 39 of the Great Charter, 4, 443.
American law, wider scope of chapter, 15.
reproduction in first state constitutions, 13,
charter as national act, fusion of Normans and English, 4.
constitution, amendments to Federal Constitution, first eight articles, 19.
Fourteenth Amendment, meaning of ''due process of law" clause,
41.
text of Fifth Amendment, 55.
contempt, punishment, power to punish inherent in all courts, 578.
criminal law, trial, right of accused to be present in state court, 556.
Due Process Clause, common heritage of all states, 270.
guaranty in American law, 251.
guaranty in English law, 249.
notable attempts to define due process, 274.
review of cases and criticism of decisions, 186.
Webster's famous definition, 58.
due process of law as embodied in Fifth Amendment, 21.
eminent domain, due process, duty of state to guarantee protection to
life, liberty and property, 379.
English constitutional system, Blackstone as true guide instead of
Coke, 11.
exposition. Coke as misleading expounder of the Great Charter, 8.
error of Coke 's construction, change of principles in bills of rights,
12.
later versions of the Great Charter^ 6.
942 INDEX
[R1FIEXNC18 ABM TO PAOIS]
MAGNA CABTA-^eontiniied.
national citizenahip, creation bj Fourteenth Amendment to Federal
constitution, 29.
procedure, change of procedure, Due Process Clause of Fifth Amend-
ment, re-enforced b> Sixth and Seventh Amendments, 533.
property not to be taken from one and given to another contrary to
settled usages and modes of procedure, due process, 472.
property taken bj military governor of Porto Bico without notice or
hearing, Due Process Clause, 168.
rebirth of the Great Charter in 1628, 7.
remedies, change of remedies, power of legislature, 526.
revolutions of 1640 and 1688, 9.
struggle for charters, reigns of Bichard I and John, 2.
vested rights, growth in England of idea, 443.
MALiaonS PROSECUTION,
costs, statute rendering prosecutor liable for costs, equal protection not
denied, 828.
MANDAMUS,
attorneys' fees, allowance to successful plaintiff, equal protection not
denied, 808.
contempt, punishment, consequences of lack of jurisdiction, 588.
MAKES AND BRANDS,
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, Act as to
Food and Drugs, misbranding, 181.
paint, statute requiring labels on mixed paints to show ingredients,
equal protection not denied, 730.
MABBIAGE,
due process, jurisdiction, divorce proceedings not in rem or in per-
sonam, 323.
MARTIAL LAW,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, construction in case involving
military trial and service, triumph of legfality, 65.
MASTER AND SERVANT,
aliens, employment, discrimination against aliens, equal protection
denied, 753.
public improvements, discrimination against foreign labor, due
process and equal protection not denied, 755.
compensation, see Workmen's Compensation Act.
contracts, freedom of contract, definition, 496.
employment at will of parties not employment at wiU of others, 514.
INDEX 943
[bEFEBENCES ABE TO PAGIS]
MASTER AND SERVANT— continued,
contracts— continued.
imposition hj employer of certain conditions on employee as crime,
freedom of contract denied, 512.
subjection to sovereign powers of state, 493.
Due Process Clause, limitation upon power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, relative rights of employer and employee,
150.
hours of work,
contracts, Ten-Hour Law forbidding employment of children or
women, freedon^ of contract not infringed, 509.
Eight-Hour Law, public improvements, equal protection nt)t denied,
774.
validity of statute, 182.
women employed in hotels, validity of statute, 796.
Federal constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, due process, Supreme
Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, 262.
police power, limitation on hours of labor of women, due process
not infringed, 421.
''liberty,'' definition in Federal law, 491.
definition in state law, 490.
license tax on emigrant agents, equal protection of the law, 622.
mines, classification of coal mines by number of men employed, sta1>-
ute as to wages of employees, equal protection not denied, 731.
"run-of-mine" or ''anti-screen" law as to compensation of miners,
due process not denied, 436.
excessive penalties, equal protection not denied, 812.
freedom of contract not infringed, 516.
state law preventing miners from contracting for wages on certain
basis, freedom of contract not infringed, 497.
statute imposing responsibility for defaults of certain employees,
equal protection not denied, 781.
washhouses required for coal miners, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 751.
minors, prohibition of employment^ hazardous occupations, equal pro-
tection not denied, 792.
police power, statute inflicting penalties on employer where certain con-
ditions are imposed on employee, denial of due process, 435.
railways, classification of employees, relief fund, classification not
denial of equal protection, 683.
crime for person to act as railway conductor without certain qual-
ifications, freedom of contract not abridged, 508.
Federal Employers' Liability Act, due process and equal protection
not denied, 685. «
fellow servant act, abolition of fellow servant rule, equal protec-
tion not denied, 653, 654, 675, 684.
944 INDEX
[Em&XNCIS ABX TO PAGBS]
MASTBB AND SEBVANT— contmnecL
railwajs — continued.
elasflifieation of railway emplojees, equal protection not denied,
680.
itatnte changing rale as to railroad employeee, equal protec-
tion not denied, 069, 686.
statute creating presumption of negligence, equal protection
and due process not denied, 680.
validity of statute, 663.
injuries, daasif jing railway mail clerks with railway employees,
equal protection not denied, 677.
statute as to eomparatiye negligence, equal protection not
denied, 686.
statute defining liability of railways for injuries, free-
dom not infringed, 502.
statute requiring full switching crews,, due process not denied, 439.
equal protection not denied, 683.
wages of employees, statute as to time of payment, equal protec-
tion not denied, 667.
wages, assignments of future earnings, regulations, exemption of banks,
equal protection not denied, 742.
prohibition of orders for payment of labor not redeemable in
money, equal protection not denied, 749.
freedom of contract not infringed, 509.
women, employment of, freedom of contract not infringed by statutes
regulating employment of women, 516.
MEAT,
tax on local managers of foreign packing houses, equal protection not
denied, 716.
tax on meat-packing houses, equal protection not denied, 638.
MECHANICS ' LIENS,
contracts, freedom of contract subject to sovereign powers of state,
493.
MILITABY COMMISSION,
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, construction, case involving
military commission, 69.
construction in case involving military trial and service, triumph
of legality, 65.
MILITABY GOVEBNOB,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, property
taken by military governor of Porto Bico without notice or
hearing, 168.
INDEX 945
[betebenoxs abb to paqbs]
MILITABY RESEBVATION,
Pedend constitution, Fifth Amendment, self-inerimination, crime com-
mitted within military reservation, 159.
MILITABY 8EBVICB,
struggle for charters, reigns of Bichard I and John, 2.
MILITIA,
Fedeittl constitution, Fifth Amendment, construction, persons subject
to militttry law, 95.
statutes, validity. Fourteenth Amendment, purpose. Congress as pro-
tecting and enforcing body, 269.
MILK,
see Food.
MINES,
barrier pillars between adjoining coal properties, statute regulating,
due process not denied, 432.
defaults of certain employees, statute imposing responsibility for, equal
protection not denied, 781.
entries, statute requiring entries in coal mines, equal protection not
denied, 791.
explosives, regulation of sale, equal protection not denied, 786.
fellow servant act, statute abrogating fellow servant rule, equal pro-
tection not denied, 675.
hours of work. Federal constitution. Fourteenth Amendment, due proc-
ess. Supreme Court of the United States as supervising tribunal,
262.
inspection of coal mines, classification, validity of statute, 771.
taxation, income tax on mining companies, equal protection and due
process not denied, 625.
mineral rights, tax on, equal protection not denied, 643.
state taxation, corporate property situated in several states, power
to tax, 342.
transportation of products,
police power, carriers, reasonableness of rates, due process, recent
cases, 416.
prohibition in Hepburn Act of transportation from market to mine.
Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, 170.
regulation of distribution of railroad coal cars, freedom of contract
not destroyed, 498.
wages,
classification of coal mines by number of men employed, statute
as to wages of employees, equal protection not denied, 731.
prohibition of orders for payment of labor not redeemable in
money, equal protection not denied, 749.
freedom of contract not infringed, 509.
Due Process — 60
946 INDEX
[references are to pages]
MINES— continued,
wagea— continued.
* < run-of -mine ' ' or " anti-sereen ' ' law as to compenaation of miners,
due process not denied, 436.
equal protection not denied, 812.
freedom of contract not infringed, 516.
state law preventing miners from contracting for wages on certain
basis, freedom of contract not infringed, 497.
washhottses required for coal miners, due process and equal protection
not denied, 751.
MISTAKE,
eminent domain, compensation for taking private property, due process,
mistake of law, 391.
MOBS AND BIOTS,
municipality's liability for damages caused by mobs, due process not
denied, 469.
equal protection not denied, 742.
MONEY,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, construction, legal tender cases,
71.
police power, due process, prohibition of exportation of Philippine coin,
422.
MOBTGAOES,
due process, vested rights, effect of Fourteenth Amendment, prohibi-
tion of arbitrary interference with rights, 452.
foreclosure, contracts for sale of land, statute regulating cancellation,
equal protection not denied, 743.
Federal constitution, due process, fundamental requisites, notice,
287.
limitation statutes, right to enact retroactive laws, v^ted rights,
522.
taxation, mortgagee's interest in land, equal protection, 618.
savings banks, tax on, equal protection not denied, 644.
usury, exemption of banks, trust companies '4Uid bona fide mortgages,
equal protection not denied, 736.
MOTOB VEHICLES,
see Automobiles.
MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS,
see Drainage, Pttblio Improvements, Sewers, etc.
annexation of land, discrimination between agricultural and other lands,
due process and equal protection not denied, 725.
INDEX 947
[RETERENCES ABE TO PAOES]
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— continued.
bridges, classification of municipal corporations^ requiring certain
towns to maintain bridge and highway, equal protection not
denied, 768.
elections, registration law, discrimination between citizens, equal pro-
tection not denied, 726.
eminent domain, construction of Fifth Amendment to Federal consti-
tution, right of eminent domain in District of Columbia, 87.
jury, selection, local regulations, equal protection not denied, 833.
statute abridging right of trial by jury, equal protection not
denied, 829.
licenses, occupations, classification, due process and equal protection
not denied, 745.
classification of merchants, equal protection not denied, 728.
tax on street railways, equal protection not denied, 627.
mobs and riots, statute imposing liability for damages, equal protec-
tion not denied, 742.
vested rights, due process not denied, 469.
ordinances. Due Process Clause, guaranty in American law, 256.
ordinances enacted in exercise of police power,
advertisements, ordinance prohibiting advertising trucks or vans,
due process not denied, 426.
equal protection not denied, 740.
barricaded gambling rooms, ordinances prohibiting visiting of, equal
protection not denied, 776.
billiard or pool rooms, ordinance prohibiting, due process not
denied, 427.
equal protection not denied, 787.
brick yards, ordinance prohibiting in certain portions of city,
due process not denied, 437.
equal protection not denied, 756.
building lines, unconstitutional exercise of police power, 427.
burial within city limits, prohibition of, due process not denied, 423.
cigarettes, license for sale, due process And equal protection not
denied, 769.
engines on certain streets, ordinance prohibiting, due process and
equal protection not denied, 651.
intoxicating liquors, licenses, equal protection not denied, 799.
laundries, regulation -of business, classification, equal protection
denied, 764.
validity of ordinances as to public laundries, 760, 762.
livery stables, regulation of, due process and equal protection not
denied, 794.
milk business, municipal regulation, equal protection not denied,
777.
tuberculin test required, due process not denied, 431.
equal protection not denied, 789.
948 INDEX
[UFBKNCIS AXE TO PAOBS]
MUNICIPAL OOBPORATIONS-^eontinued.
ordinaneM enacted in eaerciae of poliee
private deteetiveSy poliee ■npervision, due proeess and equal pro-
teetton not denied, 438, 817.
iewen, ordinanee reqoiring abutting owners to connect property
with sewer, doe proeess and equal proteetion not denied, 788.
size of loaves of bread, freedom of contract not interfered with|
505.
smoke, legislation declaring emission of dense smoke a nuisance,
due process not denied, 438.
equal protection not denied, 757.
speed of trains, exceptions, equal protection not denied, 670.
theaters, grading license fee according to receipts, equal protec-
tion not denied, 641.
water-closets, ordinance requiring under certain conditions, doe
process not denied, 430.
police power, delegation to municipalities, 400.
limitations, enjoyment of property limited, 405.
rates of carriers, reasonableness, due process, recent cases, 416.
taxation, penalties, discrimination between county and city in disposi-
tion of penalties, due proeess and equal proteetion not denied,
752.
state tax laws, constitutionality, 611.
state taxation, power to tax, residuum of taxing power, 375.
taking property for publie use, compensation required by Due
Process Clause, 358.
township compelled to collect taxes for drain, due process not
denied, 470.
telephone companies, rates, municipal regulation, equal protection not
denied, 816.
water supply,
construction and acquisition of waterworks system, franchise of
waterworks company expiring, equal protection not denied,
791.
establishment of competing plant by city, Fourteenth Amendment
not yiolated, 746.
vested rights, property of private water company taking by munic-
ipal corporation, due process not denied, 473.
N
NAMES,
corporations, see title, CdBPOiunoNS.
NATUBALIZATION,
see AuxNS.
INDEX 949
[bifkrinois abb to pagbs]
NAVIGABLE WATEBS,
bridges, limitation on power of Secretarj of War, Due Process Glanse,
alterations in bridges over waterways, 147.
easements, state lands on navigable rivers, servitude in favor of public,
effect of Fourteenth Amendment, 766.
eminent domain, equivalent under Fifth Amendment, 90.
power as vested in Federal government paramount, 208.
power of Congress, 177.
riparian owner deprived of access to navigable stream, Fifth
Amendment, construction, 103.
taking private property, what constitutes taking, 213.
construeticm of revetments, injury to riparian rights, 127.
land taken to improve navigation, liability for, 113.
excise tax based on gross tonnage upon use of foreign built pleasure
yachts, Fifth Amendment, I>ue Process Clause, 171.
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, conflict of state law with
state constitution, jurisdiction of Federal courts, 64.
grant of shore, vested rights, rights below standard of vested rights^
456.
NEGLIGENCE,
see FXDBBAL ElCPLOYXBS' LlABILITT ACT, MaSTBB AND SXBVANT, WOBK-
MBN's Compensation Act.
contracts, statute defining liability of railways for injuries, freedom
not infringed, 502.
limitation of liability, telegraph companies, prohibiting limiting of
liability for negligence, equal protection not denied, 704.
police power, fixing of certain absolute liabilities, due process not
denied, 440.
NEGOTIABLE INSTBUHENTS,
see Bills and Notbs.
NEGBOES,
see CIVIL Bights, Slavis.
NEWSPAPEBS,
national flag, state protection, equal protection not denied, 780.
NOBMAN PEBIOD,
distinctive feature, development of system of central administration, 1.
NOTICE AND HEABING,
contempt, proceedings criminal in nature, 579.
right to notice and hearing, indirect or civil contempt, 585.
drainage, assessment of expenses after notice, due process and equal
protection not denied, 763.
validity of tax sales, notice to nonresidents, equal protection not
denied, 717.
950 INDEX
[RErUlENCXS ARK TO PAOIS]
NOTICE AND HEARINO— continued.
due process, Bankruptcy Act of 1898 not invalid, 107.
fundamental requisites, hearing, 292.
kind of hearing necessary, 295.
jurisdiction as requisite, 307.
necessity of competent tribunal and notice, 312.
notice as fundamental requisites, 286.
curing lack of notice or service of process by appearance^ 316.
service of process, necessity, validity of judgment, 314.
Indians, Creek freedmen entitled to due process, 472.
property not to be taken from one and given to another contrary to
settled usages and modes of procedure, due process, 472.
property taken by military governor of Porto Bieo without notice or
hearing, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, 168.
taxation, dassifieation in proceedings, power of state, equal protection
not denied, 825.
collection of taxes, summary proceedings, 361.
due process, notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 364.
power to tax, legislature may act directly or may delegate func-
tions, 356.
titles, statute as to notice to original owners to cut off redemp-
tion, due process and equal protection not denied, 821.
NinSANCE,
brick yards, ordinance prohibiting in certain portions of city, due
process not denied, 437.
livery stables, regulation of, due process and equal protection not
denied, 794.
police power, definitions by American jurists and text writers, 397.
delegation to municipalitieB, 400.
limitations, enjoyment of property limited, 405.
right of forfeiture, 404.
railroads, imposition of entire cost of abolishing grade crossings,
validity, 660.
smoke, legislation declaring emission of dense smoke a nuisance, due
process not denied, 438.
equal protection not denied, 757.
OFFICERS AND PUBLIO EMPLOYEES,
confiscation of office without compensation, vested rights, power of
Congress, 466.
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, limitation
on power of Secretary of War, alterations in bridges over water-
ways, 147.
INDEX 951
[butrbnces abb to pages]
OFFICEBS AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES— continued.
municipal corparatians, ordinances, regulation of private detectives,
police supervision, due process and equal protection not denied,
817.
neglect of duty, railways, taxation, assessment of omitted property,
equal protection not denied, 670.
police power, limitations, vested rights as limitation, 403.
public funds, vested rights, rights below standard of vested rights, 456.
railways, taxation, assessment to meet expenses of state railroad com-
mission, validity, 657.
suspension, contempt, right to notice and hearing, indirect or civil
contempt, 585.
taxation, state taxation, due process, notice and hearing in tax pro-
ceedings, 366, 370.
trying title to office, due process, common heritage of all states, 272.
OIL,
taxation, wholesale dealers in oil, equal protection not denied by occu-
pation tax, 635.
OLEOMABGABINE,
see Food.
PAINT,
labels, statute requiring labels on mixed paints to show ingredients,
equal protection not denied, 730.
PABKS,
eminent domain, public use, right of legislature to determine what is
public use, 212.
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, construction, right of eminent
domain in District of Columbia, 87.
PABTIE8,
due process, jurisdiction, notice, curing lack of notice or service of
process by appearance, 316.
service of process, necessity, validity of judgment, 315.
PATENTS,
state regulation of sale of patented articles, equal protection not
denied, 782.
PAWNBBOEEBS AND SECOND-HAND DEALEBS,
itinerant vendors, prohibition of * sale by, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 793.
952 INDEX
[UFBKNCIS ASl TO PAQIS]
PAWNBBOEEBS AND SEOONDHAND DEALEB8— continned.
junk dealers, regulation, prohibition of purchase of certain articles,
equal protection not denied, 787.
freedom of contract not abridged, 507.
PAYMENT,
master and senrant, prohibition of issuance of irredeemable orders in
payment of labor, freedom of contract not infringed, 509.
PENALTIES AND rOBPEITUBES,
corporations, forfeiture of charter, failure to file affidavit of innocence
not required of individuals, anti-trust law, equal protection not
denied, 706.
due process, fundamental requisites, generalitj and equality of laws,
297.
guaranty in English law, 249.
jurisdiction, proceedings in rem, 321.
Webster's famous definition, 68.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, civil rights eases, 608.
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, construction in favor of refusal
to testify, 84.
insurance, company connected with tariff association, penalty imposed,
equal protection not denied, 738.
payment of claims, statute imposing attorneys' fees and penalties,
faOure to pay, equal protection denied, 805.
Magna Carta, chapter 39 in American law, wider scope of chapter, 15.
milk, sale of adulterated milk, discrimination against nonprodncing
vendors, equal protection not denied, 729.
mines, compensation of employees, "run-of-mine" or "anti-screen"
law, excessive penalties, equal protection not denied, 812.
police power, due process, prohibition of exportation of Philippine coin,
422.
right of forfeiture, 404.
statute inflicting penalties on employer where certain conditions
are imposed on employee, denial of due process, 435.
railways, demurrage cases, discrimination between carrier and ship-
per as to attorneys' fees, statute rendered invalid, 692.
employees, statute requiring full switching crew, equal protection
not denied, 683.
excessive penalties for violation of orders of state conmiission, in-
vaUdity, 689.
excessive penalties for violation of statute, equal protection denied,
678.
payment of claims, statute imposing attorneys' fees and penalties,
failure to pay, equal protection denied, 803.
equal protection not denied, 809.
INDEX 953
[RIFIBEN0X8 ABB TO PAOBS]
PENALTIES AND FOBFEITUBES— continued.
raOwajfr— Hsontinued.
rates, judicial review of regolations, statute failing to provide for,
due process and equal protection not denied, 688.
weeds, discrimination against railways, penalties imposed for
allowing weeds, equal protection not denied, 674.
taxation, coUection of taxes, summary proceedings, 361.
penalties, discrimination between county and city in disposition of
penalties, due process and equal protection not denied, 752.
penalty for nonpayment of taxes, equal protection and due proc-
ess, 617, 619.
equal protection not denied, 637.
state taxation, due process, notice and hearing in tax proceedings,
364.
vested rights, penalties, due process denied by imposition of excessive
penalties, 474.
PENITENTIABIES,
assault, classification of prisoners committing assaults, equal protection
not denied, 837.
PEBJTJEY,
criminal law, punishment, extent, power of court, due process and equal
protection not denied, 841.
self-incrimination. Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, effect of
statutory immunity upon constitutional protection, 144.
PEBSONS,
see Aliens, Criminal Law, Dttx Pboobss, etc.
Federal constitution. Fourteenth Amendment, corporation as person
within the meaning of Section 1, 240.
Federal procedure, summary of rights of persons and property, guar-
anties of Federal constitution, 539.
Magna Carta, chapter 39 and amendments, 443.
protection of life and liberty by due process, contempt proceedings,
disbarment of attorneys, chapter XVI, 578.
procedure in criminal cases in state courts, chapter XV, 541.
rights, national citizenship, definition in Slaughter House Cases, 228.
vested rights, formula in Declaration of Independence, life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness, 448.
growth in England of idea, 443.
PHYSICIANS AND SUBGEONS,
carriers, prohibition of soliciting of business on carriers' premises,
equal protection not denied, 786.
health, compulsory vaccination, equal protection not denied, 775.
registration, exemption of practicing physicians, equal protection not
denied, 735.
954 INDEX
[Em&XNCBS AU TO PAOIS]
PLEADING,
crixninal law. Federal procedure, right to plead, guaranty by Fifth
Amendment, due process, 536.
due process, jurisdiction, notice, curing lack of notice or service of
process by appearance, 316.
POLICE POWEB,
see specific topics, such as Animals, Automobilxs, Food, Highways
AND SlSKBTS, MUNICIPAL CORPOaATIONS, RAILWAYS, Otc.
aliens, employment, discrimination against aliens, equal protection
denied, 753.
banks, guaranty fund, constitutional exercise of police power as to
depositors' fund, 433.
creation as valid exercise of police power, 425.
contracts, freedom of contract, definition, 496.
subjection to sovereign powers of state, 493.
definitions by American jurists and text writers, 397.
delegation to municipalities, 400.
enjoyment of property limited, 405.
equal protection, police power, chapter XXII, 760.
extent, promotion of public convenience, 419.
Federal constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause,
protection of national citizenship against state action, 244.
fixing of certain absolute liabilities, due process not denied, 440.
Interstate Commerce Act, and common law, 410.
limitations, reasonableness as limitation, 401.
vested rights as limitation, 403.
ordinances enacted in exercise of police power, see Mxtnioipal Gobpo-
RAT10N8.
origin of state police power, English origin, 395.
property or business of public interest, police power, 407.
right of forfeiture, 404.
state police power ond due process, chapter X, 395.
typical English state in America, 396.
vested rights, all laws impairing vested rights within scope of due
process, 459.
growth in England of idea, 443.
POOL ROOMS,
ordinance prohibiting billiard or pool rooms, due prooess not denied,
427.
equal protection not denied, 787.
P08T0FFICE,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, due process as limitation on
power to regulate mails, 134.
railways, employees, injuries, classifying railway mail clerks with rail-
way employees, equal protection not denied, 677.
INDEX 955
[BXVEBINCIS axe to PAGIS}
PBOCEBXJBEy
ehange of procednrOi ehange nnder either Federal or state law must
not deny fundamental rights, 532.
Due Process Glanse of Fifth Amendment, re-enforced by Sixth
and Seventh Amendments, 533.
contempt, right to notice and hearing, indirect or civil contempt, 585.
corporations, procedure against corporations, difference in mode of
procedure, anti-trost law, eqnal protection not denied, 836.
courts, different courts in same state, power of state to establish, Four-
teenth Amendment does not restrict, 820.
criminal law, accusation of felony, necessity of presence of accused,
privilege not to be waived, 538.
exemption from self-incrimination in state courts, due process not
denied, 550.
indictment by grand jury, Federal right to indictment, informa-
tion, 534.
modification of procedure, power of state, 541.
struggle to leave power of states untrammeled, 543.
no arraignment or plea on second information, due process not
denied, 554.
powers of state, query as to existence of restraints upon powers,
573.
punishment of habitual criminals, equal protection not denied, 839.
eminent domain, procedure, decision of state court as to different pro-
cedure, payment of compensation, equal protection not denied,
828.
equal protection, chapter XXIII, 820.
equal protection not denied by procedure general in application, 829.
Federal procedure, summary of rights of persons and property, guar-
anties of Federal constitution, 539.
foreign corporations, quo warranto proceedings to oust, violation of
anti-trust laws, equal protection not denied, 838.
Jury, struck Jury law, validity, 830.
trial by struck jury, right of state to provide, due process, 547.
life and liberty as protected by due process, procedure in criminal cases
in Federal courts, chapter XTV, 532.
procedure in criminal cases in state courts, chapter XV, 541.
limitation statutes, nature, due process not denied by passage, con-
tracts not impaired, 519.
vested rights, procedure, right of state to regulate its procedure 458.
property not to be taken from one man and given to another
contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure, due
process, 472.
right of state to enact curative legislation, 457.
956 INDBX
[umiNCBS ABX TO TAJSEB]
FBOCESS,
a886B8mentS| Talidity of tax sales, notice to nonresidents, equal pro-
tection not denied, 717.
corporations, statute appointing state auditor to accept service of
process, equal protection not denied, 702.
due process, jurisdiction, nonresident persons, 318.
notice, curing lack of notice or service of process bj appearance,
316.
serviee of process, necessitj, validity of judgment, 314.
judgment hj default, smnmons left at residence of defendant. Fifth
Amendment, Due Process C3ause, 173.
motor vebidee, state regulation, service of process on nonresidents,
validity of statute, 819.
vested rights, foreign corporations, money judgment rendered upon
serviee on resident director, denial of due process, 485.
PBODUCnON OP BOOKS AND PAPEKS,
contempt, what constitutes, indirect or civil contempt, 582.
corporations, classification between corporations and individuals, com-
pulsory production of testimony, equal protection not denied,
732.
self-incrimination, privilege invoked by officer of corporation, 162.
statute requiring corporations alone to produce books and papers,
equal protection not denied, 703.
self-incrimination, immunity based on Act of 1903, Anti-Trust Act, 166.
PBOPERTY,
see EiciNBNT Domain, Taxation.
adverse possession, due process not denied by limitation act, 525.
statute declaring ten years' possession to give title, due process
not denied, 481.
equal protection not denied, 794.
attachment, property of nonresident, bonds attached, due process and
equal protection not denied, 840.
building restrictions, police power, unconstitutional exercise of police
power, 427.
business,
classification of merchants, license taxes, equal protection not
denied, 728.
license tax on profit sharing coupons and trading stamps, due
process not denied, 440.
equal protection not denied, 647.
freedom of contract not infringed, 517.
ordinance as to milk, tuberculin test, due process not denied, 431.
tax on mea^packing houses, equal protection not denied, 632.
INDEX 957
[bivkbinoss abx to faobs]
PBOPBBTT— continued.
eonflBcation,
carriers, reasonableness of rates, delegation of l^gislatiye power,
411.
dne process, recent cases, 416.
maxiTnnm intrastate rates, confiscation and denial of due proc«
ess, 484.
due process, jurisdiction, proceedings in rem, 321.
Eight-Hour-Law Gase, yalidily of statute, 182.
office confiscation without compensation, power of Congress, 466.
police power, right of forfeiture, 404.
raOwajB, rates, excessive penalties for violation of statute, equal
protection denied, 678.
taxation, state taxation, purpose, taxation must be for public pur-
pose, 358.
constitution. Fifth Amendment, conflict of state law with state con-
stitution, jurisdiction of Federal courts, 64.
construction, confiscation of property, 73.
Fourteenth Amendment, judicial rule of inclusion and exclusion as
to deprivation of due process and denial of equal protec-
tion, 49.
meaning of ^^ equal protection of the law" clause, 45.
purpose. Congress as protecting and enforcing body, 266.
contracts, impairment, allowance of passage of retrospective state leg-
islation, necessity of Fourteenth Amendment, 452.
corporations, alteration of charters without taking property of cor-
poration, due process not denied, 482.
taxation, unequal assessment of franchises and other property,
denial of due process and equal protection, 702.
discrimination against dealers, articles manufactured from
produce of another state, not discrimination, 700.
deposits in savings banks unclaimed for thirty years, state control,
bank not deprived of due process, 469.
due process, common heritage of all states, 270.
fundamental requisites, generality and equality of laws, 297.
hearing, kind of hearing necessary, 295.
jurisdiction, divorce proceedings, not in rem or in personam, 323.
proceedings in rem, 321.
service of process, necessity, validity of judgment, 314.
notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 364.
property taken by military governor of Porto Bico without notice
or hearing, 168.
protection of property rights, freedom of contract^ chapter XII,
490.
relation to res judicata, 139.
right to due process in unincorporated territory, 237.
958 INDEX
[BXFEBXN0X8 AKB TO PAGKS]
PBOPEBTY— eontinued.
due process — continued.
state statutes and constitutions, constraetion hy state courts to be
considered, 382.
Tested rights, effect of Fourteenth Amendment, prohibition of arbi-
trarj interference with rights, 452.
Webster's famous definition, 58.
exemptions, strict construction of exemptions, state taxation, 349.
Pederal procedure, summary of rights of persons and property, guar-
anties of Federal constitution, 539.
forfeiture for nonpayment of taxes, equal protection not denied, 637.
fraternities, abolition of Greek letter fraternities in state nniTeraitieB,
equal protection not denied, 750.
infants, due process, jurisdiction, collateral attack on judgments, 334.
"Uberty" defined in Federal law, 49L
defined in state law, 490.
limitation statutes, exemption from suit as vested right, ending of
statutory period of limitations, 523.
vested rights as limitation, 403.
liquor sellers, tax on, discrimination, equal protection not denied, 633.
Magna Carta, chapter 39 and amendments, 443.
mineral rights, tax on, equal protection not denied, 643.
paint, statute requiring labels on mixed paints to show ingredients,
equal protection not denied, 730.
personal property, inheritance tax on bequests of personalty, validity,
equal protection not denied, 632.
taxation of intangible personal property, 347.
taxation of tangible jwrsonal property, 344.
police power, fixing of certain absolute liabilities, due process not
denied, 440.
limitations, enjoyment of property limited, 405.
ordinance requiring water-closets under certain conditions, due
process not denied, 430.
property or business of public Interest, 407.
statute regulating barrier pillars between adjoining coal prop-
erties, due process not denied, 432.
procedure, change of procedure, change under either Federal or state
law must not deny fundamental rights, 532.
railroad property, valuation and taxation of, equal protection not
denied, 652.
tax on property in each coimty, equal protection not denied, 658.
remedies, change of remedies, power of le^slature, qualificatidns, 529.
rights as protected by due process, limitations and remedies, chapter
Xni, 519. /
vested rights and their impairment, chapter XI, 443.
spirits in bond, tax on, equal protection not denied, 635.
state tide lands, assessment of leaseholds for local improvements, equal
protection not denied, 704.
INDEX 959
[rbterences abb to pages]
PEOPERTY— continued.
Tested rights,
all laws impairing vested rights within scope of due process, 459.
development of idea, advancement by constitutional limitations
on legislative power, 445.
double liability for failure to pay damages within certain time,
due process denied, 477.
game, prohibition of killing of birds or animals by unnaturalized
foreign-bom residents, due process not denied, 479.
growth in England of idea, 443.
legitimate modification of rights of abutting owner, due process,
462.
municipality's liability for damages caused by mobs, due process
not denied, 469.
procedure, right of state to regulate its procedure, 458.
property classifications, power of state, discrimination, 464.
property not to be taken from one man and given to another
contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure, due proc-
esSy 472.
property of absentees, right of state to take away, not denial of
due process, 471.
property of private water company, taking by municipal corpora-
tion, due process not denied, 473.
protection by Due Process Clause, repeal of remedy, 390.
reorganization of co-operative association without consent of mem-
bersy p0Tv»r of state, 464.
spur track for public use, initial cost may be imposed upon single
industry, due process not denied, 476.
water, restraint on land owner drawing unnatural quantities of
mineral water from common source of supply, due process
not denied, 467.
what constitutes, 453.
PROSTITUTION,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, alien
practicing prostitution after entry, 167.
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS,
assessments for improvements,
consequential damages, claim of abutting owners to compensation,
protection by due process, 475.
drainage, assessments, validity of tax sales, notice to nonresidents,
equal protection not denied, 717.
due process, notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 364.
Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, assessments for benefits
in City of Washington, 161.
960 INDEX
[BXmiNOIS All TO TAOBI
PUBIilO IMPBOYEMENTS— «oati]ined.
asMMments for improvements — eontiimed.
ordinance held inTalid, 64d.
power to tax, legiilatnre may aet direetty or may delegate fnne-
tiona, 356.
rendnnm of taxing power, 374.
pnrpoee, taxation must be for pnblie purpose, 352.
railwajs, imposition of expense of drainage on railways, equal
proteetion not denied, 676.
state tax laws, eonstitntionalitj, 611.
taking property for pnbHe nse, eompenaation required by Doe
Process Clause, 358.
taxing districts, creation by legisUtnre by arbitrary action, denial
of due process, 488.
township compelled to collect taxes for drain, due process not
denied, 470.
▼ested rights, arbitrary assertion of power, burdens imposed with-
out advantages, confiscation and denial of due process, 488.
legitimate modification of rights of abutting owner, due proc-
ess, 468.
street extension proceedings, amounts awarded as damages,
property not taken without compensation, 467.
bridges, limitation on power of Secretary of War, Due Process Clause,
alterations in bridges over waterways, 147.
eonstruction of revetments, injury to riparian rights, Federal consti-
tution, Fifth Amendment, taking of property, 127.
due process, definition, difileulties in way of complete and authoritative
definition, rule of inclusive and exclusive, 284.
fundamental requisites, hearing, 292.
notice, 288.
Jurisdiction, Judgments, ooQateral attack on judgments, 334.
state taxation. Federal supervision, right to review, necessity that
taxation be spoliation, 384. «
due process in District of Columbia, meaning of phrase, 104.
easements, vested rights, all laws impairing vested rights within scope
of due process, 450.
eminent domain, laches, right of Congress to legislate against, 221.
power of eminent domain, taking must be for public use, 211.
public use, right of legislature to determine what is public use, 212.
right of eminent domain, Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment,
construction, 74.
right of eminent domain in District of Columbia, Federal consti-
tution, Fifth Amendment, construction, 87.
etate power of eminent domain, state definitions of publie use to
be respected, due process, 385.
taking private property, due process, mistake of law, 391.
.vr.
r-
INDEX 961
[refibincss arb to pagxs]
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS— contmued.
emplojeesy
discrimination against foreign labor, due process and equal pro-
''^- tection not denied, 755.
Eight-Hour Law, equal protection not denied, 774.
estoppel to contest constitutionality, availability of defense against pro-
moters of public improvements, 138.
highways and streets, vested rights, what constitutes, 455.
land taken to improve navigation, liability for. Federal constitution,
Fifth Amendment, 113.
property, vested rights, protection by Due Process Clause, repeal of
remedy, 390.
railways, statute compelling railroad to provide means for passing
water under embankments. Federal constitution, Fifth Amend-
ment, taking private property, 180.
state tide lands, assessment of leaseholds for local improvements, equal
protection not denied, 704.
war department, contempt^ punishment, consequences of lack of juris-
diction, 588.
PUBLIC LANDS,
easements, state lands on navigable rivers, servitude in favor of public,
effect of Fourteenth Amendment, 766.
sheep, restrictions on sheep grazing, equal protection not denied, 778.
state tide lands, assessment of leaseholds for local improvements,
equal protection not denied, 704.
taking private property. Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, Due
Process Clause, review of cases and criticism of decisions, 187.
PUNISHMENT,
additional punishment on third conviction, equal protection not denied,
831.
difference in term of sentence for imprisonment, equal protection not
denied, 831.
extent, power of court, due process and equal protection not denied, 841.
Federal procedure, summary of rights of persons and property, guar-
anties of Federal (Constitution, 539.
habitual criminals, punishment pf, equal protection not denied, 839.
imposition of more severe punishment for subsequent offenses, equal
protection not denied, 826.
Indeterminate Sentence Act, due process and equal protection not
denied, 834.
statutes, validity. Congress as protecting and enforcing body, Four-
teenth Amendment^ purpose, 269.
Dae Process — 61
962 INDEX
[smUNClS All TO PAOBS]
QUABANTTNE,
animals, preTention of diaeaae, eqixal proteetion not denied, 772.
quo WABRANTO,
foreign corporations, qno warranto proceedings to oust, violation of
anti-trust laws, eqnal proteetion not denied, 838.
B
RAILWAYS,
see CAsams, Intiestatb OoMicnci.
animals, killing of live stock bj railway, payment of double damages,
refusal to pay daim, equal protection not denied, 811.
vested rights, railroad subjeeted to double liability and attorney's
fee, killing of live stock, due process denied, 470.
exaction without denial of due process, 477.
bridge over highway, railroad property burdened by construction, due
process not denied, 466.
business, prohibition of soliciting of business on carriers' premises,
equal proteetion not denied, 786.
cars,
regulation of distribution of railroad coal cars, freedom of con-
tract not destroyed, 498.
claims, payment of, imposition of penalties for failure to pay, equal
protection not denied, 809.
statute imposing attorneys' fees and penalties, failure to pajr,
equal protection denied, 803.
commission to regulate carriers,
due process, fundamental requisites, generality and equality of
laws, 306.
notice as fundamental requisite, 290.
excessive penalties for violation of orders of state commission, in-
validity, 689.
reasonableness of rates, delegation of legislative power, 411.
construction of railways,
fellow servant act, statute abrogating fellow servant rule, equal
protection not denied, 675.
railroad across street, damages, equal protection not denied, 665.
remedy for property injured, due process and equal protection
not denied, 661.
control of railways, chapter XIX, 650.
corporations, condemnation of outstanding shares of owner of stock
without denial of due process, 463.
demurrage cases, discrimination between carrier and shipper as to at-
torneys' fees, statute rendered invalid, 692.
INDEX 963
[beherences abx to pages]
BAILWAYS— continued,
drainage^
imposition of expense of drainage on' railways, equal protection
not denied, 676.
statute compelling railroad to provide means for passing water
under embankments, Fifth .Amendment, taking private prop-
erty, 180.
statute requiring railroads to provide drainage contrary to com-
mon law rule, equal protection not denied, 693.
electric headlights on locomotives, requiring, equal protection not
denied, 689.
eminent domain,
compensation, matters to be excluded, proceeding to recover for
decline in market value, 393.
right of eminent domain, Fifth Amendment, construction, 74.
taking private property, extension of spur track for benefit of
single industry, taking not unlawful, 392.
kind of property which may be taken, 218.
what constitutes, no taking for public use, 387.
employees,
crime for person to act as railway conductor without certain
qualifications, freedom of contract not abridged, 508.
fellow servant act, abolition of fellow servant rule, equal protection
not denied, 653, 654, 684.
classification of railway employees, equal protection not
denied, 680.
liability of railroads for personal injuries caused by negli-
gence, validity, 663.
modification of rule as to railway employees, equal protection
not denied, 669, 686.
statute creating presumption of negligence, equal protection
and due process not denied, 680.
full switching crew, statute requiring, equal protection not denied,
683.
due process not denied, 439.
full train crew, statute requiring, equal protection not denied, 681.
employees' relief fund,
classification of employees held not denial of equal protection, 683.
engines on certain streets, ordinance prohibiting, due process and equal
protection not denied, 651.
extension of tracks, vested rights, spur track for public use, initial
cost may be imposed upon single industry, due process not denied,
476.
Federal Employers' Liability Act, due process and equal protection
not denied, 685.
964 INDEX
[simXNOIS All TO PAOIS]
RAILWAYS— eontinued.
fencM, liabilitj of riulroad for omiBBion to fence railroad, doable dam-
agea, equal protection not denied, 655.
fire eaneed by locomotives, liability for damages, equal proteetion not
denied, 668.
police power, fixing of eertain absolute liabilities, doe process not
denied, 440.
Tested rights, double liability for failure to pay damages nitbia
eertain time, due process denied, 477.
heating of railroad ears, statute excluding eertain railways, equal pro-
tection not denied, 664,
injuries to employees,
daisifying railway mail clerks with railway employees, equal pro-
tection not denied, 677.
comparative negligence, statute as to, equal protection not denied,
686.
statute defining liability of raHways for injuries, freedom of con-
tract not infringed, 502.
Interstate Commerce Act and common law, 410.
legislative control, raflway fare and rates, effect of Equal Protection
Clause, 650.
local improvements, Federal eonstitution, due process, fundamental
requisites, notice, 287.
n^gro passengers.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, statute requiring separate
accommodations for white and colored persons in railway
coaches, 604.
rates,
classification for regulation, equal protection not denied, 687.
excessive penalties for violation of statute, equal protection denied,
678.
judicial review of regulations, statute failing to provide for, due
process and equal protection not denied, 688.
police power, reasonableness of rates, delegation of kgialative
power, 41 L
denial of due process and equal protection, 656.
due process, recent eases, 416.
elements involved, 413.
unjust and unreasonable rates, fixing by eommisdon, equal
protection not denied, 662.
prohibiting charging more for shorter than for longer haul, equal
protection not denied, 672.
statute establishing rates, invalidity, denial of due process and
equal protection, 665.
safety appliances, order requiring, at grade crossings, validity, due
process and equal protection not denied, 673.
INDEX 965
[BETIBENGBS ABE TO PAQBS]
BAILWAYS— «ontinued.
shipments, requiring carrier to accept reshipments in cars of other
carriers, equal protection not denied, 689.
sleeping cars, prohibition of letting down of unoccupied upper berth,
due process denied, 483.
speed of trains, ordinance as to, exceptions, equal protection not denied,
670.
taxation,
assessment of omitted property, equal protection not denied, 670.
assessment to meet expenses of state railroad conmiission, yaliditj,
657.
consolidated railway company, annual franchise tax on, statute not
invalid, 648.
due process not denied, 343.
due process, fundamental requisites, hearing, 292.
excise tax on gros^ earnings of railway companies, equal protec-
tion not denied, 645.
exemptions, strict construction cf exemptions, 349.
foreign railroads, tax on stock, equal protection not denied, 714.
tax on foreign companies, due process and equal protection not
denied, 691.
gross earnings of railroads, state tax not confiscation, 480.
imposition of entire cost of abolishing grade crossings, validity,
660.
personal property, taxation of tangible personal property, 344.
property in each county, tax on, equal protection not denied, 658.
property situated in several states, power to tax, 342.
property, valuation and taxation of, equal protection not denied,
652.
ticket agent, habeas corpus to procure discharge, duty of accused to
exhaust all remedies in state courts, 562.
wages of employees, statute as to time of payment, equal protection
not denied, 667.
weeds, discrimination against railways, penalties imposed for allowing
weeds, equal protection not denied, 674.
statute requiring railways to remove noxious weeds, equal protec-
tion not denied, 694.
BATES,
see CABBIX&8, PouoB PowBB, Bailboads.
BECEIVEBS,
contempt, what constitutes, indirect or civil contempt, 682.
railways, regulations, requiring electric headlights on locomotives,
equal protection not denied, 689.
vested rights, property of absentees, right of. state to take away, not
denial of due process, 471.
966 INDEX
[rKTSBBKCXS All TO PAOXS]
BECONSTBUCTION ACT,
Federal eoiutitution, Fifth Amendmenty eonstruction, cum inTolving
militaxy cominiBaion, 69.
BEO0BD8,
iaiee in bulk, regulation, record of notice to sell, equal protection not
denied, 785.
BELIEF FUND,
•ee Bailwats.
BEMEDIES,
change of remedies, power of legielature, 526.
qnalificatiosB, 527.
criminal law, habeas corpus as proper remedy to test validity of de-
tention under state law, 564.
remedies in state courts, duly of accused to exhaust all remedies,
562.
limitation statute!*, constitutional limitation of reasonableness, 520.
nature, due process not denied by passage, contracts not impaired,
519.
property rights as protected by due process, limitations and remedies,
chapter XIII, 519.
vested rights, protection by I>ue Process Clause, repeal of remedy,
390.
railways, construction, remedy for property injured by construction,
due process and equal protection not denied, 661.
BESIDENCE,
see DouionjB.
EEV0LUTI0N8,
English constitutional system, Blackstone as true guide instead of
Coke, 11.
Magna Carta, revolutions of 1640 and 1688, 9.
EIPABIAN OWNEBS,
eminent domain. Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, construction,
riparian owner deprived of access to navigable stream, 103.
construction of revetments, injury to riparian righte, Fifth
Amendment, 127.
land taken to improve navigation, liability for. Fifth Amend-
ment, 113.
taking private property, what constitutes taking, 213.
water, prevention of diversion of waters, due process not denied, 421.
statute prohibiting diversion of water beyond state by riparian
owner, due process and equal protection not denied, 784.
INDEX 967
[B17BBINCB8 ABB TO PAGBS]
RUSSIAN THISTLE,
see WBXD&
S
SALES,
auction sales, see AuonoNS.
bulk sales, regulation, police power, due proeess not denied, 424.
record of notice to sell, equal protection not denied, 785.
cigarettes, license for sale, ordinances, due process and equal protec-
tion not denied, 769.
competition, anti-trust laws, statute permitting combinations among
purchasers, equal protection not denied, 748.
prohibition of unfair competition, sale at lower price in one place,
equal protection not denied, 744.
freedom of contract not abridged, 506.
corporations, stock, sale on margin, statute prohibiting, equal protec-
tion not denied, 773.
explosives, regulation of sale, equal protection not denied, 786.
food, prohibition of sale of preservatives containing boric acid, equal
protection not denied, 747.
intoxicating liquors, ordinances, regulation of sale, Ucenses, equal pro-
tection not 'denied, 799.
prohibition of sale of malt liquor, due process not denied, 428.
itinerant vendors^ prohibition of sale by, due process and equal protec-
tion not denied, 793.
junk dealers, regulation, prohibition of purchase of certain articles,
equal protection not denied, 787.
freedom of contract not abridged, 507.
local option law, prohibition of sale of intoxicating liquors, equal pro-
tection not denied, 801.
milk, 'sale of adulterated milk, discrimination against nonprodueing
vendors, equal protection not denied, 729.
oleomargarine, regulation of sale, equal protection not denied, 765.
statute restricting sale and manufacture, validity, 770. '
patented articles, state regulation of sale, equal protection not denied,
782.
taxation, classification, sales for future delivery, equal protection not
denied, 638.
state taxation, personal property, taxation of tangible personal
property, 344.
stock transfer tax, validity, 634.
tax on capital of foreign corporation, equal protection not denied,
708.
SCHOOLS.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, discrimination against colored chil-
dren, 604, 605.
968 INDEX
[RBFIKINC18 ABB TO PAGKS]
SCHOOLS— eontinued.
fraternities, abolition of Greek letter fraternities in state nnlTarsities,
equal protection not denied, 750.
requirements of members of Greek letter f ratemitj, due proeeas not
denied, 486.
health, eompnlsory vaceination, equal protection not denied, 775.
SEABCHES AND SEIZUBES,
due process, jurisdiction, proceedings in rem, 321.
Federal procedure, summarj of rights of persons and property, guar-
anties of Federal constitution, 539.
Fifth Amendment, construction, confiscation of property, 73.
due process, admission of evidence illegally obtained, 131.
due process as limitation on power to regulate mails, 134.
kinship with Fourth Amendment, 79.
self-incrimination, privilege invoked by officer of corporation, 102.
SEOOND AMENDMENT,
Federal procedure, summary of rights of persons and property, guar-
anties of Federal constitution, 539.
SECRETABY OF WAB,
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, limitation
on power of Secretary of War, alterations in bridges over water-
ways, 147.
SEVENTH AMENDMENT,
jury, Federal right to trial by petit jury, 535.
procedure, change of procedure. Due Process Clause of Fifth Amend-
ment re-enforced by Sixth and Seventh Amendments, 533.
SEWEBS,
compelling abutting owners to connect property with sewer, discrimina-
tion between residents and nonresidents, validity of statute, 718.
due process and equal protection not denied, 465, 788.
ordinance requiring water-closets under certain conditions, due
process not denied, 430.
Federal constituticm, due process, fundamental requisites, notice, 291.
state taxation, power to tax, residuum of taxing power, 374.
SHEBIFFS,
due process, jurisdiction, service of process, necessity, validity of judg-
ment, 315.
SHEBMAN ACT,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination, efiTect of
statutory immunity upon constitutional protection, 144.
INDEX 969
[befkbbnces are to pages]
SIXTH AMENDMENT,
Federal constitution, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, jury of 'twelve men,
right of trial by, incorporation of Alaska with United States,
123.
procedure, change of procedure, Due Process Clause of Fifth Amend-
ment re-enforced by Sixth and Seventh Amendments, 533.
right to plead, guaranty by Fifth Amendment, due process, 536.
SLAVES,
constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, meaning of "equal protection of
the law" clause, 45.
national citizenship, absence of, emphasis by Dred Scott Case, 25.
creation by Fourteenth Amendment to Federal constitution, 29.
definition in Slaughter House Cases, 228.
SLEEPING CAR COMPANIES,
vested rights, prohibition of letting down of unoccupied upper berth,
due process denied, 483.
SMALLPOX,
see Health.
SMOKE,
nuisances, abatement of smoke nuisances, equal protection not denied,
757,
legislation declaring emission of dense smoke a nuisance, due
process not denied, 438.
SMUGGLING,
definition, 231.
STAMP ACTS,
taxation, stock transfer tax, validity, 634.
STAMPS,
see Tbading Stamps.
STATES,
claims, limitation statutes, right to enact retroactive laws, vested rights,
522.
colonies, transformation into sovereign states, 337.
constitutions of various states,
eminent domain, due process, duty of state to guarantee protection
to life, liberty and property, 379.
limitation by Due Process Clause, 209.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, colored race, right to mixed
juries, 597.
970 INDEX
[smUNOU AMM TO PAOIS]
STATES— «ontinoed.
eonstitutionB— -«o]itintted.
Magna CU'ta, clutpter 39 as reproduced in first state constitu-
tions, 13.
eonstmctiony error of Coke 's construction, change of principles
in bills of rights, 12.
self-incrimination^ exemption in bills of rights and state constitu-
tions, 10.
Tested rights, contracts, impairment of obligation by state law pro-
hibited, 449.
contracts,
freedom of contract, crime for person to act as railway condnetor
without certain qualifications, freedom not abridged, 508.
right of state to regulate combinations and monopolies, 494.
state law preventing miners from contracting for wages on
certain basis, freedom not infringed, 497.
state regulations of boards of trade, freedom not interfered
with, 503.
impairment of obligation by state law prohibited, 449.
allowance of passage of retrospectiTe state legislation, neo^a-
sity of Fourteenth Amendment, 452.
contract clause limited to vested ri^ts that arise out of it,
450.
corporations, condemnation of outstanding shares of owner of stock
without denial of due process, 463.
state control of corporations, 696.
courts, diif erent courts in same state, power of state to establish, Four-
teenth Amendment does not restrict, 820.
criminal law, modification of procedure, power of state, 541.
query as to existence of restraints upon powers, 573.
struggle to leave power of states untrammeled, 543.
deposits in savings banks unclaimed for thirty years, state control,
bank not deprived of due process, 469.
due process of law,
common heritage of all states, 270.
fundamental requisites, jurisdiction, 310.
state statutes and constitutions, construction by state courts to
be considered, 382.
state taxation, Federal supervision, right to review, necessity that
taxation be spoliation, 384.
vested rights, effect of Fourteenth Amendment, prohibition of
arbitrary interference with rights, 452.
eminent domain,
compensation for taking property, necessity, 217.
definition, power vested in all states, Federal as weU as single, 207.
due process, duty of state to guarantee protection to life, liberty
and properly, 379.
INDEX 971
[siriEINGIS ABI TO FAQIS]
STATES— continued.
eminent domain— eontinued.
Federal superyiedon, 377.
substance and not form to be eonsidered, 380.
inherent power of states, 378.
power as vested in Federal Government paramount, 208.
public use, ascertainment by idtimate and not by proximate effect,
389.
state definitions of public use to be respected, due process, 385.
taking private property, extension of spur track for benefit of
eing^ industry, taking not unlawful, 392.
necessity justifying taking, 215.
what constitutes, flooding of land not a taking, 386.
no taking for public use, 387.
Federal constitution,
Amendments to Federal Constitution, first eight articles, 19.
limitations on Federal powers, 60.
Fifth Amendment, constitution of parent state, right of colonists
to participate in, 116.
construction, questions of state procedure not embraced, 89.
Due Process Clause, limitation on Federal power to tax dis-
pensing agents of state, 143.
Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, protection of national
citizenship against state action, 244.
protection against unlawful or unequal exercise of state power,
241.
purpose, Congress as protecting and enforcing body, 266.
right to review state action, 380.
scope of section, definition of citizenship, 228.
Supreme Court of the United States as- supervising tribunal,
257.
foreign corporations, admission, state restrictions, equal protection, 708.
grand jury, abolition, power of state, 544.
national citizenship, definition in Slaughter House Cases, 228.
existence, inquiry in Dred Scott Case, 227.
navigable waters. Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, taking
private property, power of Congress, 177.
ofSeers, corporations, statute appointing state auditor to accept service
of process, equal protection not denied, 702.
patented articles, state regulation of sale, equal protection not denied,
782.
police power of states,
delegation to municipalities, 400.
due process, prevention of diversion of waters, due process not
denied, 421.
extent, promotion of public convenience, 419.
limitations, vested rights as limitation, 403.
972 INDEX
[nriBEMClS ASI TO EAdS]
STATES— eontinQed.
police power of etatee— continued.
origin of state police power, English origin, 395.
state* police power and due process, chapter X, 395.
typical English state in America, 396.
procedure, change of procedure^ change under either Federal or state
law must not deny fundamental rights, 532.
right of state to regulate its procedure, 458.
property elassiflcations, power of state, discriminalion, vested rights,
464.
property of absentees, right of state to take away, not denial of due
process, 471.
railways, legislative control, railway fare and rates, effect of Equal
Protection Clause, 650. '
vested rights, spur track for public use, initial cost may be im-
posed upon single industry, due process not denied, 476.
reorganisation of co-operative association without consent of members,
power of state, 464.
self-incrimination, Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, state need
not accord protection, 165.
taxes, see Taxation.
power of taxation, chapter XYIII, 611.
power of taxation, and due process, chapter viii, 336.
vested rights, development of idea, advancement by constitutional limi-
tations on legislative power, 445.
right of state to enact curative legislation, 457.
taxation, township compelled to collect taxes for drain, due process
not denied, 470.
water, statute prohibiting diversion of water beyond state by riparian
owner, due process and equal protection not denied, 784.
STATUTES,
banks, guaranty fund, constitutional exercise of police power as to
depositors' fund, 433.
creation as valid exercise of police power, 425.
classification,
aliens, prohibition of possession of firearms, equal protection not
denied, 792.
anti-trust laws, statute permitting combinations among purchasers,
equal protection not denied, 748.
assault, classification of prisoners committing assaults, equal pro-
tection not denied, 837.
attachment, property of nonresidents, statute not requiring bond,
equal protection not denied, 711.
auctions, licenses, discrimination in fee, equal protection not
denied, 744.
INDEX 973
[bitxbxnobs abx to pages]
STATUTES— continuecL
dassification — continued.
banks, savings bank deposits undaimed, statute as to control of
funds, eqaal protection not denied, 741.
bridges, classification of municipal corporations, requiring certain
towns to maintain bridge and highway, equal protection not
denied, 768.
building restrictions, discrimination in regulations, equal protection
not denied, 734.
carriers, payment of claims, imposition of penalties for failure to
pay, equal protection not denied, 809.
corporations, evidence, statute requiring corporations alone to pro-
duce books and papers, equal protection not denied, 730.
forfeiture of charter, failure to file afidavit of innocence not
required of individuals, anti-trust law, equal protection
not denied, 706.
procedure against corporations, difference in mode of 'pro-
cedure, anti-trust law, equal protection not denied, 836.
criminal law, appeal by government, equal protection not denied,
837.
punishment of habitual criminals, equal protection not denied,
839.
elections, registration law, discrimination between citizens, equal
protection not denied, 726.
elevators, statute requiring barriers of shafts, equal protection not
denied, 790.
equal protection, arbitrary classification, creation of presumption
of guilt, equal protection denied, 758.
power of classification, chapter XXI, 725.
food, prohibition of sale of preservatives containing boric acid,
equal protection not denied, 747.
futures, statute preventing dealing in futures, equal protection not
denied, 777.
insurance, company connected with tariff association, penalty im-
posed, equal protection not denied, 738.
, farmers' mutual insurance companies, exemption from statute
regulating fire insurance rates, equal protection not
denied, 705*
payment of elidms, statute imposing attorneys ' fees anc> penal-
ties, failure to pay, equal protection denied, 805.
statute applicable to fire insurance companies only, equal pro-
tection not denied, 697.
statute as to effect of false answers by applicant for life in-
surance, equal protection not denied, 698.
jury, statute abridging right of trial by jury, equal protection not
denied, 829.
974 INDEX
[smBBNCIS ABS TO PAGIS]
STATTFTES— continued.
clAflflifieation— continued.
man dam ua, allowance of attOTneys' fees to Buccessful plaintiff,
equal protection not denied, 808.
maater and servant, Eight-Hour Law, women employed in hotels,
validity of statutes, 798.
prohibition of 'employment of minors, hazardous occupations,
equal protection not denied, 792.
regulations, requiring washhouses for coal miners, due process
and equal protection not denied, 751.
wages, prohibition of orders for payment of labor not re-
deemable in money, equal protection not denied, 749.
milk, sale of adulterated milk, discrimination against nonproduc-
ing vendors, equal protection not denied, 729.
mineral waters, prohibition of waste, due process and equal pro-
tection not denied, 739.
mines, classification of coal mines by number of men employed,
statute as to wages of employees, equal protection not
denied, 731.
inspection of coal mines, classification, validily of statute, 771.
statute requiring entries in coal mines, equal protection not
denied, 791.
municipal corporations, annexation of land, discrimination between
agricultural and other lands, due process and equal protec-
tion not denied, 725.
mobs and riots, statute imposing liability for damages, equal
protection not denied, 742.
patented articles, state regulation of sale, equal protection not
denied, 782.
physicians, registration, exemption of practicing physicians, equal
protection not denied, 735.
police power of state, equal protection, regulations of public laun-
dries and washhouses, 760.
railways, demurrage cases, discrimination between carrier and
shipper as to attorneys' fees, statute rendered invalid, 692.
employees, statute requiring full train crew, equal protection
not denied, 681.
Federal Employers' Liability Act, due process and qqual pro-
tection not denied, 685.
fellow servant act, abolition of fellow servant rule, equal pro-
tection not denied, 684.
classification of railway employees, equal protection not
denied, 680.
fire caused by locomotives, liability for damages, equal pro-
tection not denied, 668.
payment of claims, statute imposing attorneys' fees and penal-
ties, failure to pay, equal protection denied, 803.
INDEX 976
[bIFEBXNCES ABE TO FAOIS]
STATTJTES— continued.
dasBification — continued.
property, valuation and taxation of, equal protection not
denied, 652.
rates, elaasifieation for regulation, equal protection not denied,
687.
regulations, heating of railroad cars, statute excluding certain
railways, equal protection not denied, 664.
requiring electric headlights on locomotiyes, equal protec-
tion not denied, 689.
taxation, tax on foreign companies, due process and equal pro>
tection not denied, 691.
sales in bulk, regulation, record of notice to sell, equal protection
not denied, 785.
sewers, compelling abutting owners to connect property with sewer,
discrimination between residents and nonresidents, validity
of statute, 718.
stock, sale on margin, statute prohibiting, equal protection not
denied, 773.
stock-yards companies, statute limiting charges, equal protection
denied, 814.
taxation, classification in proceedings, power of state, equal pro-
tection not denied, 825.
corporations, discrimination against dealers, articles manufac;
tured from produce of another state, not discrimination,
700.
discrimination in taxes, denial of equal protection, 620.
excise tax on gross earnings of railway companies, equal pro-
tection not denied, 645.
express companies, property, state taxation of, equal protec-
tion, 613, 614.
foreign corporations, tax on franchise of foreign company,
equal protection denied, 721.
foreign railroads, tax on stock, equal protection not denied,
714.
forfeiture for nonpayment of taxes, equal protection not
denied, 637.
inheritance tax, validity, equal protection not deniect classifi-
cation, 630.
equal protection not denied by Illinois law, 624.
legacy and inheritance taxes, equal protection, 615.
license tax on emigrant agents, equal protection of the law,
622.
municipal Hcense fees for theaters, grading fee according to
receipts, equal protection not denied, 641.
occupation tax, distillers, equal protection not denied, 636.
976 INDEX
[bxrbincbs aki to paobs]
STATUTES— continued,
classification — continued.
penalty for nonpayment of taxes, equal protection and due
process, 617.
sales for future delivery, equal protection not denied, 638.
spirits in bond, tax on, equal protection not denied, 635.
state tax law as to banlu, equal proteclioni constitutionality
of statute, 618.
street railways, tax on, equal protection not denied, 627.
tax on cigarette selling, equal protection not denied, 625.
tax on local managers of foreign packing houses, equal pro-
tection not denied, 716.
telegraph companies, state regulations, prohibiting limiting of lia-
bility for negligence, equal protection not denied, 704.
telephone companies, classification for taxation, exemption of cer-
tain property, equal protection not denied, 747.
usury, exemption of banks, trust companies and bona fide mort-
gages, equal protection not denied, 736.
vested rights, carriers, maximum intrastate rates, confiscation and
denial of due process, 484.
warehouses, licenses, classification of elevators and warehouses,
equal protection not denied, 727.
Workmen's Ck)mpensation Act, equal protection not denied, 795.
construction, eminent domain, decision of state court as to different
procedure, payment of compensatioUi equal protection not denied,
828.
contracts, freedom of contract, license tax on merchants using profit
sharing coupons and trading stamps, freedom not infringed, 517.
impairment, allowance of passage of retrospective state legislation,
necessity of Fourteenth Amendment, 452.
criminal law, statutes operating on all alike, equal protection neces-
sary, 823.
due process, fundamental requisites, generality and equality of laws,
297.
guaranty in American law, 255.
jurisdiction, divorce proceedings, not in rem or in personam, 323.
notable attempts to define due process, 274.
notice as fundamental requisite, 286.
state statutes and constitutions, construction by state courts to be
considered, 382.
Webster's famous definition, 58.
eminent domain, compensation for taking property, necessity, 217.
question a judicial one, necessity of competent tribunal, 219.
laches, right of Congress to legislate against, 221.
public use, ascertainment by ultimate and not by proximate effect,
389.
right of legislature to determine what is public use, 212.
INDEX 977
[bsfxbencxs abb to pagbs]
STATUTES — continued.
eminent domain— continued.
state power of eminent domain. Federal superyision, due process^
substance and not form to be considered, 380.
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, jury, discrimination against citi-
zens of African descent, setting aside jury panel, 603.
statutes excluding jurors on account of race or color, 602.
ex post facto laws, limitation statutes, right to enact retroactive laws,
vested rights, 522.
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, conflict of state law with state
constitution, jurisdiction of Federal courts, 64.
self-incrimination, effect of statutory immunity upon constitu-
tional protection, 144.
taking private property, statute compelling raOroad to pro-
vide means for passing water under embankments, 180.
Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, proteclion of national
citizenship against state action, 244.
jurisdiction to review judgment of highest court of state in"" criminal
case, first ten amendments as Ibnitations upon Federal govern-
ment, 82.
limitation statutes, constitutional limitations of reasonableness, 520.
Magna Carta, chapter 39 in American law, wider scope of chapter, 15.
master and servant, assignments of future earnings, regulations, ex-
emption of banks, equal protection not denied, 742.
police power, carriers, reasonableness of rates, delegation of legisla-
tive power, 411.
due process, recent eases, 416.
elements involved, 413.
fixing of certain absolute liabilities, due process not denied, 440.
life insurance, exclusion of suicide as defense in action on policy,
420.
limitations, reasonableness as limitation, 401.
statute regulating barrier pillars between adjoining coal proper-
ties, due process not denied, 432.
statute requiring hotel keepers to give notice to guests in case of
fire, due process not denied, 437.
procedure, change of pirocedure, change under either Federal or <9tate
law must not deny fundamental rights, 532.
remedies, change of remedies, power of legislature, 526.
qualifications, 527.
repeals, property, vested rights, protection by Due Process Clause,
repeal of remedy, 390.
vested rights, rights below standard of vested rights, 456.
retrospective laws, due process, vested rights, effect of Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibition of arbitrary interference with rightS|
452.
Due Process — 62
978 INDEX
[UBflUNCSB ABM TO PAfflW]
8TATXTTE8— eontinned.
retrospeetive Umb — eontinaed.
Umitatioii etAtuteB, right to enaet retroaetiTO laws, Tested righto,
62L
Twted rigfatSy an laws impairing Tested rights within scope of
doe proeessy 459.
■peeial law, raJlwaTS, fellow serrant statute, liabflitj to emplojree for
negligenee, equal protection not denied, 653, 654.
taxation, state taxation, power to tax, legislatnre may act direetlj or
may delegate functions, 356.
purpose, taxation must be for pnblie purpose, 352.
Taliditj of statutes, Federal constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, pur-
pose. Congress as protecting and enforcing body, 269.
Tested rights, contracts, impairment of obligation by state law pro-
hibited, 449.
contract clause limited to Tested rights that arise out of it,
450.
dcTelopment of idea, advancement by constitutional limitations on
legislative power, 445.
growth in England of idea, 443.
impairment, redress under Due Process Clause, application of rule
of inclusion and exclusion, 461.
policy of legislation, no Tested rights in general rules of law or
policy, 458.
property dassilicationa, power of state, discrimination, 464.
right of state to enact euratiTO legislation, 457.
futures, statute prerenting dealing in futures, equal protection not
denied, 777.
sale on margin, statute prohibiting, equal protection not denied, 773.
taxation, classification, sales for future deliTOfy, equal protection nst
denied, 638.
8TOCK-YABDS,
statute limiting charges, equal protection denied, 814.
8TBEET RAILWAYS,
orders requiring safety appliance at grade crossings, Talidity, due
process and equal protection not denied, 673.
ordinance as to speed of trains, exceptions, equal protection not denied,
670.
, rates, classification for regulation, equal protection not denied, 687.
tax on special franchises, equal protection not denied to street rail-
way companies, 628.
tax on street railways, equal protection not denied, 627.
INDEX 979
[BIRBBNOIS abb to PAGB8]
SUICIDE,
police power, life insurance, exclusion of suicide as defense in action
on policy, 420.
TAEIPT,
Insular Tariff Cases, Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, constitu-
tion of parent state, right of colonists to participate, 116.
TAXATION,
see LiCENSBS, Pubuo Impbovbmbnts.
ad valorem tax, state taxation, due process, notice and hearing in tax
proceedings, 366.
capital of foreign corporation, tax on, equal protection not denied, 708.
dassiflcation, due process, fundamental requisites generality and equal-
ity of laws, 305.
sales for future delivery, equal protection not denied, 638.
classification in proceedings, power of state, equal protection not denied,
825.
collection of taxes, summary proceedings, 361.
colonies, extension of parliamentary control, taxation, 337.
tasdng power of Imperial Parliament, 336.
transformation into sovereign states, 337.
consolidated railway company, annual franchise tax on, statute not in-
vaUd, 648.
contracts, freedom of contract subject to sovereign powers of state,
493.
corporations, discrimination against dealers, articles manufactured from
produce of another state, not discrimination, 700.
Due Process Clause, Corporation Tax Act, limiting deductions held
not invalid, 180.
equal protection of the law, 623.
tax on corporate franchises, equal protection, 626.
tax on corporate securities, Equal Protection of the Law Clause,
612.
taxation of nonresident stockholders, equal protection not denied,
713.
unequal assessment of franchises and other property, denial of
due process and equal protection, 702.
deposits in national banks, tax on, equal protection not denied, 642.
discrimination in taxes, denial of equal protection, 620.
districts, creation by legislature by arbitrary action, denial of due
process, 488.
due process, definition, difficulties in way of complete and authorita-
tive definition, rule of inclusive and exclusive, 284.
fundamental requisites, hearing, 292.
notable attempts to define due process, 280.
980 INDEX
[umtHOIS All TO PAOIS]
TAXATION— eontinned.
ezeite tax baaed on groM tonnage npon nse of foreign built pteasnre
jaehtsy Fifth Amendment, dne proeeae, 171.
ezciae tax on eorporations, natore, 639.
ezeiee tax on grooe earninga of raUway companie8| equal protection
not denied, 645.
exemptiona, veated righta, what eonatitutea, 455.
expreaa eompaniea, property, atate taxation of, equal proteetion^ ^4.
tax on buaineaa of expreaa eompany. Equal Protection of the Law
Glanae, 613.
Federal eonatitution. Fifth Amendment, Due Proeeaa Clauae, eonstita-
tionality of oleomargarine tax, 140.
limitation on Federal power to tax diapenaing agenta of state,
143.
not limitation on taxing power, income tax, 181.
foreign corporationa, exeiae tax on, equal protection not denied, 720.
tax on f ranchiae of foreign company, equal protection denied, 721.
foreign railroada, tax on atock, equal protection not denied, 714.
forfeiture for nonpayment of taxea, equal protection not denied, 637.
income tax on mining eompaniea, equal protection and due proeeaa not
denied, 625.
inheritance taxea) equal protection not denied by Ulinoia law, 624, 630.
New York inheritance-tax law doea not Tiolate Fourteoith Amend-
ment, 624.
inheritance taxea on bequeats of peraonalty, validity, equal protection
not denied, 629, 632.
interatate citizenahip, development by aecond Federal Constitution, 225.
legacy and inheritance taxea, equal protection, 615.
limitationa, constitutional limitationa an American invention, 338.
membership in incorporated chamber of commerce, tax on, equal pro-
tection not denied, 646.
mineral rights, tax on, equal protection not denied, 643.
mortgagee's interest in land, tax on, equal protection, 618.
payment, appeal to Commiaaioner of Internal Revenue after payment of
taxes. Fifth Amendment, due process, 182.
nonpayment of taxea, forfeiture of land, equal protection, 619.
penalty for nonpayment of taxea, equal protection and due proeeaa,
617.
penalties, discrimination between county and city in diapoaition of
penalties, due proeeaa and equal protection not denied, 752.
power of taxation, chapter AVill, 611.
purpose, railways, taxation, asseaament to meet expenses of atate rail-
road commission, validity, 657.
railways, aaaeaament of omitted property, equal protection not denied,
670.
INDEX 981
[BEFIBINOBS ABE TO PAGBS]
TAXATION— continued,
railways— continued.
foreign companiesi tax on^ due process and equal protection not
denied, 691.
property, valuation and taxation of, equal protection not denied,
652.
tax on property in each county, equal protection not denied, 658.
eavings banks, tax on, equal protection not denied, 644.
shares of foreign corporations owned by residents, tax on, equal pro-
tection not denied, 720.
special franchises, tax on, equal protection not denied to street rail-
way companies, 628.
state taxation,
banks, state tax law as to, equal protection, constitutionality of
statute, 618.
corporate property situated in several states, power to tax, 342.
due process, notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 364.
exemptions, strict construction of exemptions, 349.
Federal supervision, right to review, necessity that taxation be
spoliation, 384.
limitations, nature and extent, exemption of governmental agencies,
339.
personal properly, taxation of intangible personal property, 347.
taxation of tangible personal property, 344.
power of taxation and due process, chapter VIII, 336.
power to tax, legislature may act directly or may delegate func-
tions, 356.
property within state jurisdiction, 341.
residuum of taxing power, 371.
purpose, taxation must be for public purpose, 352.
state tax laws, constitutionality, 611.
statute imposing annual franchise tax, on consolidated railway
corporation, due process not denied, 343.
taking property for public use^ compensation required by Due
Process Clause, 358.
stock transfer tax, validity, 634.
street railways, tax on, equal protection not denied, 627.
struggle for charters, reigns of Bichard I and John, 2.
taking private property. Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, Due
Process Clause, review of cases and criticism of decisions, 187.
telephone companies, classification for taxation, exemption of certain
property, equal protection not denied, 747.
titles, statute as to notice to original owners to cut off redemption, due
process and equal protection not denied, 821.
transfers inter vivos, tax on, equal protection not denied, 640.
vested rights, all laws impairing vested rights within scope of due
process, 459.
982 INDEX
[umXNClS ABS TO FAfils]
TAXATION-HSontiBQed.
vested rights— oontmned.
growth in Engliud of ides, 443.
•tate tax on groee earnings of railroads, not eonliseation, 480.
taxation without jnrisdietion, denial of dae process, 487.
township compelled to collect taxes for drain, due process not
denied, 470.
TELEOBAPH COMPANIES,
eminent domain, taking private propertj, kind of property which may
be taken, 218.
state regulation, prohibiting limiting of liability for negligence, eqoal
protection not denied, 704.
taxation, penalty for nonpayment of taxeS| equal protection and doe
process, 017.
TELEPHONE COMPANIES,
rates, municipal regulation, equal protection not denied, 818.
police power, reasonableness of rates, due process, recent eases, 416.
taxation, elassiflcation, exemption of certain property, eqoal protection
not denied, 747.
TEBRITOBIE8,
Federal conslitution, due process, right to due process in unincorporated
territory, 237.
THEATERS AND SHOWS,
amusements, regulation of admission to places of public amusement,
equal protection not denied, 779.
municipal license fees for theaters, grading fee according to receipts,
equal protection not denied, 641.
state regulations of foreign corporations, theaters, equal protection not
denied, 698.
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT,
Equal Protection of the Law CSlanse purely American invention, 595.
TOBAOCO,
cigarettes, license for sale, doe process and equal protection not denied,
769.
equal protection not denied, 625.
notice and hearing in tax proceedings, 367.
TOWNS AND TOWNSHIPS,
bridges, classification of municipal corporations, requiring certain towns
to maintain bridge and highway, equal protection not denied,
768.
taxation, township compelled to collect taxes for drain, due process not
denied, 470.
INDEX 983
[nriBEMCBS AEX TO PAGBS]
TBABE UNIONS,
eontraeta, master and serrant, employment at will of parties not em-
ployment at will of others, 514.
statute inflicting penalties on employer where certain conditions
are imposed on employee, denial of due process, 435.
freedom of contract denied, 512.
TBADING STAMPS,
police power, license tax on profit sharing coupons and trading stamps,
due process not denied, 440.
equal protection not denied, 647.
freedom of contract not infringed, 517.
TBEATIES,
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, constitution of parent state,
right of colonists to participate in, 116.
construction of Fifth Amendment, confiscation of property, 73.
right of sovereign to deport foreigners already domiciled, 93.
Indians, power of Congress not limited, 111.
TBIAL,
contempt, nunishment, power to punish inherent in all courts, 578.
what constitutes, direct contempt committed in presence of court,
580.
criminal law, accusation of felony, necessity of presence of accused,
privilege not to be waived, 538.
right of accused to be present in state court, 556.
presence at trial and rendition of verdict, habeas corpus, 567,
569.
TUBERCULOSIS,
see HXALTH.
TUBNPJKE8,
regulation of charges, equal protection not denied, 814.
U
UNITED STATES,
due process, common heritage of all states, 270.
guaranty in American law, 251.
Supreme Court of the United States as supervising tribunal, Four-
teenth Amendment, 257.
eminent domain, compensation for taking property, necessity, 217.
definition, power vested in all states Federal as well as single, 207.
power as vested in Federal government paramount, 208.
public use, right to determine what is public use, 212.
taking must be for public use, 211.
taking private property, necessity justifying taking, 215.
what constitutes taking, 213.
984 INDEX
[umXNCIS ABS TO PAfils]
UNITED STATES— eoBtinned
Federal constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, protection agminrt un-
lawful or unequal exercise of state power, 241.
scope of section, definition of citizenship, 228.
national citizenship, definition in Slaughter House Cases, 228.
existence, inquiry in Bred Scott Case, 227.
procedure, change of procedure, change under either Federal or state
law must not denj fundamental rights, 532.
UNIVEBSITIE8,
see Schools.
USURY,
exemption of banks, trust companiea and bona fide mortgages, equal
protection not denied, 736.
limitation statutes, right to enact retroactive laws, vested rights, 522.
remedies, change of remedies, power of legislature, qualifications, 529.
VALUE,
eminent domain, compensation for property taken, rule for aseertain-
ing value, 391. *
matters to be excluded, proceeding to recover for decline in market
value, 393.
police power, carriers, reasonableness of rates, elements involved, 413.
railroad property, valuation and taxation of, equal protection not
denied, 652.
VEHICLES,
advertisement, prohibition of advertising wagons on city streets, equal
protection not denied, 740.
due process not denied, 426.
motor vehicles, state regulation, service of process on nonresidents,
validity of statute, 819.
VENDOR AND PUBCHASEB,
contracts for sale of land, statute regulating cancellation, equal pro-
tection not denied, 743.
VENUE,
change of venue, local prejudice, equal protection not denied, 832.
VERDICTS,
criminal law, verdict, refusal to »et aside verdict, insanity of juror, 552.
rendition of verdict, right of accused to be present in state court,
556.
right to be present at trial and rendition of verdict, habeas
corpus, 567, 569.
INDEX 985
[bifesences aei to packs]
VESSELS,
Federal consiltation, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, excise tax
based on gross tonnage upon use of foreign built pleasure
yachts, 171.
harbors, taking private property, power of Congress, Fifth Amendment,
177.
W
WAIVEB,
criminal law, accusation of felony, necessity of presence of accused,
privilege not to be waived, 538.
jurisdiction, notice, curing lack of notice or service of process by
appearance, 316.
WAR,
amendment to Federal constitution, text of Fifth Amendment, 55.
due process, jurisdiction, proceedings in rem, 321.
Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, construction, confiscation of
property, 73.
construction as to persons subject to military law, 95.
construction in case involving military tria] and service, triumph
of legality, 65.
early cases construing, 56.
WAB DBPABTMENT,
contempt, punishment, consequences of lack of jurisdiction, 588.
WABEHOITSES,
elevators, regulation of charges, validity of statute, 812.
licenses, classification of elevators and warehouses, equal protection not
denied, 727.
police power, property or business of public interest, 407.
taxation, spirits in bond, tax on, equal protection not denied, 635.
WASTE,
mineral waters, prohibition of waste, due process and equal protection
not denied, 739.
WATEB-CLOSETS,
see HxAi/FH.
WATEB8 AND WATER COUBSES,
see Drainage, Navigable Waters, Biparian Owners.
companies, property of private water company, taking by municipal
corporation, due process not denied, 473.
equal protection not denied, 791.
establishment of competing plant by city, Fourteenth Amend-
ment not violated, 746.
986 INDEX
[RXraRXKCXS AEX TO PAOXS]
WATERS AND WATEB COXJBSES— eontinued.
eoBBtniction of revetments, injury to riparian rights, Fifth Amend-
ment, taking of property, 127.
dams, Federal constitution. Fifth Amendment, eonatruetion, right of
eminent domain, 74.
diversion of waters,
police power, due process, prevention of diversion of waters, due
process not denied, 421.
statute prohibiting diversion of water beyond state by riparian
owner, due process and equal protection not denied, 784.
eiAinent domain in District of Columbia, right, Fifth Amendment, con-
struction, 87.
eminent domain, taking private property, due process, mistake of law,
391.
kind of property which may be taken, 218.
what constitutes taking, 213.
mineral waters, prohibition of waste, due process and equal protection
not denied, 739.
restraint on land owner drawing unnatural quantities of mineral
water from common source of supply, due x>rocess not denied,
467.
WEAPONS,
aliens, prohibition of possession of firearms, equal protection not
denied, 792.
game, prohibition of killing of birds or animals by unnaturalized
foreign-bom residents, due process not denied, 479.
WEEDS,
railways, discrimination against railways, penalties imposed for allow-
ing weeds, equal protection not denied, 674.
statute requiring railways to remove noxious weeds, equal pro*
tection not denied, 694.
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES,
lard, regulation of net weight of packages, equal protection not denied,
758.
police power, ordinance regulating size of loaves of bread, due process
not denied, 429.
freedom of contract, not interfered with, 505.
WHARVES,
Federal constitution, Fifth Amendment, navigable waters, taking
private property, power of Congress, 177.
police power, property or business of publie interest, 407.
INDEX 987
[SXrEBZNCSS ABX TO PAOBS]
WITNESSES,
Federal ecmstitution. Fifth Amendment, eonstruction, qaestions of state
proeedore not embraced, 89.
light of sovereign to deport foreigners already domiciled, 94.
interstate commerce,
immonitj of witnesses under Interstate Commerce Act of 1893,
application to state and Federal courts, 96.
obstruction of justice, contempt, right to notice and hearing, indirect
or civil contempt^ 585.
self-incrimination,
crime committed within military reservation, 159.
eriminal procedure, exemption from self-incrimination in state
courts, due process not denied, 650.
modification of procedure, struggle to leave power of states
untrammeled, 543.
due process, vested rights. Fifth Amendment developing idea of
vested rights, 451.
exemption in bills of rights and state eonstitutioDs, 10.
Federal constitution, due process of law as embodied in Fifth
Amendment, 21.
Fifth Amendment^ construction in favor of refusal to tes-
tify, 84.
conviction without indictment, prisoner compelled to tes-
tify against himself, 145.
due process, admission of evidence illegally obtained, 131.
effect of statutory immunity upon constitutional protec-
tion, 144.
exemption not fundamental right of national citizenship,
153.
immunity based on Act of 1903, Anti-Trust Act, 166.
kinship with Fourth Amendment, 79.
privilege invoked by officer of corporation, 162.
state need not accord protection, 165.
Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, protection of
national citizenship against stat« action, 247.
taxation, state taxation, due process, notice and hearing in tax pro-
ceedings, 370.
WOMEN,
Equal Protection of the Law Clause, attorneys, right of women to
practice law in state courts, 608.
master and servant,
contracts, freedom of contract, not infringed by statutes regu-
lating employment of women, 516.
due process not infringed by limitation on hours of labor, 421.
Eight-Hour Law, women employed in hotels, validity of statutes,
798.
988 INDEX
[timnfois AU TO paoes]
WOMEN— ^ontinnod.
BiAstar and senrant^-eoiitiniied.
Ten-Hour Iaw, forbidding emplqjment of children or women,
freedom of eontraet not inf ringed, 609.
t<Tatioti, dieerimination in lieenae tax, e^pal protoetion not denied. Ml.
WOBKMEN'8 OOMPENSATION ACT,
equal proteetion not denied, 757, 79&
■PATDUd
1^ PraoMt ormv Md ««•
iiiP*
3 6105 043 024 633
B UNIVERSfTY LAVf UBMit